Interchange: Globalization and Its Limits between the American Revolution and the Civil War

Whether historians investigate consuls, missionaries, merchants, naval squadrons, or scientists, they can discern a striking transformation in the global reach of the United States between the American Revolution and the Civil War. A burgeoning amount of new and forthcoming scholarship on American globalization during this era has created an opportunity to rethink orthodox narratives of American history and globalization.

This “Interchange” conversation illustrates how historians have been pursuing productive imperatives to move American history beyond the container of the nation-state and also considers how we should reintegrate a globalized U.S. history into our more traditional narratives. The conversation also places the history of American globalization in a larger context, allowing us to interrogate the more complex history of globalization. Attending to the limits of globalization can reveal important histories foreclosed by a rush to demonstrate mere interconnection. Global interconnection was not some kind of already-existing condition to be discovered by historians. Globalization entailed work—a contingent and grounded process that deserves a full history. And globalization included varying vantage points and power dynamics. The JAH is indebted to all of the participants for sharing their thoughts on this subject.

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**JAH:** How does studying the era between the American Revolution and the American Civil War present new opportunities to analyze the globalization of the United States as a contingent process characterized by opposition, indifference, resistance, insufficient knowledge, and insufficient resources? Historians have long challenged “the national” as a category of historical inquiry by searching for evidence of global interconnection; is it also time to consider the concomitant limits to “the global”?

Amy S. Greenberg: I come at this question from two different directions—as an author and an editor. My work in progress is “Who’s Afraid of a Little Empire: U.S. Imperialism and Its Discontents, 1780–1900,” which looks at the extent to which conflict, rather than consensus, shaped U.S. territorial growth. I have also been involved
with this question as an academic editor of the United States in the World book series from Cornell University Press. Recently the editorial staff and I have seen a number of book proposals and manuscripts focusing on the United States abroad during the early republic. Some of this work is fantastic. Two of our most exciting publications are set firmly in the era. Emily Conroy-Krutz’s *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* makes a convincing case that American missionaries played a key role in spreading American “values” abroad. It is a marvelous transnational study that takes missionaries seriously and shows how important they were to the creation of an American empire. Brian Rouleau’s *With Sails Whitening Every Sea: Mariners and the Making of an American Maritime Empire* makes an equally bold argument for the importance of maritime history within the field of U.S. foreign relations during the early republic. His study shows that sailors, by far the largest contingent of Americans abroad before the Civil War, were crucial to the expansion of American influence.

We have also seen work that does little more than locate Americans, and U.S. goods, ideas, or culture abroad and then extrapolate from that about the previously unknown reach of U.S. globalization. Will there be a time when we agree that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction from the politically informed ideologies of American exceptionalism that governed the narration of American territorial growth during the Cold War? At that time the “facts” that the United States expanded primarily by treaty rather than war and always incorporated the people of newly annexed territory into the polity were offered as evidence for the essential difference and superiority of the United States over the “evil” empires of the past (such as Britain and Rome) and the present (such as the Soviet Union).

Conversely, I have recently been reading through *Godey’s Lady’s Book*, the preeminent (and original) women’s fashion magazine, published in the 1830s. I frankly cannot believe how cosmopolitan and global the content is—not simply because it covers fashion trends in London and Paris as closely as it does those in New York and Philadelphia but also because every issue has multiple articles focusing on the history and culture of women in other nations, including Turkey, China, and Egypt. It is a fashion magazine with a clear mandate to avoid “political topics” considered inappropriate for women, yet the publication accepts the “wider world” as clearly within its (and female readers’) sphere. When the editor Sarah Josepha Hale noted that “all nations are ransacked to equip the modern lady,” it seems evident that she was gesturing well beyond fashion.

**Konstantin Dierks:** Historians have long associated this era with nation building and sectional conflict. Now there seems to be a groundswell of research taking a global turn, just as Rosemarie Zagarri encouraged among historians of the early American republic in 2011. Contrast the completion of the transcontinental railroad across the United States in 1869 with the first American circumnavigation of the globe between 1787 and 1790.

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The United States was born global—but such an assertion presents a host of problems. We look for evidence of the global, and we find what we are looking for, in a classic self-fulfilling prophecy. Yet how do we give our findings due weight, proportion, context, and outcome?3

At the very least we should not forget that not everyone apprehended “the global” equally, even in the same moment. In examining that first circumnavigation of the world we must parse out the different perspectives of, for example, merchants, sailors, chandlers, indigenous peoples, imperial rivals, newspaper editors, producers, retailers, consumers, and politicians on how they understood “the global,” if at all.

Jay Cook: For some time now I have been intrigued by the vast reach of the early culture industries, which extended across multiple national borders. While finishing a book on P. T. Barnum, for example, I noticed a transnational flow of performers, capital, and publicity in and out of the United States that was rarely discussed in the older scholarship. It is not just that Barnum launched his first European tour within a year of establishing his first domestic venue; or that he vastly expanded his domestic empire in terms of markets, visibility, and profits by contracting with a European opera star. More telling is the fact that Barnum had agents and buyers in Europe, South Asia, and Africa secure many of the “wonders” that eventually found their way back to his U.S. venues. By the dawn of the transcontinental railroad, Barnum was already thinking about export strategies across the Pacific Ocean. In 1870 (even before he launched his first domestic railroad circus), Barnum sent Tom Thumb out with a small touring company to Hawaii, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, the Chinese and Japanese treaty ports, and Egypt before circling back to Europe and New York. It was one of the first “round-the-world” tours in the history of mass culture.4

This outward impulse was typical of the early culture industries, with an expanded reach that (like many other early forms of maritime capitalism) routinely exceeded the boundaries of any single nation-state. By the 1820s Stephen Price, the powerful manager of the Park Theatre in New York City, had established a transatlantic pipeline of foreign stars (Fanny Kemble, Edmund Keane, the first Italian opera companies) who came to the United States with advance contracts and toured through newly established regional syndicates—what we now describe as the origins of the star system. With the profits from these tours, Price secured the lease for one of the world’s most important venues (the Drury Lane Theatre in London) so he could run his larger enterprise as a more vertically integrated transatlantic venture. Much the same was true of T. D. Rice, an early blackface artist who was explosively popular in Britain during the mid-1830s and who sparked multiple waves of U.S. blackface troupes across Europe over the next fifty years. We have often described the global fascination with American “blackness” as tied to the massive resonance of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, but Harriet Beecher Stowe was

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working transatlantic markets that were at least two decades old by the 1850s. A few years later, U.S. travel writers told stories of hearing American blackface songs in India.\(^5\)

The power dynamics within these industries were radically asymmetrical. In 1772 the seminal poet Phillis Wheatley used British patrons, publishers, and publicity to produce the first black-authored book bound between covers. She did so as a slave, however; and as recent scholarship has powerfully demonstrated, her manifold efforts to control the terms of her global renown were always tenuous (and incomplete).\(^6\)

**Emily Conroy-Krutz:** Thinking about opposition, indifference, resistance, insufficient knowledge, and insufficient resources can tell us a great deal about not only global interconnections but also about the nation itself. How some Americans attempted to engage with the globe even in the face of limitations and constraints gives us a new way of thinking about nation building. I say this for two reasons. In the first place, like Amy S. Greenberg I have been struck by the global focus of early republican periodicals. My work on foreign missions means that I am largely reading missionary magazines. These might be more expected sites for a global focus than *Godey’s Lady’s Book*, given the international focus of missions. It is unsurprising to find articles on Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas printed side by side in individual issues. This packaging of the globe to American readers, though, has made me wonder about who was reading these magazines and how this reading helped shape early Americans’ understandings of the rest of the world. Thinking about those readers might help us examine two directions of this global turn: the Americans who went out into the world, and those who stayed home but thought, read, and sometimes wrote about the world at large. For both groups, we might ask how global engagement changed Americans’ understandings of who they were as a people and how (or if) global engagement changes our understanding of that period.

Paying attention to missionaries’ insufficient knowledge and insufficient resources was central to understanding Americans’ ideas about the rest of the world and their place in it. It is one thing to point out that missionaries were out in the world, but the more interesting questions concern how they got there, why they went, and what they and their supporters thought being there meant—as Americans, as Christians, and as both.

From the beginning of the mission movement, evangelical Protestants had a global vision (the conversion of the world), but there were economic and political constraints to that vision—some that they recognized and others that they did not. They modeled themselves on British missionaries, but even that emulation suggests some of the initial problems they would face: British missionaries worked in the British Empire. The Ameri-


can missionaries did not have their own overseas empire in which to evangelize, so they
too looked toward the British Empire, where they would have difficulty balancing their
identities as Americans and as Anglo-American Protestants. They began their work with
as much knowledge as possible about the places they would go, but their access to infor-
mation was limited by political and economic realities. For example, the initial plan to
start a mission in Burma was based on decades-old information because American mer-
chants had not traded with Burma in approximately fifteen years. Only once the mis-
sionaries reached India could they begin to gather more recent information and quickly
find themselves among the experts that Americans would later call upon for information
about places all around the Indian Ocean region.

**Courtney Fullilove:** As a settler colony, the United States was a product of a mer-
cantilist political economy based on extraction and enslavement. Whether or not U.S.
history has been narrated as a story of nation building and sectional conflict, we cannot
assume that the nation-state is a prior or self-contained unit of analysis. Whether we
characterize the broadened analysis as global may be a different question, but histories
oriented toward the Atlantic world, empire, and colony have moved us past flat-footed
accounts of American political development.

Arguably, the opposition of “national” and “global” is misplaced. The national would
be apposite to the international rather than the global. Here it may be worth acknowledg-
ing that the global is a representational rather than a material designation; by extension,
it does political work by asserting connection over and against environmental or political
constraints.

