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Letter from the Editors

Dear Readers,

We are proud to have published the Fall 2022 Edition of the Michigan Journal of Political Science. This is our second edition as Editors-In-Chief, and we are pleased to continue the legacy of MJPS in our latest edition showcasing exceptional undergraduate work from the fall of 2022. Originally founded in 1981, the Journal was created as a platform to share undergraduate work in Political Science to foster discussions on contemporary and thought-provoking political issues in a non-partisan, academic fashion. We hope you enjoy the thoughtful and creative arguments, made by students around the world, in this edition.

In this edition, you will find contributions drawn from undergraduate authors about notable empirical issues, public policy, theoretical concerns, and international relations. Our authors have composed original pieces ranging from a discussion of philosopher Hannah Arendt's work on political socialization and alienation to the differing role of Marxist-Leninist thought in South Korea and Japan. These written works buttress the longstanding demographic, theoretical, and political diversity within contemporary research. Pieces like "What Socialism Missed: Women's 'Double Shift' and the Endurance of the Patriarchy in the GDR" explore how gender relations can shift on paper during a regime change without manifesting in tangible improvements for women. Meanwhile, "Caring is Not Always Sharing" demonstrates the limited extent to which Americans will go to help their friends across the aisle. Finally, our journal highlights classic political science research and exploration with "The Incumbent's Dilemma: Incumbent Ideology and its Effect on Primary Election Performance in the United States House of Representatives from 2000 to 2020." We hope these seven pieces will build on the understanding that institutional legacies continue to inform policy responses that undergird our systems of government.

We want to thank our Editors and particularly our Section Editors Amal, Alison, Bailey, and Selin for their hard work and leadership throughout this semester. We'd also like to congratulate Amal and Selin for their ascension to editors-in-chief. It has been a privilege to lead this Journal for the last year, and we are grateful for the trust and commitment of our team. The entire Editorial Board has brought the utmost attention to detail and quality of writing, and for that, we are tremendously grateful.

Thank you to the Department of Political Science, and particularly Alice Austin, Brian Min, Joseph Johnson, and Dustin Hahn for giving us the platform and capability to grow our journal. Our ultimate mission as a Journal has always been to promote free discourse on the most important issues. Because of your readership, we are confident that we can make the future of political science research more transparent, accessible, and helpful in understanding the political world around us.

Sincerely,
Lindsay Keiser and Kayla Zhang

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Section 1:

American Politics

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Featuring:

“Caring is Not Always Sharing: Partisan Identity Centrality, Social Status & Prosociality in U.S. Politics”

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“The Incumbent’s Dilemma: Incumbent Ideology and its Effect on Primary Election Performance in the United States House of Representatives from 2000 to 2020”

Written by Jack Eichholz
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Caring is Not Always Sharing: Partisan Identity Centrality, Social Status & Prosociality in U.S. Politics

Julia Kassab, Noah Rich, and Rebecca Brewer

Abstract

Evidence from social psychology demonstrates that self-interest, alongside prosocial tendencies (tendencies to want to help others), are instinctual and informed by conformity (Zaki & Mitchell 2013, Nook et. al 2016).¹ Similarly, political science research has demonstrated that social comparison is important for welfare preferences among Americans.² However, the role of social comparison, in terms of self-perception of power and partisan group identification, is less explored in this area of research. In this paper, we study the relationship between self-perceived power levels and partisan identity centrality with respect to political prosocial preferences. With a Lucid Theorem convenience sample (n = 1000), we first test how prosocial political preferences and government efficacy beliefs are moderated by respondents' self-perception of power, using a novel prosocial political preferences indicator. We propose and find support for the hypothesis that those who self-identify as most in power will report higher levels of prosocial preferences, and those who self-identify as least in power will least support the idea that government is efficient. We then test the strength of partisan identity centrality, using both the ANES political identity centrality scale and Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale, against the same prosocial political preferences indicator to successfully support our hypothesis.³ Specifically, we are interested in how group-connection strength in politics positively corresponds with political preferences. We discuss limitations of and future research directions, emphasizing why subjective measures of status matter for political behavior.

Introduction

Prosociality encompasses both behaviors and preferences. Prosocial preferences refer to one's penchant for outcomes that benefit others or uphold prosocial norms.⁴ Prosocial behaviors refer to an act intended to benefit the well-being of another, whether that be a group or an individual.⁵ Prosociality is pertinent to politics due to its nature of upliftment and its origins in empathy. We can observe prosocial political behavior in abundance and across partisanship: for example, men who march in defense of women's rights, or white individuals marching for the Black Lives Matter movement. The act of engaging politically, while incurring a cost onto oneself for the sake of others, appears irrational in accordance with some perspectives in political science. Prosocial political behavior is thought of as an outlier, yet many people engage in political actions for the benefits or welfare of others. In this study, we attempt to explore the relationship between one's self-evaluation of power and their proclivity towards political prosociality, as well as a potential association between the strength of one's partisan identity and their prosocial preferences.

¹ Zaki, Jamil, and Jason P. Mitchell. "Intuitive Prosociality." *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 22, no. 6 (December 1, 2013): 466–70; Nook. "Prosocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 42 (8): (2016) 1045–62.

² Condon, Meghan, and Amber Wichowsky. "Inequality in the Social Mind: Social Comparison and Support for Redistribution." *The Journal of Politics* 82, no. 1 (January 2020): 149–61.

³ Aron, Arthur, Elaine N. Aron, and Danny Smollan. "Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the Structure of Interpersonal Closeness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 63, no. 4 (1992): 596–612.

⁴ Zaki, and Mitchell. "Intuitive Prosociality."

⁵ Pfattheicher, Stefan, Yngwie Asbjørn Nielsen, and Isabel Thielmann. "Prosocial Behavior and Altruism: A Review of Concepts and Definitions." *Current Opinion in Psychology* 44 (August 23, 2021):

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I. Background on Prosociality

Prosociality is made up of preferences for outcomes that benefit others or uphold social norms and behaviors designed to increase others' well-being.⁶ For the purposes of this paper, political prosociality can be construed as preferences for government action in aiding others and approval of political action that works towards those goals.

Research shows that prosocial behavior and prosociality are associated with greater levels of empathy or perspective taking abilities.⁷ The concept has been measured in the past through behavioral items such as donating blood or giving to charity (see NLSY97), as well as through behavioral zero-sum games.⁸ Self-perceived power and strength of group identity could potentially influence prosociality in political contexts. If an individual perceives themselves as capable of enacting change or helping others, the strength of their political group identity could facilitate likelihood of prosocial behavior, or greater expressed preferences for helping others. To better demonstrate this theoretically, we proceed with a brief review of how status should matter for prosocial preferences below.

Self-perceived Status and Prosocial Political Preferences

Self-perceived power is a socially constructed belief, supported by external factors that have consistently warranted one the privilege of engaging politically.⁹ These factors may include, but are not limited to, time, freedom, and the allocation of both structural and materialistic wealth. The allotment of this wealth is heavily influenced by strategic and targeted actions made by politicians to attain and maintain their political power, authority, and influence. Although social constructions are stereotypes that initially arose from cultural factors such as media, history, literature, religion, and popular culture, the boundaries of these socially constructed groups are empirically set through the criteria for eligibility within public policy.¹⁰

Advantaged groups tend to be perceived as both powerful and positively constructed, whereas deviant groups lack power and are negatively constructed.¹¹ It is pertinent to note that populations both targeted and promoted by politicians have remained consistent over time, sending a key message to all socially constructed groups. Those in the advantaged category are repeatedly told their opinions and needs matter politically. Through a constant stream of beneficial public policy, they have learned that the government is effectively serving the needs of a specific group.¹²

In contrast to more advantaged groups, deviant groups have been repeatedly told through punitive public policy that their opinions and needs are not worthy of attention. These messages sent through public policy have the power to influence voter participation, as it consistently marginalizes targeted, powerless groups and uplifts targeted and socially constructed powerful groups. The policy feedback theory asserts that public policy impacts beliefs in political efficacy through the allocation of resources allotted to specific communities, and the interpretation of either advantageous or

⁶ Zaki, and Mitchell. "Intuitive Prosociality."

⁷ Empathy drives generalized prosociality (Zaki, Mitchel 2013). Empathy is not automatic, as it can be changed; the modulation of empathy occurs prior to emotional generation. (Zaki 2014) The factors that modulate empathy, such as awareness of one's status in relations to groups and others, drive prosociality. Individuals given their own life experiences, of which awareness of status serves as a proxy for, appraise whether or not one is worthy of empathy. This Dispositional empathic concern predicts one's willingness to engage in prosocial behaviors that arouse feelings of sympathy (Davis et al., 1999). In this way, empathy and prosociality are intertwined. Importantly for this study, empathy can be motivated up and down and can be modulated by various factors (Zaki 2014). This is important, as one can examine the contextual modulators of empathy and use them to approximate potential influences on prosocial political preferences and behavior (Zaki 2014). This can most easily be seen through the lens of intergroup relations. Empathy decreases in the presence of an outgroup, holding true across all boundaries (Zaki 2014).

⁸ Fowler, James. "Altruism and Turnout." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (August 1, 2006): 674–83.

⁹ Pratto, Felicia, I-Ching Lee, Judy Y. Tan, and Eileen Y. Pitpitan. "Power Basis Theory: A Psychoecological Approach to Power." In *Social Motivation*, 191–222. *Frontiers of Social Psychology*. New York, NY, US: Psychology Press, 2011.

¹⁰ Schneider, Anne, and Helen Ingram. "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy." *The American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (1993): 334–47.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Lerner, Melvin J. "The Belief in a Just World." In *The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion*, *Perspectives in Social Psychology*. Boston, (1980) 9–30.

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punitive public policy.¹³ Through the act of marginalizing, neglecting, or uplifting specific groups, elected officials clearly reveal who they prioritize. Political efficacy can be split into three categories. Internal efficacy refers to one's belief in their own competence to engage politically.¹⁴ External efficacy refers to one's belief in the competency of the government to effectively serve constituents.¹⁵ Political trust, the third component within the umbrella of political efficacy, refers to one's belief in the fairness of the government and the amount of blame placed on the institution for various faults.¹⁶ Noting the impact of public policy on self-perception of power, we are interested in studying the impact of self-perception of power on beliefs in political efficacy. In turn, we infer that one's belief in political efficacy will be positively associated with one's proclivity towards political prosocial preferences, to the extent of which self-perception of power could inform one's prosocial political preferences.

If this is the case, the implications are clear: public policy is a tool that can be utilized to maintain institutionalized oppression. Insofar as public policy's effects are internalized by targeted groups, this could then directly influence members' proclivity towards prosocial political preferences and behaviors. In the context of the United States, it is reasonable to assume these groups will involve partisan and ideological skews.¹⁷ Our next section argues for how the salience of individual level partisan identity centrality, or connection to partisan groups, should influence prosocial political preferences.

Partisan Prosocial Influences and Party Identity Centrality

In a landmark study on conformity, it was found that when an individual was placed in a group that was arbitrarily assigned to disagree with the individual on a length of stick, the individual was likely to shift their position to the group view, even if they were wrong.¹⁸ In recent years, conformity research has expanded to conformity's relationship with prosocial preferences. Specifically, it has been found that observing prosociality affects prosocial decision-making across behavior types and psychological domains.¹⁹ In other words, an environment where people are seen as acting prosocially increases one's demonstrated empathy. Conformity is not just something that can impact judgment; it can also impact attitudes and behavior—potentially including those regarding politics.

To better understand the power of conformity, especially in political contexts, it is useful to consider how an individual's identity factors into sensitivity. Work on social identity theory clarifies this relationship:²⁰ Social identity theory seeks to understand the psychological motivations that lead a group member to endorse or disavow an existing group membership, and includes research elaborating on the relative ease of fostering a sense of ingroup favoritism, or a preference for the member of one's group over others.²¹ While scholars like Huddy have carefully discussed the limitations of social identity theory in explaining political groups—identities in the real world tend to be shaped by more complex forces than social identity theorists grapple with, although these scholars have also pointed out areas where the ideas from this theory can be used. For example, prior research has found that shades of group identity influence the development of ingroup bias and outgroup derogation, and in politics, people identify

¹³ Shore, Jennifer. "How Social Policy Impacts Inequalities in Political Efficacy." *Sociology Compass* 14, no. 5 (2020): e12784.

¹⁴ Coleman, Kenneth., Davis Charles. "The Structural Context of Politics and Dimensions of Regime Performance: Their Importance for the Comparative Study of Political Efficacy" (1976) 1-22.

¹⁵ Craig, Stephen C., Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver. "Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items." *Political Behavior* 12, no. 3 (September 1, 1990): 289-314.

¹⁶ Miller, A.H. "Political Issues and Trust in Government" *American Political Science Review*, 68, (1974) 951-972.

¹⁷ Mason, Lilliana. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2018.

¹⁸ Asch, S. E. "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments." In H. Guetzkow (Ed.), *Groups, leadership and men; research in human relations*. Carnegie Press (1951) 177-190..

¹⁹ Nook. "Prosocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy."

²⁰ Brewer, Marilynn B. "The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 17 (5): (1991) 475-82.

²¹ Huddy, Leonie. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology* 22, no. 1 (2001): 127-56.

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with parties to varying levels. Despite its limitations, social identity theory might be helpful in understanding political identities because these identities tend to be more collective in nature than other aspects of one's identity.²²

Research in conformity finds social pressure can impact judgment, attitudes, and behavior.²³ Further work on social identity theory also demonstrates how identity and political group identification can influence individual behavior and reasoning.²⁴ Seeing these findings together leads to further questions about how conformity and social identity matter for *prosocial political preferences and behavior*. Already, it has been found that prosocial behavior engages the same value-related neural structures as those associated with conformity.²⁵ Given this connection between prosocial behavior and conformity, *could the strength of political identity relate to political prosociality?*

A useful measure of political group identity strength has been political identity centrality (PIC). PIC is the extent to which individuals' political preferences are central to their self-concept, or how integral political attitudes and beliefs are to someone's identity.²⁶ In Federico and Ekstrom's research, they found that respondents with higher levels of partisan identity centrality were more likely to adopt conservative or liberal positions on policies, and that partisan identity centrality correlated with party identification in the US. Additionally, individuals who identified to a greater extent with ideological terms (like conservative or liberal, as opposed to Republican or Democrat in the U.S.) were more likely to participate in campaigns and vote.

Another useful, yet uncommon, measurement is Aron, Aron, and Smollans' Inclusion of Others in Self (IOS) Scale. While IOS has been omitted from studies on political identity strength, a modified version of this scale might better isolate the impact of partisan group identity on prosocial political preferences. Originally designed to measure how close individuals were to other individuals, it has since been adapted by researchers to measure how close an individual is to their community.²⁷ On the scale, respondents select the picture that best describes their relationship from a set of Venn-like diagrams, each representing different degrees of overlap of two circles.²⁸ The key element in the IOS measurement is its use of visual imagery, which could better communicate community belonging to respondents.




Figure 1. Inclusion of Others in Self Measure (IOS) Aron et. al (1992)

In the case of the community-closeness version of the scale—more relevant to measuring sense of relation to a political social group—it has been found to map onto community-related constructs as related to a sense of a Psychological Sense of Community (PSOC), which by definition is a feeling that members have of belonging and being important to each other, and a shared faith that members' needs will be met to be

²² Ibid.

²³ Asch, S. E. "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments.;" Nook. "Prosocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy."

²⁴ Leonie. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory."

²⁵ Nook. "Prosocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy."

²⁶ Federico, Christopher M., and Pierce D. Ekstrom. "The Political Self: How Identity Aligns Preferences With Epistemic Needs." *Psychological Science* 29, no. 6 (June 1, 2018): 901–13.

²⁷ Mashek, Debra, Lisa W. Cannaday, and June P. Tangney. "Inclusion of Community in Self Scale: A Single-Item Pictorial Measure of Community Connectedness." *Journal of Community Psychology* 35, no. 2 (2007): 257–75.

²⁸ Aron, Aron, and Smollan. "Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the Structure of Interpersonal Closeness."

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together.²⁹ This scale was not designed to measure political identity. However, after learning of its success in quantifying one's feeling of connection to a broader group, we became curious about how this scale could approximate the group-identity aspect of partisan identity centrality in a way similar to other partisan identity centrality scales.

Hypotheses & the Current Study

Above, we have reviewed research explaining how government action through public policy can influence both one's perception of the government and their own capability to enact change. We infer that one's self perception of power in relation to governmental institutions is informed by targeted public policy. Public policy empirically defines the borders of socially constructed targeted groups.³⁰ We argue that one's self-perceived allocation of power informs beliefs in internal and external political efficacy, as well as political trust. We then argue that those who highly believe in the efficacy of the government will be inclined towards political prosocial preferences and behaviors, which in turn influences political engagement. Our first research question focuses on exploring the relationship between self-perception of power, belief in political efficacy, and likelihood of engaging in prosocial behaviors.

Research Question 1: How does self-perceived power and political efficacy correspond with prosocial political behaviors?

We hypothesize that there will be a statistically significant relationship between those who rate themselves as most in power and those who are most agreeable in regards to internal political efficacy, external political efficacy, and political trust. Further, we hypothesize that those who are most agreeable in our measures of political efficacy will, in turn, show a higher preference for prosocial political behavior. Given that self-perception of power informs agreeableness regarding political efficacy, we also hypothesize that the relationship between self-perception of power and higher levels of prosocial political preferences will be statistically significant.

Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between political efficacy and likelihood of self-identifying as least in power.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents identifying as "Most in Power" will have higher levels of prosocial political preferences.

We have also reviewed research on prosociality, conformity, partisanship, and social status. Additionally, we have analyzed the role of conformity on influencing prosocial attitudes and behavior and how social identity theory can be used to understand these relationships.³¹ Further, partisan identity centrality corresponds with greater instances of political behavior, like voting and campaigning, alongside a sense of group identity.³² Similarly, modified IOS scales have been found to relate to a sense of group identity.³³ The literature still needs to explore how partisan identity centrality corresponds with prosociality, and specifically how prosociality matters for political behavior. Our first research question focuses on exploring this relationship.

Research Question 2: How does partisan identity centrality correspond with prosocial political preferences?

The theory and findings described above suggest that there could be a connection between a sense of belonging in a group and developing tendencies to certain beliefs, and a relationship between conformity and prosocial preferences. From this, we then hypothesize that there is a positive and statistically significant association between group political identity centrality and prosocial political preferences. Conformity is simply another name for social influence. If one indicates that they see themselves as more connected to a political group, they might be more influenced by the attitudes of the

²⁹ Mashek, Cannaday, and Tangney. "Inclusion of Community in Self Scale: A Single-Item Pictorial Measure of Community Connectedness."

³⁰ Schneider and Ingram. "Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy."

³¹ Asch, S. E. "Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments."; Leonie. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory"; Nook. "Prosocial Conformity: Prosocial Norms Generalize Across Behavior and Empathy."

³² Federico and Ekstrom. "The Political Self: How Identity Aligns Preferences With Epistemic Needs."

³³ Mashek, Cannaday, and Tangney. "Inclusion of Community in Self Scale: A Single-Item Pictorial Measure of Community Connectedness."

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political group. This could then include attitudes about using the political system to help groups they care about

Hypothesis 3: Respondents' level of political identity centrality will be positively associated with higher levels of prosocial political preferences.

II. Methodology

Participants

A total number of 1,000 participants were recruited to complete the survey by Lucid Theorem. 45 participants were excluded from analysis as they did not finish the survey, resulting in a total of 955 participants. Of those, 461 identified as male and 494 identified as female. The average age of the participants was 45, and the median income of the sample was between \$35,000 and 39,000. Overall, 685 respondents identified as White, 118 as Hispanic, 115 as Black, 51 as Asian, 12 as Native/Pacific Islander, and 58 as other. 263 respondents identified as Republicans, 366 identified as Democrats, and 237 identified as Independent. All participants in this sample indicated their voluntary, consenting participation and were told they could choose to stop or restrict their participation at any time via a standard IRB Consent Form. Participants were compensated \$1 for their time.

Procedure

Participants were first invited to participate in a survey titled "Prosocial Political Pilot." They were told that they would be participating in "a research study about U.S. politics and events." From there, they were directed to a 14-part survey distributed via Qualtrics. Except for predetermined sections, random assignment was generated through the program's logic.

In the first randomized section, respondents answered blocks of question—distributed in a random order—about their racial attitudes,³⁴ religious perspectives on helping, level of religion and moral helping, views on political efficacy and government trust (American National Election Studies), voting behavior in the 2016 and 2020 general presidential elections, prosocial political preferences, participation and perspectives on protest their protesting beliefs and participation, humanitarian and egalitarian feelings (Feldman and Steenbergen 2001), and beliefs about personal responsibility (American National Election Studies). In this section of the survey, half of the sample was randomly assigned to rank their self-perceived level of power and need, in addition to other self-determined societal groups, while the other half only had to rank self-determined societal groups on power and need.

In the second and final section, all participants reported their partisanship and then were randomly assigned to rank their level of partisan identity centrality via a modified Inclusion of Other in Self Scale or partisan identity strength scale (American National Elections Studies).³⁵ Afterwards, participants were thanked for their participation, referred to the Lucid website to receive compensation, and informed that their responses had been collected.

Measures

Outcomes of Interest: To test our hypotheses, we focus on two outcomes. The first dependent variable is one's mean score on the prosocial political preferences index (3PI), as measured by the 3PI, a measure with an internal validity of $\alpha = .80$ (Quintanilla, working paper). The 3PI consists of eight construct-specific items intended to tap into the extent to which a respondents' outlook on politics involves prosocial norms (e.g. How often do you prefer policies and political actions that help others, even if there is nothing in it for you?).³⁶ Respondents who have higher averages are determined as having greater levels of prosocial political preferences.

