Ibn Khaldūn and Chomsky on Language:
A Comparison[1]

Ghiath El-Marzouk
University of Southern Denmark

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to shed a new light on some of the facets of Ibn Khaldūn's quite obscure theorization on language, facets which seem to be well comparable with their conceptual counterparts within the framework of Chomsky's theorization on the same phenomenon. Thus, for drawing the intended comparison between the two figures, these facets concern such conceptual issues as 'language dichotomization,' 'language internalization,' and 'language externalization,' specifically. Hence, a number of concrete examples as actually used by either figure in his native language are cited and analyzed in empirical corroboration of the comparative study. Given the historical interlude which separates Ibn Khaldūn's society from Chomsky's society (over six centuries), the remarkable intellectual similitude that is discernible from this comparative study manifests itself as one indication of the fact that no barrier can impede the confluence of ideas, be they as they may, regardless of any actual or potential 'difference' between such imaginary constructs as East and West.

Keywords: Chomsky, de Saussure, Ibn Khaldūn, language theorization, linguistic competence, linguistic performance

Introduction

Unlike most of the methodological frameworks that have been implemented within the fields of sociology, political science and comparative cultural studies, in particular, the present study does not look at the significant question of "The Intellectual Encounter between the East and the West" from a purely empiricist perspective as such, a perspective whereby even the uninitiated outsider would refuse to take this question for granted unless certain 'historical' conditions of worldly experience are met. Instead, the present study attempts to view the same question from a merely rationalist standpoint in essence, a standpoint which substantiates the intellectual encounter under consideration trans-historically by reference to the unnoticed symmetry between given systems of thought, irrespective of any 'historical' conditions of worldly experience. In this connection, I have chosen an 'Eastern' thinker and a 'Western' thinker as no more than two empirical representatives of one such system of thought so far as human language is concerned—notwithstanding the fact that the chosen 'Eastern' thinker was not primarily a unique linguist. Put as simply as possible, from the outset, the perceived intellectual tale may be told (or, rather, pre-told) in the following way:

> *Once upon a time there was a linguist named Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), from Switzerland, who did emphasize the social dimension of language when he founded a trend in linguistics called structuralism; there was another linguist named Noam Chomsky (b. 1928), from the United States, who did not deny the social dimension of language, but studied its mental dimension in massive detail when he adopted an approach to linguistics known as universal grammar; and on the other side of the globe, there was a further someone named Abd-ul-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), from Tunisia, who was not a linguist of the caliber of the other two, but he wrote something about language and formulated a system of thought which proves to be still alive compared with the most influential system of thought formulated by Noam Chomsky.*

It should be noted here, however, that this comparison is not to be viewed as if it were a form of romantic association falling into the clutches of nostalgic reminiscences of a 'beautiful' past. The intended comparison is a serious attempt to demonstrate with conclusive evidence that there *is* a remarkable harmony between given extraordinary minds (wherever they were born) on human language, an harmony that may well be reconstructed as a set of worthy arguments against all kinds of religiously fanatic groups or politically rank institutions whose

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'harmonious' survival, so it appears, cannot but be contingent upon that deliberate and premeditated discrimination between such chimerical constructs as East and West.

Within the last part of his monumental work المقدّمة *Prolegomena* (also transliterated as *al-Muqaddimah*), Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406) authored a number of chapters on the nature of speech and its problems, which may now be entitled *A Prolegomenon to Language*, and may therefore be considered a specialized scientific treatise in its own right. Although it does raise questions that are germane to contemporary thinking about language in general, the treatise does not seem to have received sufficient and serious attention in any of the sub-fields of comparative linguistics specifically. For this reason, an attempt is made in the present study to fill in the consequential gap by drawing on some of the guiding conceptual threads of current linguistic theory, as will be seen in the upcoming sections. The twentieth-century historian Arnold Toynbee once described Ibn Khaldūn's *Prolegomena* as "the greatest work of its kind that has ever yet been created by any mind in any time or place" (Toynbee 1935:322), a description which even those unlike-minded historians who launched severe attacks against Toynbee's spiritualist approach to the rise and fall of civilizations (contrary to Marx's materialist approach) would undoubtedly agree to endorse. The description is, thence, referring to the person of Ibn Khaldūn as being, first and foremost, an original philosopher of history and a brilliant sociologist and political economist–to mention a few–in the modern senses of these designations. In this respect, the paramount influence that he exerted on such European intellectual figures as Vico (1668-1744), Montesquieu (1689-1755), Herder (1744-1803), etc. can neither be denied nor even contested (Schimmel 1951; Gates 1967). Despite the fact that Ibn Khaldūn was not primarily a unique linguist, as was the case with many of his medieval contemporaries and predecessors, the profound insight which he showed into a variety of enduringly significant linguistic aspects does indeed warrant the worthiness of considering his own (albeit not easily tractable) statements, especially in the light of what seems to be the most influential and authoritative linguistic theory at present (viz. universal grammar). The purpose of this study is, therefore, to highlight some of the facets of Ibn Khaldūn's quite obscure theorization on language, facets which appear to be well comparable with their conceptual counterparts within the framework of Chomsky's theorization on the same phenomenon. Given the historical interlude which separates Ibn Khaldūn's society from Chomsky's society (over six centuries), the remarkable intellectual similitude that is discernible from this comparison manifests itself as one indication of the fact that no barrier can impede the confluence of ideas, be they as they may,

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regardless of any actual or potential 'difference' between such imaginary constructs as East and West.

The present study falls into three main sections, each concerned with a pivotal conceptual issue for comparative analysis. Section 1 discusses the conceptual issue of what may be called 'language dichotomization' in order to specify which of Chomsky's postulated dichotomies (e.g., 'competence *vs*. performance,' 'I-language *vs*. E-language,' etc.) that may conceptually coincide with Ibn Khaldūn's proposed distinction between اللسان "language" (literally, "tongue") and اللغة "a language," a coincidence which will be viewed from a purely structural perspective. Section 2 explains the conceptual issue of what may be named 'language internalization,' thereby characterizing human language as a psychological/mental phenomenon according to both Chomsky and Ibn Khaldūn (as opposed to de Saussure), a characterization that brings to light the conceptual analogy between Chomsky's idea of 'linguistic competence' and Ibn Khaldūn's notion of الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty." This characterization also entails a comparative exposition of several ancillary issues, such as the concept of idealization/perfection, the nature of linguistic knowledge lurking behind competence/faculty, and the sort of mechanism (or mechanisms) underlying this knowledge. Section 3, the final section, considers the conceptual issue of what may be termed 'language externalization,' therewith identifying the nature of linguistic knowledge with its reification in the structures of actual discourse, an identification which sheds new light on the further conceptual analogy between Chomsky's idea of 'linguistic performance' and Ibn Khaldūn's notion of التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior." This identification also involves a comparative explication of particular subsidiary topics, such as, the logical priority of syntax, the concept of deviancy/nondeviancy, and the concrete instantiation of this concept. All technical details will be kept to a bare minimum for the purposes of simplicity and clarity.