The suggestion that *global* means interconnected seems to be a rehash of 1990s new-
economy evangelism. As someone interested in food politics and biodiversity preserva-
tion, I become cranky when the term *global* is deployed to smooth over problems of in-
equality and governance. The tendency to celebrate “the global and the local” suggests
that the latter is simply a microcosm of the former and that everyday people can concept-
ualize world politics simply by attending to their daily business. This pairing of scales
insinuates a pattern of connectivity that implies the long reach of sustainable life choices,
whereas, in fact, the play to good conscience legitimizes the reflexivity and self-absorp-
tion that mask inequities in the distribution of resources and entitlements at many levels
of governance. The result is an innocent imagining of the global. Of course, appeals to
the global can justify important political interventions—for example, to take action on
anthropogenic climate change—but they can also be a lazy form of politics, insinuating
commonality and universality to circumvent conflict or consensus building.

We should distinguish apprehension of the global from inhabitation of it—or concep-
tual from material implications. It is true, for example, that a guano merchant may have
had more knowledge of Peruvian politics or tiny islands in the Pacific Ocean than did an
Ohio farmer, but the material realities of each were altered by access to fertilizers rich in
nitrogen and phosphorus.

I agree that we need to pay attention to the different ways people imagined the global—
for example, as a theater of commerce, conflict, or civilization. These fantasies of the glob-
al are related, but not identical to, the institutional and economic characteristics of mis-
sionaries, merchants, men of science, naval officers, and consuls.
I also wonder about our rationale for using the American Revolution and the Civil War as bookends for this discussion, inasmuch as each were defining events of American government. If the latter is not our primary subject, these events may not be best for framing a conversation. That is not to say that either event lacked world historical significance. The place of the United States in an age of revolutions needs no reiteration. Arguably, historians have focused less on the global ramifications of the Civil War, with exceptions. Sven Beckert has recently emphasized how the decline of the cotton South integrated new parts of the “global countryside” into a capitalist world market. Importantly, such an analysis identifies the Civil War as a macroeconomic factor, and the history in question is of global capitalism rather than of the United States. But this brings us to the question of our primary subject: Is it nation? Is it culture? Is it economy? On what scale? Do we assume that globalization implies an extension of geopolitical power? Is it necessarily American? Occasionally I think of the early republic as a provincial backwater of European empire, not an agent of world power—but this still requires a global frame.7

Justin Leroy: As someone who writes about the struggle against slavery throughout the British Atlantic, I have difficulty with the limits of the nation as historians’ presumptive unit of analysis. Slavery placed the United States firmly within global networks of production, exchange, and consumption, and those who fought against it—as well as to maintain it—were mindful of that. I tend to think of the local, the national, and the global as scales of identity and engagement unevenly available to people in the United States for imagining political projects. If we look at the social movements of this period, whether focused on abolition, labor, gender, or religion, we see major transnational and Atlantic components. National identity was one of several roles available to reformers who sought to reshape their world. It could be much less important than one’s sense of self as an abolitionist, a workingman, a woman, or an evangelical.

Even so, I also want to be careful not to romanticize global reform efforts. The global is a useful scale for considering how people imagined reform; it is much trickier to use the notion of the global as a measure of how reform took place. For example, black thinkers in the antebellum period would often describe themselves in cosmopolitan terms—as antislavery activists whose calling tied them more closely to their counterparts in Britain than to American countrymen invested in black bondage, or as Africans with deeper ties to enslaved people in the world than to white Americans. Yet any attempt to approach African American history from a purely global or diasporic perspective would have to account for the ways black Americans were undeniably tethered to a nation with which they often disidentified. Their intellectual milieu was primarily American, and they absorbed American ideas about Africa and Africans even as they were invested in their own real or imagined connections to the continent.

I also want to follow up on Courtney Fullilove’s thoughts on how the distinction between the national and the global can be fraught, depending on the type of history we practice. How do we distinguish between globalization and mere pretensions to the global? Is globalization about the movement of ideas and people, or just the extension of state power? If historical actors aspired to influence on a global scale but never achieved it, does that count as globalization? As historians, how do we measure the difference between aspiration and achievement when our object of analysis is something as ephemeral as an idea? I

am thinking specifically of filibustering and various southern attempts to create an empire of slavery in the Caribbean and South America. From the perspective of a political historian, such attempts were nothing more than errant dreams and could not be easily counted among the examples of globalization in the mid-nineteenth century. For intellectual or cultural historians, however, such plots are evidence that the American slaveholding class was not backward or resistant to change but was modern and forward thinking.8

Kariann Akemi Yokota: Studying the experiences of Americans whose lives took them around the globe reveals that national identity was much more conflicted and contingent than is often assumed. Like Justin Leroy, I have always found it perplexing that historians so often “take the nation as the presumptive unit of analysis.” Having a background in ethnic studies and early American history, I am attuned to how the lives of many immigrants to the United States remained steadfast in their transnational orientation. For instance, Asian immigrants commonly sent remittances back to families who remained in Asia, supported political causes, and continued to travel back and forth across the ocean.

Ann V. Fabian: Can we learn by including early national naturalists (or “men of science”)? It is obvious that the exchange of letters and objects anchors these people in global networks and that their paths cross those of missionaries, slave traders, sailors, soldiers, and low-level consular officials; that they take and recast knowledge gleaned from Africans and from Native Americans; and that appropriation of local knowledge sometimes provides cachet in London and elsewhere.

I think of the natural scientist Samuel George Morton’s skulls and the global necropolis he assembled in Philadelphia—thanks to a far-flung network of part-time collectors. His ideas work across scales—local, national, global—and his publications circulate ideas through global networks of learned societies. We can link his collecting to the obvious global interests of, for example, Muhammad Ali Pasha and Egyptian cotton to the United States Exploring Expedition in the Pacific Ocean (1838–1842) and to Methodist missions in Africa and Oregon. But do naturalists add something to histories of trade, exploration, and benevolence? And do those histories help us see global patterns in the development of American science?9

Cook: I agree with Courtney’s suggestion that the American Revolution and the Civil War may not always be the most effective historical “bookends” for some of the global processes we have been discussing.

Consider the conventional narratives we have told about African American expressive culture. As late as 1990 it was still common to describe the outward movement of African American performers, styles, and products as something that only became possible during the Jazz Age (think Josephine Baker and Paul Robeson). Central to this story were certain

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assumptions about causality—for example, that the struggle for commercial viability in domestic markets necessarily preceded (and enabled) the broader turn to global export. In this view, the “black modernisms” and “internationalisms” of the 1920s often appeared as long-term effects of nineteenth-century “freedom struggles” and necessarily followed other key watershed events such as the Civil War and the Great Migration.

Subsequent studies of “black diasporas” and the “black Atlantic” marked a critical juncture because they decentered the “nation-state” and demonstrated the manifold ways black identities, aesthetics, and political struggles routinely exceeded U.S. borders. If we are talking about periodization, however, even this type of argumentation may not go far enough. As Robeson argued, the “right to travel” was central to the black freedom struggle from the dawn of emancipation. From Phillis Wheatley’s early efforts to access British publishers in the wake of the 1772 decision in *Somerset v. Stewart* (which suggested that slaves brought to English soil could not be forcibly returned to the colonies as slaves) to Frederick Douglass’s overseas campaigns to build a “moral cordon” of antislavery during the 1840s and 1850s, virtually every pioneering figure in African American culture and politics was “global” by necessity. The coming of the Civil War also affected this process but not always in the ways we might expect. By the early 1850s William Wells Brown was warning black abolitionists away from Britain because the political landscape was shifting toward intolerance. Around the same moment, the actor Ira Aldridge, who had been working British markets since 1824, began looking to central and eastern Europe as a means of bypassing “Uncle Tom mania” and exerting greater control over the terms of his global celebrity. (This type of renown truly was global by the time of the Civil War; in 1866, for example, his performances of *Othello* in Constantinople received extensive press on four continents.)

Dierks: Are we writing an open-ended global history with its own trajectory, or are we writing a globalized national history with other dimensions, beyond the global, at work?

I will return to this point after I latch on to Courtney’s remarks. She used the term scale, which can seem far more conceptually helpful than global. In two incisive essays published in 2000 the anthropologist Anna Tsing sought to give contingency to the notion of the “global” by drawing attention to what she called “ideologies of scale” and “projects of scale making.” Ideologies of scale are discursive claims about the scale of things, whether

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imagined as global, local, national, or regional. They are only claims, though, in the way that, for example, universalism is a claim (quite a fragile one, of course). Claims for the global in recent historiography present the global as a scale deemed more true to historical reality. The national container is a false one, an artifact of the nineteenth century, whereas we now see that the global container is the true one, with a history that must be written—so goes the claim, anyway.¹¹

Projects of scale making are attempts to mobilize resources to realize such claims. This is apparent in James Cook’s fantastic example of early American culture industries. In his illustrious career P. T. Barnum pursued an increasingly global project in service of mass commercial entertainment. What about other culture entrepreneurs in the same era? On what scales were their enterprises? How many were as capable as Barnum of global ambitions and activities? I encountered this kind of conundrum when I came across an obscure 1830 book by George Armroyd, A Connected View of the Whole Internal Navigation of the United States. I thought it would be about how American canals and railroads were connected to the wider world, but it was very much an account within national borders, with only a few gestures toward the extranational. Although it initially disappointed me, the book eventually reminded me that the era between the American Revolution and the American Civil War also saw the proliferation of local historical societies in the United States. However global such canals, railroads, and historical societies might arguably have been in the 1820s and 1830s, it was possible then for enough people to understand them on a completely different geographic scale, without the global.¹²

Instead of looking solely for projects of global scale making, as was my first instinct, I have become increasingly alert to the multiplicity of parallel projects of scale making—sometimes more global, sometimes more national, sometimes more local. The global scale was one possible choice that some Americans made in the early nineteenth century. How was such a global choice made? How was knowledge of the world gathered? How were suitable resources mobilized? Were those global activities opposed or resisted? What went right, and what went wrong?