The second dependent variable is political efficacy, as measured by respondents' mean score on the ANES political efficacy items. Respondents who rank higher are seen as believing that the government is more effective and worthy of trust.

³⁴ Kreitzer, Rebecca J., and Candis Watts Smith. "Reproducible and Replicable: An Empirical Assessment of the Social Construction of Politically Relevant Target Groups." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 51 (4) (2018) 768–74.

³⁵ Aron, Aron, and Smollan. "Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the Structure of Interpersonal Closeness."

³⁶ See Appendix.

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Independent Variables: Our first independent variable is the respondent's self-perceived power. To measure this, we use an original categorical item, asking respondents to reflect on their power status using a visual stimulus (the stimulus is provided in the appendix A). Our second independent variable is partisan identity centrality (PIC), as alternately measured by a battery of three questions from ANES, and an adjusted, single item Inclusion Of Other in the Self scale. Respondents who rank higher on these scales (1-5 for ANES, 1-7 for IOS) are interpreted as having higher levels of partisan identity centrality.

III. Results

Hypothesis 1 - Self-Perceived Status and Political Efficacy

Political efficacy mean scores were calculated for each self-perceived status condition. A mean of 0.68 was found for those most in power, a mean of 0.49 was found for those somewhat in power, and a mean of 0.38 was found for those least in power. A one-way between subjects' ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between self-appraisal of power, and belief in political efficacy in terms of least in power, somewhat in power, and most in power. There was a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) effect of self-perceived status on prosocial political preferences for the three conditions. Post hoc analyses were conducted using Tukey's post hoc test. From this, we can conclude that there is a relationship between self-perceived social status and prosocial political preferences, and that regardless, hypothesis one is supported as respondents identifying as those most in power had more highly rated beliefs in political efficacy at a statistically significant level.

Hypothesis 2 - Self-Perceived Status and Prosocial Political Preferences

Prosocial political preference mean scores were calculated for each self-perceived status condition. For those most in power, somewhat in power, and least in power, we found the mean prosocial politics scores of 0.64, 0.46, and 0.47, respectively. A one-way between subjects' ANOVA was conducted to compare the effect self-perceived status has on power. There was a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) effect of self-perceived status on prosocial political preferences for the three conditions. Post hoc analyses were conducted using Tukey's post-hoc test. From the post hoc test results, there is a statistically significant difference between those somewhat in power and most in power, and least in power and most in power, but not between those least in power and somewhat in power. From this, we can conclude that there is a relationship between self-perceived social status and prosocial political preference, and that regardless, hypothesis two is supported, as respondents identifying as those most in power had higher prosocial political preferences at a statistically significant level.

Hypothesis 3 - Political Identity Centrality & Prosocial Political Preferences

We used a correlation analysis to study the relationship between political identity centrality and political prosocial preferences (see Table 2). Between these two variables—partisan identity centrality and political prosocial preferences—we found a moderate but statistically significant correlation, ($r = 0.28$, $p < 0.01$). However, we also found a stronger correlation between partisan affiliation and political prosocial preferences ($r = 0.36$, $p < 0.01$) and political efficacy beliefs and political prosocial preferences ($r = 0.56$, $p < 0.01$). Our hypothesis was supported as the relationship between political identity centrality and political prosocial preferences was positive and statistically significant.

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Table 2. Means, SD, and Correlations with Confidence Intervals

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5
1. Age	46.34	17.48					
2. HHI (cat)	8.86	7.37	.09*				
			[.01, .16]				
3. PIC	0.45	0.27	.03	.16**			
			[-.05, .11]	[.09, .23]			
4. PID 7	4.34	2.29	-.22**	.08*	.09*		
			[-.29, -.14]	[.01, .16]	[.01, .16]		
5. 3PI	0.50	0.19	-.17**	.14**	.28**	.36**	
			[-.25, -.10]	[.07, .22]	[.21, .35]	[.29, .42]	
6. Efficacy	0.48	0.19	-.23**	.16**	.28**	.20**	.56**
			[-.30, -.15]	[.09, .24]	[.21, .35]	[.12, .27]	[.51, .61]

Table 1. Note: *M* and *SD* are used to represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation. The confidence interval is a plausible range of population correlations that could have caused the sample correlation (Cumming, 2014). * indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.

IV. Discussion

These results support all established hypotheses. Those identifying as lower in power exhibited lower levels of political efficacy. Those identifying as higher in power indicated higher levels of political prosocial beliefs, and those higher in partisan centrality indicated higher levels of political prosocial preferences. In other words, there is some evidence that less powerful groups—like the incarcerated—are less likely to see the government as working well. Powerful groups—like scientists who rely on government funding—are more likely to see the government as something that should be used to help others. While people who identify strongly either as Democrats or Republicans are more

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likely to see the political process as an appropriate method to help others, notwithstanding the differences in the groups being helped.

These results are important for several reasons. First, they increase the robustness of evidence for theories previously discussed. In the survey, people higher in power believed that both the government was more effective and a good tool to help people. This is in line with prior literature on policy feedback theory, and other research concerning the implications of public policy. Further, people higher in partisan centrality are more likely to believe that the realm their partisan group operates in (politics) is an appropriate way to help people they care about. Second, it extends the theories previously discussed. Not only do people see the signals that public policy sends about other groups in terms of power and need, people internalize those signals about themselves. Not only are people higher in partisan centrality more likely to adopt the beliefs of their partisan group, they are likely to exhibit prosocial political preferences as conformity and social identity theory would suggest.

However, this study has its limitations. One key limitation is sample size: of the 955 participants, only half self-reflect on their power status. This could decrease confidence in results drawn from this subsample, as it was further broken down into smaller groups of those self-identifying as least-in-power, somewhat-in-power, and most in power. Another key limitation was that the sample was one of convenience; as such, it is not completely representative of the United States' population, so conclusions cannot be drawn about the U.S. population as a whole from our study. Further, the survey was limited in what information it captured: it was exploratory, and thus, it was not designed to capture causal, one-way relationships between variables. Consequently, caution should be taken in interpreting the results.

While the three hypotheses of this paper were supported, there were some nuances which did not align perfectly with our expectations. For the analysis of the relationship between power status and level of prosocial preferences, for example, those identifying as low in power indicated slightly higher levels of prosocial political preferences than somewhat-in-power identifiers. This is surprising because interpretation of prior literature suggests that those highest in power should have the highest levels of prosocial political preferences, followed by those somewhat in power, followed by those least in power. There could be a few explanations for this discrepancy. First, there could be errors in the measurement as the sample was relatively small. Second, respondents could have been biased towards the middle power level option because they might have had a skewed sense of their power in society. Research has demonstrated that people do not always have an accurate sense of their place in society relative to others when compared to objective metrics like income. Regarding the analysis of the relationship between partisan identity centrality and partisan prosocial preferences, while the hypothesis was supported, the relationship was relatively weaker than other relationships, such as those between political prosociality, partisan identification, and political efficacy beliefs, respectively. This limitation could be explored more in depth by examining the role of conformity with more intention, as conformity itself was not measured directly in the study. Further, it is possible that the question wording could have biased responses, as this study used partisan strength questions from ANES instead of the exact questions Federico and Ekstrom used in their paper on partisan identity centrality, potentially impacting the effect found here even though the wording was similar. Finally, there was a slight skew towards high-partisan centrality Democrats in having higher prosocial political preferences; this could be explained by the ideological differences between Democrats and Republicans.

Our study was exploratory in nature, so our findings should be regarded within this scope as the implications we can draw from our findings are limited. As such, future work could include analyzing the difference in prosocial preferences between those who reflect on their power and those who don't, and those who are assigned to a level-of-power group and those who are not. It would also be worthwhile to understand how other factors, like resilience, might impact political prosociality as a small but notable number of participants placed themselves both as least in power and scored highly in regards to their prosocial political preferences.

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These considerations would help elucidate the impact of perception of power and actual power on prosocial political preferences. Further research could also be conducted to better define any conformity-related effects of partisan group membership; as stated previously, that was not directly investigated in this study. Relatedly, the differences between conventional measures like those used by ANES and visual measures like IOS could be further examined. In this study, they were used to similar effect in the political domain; however, could the measures' subtle difference be used to further develop insights into political preferences and behaviors? Finally, the main focus of the analyses here were the moderators of prosocial political preferences. How strong are the connections between these moderators and prosocial behavior? Interview-based methodology could be illuminating here as well to identify possible incongruencies between peoples' characteristics, professed beliefs, and actions.

V. Conclusion

In this study, we sought out to explore the motivations behind the prosocial political preferences of individuals. More specifically, we sought to understand how one's level of self-perceived power and strength of partisan identity centrality related to one's prosocial political preferences. Ultimately, we found that our hypotheses were supported: in our sample, those in power believed the government was more effective, those least in power had lower preferences for the government to help people, and those higher in partisan identity centrality indicated higher levels of prosocial preferences. These results were significant in that they aligned with what prior research has suggested and demonstrated how the psychological lens of prosociality could be used to understand political behavior, such as the motivation we have to help others, while incurring a cost onto ourselves. Our supported hypotheses are significant, as they lead to the following assertions: prosocial political preferences are higher among individuals with higher levels of partisan identity centrality and respondents' self-perceived status also corresponded with their levels of political efficacy and levels of 3PI.

While this study was constrained by the small sample used for some of our analyses, and the fact that our sample was one of convenience, our hypotheses were still supported. From this, natural steps to take in future research includes more specific exploration of the relationships we broadly identified, such as testing directional hypotheses with more complex analysis. Additionally, we could look into how the relationships we found matter for different groups with more data collection or analyze how identity centrality and self-perceived power matters for behavioral outcomes. Our findings also could lead us to pay closer attention to how an individual's perception of their own group as in power or not in power matters for their likelihood of political behavior. Ultimately, we have established a baseline for politicized prosocial tendencies as a motivational facet in discretionary political involvement.

VI. Appendix A: Survey Measures Used

Prosocial Political Preference Measure (3PI)

- 1) [propol_vote] In elections, how important do you think it is to vote with the needs of others in mind?
 - a) Not at all important
 - b) Slightly important
 - c) Moderately important
 - d) Very important
 - e) Extremely important
- 2) [propol_help_type] There's a lot of talk among Americans about helping those in need. Some individuals think charity or community group action is the best way to do this, while others think we should use government action. What do you think is the most appropriate way to help those in need?
 - a) Only helping through charity and community groups
 - b) Mostly helping through charity and community groups
 - c) A mix of both
 - d) Mostly helping through government action
 - e) Only helping through government action

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- 3) [propol_charity] How often is charity and community group action an effective way to help those in need?
 - a) Never
 - b) Sometimes
 - c) About half the time
 - d) Most of the time
 - e) Always
- 4) [propol_govt] How often is government action an effective way to help those in need?
 - a) Never
 - b) Sometimes
 - c) About half the time
 - d) Most of the time
 - e) Always
- 5) [propol_issues] Many Americans vote for different reasons. Some vote to address issues affecting them personally, and others vote to address issues affecting groups they do not belong to. Generally speaking, what kind of issues do you have in mind when you vote?
 - a) Mostly issues affecting me
 - b) Some issues affecting me
 - c) A mix of both
 - d) Some issues affecting others
 - e) Mostly issues affecting others
- 6) [propol_prio] How important do you think it is that politicians prioritize the issues of individuals or groups in need?
 - a) Not at all important
 - b) Slightly important
 - c) Moderately important
 - d) Very important
 - e) Extremely important
- 7) [propol_focus_crisis] During times of war, disaster, or other crises, some citizens often give up or sacrifice something for the good of the country. Other citizens prefer to focus on themselves and their families. What do you think citizens should do during such times?
 - a) Mostly focusing on the good of the country
 - b) Some focus on the good of the country
 - c) A mix of both
 - d) Some focus on myself and my family
- 8) [propol_self_benefit] How often do you prefer policies and political actions that help others, even if there is nothing in it for you?
 - a) Never
 - b) Sometimes
 - c) About half the time
 - d) Most of the time
 - e) Always
- 9) [propol_pol_focus] In U.S. politics, there is only so much that politicians can focus on. Sometimes there are groups that get more attention than others from politicians and government officials. How frequently do you think politicians should focus on groups who are ignored?
 - a) Never
 - b) Sometimes
 - c) About half the time
 - d) Most of the time
 - e) Always

Political Efficacy (ANES)

- 1) [efficacy_1] How often do politics and government seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on?

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- a) Not well at all
 - b) Slightly well
 - c) Moderately well
 - d) Very well
 - e) Extremely well
- 2) [efficacy_2] How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country?
- a) Not well at all
 - b) Slightly well
 - c) Moderately well
 - d) Very well
 - e) Extremely well
- 3) [efficacy_3] How much do public officials care what people like you think?
- a) Not well at all
 - b) Slightly well
 - c) Moderately well
 - d) Very well
 - e) Extremely well
- 4) [efficacy_4] How much can people like you affect what the government does?
- a) Not well at all
 - b) Slightly well
 - c) Moderately well
 - d) Very well
 - e) Extremely well

Government Trust-ANES

[gvt_trust_1] How often can you trust the federal government in Washington to do what is right?

- f) Never
- g) Some of the time
- h) About half the time
- i) Most of the time
- j) All of the time


Partisan Identity Centrality (ANES)

- 1) [pid_strength1*] How often do you think about the fact that you are a [Republican/Democrat/Independent]?
- a) Never
 - b) Rarely
 - c) Sometimes
 - d) Often
 - e) All the time
- 2) [pid_strength2*] How important is being a [Republican/Democrat/Independent] to your identity?
- a) Not at all important
 - b) A little important
 - c) Very important
 - d) Extremely important
- 3) [pid_strength3*] How big a part does being a [Republican/Democrat/Independent] play in how you see yourself?
- a) None
 - b) Small
 - c) Moderate
 - d) Very large
 - e) Large

Self-Perceived Power & Need Measure & Self-Rank Item

Note: Respondents are presented with the following diagram, and then asked the following question.


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- 1) [power_sr1] Reflect on this diagram. In terms of politics, where do you think people like you fit in best?
- Most powerful
 - Somewhat powerful
 - Least powerful

Inclusion of Other in Self Measure (IOS) Party Identity Centrality

Note: The following is an example item, all respondents once providing their partisanship identification (Independent, Republican, or Democrat) were assigned to view a corresponding venn diagram.




- 1) [ios_reps*] Which picture above best describes your relationship with Republicans?
- No overlap
 - Little overlap
 - Some overlap
 - Equal overlap
 - Strong overlap
 - Very strong overlap
 - Most overlap

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VII. Appendix B: Supplementary Analysis

1. Distribution of 3PI by PIC type (ANES against IOS)



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The Incumbent's Dilemma: Incumbent Ideology and its Effect on Primary Election Performance in the United States House of Representatives from 2000 to 2020

Jack Eichholz

Abstract

The renomination rate of incumbent members of the United States House of Representatives in primary elections is very high. Yet considering incumbent primary performance in addition to renomination rates lends valuable nuance. The United States' unique two-stage electoral process consisting of a primary and general election imposes a strategic dilemma on candidates when positioning themselves ideologically. This dilemma is heightened for incumbents who take votes in Congress that demonstrate their ideology to their constituents. All candidates must weigh aligning themselves ideologically with the median voter in their primary or the median voter in their general election. They must be acceptable to both constituencies and avoid flip-flopping to maintain their seat in Congress. This study seeks to understand what effect this strategic dilemma has on an incumbent's re-election primary vote share. The results would suggest that this dilemma has serious consequences for Democratic incumbents who align ideologically with the median general election voter rather than the median primary voter, decreasing their share of the vote in the primary. Among Republican incumbents, the relationship is more complicated. This could be due to the fact that Democratic incumbents are less adaptive to ideological preference shifts among their electorates than are their Republican colleagues.

Introduction

On June 10, 2014, Republican House Majority leader Eric Cantor lost his re-election primary to Tea Party-backed David Brat. This was the first time that a sitting majority leader had ever lost a re-election primary.¹ This loss was quite surprising to many political observers. Born and raised in Virginia, with a Democratic wife and three young kids, Cantor seemed like the perfect candidate for Virginia's suburban 7th district.² Nevertheless, while Cantor fit the district at-large, his former Republican supporters would claim that he was becoming less conservative and was no longer in lockstep with them ideologically.³ Those former supporters would then vote against him in the 2014 primary. As one political pundit put it, speaking on Cantor's conservative track record, "almost 100% wasn't enough."⁴

The median voter theorem, popularized by Anthony Downs, states that political parties, and by extension the candidates within those parties, will take ideological stances aligned with the median voter in their constituency to maximize their electoral vote share.⁵ This system assumes a normal distribution of voters within a single-member-district-plurality system, like the United States, in which a plurality of the vote is enough to win. Downs, building on the work of Harold Hotelling, posits that if a candidate converges their ideology on this median voter, the more significant number of votes to be gained from the middle will far outweigh any votes lost on the extreme tail ends.⁶ This

¹ Robert Costa, Laura Vozzella, and David A. Fahrenthold, "Republican House Majority Leader Eric Cantor succumbs to tea party challenger Dave Brat," *Washington Post*, June 11, 2014.

² Benjamin Bell, "Five Things You Might Not Know About Eric Cantor," *ABC News*, June 15, 2014.

³ Leigh Ann Caldwell and Jeremy Diamond, "7 Reasons Eric Cantor Lost," *CNN*, June 11, 2014.

⁴ Caldwell and Diamond, "7 Reasons."

⁵ Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 118.

⁶ Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *The Economic Journal* 39, no. 153 (1929): 44.

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also assumes that the distribution of voters on issues can be represented by a normal bell-shaped curve.⁷

While this theory appears logical, U.S. congressional elections involving primaries are significantly more complicated. Candidates do not have only one constituency with just one median voter. To be elected to the U.S. Congress, the vast majority of candidates, including incumbents, must win two elections: a primary and a general election. These elections are decided by different constituencies, and the types of voters in each election vary greatly, especially given the lower turnout for party primaries and the likely more partisan makeup of primary voters.⁸ Thus, candidates must position themselves in a way such that they appeal enough to both sets of voters to win a plurality in each election. This creates the existence of a strategic dilemma for candidates: Do they position themselves ideologically closer to the median voter of their primary election or to their general election constituency?⁹

This strategic dilemma is magnified for incumbent members of Congress due to the existence of their voting records, which tend to reveal their ideological positions. Thus, they face much more scrutiny than first-time challengers and must think carefully about how they vote in Congress and how it could impact their re-election chances. This leads to the question: how do incumbent members of the House navigate and survive this strategic dilemma? Do incumbents fare better in primaries when they are aligned with their median primary or general election voter? This study seeks to gain a better understanding of how this strategic dilemma affects incumbent members of the U.S. House of Representatives' performances in primary elections.

I. *Incumbents and Re-election*

To understand the dynamics of incumbents in primary elections, a broader examination of factors leading to successful electoral outcomes is necessary. Existing literature suggests that one of the most important aspects is a campaign's fundraising ability. Receiving and spending money has been shown to boost the candidates' vote share.¹⁰ Incumbency can present a substantial advantage for candidates as incumbents typically outraise challengers.¹¹ Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning found that in elections from 1998 to 2002 where incumbents' challengers raised less than \$500,000, only seven percent were decided by less than ten percentage points.¹² Additionally, no incumbent during this period lost to a challenger who raised less than \$500,000. This \$500,000 mark is a high bar to clear because incumbents during that period on average automatically enjoyed a \$275,000 increase in campaign contributions in House elections.¹³ Incumbents continued to outraise challengers in more recent elections. In 2020, incumbent members of the House raised an average of \$2,725,130 while their challengers raised an average of only \$417,786.¹⁴ Several factors could help explain this phenomenon: incumbents have established a successful campaign infrastructure, they often have funds left over from previous campaigns, and interest groups donate more to incumbents than to challengers to maintain access to existing members of Congress.¹⁵

⁷ See: A.P. Lerner and H.W. Singer, "Some Notes on Duopoly and Spatial Competition," *Journal of Political Economy* 45, no. 2 (1937); A. Smithies, "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *Journal of Political Economy* 49, no. 3 (1941).

⁸ David W. Brady, Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope, "Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with Primary Electorate?," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 1 (2007): 90.

⁹ The concept of a strategic dilemma has been used in past studies. See: Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 80.

¹⁰ Alan I. Abramowitz, Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning, "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in the U.S. House Elections," *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 1 (2006): 83; Robert S. Erikson and Thomas R. Palfrey, "Equilibria in Campaign Spending Games: Theory and Data," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 3 (2000): 601; Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 2 (1990): 334; Jonathan S. Kranso, Donald P. Green, and Jonathan A. Cowden, "The Dynamics of Campaign Fundraising in House Elections," *Journal of Politics* 56, no. 2 (1994): 472-473.

¹¹ Gary C. Jacobson, *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (New York: Longman, 1997), 75.; Kranso, Green, and Cowden, "Dynamics of Campaign Fundraising," 472-473.; Christopher S. Mangee, "The Incumbent Spending Puzzle," *Social Science Quarterly* 93, no. 4 (2012): 947-948.

¹² Abramowitz, Alexander, and Gunning, "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline," 83.

¹³ Alexander Fourniaies and Andrew B. Hall, "The Financial Incumbency Advantage: Causes and Consequences," *The Journal of Politics* 76, no. 3 (2014): 716.

¹⁴ OpenSecrets, "Incumbent Advantage," 2020.

¹⁵ Fourniaies and Hall, "Financial Incumbency Advantage," 717.