1. Language Dichotomization

Before the rise of modern linguistics at the turn of the twentieth century, most of what used to be called 'philologists' appear to have endorsed the speculative theory (or theories) which attempted to explain the origin of language, as a human phenomenon, in terms of the systematically onomatopoeic relationship between the entity of the 'signifier' (or *signifiant*) and the entity of the 'signified' (or *signifié*), to use de Saussure's terminology. In refutation of all these conjectural theories, therefore, de Saussure did underline the arbitrarily nononomatopoeic nature of the relationship between the two entities, in general, since there is nothing, in the least, that can be discerned as 'piggish' or 'swinish' from the actual words

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pig or *swine*, for instance (de Saussure 1916:66f.). In short, such a refutation had led de Saussure to characterize natural language in its human incarnation as a differential system of sheer signs, where each sign represents a fortuitous bond between its concrete or sensible constituent (i.e., the signifier) and its abstract or perceptible constituent (i.e., the signified). Accordingly, de Saussure put forward his famous dichotomy *langue-parole* (roughly, "language-speech") in order to emphasize the first of the following two distinctive dimensions of natural language to the detriment of the second. At the one extreme, the nonphysical realization of *langue* comprises, in its abstract totality, all of the possible linguistic habits that have survived in a given society or speech-community. At the other extreme, the physical actualization of *parole* includes, in its concrete partiality, any observable set of linguistic acts that are produced by the individual in the same society or speech-community (de Saussure 1916:77).[2] In consequence, what de Saussure seeks to explore, within his structural-linguistic method (where there is no specific place even for the concept of 'sentence' to be incorporated into its theoretic paradigms), is in fact the 'collective unconscious' level of human language as well as the naturally determined potentiality of this phenomenon in the social or societal domain (El-Marzouk 2009a, 2009b).

Within his generative-linguistic method (where there *is* special room for the concept of 'sentence' instead), Chomsky in turn identifies natural language as a latently generative system of finite rules of whatever sort—unlike the differential system of signs in de Saussure's sense. This latently generative system enables the native speaker to perceive, and thence to produce, an infinite number of sentences that follow the finite rules themselves, even if some of these sentences have not been heard or uttered in reality (Chomsky 1957:13). For him, the fundamental objective is to highlight the psychologically individual domain of language to the detriment of its socially collective domain (in de Saussure's sense) by means of a seemingly 'introspective' notion of the derivational system which is said to operate in an

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[2] It is worthy of mention, here, that, within his 'post-structuralist' psychoanalytic method, Lacan characterizes natural language as a differential system of signifiers (rather than that of signs in de Saussure's sense). Lacan is, thereby, emphasizing the logical priority and ascendancy of the signifier over the signified so as to make a further distinction between *langue* "a language" and *langage* "language." Whereas the concrete system of *langue* embodies a sensible continuum with its particularity (e.g., Arabic, English, French, etc.), the abstract system of *langage* represents a perceptible continuum with its generality (i.e., the universal language which embraces the super-structure of all human languages). As a result, Lacan intends to introduce and, thence, to establish his new dichotomy *langage-parole* as an alternative to de Saussure's (old) dichotomy *langue-parole* for certain psychological reasons which are beyond the scope of this paper (Lacan 1966a:30f.; 1966b:197f.; El-Marzouk 2009a, 2009b). Yet, it is the gist of Lacan's distinction between *langue* and *langage* which seems to approximate that of Chomsky's distinction between 'descriptive adequacy' and 'explanatory adequacy,' respectively, with the intent of the latter distinction, in turn, approximating that of Ibn Khaldūn's distinction between اللغة "a language" and اللسان "language" (literally, "tongue"), correspondingly, as will be seen presently in the text.

intermediary sphere well below the level of consciousness.[3] It appears, therefore, that this derivational system manifests itself as an internalized ordinance whose mental reality is explained *a priori* in terms of what is known as 'universal grammar' (UG), an *a priori* explanation which underlines the givenness or innateness of UG (rather than its acquiredness). Nevertheless, such an internalized ordinance is supposed to function *a posteriori* in the natural world—just as any other aspect of the human genetic endowment does, as pointed out by Chomsky (personal communication). What he intends by this explanation is to adduce the very significant hypothesis that all human languages converge in the application of a set of general principles which are dictated by the invisible core of UG. The visible periphery of UG, moreover, is accounted for in terms of particular parameters, which are no more than empirical instantiations of historical coincidences. Thus, within the first major model of UG up to the 1970s (viz. the *transformational-generative-grammar* model), the standard conception of the derivational system entailed the incorporation of two discrete levels of structural representation scanning the derivational history *per se*: firstly, the 'surface-structure' level that produces the output of the syntactic component in order to disclose the input to the phonological component; secondly, the 'deep-structure' level which yields the output of the lexical component so as to manifest the input to the semantic component (Chomsky 1965:16). Since their initial incorporation into the derivational system, these two levels of structural representation have, in fact, been the subject-matter of acrimonious polemics amongst linguists, philosophers and psychologists alike, a matter that is not to be addressed in the present study.[4]

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[3] Notice, here, that this statement does not connote the entire confinement of the derivational system to purely 'introspective' criteria from a psychologically individual perspective (as opposed to a socially collective perspective), a statement which may be somewhat misleading upon first impression. Although it is true that a great deal of research in generative linguistics is based on the native speaker's introspections (say, about structural or lexical ambiguities), the scientific orientation of such 'introspective' criteria makes it possible, where necessary, to shift to experimentation in essence—just as a great deal of research in perceptual psychology is based on the committed researcher's judgements (say, about the moon illusion or the Necker cube illusion). All of these clarificatory remarks, as well as others referred to in the text, have been pointed out by Chomsky himself (personal communication).

[4] Nonetheless, suffice it say here that the two terms 'surface structure' and 'deep structure' can never be viewed as logical terms that *were* introduced within a unique innovative contribution to modern linguistic theory, owing to the very long history that lurks behind their concepts. They even have roots in quite ancient sources such as the Sanskrit grammarian Panini (*floruit* 500 or 400 B.C.), who already employed the two terms *vibhakti* and *kaaraka* which, to a certain extent, correspond conceptually with the two terms 'surface structure' and 'deep structure,' respectively. Whereas the term *vibhakti* indicates the outer morphological (or phonological) shape of a given category, the term *kaaraka* refers to the inner semantic (or lexical) function of the same category. What is more, the theoretic principles underlying either such term were also developed by some Arabic linguists and grammarians in the Middle Ages (Gruntfest 1984) and were later implemented by other European linguists and philosophers within essentially similar theoretic paradigms (Chomsky 1965:198f., n.12; El-Marzouk 2003:8f., n.1).