Historians writing a global history can easily lose sight of such contingencies, perhaps because tracing global trajectories is a labor-intensive task. The opportunity and the necessity of writing a globalized national history is to juxtapose global-scale projects against parallel, intersecting, or competing projects on other scales, to capture multiple and contingent dimensions of history within a given era.

Nicholas Guyatt: I take Amy’s point about historians who start with the novelty of finding Americans overseas: we all know of studies that track previously overlooked globe-trotters who made only a modest impact on American society, politics, or culture. This work is often terrific and rarely feels antiquarian. But I think we have also been mapping a wider terrain of American history that does not feel finished. The points made by James and Amy about the striking receptiveness of American periodicals in the

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early nineteenth century remind me of my surprise and delight when reading Michael O’Brien’s *Conjectures of Order*. O’Brien’s book recovers antebellum southern intellectuals from the condescension of northern “modernizers” and leapfrogs a lively national culture in its restoration of southerners to an Atlantic (and occasionally global) conversation. We have seen plenty of work since the publication of *Conjectures of Order* that fills out the picture of northern cultural curiosity, and I suspect that there is more to come. The knowledge that Americans were closely interested in French novels, or South Asian labor markets, or Chinese political unrest still seems fresh and even arresting.¹³

Then there is the project of figuring out whether these points of curiosity and engagement force us to reshape what we thought we knew about the “core” narratives of the early republic. Some books and articles have really made a difference here: the efforts of Max Edling and Peter Onuf, for example, to align the constitutional achievements of the 1780s with a desire to create a European-style fiscal-military state rather than a *sui generis* exceptional-isolationist republic. Or François Furet’s reframing of the period from 1763 to 1815 as a long struggle for control of the Mississippi Valley, drawing in numerous powers (European and indigenous) and diverting our gaze from the formal politics of the Eastern Seaboard. One could make the case that, as with the 1980s reinvention of (late) nineteenth-century western history, historians of the “interior” have produced some of the most outward-looking work in our period: the recent, alternative accounts of the American Revolution by Kathleen DuVal and Claudio Saunt are great examples of this.¹⁴

**Conroy-Krutz:** I wonder if the value of thinking about this period is less in saying that there is anything particularly distinctive about the global, as such, in the decades between the American Revolution and the Civil War and more in making a point that there is a global context and global engagement. To the extent that I have used these events as book-ends, it has been to encourage students to think about this era differently. Students will tell me that globalization began either very recently or at the dawn of time. The turn of the nineteenth century never stands out to them as a significant period for thinking about the global until we get into the materials. The work on the continental interior does seem to be particularly vibrant in this respect also because of its increasing focus on themes of empire and colonialism. (I am thinking here of Bethel Saler’s *The Settler’s Empire*.)¹⁵

**Fabian:** The global turn asks for different sign posts—not political events but clipper ships and steam presses; the international post; and finally the long, slow movements of humans, plants, animals, and germs. In their 2014 textbook, *Becoming America*, Rebecca

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McLennan and David Henkin try to use a global narrative as the beginning and the end of the story. What are the narrative nodes that can draw students into the story of movements of people and ideas?²⁶

**Fullilove:** Alfred Crosby anticipated some of the global turn in his attempt to account for the “Columbian exchange” of plants, animals, and microbes between Europe and the Americas during the sixteenth century. Judith Carney has extended and qualified his analysis of “neo-Europes” by examining the transit of African food, plants, and knowledge to the Americas.¹⁷

What happens if we consider an environmental history rather than a political history primary? Arguably, reckoning with climate change has provoked some of the most significant recent reassessments of how we organize human history. And abrupt climate shifts can provide context for social-political ruptures. For example, early Americanists have begun to pay closer attention to the defining effects of the Little Ice Age of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries on European encounters with North America. Drought and hurricanes also regularly thwarted mercantilist projects. Sherry Johnson’s history of Cuba emphasizes how climate change and environmental disaster hastened Spain’s withdrawal from its Atlantic empire in the later eighteenth century.¹⁸

If we break free of the span of time from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries (the early modern and modern ages of “globalization”), we know that abrupt climatic shifts are responsible for some of the defining transformations of human society—that is, the warming in the late Pleistocene that allowed for plant domestication and the spread of agriculture, or, more controversially, the warming unleashed by demographic expansion and industrialization in the late eighteenth century. The latter is one proposed point of origin for the “Anthropocene,” the new geologic age defined by human impacts on the environment.

I am dissatisfied with the Anthropocene as a conceptual tool, inasmuch as it seems to use stratigraphy to reinscribe the British Industrial Revolution as the dawn of modernity—after all that work breaking up the fetish! But perhaps environmental periodization creates a space for histories of migration and settlement that assess broad ecological implications rather than narrowly political ones. That is not to say that history becomes one giant environmental impact statement, or that all things nonhuman become companion species, or even that we need to have a posthuman moment. But orienting ourselves toward ecological transformation may move us away from “event-based histories” and allow us to see units of analysis (environmental and technological) that we might otherwise ignore or diminish: watersheds, grasslands, roads, canals, farms, fertilizers. I am thinking about the work of Christopher Jones, Andreas Malm, Frederik Albritton Jonsson, and Sean Adams on energy transitions—especially to coal—in the nineteenth century.¹⁹

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¹⁶ Rebecca McLennan and David Henkin, *Becoming America* (Columbus, 2014).
Fabian: Are there are not two different sets of questions about the global? Sometimes we seem to be thinking about the nation, national formation, or the construction of national identity; sometimes we seem to be thinking about global roles of nonhuman actors. Are there ways to bring those two sorts of questions together?

Fullilove: Ann Fabian’s suggestion seems right to me. We talk about globalization differently if we are trying to explain anthropogenic climate change or global capitalism than if we are trying to understand problems of national development or self-identification. These concepts are not mutually exclusive. Energy histories are a good example, inasmuch as energy is a problem of political economy, consumption, and scale—the latter a recurrent theme here. The histories of coal I mentioned are good models. I am also thinking of Gregory Cushman’s concern for how the nineteenth-century Peruvian guano boom transformed world agriculture, increased human carrying capacity, altered human-environment interactions, and spawned major companies such as Lever Brothers, Proctor & Gamble Corporation, and W. R. Grace and Company along the way. Demand for guano also justified civilian and naval forays into the Pacific to claim islands with guano deposits on behalf of the United States (something I first learned from Christina Duffy Ponsa’s early work). For American farmers, guano and off-farm fertilizers are important because they break the closed loop of the farm’s energy system, allowing for increased production and the possibility of cultivation on exhausted soils. They also require capital for purchase. So the geography of the farm changes as well. Were we to sketch it on a map, we would have to include not only seed stocks from Africa and Eurasia but also bat droppings from South America and the Pacific region. The globalized farm seems like an interesting problem of scale to me.20

Dierks: Courtney’s phrase “scaling up” is significant. Which social constituencies in the early nineteenth century managed to assemble the motivation, determination, knowledge, or resources to scale up their ambitions and activities to reach beyond the horizons of the local, the national, or the Atlantic?

One might reverse the flow, to ask: Who could “scale down” in different ways? Who could see phenomena happening in the wider world and then seek to act in response to them at a less-than-transnational level? Who could recognize the reach of global phenomena into their communities? Courtney’s examples are perfect for testing this. Who used guano, and who did not? The eventual guano boom involved promotion, brutal extraction, difficult transport, market logistics, and more; it had to be constructed; it was not a given, even if it gradually became a global force. What traditional or alternative fertilizers did non-guano farmers use? How were various hopes envisioned, and various choices implemented, whether global guano or not?

JAH: It seems as if much of this work is investigating the expansion of the United States into the world. What about the world reaching into the United States? How can we understand the country being a recipient rather than an agent of globalization?

Fullilove: I would begin with the caveat from the previous question that the United States cannot be treated as a discrete unit, even if we regard its history as the transformation of a settler colony into a nation-state with imperial ambitions. Like the empires from which it emerges, the United States is a hybrid of Dutch banking and shipbuilding technologies; continental and English industrial knowledge, legal tradition, and investment capital; and plantation agriculture practiced in the West Indies and elsewhere in the Americas. There is never a point at which the United States is not “in the world,” and vice versa.

I am not sure globalization is a question of reaching in or out so much as of exchange—and, in the narrow economic context, of trade-driven integration. Networks of capital in the first half of the nineteenth century were transatlantic rather than national. When I teach the history of American slavery I have students examine mortgages backed by slave collateral. I draw on the work of Edward Baptist, Seth Rockman, and others to help students understand how British and American investment capital supported the expansion of slave-produced cotton in the South. It is essential for students to consider how the financial instruments of transatlantic capitalism made slaves into money. It also provides a better framework for interpreting the boom and bust cycles of the American economy than did more narrowly framed histories of Andrew Jackson and the bank wars. (I am thinking of the recent work of Jessica Lepler and others to contextualize the panic of 1837.)

Indian removal, agricultural settlement, and internal improvements financed by British investors were of a piece with other expansionist visions. American presidents brought to office by popular enthusiasm for westward expansion tried to protect free navigation and commerce with European nations, which Thomas Jefferson had prioritized while seeking new pathways and connections in the Pacific: linking Europe to East Asia through the United States. Matthew Perry’s 1852–1854 expedition to Japan was one byproduct of such visions, and it was a race against Russian and British envoys simultaneous with the pursuit of trade relations with Japan. Midway through the expedition, part of Perry’s fleet was diverted to China to protect American interests imperiled by tensions between the English and the Chinese in advance of the Second Opium War (1856–1860).

I wonder if the vocabulary of globalization conceals the precise Atlantic, Pacific, and primarily European imperial networks in operation. In the case of my research, federal efforts to import seeds and cuttings for American agriculture almost always relied on the navy and consular service. Officers relied on existing diplomatic, commercial, and military relationships, remaining closely bound to the course of European empire. In their experiments with tea culture in the American South, for example, American improvers drew on knowledge and seeds gained on British tea plantations in Assam. And the U.S. Patent Office ultimately hired the East India Company’s smuggler, Robert Fortune, to acquire seedlings from Fujian. The British gardens at Kew provided the gold standard of

botanic imperialism to which American improvers aspired, but it would be too easy to call these collections global. The imagination of a single world comprising biologically diverse resources was less a precondition than a product of efforts to amass natural wealth for national gain.