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Name recognition and recall is another factor that leads to a successful electoral outcome. Existing literature suggests that greater name recognition leads to increased candidate support.¹⁶ Jacobson writes, “At the most basic level, people hesitate to vote for candidates they know nothing about”.¹⁷ A survey from 1978 to 1994 by Jacobson found that 47 percent of voters within a district could recall the name of their incumbent member of Congress, while only 18 percent of voters could recall the name of that member’s general election challenger.¹⁸ This increased access to funding and a higher level of name recognition has been found to be a reliable explanatory variable for the high reelection rate of incumbent members of Congress, whom Mayhew describes as “single-minded re-election seekers”.¹⁹ A report from OpenSecrets.org shows that the general election re-election rate of incumbent members of the House is usually around 95 percent each election cycle, with the lowest percentage since 2000 being 85.4 percent in 2010.²⁰

II. Incumbents in Primaries

Primaries have long been regarded as low-importance affairs by those in office.²¹ While the incumbent election rate in general elections is markedly high, the nomination rate of incumbents in primaries is even higher.²² Primaries are typically thought of as low hurdles that incumbents are able to clear with minimal difficulty. Yet the empirical history of incumbent performance in primary elections shows mixed results.

The development of the direct primary, in which voters exercise more direct authority in the party nomination process, came about during the Progressive Era of the early 20th century. The direct primary was a vehicle for reallocating power away from party bosses and machines to bring forth new candidates with new ideas and incorporate emerging constituencies.²³ The introduction of the direct primary resulted in primary challenges to incumbents. Ansolabehere et al. found that during the Progressive Era, incumbents lost between three to four percent of primary elections.²⁴ This figure would drop to one percent in the 1950s and remain around one percent through the end of the study in 2004.²⁵ Boatright, measuring incumbent primary performance, not solely incumbent losses, found similar results. Incumbent members of the House who received less than 75 percent of the vote in their re-election primary were classified as serious challenges.²⁶ Boatright wrote that the 75 percent threshold was somewhat arbitrary; however, he said that this threshold was “designed to include any challenger to whom an incumbent might pay the slightest attention”.²⁷ Although this is clearly a high percentage of the vote, given how non-competitive primaries often are, the 75 percent threshold indicates a potential problem for an incumbent. Boatright argued that an incumbent who receives less than 75 percent in a re-election primary should perceive a notable threat. Using this threshold, Boatright found that in the 1970s, around ten percent of U.S. House incumbents running for re-election received less than 75 percent of the vote in their primary.²⁸ During the 1980s, serious primary challenges declined and remained low across the decade, hovering at around five percent.²⁹ However, in 1992, there was a significant increase in the number of serious primary challenges, largely due to the House

¹⁶ Jacobson, *Politics of Congressional*, 92-97; Cindy D. Kam and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, “Name Recognition and Candidate Support,” *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013): 971; Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger, “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections,” *The American Political Science Review* 74, no. 3 (1980): 631.

¹⁷ Jacobson, *Politics of Congressional*, 92.

¹⁸ Jacobson, *Politics of Congressional*, 93.

¹⁹ David R. Mayhew, *Congress: The Electoral Connection* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), 19.

²⁰ OpenSecrets, “Re-election Rates Over the Years,” 2020.

²¹ Brady, Han, and Pope, “Primary Elections,” 100.

²² Brady, Han, and Pope, “Primary Elections,” 82.

²³ Stephen Ansolabehere et al., “The Decline of Competition in US Primary Elections, 1908-2004,” in *The Marketplace of Democracy: Electoral Competition in US House Elections*, ed. Michael P. McDonald and John Curtis Samples (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 2.

²⁴ Ansolabehere et al., “The Decline,” 9.

²⁵ Ansolabehere et al., “The Decline,” 9.

²⁶ Robert G. Boatright, *Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of Congressional Primary Challenges* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 71.

²⁷ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 71.

²⁸ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 74-75.

²⁹ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 74-75.

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Banking Scandal.³⁰ Beginning in 1994, primary competition remained higher than pre-1992 levels, but not to the extent of the 1992 peak. It receded again in the 2000s, dropping to around four percent, then steadily increased to around eight to ten percent until 2010—when Boatright’s examination concluded.³¹ Boatright summarized these findings saying, “During the 1970 to 2010 period, there were 8,224 races in the House of Representatives where an incumbent was seeking re-election. Approximately one out of ten House incumbents (774, or 9.4) running for re-election during this period faced a primary challenger or multiple primary challengers who garnered more than 25 percent of the vote”.³²

III. Demonstrating the Existence of a Strategic Dilemma

One potential reason for this history of incumbents’ diminishing vote share in primaries is the aforementioned strategic dilemma they face. In order for there to be a demonstrable strategic dilemma, two paradigms must exist. First, a primary and general election electorate must have different median ideologies, with the primary electorate being more partisan. While a unanimous consensus in the literature is not present, strong evidence suggests that this dynamic exists.³³ Hill found that these engaged primary voters tend to be less ideologically centrist than general election voters, and this result is consistent across districts and parties.³⁴ He found that the median primary voter was more ideological than the median general election voter and also more ideological than their fellow partisans in the district who do not regularly vote in primaries.³⁵ Jacobson concurs with this finding, writing, “Republicans and Democrats in Congress hold their seats at the behest of distinct and ideologically distant electoral constituencies and of even more distant primary constituencies”.³⁶ Primaries tend to be low turnout affairs, with the most contested primary resulting in a turnout of around 90,000, a significantly lower figure than the average turnout in a general election.³⁷ This low turnout suggests that primary voters are an unrepresentative sample of voters, whom Schlesinger described as, “older, wealthier, more educated, more interested in politics, more associated with organized interest groups, and more concerned about issues”.³⁸ Voting in primaries gives these hardcore partisans an outsized influence on who gets through the first round of voting and, therefore, who is eventually elected to Congress.

The second paradigm that must be present for the existence of a strategic dilemma is that primary voters must be aware of the candidates’ ideology and vote in higher frequencies for candidates who are ideologically similar. Existing literature suggests that voters, particularly primary voters, are well aware of a given candidate’s ideology and are more likely to approve of and vote for legislators who share their ideological perspective.³⁹ Ansolabehere and Jones wrote, “roll-call votes directly affect constituents’ beliefs, and those roll-call votes, in turn, have substantial effects on approval

³⁰ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 74-75.

³¹ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 74-75.

³² Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 66.

³³ Brady, Han, and Pope, “Primary Elections,” 80.; Barry C. Burden, “Candidate Positioning in US Congressional Elections,” *British Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 1 (2004): 214,

<https://doi.org/10.1017/S000712340400002X>.; Seth J. Hill, “Institution of Nomination and the Policy

Ideology of Primary Electorates,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10, no. 4 (2015): 482,

<https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015023>.; Gary C. Jacobson, “The Electoral Origins of Polarized Politics:

Evidence from the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Study” *American Behavioral Scientist* 56, no. 12 (2012):

1614, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212463352>.

³⁴ Hill, “Institutions of Nomination,” 482.

³⁵ Hill, “Institutions of Nomination,” 482.

³⁶ Jacobson, “Electoral Origins,” 1615.

³⁷ Brady, Han, and Pope, “Primary Elections,” 91.

³⁸ Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 164.

³⁹ Stephen Ansolabehere and Philip Edward Jones, “Constituents’ Response to Congressional Roll-Call Voting,”

American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 3 (2010): 596, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00448.x>.; Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart, “Candidate Positioning in

U.S. House Elections,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no 1 (2001): 152,

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2669364>.; Brady, Han, and Pope, “Primary Elections,” 91.; Brandice Canes-Wrone,

David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan, “Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’

Voting,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (2002): 138,

<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402004276>.; Mia Costa, “Ideology, Not Affect: What Americans Want from

Political Representation,” *American Journal of Political Science* 65, no. 2 (2020): 9,

<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055402004276>.

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ratings and electoral behavior".⁴⁰ This supports the paradigm that primary voters are aware of an incumbent's ideology and will vote for them if they are closely aligned with them ideologically.

The evidence presented creates a strong case for the existence of a strategic dilemma faced by all candidates. Evidence suggests that 1) the median primary voter is less moderate than the median general election voter and that 2) primary consistencies will punish candidates who are not ideologically congruent with the median primary voter when they come up for re-election. Additionally, previous studies suggest that candidates cannot simply flip-flop openly on positions when facing different sets of voters, as this can diminish their chances of winning in the general election or future primaries.⁴¹ While this is a dilemma all candidates face, it is magnified for incumbent members of Congress who have to take votes and who are more well known than their challengers. Evidence suggests that if candidates fail to position themselves correctly, the consequences could be dire.

IV. Consequences of the Strategic Dilemma on Incumbents

With the demonstrated existence of a strategic dilemma, its consequences can be examined. A candidate facing this dilemma can be defeated in two scenarios. First, if they position themselves too close to their median primary voter, they risk losing the general election. This scenario is challenging to study because it typically involves members who fear a primary challenge and thus shift their voting record in anticipation of such a challenge. Some studies have shown that members of Congress who face primary challenges will vote more consistently with their party and behave in a less bipartisan manner.⁴² However, the existing literature does not indicate that members frequently lose general elections due to positioning themselves too close to their median primary voter. Additionally, it is difficult to identify members who fear primary challenges and thus shift their ideology via their voting record. Legislators shift ideology for many reasons: pressure from leadership, sincere changes in belief systems, or the threat of a primary challenge. To isolate all cases where legislators shift their ideology to be more in line with their median primary voter due to fear of a primary challenge and then go on to lose the general election would require future extensive research.

The other scenario in which a candidate facing this dilemma could be defeated, and the focus of this study, is when an incumbent is not sufficiently aligned with the median primary voter ideologically, and subsequently loses support in their primary. Previous literature suggests that these incumbent members of Congress perform worse in their re-election primaries. Brady, Han, and Pope found that more conservative Democrats and more liberal Republicans relative to their districts are more likely to face primary challengers.⁴³ They found that each primary challenger can decrease an incumbent's vote share by approximately 12 percent on average.⁴⁴ This is a significant percentage for an emerging rival candidate who likely has fewer financial resources and lower name recognition. Additionally, the number of challengers an incumbent might face is largely correlated with how far removed they are from their median primary voter ideologically. Brady, Han, and Pope wrote, "Incumbents who veer from their primary constituency are much more likely to draw challengers and thus are more vulnerable to primary defeat".⁴⁵ Pyeatt agrees with this conclusion. He found that the more out of step incumbents are with their primary voter, the more likely they are to face a serious primary challenger.⁴⁶ He wrote, "If an incumbent wants to play it safe as far as the

⁴⁰ Ansolabehere and Jones, "Constituents' Response," 596.

⁴¹ Michael R. Alvarez, *Information and Elections* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 106; Burden, "Candidate Positioning," 215.

⁴² Richard Barton, "The Primary Threat: How the Surge of Ideological Challengers is Exacerbating Partisan Polarization," (unpublished manuscript, 2020): 9.; Chase Meyer, "Getting 'Primaried' in the Senate: Primary Challengers and the Roll-Call Voting Behavior of Sitting Senators," *Congress & the Presidency* (2021): 16, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2021.1922541>.

⁴³ Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 86.

⁴⁴ Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 90.

⁴⁵ Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 90.

⁴⁶ Nicholas Pyeatt, "Strategic Entry and Congressional Behavior: Primary Challenges to House Incumbents," *The Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 1 (2013): 113, <https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol41/iss1/4>.

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primary electorate is concerned, ideological extremity is one of the best ways to reduce the risk of a primary contest⁴⁷.

Other research reveals that incumbents are aware of the potential consequences of not being ideologically congruent with their primary electorate, and will change how they vote on specific issues to increase their chance of re-election.⁴⁸ Aldrich et al. describes how the median primary voter is increasingly becoming a better predictor of a legislator's ideology than the median general election voter.⁴⁹ Bafumi and Herron came to the same conclusion writing, "legislators' ideal points are usually closer to the ideal points of Republican or Democratic median voters than they are to state median voters. That is, members of Congress, both Senators and Representatives, are more representative of state partisans than they are of state medians."⁵⁰ These studies suggest that members of Congress are aware of the potential penalty for not aligning themselves with median primary voters and adjust their voting records accordingly.

V. Other Explanations

Other important variables affect the percentage of the votes an incumbent would receive in a primary. One such variable is the time an incumbent has spent in Congress. Less senior incumbents have had less time to build up their primary constituencies and would therefore be more vulnerable to primary challenges.⁵¹ Brady, Han, and Pope found that less senior incumbents are more likely to lose their primaries.⁵² They found that Democratic incumbents who have only served one term have a four percent chance of losing their primary, while more senior Democratic incumbents who have served two terms or more only have a two percent chance.⁵³ Similarly, for Republicans, a first-term incumbent has a two percent chance of losing, whereas a more senior Republican who has served two or more terms has less than a one percent chance.⁵⁴ Boatright, contrarily, found seniority to have a significant correlation with primary competition rather than the inverse, meaning that more senior representatives were more likely to face primary opponents than their freshman colleagues.⁵⁵ These conflicting findings suggest that length of service in Congress is a complicated variable and must be more closely examined to fully understand how it impacts primary performance.

Redistricting can also affect the percentage of the vote an incumbent receives in their primary by significantly changing the voting pool. This could negatively impact loyalty, which has been shown to be an electoral advantage for incumbents and is likely to be impacted by redistricting.⁵⁶ Pyeatt found that an incumbent whose district has been redrawn is four percent more likely to face a primary challenger compared with members whose district has not been altered.⁵⁷

The last relevant variable that has been found to affect an incumbent's share of the vote in their re-election primary is age. Boatright suggests that older incumbents can face more scrutiny and have their competence questioned at a higher rate.⁵⁸ This perceived decline in competency could invite a primary challenge as the member is no longer seen as an effective representative of the district.

⁴⁷ Pyeatt, "Strategic Entry," 113.

⁴⁸ John H. Aldrich, Michael Brady, Scott de Machi, Ian McDonald, Brendan Nyhan, David Rhode, and Michael W. Tofias, "The Concentric Circles of Consistency: Geographic and Partisan Representation in the U.S. Senate, 1989-2006," (unpublished manuscript, 2009): 12.; Joshua D. Clinton, "Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House," *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 2 (2006): 406, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00415.x>.

⁴⁹ Aldrich et al. "Concentric Circles of Consistency," 12.

⁵⁰ Joseph Bafumi and Michael C. Herron, "Preference Aggregation, Representation, and Elected American Political Institutions," (unpublished manuscript, 2007): 3.

⁵¹ Richard F. Fenno, *Home Style: House Members in Their Districts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 18.

⁵² Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 86.

⁵³ Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 94-96.

⁵⁴ Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 94-96.

⁵⁵ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 91.

⁵⁶ Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart, "Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 30, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2669290>.

⁵⁷ Pyeatt, "Strategic Entry," 110.

⁵⁸ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 148.

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
VI. Theory and Hypothesis

Building on existing literature and employing a newly constructed dataset of primary elections, this study will attempt to see if a relationship exists between incumbents' ideological positioning and their share of the vote in their re-election primaries. One conclusion is clear: incumbents receive a lower percentage of the vote in their primary than they did in the past.

The number of serious primary challenges has spiked in the last twenty years when applying Boatright's 75 percent threshold to the dataset. In 2000, the percentage of incumbents running for re-election who received less than 75 percent in their primary was relatively low at 4.23 percent. This percentage climbed to an average of 7.1 percent between 2002 and 2008. In 2010, it increased to 14.81 percent and has remained above 16 percent ever since [See Figure 1 below]. The average since 2010 is much higher, at 17.4 percent, with the highest rate being 20.27 percent in 2016.

Boatright concluded his study by observing that from 1970 to 2010, approximately one in ten House incumbents faced a serious primary challenge.⁵⁹ The data collected for this study suggests in the ten years since (2010-2020), the figure has almost doubled to one in five. This presents researchers with an important question: What explains this dramatic increase in serious primary challenges?

Figure 1. Percentage of Incumbent Members of the U.S. House of Representatives Running for Re-Election Who Received Less Than 75% of the Vote in Their Re-Election Primary by Year, 2000-2020



Incumbents' distance from their median voter in the primary is likely to be the most critical variable in predicting primary vote percentage. Due to increasing polarization among the most politically active voters in the U.S., the distance between the median primary voter and the median general election voter is growing.⁶⁰ This leads to a

⁵⁹ Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 66.

⁶⁰ Alan I. Abramowitz and Kyle L. Saunders, "Is Polarization a Myth?," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 2 (2008): 553-554, <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608080493>; Christopher Hare and Keith T. Poole, "The

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more arduous dilemma for incumbents when trying to clear the first stage of their re-election: the primary. It is becoming more difficult for them to place themselves in an acceptable ideological position to both their primary and general election constituencies. This in turn could lead to increasingly lower percentages of the vote share in their primaries. This leads to the main hypotheses of the study:

Hypothesis 1: An increase in the ideological distance between the incumbent Democratic member of the U.S. House and their median general election voter will lead to an increase in the incumbent's share of the vote in their re-election primary.

Hypothesis 2: An increase in the ideological distance between the incumbent Republican member of the U.S. House and their median general election voter will lead to an increase in the incumbent's share of the vote in their re-election primary.

This study expects a significant relationship between the ideological distance from the median general election voter for an incumbent member of the House and an increasingly higher vote share in their re-election primary. The further away a member is from their median general election voter, the more aligned they will likely be with their median primary voter.⁶¹ This relationship is expected for both Democratic and Republican incumbents.

VII. Variables

The independent variable of interest will measure how far ideologically an incumbent member of Congress is from their median general election voter, and therefore how much closer they are to their median primary voter. The dependent variable will be the percentage of the vote an incumbent receives in their re-election primary. This study controls for other variables found to affect the percentage of the vote incumbents garner in their primaries. The first control variable will be how many opponents a member faced in their primary. The second will be the incumbent's age. The third will be the number of years the incumbent has served in Congress. The fourth will be if the incumbent is a freshman, meaning this is their first time running for re-election as an incumbent. The final control variable will be whether or not an incumbent's district has changed due to redistricting.

VIII. Operationalization

To examine the hypotheses, the dependent variable will be *Incumbent Primary Percent*, which is the percentage of the primary vote the incumbent garnered in either party.⁶² The primary independent variable will be the *Member Difference Score*. This variable will reflect how candidates position themselves regarding the strategic dilemma they face and will be calculated in two steps. First, in order to operationalize the ideology of the incumbent member of Congress, the first dimension of the member's DW-Nominate score developed by Poole and Rosenthal will be used.⁶³ DW-Nominate scores measure the ideology of members of Congress relative to their fellow members on a scale

Polarization of Contemporary American Politics," *Polity* 46, no. 3 (2014): 428, <https://doi.org/10.1057/pol.2014.10>; Jacobson, "Electoral Origins," 1625-1626.; Yphtach Lelkes, "Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 80, no. 1 (2016): 401, <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfw005>; Geoffrey Skelley and Holly Fuong, "3 in 10 Americans Named Political Polarization as a Top Issue Facing the Country," *FiveThirtyEight*, June 14, 2022, <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/3-in-10-americans-named-political-polarization-as-a-top-issue-facing-the-country/>.

⁶¹ This dynamic of primary electorates being more partisan than general election electorates has been demonstrated. See: Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 80.; Burden, "Candidate Positioning," 214.; Hill, "Institutions of Nomination," 482.; Jacobson, "Electoral Origins," 1614.

⁶² The Incumbent Primary Percent data for 2000 through 2010 comes from the "U.S. House Primary Election Results (1956-2010)" dataset by Stephen Pettigrew, Karen Owen, and Emily Wanless. The data for 2012 to 2018 comes from the "U.S. House Primary Election Results (2012-2018)" dataset by Michael Miller and Nicki Camberg. The 2020 data comes from the *2022 Almanac of American Politics*.

⁶³ Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "Patterns of Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 1 (1991). <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111445>. The DW-Nominate data comes from voteview.com.

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of negative one to one. This results in the most liberal Democrat in Congress scoring close to a negative one and the most conservative Republican scoring close to a positive one. The second step will be determining the ideology of the incumbent's median general election voter. It is calculated by subtracting the vote percent received by the Democratic nominee for president from the Republican vote share for president.⁶⁴ The most recent presidential election results are used when midterm elections are analyzed.

The *Member Difference Score* is determined by subtracting the ideology of the median general election voter from the member's ideology. The resulting *Member Difference Score* will be on a scale of negative one to one. A negative number will mean the incumbent member is more liberal than their median general election voter, and a positive number will mean they are more conservative than their median general election voter.

IX. Controls

This study will also control for other independent variables shown to affect the dependent variable *Incumbent Primary Percent* - the percentage of the vote an incumbent receives in their primary. One such control will be the *Number of Years Served* by an incumbent, measured by subtracting the year the member was first elected to the House of Representatives from the year of the election being examined.⁶⁵ The control variable *Freshman* will be determined based on whether the incumbent has served two or fewer years in Congress at the time of the election. *Redistricting* will also be controlled for through a binary variable showing if the district lines have changed due to redistricting since the last election. A variable of *Age* will also be included in the analysis and calculated by subtracting the year the member was born from the election year.

X. Data

The dataset in this study consists of House primaries including an incumbent candidate from 2000 to 2020. Independent incumbents were excluded because they do not follow the same party structure. Elections from Louisiana, Virginia, Connecticut, and Utah are also excluded because their unique primary systems present different challenges and advantages to incumbents. If a state has a runoff system in its primary, only the first round of the runoff will be included.⁶⁶ In states with two-winner nonpartisan blanket primaries (Washington and California), only votes from within the same party were used in calculating the incumbent's primary vote share.⁶⁷ Instances in which two incumbents were forced to run against each other because of redistricting were excluded because the competition was forced.⁶⁸ Separate models will be run for Democratic incumbents and Republican incumbents because they are expected to have different directional results.⁶⁹

XI. Model

In order to test the hypotheses, two models will be constructed. The first model is an OLS linear regression analysis of the incumbent's vote share in their re-election primary against the incumbents' ideology relative to the median general election voter. Only incumbents who faced at least one primary challenger will be included.⁷⁰ Building on the understanding that the median primary voter is more ideological than the median general election voter, if the data supports the hypotheses, Democratic incumbents who

⁶⁴ The use of presidential election results to calculate the ideology of a median general election voter is a practice used in other studies. See: Ansolabehere, Syder, and Stewart, "Old Voters, New Voters," 21.; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, "Candidate Positioning," 140.; Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 84.; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan, "Out of Step," 131.; Pyeatt, "Strategic Entry," 104.