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What is relevant in this context, however, is the import of the well-known dichotomy *competence-performance* which Chomsky did introduce, among other dichotomies, as being one theoretic prerequisite for the standard analysis of the derivational system. This Chomskyan dichotomy does not appear to conceptually deviate from the already introduced Saussurian dichotomy *langue-parole* at bottom, except that the mental aspect of natural language is far more emphasized than its nonmental aspect—notwithstanding the account of one essential difference between generativism and structuralism in terms of the corresponding difference between the presence and the absence of the concept of 'sentence' mentioned above (Chomsky 1965:4f.; 1972:115f.). On the one hand, the idealized representation of competence refers to the speaker's tacit knowledge of his/her native language, where the afore-said generative system of limited rules permits him/her unlimited access to general grammatical sentences (cf. the idea of 'linguistic habits' in de Saussure). On the other hand, the materialized realization of performance points to the same speaker's actual (albeit partial) implementation of that tacit knowledge, an implementation which is observable in the concrete ranges of his/her specific pragmatic utterances (cf. the notion of 'linguistic acts' in de Saussure). In fact, the theoretical basis of Chomsky's dichotomy *competence-performance* still has its effects on the analogical distinction that he later made between *I(nternalized)-language* and *E(xternalized)-language*, respectively, within the second major model of UG in the 1980s (viz. the *principles-and-parameters* model). It is, therefore, this latter intended distinction which appears to define the ultimate objective of UG along with its core and periphery. While I-language denotes an internally represented continuum in any individual and is presumed to be a property of the human mind/brain, E-language indicates an externally embodied continuum in a given society or speech-community and is assumed to be quite independent of the human mind/brain (Chomsky 1986:19f.). As a result, the ultimate objective of UG is to shed new light on the nature of language acquisition itself, so as to specify the set of core principles that are minimally applied as well as the number of cognitive orders that are 'maximally' utilized.

Given the ultimate goal of UG, there seem to exist at least two levels of theoretic adequacy which any supposedly correct linguistic theory must fully satisfy: firstly, *descriptive adequacy* that correctly describes how ramified human languages are acquired and used (whatever the degree of difficulty); secondly, *explanatory adequacy* which accurately explains why such ramified human languages have the common underlying properties they do. Needless to say, however, these two levels of theoretic adequacy are still under current consideration and reconsideration within the third major model of UG, which

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was enunciated in the 1990s –viz. the *minimalist-program* model (Chomsky 1995, 2002). This means, in other words, that the ultimate goal of UG is to address adequately the theoretical description of a particular human language (e.g., Arabic, English, French, etc.), at the one end, and to undertake adequately the theoretical explanation of the UG system as a whole (i.e., the convergent super-system which is an inherent quality of all human languages), at the other end. Accordingly, the implicit distinction that Chomsky alludes to, here, between 'a language' and 'language' is well comparable to the explicit distinction that Lacan makes between *langue* (in the particular sense) and *langage* (in the general sense), respectively, within his 'post-structuralist' psychoanalytic method, as seen earlier (see note 2). It is, therefore, this clearly analogous distinction which resonates with a quite unnoticed distinction that Ibn Khaldūn put forward between اللغة "a language" and اللسان "language" (literally, "tongue"), correspondingly, in his *A Prolegomenon to Language* referred to above. For ease of exposition, Lacan's distinction between *langue* and *langage*, which is discernible from Chomsky's distinction between *descriptive adequacy* and *explanatory adequacy*, will be employed as the direct renderings of Ibn Khaldūn's distinction between اللغة and اللسان, respectively. Consider, in this context, how Ibn Khaldūn makes explicit the distinction in question in his own words (henceforward, the relevant statements that are quoted from Ibn Khaldūn's المقدّمة [*Prolegomena*] will be referred to by the book's title followed by the page number; all cited statements are my own translations):

> Know that all *langues* ... are faculties of *langage* for expressing meanings. The adequacy or inadequacy of these [expressions] is contingent upon the perfection or imperfection of the faculty. This is not to be considered from the viewpoint of lexis, but from the viewpoint of structures. (Ibn Khaldūn: 554)[5]

From this outstanding distinction which is made explicitly between اللغة "langue" and اللسان "langage" ('explicitly' in the sense of particularly pluralizing the former term and generally singularizing the latter term), it can be evidently seen how Ibn Khaldūn adduces the fact that human language does, in and of itself, reflect certain intrinsic characteristics of the human mind. That is to say, the quality of linguistic expressions is conditioned by the quality of the language faculty (the faculty which, in turn, reveals itself as a mentally determined

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[5] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

إعلَم أنَّ اللُّغاتِ كلَّها... مَلَكاتٌ في اللِّسان للعبارة عن المعاني وجودتها وقصورها بحسب تمام المَلَكة أو نقصانها وليس ذلك بالنظر إلى المفردات وإنما هو بالنظر إلى التراكيب (ابن خلدون: 554).

predisposition): if the expressions in question are 'adequate' or 'inadequate,' then the faculty that generates them would be 'perfect' or 'imperfect,' respectively. Thus, the principal concern of the linguist, according to Ibn Khaldūn, is to attempt to extrapolate possible generalizable statements about specific mental or intellectual attributes from serious insights into human language—just as Chomsky himself is "primarily intrigued by the possibility of learning something, from the study of [human] language, that will bring to light inherent properties of the human mind" (Chomsky 1972:103). And contrary to de Saussure who is essentially concerned with the social or collective domain of human language, as seen above, both Ibn Khaldūn and Chomsky appear to be in agreement upon stressing the psychological or individual domain of this intricate continuum at the expense of its social or collective domain. What is more, since the ultimate objective of UG is to identify the nature of language acquisition itself, through the significant distinction that is made between I-language and E-language, Chomsky's concept of what he terms *linguistic competence* seems to also be quite comparable to Ibn Khaldūn's concept of what he terms المَلكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty," the term which is particularly pluralized and generally singularized, too, as will be seen in the next section (cf. Section 2).

From the same outstanding distinction between اللغة "langue" and اللسان "langage" in the afore-quoted statement, it can also be evidently seen how Ibn Khaldūn subscribes to the further fact that اللغة "langue," which is nothing else than an empirical sample of اللسان "langage," is to be viewed as a potentially unlimited set of linguistic expressions rather than an actually limited set of lexical items. This means, in other words, that the quality of linguistic expressions, which is conditioned by the quality of the linguistic faculty (as seen), should be measured with reference to the structural representations of these expressions, and not with reference to their lexical exemplifications. Hence, the further principal concern of the linguist, according to Ibn Khaldūn, is to focus attention upon the merely structural properties of linguistic expressions (cf. his own words وإنما هو بالنظر إلى التراكيب "but from the viewpoint of structures")—just as the essential task of the linguist, according to Chomsky, is to attempt to work out a certain generative-grammatical device, "a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns [purely] structural descriptions to sentences [i.e., linguistic expressions]" (Chomsky 1965:8). And unlike de Saussure who considers human language a differential system of sheer linguistic signs, both Ibn Khaldūn and Chomsky seem to be in conformity upon regarding human language as a generative system of finite means which permits one (i.e., the native speaker) inexhaustible access to infinite use, to use Humboldt's analogy (quoted in Chomsky 1965:8). Furthermore, since this generative system

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of finite means is, in itself, an ordinance that is internalized in the native speaker's mind in the form of linguistic competence (or الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty"), Chomsky's notion of what he terms *linguistic performance* also appears to be well analogous with Ibn Khaldūn's notion of what he terms التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior," the term which is derived from the latter's use of the verbal form تصرَّف "to behave/act," as will be seen in the final section (cf. Section 3).