Conroy-Krutz: I agree with Courtney that what we have been calling “global effects” within the country are, in fact, imperial ones. Perhaps the global language flattens out the dynamics of power and particularity. I am not sure I agree that the United States cannot be treated as a discrete unit. Certainly the United States emerges from empires and remains connected to other places, movements, ideas, and environmental contexts around the world. Perhaps for an environmental history the political boundaries are less relevant, but political boundaries and bodies matter a great deal to a general discussion of a global early republic. The ways that the United States did and did not fit into the various imperial, commercial, colonial, and cultural networks crisscrossing the globe at this point is an issue that requires careful discussion.

For the question at hand, about the inward effects of “globalization” (or whatever we want to call it), this is a key issue. British imperial historians wrote about a “new imperial history” in the 2000s, asking: What does being an empire do to the domestic and national culture? I have found that question to be an exciting entry point for thinking about the American experience in the early nineteenth century. Precisely because we have not always expected this period to be globally engaged, it is a question that has only recently been discussed in the American historiography.22

The desire of the missionaries I study to go out into the world and evangelize was the direct effect of the receipt of goods, objects, and texts from foreign places. Many of the early missionaries were based in and around Salem, Massachusetts, where they could visit the museum or watch the parades of the East India Marine Society. They could read the writings of British chaplains and missionaries describing Asia in letters, books, and periodicals that crossed the Atlantic. That global engagement helped shape their understanding of themselves as Christians and Americans who had a duty to go out and “convert the world.” The missionaries, in turn, sent back objects and words describing the world that they encountered to shape the thinking of those who remained at home.

Greenberg: Discourses of U.S. power are almost always univocal, and historiographies of American foreign relations, territorial expansion, and empire have reflected this orientation. Because we think about American power as a force emanating outward, it is easier to locate and write about the United States impacting the world than about engagements with mutually constitutive effects.

This was one of the key challenges posed by transnational history: how to write a history that is both the United States in the world and the world in the United States. It is easier to see the world in the United States if you abandon a focus on the United States as a discrete and stable entity and instead look at regions, trade, or global capital. Not surprisingly, some of the biggest promoters of transnational history were also, at least in the initial phase of its development, also in favor of deemphasizing the state, and are why

22 On the new imperial history, see, for example, Kathleen Wilson, ed., A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840 (Cambridge, Eng., 2004); and Catherine Hall and Sonya O. Rose, eds., At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World (Cambridge, Eng., 2006).
some of the most compelling transnational histories of this time period have also been borderland studies. To appreciate the impact of the world in the United States beyond immigration, slavery, and global capital, there is no better place to look than consumer goods. In addition to the examples offered by Courteney, James, and Ann, I am thinking about Sean Trainor’s work on the role of British-made razors in the transformation of American men’s grooming in the 1830s–1850s. And I agree with Nicholas Guyatt that there is still a great deal to do. One of our students at Penn State University is charting the impact of Chinese demand for ginseng on collecting and planting practices among Native American and white farmers—a fantastic project.23

It is easy to overstate the reach of federal power in the first decades of the nineteenth century, but I agree with Emily that there is value in holding onto “the state” as a unit of analysis, if only because political boundaries matter a lot when discussing empire. No doubt I think this way because my own work has focused so closely on territorial expansion. In Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire I charted the impact of filibustering abroad on gender practices at home, and in A Wicked War I narrated a story about how the invasion of a neighboring republic taught Americans at home how to organize against war and against the federal government.24

FULLILOVE: I agree with these qualifications. We have been bringing the state back into studies of U.S. history for a few decades now, and I did not mean to suggest that it is not an essential actor, even in an environmental history. Surely the federal government powerfully influenced land use and resource policies in the period we are discussing. In his history of cotton production Sven Beckert controversially uses the term “war capitalism” in lieu of a softer language of “mercantile” or “commercial” interests to underscore the state power required to clear land of Native Americans, legally enforce slavery, and secure free navigation of American ships and trade goods. My point is that integration rather than isolation is primary, so in that sense the trade network rather than the nation is the unit of analysis.25

DIERKS: Was there a transition in the early nineteenth century from an Atlantic world to a global one, from the vantage of the United States? Is there a periodization where the “container” of the Atlantic world gave way to something more global in scale? The stories of slavery, immigration, and imperial commerce were mainly Atlantic in the 1790s, but when we compare the 1790s to, say, the 1850s, we can see that it had become a very different world. Numerous constituencies were emanating out of the United States far beyond the Atlantic container.

One challenge is to investigate whether the wider world was reaching into the United States. Did the United States transition from more of a recipient to more of an agent of globalization? In terms of social constituencies, we have referred to consuls, missionaries, merchants, culture entrepreneurs, black activists, men of science, naval officers, and other kinds of Americans who went abroad. What about a reverse history of such social constituencies appearing in the United States from foreign lands? Kariann Akemi Yokota

25 Beckert, Empire of Cotton, xvi.
referred to Asian immigrants, which certainly became an important category in the decade before the Civil War. Courtney mentioned British investors, of importance throughout the era.

If the story of globalization was and is premised on mutual exchange, we have much more emerging scholarship on Americans abroad than on comparable foreigners sojourning or stationed in America. So if the United States entered an already-global world as a young independent nation with an Atlantic-world past in the 1790s, it might itself have become an agent of globalization. That transition deserves its own history.

Was the postcolonial United States ever primarily a recipient of globalization—of forces that entered into the country on a global (not just Atlantic or imperial) scale? That would be a less self-congratulatory narrative than a fundamentally agentive American history. It would mean close and cumulative research into the presence of different constituencies of foreigners either in the United States or, as with investors, acting on the United States from a distance. With respect to the latter, I can think of important recent work by Jessica Lepler and Max Edling. With respect to the former, we have a long-standing historiography on immigration not really framed in terms of globalization, and typically transnational rather than global in scope. But the overriding question of “the world in the United States,” as Amy puts it, seems much less considered and researched.26

**Yokota:** The idea that one’s nation can be self-contained or self-sustaining is a myth that is a product of the modern rise of the United States as a dominant global power—what I jokingly refer to as the luxury of ignorance of others. Indifference to others is enjoyed only by those with the power to erase the presence of others. This dynamic drew me to writing about the postcolonial period in U.S. history in *Unbecoming British*. During the uncertain and unstable period of the nation’s early years, Americans did not enjoy such luxury.27

Americans in the postcolonial period involved in transnational, transatlantic, and/or global networks of exchange devoted their energies to establishing ties with the outside world and being recognized by that world as players in the game of exchange. We must be mindful of the asymmetry of exchange and the differing power dynamics within these interactions. It is also important to remember that Americans were not always the ones in control of these unequal exchanges. For example, in the early China trade (prior to the Opium Wars), Europeans and Americans in search of coveted Chinese goods such as tea and silk were at the mercy of the demands of the Qing Dynasty’s leaders. Chinese tastes launched thousands of ships across the globe as Europeans (and, after 1784, Americans) went out in search of any goods that would be of remote interest to the Chinese who defined power as disinterest in other’s goods.

In the course of pursuing these goods for the Chinese market, Europeans and Americans connected various groups of native peoples on the North American continent and linked the transpacific world to global networks of exchange. They wreaked havoc upon the internal social structures of these native cultures and also destroyed entire species of animals and whole ecosystems.

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While I recognize the importance of recent scholarship that focuses on recovering the history of the expansion of the United States into “remote” corners of the world, I would like to see the historiography of the period focus on the other side of the equation: the other entities involved in these global encounters. Studies by historians of America and Europe that look at the Western “discovery” and infiltration of Hawaii commonly ignore the fact that Hawaii had established a highly developed and complex political system long before the “outsiders” arrived.28

These are the often-ignored but important backstories that precede the eventual European and American domination of China and Hawaii. Regarding the issue of periodization, if your historical narrative begins (as most studies do) on U.S.-China relations with the Opium War or a history of the United States in Hawaii and the Pacific with the American coup which resulted in displacing Queen Lili‘uokalani in 1893, you have a story of “the expansion of the U.S. into the world” rather than a more balanced perspective.

Cook: Where do we not see evidence of these sorts of reciprocal movements (the United States into the world, and the world into the United States)? What antebellum categories of people, products, styles, ideas, collections, books, periodicals, and seeds do not suggest growing evidence of “the world reaching into the United States” (and vice versa)?