⁶⁵ The data of years members were first elected to the U.S. House were gathered from the various editions of the *Almanac of American Politics*.

⁶⁶ This method of only including the first round of voting if a runoff system has been used previously. See: Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 72.

⁶⁷ This approach to calculating vote share in a two-winner nonpartisan blanket election system has been used previously. See: Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 72.

⁶⁸ The exclusion of incumbent versus incumbent primaries has been present in previous research. See: Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 71.; Pyeatt, "Strategic Entry," 102.

⁶⁹ Separate models for Republican and Democratic incumbents have been created in previous research. See: Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 84.

⁷⁰ Inclusion of only incumbents who faced at least one challenger has been used in previous research. See: Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 85.

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are more ideologically liberal than their median general election voter should receive higher vote percentages in their primary.⁷¹ The same applies to Republicans, who are more conservative than their median general election voter should receive higher vote percentages in their primary. Two regression models will be estimated given the means of calculating the variable - once with only Republican incumbents and once with only Democratic incumbents.

The second model will be a logistic regression of incumbents' ideology relative to the median general election voter against whether or not they received a primary challenge that held them to less than 75 percent of the vote. This study considers this 75 percent threshold to be a serious primary challenge demonstrating weakness in the incumbent. If the hypotheses are supported, Democratic incumbents who are more liberal and Republicans who are more conservative than their median general election voters should be less likely to face a serious primary challenge. Two regression models will be estimated given the means of calculating the variable - once with only Republican incumbents and once with only Democratic incumbents.

XII. Findings

The results of the OLS regression employed in model 1 are presented in Table 1 and suggest contrasting narratives for each party. Among Democratic incumbents, the relationship between how far ideologically a member is from their median general election voter and the percentage of the vote they receive in their primary is negative and statistically significant. This model suggests that as Democratic incumbents become more liberal than their median general election voter, their share of the vote in primaries increases. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of this study. This relationship among Republican incumbents is more complicated. The correlation between how far ideologically a member is from their median general election voter and the percentage of the vote they receive in their primary is positive, suggesting that as Republicans become more conservative, their vote share in the primary increases. However, this relationship is not strong enough to be statistically significant.

The results of the model also suggest differing dynamics within each party when taking the control variables into account. The variable with the highest significance among both parties is the *Number of Challengers*. This finding is not surprising - as the number of primary challengers increases, the percentage of the vote received decreases. Among Democratic incumbents, the only other significant control variable was *Years Served*, which has a negative relationship with vote share. This finding would posit that among Democratic members, the longer they have served in Congress, the lower percentage of the votes they will receive in future primaries. Among Republican incumbents, the two statistically significant control variables were *Age* and if the incumbent was a *Freshman*. Both of these variables have a negative relationship with the percentage of the vote an incumbent receives in the primary. This finding demonstrates that among Republicans, as an incumbent gets older, their percentage of the vote in the primary will decrease. Additionally, members who have only served one term or less tend to perform worse in their primaries.

The results of the model 2 presented in Table 2 suggest similar results to the first model. This model is a logistic regression of whether or not an incumbent will face a serious primary challenge that decreases their vote share to below 75 percent.⁷² When examining the *Member Difference Score*, the results differ for both parties. Among Democratic incumbents, the relationship is positive and statistically significant. This result is consistent with the first model presented in Table 1, suggesting that as Democrats' conservatism increases, the likelihood they will face a serious challenge increases. Conversely, this result also suggests that as Democrats' liberalism increases, the likelihood they will face a serious primary challenge decreases. The relationship is not statistically significant among Republican incumbents, mirroring the results of the first

⁷¹ See: Brady, Han, and Pope, "Primary Elections," 80.; Burden, "Candidate Positioning," 214.; Hill, "Institutions of Nomination," 482.; Jacobson, "Electoral Origins," 1614.

⁷² As previously mentioned, this same threshold has been used in previous research to determine if an incumbent faced a serious challenge in their primary. See: Boatright, *Getting Primaried*, 70-71.

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model. However, the relationship is negative, suggesting that as Republicans' conservatism increases, the likelihood they face a serious primary challenge decreases, which is the expected result.

Examining the control variables of the second model in Table 2 also suggests similar results to the first model in Table 1. Among Democratic and Republican incumbents, the *Number of Challengers* an incumbent faces is statically significant. This relationship is, as expected, positive for both parties; as the number of challengers an incumbent faces increases, the likelihood they will receive less than 75 percent in their re-election primary also increases. The only other control variable that is statistically significant for Republican members is *Age*. This would suggest a unique relationship between a Republican incumbent's age and their performance in primaries. It would require future research to fully understand the dynamics at play regarding this variable.

Table 1. OLS Regression of Incumbent Primary Percent on Member Difference Score, 2000-2020

		Dependent Variable: Incumbent Primary Percent		
		B	Standard Error	Significance
Democrat	Constant	.865	.032	.000
	Number of Challengers	-.034	.004	.000 ***
	Age	-9.212E-5	.001	.871
	Years Served	-.002	.001	.006 ***
	Freshman	-.017	.017	.325
	Redistricting	-.009	.013	.466
	Member Difference Score	-.059	.026	.025 **
	Model Significance		.000	
	R Squared	.111		
	N	669		
Republican	Constant	.881	.028	.000
	Number of Challengers	-.047	.004	.000 ***
	Age	-.001	.000	.030 **
	Years Served	1.655E-5	.001	.981
	Freshman	-.035	.013	.010 ***
	Redistricting	.016	.011	.143
	Member Difference Score	.021	.026	.406
	Model Significance		.000	
	R Squared	.192		
	N	719		

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

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Table 2. Logistic Regression of Serious Primary Challenges on Member Difference Score, 2000-2020

		Dependent Variable: Incumbent Facing a Serious Primary Challenge in Their Re-Election Primary		
		B	Wald	Significance
Democrat	Constant	-4.603	60.046	.000
	Number of Challengers	1.363	238.476	.000 ***
	Age	.017	2.676	.102
	Years Served	.010	.694	.405
	Freshman	.384	1.723	.189
	Redistricting	.316	1.947	.163
	Member Difference Score	1.039	4.741	.029 **
	Model Significance	.000		
	-2 Log Likelihood	935.789		
	Cox & Snell R Square	.185		
Nagelkerke R Square	.380			
	N	2,027		
Republican	Constant	-4.114	61.015	.000
	Number of Challengers	1.706	315.579	.000 ***
	Age	.016	3.097	.078 *
	Years Served	.004	.081	.775
	Freshman	.300	1.615	.204
	Redistricting	-.122	.389	.533
	Member Difference Score	-.379	.643	.432
	Model Significance	.000		
	-2 Log Likelihood	1,113.177		
	Cox & Snell R Square	.247		
Nagelkerke R Square	.435			
	N	2,004		

*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

XIII. Analysis

The findings of this study have important yet differing implications for both the Democratic and Republican parties. Among Democratic incumbents, this study finds that more liberal Democrats will both perform better in their primary and are less likely to face a serious primary challenge which decreases their vote share to below 75 percent. This finding supports the first hypothesis of this study. If Democratic incumbents are concerned about losing or appearing vulnerable in their re-election primary, the most strategic action would be to shift their voting record to be more liberal. This suggests that Democratic primary voters are both aware of how their legislators vote and are willing to punish them if they deviate ideologically.

The relationship between Republican incumbent ideology and primary vote percentage appears to be more complicated. While the hypothesis is not fully supported, the relationship was in the expected direction for both models. This would suggest that Republicans who are more in line ideologically with their median primary voter receive higher vote percentages in their primaries. It would also suggest that Republican primary voters are aware of their representatives' ideology and are willing to punish them. However, since the relationship was not statistically significant for either model, this cannot be said conclusively.

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This contrasting finding presents an interesting question: what explains this discrepancy among the parties? Why is the relationship significant among Democrats yet not Republicans? One potential explanation is that Republicans appear to be better at positioning themselves ideologically in response to this strategic dilemma. As previously mentioned, the most politically active voters in the United States, including those that vote in primaries, are becoming more polarized.⁷³ This would also suggest that the gap between the median primary voter in a party and the median general election voter is growing. Republicans appear to be navigating this growing gap to be aligned with their median primary voter better than Democrats. A 2022 study by the Pew Research Center relying on the DW-Nominate scores of legislators found that “between the 92nd Congress of 1971-72 and the current 117th Congress, both parties in both the House and the Senate have shifted further away from the center, but Republicans more so. House Democrats, for example, moved from about -0.31 to -0.38, meaning that over time they’ve become modestly more liberal on average. House Republicans, by contrast, moved from 0.25 to nearly 0.51, a much bigger increase in the conservative direction”.⁷⁴ It would appear that as Republican primary voters have become more conservative, Republican members of Congress have become more conservative at a similar rate, thus better aligning themselves with their median primary voter. By contrast, Democratic members of Congress have not become more liberal at the same rate as their primary voters, therefore increasing the ideological gap between themselves and their median primary voter.⁷⁵ The data for this study finds a similar result to the Pew Research Center data [See Figure 2 and Figure 3 below]. The result is stark when comparing the average DW-Nominate ideology for Democratic incumbents to the average vote difference in the presidential election for the district they represent. As the districts Democrats represent in Congress and consequently their median primary voter have become more liberal, Democratic members have not become more liberal [See Figure 2 below]. Conversely, among Republican incumbents, as the districts Republicans represent in Congress have become more conservative, Republican members have also become more conservative [See Figure 3 below]. This finding would suggest that Republicans have been more in step with their median primary voter as that primary voter has become more partisan.

While this is not the only explanation of the differing results among the two parties regarding performances in primaries, it does show apparent differences. Additionally, it shows the importance of alignment with the median primary voter for incumbent members of Congress, as primary voters are aware of the votes a legislator is taking and understand where the member falls on the ideological spectrum. Additionally, it shows that primary voters in both the Democratic and Republican parties are willing to take action and vote against an incumbent whom they view as not sufficiently partisan.

⁷³ Abramowitz and Saunders, “Is Polarization,” 553-554.; Hare and Poole, “Polarization of Contemporary,” 428.; Jacobson, “Electoral Origins,” 1625-1626.; Lelkes “Mass Polarization,” 401.; Skelley and Fuong, “3 in 10”.

⁷⁴ Drew Desilver, “The polarization in today’s Congress has roots that go back decades,” *Pew Research Center*, March 10, 2022, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2022/03/10/the-polarization-in-todays-congress-has-roots-that-go-back-decades/>.

⁷⁵ This phenomenon has been observed by other scholars as well. See: Matt Grossmann and David A. Hopkins, “Ideological Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics,” *Perspectives on Politics* 13, no. 1 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714003168>.; Jacob S. Hackler and Paul Pierson, “Confronting Asymmetric Polarization,” in *Solutions to Political Polarization in America*, ed. Nathaniel Persily (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).; Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, *It’s Even Worse than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with New Politics of Extremism* (New York: Basic Books, 2012).

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Figure 2. Average DW-Nominate Ideology of Incumbent Democratic Representatives against Average Vote Difference of Districts Represented by Incumbent Democratic Representatives by Year, 2000-2020





Figure 3. Average DW-Nominate Ideology of Incumbent Republican Representatives against Average Vote Difference of Districts Represented by Incumbent Republican Representatives by Year, 2000-2020



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XIV. Conclusions

Despite the advantages incumbency affords a member of Congress, including increased access to campaign funds and higher name recognition, it also brings challenges. First among these challenges is the strategic dilemma that all incumbents face when running for re-election in a system that requires them to win both a primary and general election. Both elections have different constituencies with different priorities and members must act strategically when positioning themselves ideologically. The analysis conducted in this study finds that Democratic incumbents who are more ideologically liberal than their median general voter and thus more aligned with their median primary voter receive higher vote shares in their primaries. The relationship among Republican incumbents appears to be more complex. While the analysis suggests that Republican incumbents who are more conservative than their median general election voter and thus closer to their median primary voter receive higher vote shares, the relationship is not strong enough to be conclusive. This discrepancy between the two parties could be due to the fact that Republicans, on average, have better navigated this strategic dilemma. They have aligned themselves with their median primary voter as that median voter has become more partisan. Democrats, by contrast, have, on average, not moved significantly ideologically over the past twenty years while their median primary voter has. Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of primary elections, as incumbent members of Congress are increasingly receiving lower vote shares in their primaries, and further research is necessary to gain a clearer understanding of why. Primary elections serve an important function in determining who is elected to Congress. In order to fully understand why members of Congress behave how they do, it is imperative that future research reflects the importance of primaries.

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Section 2:

International Politics

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Featuring:

“What Socialism Missed: Women’s “Double Shift” and the Endurance of the Patriarchy in the GDR”

Written by Cecilia Duran
University of Michigan, Political Science and Art History Major, Class of 2023

“Destined to Fail? Misinformation and Compulsory Voting in the 2022 Chilean Plebiscite”

Written by Alex Dean
West Virginia University, Political Science Major, Class of 2023

What Socialism Missed: Women's "Double Shift" and the Endurance of the Patriarchy in the GDR

Cecilia Duran

Introduction

In 1949, a post-war divided Germany gave way to tremendously different regimes on each side of the border. In the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became a country in the communist bloc — resulting in the implementation of wholly new political and economic systems which strove to achieve absolute social equality. Since its foundation, the integration of women into employment was regarded as the most important and fundamental step towards equal rights. Despite this equality before the law, women's conditions drastically differed from those of their male counterparts — wage disparity, access to respectable professions, and living conditions proved to be massively burdensome for women. Furthermore, working mothers were subjected to "the double shift" as they tried to find the compatibility of vocational occupation and motherhood within the framework of socialist production relations. Despite legislation and the attempt to make an egalitarian society, this paper will argue that given that women's inclusion in the workforce was made out of the necessity of economic productivity rather than as a feminist reform; equality was never fully accomplished. Furthermore, it will be proved that the patriarchy remained stronger than socialism and that it was ultimately the informal network of male culture and social norms which determined gender relations inside and outside the home.

This paper will begin by outlining the systemic changes that the GDR brought about, with political and economic shifts resulting in legislative reforms that altered gender relations, inside and outside the home. Gender relations will be considered as the routine ways in which men and women interact with each other in social institutions: the division of labor in households, sexual relationships, friendships, workplaces, and within different sectors of the economy (Gal and Kligman, 2000: 37).¹ Throughout the paper, these changes will be looked at both through what was promised on paper — in the 1949 Constitution, and through what actually occurred. Unequal working conditions will become especially apparent with the case of working mothers. Despite attempts from the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) to impede inequality, it will be shown that women were condemned to the difficulty of choosing the workplace or the home. Through the years, this failure at restructuring the patriarchy brought about the loss of the "family-as-cell" with increasing rates of divorce, abortion, and single-motherhood. By including evidential data, the argument will reveal how paternalism outperformed socialism and the GDR became everything communism feared — leaving working women, especially working mothers, to a complicated balancing act.

I. The Political and Economic Transformations of the GDR

The SED and The Centralized Government

The GDR was established in 1949 as part of the Soviet Union's post-war communist bloc. Germany's Eastern side had endured the downfall of a weak parliamentary democracy, the bloodshed of a brutal World War, and the overlapping of two different authoritarian regimes in the span of two decades. The Democratic Republic was established as a new independent nation with the SED as the sole party of the centralized government. With the abolition of private property, all resources and property were controlled by the state, which committed itself to the equitable redistribution of wealth and to a social safety net. This new regime brought about economic, political, and legislative reforms under Stalinist commands. While it was at a considerable advantage to

¹ Gal, S., & Kligman, G. (2000). *The Politics of Gender after Socialism: A Comparative-Historical Essay*. Princeton University Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rn10>

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other Soviet satellite states for having been part of an advanced capitalist economy—as it had the industrial infrastructure and a high level of scientific and technical education—the GDR struggled to reform patriarchal social norms which lingered on until reunification in 1990.

The “Rights Regime”

Stalin famously stated: “What is ‘personal freedom’ for the unemployed, who go hungry and cannot find any application for his work capacity? Only when exploitation is overcome, when the oppression of one person by another, when unemployment, begging and fear of finding work, bread and a place to live are no more — only then will true freedom be found.” To accomplish this, the GDR followed state socialism’s “rights regime” — an attempt at institutionalizing fundamental elements of socialist justice and entitlements. All citizens of East Germany were guaranteed food, housing, education, medical care, and consumer goods. Decades before the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which established the inviolability of fundamental freedoms such as sovereign equality and respect for human rights,² the GDR was already attempting to form the ideal socialist society. It must be noted that, while these “rights to” released citizens from financial burdens that they faced prior to the creation of the GDR, they were also incentives to mask the state’s intervention in private life. In the West, the opposite phenomenon of “rights from” established all guarantees as a way to grant the citizens full privacy from interventions of the state in matters of one’s personal life.

These given rights were double-edged swords especially with regard to the family, gender dynamics, and the home. The home became one of the only places to protect from the omniscience of the state in the public sphere. While the GDR projected that its housing construction program would assure modest but adequate housing for every citizen, the “nationalization” policies of property were put forth as a way to control all aspects of society and to create an alternative modernity better than the West. Apartments had been described as “gifts” from a generous, paternalistic state to deserving citizens (Verdery, 1996: 28).³ By capitalist standards, citizens often complained about the drabness of the *Neubau* (new construction) areas and the deteriorated state of many others, but rent was inexpensive and most citizens credited the state for granting them this security. While it released citizens from the burden of rent, free housing made people interdependent on the state. As housing became standardized — often prefabricated and poorly built — and as imported materials became unpredictable, the 60s saw increasing shortages in the ability to acquire a home. Often unable to leave the “family home” due to the long housing waiting lists, and due to the increased difficulty to afford a house on a single-income basis, women were unable to move upwards or to become autonomous — subjugating them to their partners or to their parents.

An Economy that Needs Women

Economic rights wholly transformed society, especially those related to labor, as they rewrote the expectations of civic responsibility and social norms altogether. To begin, ultra-Stalinist Premier Walter Ulbricht sought to modernize the economy through partial decentralization market-style incentives for managers and consumer perks for workers. East Germany functioned under a strict socialist regime with state-owned means of production. As members of COMECON, they were economically isolated from world economic trends and subject to the interrelations between the communist bloc. This “One Nation, One Factory” followed Marx’s famous claim: “from each according to their ability; to each according to their need” (1875), where the state believed that all production should be done for the benefit of others in response to their needs without conditioning

² Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères. *45th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords (01 Aug. 20)*, *France Diplomacy - Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2020/article/45th-anniversary-of-the-helsinki-accords-01-aug-20> (Accessed: November 22, 2022).

³ Verdery, Katherine. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* Princeton University Press, 1996. *JSTOR*, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7rnm. Accessed 25 Nov. 2022>.

the commitment to aid on the abilities or contributions of others (Crampton, 1994: 250).⁴ Growing safe-haven currency debts caused by domestic instability, coupled with the underinvestment in the state's capital goods, led to reliance on the USSR, the creation of the wall, and the pressing recruitment of a labor force to get the economy on a positive trend again (Baylis, 1986).⁵

The new centrally-planned economic system propagated by Ulbricht's *model DDR* required an increase of citizens in the workforce to meet demands — leading to the introduction of women into the workforce. In the constitution of 1949, the Labor Code outlined working conditions, time regulations, and a 40-day paid leave as part of employment privileges, therefore granting women equality before the law and labor conditions that were equal to those of their male counterparts. Article 15 of the document stated: "The individual's capacity for work is protected by state authority; the right to work is guaranteed; whenever suitable work cannot be found for him, he shall be provided necessary sustenance." This was true for both men and women.

As Friedrich Engels stated: "the emancipation of women and their equalization with men is, and will remain, an impossibility as long as women are excluded from socially productive life and remain confined to their own home."⁶ One of the ideas that the GDR emphasized the most was that women regard employment as the key to equality and a higher form of family life and consequently, men see women as crucial pieces in constructing a socialist society. By 1965, 70 percent of married women had a job and 48.3 percent of all workers were women (Harsch, 2018: 245).⁷ From 1950 to 1989, the participation of women in the labor force rose from 45 percent to 78 percent (Kolinsky, 2003:54).⁸ However, women's employment increased at the expense of their living conditions.

II. *Equality on Paper vs. in Reality*

The victory of the working class believed that the violence against women would disappear with the elimination of the private ownership of the means of production, but the GDR proved that legislative equality did not result in true equality. Both of the aforementioned laws were essentially designed and administered in a paternalistic manner and since the policy was based on male values, it treated women as if they were men therefore subjecting them to massive pressures to behave like them. While socialism created the basic objective preconditions for overcoming the inequality of sexes, the contradiction between women's integration into the public workforce and their social responsibility in the private familial sphere became the greatest impediment in the attempt to create an egalitarian society (Kolinsky: 59). The worst mistake was ignoring issues of parenthood and career development, which produced new patterns of discrimination and structures of disadvantage for women. The right to work began to be seen as a duty to work and employment became a social norm therefore resulting in the social stigmatization, financial losses, and lack of material benefits with its abstinence.

Unequal Conditions in Career Opportunities

Despite the legislative attempts at creating a fully equal society, women suffered great inequalities in the workforce, especially with regard to earnings, occupational integration, and career opportunities (Rosenfeld, 2004: 2).⁹ As Kolinsky states: "equal

⁴ Crampton, R.J. (1994). *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century – And After* (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203445464>

⁵ Baylis, T. A. (1986). Explaining the GDR's Economic Strategy. *International Organization*, 40(2), 381–420. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706841>

⁶ Richter, Werner, et al. *The Changing Role of Women in Society : A Documentation of Current Research : Research Projects in Progress, 1981-1983*. Akademie-Verlag, 1985.