2. Language Internalization

With the emphasis placed on the mental or psychological aspect of human language by both Ibn Khaldūn and Chomsky, its social or collective aspect must subsequently be regarded as secondary to the linguist's main concern. Internalization of language signifies, therefore, that this intricate continuum exists in the native speaker's mind as an underlying system of what is referred to as *linguistic competence* in Chomsky's terminology or الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty" in Ibn Khaldūn's terminology. Thus, the latter's particular pluralization of the term, as in الملكات "faculties," and his general singularization of it, as in الملكة "faculty," in the afore-quoted statement, clearly indicates that the native speaker internally possesses a capacity for the perception and production of his/her native language, at the one extreme, and that this capacity is also internally possessed by any other native speaker (whatever his/her native language may be), at the other extreme. Similarly, Chomsky tends to speak of competences (or I-languages) in the plural in the language-specific sense, on the one hand, and of competence (or I-language) in the singular in the language-universal sense, on the other hand. Moreover, even in his recent publications, Chomsky is now more inclined to refer to competence (or I-language) in the latter sense as the *faculty of language* (abbreviated to FL), thereby corresponding far more closely to Ibn Khaldūn's term الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty" (Chomsky 2002:47f.). Following the Cartesian approach to rationalist psychology, Chomsky subscribes to the view that this faculty is firmly fixed in advance as a predisposition of a latent mental structure (El-Marzouk 1998:5f.). Chomsky is, therefore, in opposition to all thinkers (especially the rank empiricists) who do not believe 'resolutely' in the existence of pre-social structures—just as Ibn Khaldūn endorses the idea that الملكة "the faculty" in

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question is, in and of itself, صفة راسخة للنفس "a deep-rooted quality of the mind (or the psyche)."[6] Ibn Khaldūn states:

> Faculties may only set in through the repetition of actions, for the action occurs first and bestows upon the self a [given] quality. This quality is repeated and then becomes a condition [*per se*], a condition which means that the quality is not a deep-rooted one. Only after further repetition, does the quality become a faculty, that is, a deep-rooted quality [of the mind]. (Ibn Khaldūn: 554)[7]

Notice, here, that Ibn Khaldūn's emphasis on تكرار الأفعال "repetition of actions" for the emergence of deep-rooted faculties (through the emergence of contingent qualities and then less contingent conditions) should not be confused with the psychologists' emphasis on 'acquisition through habituation' in the behaviorist sense.

Given the deep-rooted nature of the linguistic faculty (or FL), it appears to be of considerable necessity to postulate the theoretic elevation of this not-easily-tractable faculty, it is true, for the investigation of possible linguistic worlds, an objective necessity which is quite familiar in the various fields of the natural sciences. Such a theoretic elevation of the faculty logically entails the theoretic exaltation of its possessor (i.e., the speaker-listener), who, in turn, logically entails the theoretic sublimation of the society or speech-community which he/she lives in. For this reason, Chomsky has been unyieldingly reiterating these objective necessities since he first set out to construct the standard version of the transformational-generative-grammar model in the early 1960s (or even before). Accordingly, Chomsky underlines here three objective necessities so far as theoretic idealization is concerned, necessities which may be restated from his oft-quoted words as follows. Firstly, the *faculty* itself would be ideal in the sense that it reflects "[perfect]

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[6] In this context, some other technical terms, which appear to be conceptually equivalent to Ibn Khaldūn's term الملكة "faculty" itself, were actually employed within the framework of medieval Arabic linguistic theory, such as, the two terms السجية "connate disposition" and الطبع "natural disposition" by Al-Zajjājī (d. 949/951; 1979:66f.), the term السليقة "innate disposition" by Ibn Jinnī (d. 1002; 1999:114f.), and the like. Elsewhere in *A Prolegomenon to Language*, Ibn Khaldūn himself also refers to either of the two terms الجبلة "inborn disposition" and الطبع "natural disposition" interchangeably with the term الملكة "faculty" (Ibn Khaldūn: 562). Yet, it is Ibn Khaldūn's latter term الملكة "faculty" which seems to have been implemented by a multitude of religious philosophers (i.e., العلماء "the theologians" at the time, so as to assert the maxim that the faculty in question is صفة راسخة للنفس "a deep-rooted quality of the mind (or the psyche)," as mentioned in the text (Al-Bustānī 1983:862).

[7] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

والمَلَكاتُ لا تحصل إلا بتكرار الأفعال لأن الفعلَ يقع أولاً وتعود منه للذات صفةٌ ثم تتكرَّر فتكون حالاً ومعنى الحال أنها صفة غيرُ راسخةٍ ثم يزيد التكرار فتكون مَلَكة أي صفة راسخة (ابن خلدون: 554).

knowledge of the language [and its application] in actual performance." Secondly, the *speaker-listener* himself/herself would also be ideal in the sense that he/she is "unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions," etc. Thirdly, the *society* in which he/she lives would be ideal, too, in the sense that it theoretically exemplifies "a completely homogeneous speech-community" (Chomsky 1965:3). It is extremely astonishing to see that these three objective necessities of theoretic idealization are readily perceivable from Ibn Khaldūn's own writing on the same phenomena. Thus, he talks explicitly about the perfection of the faculty (cf. الملكة التامّة "perfect faculty"), and he also speaks frankly of the unimpairedness of the speaker-hearer who requires سلامة الطبع "soundness of disposition" (see, also, note 6), though he refers implicitly to the ideal harmony of the language-society or the theoretic nondeviancy of the speech-community (i.e., the Arabic community, in this case). Ibn Khaldūn writes:

> If the perfect faculty is acquired, the faculty for constructing lexical items to express the intended meanings, and for controlling the combination which applies speech to the exigency of the situation (i.e., context), then the speaker attains (to) the goal of conveying his intention to the hearer… In addition, he requires a sound disposition to, and a good understanding of, the Arabs' [nondeviant] manner of constructing structures and of controlling the application of these (structures). (Ibn Khaldūn: 454-9)[8]