By the first decades of the nineteenth century, the emerging U.S. theater syndicates were full of foreign stars (who often performed plays about “Barbary pirates” or Mungo Park’s 1790s explorations of the Senegambian “interior”). By the 1830s most of the leading U.S. newspapers ran “foreign intelligence” sections every week (often on the front page), along with regular reports on multiple European cities, countries, and colonial outposts. By the 1840s agricultural journals such as *Debow’s Review* reported on global crop prices and novel developments across the commodity chains of multiple slave-based industries. But this was not just happening in the contexts of slavery, resource extraction, and staple-crop production. Increasingly far-flung industries built around fashion, novels, sports, and theater required distant information and transnational infrastructure to facilitate the coordination of workers, products, and markets. During the 1840s and 1850s, new or recently launched periodicals such as the *Spirit of the Times*, the *Era*, *Bell’s Life in London*, *Godey’s Lady’s Book*, the *New York Clipper*, and many others began to offer more specialized “departments” (often with dedicated foreign reporting) on recent developments in each of their primary hubs: New York, Philadelphia, New Orleans, London, Paris, Dublin, and Glasgow. Through the early 1850s the purview of these periodicals consisted almost entirely of Atlantic port cities. During the 1860s and 1870s, however, the “foreign intelligence” sections expanded to San Francisco, Hawaii, Australia, South Asia, and East Asian treaty ports. Why? Because the industries (and commercial interests) driving these periodicals now encompassed those sectors. The *New York Clipper*, for example, began to publish annual supplements (or “almanacs”) for U.S. managers that read like a kind of how-to manual for globalization. The advertisements focus on transatlantic and transpacific steamship lines and the basic infrastructure of overseas promotion: hotels, printers, railroads, and telegraphy. Entire sections are dedicated to logistical

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questions such as the train lines in Russia, the steamship schedules around the Black Sea, or the seating plans of theaters in Sydney.29

I suspect that the patterns would be very similar if we shifted the focus from commercial to religious periodicals. Between 1840 and 1870, the evangelical impulses of the “Christian perfectionism” of Charles Grandison Finney were rapidly expanding into missionary projects across West Africa, upper Canada, Hawaii, and much of Asia. The reporting from these far-flung projects circled back to Finney’s base in Oberlin, Ohio through purpose-built infrastructure and with increasing frequency, thereby (re)shaping domestic causes, donations, and policy making. Much the same was true of antislavery politics. It is not just that Garrisonian abolitionism was “internationalist” in self-conception and tactics from the first issue of the Liberator; or that the first waves of African American lecturers to work abroad (Nathaniel Paul, Charles Lenox Remond, Frederick Douglass) moved through rapidly expanding networks of “immediatist” ferment in places such as London, Birmingham, Dublin, Cork, Glasgow, and Paris. It is also that the effects of this process always moved in both directions. Paul went to Britain during the early 1830s to raise fungible capital for a free black settlement in Canada. Douglass used the fame and profits from his first British tour (1845–1847) to launch the North Star and create his own domestic networks of black reporting. If we follow the money across Douglass’s career, the broader effects of “the world in the United States” are everywhere apparent: from the weekly lists of foreign donors to his strategic serialization of Charles Dickens’s novels.

This does not mean, of course, that the reciprocal movements were seamless or free of conflict. One could easily write an alternative version of the story emphasizing Dickens’s battles over international copyright law (during his U.S. tour of 1842); domestic backlashes against foreign actors (such as the Astor Place riot in 1849); or the recurring struggles around international travel experienced by people of color at every turn. Before we turn to limits and strictures, however, we should establish the range of movements in multiple directions.30

Dierks: Let me introduce the term friction. Focusing on the process of globalization from the United States outward, we see the difficulty of reaching into the world. Emily’s new book on American missionaries captures this difficulty beautifully. How did missionaries figure out where in the world to go? How did they amass the financial resources to station missionaries in distant places? How did they craft public appeals in the United States to make those foreign places seem worthy of and receptive to missionizing? Friction.31

Kariann highlights the neglected factor of recipient places. What was happening in those places before the arrival of various Americans? How did indigenous peoples react to those arrivals, whether in the form of a ship that came and went or in the form of a consul who

31 Emily Conroy-Krutz, Christian Imperialism.
sojourned? We know from some recent historical work that there was a spectrum of accommodation and resistance to the presence and activities of Americans abroad. Friction.

The new essay collection entitled Empire’s Twin as well as Amy’s forthcoming book on anti-imperialism voiced in the United States address domestic opposition to the projection of American power abroad. Friction. I think of Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing’s 2004 book Friction in light of the connection-friction dyad that Courtney mentions. Pursuing only the “connection” half of the dyad leads to the repeated argument that some element of American life was more interconnected than our outdated nationally oriented histories could ever have imagined. That argument now offers a diminishing dividend without due attention to the “friction” half of the dyad, the power dynamics.

To what degree was the United States a recipient of globalization—perhaps another source of friction? As part of my book project I have been working on an interactive digital world map project that traces, so far, ten variables in the globalization of the United States. Given record-keeping practices in the nineteenth century, it was far easier to find the data for American diplomatic and naval officials stationed abroad than it has been to find the data for comparable foreign officials stationed in the United States. Over time there were considerably more Americans stationed abroad than foreigners stationed in the United States. That disparity is important for appreciating what some American constituencies accomplished in the early nineteenth century. Equally importantly, that disparity has a history, with mobilization (the allocation of tax revenues and the recruitment of personnel), opposition (political preference for domestic priorities), and resistance (indigenous resentment and protest). It is not reducible to global interconnection as an unchanging, frictionless condition of life. The disparity could reach the level of serious friction, because American officials abroad seemed to spark considerably more controversy than did foreign officials in the United States.

Fullilove: I like the metaphor of friction. I continue to resist metaphors of reaching in or out because of their implication of national containment, and also because I research and read about guys on boats—and especially guys on boats who like plants. They may have territorial-national destinies or affiliations, but a lot of their time is the tide’s. When they engage in exchange of goods, services, and information, they are changed as much as the world is; although I do want to know how and whether they articulate and operationalize their changed perspectives.

I am writing about James Morrow, the agriculturalist on the Perry expeditions, who spends the months in Edo harbor wandering the Japanese countryside collecting wild plants, trading seeds with gardeners and farmers on behalf of the U.S. Patent Office and Philadelphia horticulturalists, and jostling with merchants at the bazaar: collecting, giving, bartering, and buying, as a private citizen and an agent of the government. I am interested

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in how missionaries (and others) conceived of plants relative to the other ideas and goods in which they trafficked. What should be given or exchanged? What should not? Were there contradictions, in principle or in practice? I find the contradictions interesting and often-useful keys to contemporary conundrums. For example, there is a pervasive notion that nature should be shared freely but that property should not. Seeds are in an interesting gray area, because they require human labor to be cultivated and improved. These questions about which kinds of exchange are permissible bring to mind Brian Rouleau’s accounts of badly behaved sailors in foreign ports. How is license to take or trade negotiated?35

I would not say that any minds are necessarily being (de)colonized by these varied transactions, but we can assess them as sites of power and action without reifying or privileging national identity. That is not to deny that travelers are constantly identified as Americans, or that there is a political-economic rationale for their travels. Nevertheless, I may be resisting “the vantage of the United States,” as a point of methodology. To me, ecology (as relations between organisms and their environs), the body, and transaction are the sites to find the frictions that Konstantin Dierks identifies—even if as a result we can tell a more compelling story about American governance and commerce in the world.

Cook: I agree that asymmetry and friction (as opposed to mere connectivity and expansion) are central to the drama. It also seems to me that multiple forms of friction coexist in most of these stories. Take Dickens’s 1842 U.S. literary tour—one of the pivotal events in early mass culture. By that year Dickens was among the best-known authors on the planet, and the United States constituted his biggest foreign market. From the beginning, however, he experienced one form of friction after another. Crowds hounded him in the streets, swarmed his hotels, and demanded greater access to his public appearances. In response, Dickens began canceling scheduled events and groused in the papers. Although his global celebrity was built, in large part, from U.S. sales and publicity, he spent much of his tour criticizing U.S. newspaper editors who had violated British copyrights by serializing his novels free of charge. As Meredith L. McGill has shown so well, the tour quickly devolved into a public battle over competing models of intellectual property (and political economy).36

Even this was just the beginning. In New York City Dickens issued a moratorium on the high-level dinner parties held for him and instead spent an evening touring African American dance halls in the Five Points District (an episode that later became the notorious focus of his New York chapter in American Notes for General Circulation). This activity, in turn, provoked a backlash by U.S. editors, who called for boycotts of Dickens’s books. Meanwhile, the black dancer featured in Dickens’s chapter on New York (the previously unknown virtuoso William Henry Lane) used the unexpected fame from American Notes for General Circulation to circumvent the conventional color lines in the U.S. culture industries. Over the next few years, Lane became the first African American dancer to headline a U.S. company (1844–1848) and tour abroad (1848–1852), ultimately starring at almost every major venue in England, Ireland, and Scotland.37

This latter wrinkle suggests a form of friction that we have only recently begun to recognize as central for African American performers: access to commercial publics: transnational mobility as strategic maneuver. As David Brion Davis, Richard Blackett, and others have noted, a similar set of maneuvers drove Douglass’s 1846 vision of a “moral cordon”: his notion that one could build antislavery publics across national boundaries, repurpose foreign capital, and exert political pressure (on the United States) from afar.\textsuperscript{38}

A number of major twentieth-century studies (such as Mary L. Dudziak’s \textit{Cold War Civil Rights}, Brent Hayes Edwards’s \textit{The Practice of Diaspora}, and Robin D. G. Kelley’s \textit{Freedom Dreams}) have explored this sort of friction to great effect, illuminating the ways minority intellectuals, activists, and artists built their projects geopolitically. But it seems to me that we are only beginning to understand how these earlier strategies operated beyond the context of organized antislavery networks.\textsuperscript{39}

In terms of “limits,” key questions surrounding early black geopolitics remain. For example, despite a recent flurry of good books on the history of the passport, we still know relatively little about the law and logistics of black travel between 1770 and 1870. We know that many “sojourners” had their passport applications denied yet still traveled abroad without a passport of any kind; indeed, for Lane and Douglass, it may have been easier to enter Britain than to tour in the United States. But we still know relatively little about how they engineered such overseas travel or what kinds of challenges they faced in moving across national borders beyond the United States.\textsuperscript{40}

Leroy: This question reveals how challenging it is to de-center the United States even for Americanists critical of United States–centrism. Indigenous history, Mexican history, and the history of immigration are profound examples of the world reaching into the United States. Yet because they have become such fundamental movements in U.S. history it can be difficult to see them from any other perspective. One specific example might be the immigration of German radicals to the United States in the 1840s. These immigrants had transformative effects on the labor movement and mobilizations against economic inequality in the antebellum period and beyond. Even before the end of the Civil War black abolitionists began to use the language of capital and labor to emphasize the continuity of slavery and sharecropping. The Marxist ideas that German immigrants introduced to the United States resonated with black thinkers far more than the utopian socialism of earlier decades and gave them the language to describe the limits of emancipation that did not include economic restructuring. Surely there is much more work to be done on how ideas from abroad influenced American social movements.