⁷ Harsch, Donna. "CHAPTER SIX. Reconstituting the Family: Domestic Relations between Tradition and Change". *Revenge of the Domestic: Women, the Family, and Communism in the German Democratic Republic*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018, pp. 198-235. <https://doi-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.1515/9780691190402-011>

⁸ Kolinsky, Eva and Nickel, Hildegard Maria. *Reinventing Gender : Women in Eastern Germany since Unification*. Cass, 2003.

⁹ Rosenfeld, Rachel A., et al. "Gender and Work in Germany: Before and after Reunification." *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 30, 2004, pp. 103–24. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737687>. Accessed 5 Nov. 2022.

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pay for equal work was nothing more than a hollow claim and an unmet promise” (8). Women’s employment was concentrated in low-income industries and pay was lowest where the proportion of women was high. In fact, even in positions of power, the pay was far from equal. In 1987, over 60 percent of women were concentrated in 16 of the 335 recognized job designations in the service industry. They were also paid 12 to 25 percent less than men (Kolinsky: 79). By 1979, only 2.3 percent were in management positions within the socialist industry (Richter, 1985). Women were mostly hired as hairdressers, nurses, typists, and nursery teachers and they rarely ever entered virile positions like carpentry or bricklaying, which lowered their earning potential. This was owed to the fact that in order to become a skilled worker one had to do two years of vocational training which provided specific skills that narrowly defined the occupations women could aspire to have. Given that the degree included medical and pedagogical occupations, the aforementioned jobs became more typical for women. Furthermore, women were seriously underrepresented in leading state and party positions. In 1986, Margarete Muller and Inge Lange were SED candidates, but no woman ever achieved the status of a full member in the Politburo. In conclusion, women worked in gender-stereotyped occupations, and they were thus subjected to lower wages and lesser benefits.

The Case of ‘Working Mothers’

As shown, the introduction of women to the workforce was not a feminist reform, but a matter of productivity and necessity. Since change occurred from above, and inequality was “constitutionally abolished”, equality became a myth that ignored the fact that gender was the root issue of importance. This avoided challenging the status quo and resulting in the consolidation of gender stereotypes (ibid: 79). Policies were designed to support working mothers in the combination of familial and labor responsibilities and they tried to persuade women in Eastern Germany that they should be committed to motherhood and employment with equal intensity. These “working mothers” were expected to do it all and they had little choice about whether or not they wanted to combine work and children.

The women-family-work relations fell in with all forms of discrimination in the labor market. For example, having a part-time job —working less than 40 hours a week— carried negative connotations and unemployment implied a loss of social status. Those who didn’t work were seen as *schmarotzer*, which translates to “parasites.” Additionally, motherhood was strongly imposed upon women. While women and men contributed to the labor force to the same extent, gender roles within the family hardly changed and women still faced discrimination at work, in politics, and in the home. The Politburo neither reconsidered its drive for the full-time, permanent employment of mothers nor pondered why the husband still did not feel obligated to share inner familial functions (Harsch: 286). Ultimately, the futures of women were at the hands of the “father state,” one which condemned them to a double, or sometimes triple, burden.

III. Legislative Failures in Transforming the Private Sphere

Engels’s work “Origins of the family, private property and the state” inspired the 1950 Law on the Protection of Mother and Child, which guaranteed that decisions on all marital matters be made by the joint decision-making right of both partners and attempted to equalize women and men in all spheres of life. In 1965, in an effort to mend gender disparities, Premier Erich Honecker passed the Family Code, which defined the family as the smallest cell in society and advocated for union for life based on mutual love, respect, faithfulness, and understanding love for one another. This Family Code established parity in gender responsibilities within the home, such as taking care of children and doing household chores. However, there was no fundamental change in the amount of time devoted to family tasks: from 1965 to 1990, the time the average woman devoted to it fell from 47.5 to 47 hours per week in a four-person household (Kolinsky: 58). Additionally, East German mothers devoted an average of six hours a day to household chores, while their male counterparts devoted that same amount of time in an entire week (ibid: 110).

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The GDRs Constitution and its Mother and Child Law eliminated patriarchal powers but offered no guidance to the courts in matters of family conflict, and men were able to perpetuate a traditional gender-specific division of work within the family. In addition, a woman's double shift was coupled with the endless hours spent queuing outside shops — as the economic system was ridden with shortages, more often than not. After their first shift, women had to perform the chores that were needed to sustain a family such as shopping for goods, doing the laundry, dealing with doctors' appointments for their children, picking them up from daycare, making dinner, etc. Due to the fact that a woman's day was filled with work, their leisure time was narrowed down to the hours before going to bed, or the time they had before their shift at work began. While the constitution declared that every worker was entitled to recreation (Article 16), women faced a "free time" deficit that put them, yet again, at a disadvantage with their male counterparts, who had their afternoons after work free to themselves.

The Balancing Act: Choosing the Workplace or the Home

Despite the changes occurring at every level of the economy and government, the patriarchal pillars on which Germany's society had been built even before the country's split remained strong and unmovable. Women and men across the social spectrum had internalized norms that assumed the housewife and mother would tend to the family's physical and emotional needs (Harsch: 223). In order to fight the losses that childbearing brought about in terms of professional opportunities, women often limited themselves to one offspring. The strain of housework and childbearing, with the unequal systematic development of women, contributed to the lower participation rates of women in the public sphere of work. Those that chose to form families were forced to seek jobs with low demands, or work part-time. In 1980, 29.4 percent of women worked part-time — hindering their professional development, strengthening the traditional division of labor within the family, and sacrificing part of their labor capacity.

Social Welfare Measures to Aid 'Working Mothers'

Evidently, access to employment did not necessarily mean emancipation for women, as they were subjected to incredibly difficulty balancing familial and labor responsibilities. In an attempt to curb this, the state made various reforms that would support women in their efforts to be mothers and workers alike. To deal with the decline of childbearing in the 1950s and 60s due to women's introduction to the labor market, the SED also introduced a package of social welfare measures to ease the compatibility of women's full-time employment and childcare. The state provided substantial help for childcare so that mothers could work part-time, or even full-time. The "baby year" provided public childcare provisions and one fully paid housework day per month reduced the full-time work for mothers with more than one child (ibid: 195). With the "baby year" — an exemption from work on pay equivalent to 65 to 90 percent of their average net earnings — mothers had the chance to spend more time with their infants. Since 1979, all children ages 3 to 6 could attend daycare facilities if desired by the parents and by 1989, the GDR covered the daycare needs for 80 percent of children ages 0 to 3, compared to 16 percent in Czechoslovakia or 5 percent in Poland (Makkai, 1994).¹⁰ In 1987, monthly child benefit was increased from 20 to 50 East German marks for the first child, 20 to 100 for the second child, and 100 to 150 marks for the third child. However, despite all of these advancements, there was still strong evidence that established gender relations persisted, even under the strain of structural and transformative change (Kolinsky: 72). Women still regarded homemaking as an interim period between full employment, not as a substitute for it.

IV. The Loss of the "Family-as-cell": Divorce, Abortion, and Single Motherhood

¹⁰Makkai, T. (1994). Social policy and gender in eastern Europe. In D. Sainsbury (Ed.), *Gendering welfare states* (pp. 188-205). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

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The GDR was filled with ambivalences and contradictions in the opportunities that women were afforded during the 40-year-history of East Germany; women either used or refused them in an attempt to establish a sane balance between their increasing desire to be employed, and the often opposing desire to be mothers. As Gembries puts it: “Although women were appreciated and also deemed necessary as workers, they were predominantly addressed as mothers” (195). Women, who had to bear the burdens of the triple overlap of family, housework, and career, valued their employment nonetheless. As Kolinsky states: “even during the family phase she perceives herself as a woman with a career and not a housewife” (44). Furthermore, the negative connotations behind childlessness, which was regarded as “bourgeois,” led to a normative pressure regarding marriage and children, which, coupled with the declaration of reproductive work as a patriotic task, made women’s lives meet with unsustainable responsibilities.

Given that women faced discrimination inside and outside the household, granted the possibility, they were quick to free themselves from the subordination they faced within the home. Since the 1960s, divorce skyrocketed while birth rates plummeted. Financial incentives for childbearing, coupled with the legalization of abortion in 1972 and increased availability of contraception, proved a success as births rose from 180,336 in 1973 to 245,130 in 1980 (Sayner, 2012: 231).¹¹ Access to legal abortion built the groundwork for women to more safely decide on motherhood before and after a detected pregnancy. In 1972, there were 599 abortions for every 1000 births, which meant 114,000 abortions in total. Mortality caused by abortions declined by over 80 percent, as before the Abortion Law, about 70 percent of women died per year due to illegal abortions (Gembries: 191).

Childbearing defined womanhood more than marriage in the GDR. The separation of sexuality and reproduction, and the associated decoupling of parents and partnership made possible by the birth control pill in the 60s, and other chemical and mechanical contraceptives increasingly available, influenced social forms of the family, population development, and gender relations (Gembries, 2018: 1).¹² However, it must be stressed that the access to contraceptive methods was not motivated by the recognition of women’s sexual self-determination or to ensure the health of children and mothers, but rather as an attempt to have control of the predictability of someone’s uninterrupted employment history (ibid: 192).

Furthermore, single motherhood became the more common family form in East Germany, with an increase in births out of wedlock and the possibility of divorce. So much so that every second woman in the GDR lived as a single mother at least once in their life (Kolinsky: 152). To put this into context, from 1978 to 1983, births from unmarried mothers rose from 17.3 to 32 percent, and while this liberated women, it made them dependent on state benefits and often prompted them to hover over the poverty line.

V. *The Patriarchy, Traditionalism, and Social Norms – What Socialism Never Beat*

By 1970, East German women had attained the world’s highest rate of employment in an industrialized economy. The traditional “male-breadwinner/female-carer” dynamic changed partially with the “dual-earner/dual-carer” society that merged work-gender equality (Rosenfeld: 120). The workforce was 48.3 percent female, and while this proved to be a historic change, it was only peripherally. That same year, 50 percent of women with one or more children under three years old did not work for wages, twenty percent of wives were not employed, and one-third of women worked part-time (Kolinsky: 318). Reproduction became a crisis as pressing as that of production, and despite the party’s attempt at mending the breaches between men and women, and

¹¹ Sayner, Joanne. “After the History of Sexuality: German Genealogies with and Beyond Foucault.” Edited by Scott Spector, Helmut Puff, and Dagmar Herzog. *German Studies Review* 37, no. 3 (2012): 231–47.

¹² Gembries, A, Theuke, T, & Heinemann, I (eds) 2018, *Children by Choice? : Changing Values, Reproduction, and Family Planning in the 20th Century*, Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/München/Boston. Available from: ProQuest Ebook Central. [22 November 2022].

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attaining their sought-after “equal society”, the patriarchal society that had ruled in Germany prior to the establishment of the GDR managed to beat socialism.

Traditional roles inside the private sphere persisted and while women were granted formal equality at work, cultural stereotypes of femininity and masculinity were pervasive, confining men and women to their conventional social roles (Fulbrook, 2009:261).¹³ The attempt to modernize society failed. The high employment of women and the socio-political measures for childcare could be interpreted as a sign of women’s emancipation and gender equality, but they were essentially a coerced double burden of occupation and family.

Hostage to the Patriarchy’s Hierarchies, Nevertheless

While communism advocated for the collective, it bred a society of individualized women, who opted for controlling the little freedom they had when met with the increasing demands of the “father state” and its patriarchal functioning. Ironically, the GDR became everything that communism advocated against: the loss of the “optimal family” anchored in heterosexual marriage was instead overshadowed by a disorganized climate of high divorce rates, adultery, and unmarried cohabitation (Harsch: 284). All these trends demonstrated that women accepted the tasks and duties arising from motherhood but did not accept gender inequalities in the private sphere. In hindsight, women were crucial aspects of the household in all aspects of its maintenance: chores, childcare, and most importantly, income. The financial codependency that equal labor brought about often forced women to remain married, despite being unhappy, as their families relied on their wages to support themselves. Women provided 40 percent of the household income, and they worked to live, not just to exert their rights as equal citizens. This double-sided coin provided women with the incentive to work in order to become financially independent but balancing work and family was often too much to carry for the average working mother. In other words, women were no longer dependent on men but they were still subordinate to them.

VI. Conclusion

Article 7 of the Labor Code of 1949 stated: “men and women have equal rights. All laws and regulations which conflict with the equality of women are abolished.” Article 18 declared that working conditions ought to be such as to safeguard the health, cultural requirements and family of the workers, as well as stated that “the laws of the republic shall provide for institutions enabling women to co-ordinate their tasks as citizens and workers with their duties as wives and mothers.” Article 32 swore that institutions were “created to protect mother and child” and that all laws or statutory provisions by which impaired the equality of men and women within the family were to be abrogated (Article 30). In short, within the 144 Articles contained in the Labor Code, the basis was utopically established — and it was one that favored the equality of women before the law, the factory and the man.

However, this paper proved that they were nothing more than speculative and failed attempts at creating an egalitarian socialist society. Upon the failure of its creation from 1949 to 1990, the SED put forth several reforms in order to maintain the predictability of production and reproduction of society and the economy of the GDR — all through the veil of wanting to improve women’s lives. Through the numerous examples that have been stated it has been demonstrated that socialism never managed to beat the patriarchy. It failed within the home, with the Family Code of 1965; and in the workforce, as shown by the unequal conditions between genders. Most importantly, it failed because of the very way in which these reforms were implemented: paternalism pickled with weak and malfunctioning society. The GDR lasted for forty years, but it was long enough to ingrain socialism’s ideologies into its citizens and maintain the misogynistic and unequal social norms that affected women in Germany, especially mothers, decades after reunification.

¹³ Fulbrook Mary. 2009. *A History of Germany 1918-2008 : The Divided Nation*. 3rd ed. Chichester West Sussex U.K: Wiley-Blackwell.

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Destined to Fail? Misinformation and Compulsory Voting in the 2022 Chilean Plebiscite

Alex Dean

Following the rejection of the proposed constitution in the Chilean plebiscite that took place on September 4, 2022, the *Centro de Investigación Periodística* (Center for Journalistic Investigation, CIPER) conducted interviews with voters from the region of Santiago who rejected the proposed constitution in an effort to understand what factors drove their vote. Brenda of Estación Central voted no because she thought the new constitution would let mothers kill their up to one-year-old children in the name of “legal abortion.”¹ Marlén of Estación Central casted a vote for the first time in her life, voting no because her sister told her that the state would be able to repossess deceased people’s houses and real estates would no longer be inheritable.² Jorge of Puente Alto never read the proposed constitution, instead, he got information about the document on his cellphone. He voted no because he didn’t want pension funds to become uninheritable.³

These interviews, and many others conducted by CIPER, were concerning for one reason in particular: misinformation. The proposed constitution did not guarantee legal abortion to already born children or outlaw the inheritance of real estate — in fact, the document actually guaranteed a right to property and did not stipulate that pension funds would automatically become uninheritable. Brenda, Marlén, Jorge, and many others rationalized their vote in the Chilean 2022 plebiscite unknowingly using misinformation. In the qualitative interviews conducted by CIPER, half of individuals (60 of 120 interviews) required misinformation citations because they were repeating misinformation about the proposed constitution.⁴ While 120 qualitative interviews within a single region of Chile is not statistically representative of the entirety of Chile, it nonetheless paints a concerning picture of the role of misinformation in the voting rationale of people in the 2022 constitutional plebiscite.

The rejection of the proposed constitution was unexpected given the overwhelming support for change leading up to the constitutional plebiscite. The Chilean government authorized the drafting of a new constitution in response to constitutional radical protest action, most notably the *Estallido Social* (the social outburst) in Santiago initially against a raise in subway fare for the Santiago Metro. It later evolved into a general protest against high levels of inequality and the feeling that the return to democracy was unfinished.⁵ The plebiscite, which took place in 2020, was reported by Chile’s electoral service (SERVEL) to have won overwhelmingly with 78% of Chileans supporting the writing of a new constitution.⁶ Yet, despite an atmosphere that seemingly was in favor of radical change, the proposed constitution was resoundly rejected by a wider-than-expected margin, with only 38% of voters in favor of the proposed constitution and 62% against it.⁷

¹ Nicolás Massai D, “Estación Central: Porque todos van a ser de Fonasa” *CIPER Chile* (blog), September 8, 2022, <https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/07/estacion-central-porque-todos-van-a-ser-de-fonasa/>.

² Nicolás Massai D, “Estación Central: Porque todos van a ser de Fonasa” *Ciper Chile* (blog), September 8, 2022, <https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/07/estacion-central-porque-todos-van-a-ser-de-fonasa/>.

³ Macarena Segovia, “Puente Alto: No nos beneficiaba a nosotros, al pueblo, la gente que trabaja, era para ellos no más, los políticos de las tres comunas,” *CIPER Chile* (blog), September 8, 2022, <https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/07/puente-alto-no-nos-beneficiaba-a-nosotros-al-pueblo-la-gente-que-trabaja-era-para-ellos-no-mas-los-politicos-de-las-tres-comunas/>.

⁴ Equipo CIPER, “120 residentes de 12 comunas populares de la Región Metropolitana explican por qué votaron Rechazo,” *CIPER Chile* (blog), September 8, 2022, <https://www.ciperchile.cl/2022/09/07/120-residentes-de-12-comunas-populares-de-la-region-metropolitana-explican-por-que-votaron-rechazo/>.

⁵ Rocío Montes, “Las sombras de Allende y Pinochet siguen planeando sobre nuestras cabezas,” *El País*, October 29, 2021, <https://elpais.com/internacional/2021-10-29/las-sombras-de-allende-y-pinochet-siguen-planeando-sobre-nuestras-cabezas.html>.

⁶ “Sitio Historico Resultados Electorales - Servel,” accessed October 14, 2022, <https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=10>.

⁷ “Sitio Historico Resultados Electorales - Servel,” accessed October 14, 2022, <https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=237>.

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Initial analysis from both Chile and abroad blamed the failed plebiscite on the proposed constitution being too “left-leaning” and “radical.”⁸ However, based on the aforementioned CIPER interviews, it is possible that voters exaggerated the radical nature of the proposed constitution considering that half of the interviewees expressed misinformed opinions about the constitution’s contents. If misinformation did impact the electorate, which voters were more likely to believe it? Furthermore, was the role of misinformation pivotal in the outcome of the plebiscite?

I theorize that the failure of the plebiscite is due to two factors: the reintroduction of compulsory voting and misinformation about the contents of the proposed constitution, especially on social media. The reintroduction of compulsory voting dramatically increased the number of participants within the political system, especially low-information voters who seldom or never participated previously. These low-information voters, who are more likely to be swayed by new political information than highly partisan and informed voters, had a more difficult time discerning the negative misinformation about the proposed constitution than high-information voters did and, as a result, were a central reason that the proposed constitution was rejected by such a high margin.

To test my theory, I created a regression model of the percent approval vote by commune, the smallest unit of government in Chile. I chose to analyze data at the commune level because this was the smallest unit of analysis available publicly given the temporal and monetary constraints of this capstone. The literature suggests that low information voters are disproportionately less educated, poorer, less interested in politics, and less partisan. Findings from my regression analysis indicate that communes with higher proportions of low-information voters were less likely to vote in favor of the proposed constitution. Qualitative interviews sourced through Nexis Uni database were used to understand these findings and the role of misinformation within the context of the 2022 Chilean plebiscite.

I. The Leadup to the 2022 Plebiscite: The Legacy of Pinochet

To understand the 2022 Chilean plebiscite, a brief overview of Chile’s political history must first be established. Chile’s politics are characterized by strong programmatic political parties, long periods of democratic continuity with relatively short periods of nondemocratic interruptions, mainly the Carlos Ibáñez dictatorship from 1927 to 1931 and the Pinochet dictatorship from 1973 to 1988, and strong political institutions.⁹ The Freedom House Index classifies Chile as a free country and as of 2021, the only Latin American country ranked higher than Chile on its global freedom index was Uruguay.¹⁰ However, under the seemingly stable surface of Chilean political institutions is a society discontent with the unfinished transition to democracy in 1989. The discontent can primarily be seen through increased levels of protest in Chile since 2010, especially among its student population, along with a general decline in approval of Chilean political institutions.

The gradual discontent starting in 2010 can be explained primarily by a change in the partisan leaning of the presidency which led to student protests and a decreased trust in political institutions. In 2010, Chile elected its first right-wing president, Sebastián Piñera, since the return to democracy, thus ending over 20 years of center to center-left governance by the *Concertación* coalition which was formed prior to the 1988 plebiscite in opposition to Pinochet. As seen below in Figure 1 using data from the Chilean Center

⁸ Samantha Schmidt, “Chilean Voters Decisively Reject Leftist Constitution,” *Washington Post*, September 5, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/04/chile-votes-constitution-referendum/>.
Cristián Pizarro Allard. “El proceso fue un fracaso. Una falla de la política chilena.” *El Mercurio (Chile)*. 6 septiembre 2022 martes.

<https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:66B8-0PX1-JCG7-84WS-00000-00&context=1516831>.

⁹ Simon Collier, “Timothy R. Scully, Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00004909>; Arturo Valenzuela and Lucia Dammert, “A ‘Left Turn’ in Latin America? Problems of Success in Chile,” *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 4 (2006): 65–79, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2006.0074>; Robert Barros, *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2002), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511606298>; Weeks, Gregory Bart. *The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003.

¹⁰ “Explore the Map,” Freedom House, accessed October 16, 2023, <https://freedomhouse.org/explore-the-map>.