Under the banner of this idealized conception of the 'perfect faculty' in essence, the faculty which mirrors "[perfect] knowledge of the language [and its application] in actual performance," all forms of undesirable discrimination between language-societies or between speech-communities or even between social classes would naturally disappear (Chomsky 1965:3). It appears, therefore, that the realm of linguistic knowledge being talked about has nothing to do with the communal status of the speaker-hearer, whether he/she is an 'erudite tycoon' or an 'ignorant pauper,' one may incontestably say. In psychological (or mental) reality, however, the kind of linguistic knowledge in question refers to the sort of intuitive knowledge which exists introspectively well beyond the level of consciousness, be it actual or potential. Thus, the further essential task of the linguist is to attempt, in Chomsky's own

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[8] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

فإذا حصلت المَلَكة التامّة في تركيب الألفاظ المفردة للتعبير عن المعاني المقصودة ومراعاة التأليف الذي يطبّق الكلامَ على مقتضى الحال بلغ المتكلّمُ حينئذٍ الغايةَ من إفادة مقصوده للسامع... ويحتاج مع ذلك إلى سلامة الطَّبع والتفهُّم الحسن لمنازع العرب في التراكيب ومراعاة التطبيق بينها (ابن خلدون: 9-454).

words, "to specify what the speaker-[hearer] *actually knows*, not what he may report about his [linguistic] knowledge" (Chomsky 1965:8, emphasis added). This actual linguistic knowledge, in other words, points to an underlying representation of it as a tacit continuum (or *Sprachgefühl*), a continuum that is unconsciously acquired in natural or informal settings (typically, the family) rather than consciously learned in nonnatural or formal settings (such as the school), with this conscious language learning being outside the sphere of the language faculty (FL). By the same token, Ibn Khaldūn goes on to stress the idea that the deliberate learning of what he calls, القوانين العلمية "grammatical rules" (literally, "scientific laws"), the grammatical rules which are normally learned after the process of natural language acquisition has been accomplished, would also, in this case, exist outside the sphere of الملكة اللسانية "the linguistic faculty," and would subsequently have nothing to do with its qualitative or quantitative measurement. In Ibn Khaldūn's words:

> This [linguistic] faculty is not acquired from knowing the grammatical rules [literally, the "scientific laws"] which have been deduced by the linguists. Such rules [literally, "laws"] do increase [conscious] knowledge of *langage* but do not actually ameliorate the acquisition of the [linguistic] faculty *per se*. (Ibn Khaldūn: 562)[9]

What is more, according to both Chomsky and Ibn Khaldūn, one prominent characteristic of this linguistic faculty is that it has the potential for 'creativity,' which can be discerned from the notion of 'generativity' referred to in the previous section. Thus, for Chomsky, the idea of 'creativity' is explicitly expressed in his contention that the language faculty (FL) is, in and of itself, a creative system of finite means which permits the native speaker full access to infinite use, to reiterate Humboldt's analogy (Chomsky 1965:8; 1972:139). Elsewhere, Chomsky also writes elaborating on the same idea: "The most striking aspect of linguistic competence [or faculty] is what we may call the 'creativity of language,' that is, the [native] speaker's ability to produce new sentences" (Chomsky 1966:11). This indicates that the finite means in question are internally represented in the form of a mental device (of whatever sort) which enables the speaker-hearer to process his/her native language in the two contrasting modes of perception and production, as will be seen presently. For Ibn Khaldūn, along similar lines, the idea of 'creativity' can also be perceived from his assertion

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[9] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

وهذه المَلَكة [اللسانية] ليست تحصل بمعرفة القوانين العلمية التي استنبطها أهلُ صناعة اللسان فإن هذه القوانين إنما تفيد علمًا [واعيًا] بذلك اللسان

ولا تفيد حصولَ المَلَكةِ [اللسانية] بالفعل في محلّها (ابن خلدون: 562).

that the ultimate conception of الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty" is that it must be inscribed in the infant's mind in the shape of a mental apparatus (of whatever kind, too), thereby capacitating him/her to 'generate' new structures (or expressions), as well. The 'reification' of this inner inscription of the faculty would, no doubt, come into existence through the infant's unremitting subjection to the speech of his/her ancestors (typically, the parents). In this connection, Ibn Khaldūn figuratively employs the nominal form المنوال "the loom" to stand for the notion of the 'mental apparatus,' as will be seen below, and he also figuratively implements the verbal form نسج "to weave" to stand for the idea of 'creativity' itself, as can be clearly understood from his own writing on the same phenomenon.[10] Ibn Khaldūn continues:

> The acquisition of the Arabic linguistic faculty *per se* is verily [reified] through the infant's multitudinous exposition to [literally, "memorization of"] the Arabs' speech until [the image of] the loom, at which they wove their structures, is engraved in his mind so that he can weave at it [his own structures]. (Ibn Khaldūn: 561)[11]

Notice here, however, that 'reification' of the acquisition of the linguistic faculty through 'exposition' to ancestors' speech (which literally means "memorization" of this speech) should not be confused with the acquisition of the linguistic faculty itself, given Ibn Khaldūn's already emphasized contention that صفة راسخة للنفس "the faculty" *per se* is الملكة "a deep-rooted quality of the mind (or the psyche)" (see, also, note 6). As such, 'acquisition reifying' through 'exposition' to ancestors' speech would, in principle, be similar to Chomsky's underlined assumption of 'parameter setting' via 'exposure' to linguistic evidence, a process which operates within the empirical world of the mental 'loom/device' analogy. This now brings to light the last point of comparison to be drawn here, so far as

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[10] Elsewhere in *A Prolegomenon to Language*, Ibn Khaldūn literally uses both of the two terms التأليف "combination" and النظم "composition," as well, to indicate basically the same idea of 'creativity' or 'generativity' referred to in the text—notwithstanding the use of the verbal form 'generate' (or 'create,' for that matter) by Chomsky himself as an appropriate terminological rendering of Humboldt's verbal form *erzeugen* (Chomsky 1965:9). As for the term التأليف "combination," it can be evidently seen from Ibn Khaldūn's afore-quoted statement: ومُراعاة التأليف الذي يُطبّق الكلامَ على مقتضى الحال "and controlling the combination which applies speech to the exigency of the situation" (Ibn Khaldūn: 454). As for the term النظم "composition," it can also be clearly understood from Ibn Khaldūn's further statement: هي ملكة لسانية في نظم الكلام "it is a linguistic faculty for the composition of speech" (Ibn Khaldūn: 562).