Greenberg: I am sympathetic to the idea that the first decades of the nineteenth century were marked by a transition from Atlantic networks to more global ones. Is this a remnant from previous historiography? Kariann’s and Emily’s recent scholarship suggests this. As for Justin’s appealing proposal that we focus on what we do not know about U.S. globalism, I can only reiterate, from experience, that researching something defined by a lack of evidence is ridiculously frustrating, since you can never be sure the evidence is not out there, and you just failed to find it.\(^{41}\)

Andrew Zimmerman is currently researching the impact of German radicalism on the United States during this period, and he makes a strong case for the transformative impact of this network. He wrote a fantastic transnational history of Booker T. Washington and the German colony of Togo at the turn of the twentieth century.\(^{42}\)

Guyatt: As colonial Americanists have always known, the United States is the product of many overlapping processes and developments that were necessarily international-transnational in their origins and workings. The problem, from a traditional diplomatic history perspective, is that we allowed ourselves to imagine that the United States entered existence as a strong nation-state with an unusual set of advantages—foremost among them, its supposed isolation from its natural rivals in Europe. One only gets to this vantage by ignoring those transnational-international forces that guided European settlement in the Americas, and one only manages that feat by giving an almost-supernatural agency to both nationhood and isolation. We have written plenty already about the fallacy of the latter, as an assumption about America’s place in the world in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. (Perhaps one can only sustain the fiction of isolation through exceptionalist narratives such as the melting pot and the frontier thesis.) On nationhood, I wonder if we will need to revisit our assumptions about the nature of the international system in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I am fascinated by the process through which the United States, even as it shed some of its British trappings and predilections, effectively entered a world of international finance, law, and humanitarianism that was either British, imperial, or both. In this sense, empire is not something that the United States projects into the world; it is the glue that seems to hold together an international system in which the United States is, initially at least, a junior partner.\(^{43}\)

Dierks: In the introduction to Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People, David Armitage and Alison Bashford acknowledge that the field of Atlantic history has the advantage of


possessing a fairly mature and generally accepted master narrative of the horrors of European imperialism and the African slave trade. By contrast, Pacific history, they argued, had not yet developed a comparable master narrative. (One can, of course, question the value of a master narrative.) Yet nineteenth-century Pacific history seems to be rapidly gaining scholarly attention, unsurprising given the apparent tilt of our contemporary world.\footnote{David Armitage and Alison Bashford, \textit{Pacific Histories: Ocean, Land, People} (London, 2014).}

What about truly global history of the nineteenth century, with the United States in it to whatever degree? We seem unavoidably quite far from any master narrative, even if Jürgen Osterhammel has frozen historiographical time and attempted such a magisterial history. What is the history, more precisely, of globalization? It is telling that there seems to be considerably less research on the nineteenth century about global encounters in the United States, if we seek to focus on encounters involving people rather than things.\footnote{Jürgen Osterhammel, \textit{The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century} (Princeton, 2014).}

\textit{JAH: From this discussion it seems that global history has its own periodization that is distinct from any national history, but how does this periodization intersect with the history of the United States between the American Revolution and the Civil War? Were there new directions, critical masses, tipping points, or decisive events in the globalization of the United States within those seventy years of American history?}


\textbf{Cook:} Many of us, I suspect, would begin with competing milestones: the many slave emancipations across the Atlantic world, for example, or the shifting parameters of slavery in different geographic contexts. More than forty years of comparative work have made us keenly aware of the multiple rhythms of slavery, emancipation, and freedom through the 1870s. Today, the stories vary by regime (British, French, Spanish, U.S., and Native American), region (northern, southern, western, Caribbean); and systems of production (tobacco, rice, sugar, cotton, urban manufacturing). And that variance is just within the Western Hemisphere.

However, much work in recent years has suggested the need for periodizations not so much disconnected or wholly separate as convergent and mutually constitutive. As James Walvin, Vincent Carretta, Joanna Brooks, and James Sidbury have shown, key events
in British law such as *Somerset v. Stewart* shaped the strategic choices of distant figures such as Phillis Wheatley, Olaudah Equiano, and John Marrant (who, in turn, journeyed across the Atlantic and (re)shaped the contours of British antislavery politics). The Haitian Revolution impacted the law and politics of every other Western regime, and shaped grassroots efforts to challenge those regimes from Philadelphia to Kingston and the Carolina Low Country to the British Midlands. The political careers of figures such as Daniel O’Connell cut across multiple periodizations that are not easily disentangled: Catholic emancipation and British immediatism; West Indian emancipation and the Irish repeal movement; Garrisonian abolitionism in the United States; and the mass migrations sparked by famine. For good examples of the entanglements, see the pioneering studies of Douglas Riach and C. Duncan Rice. 47

**FULLILOVE:** If we define globalization narrowly, as integration primarily structured by trade, a commodity chains approach is useful. We could also cite global commodity shortages precipitated by conflict and natural disaster, which yoked U.S. producers to international markets: for example, American wheat during the Crimean War. The capital flows of each trade warrant attention. An intellectual history of the “global” would call for a different chronology, requiring us to take into account varied rhetorics of civilization, morality, nature, science, and national competition.

**DIERKS:** I find direct and indirect evidence of global concerns registered in American public discourse. Among thousands of pieces of evidence of this sort, there were more world atlases produced in the United States in the 1850s than in the 1790s, just as there were more American cookbooks that included seemingly foreign recipes. As James insisted earlier, the global was increasingly everywhere in American culture.

I also remain preoccupied with institutionalization, with putting cultural concerns in durable material form, and with assembling real power. With institutionalization in mind, I will limit my examples to the U.S. Navy:

A new direction. In 1813 a U.S. Navy warship cruises in the Pacific Ocean for the first time.

A critical mass. In 1835 the U.S. Navy establishes the East India Squadron and from then on maintains naval squadrons in every oceanic theater.

A decisive event. The United States Exploring Expedition circumnavigates the world for four years between 1838 and 1842, engaging in diplomatic, scientific, and military activities, and ratifying the global scale of American presence and reach.

A tipping point. In 1853 a U.S. Navy officer in charge of the Depot of Charts and Instruments organizes an international maritime conference held in Belgium, be-speaking increasing American credibility in international scientific circles. 48


While they were not truly global events, these kinds of indicators internal to the various social constituencies reaching out of or into the United States are important in and of themselves, and they could be even more important once more indicators are compared and contrasted.

My digital global map project will develop into a platform to juxtapose far more than the current ten variables so that convergences and divergences can be detected along a time line. Right now I see a global scale attained in the 1830s for several variables of American activity in the world. For better or worse, the postcolonial United States managed to become a global player by the 1830s, and Americans could increasingly imagine themselves as ranking second in the world behind only the British Empire.  

Conroy-Krutz: My time line would add to Amy’s and Konstantin’s lists of events the 1812 departure of the first American foreign missionaries and the War of 1812, which created a crisis for hopes of an Anglo-American cooperative venture in the work of world missions. I would also add the arrival of missionaries in Hawaii and the Middle East in 1819 and the purchase of land in Liberia by the American Colonization Society in 1821. I imagine that were we to pool our respective time lines, the results would be quite interesting. We have been talking about the American Revolution for much longer than we have been talking about some of these other global contexts. As more of this work appears, our U.S. history time line will appear more global. After reading Kariann’s book, for example, I now teach about the Empress of China, and my American Revolution students should be able to tell you that 1784 should be on our time line as a result. As we incorporate the global into our histories of America more generally, it might become harder to disentangle national and global events.

Yokota: Emily’s question about whether the archives were sufficient for thinking about the ways that many people engaged with the global in their daily lives makes me wonder how global and national concerns structure the lives of individuals. Archives contain records that locate Americans in practically every corner of the transpacific world during the period we are discussing. At some moments these people seemed literally and figuratively unmoored from the nation, while at other moments and in other contexts, national identity and the power of the nation-state were of the utmost importance. For example, there are numerous petitions sent by American citizens involved in the early Pacific trade begging the U.S. Congress for diplomatic and military support when trouble arose or foreign competition became too intense. For the most part, however, the people writing these petitions were happy to work independently, freed from the confines and restrictions of their nation. Americans were not the only ones to do this. For decades the British employees of the British East India Company who were involved in the early China trade implored their government to refrain from interfering in Canton. However, when the opium they introduced into China began to cause social and political instability, they used the British Royal Navy to finish the job in what became known in the West as the First Opium War (1839–1842) and the Second Opium War (1856–1860).

49 Globalization of the United States, 1789–1861.
Is there an unconscious or even unwitting assumption that the introduction of the global makes both historians and the historical actors we study less nation-centric and perhaps even more cosmopolitan and accepting of difference? One could argue that the opposite is true. In the eyes of the people I study (all of whom were involved in some form of global, or at the very least transnational, networks of exchange of ideas, people, and objects), this shared Anglo-American identity strengthened the new and struggling nation. Although it may seem counterintuitive, the global was put into the service of the nation.

It seems to me that early American history was traditionally broken into two distinct periods—before and after the American Revolution. These works either led up to or started from the point of the Revolution. At its most extreme they provided two snapshots—the before and after photos of American society. I am interested in destabilizing that periodization by looking at networks of global exchange that existed before and continued after the political rupture. Although politically free, America remained culturally, technologically, and economically dependent on the mother country in the postrevolutionary years. This approach puts less emphasis on American political independence while still acknowledging its importance, for although postrevolutionary Americans remained dependent on their British patrons, as members of an independent nation they became increasingly uneasy and then ashamed of the dependence that was an accepted part of the colonial relationship.