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for Public Studies (CEP), surveys mapping Chilean presidential approval, while the *Concertación* was in power, showed relatively little discontent with governance and presidents almost always maintained positive approval ratings. Since the election of Piñera, Chilean presidents have struggled to achieve a positive approval rating. The decline of Piñera's favorability began in 2011. This decline corresponds with the beginning of the Chilean student protests, also known as *El invierno estudiantil chileno* (The Chilean Student Winter). These students were protesting against the state of the Chilean educational system, for which Pinochet had decreased funding in 1981 while encouraging the privatization of education and eliminating gratuitous tertiary education. This placed the burden of cost on students rather than the state. The protests ushered in a new era for Chilean politics with declining trust in institutions, causing some political scientists to argue that the Chilean political system is in the throes of a legitimacy crisis.¹¹




Figure 1.: Chilean Presidential Approval 1991-2021¹²

The dissatisfaction with political institutions can be seen through successive AmericasBarometer surveys from Chile. On questions like “satisfaction with democracy”, there is a marked decrease over the past 10 years and in the last survey conducted in 2021, satisfaction with democracy was only at 37.5% (Latin American Public Opinion Project 2004-2021).¹³ The declining levels of trust culminated with a massive outburst of protests in 2019, beginning with protests over a rise in subway fares in Santiago but morphing into wider protests against the rising cost of living and high levels of inequality.

¹¹ Camila Jara, “Democratic Legitimacy under Strain? Declining Political Support and Mass Demonstrations in Chile,” *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe / European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, no. 97 (2014): 25–50; Peter M. Siavelis, “Crisis of Representation in Chile? The Institutional Connection,” *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 8, no. 3 (December 1, 2016): 61–93, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1600800303>; Lucía Dammert, Felipe Elorrieta, and Erik Alda, “Satisfaction with the Police in Chile: The Importance of Legitimacy and Fair Treatment,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 63, no. 4 (November 2021): 124–45, <https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.40>.

¹² Carmen Le Foulon, “Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública” 2021.

¹³ The AmericasBarometer by Latin American Public Opinion Project Surveys 2004-2021. www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.

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These protests, known as *el estallido social*, were the largest in Chilean history since the transition to democracy and spurred the government to hold a referendum in 2020 on whether Chile should rewrite its constitution.¹⁴ The referendum resulted in over three-fourths of Chileans voting in favor of a new constitution drafted through an elected constitutional convention, inaugurating one of the most democratic exercises in constitution-building.

Satisfaction with Democracy in Chile 2004-2021




Figure 2: Satisfaction with Democracy in Chile 2004-2021¹⁵

The vote was successful, with over three-fourths of Chileans voting in favor of drafting a new constitution through an elected constitutional convention, therefore inaugurating one of the most democratic exercises in constitution-building. Notably, the 2020 plebiscite had an unusually wide ideological gap in turnout. Data from CEP reported that there was a 17-point self-reported turnout gap between left-leaning and right-leaning Chileans.¹⁶ An additional factor in the margin of victory for the 2020 plebiscite was a unified left in favor of drafting a new constitution while political parties on the right were splitting.¹⁷ However, the conditions that allowed the 2020 plebiscite to pass by overwhelming margins were not repeated in 2022 due to the implementation of compulsory voting, negating any potential ideological imbalances in the electorate. Additionally, right-wing parties united in opposition against the proposed constitution out of a fear of the “radical” document.¹⁸ In the following section, I investigate the effects of Chile adopting compulsory voting for the first time in 10 years and its effects on the 2022 plebiscite.

¹⁴ Mario Weissbluth, “Orígenes y Evolución del Estallido Social en Chile.” (Centro de Sistemas Públicos, Universidad de Chile, January 31, 2020), https://www.mariowaisbluth.com/descargas/mario_waisbluth_el_estallido_social_en_chile_v1_feb1.pdf.

¹⁵ The AmericasBarometer by Latin American Public Opinion Project Surveys 2004-2021. www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.

¹⁶ Carmen Le Foulon, “Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública” 2021.

¹⁷ Lautaro Cella and Eli Rau, “Chile’s New Voting Rules May Have Derailed the New Constitution,” *Washington Post*, September 16, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/16/chile-constitution-mandatory-voting/>.

¹⁸ Lautaro Cella and Eli Rau, “Chile’s New Voting Rules May Have Derailed the New Constitution,” *Washington Post*, September 16, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/16/chile-constitution-mandatory-voting/>.

II. *What Made the 2022 Constitutional Plebiscite Different*

The 2022 constitutional plebiscite is unique in its voting procedure when compared to other voting systems Chile has used since the return of democracy. For the first time in Chilean electoral history, the election had both automatic voting registration and compulsory voting.¹⁹ From 1988 to 2011, compulsory voting was legally enforced but voting registration was voluntary. Thus, a person was legally obligated to vote in every election only once they registered to vote. Despite having an enforced compulsory voting law, Chile's non-automatic voting registration resulted in one of the most "lopsided" electorates in Latin America by the eve of its electoral reform in 2012.²⁰ Chile had one of the largest age biases in voter registration roles compared to other modern democracies, with older voters participating at much higher rates than young voters.²¹ In the 2009 elections, for those above the age of 35 turnout was above 90% while turnout for those younger than 30 was less than 25 %t.²² This age gap was further exacerbated by Concertación, which registered a large proportion of the Chilean electorate as part of their campaign strategy to defeat Pinochet at the ballot. Their efforts paid off and resulted in a 97.5% voter turnout with 56% having voted "No" against Pinochet's regime.²³ However, from 1988 to 2011, a decreasing number of citizens registered nearly every year because of the perceived costs of compulsory voting, resulting in the voting-eligible electorate skewing much older than the Chilean adult population.²⁴

In addition to there being an age bias in voting turnout, the voluntary voter registration process produced a youth vote that was disproportionately wealthy and upper class.²⁵ In Vitacura, one of the wealthiest areas of Santiago, 50% of 18 and 19-year-olds registered while in the poor neighborhood of La Pintana, registration for the same age group was only 5%.²⁶ It was these factors of electoral inequality that inspired the Chilean parliament to introduce automatic voter registration and voluntary voting in 2012.²⁷

The electoral reform was only partly successful. It did diminish the age bias in the electorate however voter turnout dropped to a low of 40% in the 2012 municipal elections and only rebounded to 49% turnout for the 2013 presidential and parliamentary elections.²⁸ Cox and Gonzalez found that overall turnout decreased by 5% but the age bias of voters did reduce by 39%.²⁹ Turnout in Chilean elections with non-compulsory voting since 2012 has not rebounded. From 2012 to 2020, Chile's department of elections, *Servicio Electoral de Chile* (SERVEL), reported voting participation in each election to be around 50% or less of eligible voters.³⁰ This low level of voting participation since the electoral reforms is contrasted with the participation rate in Chile's 2022 constitutional plebiscite, which had a turnout rate of 86%.³¹ While the stakes of the plebiscite certainly increased turnout, previous studies on the effects of compulsory voting displayed a similar change.

III. *Compulsory Voting and its Effects on Turnout and Voting Demographics*

¹⁹ Cella and Rau, "Chile's New Voting Rules," 2022.

²⁰ Alejandro Corvalan and Paulo Cox, "Class-Biased Electoral Participation: The Youth Vote in Chile," *Latin American Politics and Society* 55, no. 3 (2013): 47–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2013.00202.x>.

²¹ Tiffany D. Barnes and Gabriela Rangel, "Election Law Reform in Chile: The Implementation of Automatic Registration and Voluntary Voting," *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy* 13, no. 4 (December 2014): 570–82, <https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2013.0205>.

²² Corvalan and Cox, "Class-Biased Electoral Participation," 2013.

²³ Barnes and Rangel, "Election Law Reform in Chile: The Implementation of Automatic Registration and Voluntary Voting," 2014.

²⁴ Barnes and Rangel, "Electoral Law Reform in Chile," 2014.

²⁵ Corvalan and Cox, "Class-Biased Electoral Participation," 2013.

²⁶ Corvalan and Cox, "Class-Biased Electoral Participation," 2013.

²⁷ Barnes and Rangel, "Electoral Law Reform in Chile," 2014.

²⁸ Loreto Cox and Ricardo Gonzalez, "Fewer but Younger: Changes in Turnout After Voluntary Voting and Automatic Registration in Chile," *Political Behavior*, March 17, 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-022-09788-0>.

²⁹ Cox and Gonzalez, "Fewer but Younger," 2022.

³⁰ "Sitio Historico Resultados Electorales - Servel," accessed October 18, 2022, <https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=237>.

³¹ "Sitio Historico Resultados Electorales - Servel," accessed October 18, 2022, <https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=237>.

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Early studies of the effects of compulsory voting implementation found it increased turnout anywhere from 7 to 22 points higher than if non-compulsory voting was in place.³² However, these earlier comparative studies on the effects of turnout on compulsory voting had an “omitted variable bias” as described by Cox and Gonzalez.³³ As a result, these studies failed to properly model for country-level variation, like beliefs that voting is a civic duty or other indicators of high levels of political participation, that may alternatively describe the higher levels of participation in countries with compulsory voting.³⁴ More recent studies have turned to cross-section time series analysis or synthetic control design to better account for confounding variables. For instance, Fowler examined the differential adoption of compulsory voting across Australian states to find that turnout increased by 24%.³⁵ Bechtel et al. used the unique factor of limited compulsory voting in the Swiss canton of Vaud, to find that compulsory voting increased turnout in federal referendums in Vaud by 30 percent.³⁶ Other studies have attempted to move beyond a simple correlation between compulsory voting and turnout and towards asking who the voters are that only turn out in elections with compulsory voting. Studies show that compulsory voting lessens socioeconomic and class biases when compared to voluntary voting.³⁷ Additionally, Gallego found that education has a weaker relationship with turnout in compulsory voting systems than in voluntary voting systems.³⁸

The empirical findings from the literature, showcasing that compulsory voting lessens socioeconomic, educational, and demographic inequalities in turnout, counter the Chilean experience where compulsory voting caused an age bias in turnout and exacerbated a class bias in turnout also. However, it is important to note that the previous Chilean experience with compulsory voting prior to 2012 was unique in its non-automatic voting registration, effectively letting citizens opt out of voting unlike other compulsory voting systems. Unlike in previous years, the 2022 constitutional plebiscite was held in conditions much closer to a “normal” compulsory voting scheme, as 2012 electoral reforms allowed voters to be registered upon arrival at the polls. Thus, since the 2022 constitutional plebiscite functioned similarly to other votes with compulsory voting. With the literature above, it can be inferred that the Chileans that seldom or never voted in non-compulsory elections prior to 2022 had lower levels of educational attainment and were more likely to be poor and display lower levels of interest in politics. These voters usually turn out at lower rates than the educated, wealthy, and politically interested individuals in a voluntary vote when compared to a compulsory vote.

IV. Political Characteristics of These Voters

The voters that are less likely to turn out in elections and plebiscites with voluntary voting — the less wealthy, the less politically interested, and the less educated — have a myriad of reasons not to vote, including systemic barriers, discontent with political institutions, or a distrust of democracy, among many other reasons. However,

³² “Why Europe Votes. By Harold F. Gosnell. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1930. Pp. Xiii, 247.) | American Political Science Review | Cambridge Core,” accessed February 12, 2022, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/why-europe-votes-by-harold-f-gosnell-chicago-the-university-of-chicago-press-1930-pp-xiii-247/27B5A53D747BC7D0E29FB708E44F8182>; Robert W. Jackman, “Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies,” *American Political Science Review* 81, no. 2 (June 1987): 405–23, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1961959>.

³³ Cox and Gonzalez, 2022.

³⁴ Cox and Gonzalez, 2022.

³⁵ Anthony Fowler, “Electoral and Policy Consequences of Voter Turnout: Evidence from Compulsory Voting in Australia,” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 8, no. 2 (April 10, 2013): 159–82, <https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00012055>.

³⁶ Michael M. Bechtel, Dominik Hangartner, and Lukas Schmid, “Compulsory Voting, Habit Formation, and Political Participation,” *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 100, no. 3 (July 2018): 467–76, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00701.

³⁷ C. van der Eijk, M.N. Franklin, and J. Ackaert, *Choosing Europe?: The European Electorate and National Politics in the Face of Union* (University of Michigan Press, 1996), <https://books.google.com/books?id=KnB-XoHndRYC>; Peter Söderlund, Hanna Wass, and André Blais, “The Impact of Motivational and Contextual Factors on Turnout in First- and Second-Order Elections,” *Electoral Studies* 30, no. 4 (December 1, 2011): 689–99, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2011.06.013>; Shane P. Singh, “Compulsory Voting and the Turnout Decision Calculus,” *Political Studies* 63, no. 3 (August 1, 2015): 548–68, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12117>.

³⁸ Aina Gallego, “Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative Perspective,” *Electoral Studies* 29, no. 2 (June 2010): 239–48, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2009.11.002>.

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one factor that unites the majority of these potential voters are lower levels of political sophistication. Political sophistication is a nebulous term that can be defined as knowledge of politics and policy.³⁹ More recent literature has taken a more encompassing approach to political sophistication to include many of the political qualities of an “ideal” citizen such as interest in, knowledge of, and attention to politics, its process, and its outputs.⁴⁰ A similar term to low and high political sophisticates, low information and high information voters, will be used interchangeably in this paper. The primary effect of political sophistication that is of importance to this paper is how high and low sophisticates process new information.⁴¹ Political sophistication is important due to its effect on the voting calculus for the proposed constitution that low-information voters undertook compared to high-information voters.

The voting calculus required to cast an informed vote for the 2022 plebiscite has many variables of consideration due to the scope and scale of the proposed constitution. Under ideal circumstances, every citizen planning to vote would examine each article and formulate their opinion on it and methodologically contrast it to their opinion of the entire constitution to maximize their utility. This method of voting calculus is a rational model of behavior developed by Anthony Downs.⁴² The year after Downs’s seminal book was published, James March and Herbert Simon published their theory of bounded rationality.⁴³ March and Simon primarily critique rational choice because individuals tend not to explicitly seek optimality in their decision-making but tend towards an acceptable alternative with less effort, described as satisficing.⁴⁴ More recent scholarship has found credence in a bounded rationality model of cognition. The mental acuity needed to think through each and every choice in a systemic manner that weighs concerns of personal utility in an unbiased way is not a sustainable way of thought due to humans’ limited cognitive capacity.⁴⁵ The cognitive capacity is limited in the sense that it is not infinite, therefore resulting in heuristic shortcuts like cues in decision-making.⁴⁶

These heuristic shortcuts are important for the political process because the amount of time and mental effort needed to develop a policy position on all relevant political issues including electoral reform, environmental policy, and trade, for example, requires much more time than many, if not all, are willing to expend. The human disinterest in taking a fully rational approach to political knowledge is demonstrated in Converse’s *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*, which found only a small majority of United States citizens eligible to vote knew simple facts of how U.S. government functioned and that even less people held “real” (arrived at thoughtfully) attitudes to important political attitudes.⁴⁷

Other scholarship has backed up Converse’s claims showing that even though the public by and large is interested with the political process, they tend to know relatively little about most substantive issues.⁴⁸ To fill the gap in knowledge about politics and

³⁹ Arthur Lupia, “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections,” *The American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (1994): 63–76, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2944882>; Larry M. Bartels, “Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections,” *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (1996): 194–230, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111700>

⁴⁰ Patrick R. Miller, “The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication,” *Political Psychology* 32, no. 4 (2011): 575–600, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00824.x>.

⁴¹ Sally Marthaler, “The Paradox of the Politically-Sophisticated Partisan: The French Case,” *West European Politics* 31, no. 5 (September 1, 2008): 937–59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802234607>.

⁴² Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1957).

⁴³ J.G. March et al., *Organizations* (Wiley, 1958), <https://books.google.com/books?id=9oxEAAAIAAJ>.

⁴⁴ J.G. March et al., *Organizations*, 1958.

⁴⁵ A. Newell, H.A. Simon, and American Chemical Society Division of Polymer Chemistry, *Human Problem Solving*, ACS Symposium Series (Prentice-Hall, 1972), <https://books.google.com/books?id=h03uAAAAMAAJ>.

⁴⁶ A. Newell, H.A. Simon, and American Chemical Society Division of Polymer Chemistry, *Human Problem Solving*, ACS Symposium Series (Prentice-Hall, 1972), <https://books.google.com/books?id=h03uAAAAMAAJ>.

⁴⁷ Philip E. Converse, “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics (1964),” *Critical Review* 18, no. 1–3 (January 2006): 1–74, <https://doi.org/10.1080/08913810608443650>.

⁴⁸ Henry E. Brady and Paul M. Sniderman, “Attitude Attribution: A Group Basis for Political Reasoning,” *The American Political Science Review* 79, no. 4 (1985): 1061–78, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1956248>; Neuman, *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate* (Harvard University Press, 1986), https://books.google.com/books?id=_k8kAQAAIAAJ; Carpini, Michael X. Delli, and Scott Keeter, *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*. Yale University Press, 1996.

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1cc2kv1>; Kevin Arceneaux and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, “The Effects of Need for Cognition and Need for Affect on Partisan Evaluations,” *Political Psychology* 34, no. 1 (2013): 23–42, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00925.x>; W.R.

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policy, potential voters use heuristic shortcuts through cues like partisanship,⁴⁹ similarity to candidate sociodemographic characteristics,⁵⁰ “expert” opinion,⁵¹ and candidate or policy endorsements.⁵² Importantly, cue-taking is not limited to voters with lower levels of political sophistication, but is commonplace among all voters, regardless of their sophistication with policy and process.⁵³ Rather, the difference between voters with higher and lower levels of political sophistication is in a heterogeneous information model.

An informational heterogeneity model among voters, first hypothesized by Simon, theorized that individuals with more information, those with higher levels of political sophistication, would have a different and often more complex voting calculus than those with less information about the political process.⁵⁴ This model was then expanded by Campbell et al. in *The American Voter*, with them stating “if someone has little perception of the candidates, or the record of the parties, of public issues or questions of group interest, his attitudes toward these things may play a less important intervening role” than those with a “well-elaborated view of what their choice concerns.”⁵⁵ More recent scholarship has backed this claim of information heterogeneity of the voting electorate with political sophisticates, who are more knowledgeable, having a more complex rationale for voting even if the rationale is reliant upon cues like partisanship.⁵⁶

Miller’s explanation of this phenomenon through informational nodes of connection gives a visual demonstration of heterogeneous information voting within a U.S. context through former President Barack Obama. A node for Obama of a low sophisticate may link to intersections on Obama running for president, that he is a Democrat, and perhaps that he wished to reform healthcare policy. High sophisticates still know the information that low sophisticates know but also have richer association networks between their nodes connected to their knowledge of Obama and other political nodes like Obama’s environmental policy or more disparate political issues.⁵⁷ Since low sophisticates rely on less information in their vote decision-making, a valid assumption would be that they would more heavily rely on a cue like partisanship than a high sophisticate who is able to make political choices with a deeper and more knowledgeable understanding of their choice. This viewpoint, popularly espoused in Campbell et al.’s *The American Voter*, experienced relatively little empirical pushback until recently. However, more current research has actually suggested that high sophisticates use partisan cues equally as much, if not more than, low sophisticates.⁵⁸

Despite these findings of partisanship and sophistication, there are claims that developing democracies of today – unlike in advanced democracies where most mass

⁴⁹ Marthaler, 2008.

⁵⁰ Fred Cutler, “The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and Electoral Choice,” *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 466–90.

⁵¹ John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818691>.

⁵² Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Phillip E. Tetlock. *Reasoning and choice: Explorations in political psychology*. Cambridge University Press, 1993.

⁵³ Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Cognitive Heuristics in Political Decision Making,” *American Journal of Political Science* 45, no. 4 (2001): 951–71,

<https://doi.org/10.2307/2669334>; Fred Cutler, “The Simplest Shortcut of All: Sociodemographic Characteristics and Electoral Choice,” *The Journal of Politics* 64, no. 2 (2002): 466–90; Jason Roy, “Information Heterogeneity, Complexity and the Vote Calculus,” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 21, no. 1 (February 2011): 29–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2010.537342>.

⁵⁴ Simon, 1955.

⁵⁵ *The American Voter*. Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. Wiley, New York, 1960.

⁵⁶ Douglas Rivers, “Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice,” *American Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 3 (1988): 737–57, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2111244>; Patrick R. Miller, “The Emotional Citizen: Emotion as a Function of Political Sophistication,” *Political Psychology* 32, no. 4 (2011): 575–600,

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00824.x>; Jason Roy, “Information Heterogeneity, Complexity and the Vote Calculus,” *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties* 21, no. 1 (February 2011): 29–56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2010.537342>; Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew S. Winters, “Can Citizens Discern? Information Credibility, Political Sophistication, and the Punishment of Corruption in Brazil,” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 1 (January 2017): 60–74, <https://doi.org/10.1086/687287>.

⁵⁷ Miller, 2011.

⁵⁸ Sally Marthaler, “The Paradox of the Politically-Sophisticated Partisan: The French Case,” *West European Politics* 31, no. 5 (September 1, 2008): 937–59, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380802234607>; Jeremy J. Albright, “Does Political Knowledge Erode Party Attachments?: A Review of the Cognitive Mobilization Thesis,” *Electoral Studies* 28, no. 2 (June 1, 2009): 248–60, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2009.01.001>; Lupu, Noam. “Partisanship in Latin America.” In *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts*. University of Michigan Press, 2015: 226–245.