[11] The original Arabic text runs as follows:
إن حصولَ مَلَكةِ اللسان العربي إنما هو بكثرة الحفظ [أي حفظ الطفل] من كلام العرب حتى يرتسمَ في خياله المنوالُ الذي نسجوا عليه تراكيبَهم فينسج هو عليه (ابن خلدون: 561).

internalization of language is concerned. Upon first impression, therefore, Ibn Khaldūn's explicit configuration of the mental 'loom' in question (as in the nominal form المنوال specifically) may well refer to his implicit characterization of what may be called, the *language acquisition loom* (LAL). This implicit characterization may, for the same reason, be quite analogous with Chomsky's well established identification of the mental 'device' under consideration as the *language acquisition device* (LAD)—notwithstanding, of course, the latter's persistent employment of the term in his recent writings (Chomsky 2002:85f.). What is more, since the core of الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty" is, according to Ibn Khaldūn, naturally transmitted (or inherited) from older generations to younger generations, the 'incipient state' of this faculty would, for obvious reasons, be a predisposition which is genetically conditioned in the shape of the LAL (the mental 'loom' itself). In like manner, Chomsky has always been talking about the 'initial state' of the language faculty (FL), an initial state which would, for him, also be a predisposition that is biologically determined in the form of the LAD (the mental 'device' itself), with this device mapping imposed experience (cf. الحفظ "exposition" (literally, "memorization") in Ibn Khaldūn's sense) into the attained state of the language being acquired. In Chomsky's own words:

> It is hard to avoid the conclusion that a part of the human biological endowment is a specialized 'language organ,' the faculty of language (FL)... We can think of the initial state of FL as a device that maps [imposed] experience into state L attained: a 'language acquisition device' (LAD). (Chomsky 2002:85)

Clearly, therefore, with the indisputable analogy between the workings of the mental 'loom' (LAL) in Ibn Khaldūn's sense and the workings of the mental 'device' (LAD) in Chomsky's sense, the incipient or initial state of the language faculty (FL) that is represented *a priori* by this mental 'loom' or 'device' in psychological reality would, no doubt, point to its universal determinism, irrespective of any linguistically impertinent or even extraneous factors in this context (such as, race, gender, sexuality, and so on). In other words, the incipient or initial state of the faculty as such would, in addition to its empirical manifestations within later states, re-stress the logical irrelevance of the above-mentioned speaker-hearer's communal (or social) status, and would subsequently re-emphasize the natural disappearance of all forms of human conflict, be it society conflict or community conflict or even class conflict.

3. Language Externalization

As discussed in Section 1, the further essential concern of the linguist, for both Ibn Khaldūn and Chomsky, is to focus attention upon the purely structural properties of sentences (or linguistic expressions)—contrary to de Saussure's emphasis on the differential properties of signs. Externalization of language signifies, therefore, that this intricate continuum is well available at the native speaker's disposal for the actual instantiation of linguistic competence (or الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty") *per se*. Such actual instantiation manifests itself in the form of *linguistic performance* in Chomsky's terminology or التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior" in Ibn Khaldūn's terminology, the latter being derived from Ibn Khaldūn's own use of the verbal form تصرَّف "to behave/act," as will be seen presently. Thus, whereas linguistic competence, according to Chomsky, refers to what the speaker-listener *actually knows* (and this knowledge is by definition unconscious rather than conscious, as explained above), linguistic performance would point to what the selfsame speaker-listener *actually does* upon metabolizing (i.e., processing) the language being acquired (Chomsky 1965:4). Given the three objective necessities of theoretic idealization illustrated in the preceding section (viz. idealization of the faculty, the speaker-listener, and society), externalization of language also indicates an idealized reification of this intricate continuum through the workings of the LAD, the mental device which enables the speaker-listener himself/herself to metabolize his/her native language in the two contrasting modes of perception and production. In Chomsky's words: "To study a language, then, we must attempt to disassociate a variety of factors that interact with underlying competence to determine actual performance" (Chomsky 1972:116). It is, therefore, this disassociated variety of factors which refer to "such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions," and so forth (Chomsky 1965:3).

Since Ibn Khaldūn subscribes to the view that the deliberate cognizance of "the scientific laws (or grammatical rules) which have been deduced by the linguists" would exist outside the sphere of the language acquisition process, the intended distinction between الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty" and التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior" would also reflect the corresponding distinction between the speaker-hearer's *actual cognizing* (i.e., unconscious cognizance) and his/her *actual working* in metabolizing the language being acquired (i.e., Arabic, in this case). Under the banner of the three objective necessities of idealization, too (viz. perfection of the faculty, the speaker-hearer, and society), externalization of language would certainly denote a perfect reification of this complex continuum through the functioning of the LAL, the mental 'loom' which capacitates the speaker-hearer in question

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to metabolize his/her native language, and therefore to control التأليف الذي يطبّق الكلام على مقتضى الحال "the combination which applies speech to the exigency of the situation" (Ibn Khaldūn: 454). Only with this dual capacitation, then, does the speaker attain (to) الغاية من إفادة مقصوده للسامع "the goal of conveying his/[her] intention to the hearer" (Ibn Khaldūn: 454). On this basis, for the designation of التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior" as such, Ibn Khaldūn plainly employs the aforesaid verbal form تصرَّف "to behave/act," so as to plainly indicate the dual capacitation being talked about. This literal employment of the verbal form can be evidently seen in Ibn Khaldūn's following striking statement, even though he does not seem to explicitly implement the selfsame term التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior" in direct contradistinction to the explicit term الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty." In Ibn Khaldūn's own words (see, also, the already drawn analogy between Ibn Khaldūn's idea of 'acquisition reifying' through 'exposition' to ancestors' speech and Chomsky's notion of 'parameter setting' via 'exposure' to linguistic evidence, as explained in the previous section):

> The [mere] objective of instruction to one who seeks the [reified] acquisition of this [linguistic] faculty is that one should take upon oneself [the labor of] being exposed to [literally, "memorizing"] ... the ancestors' speech ... until one reaches the status of ... one who grew up amongst them and into whom the way they expressed their intentions was instilled. Thereupon, one behaves [i.e., acts] freely in expressing what is [latent] in one's mind in accordance with their expressions and the combination of their words. (Ibn Khaldūn: 559)[12]

Given the now drawn analogy between 'linguistic performance' in Chomsky's sense and 'linguistic behavior' in Ibn Khaldūn's sense, the complex mechanism (or mechanisms) underlying the process of language metabolization seems to dictate to each other the intrinsic order of the three essential linguistic components (viz. syntax, semantics, and phonology). According to Chomsky, this intrinsic order would be mentally determined by a metabolizing prerequisite which underpins the autonomy of the syntactic component in essence. Such a prerequisite is, in fact, no more than a self-evident corollary of focusing attention upon the purely structural properties of sentences (or linguistic expressions), as seen. Furthermore, the underpinned autonomy of the syntactic component is, in turn, based on the assumption that both the semantic component and the phonological component are merely interpretive

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[12] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