Guyatt: I would like to follow up on Kariann’s question about whether there is any kind of connection between mobility and cosmopolitanism. Having just finished reading American Apostles, I am tempted to say no. I am wary of going too far in that direction and assuming that first-hand experience of the wider world served to confirm Americans’ prejudices—that, in effect, itinerant Americans packed their hang-ups and their narrow field of view whenever they left the United States. One obvious consequence of travel is that our subjects are forced to test their prejudices against concrete examples and either discard them or come up with new ones when experience intervened. I wonder if the bar for cosmopolitanism was lowered when an expatriate American confronted, say, France rather than China.52

I think the span of the American Revolution to the Civil War is hopeless, even for U.S. history. Thinking about expanding space and time, there is still mileage in the idea of a late eighteenth-century “age of revolutions,” even if we want to qualify the meaning of that term and ponder how Haiti confirms and confounds the revolutionary paradigm. I think the resolution of the War of 1812 is absolutely crucial, for all the reasons François Furstenberg has mentioned, but also because of the impetus given to a renewed alliance with Britain in the spheres of international law, finance, and civil society. (I would prefer to include the non-U.S. portions of the North American continent in our definition of the foreign-global; with this in mind, the spur to expansion in the old Southwest that followed the War of 1812 was key; ditto the U.S. rejection of the British proposal in 1814 that everything between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes should become a neutral zone occupied solely by Native Americans.)53

Clearly, British West Indies emancipation in the 1830s is a crucial event, not only for U.S. debates about slavery but also for the future of labor patterns throughout the Americas. I would also put in a word for the Spanish recolonization of Santo Domingo in 1861 (Eugenio Matibag calls it “retro-colonization”), and, of course, for the European invasion of Mexico later that year.54

CONROY-KRUTZ: I agree with Kariann that global interactions do not necessarily function to make the historical actors we study less nation-centric or more accepting of difference. But I think that Nicholas is right in thinking that we cannot just say “no” and leave it at that. I do not know if I would say that missionaries are the best tests for this thesis, but they are fairly good test subjects, as in this period they are planning to spend the rest of their lives in the field and therefore are committing to going out and making their lives among those they would like to convert. You might expect them to be the most likely to change in response to their global experiences, and some do. But they are also perhaps more likely than others to carry prejudices and particular world views with them. They are, after all, out to convert, and that conversion is not just religious but also cultural.

GREENBERG: In response to Kariann’s query about whether there is an “unconscious or even unwitting assumption that the introduction of the global makes both historians and the historical actors we study less national-centric and perhaps even more cosmopolitan and accepting of difference,” I want to offer an enthusiastic “yes” about historians. As for our historical actors, I am going to second Nicholas’s and Emily’s unwillingness to offer a blanket condemnation, while agreeing that travel seems to have been singularly unenlightening for many nineteenth-century Americans. Emily’s missionaries are far more contemplative than the vast majority of travelers I have looked at. Nine out of ten gold rush travelers who took the isthmus route and wrote about it evaluated the region almost entirely through the lens of their experience in the United States. What was familiar, they liked, what was unfamiliar, they condemned—excepting avocados (“alligator pears”), which everyone loved, and Latin American women, whom the men, generally, adored for their supposed difference. Travelers understood the region as proto-U.S. soil (on the way to becoming part of the United States). Most were utterly incapable of seeing what was in front of them.55

The common understanding of travel now is that it is a singular route to enlightenment. This is the governing narrative of the Travel Channel, study-abroad programs, and virtually every guidebook on the shelves of Barnes & Noble. When I assign my students Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Self-Reliance” they are often most shocked by Emerson’s assertion that “the wise man stays at home.” They believe that traveling abroad is what makes them citizens of the world. But there is a great deal of evidence in the posts in this interchange that nineteenth-century Americans had a very different view of the value of travel.56

FULLILOVE: Let me push back on the implication that people and stuff can be opposed, with the stuff always demonstrating interconnection and the people articulating limits—in part because, more often than not, people moved stuff (for example, trade goods,

54 Eugenio Matibag, Haitian-Dominican Counterpoint: Nation, State, Race on Hispaniola (New York, 2003), 120.
seeds, livestock, microbes); it was not just everywhere, at once, always. To recover how varied networks of exchange were constituted (that is, the history of globalization), we have to look not only within institutions (for example, the U.S. Navy) but also beneath them, to informal exchanges that structure trade networks. We can learn an enormous amount from studying the navy, but I would not call such a history “bottom-up” so much as institutionalist. I see the various time lines as overlays rather than alternatives (though I agree that we need to dump the American Revolution–Civil War container, even if we are using American history as a frame).

I am interested in this line of discussion about whether historians assume that mobility makes those we study (or us) more cosmopolitan, less nationalistic, or less provincial. I appreciate the suggestion to the contrary, and especially the example of the United States as an attempt to domesticate the Pacific for Western trade. I also think of this line of questioning when I read accounts of twentieth-century development projects emphasizing insensitivity to local knowledge and environments (for example, Nick Cullather’s *The Hungry World* or Daniel Immerwahr’s *Thinking Small*). So yes, there is no indication that people travel with open minds or become more open-minded as a result of travel.57

Conversely, I find the travel narratives of naturalists and agriculturalists fascinating because their experiences can go either way, or both ways. I have often been surprised at the openness of naturalists’ journals. James Morrow, the agriculturalist on the Perry expeditions, makes many admiring notes on diverse plants in the wild and on the methods of cultivation with which he is unfamiliar. In his youthful enthusiasm for the expedition, it is obvious that he wants to see the world for his own edification as much as for national service. And I can tell that he learns a lot about plants and people. I wish I could see changes in his mind after he returned to South Carolina; but he dies young.58

Although Morrow’s journal expresses simple frustration with nosy and scrappy villagers, I would argue that Morrow naturalizes particularly American forms of commerce and property rights in the same way he naturalizes the specimens of algae he is collecting on the shore. He believes nature, commerce, and property should all operate according to universal (that is, global) principles. Yet he has a distinctly American take on what those universal principles are. They include a resistance to state interference with the natural rules of commerce; and seven years later, he is in the Confederate Army, defending South Carolina’s rights of secession. This, I suppose, is an obvious but necessary coda that we cannot presume national uniformity or integrity in this period (or any period): cotton planters turned to Liverpool have a different geographic orientation than merchants advocating Pacific commerce, even if the son of a planter ends up as a Pacific expedition agriculturalist.

Dierks: I was using the U.S. Navy as one small indicator out of many indicators that might, cumulatively, help us see subterranean narratives of historical change outside of wars and revolutions. If many of these indicators coalesce around another temporal conjunction (emphatically not an “event”)—I would postulate the late 1830s as one of those moments based on sundry evidence I have sifted—that will enable us to recast the narra-


ative of globalization in the early nineteenth century, and how it happened. I was hoping that the way we construct narratives could be more bottom-up.

This would also be closer to the point about the importance of the informal. I scrutinize institutionalization because I am interested in the creation of power, but I did not mean to diminish the “informal” mechanisms of globalization or historical change. Tension between the recognition of and mobilization toward opportunities of power, on the one hand, and alternative ambitions and activities of people not so power hungry or so self-consciously globally minded, on the other, can lead to productive analysis as another crucial route toward giving globalization a properly contingent history.

**JAH:** Do we need to change the structure of how most historians work to meet the challenge of historicizing the global? Do these kinds of projects require language skill, time, travel, and resources beyond those available to most individual scholars? If so, are other forms of collaboration, training, research methods, or presentations needed to meet this challenge?

**Cook:** There are at least two key issues here, and the first is money. Producing rigorous work in this area often requires distressingly large sums of research money. Even with the recent explosion of digitized newspapers, pamphlets, and manuscript sources, many of the most interesting and important topics still require considerable travel to local collections in multiple countries. Most of us find it difficult to travel to archives on three or four continents or to hire teams of research assistants in a dozen different locations. This means that considerable time and effort is inevitably devoted to raising money and simply getting there. It also means that one needs to be very careful about choosing global topics that are actually researchable in a single lifetime (or within the time frame of a conventional promotion cycle). Second is language. I thought with a reading knowledge of French and German I was in pretty good shape to pursue my current project. Much of the early portion of my story focuses on the Atlantic world—and especially the United Kingdom. However, Ira Aldridge, for example, achieved some of his biggest runs in places such as Constantinople—a city with more than twenty newspapers during the 1860s (many of them in Greek, Turkish, and Armenian). And that is just one tour stop. From there, it was on to Russia, Poland, Austria, and Hungary. Later pieces of my project focus on the first “round-the-world” tours of the Fisk Jubilee Singers, who carefully assembled week-by-week scrapbooks of press clippings in cities across India, Burma, China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. It is an enormous gift from the research gods that these scrapbooks even exist, for they preserve (and collate) literally hundreds of discrete performances across tens of thousands of miles. Not surprisingly, however, most of the surviving reviews in these remarkable volumes come from British colonial newspapers—a key source but hardly the only important perspectives in each of these contexts. At the moments when the stories become most compelling, they can also become enormously challenging to reconstruct with the depth and complexity we always seek.

**Fabian:** To some extent, our growing digital archive will let us follow the circuits of performers, as James has done so remarkably. But does a global history hatch a batch of new questions? What did a Turkish audience make of Aldridge’s performance? Where did he fit in a history of performances in Istanbul?
One quick example from my book on skulls: I was pulled into the story of Ro-Veidovi, a man from Fiji arrested by Charles Wilkes, commander of the United States Exploring Expedition, and brought back to New York City, where he died. The U.S. version of the story led me to P. T. Barnum and the Smithsonian Institution. Ro-Veidovi’s history was an also an instance in the global trade in sea slugs. More importantly, his arrest by Wilkes was part of a long history of wars between rival Fijian towns. It seemed important to me to tell his story as not just a U.S. story—as though Fiji were waiting for the Americans to arrive to be brought into history.59

I had Marshall Sahlins’s *Apologies to Thucydides* to help me, although Sahlins was not interested in what happened to Ro-Veidovi once he sailed off with Wilkes. So I became slightly interdisciplinary in a conventional way. I also read accounts from Wilkes’s men, missionary’s memoirs, and beach combers’ narratives, and I played with variant spellings and found pieces of the story in databases. But how much richer would this have been if I had figured out a way to write it as a truly collaborative history? How would the questions have changed if I were not trying to fit it into a narrative of American history, whether about American race science, Pacific exploration, or the development of the Smithsonian Institution collections?60

Yes, collaboration—difficult, messy, and inefficient though it might be. I am not sure there is any other way to capture the “so what” of the global stories we try to tell. We still have Ro-Veidovi’s skull in Washington, D.C., but what did his absence mean in Fiji? And how does his story play through a long history of Fijian politics?