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partisanship studies have been located — limit partisan attachments through the prevalence of mass media, allowing politicians to directly appeal to potential voters and bypass traditional party-building.⁵⁹ Recent scholarship has disputed this claim. In particular, Lupu's chapter "Partisanship in Latin America" from the book *The Latin American Voter* finds that mass partisanship in Latin America follows similar trends to advanced democracy, with partisans in Latin America tending "to be more experienced, more informed, more attentive, and more engaged" like their counterparts in advanced democracies.⁶⁰

Subsequently, the importance of heterogeneous voting among those with different levels of political sophistication in the case of the 2022 Chilean plebiscite is influenced by an influx of new information. It is easier to sway an opinion of someone with little knowledge on a topic, their cognitive nodes of politics are relatively sparse and not densely connected. However, swaying the opinion of a high sophisticate requires cutting through densely populated and complexly linked nodes, a significantly harder task. In Zaller's seminal book, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, he outlines his "Receive-Accept-Sample" (RAS) model that provides the underpinnings of mass opinion formulation and change through media messaging.⁶¹ Those with less political awareness are less likely to receive political messages than those with higher political awareness.⁶² However, despite those with higher political knowledge receiving political messages more readily, they are more likely to resist information that is inconsistent with their former information and partisanship values. When a person does formulate a new opinion or change a previous one, whether with high levels of political knowledge or low levels of knowledge, Zaller argues people make use of ideas that are most recent and salient, since these ideas take less time to retrieve from their memory.⁶³ Therefore, in the marketplace of ideas, low sophisticates are harder to reach, but once they are reached, they are more receptive to new ideas than high sophisticates.

To review, the demographic groups less likely to vote in a voluntary system tend to have lower levels of political sophistication, since they do not participate in politics regularly, resulting in a heterogeneous information model between low and high sophisticates. This is especially important for the 2022 plebiscite because these unlikely, less-informed voters were required to vote under the new compulsory voting system. Thus, these voters were easier targets, in terms of costs of persuasion, for the "yes" and "no" campaigns.

V. *Characteristics of the Plebiscite Campaigns*

The campaigns for and against the proposed constitution can be characterized most generally as widespread and far reaching across the population. In the leadup to the plebiscite, Chileans were inundated with information about the proposed constitution from the 900,000 draft copies that were distributed by the government,⁶⁴ *franjás* (debates) that featured debates from both the "*apurebo*" (yes) and "*rechazo*" (no) campaigns,⁶⁵ constant coverage by traditional media,⁶⁶ and, importantly, information

⁵⁹ Mainwaring Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford Calif: Stanford University Press; Henry E. Hale, "Democracy or Autocracy on the March? The Colored Revolutions as Normal Dynamics of Patronal Presidentialism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Democratic Revolutions in Post-Communist States, 39, no. 3 (September 1, 2006): 305–29, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2006.06.006>.

⁶⁰ Lupu, 2015.

⁶¹ Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinions*, 1992.

⁶² Zaller, 1992.

⁶³ Zaller, 1992.

⁶⁴ José María del Pleno, "La nueva Constitución de Chile, entre la desinformación y un creciente rechazo," *Clarín*, August 2, 2022, https://www.clarin.com/mundo/nueva-constitucion-chile-desinformacion-creciente-rechazo_0_dh3X0Gevdz.html.

⁶⁵ Diario oficial de la república de Chile. July 6, 2022. "Ejecuta acuerdo sobre regulación de la televisión del plebiscito constitucional de salida". Number 43.295. <https://www.cntv.cl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/2152633.pdf>

⁶⁶ 24horas, "Chile Elige: TVN tendrá amplia y variada cobertura para el plebiscito de este domingo," accessed October 30, 2022, <https://www.24horas.cl/proceso-constituyente/chile-elige-tvn-tendra-amplia-y-variada-cobertura-para-el-plebiscito>.

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through social media.⁶⁷ The intense media focus on the plebiscite translated to a population well aware about the upcoming plebiscite. One poll found that 86% of Chileans “frequently” or “often” speak about the constitution with those around them.⁶⁸ Noticeably, this 86% is essentially identical to the turnout in the Chilean plebiscite, which was registered at 85.84%.⁶⁹

Importantly, there was a deluge of misinformation against the proposed constitution.⁷⁰ SERVEL had a misinformation tracker on their website, showcasing 59 instances alone of misinformation that had gone viral on the internet or on social media.⁷¹ Non-governmental organizations have popped up in recent years in Chile as well to combat misinformation as well. Fabian Padilla, the founder of Fast Check CL, a website that fact-checks viral misinformation in Chilean politics, said that since the articles of the proposed constitution are subject and debatable to legal interpretation, the website is often unable to declare these viral misinformation statements as false without lengthy verification times, resulting in “millions and millions more visits” to misinformation posts on social media.⁷² Cristóbal Chávez and Claudia Lagos, both academics associated with the University of Chile, described each successful takedown of misinformation as Pyrrhic because, while “denying one [piece of viral misinformation], three more sprout.”⁷³

Social media provides fertile breeding grounds for these misinformation claims to flourish because of the speed of information transfer and differences in journalistic rigor. Marcelo Mendoza, a professor of informatics at the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, stated that misinformation about the proposed constitution traveled roughly three times faster on Twitter than news from reputable, traditional media.⁷⁴ His claims are backed up by a study conducted by Vosoughi, Roy, and Aral which found that false stories on Twitter reached more people than truthful stories, were 70% more likely to be retweeted than true stories, and diffused faster as well.⁷⁵ Chile’s traditional media companies often have a very vertical structure which disadvantages the spread of misinformation because higher-up editors and directors control publishing, ensuring news stories are checked by multiple people, decreasing the spread of misinformation.⁷⁶ Comparatively, a person is able to share posts on social media with a single click, bypassing a bureaucratic structure that also ensures journalistic rigor and guards against the spread of misinformation.

The importance of social media and misinformation in Chilean politics has only recently become pronounced. In a report for the Subsecretary of Telecommunications of Chile, it was reported that internet penetration rates were at 87.4% of the population in 2017, the most recent survey of internet access from the subsecretary.⁷⁷ Additionally, in the last survey conducted by the *Consejo nacional de television* (CNTV), Chile’s national television board in November 2021, a nearly equal number of people used television media and social media as one of their primary means of information consumption, 71% and 70%, respectively, for the first time.⁷⁸ Previously, large majorities of Chileans would

⁶⁷ Alexander Villegas, “Chile Battles Flood of ‘half Truths’ as Constitution Vote Nears,” *Reuters*, August 29, 2022, sec. Americas, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chile-battles-flood-half-truths-constitution-vote-nears-2022-08-29/>.

⁶⁸ Tuinfluyes.com. August 5, 2022. “Post plebiscito, futuro constitucional, gobierno, economía y tendencias.” <https://www.tuinfluyes.com/paneles/e/julio-2022>

⁶⁹ “Sitio Historico Resultados Electorales - Servel,” accessed November 7, 2022, <https://historico.servel.cl/servel/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=237>.

⁷⁰ Defined as “incorrect or misleading information, spread regardless of ill intent” by Merriam-Webster.

⁷¹ “Noticias Falsas Desmentidas Por Servel – Servicio Electoral de Chile.” n.d. Accessed November 1, 2022. <https://servel.cl/noticias-falsas-desmentidas-por-servel/>.

⁷² Villegas, “Chile Battles Flood of Half-truths,” *Reuters*, 2022.

⁷³ Cristóbal Chávez Bravo and Claudia Lagos Lira, “La verdad... ¿cuál verdad? Información, desinformación y mala información ante el plebiscito de salida,” *Palabra Publica* (blog), accessed November 1, 2022, <http://palabrapublica.uchile.cl/2022/09/02/la-verdad-cual-verdad-informacion-desinformacion-y-mala-informacion-ante-el-plebiscito-de-salida/>.

⁷⁴ Villegas, 2022.

⁷⁵ Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” *Science* 359, no. 6380 (March 9, 2018): 1146–51, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559>.

⁷⁶ Enrique Núñez-Mussa, “Chile: Crisis of Trust and a Precarious Industry,” 2021, <https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855428-3>.

⁷⁷ “Informe Final IX Encuesta Acceso y Usos Internet 2017.” 2017. Subsecretaría de Telecomunicaciones de Chile. https://www.subtel.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Informe_Final_IX_Encuesta_Acceso_y_Usos_Internet_2017.pdf.

⁷⁸ “X Encuesta Nacional de Televisión” por Consejo Nacional de Televisión. 2021.

<https://www.cntv.cl/2021/11/x-encuesta-nacional-de-television-2021-la-tv-abierta-es-el-principal-medio-de-informacion-en-chile/>

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receive their news from television news channels, with only small minorities also using alternate forms of media consumption like social media or radio. In the same survey, CNTV found that television news is the news source with the lowest level of confidence, with only 23% expressing total or very high levels of trust.⁷⁹ Conversely, 40% of the respondents expressed very high levels of trust in information from social media.⁸⁰ The decline in traditional media trust is critical since, as more Chileans turn to social media for their news, they increase their chances significantly of accidentally viewing misinformation.⁸¹

The misinformation stories that went viral in the leadup to voting on the Chilean plebiscite were varied, ranging from claims that private property would be abolished under the new constitution,⁸² that therapeutic abortion in the last month before birth will be constitutionally enshrined,⁸³ and that workers will no longer own their own pension savings.⁸⁴ While not outright lies, these stories stretched their claims of the contents of the proposed constitution beyond reason. These stories claimed the constitution was a document that would upend society completely. In turn, these misinformation posts made the *rechazo* campaign — the status quo — seem less harmful and more benign. This false dichotomy between the *apruebo* and *rechazo* campaigns is not accidental; previous research has found that stories featuring misinformation are often written in a stylistically distinct way that maximizes its reading, sharing, and chance at virality on social media through high-arousal emotions.⁸⁵ Additionally, Carrasco-Farré found that misinformation is, on average, easier to read by “3 percent and is 15 percent less lexically diverse” resulting in a story that is easier to process cognitively.⁸⁶ With a plebiscite like the one that occurred in Chile in 2022, the difference in cognitive processing levels of these stories would only be heightened considering that the gold standard of information and best source for debunking these false claims was the proposed constitution, a highly legal, abstract, and complex document that was difficult for many to understand without a background in constitutional law.

Critically, the increase of low sophisticates voting on the 2022 constitutional plebiscite likely increased the impact of misinformation. Previous research has demonstrated that in a crowded information environment, like in the leadup to the 2022 Chilean plebiscite, there is a positive correlation between ability to discern credible information and political sophistication. This is due to political sophisticates being more resistant to updating their beliefs compared to low sophisticates,⁸⁷ low sophisticates being

⁷⁹ “X Encuesta Nacional de Televisión,” 2021.

⁸⁰ “X Encuesta Nacional de Televisión,” 2021.

⁸¹ Andreu Casero-Ripollés, “Research on Political Information and Social Media: Key Points and Challenges for the Future,” *El Profesional de La Información* 27, no. 5 (September 15, 2018): 964, <https://doi.org/10.3145/epi.2018.sep.01>; Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral, “The Spread of True and False News Online,” *Science* 359, no. 6380 (March 9, 2018): 1146–51, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aap9559>.

⁸² Paula Molina, “La ‘Brutal’ Desinformación Sobre La Nueva Constitución Propuesta Para Chile (y Algunas de Las Confusiones Más Difundidas),” *BBC News Mundo*, accessed October 31, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-62245073>.

⁸³ Isidora Osorio, “‘Aprobado el aborto hasta los 9 meses y sin causales en la constituyente’: #Engañoso,” *Fast Check* (blog), March 17, 2022, <https://www.fastcheck.cl/2022/03/17/aprobado-el-aborto-hasta-los-9-meses-de-embarazo-en-la-constituyente-enganoso/>.

⁸⁴ Cristóbal Chávez Bravo and Claudia Lagos Lira, “La verdad... ¿cuál verdad? Información, desinformación y mala información ante el plebiscito de salida,” *Palabra Pública* (blog), accessed November 1, 2022, <http://palabrapublica.uchile.cl/2022/09/02/la-verdad-cual-verdad-informacion-desinformacion-y-mala-informacion-ante-el-plebiscito-de-salida/>.

⁸⁵ Steven McCornack et al., “Information Manipulation Theory 2: A Propositional Theory of Deceptive Discourse Production,” *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 33 (August 11, 2014): 348–77, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X14534656>; Katherine L. Milkman and Jonah Berger, “The Science of Sharing and the Sharing of Science,” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111, no. supplement_4 (September 16, 2014): 13642–49, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1317511111>; Carlos Carrasco-Farré, “The Fingerprints of Misinformation: How Deceptive Content Differs from Reliable Sources in Terms of Cognitive Effort and Appeal to Emotions,” *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 9, no. 1 (May 9, 2022): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01174-9>.

⁸⁶ Carlos Carrasco-Farré, “The Fingerprints of Misinformation: How Deceptive Content Differs from Reliable Sources in Terms of Cognitive Effort and Appeal to Emotions,” *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 9, no. 1 (May 9, 2022): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01174-9>.

⁸⁷ John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge Studies in Public Opinion and Political Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818691>; Lupu, Noam. “Partisanship in Latin America.” In *The Latin American Voter: Pursuing Representation and Accountability in Challenging Contexts*. University of Michigan Press, 2015: 226–245.

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more persuadable,⁸⁸ and because high sophisticates tend to be more skeptical of low-credibility sources than low sophisticates.⁸⁹ Furthermore, a study conducted by Vegetti and Mancosu corroborated the positive link between political sophistication and ability to discern real news from fake news.⁹⁰

Polling in the leadup to the 2022 plebiscite suggests that there was a crowded media environment in Chile. As early as January 2022, the polling firm Datavoz found that 66.26% of Chileans were “well informed” about the constitutional convention and the proposed constitution on social media platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, the most popular category, 12% higher than the percent of people who listed television as a way that they have informed themselves about the plebiscite.⁹¹ More troubling was that 58% of respondents reported that they had seen false information about the proposed constitution and the constitutional convention. Of these 58% of survey participants, 48.56% reported that when they did see misinformation in the media ecosystem, it was primarily on social media platforms, nearly 30% higher than the second most-listed answer, television.⁹² These numbers are concerning because they suggest that misinformation was already well entrenched within the political media ecosystem nearly eight months prior to the actual vote date, before many low sophisticates began tuning into the plebiscite and the proposed constitution.

Despite the previous section demonstrating that many diverse parties like SERVEL,⁹³ international media,⁹⁴ and local media⁹⁵ warned of the severity of misinformation in the leadup to the 2022 Chilean plebiscite, there remains an argument that misinformation was unlikely to sway the electorate as a whole, changing the outcome of the plebiscite from approve to reject. After all, proposing and winning support for a radical constitution upending Chilean society would always have been an arduous process given human proclivity towards the status quo.⁹⁶ Yet the importance of the role of misinformation in the 2022 Chilean plebiscite isn’t necessarily that it changed the binary outcome of the plebiscite, but rather that it had the potential to affect the results at all. Misinformation is normatively bad and, ideally, would not have a place in the political process.

VI. *Methods and Model*

While it can be reasonably assumed from the empirical studies above that the increase of turnout for the Chilean constitutional plebiscite in 2022 is attributed to voters with lower political sophistication and associated characteristics of lower educational attainment, with lower incomes, and less political interest, without statistical modeling, full certainty of this hypothesis can’t be assumed. In order to test my theory, I chose to include a number of variables that might affect voting patterns at the commune level and are indicative of having a higher proportion of low information voters. I chose to analyze the percent vote share of “yes” at the commune level because it represents the smallest unit of analysis available given temporal and monetary limitations in this capstone paper.

⁸⁸ John Zaller, “Floating Voters in US Presidential Elections, 1948-2000,” *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Non Attitudes, Measurement Error, and Change* 166 (January 1, 2004).

⁸⁹ Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro and Matthew S. Winters, “Can Citizens Discern? Information Credibility, Political Sophistication, and the Punishment of Corruption in Brazil,” *The Journal of Politics* 79, no. 1 (January 2017): 60–74, <https://doi.org/10.1086/687287>.

⁹⁰ Federico Vegetti and Moreno Mancosu, “The Impact of Political Sophistication and Motivated Reasoning on Misinformation,” *Political Communication* 37 (May 6, 2020): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1744778>.

⁹¹ “Encuesta Ciudadanía y la Convención Constitucional – Datavoz,” accessed November 26, 2022, <https://www.datavoz.cl/encuesta-ciudadania-y-la-convencion-constitucional/>.

⁹² “Encuesta Ciudadanía y la Convención Constitucional – Datavoz,” accessed November 26, 2022, <https://www.datavoz.cl/encuesta-ciudadania-y-la-convencion-constitucional/>.

⁹³ “Noticias Falsas Desmentidas Por Servel – Servicio Electoral de Chile.” n.d. Accessed November 1, 2022. <https://servel.cl/noticias-falsas-desmentidas-por-servel/>.

⁹⁴ Alexander Villegas, “Chile Battles Flood of ‘half Truths’ as Constitution Vote Nears,” *Reuters*, August 29, 2022, sec. Americas, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/chile-battles-flood-half-truths-constitution-vote-nears-2022-08-29/>.

⁹⁵ Cristóbal Chávez Bravo and Claudia Lagos Lira, “La verdad... ¿cuál verdad? Información, desinformación y mala información ante el plebiscito de salida,” *Palabra Pública* (blog), accessed November 1, 2022, <http://palabrapublica.uchile.cl/2022/09/02/la-verdad-cual-verdad-cual-verdad-informacion-desinformacion-y-mala-informacion-ante-el-plebiscito-de-salida/>.

⁹⁶ Scott Eidelman and Christian S. Crandall, “Bias in Favor of the Status Quo,” *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 6, no. 3 (2012): 270–81, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2012.00427.x>.

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I estimate the affected vote margin of the 2022 Chilean plebiscite using the following regression equation using ordinary least squares regression (OLS).

Percent Yes 2022

$$= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Percent Yes 2020} + \beta_2 \text{Turnout 2022} \\ + \beta_3 \text{Turnout Increase 2021 to 2022} + \beta_4 \text{Boric Vote Share} \\ + \beta_5 \text{IDC Average} + \beta_6 \text{Percent Urban} + \epsilon_i$$

Communes with a higher percentage of low information voters are expected to have a higher turnout increase from voluntary voting elections and a negative relationship with the percent yes vote in the 2022 plebiscite, lower turnout in the 2022 plebiscite, to be less urban, and have lower scores on the Chilean Community Development Index (IDC) — which includes measures of education levels and outcomes, the poverty rate, and per capita income among other variables of wellbeing, education, and economic vitality in each commune. I collected electoral data — for variables Percent Yes 2022, Percent Yes 2020, Boric Vote Share, Turnout Increase 2021 to 2022, and Turnout 2022 — from SERVEL, the Chilean government’s election service.⁹⁷ The IDC averages were collected from a 2020 study completed by Universidad Autonoma de Chile.⁹⁸ For the variable Percent Urban, I collected data from the *Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile* (Library of the National Congress of Chile, BCN) using Chile’s most recent census, 2017.⁹⁹ Percent Urban was included as a variable because rural areas tend to be poorer and with higher poverty rates than urban areas in Chile.

VII. Model Results

This paper estimates the commune-level relationship between the percent yes vote for the proposed constitution in the 2022 plebiscite and variables that indicate there might be a higher proportion of low-information voters. The model included the square transformation of Turnout Increase 2021 to 2022 to linearize the data, as a prerequisite of conducting a linear regression model. Table 1 reports the coefficients from the OLS regression. The Percent Yes 2020 vote share was significant with a positive relationship, as was the variable Boric Vote Share. Variable Turnout 2022 also shows a significant positive relationship, with higher turnout communes significantly more likely to support the proposed constitution. Turnout increase from the 2021 presidential election was significant and negative, with communes with the largest percent increase in turnout from the most recent election, 2021, having a significantly lower vote share for the 2022 plebiscite than communes with a lower turnout increase from 2021. The IDC variable was positively related and significant, meaning that communes with better community development scores were more likely to have higher vote shares for the proposed constitution. The positive relationship between IDC values and the percent yes vote for the 2022 plebiscite was expected as a rudimentary statistical analysis by the news website BioBioChile found that the Communes with the lowest quintile of per capita income had voted against the new constitution at a higher rate than all other quintiles (Pedreros Montero 2022). The variable Urban Percent was also positively significant as well. Overall, this model demonstrates evidence for a negative relationship between communes with higher proportions of low information voters, measured through indirect measures and the percent yes vote share for the 2022 plebiscite.

⁹⁷ “Servicio Electoral de Chile,” accessed November 12, 2022, <https://www.servel.cl/>.

⁹⁸ “Índice de Desarrollo Comunal 2020, refleja altos índices de desigualdad en el desarrollo comunal de Chile,” *Universidad Autónoma de Chile* <https://www.uaautonoma.cl/news/indice-de-desarrollo-comunal-2020-refleja-altos-indices-de-desigualdad-en-el-desarrollo-comunal-de-chile/>.

⁹⁹ Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, “Portal de la Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile” <https://www.bcn.cl>.

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Table 1. Prospective Vote Share for Yes in the 2022 Constitutional Plebiscite by Commune

VARIABLES	(1) Percent Yes Vote Share by Commune in the 2022 Plebiscite
Percent Yes 2020	0.0139*** (0.00462)
2022 Turnout	0.0117*** (0.00202)
Turnout Increase 2021 to 2022	-0.0508*** (0.00344)
Boric Vote Share	0.0495*** (0.00322)
IDC Average	0.431** (0.169)
Urban Percent	0.00182** (0.000755)
Constant	2.344*** (0.224)
Observations	345
R-squared	0.927

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VIII. *Limitations of This Statistical Analysis and Future Avenues of Research*

This regression model is hampered by attempting to measure vote performance at the individual level with data from commune-level data. However, given the limitations of this paper, analysis at the commune level was the most appropriate level of analysis. Additionally, both this model and this paper did not establish a causal linkage between the increase of low information voters in the political system because of the reintroduction of compulsory voting and the effects of misinformation. Rather, I have relied on qualitative interviews from experts to document this linkage. While the combination of my model and the qualitative interviews does suggest a linkage, further research is needed to explore this relationship.