ووجهُ التعليم لمن يبتغي هذه الملكةَ ويرومُ تحصيلَها أن يأخذ نفسَه بحفظ ... كلام السلف ... حتى يتنزّلَ ... منزلةَ من نشأ بينهم ولُقّن العبارةَ عن المقاصد منهم ثم يتصرَّف بعد ذلك في التعبير عمّا في ضميرِه على حسب عباراتهم وتأليف كلماتهم (ابن خلدون: 559).

components in the grammatical representation of the language being acquired (i.e., English, in this case). Hence, Chomsky states further: "The syntactic component defines... all information relevant to semantic interpretation [and] all information relevant to phonetic interpretation. The semantic and phonological components are [thus] purely interpretive" (Chomsky 1972:125). In other words, Chomsky is well inclined to emphasize the seemingly logical priority of the domain of syntax, in language metabolization, over the merely interpretive domains of semantics and phonology (El-Marzouk 1998:49). Similarly, Ibn Khaldūn enumerates the primary linguistic components of the Arabic *langue* as an empirical sample of Arabic *langage*—what he himself calls علوم اللسان العربي "the sciences of Arabic *langage*." Of prime concern, here, are the two primary linguistic components: first, النحو "syntax" which addresses the problems of structures in general; second, البيان "elocution" (literally, "eloquence") which is both phonologically and semantically orientated, thus comprising two more secondary linguistic components, namely, البلاغة "rhetoric" and البديع "stylistics."[13] From analogy, Ibn Khaldūn is also well disposed to underline the apparently logical ascendancy of the domain of syntax, in language metabolization, over any other linguistic domain, be it interpretive or even semi-interpretive. Ibn Khaldūn concludes:

> It is, therefore, concluded that syntax is the most significant and the most prioritized [component] amongst them [i.e., the aforesaid primary linguistic components]. Through syntax, the gist(s) of semantic intentions are recognized, therewith [capacitating the speaker-hearer] to distinguish the agent from the patient, and the subject from the predicate… Had it not been for syntax, the gist of semantic intention would have been unknown... since being incognizant of it [i.e., syntax] would amount to a disruption of [mutual] intelligibility. (Ibn Khaldūn: 545)[14]

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[13] Notice, here, that Ibn Khaldūn also enumerates two further primary linguistic components: first, what he calls اللغة "language," which addresses the choice of lexis in particular; second, what he calls الأدب "literature," which is concerned with the study of both poetry and prose, a matter that is irrelevant in this context. What is relevant, however, is that the primary linguistic component البيان "elocution" (literally, "eloquence") mentioned in the text appears to approximate the term 'phonology' in its modern sense, thereby approximating the term 'semantics' as an interpretive component as well. Hence, Ibn Khaldūn himself defines the primary linguistic component in question as that which is: متعلق بالألفاظ وما تفيده ويُقصَد بها الدلالة عليه من المعاني "concerned with [the articulation of] words and with what they convey, that is, with the meanings they denote" (Ibn Khaldūn: 550). Clearly, therefore, Ibn Khaldūn's definition of the term البيان, as such, does resonate with the general definition of the selfsame term that was established within the framework of medieval Arabic linguistic theory as follows: المنطق الفصيح المعبِّر عمّا في الضمير "the eloquent articulation which expresses what is [latent] in the mind" (Al-Bustānī 1983:65).

[14] The original Arabic text runs as follows:
والذي يتحصّل أن الأهمَّ المقدَّم منها [أي علوم اللسان العربي] هو النحو إذ به تتبيَّن أصولُ المقاصد بالدَّلالة فيُعرف الفاعلُ من المفعول والمبتدأ من الخبر … ولولاهُ لجُهل أصلُ الإفادةِ … إذ في جهله الإخلالُ بالتفاهم (ابن خلدون: 545).

It follows that, with the logical supremacy being assigned to the syntactic component in language metabolization (at least over the two interpretive components of semantics and phonology), both Chomsky and Ibn Khaldūn appear to give countenance to the view that the normal speaker-hearer is unhesitatingly capable of differentiating deviant sentences (or linguistic expressions) from their nondeviant counterparts, given the ideal or perfect reification of language via the internal operations of the LAD or the LAL, as discussed. According to Chomsky, the perceived distinction between 'nondeviancy' and 'deviancy,' as such, is explicable in terms of the perceivable distinction between what he calls 'acceptability' and 'unacceptability,' respectively. In addition, this latter distinction is to be viewed at the level of linguistic performance, in particular—contrary to the further distinction between what he calls 'grammaticality' and 'ungrammaticality,' which is to be taken at the level of linguistic competence, the language faculty (FL) itself. In Chomsky's words: "The more acceptable sentences are those that are more likely to be produced, more easily understood... The unacceptable sentences one would tend to *avoid* and *replace* by more acceptable variants, wherever possible, in actual discourse" (Chomsky 1965:11, emphasis added). For Ibn Khaldūn, along similar lines, the aforesaid distinction between 'nondeviancy' and 'deviancy' is accountable in terms of the analogous distinction between اللامُعْرَضِيَّة "nonavertability" and المُعْرَضِيَّة "avertability" (or even the far more analogous distinction between اللامَمْجُوجِيَّة "gorgeability" and المَمْجُوجِيَّة "disgorgeability" in the figurative sense). As a result, the speaker-hearer, upon metabolizing his/her native language (i.e., Arabic, in this case), would also be unwaveringly prepared to recognize the 'deviant' linguistic expressions as being rather 'averted' and 'disgorged' than the 'nondeviant' counterparts in actual speech. Hence, Ibn Khaldūn states:

> If he [i.e., the native speaker-hearer] is exposed to [a sample of] speech that deviates from the manner in which the Arabs compose speech, he would avert from it and would disgorge it, thereby recognizing it as being estranged from the Arabs' speech. (Ibn Khaldūn: 562)[15]

This statement, finally, brings to light the last point of comparison to be made, here, so far as externalization of language is concerned. In particular, it refers to the native speaker-listener's ability to identify, wherever possible, certain pragmatic differences between

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[15] The original Arabic text runs as follows:

وإذا عُرِضَ عليه [أي المتكلِّم- السامع الفطريّ] الكلامُ حائدًا عن أسلوب العرب في نظم الكلام أعْرَضَ عنه ومَجَّه وعلم أنه ليس من كلام العرب (ابن خلدون: 562).

semantically identical sentences (or linguistic expressions) in natural discourse, given the close affinity between semantics and pragmatics in modern linguistics (see, also, note 13). And given the plain distinction between 'acceptability' and 'unacceptability' on the external plane of linguistic performance in Chomsky's terminology, it follows that the native speaker-listener would be quite able to realize the paramount significance of the intended pragmatic differences between some exemplary sets of sentences which exhibit divergences in word-order relationships, as in (1a–b), or between other exemplary sets of sentences that reflect divergences in paraphrase relationships, as in (2a–c), even though either set of sentences are somehow semantically convergent, as their meanings clearly demonstrate. Notice that, for ease of exposition, the following concrete examples are, in fact, slight adaptations from Chomsky's own cited examples in English (Chomsky 1965:162).

