

Contact details

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
Department of Philosophy
University of Michigan
2236 Angell Hall
435 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1003
USA

Mobile: +1-734-358-3145 (+358-40-7356849 in Finland)
E-mail: maarnio@umich.edu

Appointments

2010- Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
2007-2010 Fitzjames Research Fellow in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford.
(2013- Adjunct Professor, University of Helsinki)

Education

2010 DPhil in Philosophy, University of Oxford, University College (examined on 07.09.09).
Thesis title: *Indefeasible knowledge*
Thesis supervisor: Professor Timothy Williamson
2005 BPhil in Philosophy, University of Oxford, University College.
Thesis title: *Object-dependent belief: A defence and investigation*
Papers: *Metaphysics and Epistemology, Philosophy of Language and Philosophical Logic, Frege*
2002 MA (undergraduate degree), University of Helsinki.

Areas of Academic Specialisation (AOS)

Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind

Areas of Academic Competence (AOC)

Metaphysics, Formal Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Logic, Ethics, Environmental Ethics, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Religion.

Publications

“New Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality”, forthcoming in *Oxford Studies in Epistemology* 5.

“The Dogmatism Puzzle”, forthcoming in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol 92.

“Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat”, forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

“Disagreement and evidential attenuation”, forthcoming in *Nous*

“Unreasonable knowledge”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, Vol. 24:1, pp. 1-21, 2010.

“Is there a viable account of well-founded belief?”, *Erkenntnis*, Vol. 72, No. 2, 2010.

“Knowledge and Objective Chance”, with John Hawthorne, in *Williamson On Knowledge*, P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2009.

“Why the externalist is better off without free logic: a reply to McKinsey”, *Dialectica*, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 535-540, 2008.

“Single premise deduction and risk”, *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 141, No. 2, pp. 157-173, 2008.

“Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue”, *Dialectica*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2006, pp. 433-445.

“Are Object-Dependent Beliefs Explanatorily Redundant?” in *What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute*, T. Marvan (ed.), Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006.

“Davidson’s Triangulation: Content-Endowing Causes and Circularity”, co-authored with Tomas Marvan, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2., 2004, pp. 177–197.

“The Normativity of Semantic Correctness: A Davidsonian Perspective”, *Proceedings of the 26th Wittgenstein Symposium*, 2003.

Reviews

“Review of *Epistemic Luck*”, *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, 2007, Vol. 3, No. 1.

Work under review/in progress

“Is evidence about one’s own doxastic states inert?”

“The New Evil Demon and the disposition to know”

“Enkrasia or Evidentialism: Learning to love mismatch”

“Fallible knowledge and fallible knowers”

“The New Principal Principle”

“Against Phenomenal Conservatism” (with John Hawthorne)

Awards, scholarships, and academic positions

Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 2010-
Fitzjames Research Fellowship, Merton College, Oxford, 2007-2010
Kone Foundation, research grant, 2006
Helsingin Sanomain 100-vuotissäätiö, scholarship, 2005

AHRC scholarship, 2005
Emil Aaltonen Foundation, scholarship, 2005
AHRC scholarship, 2003
Kone Foundation, research grant, 2003
Kone Foundation, research grant, 2002
Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation, research grant, 2002

Selected talks and presentations

“Enkrasia or evidentialism: Learning to love mismatch”

- Keynote talk at conference *Defeat and Religious Epistemology*, University of Oxford, Marth 17th, 2014

“The Disposition to Know”

- *The New Evil Demon Conference*, University of Geneva, September 13th, 2013.

“Is evidence about first-person doxastic states inert?”

- Colloquium talk at University of Southern California, November 1st, 2013
- Colloquium talk at University of Arizona, December 7th, 2012
- *Midwest epistemology workshop*, September 28th, 2012
- *Harvard workshop on belief*, September 15th, 2012
- Colloquium talk at MIT, April 27th, 2012.

“Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat”

- American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, Washington DC, December 30th, 2011
- University of Oslo, May 26th, 2011.
- *The 2011 Shapiro Conference in Philosophy*, Brown University, March 12th, 2011.

“Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation”

- *Episteme* conference, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, June 24th, 2011

“Is there a viable account of well-founded belief?”

- *Formal Epistemology Festival*, University of Toronto, May 13th, 2010.

“Unreasonable knowledge”, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 18.01.2010.

“Defeat and dogmatism”, University of Oxford, 15.01.2010

“Deduction and Closure”, 14th Eidos meeting, University of Geneva, 19.03.09.

“Defeasible reasoning and justification closure”, the third Basic Knowledge workshop *Epistemic Closure, Warrant Transmission, and the Epistemology of Inference*, University of St. Andrews, 27.09.2008.

“The Dogmatism Puzzle”, the *Basic Knowledge Seminar*, University of St. Andrews, 25.09.2008.

“Single-Premise Deduction and Risk”, the *Philosophy Research Seminar*, University of Jyväskylä, 12.04.2007.

“Objektiriipuvaisten mielentilojen naturalistinen kritiikki”, symposium titled *Naturalismin transsendentaaliset rajat* in Helsinki, 20.09.2005.

“Externalism and privileged self-knowledge: what exactly is the problem?”, *Research Seminar*, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, 7.4.2005.

“Triangulation and Circularity”, *4th Prague interpretation Colloquium*, 26.04.2004, Prague, Check Republic.

”The Normativity of Semantic Correctness: A Davidsonian Perspective”, *26th Wittgenstein Symposium*, Kirchberg, Austria, 6.8.2003.

“The Role of Meaning Finitism in Communitarian Epistemology”, *Communitarian epistemology workshop*, Helsinki School of Economics, 19.9.2002.

“Objectivity, Universality, and Conceptual Schemes”, *Fourth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy*, Lund, Sweden, 14–18.6.2002.

Service

Refereeing for *Mind*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Nous*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophers' Imprint*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Synthese*, etc.

Member of the editorial panel for the journal *Thought*, 2012-

Member of the Jowett Society Organising Committee, 2005–2006; 2006–2007.