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**Greenberg:** Global history requires a great deal of time. The recent example that immediately springs to my mind is Sven Beckert’s *Empire of Cotton*. The amount of resources expended upon this project is astounding—not just funds for travel and to pay researchers around the world but the collective number of hours that Beckert and others devoted to its production. While reading it I could not help but think of the seventeenth-century Holy Roman Empire, nineteenth-century Britain, Ancient Rome—any of those empires where colonizers bragged that “the sun never sets.” Beckert’s history, it seems to me, is global not only in subject but also in production. But it is not a reproducible standard for most scholars and certainly not for anyone dealing with the pressures of a tenure clock.61

Let me offer as another example a book I have already praised as global history done remarkably well: Andrew Zimmerman’s *Alabama in Africa*. This project required not only a facility with German archives unavailable to most U.S. historians (Zimmerman, not coincidentally, started his career as a historian of Germany) but also months of research on three continents. In addition to researching Booker T. Washington’s role as an agent of imperial change, and the history of agriculture in the U.S. South during Reconstruction and the Gilded Age, Zimmerman had to puzzle through the multiple intersecting relationships of colonial officials and laborers in Togo, administrators and scientists in Germany, and eastern European laborers in the German Empire.62

Have we fully grappled with the challenges of global history for young scholars facing time constraints? All of us who direct dissertations have to think about what our students are signing up for when they embark on this kind of a project.

59 Ann Fabian, *The Skull Collectors: Race, Science, and America’s Unburied Dead* (Chicago, 2010).
61 Beckert, *Empire of Cotton*.
Ever since reading Rebecca Scott and Jean Hébrard’s *Freedom Papers* I have shared Ann’s sense that collaboration is not only useful to writing global history but might also be necessary. If so, this poses another challenge to scholars hoping to earn tenure and promotion in a university system that venerates the single-author monograph.63

Guyatt: Regarding languages, we still do not do enough to place language teaching and foreign-language archival work at the heart of what we do as American historians. This is a massive challenge here in the United Kingdom, where high school provision of languages is spotty and the university system emphasizes the study of just one subject rather than a raft of courses. Perhaps U.S. graduate schools have evolved a bit in the more than ten years since I got my Ph.D., but my biggest regret is that the language requirement for Americanists was more of a hurdle to leap over than an integral part of our research training.

We need to find a way to convince tenure committees and other academic gatekeepers that global or transnational histories are unusually complex endeavors. Junior scholars have not always been successful in making this argument, though at least a tenure committee has some discretion in its assessment of a scholar’s productivity and potential. Here in the United Kingdom we find ourselves shoveling our books and articles onto a government-run conveyor belt that demands four “outputs” from every academic scholar in each six-year cycle. Although these “outputs” are eventually placed before—perhaps even read by—a small panel of historians deputed to assess their worth, the inflexibility of the metric is a poor fit for patterns of research in transnational and global topics. Moreover, we place incredible pressure on junior career researchers in the United Kingdom, who are expected to finish their first books long before their tenure-track equivalents in the United States.

We need to examine the costs—time, money, effort—related to these kinds of histories and then make the case for proper resourcing. While collaboration might provide a way to lighten the load, it would be terrific if we found ways to support individuals—especially those starting out in their careers—who can see a fabulously ambitious project but who do not have the money, opportunity, or stamina to complete it under the existing constraints of our profession.

“Historicizing the global”: we will want to encourage research and teaching that adopts a multiplicity of perspectives on the extent and limits of American history. “Globalizing” research in U.S. history may sometimes present a challenge to familiar interpretations, but the process also contains a complementary promise. Our stories of Americans overseas are an obvious way to expand the frame of American history; our efforts to contextualize U.S. territorial expansion in an international setting give us a new vantage point on Native American history, the history of Latin America, and the persistence of European ambitions in the Western Hemisphere; and our awareness of the contours of wider world history allows us to see the entanglement of the United States in a vast and complex system.

Leroy: There is also the challenge of the imagination in terms of how we define “rigorous” historical scholarship. Several examples come to mind. First is David Armitage and Jo Guldi’s *The History Manifesto*. Guldi and Armitage advocate for an enlarged public

63 Hébrard and Scott, *Freedom Papers*. 
role for professional historians and argue that we should be tackling big questions of planetary scale, such as climate change. Most interesting to me about this idea is that it would necessarily require us to move beyond our specializations and rely heavily on secondary sources to ask the biggest questions possible of our archives. Doing so opens us to criticism from scholars who specialize in the topics in which we are dilettantes. Even so, perhaps it is time that we let go of the idea that we cannot write beyond our narrow fields of expertise, and thought about how we might engage questions that are almost by definition too big for a single scholar to research using exclusively primary sources.64

Second, as an African American historian, I am sometimes skeptical about how we determine who and what qualifies as an agent of globalization. Controversy seems to ensue whenever a scholar argues for the importance of African-descended people to global history. This has ranged from the well-known debates about the work of Eric Williams and Martin Bernal, both producing cottage industries of scholarship devoted to debunking their claims, to more contemporary scholarship. For example, when Judith Carney made the claim that African women’s agricultural knowledge profoundly transformed the plantation economy of the Carolinas in the eighteenth century, several prominent Atlantic historians dismissed her argument out of hand. What stood out to me about this debate was her detractors’ use of quantitative evidence to make what was essentially an ideological argument about the impossibility of African women being at the center of U.S. agricultural history. If we give in to the impulse to privilege quantitative over qualitative evidence when it comes to large-scale questions, then of course those who left the most complete records will emerge as the true heralds of globalization. To effectively meet the challenge of global history we must think expansively without archives and evidence.65

This brings me to my third point. One way we might approach global history differently is from the vantage point of analytical categories such as gender and sexuality. Amy’s Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire is an excellent example. It takes gender and sexuality—categories that often fall out of “big” history—and places them front and center, showing us that the global does not happen only at the level of state, economy, and environment. We need to train ourselves and our students to be better historians of global processes, but that is not only about learning more languages and applying for bigger travel grants. It is also about revising our sense of where and how the global happens.66

FULLILOVE: I do collaborate with a team of plant genetic-resource specialists collecting wild relatives of cereal crops for international seed banks; and, in part, the last six years of travel in post-Soviet republics have inspired much of my thinking on the fissures between concepts of globalized nature, commerce, and property. These projects have also forced me to consider instances in which networks of research capital rather than nation-states are prime movers. While this is a twenty-first-century condition, it has prompted me to be more precise in my analysis of political economy across time.

66 Greenberg, Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire.
On sources and methodology, I appreciate Justin’s thoughts on the debates around Carney’s black-rice thesis and the broader question about how historians operate in the absence of archives (which will become more relevant in an age of digital ephemera). This conundrum pertains to the issue of locating sub- or extra-commercial exchanges. Some of Carney’s critics rejected her use of oral histories to posit arguments about the distant past. Yes, these histories do not square with the manifests of slave ships; but are the latter more reliable sources? The transit of T urkey wheat (hard red winter wheat) from Russia to Kansas, which I discuss in *The Profit of the Earth*, is another example. Can we rely on the records of U.S. Department of Agriculture agronomists or Mennonite heritage sources? How can we recover evidence of the agricultural practices of the pastoralists that Mennonites displaced? If we cannot, how do we interpret asymmetrical evidence of exchange?67

Cook: I will add one more challenge: the question of what we can see or imagine as “global” subjects. I am thinking about Justin’s important point about “unglimpsed” possibilities. This issue hit me like a ton of bricks when I was reading Paul Robeson’s 1958 memoir, *Here I Stand*. At the time, Robeson was among the most widely traveled individuals on earth. In many cases, he spoke or performed in the same foreign venues where Douglass and Aldridge had appeared a century earlier. And because the U.S. State Department took away his passport (in 1950) Robeson was intensely self-conscious of why and how these global markets mattered for his art and politics.68

It is not surprising, then, that Robeson was among the first twentieth-century U.S. intellectuals to write about the black internationalist struggle before the Civil War. He was uniquely positioned to appreciate the massive importance of global mobility for antebellum figures such as Douglass, Aldridge, Nathaniel Paul, and William Wells Brown. He saw and wrote about these geopolitical strategies two or three decades before they became academic objects of historical study.

But it is also instructive to see how much he did not (or, more accurately, could not) see of this global process in 1958. Although he performed extensively in Eastern Europe, Robeson seems to have had only an anecdotal knowledge of Aldridge’s extensive touring there one century earlier. Similarly, although Robeson performed spirituals throughout his career, he did not mention the dozens of African American musicians (including the Fisk Jubilee Singers) who toured abroad across the nineteenth century. In recent years the power of electronic search engines and mass digitization projects have helped fill these historical gaps, but I am continually struck by how much we still do not know about the transnational circuits of early African American mobility—in part because we have not actually looked for it in the correct places. Who would have imagined that a black actor from New York City could have been performing *Othello* in Constantinople in the first year of U.S. Reconstruction—and that his press for that run would extend to Manchester, New York City, San Francisco, and Melbourne. That is the kind of global story that only becomes visible (and epistemologically possible) when one has the tools to conceive it in the first place. I suspect that all of us here could produce additional examples of vitally important global histories largely hidden in plain sight.

68 Robeson, *Here I Stand*. 