(1) a. John came yesterday.
     b. It was yesterday (that) John came.

(2) a. John liked the play.
     b. The play pleased John.
     c. The play appealed to John.

Moreover, given the further plain distinction between 'avertability' (or 'disgorgeability') and 'nonavertability' (or 'gorgeability') on the analogously external plane of التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior" in Ibn Khaldūn's terminology, it also follows that the native speaker-hearer would be well able to recognize the great importance of the deliberate pragmatic diversities amongst some typical groups of linguistic expressions which do portray heterogeneities in word-order associations, as in (3a–b), or amongst other typical groups of linguistic expressions that do mirror heterogeneities in paraphrase associations, as in (4a–c), despite the fact that either group of linguistic expressions are semantically homogeneous in one form or another, as their rendered meanings evidently illustrate. Notice, here, that the following concrete examples are actually full citations from Ibn Khaldūn's own representative examples in (written) Arabic, and are therefore followed by their literal translations into English for the purposes of clarification (Ibn Khaldūn: 551).

(3) a. جاءَني زيدٌ "***Came*** to me Zaid."
     b. زيدٌ جاءَني "***Zaid*** came to me."

(4) a. زيدٌ قائمٌ "Zaid is rising."

b. إن زيدًا قائمٌ "Zaid *is* rising."

c. إن زيدًا لقائمٌ "Zaid *is verily* rising."

As for the examples in (3a–b), Ibn Khaldūn interprets their intended pragmatic diversities in terms of the word-order association either example embodies, an association which appears to be conditioned by the mechanisms of what is called الإعراب "desinence" (or "parsing"), to some medieval Arabic linguists and grammarians, or even determined by the dynamics of what is termed العَمَل "governance" (or "government"), to others.[16] Thus, from the viewpoint of the native speaker, in general, the activity of coming is pragmatically more important than the Agent or the Doer of the activity in (3a) (cf. *Zaid came to me*.), whereas the latter (the Agent/Doer) is pragmatically more important than the former (the activity) in (3b) (cf. *It was Zaid who came to me*.). As for the examples in (4a–c), Ibn Khaldūn accounts for their deliberate pragmatic diversities with reference to the paraphrase association each example incarnates, an association which seems to be marked by the magnitudes of what is known as التوكيد "emphasis" (or "accentuation") within the Arabic linguistic theory at the time (or any other linguistic theory, for that matter). Hence, from the standpoint of the native hearer, in particular, the absence of any emphatic marker in (4a) brings advantages to one who has not yet entertained the central idea (i.e., the idea of 'Zaid being rising'), the sole presence of the emphatic marker إنَّ "stressed be" in (4b) is induced for one who is prone to hesitate about (accepting) the same idea, and the further presence of the emphatic marker لَ "stressed verily" in (4c) is actuated for one who is liable to disavow (believing) the selfsame idea (El-Marzouk 2004, 2013). In consequence, such forms of contextual emphasis (or accentuation) represented by the emphatic markers in question manifest themselves as pragmatic methods

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[16] It is worth mentioning, here, that Chomsky actually incorporated the concept of 'government' only into the derivational system of the second major model of UG referred to in the text, namely, the *principles and parameters* model in the 1980s (see Section 1). The essential purpose of this concept is to regulate the structural interrelation between any set of two categories which c-command each other, thus illustrating the logical interconnection between the 'governor' and the 'governee' (Chomsky 1981, 1986). Yet, the concept did, in fact, arouse much controversy amongst contemporary American and European linguists and grammarians alike due to its unnecessary complication of the derivational system of UG. For this reason, alone, Chomsky was forced to eliminate the concept of 'government' altogether from the third major model of the same system, namely, the *minimalist-program* model in the 1990s onwards (Chomsky 1995, 2002). It is very interesting to see that the equivalent notion of العمل "governance" was, in turn, also the subject-matter of quite astringent disputes amongst Arabic linguists and grammarians of the Middle Ages, thereby recognizing its problematic and unfathomable nature beforehand. For exactly the same reason, many of these Arabic linguists and grammarians, especially Ibn Maḍā' (d. 1195; 1982), decided to dispense with the notion of العمل "governance" in its entirety (see, for example, Al-Anṭākī 1991:65f.).

of attempting to persuade the hesitant or disavowing hearer to accept or believe the intended informative message which contains the central idea.

4. Conclusion

It can now be evidently seen that Ibn Khaldūn's theorization on human language and Chomsky's theorization on the same phenomenon are in considerable congruity from a variety of significant perspectives. Hence, with respect to the conceptual issue of 'language dichotomization' discussed in Section 1, Chomsky's generative dichotomy of 'descriptive adequacy' and 'explanatory adequacy' appears to imply the corresponding intention of Lacan's psychoanalytic distinction between *langue* and *langage*, thus coinciding in principle with Ibn Khaldūn's conspicuous distinction between اللغة "a language" and اللسان "language" (literally, "tongue"), given the focus upon the purely structural representations of sentences (or linguistic expressions). With regard to the conceptual issue of 'language internalization' explained in Section 2, both Chomsky and Ibn Khaldūn seem to view human language as a psychological/mental phenomenon (contrary to de Saussure), a view which illuminates the principled analogy between Chomsky's idea of 'linguistic competence' and Ibn Khaldūn's notion of الملكة اللسانية "linguistic faculty"—notwithstanding the former's use of the term 'language faculty' (FL) itself in his recent writings. This shared view also entails a comparative review of several concomitant issues, such as, the concept of 'idealization' or 'perfection,' the nature of linguistic knowledge lurking behind the faculty, and the sort of mechanism(s) underlying this knowledge. With reference to the conceptual issue of 'language externalization' considered in Section 3, the last section, both Chomsky and Ibn Khaldūn appear to survey the nature of linguistic knowledge in terms of its (idealized) reification in actual discourse, a survey that sheds new light on the further principled analogy between Chomsky's idea of 'linguistic performance' and Ibn Khaldūn's notion of التصرُّف اللغوي "linguistic behavior"—not to mention the derivation of the latter term from Ibn Khaldūn's own use of the verbal form تصرَّف "to behave/act." This shared survey also involves a comparative account of various ancillary topics, such as the assumption of the logical priority of syntax, the concept of 'deviancy' or 'nondeviancy,' and the concrete instantiation of this concept. Finally, it must be noted, once more, that the present comparative study is not to be perceived as a form of romantic association on nostalgic reminiscences of a 'golden' past. The study is a serious attempt to demonstrate with conclusive evidence that the considerable harmony between these two creative minds on human language is well utilizable as a set of worthy arguments against all kinds of

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religiously fanatic groups or politically rank institutions whose 'harmonious' survival, so it appears, cannot but be contingent upon that deliberate and premeditated discrimination between such whimsical and illusory constructs as East and West.

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