Going forward, I recommend two pathways for political scientists. As mentioned repeatedly in the following paragraphs and sections, this study would be better suited using survey data from individuals rather than measuring data at the municipal level. With a second proposed constitution and second plebiscite at some point in the near future being likely, another interesting and fruitful data source for a study like this would be conducting a time-series analysis of voters. The surveys would ask questions about political engagement and opinion on the proposed constitution multiple times in the leadup to the plebiscite. A research design as such would give a better understanding of when low sophisticates begin to follow media coverage of the second proposed constitution. Combined with a database modeling misinformation level within the media ecosystem, potentially established through scrapping posts from social media, would

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directly measure the effects of misinformation with low-information voters compelled to vote by their government.

A third fruitful avenue for research would be a study of constitutional plebiscites across multiple countries and measure the difference in turnout for the less politically engaged/low-information voters across different voting systems along with a study of the campaigns for “yes” and “no” sides of the proposed constitution, measuring if the campaigns are conducted differently under voluntary voting than in a compulsory voting environment. A research design like this may also be able to examine the question of whether the amount of misinformation within the media ecosystem is constant across multiple types of voting systems or if the increase of low-information voters in compulsory voting systems encourages higher levels of misinformation. These research design ideas represent a bright future for the study of compulsory voting systems and the effects of misinformation on voting outcomes.

IX. A New Future or ... Not? Chile's Next Steps

In the aftermath of the constitutional plebiscite, Chile's political future is decidedly uncertain. Following the rejection of the proposed constitution, President Boric gave a televised speech speaking about the need to take a new path forward to remove the 1980 constitution with a focus on a constitution with a broader consensus across Chilean society.¹⁰⁰ Beyond the vague assertion that another constitution will be drafted, there are no concrete plans going forward. Prescriptions on the contents of a new proposed constitution are beyond the scope of this capstone but, for Chile, there is hope for a future constitutional plebiscite without as great an impact from misinformation. While research suggests that low sophisticates are more susceptible to misinformation, they are also less resistant to corrections.¹⁰¹ This finding represents a potential path forward for Chile as it navigates the writing of a new proposed constitution, the leadup to the vote giving citizens a choice to accept or reject it, and even in future votes beyond the next constitutional plebiscite. Fridkin, Kenney, and Wintersieck found that top-down corrections from professional fact-checkers to be more successful at reducing misperception of misinformation than misinformation tags from social media.¹⁰² Wineburg and McGrew found that cross-checking news stories with multiple sources rather than relying on a single media source increased “inoculation” against misinformation because of diverse media consumption with multiple sources.¹⁰³ A combination of such top-down and bottom-up interventions could provide Chile with needed defense against misinformation as they prepare to hold another constitutional plebiscite. While credence for my theory was shown by the regression model, a quantitative linkage between these low-information voters being influenced by misinformation remains. I have sought to showcase this relationship through qualitative interviews, but future work should be done to understand this relationship more. Despite lacking a fully causal explanation for the role of compulsory voting and misinformation in the failure of the 2022 plebiscite, it can still be said with certainty that if Chile wishes to diminish misinformation within the political media ecosystem, the government must do something different. Without a change in how the Chilean government handles misinformation, Brenda and Marlén of Estación Central, Jorge of Puente Alto and many thousands of others are at risk of relying on misinformation in their voting rationale as they vote in another constitutional plebiscite in the near future, a decidedly bad outcome for everyone.

¹⁰⁰ *Cadena Nacional Plebiscito Constitucional 2022*, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VKRxunznutw>.

¹⁰¹ Jianing Li and Michael W Wagner, “The Value of Not Knowing: Partisan Cue-Taking and Belief Updating of the Uninformed, the Ambiguous, and the Misinformed,” *Journal of Communication* 70, no. 5 (October 1, 2020): 646–69, <https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqaa022>; Sumitra Badrinathan, “Educative Interventions to Combat Misinformation: Evidence from a Field Experiment in India,” *American Political Science Review* 115, no. 4 (November 2021): 1325–41, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000459>.

¹⁰² Kim Fridkin, Patrick J. Kenney, and Amanda Wintersieck, “Liar, Liar, Pants on Fire: How Fact-Checking Influences Citizens' Reactions to Negative Advertising,” *Political Communication* 32, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 127–51, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2014.914613>.

¹⁰³ Sam Wineburg and Sarah McGrew, “Lateral Reading and the Nature of Expertise: Reading Less and Learning More When Evaluating Digital Information,” *Teachers College Record* 121, no. 11 (November 1, 2019): 1–40, <https://doi.org/10.1177/016146811912101102>.

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Section 3:

Political Theory

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Featuring:

“Thinking with Arendt: The Loss of World Making Under Sovereignty”

Written by James Crawford
University of California, Berkeley, Political Science Major, Class of 2023

“The Legality of the Death Penalty: Analyzing the Intersection Between The Code of Hammurabi, Jus Cogens Norms, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”

Written by Alessandra Curry
University of Michigan, International Studies Major, Class of 2023

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Thinking with Arendt: The Loss of World Making Under Sovereignty

James Crawford

Introduction

Worlds are made on the basis of coming together to share experiences, ideas, and concerns. The political theorist Hannah Arendt saw political freedom as the human capacity to make worlds with one another as a way to make sense of ourselves and our happenings. World building, as I define it, is the process by which political agents build structures, networks, and institutions with longevity to signify how we want to live in these times and in these locations. World building is dependent on pluralistic political freedom. Arendt points to sovereignty as a problem for modern world-making, as sovereignty equates freedom with independence from one-another and from politics.¹ Political freedom in the modern age is antithetical to politics under sovereign authority. I will argue that Arendt is correct in her diagnosis of the incompatibility of political freedom with theories of sovereignty. I define sovereignty here as the governing entity that possesses absolute authority and power over a given body politic. Theories of early modern sovereignty are based on the centralization of a sovereign will that alienates individuals from a true freedom of politics. The implication of this happening entails a destruction of pluralistic gatherings and an apathy towards government that diminishes our ability to commonly care for our present world at large. In times of capitalist exploitation of natural resources and international struggles for human rights, we become unable to build political worlds for substantial life.² Pluralistic politics is essential for effective governance.

Arendt never wrote a concise critique of sovereignty in a single text. Instead, her legacy of thinking is structured in rhizomatic ways. This paper is a broader reading of the Arendtian canon in conversation with early modern western authors of sovereignty such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is not, however, an analysis of sovereignty in the history of political thought or an applied analysis of sovereignty to international relations theory. Rather, I analyze how the thoughts of early modern authors can be applied to any time and place. I ask how we as people within this world, within this time, and within these borders can move forward with or without sovereignty.

I will begin by first orientating our reading of sovereignty with Arendt's conception of political freedom, action, and the horizontal contract. In doing so, I position my own critique alongside Arendt's critique of the loss of pluralistic political freedom and action under Hobbes and Rousseau's conception of sovereignty. I will explain how in the Hobbesian state, the transfer of wills into a singular sovereign will and a freedom from politics under "silent laws" are both acts of alienation and the abolition of political freedom. I will demonstrate that Rousseau's conception of the general will is a double alienation from the self and from political freedom. I conclude with an Arendtian proposal forward and analysis of present empirical conditions of political and social alienation that inhibit a collective cultivation of earthly survival.

I. Orienting Ourselves with Arendtian Freedom

Arendtian thought rests on political freedom being the *raison d'être*. Human plurality in politics creates and acknowledges a shared reality that we bring to the

¹ Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 223.

² The work of Donna Haraway has been instrumental in thinking about the process of "worlding-worlds" in times of destruction; see Donna Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

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political realm through a phenomenology of individually experienced senses.³ Arendt thereby defines the public political realm as the “space of appearances,” or, “the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearances explicitly.”⁴ As the individual can only experience the world through a singular angle, it takes the collective coming together in the accumulation of multiple experiences to construct the world at large. To lose the public political “space of appearances” is to lose reality.⁵ Realities are the culmination of individually experienced phenomena; we rely on one another to build worlds. For Arendt, the “space of appearances” relies on speech and action.⁶ Political freedom is an ongoing political relationality where we recognize one another and our shared responsibility for caring and creating the world. Freedom to Arendt is creating something new alongside our fellow humans in the political realm.

Political freedom can never exist in a state where politics is dictated by a single entity or where the cultivation of pluralistic opinion is nonexistent. Political freedom is not a free will or self-determinism that makes us independent from one another. Free will and self-determination invoke a personal-private action which justifies a separation and removal of individual bodies from the body politic of the political realm to that of privacy.⁷ Individuals are no longer able to make-with one another and lose the ability to form a perception of worldly realities as we become politically alienated. Arendt tells us that the world—the shareable spaces between humans—“existed before us and is meant to outlast our lives in it, [and it] simply cannot afford to give primary concern to individual lives and the interests connected with them.” As such, it is the courage to step into the public realm of politics that liberates us “from [our] worry about life for the freedom of the world.”⁸ The courage to step into politics is the courage to make-with one another—to grapple with one another in the shared creation and care of the world. Arendt recognizes the messiness of our world and the inability for us to ever conform within it; we must be open to what can happen by chance when we come together. Each time we convene in political spaces to act with one another, political freedom is born anew.

For an Arendtian plurality, the horizontal contract restores a body politic by removing sovereignty. Arendt looks to the Mayflower Compact for a regenerative political freedom that unites bodies under the single but all binding “strength of mutual promise” that was to create the “civil Body Politick.”⁹ Settler colonists channeled the dangers and fears they faced into a promise of mutual dependency. The horizontal contract is a care for one another and for the world we create in which we form the boundaries of a constituent power. The settlers never delegated power to a proto sovereign, but instead chose to bind together to face a new world making experience.

However, we must recognize that this horizontal contract was new only to the world of Western political thought and practice. Indigenous peoples of the colonized Americas have long engaged in a horizontal formation of the political body where culture and tradition are created through the mutual bonds of working with one another in the absence of an absolute sovereign will. Nonetheless, in Arendt’s canon of thought, the Mayflower Compact is the basis for the abolition of sovereign authority in a constitutional republic.

Understanding that a radical pluralism is the foundation of political freedom will help us to better analyze and critique the work on sovereignty of Hobbes and Rousseau as being incompatible with political freedom.

II. *In Conversation with Hobbes and Rousseau: Sovereign Contracts, Freedom, and the Will*

³ Jennifer Gaffney, *Political Loneliness: Modern Liberal Subjects in Hiding* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020), 98; Douglas Klusmeyer, “Hannah Arendt’s Case for Federalism,” *Publius* 40, no. 1 (2010): 47.

⁴ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 198-199.

⁵ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 199.

⁶ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 198-199; Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 144-146; Gaffney, *Political Loneliness*, 97.

⁷ Hannah Arendt, “Freedom and Politics, A Lecture,” in *Thinking Without a Banister: Essays in Understanding, 1953-1975*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2018), 224-225/232-233.

⁸ Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 156.

⁹ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1963), 158; Klusmeyer, “Federalism,” 43.

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Sovereignty under Hobbes and Rousseau abolishes all forms of substantive freedom through alienation and the elimination of plurality in the public realm. The following discussion is not a detailed analysis and retelling of either Hobbes or Rousseau's state of nature and contract making. Rather, I proceed with the purpose of providing a critical lens to view the effects on the individual and the political realm as they derive from sovereignty.

Hobbes' Sovereign Will and the Escape from Politics

In the Hobbesian state, fear of a sovereign's power of the sword abolishes political freedom. Hobbes' purpose for a sovereign power of the sword is to establish equal restraints and fears to uniformly limit our natural capacity to kill one another.¹⁰ A sovereign¹¹ of the Commonwealth forms through a reduction of our will into one central authority and the enunciation that, "I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him and authorise all his actions in like manner" (original emphasis).¹² However, an equality of restraint is counter to the stability Hobbes attempts to create, because no mutual bond can ever be formed between people who fear one another.¹³ The individual reverts to the private realm and disengages with political life out of fear of one another and of the state.¹⁴ The political realm is therefore abandoned, and our shared sense of world-making through spontaneity dissolves. The culmination of individual wills creates the sovereign as a process of regularization that is counter to political freedom. I read this transfer of the will into the sovereign as an alienation of the individual. The individual is kept from coming to know their fellow citizens and the power of world-making through the free moving thoughts and actions present in the public realm. The central sovereign will eliminates any potential for a shared political space by way of the equal and uniform retreat to the private sphere out of a fear of sovereign power.

The sovereign will hangs over the state, and the freedom to engage in a free politics of regeneration is lost. Some claim that the unified voice of each person's will in the sovereign is the eternal act of political freedom through the sovereign personification of an artificial person whose will represents the will of the people.¹⁵ However, Arendt tells us that political freedom is a process of natality whereby we are born anew each time we step into the political realm.¹⁶ Freedom and power intersect with one another when a political system is constituted on the choice to enter and temporarily culminate individuals' powers to create a world. That is, political freedom rests on the potentiality of "infinite probabilities" based on the ever-changing spontaneity of ever-changing individual human actions in the space of coming together, not the regularization of all voices into one sovereign entity.¹⁷ The only constant in political freedom, as we have learned from Arendt, is the disruption of the world through the reciprocal "natality"¹⁸ we acquire through shared senses of reality.¹⁹ The delegation of power to the personified sovereign alienates the individual from the political freedom to act alongside their fellow human.

Still, some may point to political freedom and liberty in the Hobbesian concept of "silent laws." I find, however, the liberty in silent laws is not political freedom, but instead a freedom *from* politics. Hobbes creates a commonwealth that depends on a civil law which acts as "artificial chains" to bind the liberty of subjects to the will of the sovereign.²⁰ For instance, Hobbes writes "[a]s for other liberties, they depend on the silence of the law. In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty

¹⁰ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 74-75/83.

¹¹ For Hobbes, the sovereign is imagined as any person or group of persons who have acquired the sole authority to govern.

¹² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 109.

¹³ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (San Diego: Harcourt Inc., 1974), 141.

¹⁴ Arendt, *Origins*, 141.

¹⁵ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 104.

¹⁶ Arendt, "Freedom and Politics," 227-228.

¹⁷ Arendt, "Freedom and Politics," 240.

¹⁸ Arendt conceives of politics as a constant rebirth as new persons with new experiences enter the space of politics. Thus, disruption of the already existing political world is the only guarantee we have in politics.

¹⁹ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 176-180.

²⁰ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 138.

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to do or forbear, according to his own discretion.”²¹ Later, he elaborates: “For *right* is *liberty*, namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us; but *civil law* is an *obligation*, and takes from us the liberty.”²² Actions not covered by the sovereign’s creation of binding laws are permissible, since they rest outside of sovereign legislation. Freedom and liberty in Hobbes extends to the point of politics. Political freedom does not exist in a state where action is considered to take place outside of the walls of politics. As a result, freedom comes to be equated to economic mobility and action in the private realm.

Hobbesian notions of sovereignty have contributed to the manipulation of freedom into the modern conception of freedom as free-enterprise and self-determination. “Wealth and economic well-being ... are the fruits of freedom,” rather than the true freedom found in the blessings of “political freedoms such as freedom of speech and thought, of assembly and association.”²³ Freedom has been identified as an individual self-determinism that troubles a linkage between action and the political so that the individual sees an organic end-of-government as their only possibility of full autonomy of the body and action. Arendt notes that in this manipulation of freedom, “wealth actually replaces political action.”²⁴ Notions of sovereignty contribute to this manipulation of freedom in the modern world, as they require the individual to value and seek truly free action outside of government and politics. Conceptions of freedom rest on the ability to do as one wishes in the private, outside of government control. Freedom reverts to the freedom from others—the freedom to be isolated and outside of government. Thus, the manipulation of political freedom under sovereignty causes individuals to seek action in the private realm, which contributes to the separation of individuals from politics and one another in exchange for economic self-determination. The centralization of authority in Hobbes creates an absolutist sovereign will that regularizes a citizenry and carves freedoms and liberties outside of politics.

Rousseau’s General Will as Alienation

Jean-Jacques Rousseau creates the image of a popular sovereign constituted on a general will.²⁵ The general will divides the individual between man and citizen so that they are “a member of the sovereign toward private individuals, and as a member of the state toward the sovereign.”²⁶ In splitting the individual into “man” and “citizen,” a tacit agreement forms between the part of the self that is “citizen” and the sovereign. Such a contractual agreement against the self creates internalized limits and borders so that the whole person is never entirely involved in the political. Rousseau’s theory of rational choice *qua* alienation from the self entails the stepping out of one’s own body. When in the company of others, the individual leaves behind the embodied experiences that inform their opinions and world-making practices of political freedom in favor of compliance with the sovereign general will. This internal split between the identities of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ entails the destruction of political freedom under sovereign general will, as the individual is alienated from the ability to act as their whole self who carries embodied experiences, creating a regularization of thought.

Rousseau’s contract making of the sovereign general will is a production of two similar vertical contracts: one between the individual and the self (as we discussed above) and the other as a separation between individuals and their access to a truly free political realm. Rousseau thinks that when *all citizens vote as citizens*, the general will is produced towards the “right” course of action. However, this process can be corrupted by private interests or a domineering faction, so it is “important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind.”²⁷ Rousseau imagines a state that is contrary to the political freedom to engage freely and openly with one

²¹ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 143.

²² Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 189.

²³ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 209.

²⁴ Arendt, *Origins*, 146.

²⁵ For Rousseau the general will is the joint wills among the citizen body that is aimed at establishing the a “common good” for all.

²⁶ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract,” in *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Donald A. Cress, intro. David Wootton, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2011), 165.

²⁷ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” 173.

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another, because when we vote, we aim to predict how the general will will be produced. The individual citizen comes to think of politics as distinct from substantive political discussions with fellow citizens, alienating them from political engagement.²⁸

I do acknowledge that Rousseau states that one can have “a private will contrary to or different from the general will that he has as a citizen.”²⁹ However, one’s ability to dissent must take place within their capacity as an active political agent lest they are in an illusionary political body. Arendt directly critiques Rousseau’s illusionary body politic by reminding us that “[a] state, moreover, in which there is no communication between citizens and where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a tyranny.”³⁰ I argue Arendt’s worry rests on the loss of individual speech in Rousseau’s thought, and therefore a loss of accumulated experiences to construct our shared reality. When the general will produces a decision, it wills us to conform to the collectivized will. To be truly free in politics is to learn from one another’s opinions and experiences as political agents and to grapple with the messy process of deciding how to move forward. Rousseau’s general will relies on the un-free basis of will and requires the regularized conformity of all peoples to a general will.

Rousseau’s general will raises the question of how the general will and political freedom operate under the sovereign. Political freedom can never be found in the will of a single person, for the very act of a single will entails an applied force onto others. However, the Rousseauian contractual agreement between the two halves of the self works against those who resist the will so that they “will be forced to do so by the entire body [to be obligated by the will]. This means merely that he will be forced to be free.”³¹ Rousseau’s argument is that our contractual agreements already bind us to accept the result of the general will. Our inability to dissent or to resist to maintain contractual obligations represents the abolition of any substantive political freedom, as political freedom allows the space for dissenting factions and minority political opinions. Arendt tells us that when “men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as organized groups ... [they] must submit to the oppression of the will, be this the individual will with which I force myself or the ‘general will’ of an organized group.”³² The sovereignty of the general will is inevitably linked with the production of a will that relies on the ability to force others to comply. The space of true plurality under political freedom is lost when a force of the will is applied for the purpose of conformity. Political freedom is the combination of power and freedoms so that multiple people can declare “I-can,” not the single declaring “I-will” onto others.³³ The ability to will others and be willed by others is not political freedom. When the will conforms to regularity, all hope for a free exchange in a common public realm as political actors is lost.

I concede that Rousseau clearly states that the general will cannot harm any of its members, for it would be harming itself in the process.³⁴ However, Rousseau establishes a body politic of alienated individuals through the man-citizen split so that the individual is already engaged in willing the self. The individual self-regulates to conform to the general will so that physical violence need not be enacted, but the force of the will is nevertheless present. Political freedom cannot be maintained under the sovereign will of the I-will, because that is strictly a matter of force from one onto the other or onto the self from the self, which cannot be a part of political freedom.

Rousseau constructs dual vertical contracts in the formation of a sovereign-will that alienates the individual subject from their own worldly experience, the political realm, and other political agents. Rousseau’s body politic is an illusion that conceals political conformity vis-a-vis the sovereign-will so that the realm of true political freedom is abolished in the process.

III. *Imagining Anew*

²⁸ Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 164.

²⁹ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” 166.

³⁰ Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 164.

³¹ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” 167.

³² Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 165.

³³ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 141.

³⁴ Rousseau, “Social Contract,” 166.

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Not only is Arendt concerned with providing a critical analysis of sovereignty and modern conceptions of freedom, but she also offers a way of reimagining a state and political space where political freedom is plausible and sovereignty is absent through a Jeffersonian ward system. The ward system is built upon the Jeffersonian maxim: "Love your neighbor as yourself, and your country more than yourself."³⁵ This maxim encompasses the need to form a political body that is intimate with the individual and promotes plurality. A federation of republics down to the level of a neighborhood could emerge with a freedom to perform politics in one's own backyard,³⁶ without the centralization of the sovereign will and, "where every one could count and be counted upon."³⁷ The ward system provides a system of government and politics that we can feel and touch, whereby we are held accountable for our individual entrance and actions, and for our ability to be there for one another. Political participation should not occur only in times of crises or elections.³⁸ Instead, we must consistently carve a political space of community-belonging to engage in meaningful discussions of how our world is and how we want it to be. We must return to a common world that "is always being negotiated, contested, augmented, and reconfigured precisely because it originates from the speech and action of a plurality of actors."³⁹ We cannot have a predetermined political future or institutional structure—at least not one that offers substantial life for all—and thus we are continuously reimagining the world we use our political free-will to make. In the Jeffersonian ward system, a state is imaginable where political freedom and the coming together of people is prioritized over sovereign control and political limitations.

For Arendt, our ability to make-with one another depends on the creation of a pluralistic republic without the interference of a sovereign will over the body politic. The Jeffersonian ward system creates several pluralistic political meeting places wherein the opinion of the individual is promoted at every level of politics, from the local to the national. There are concerns regarding this type of decentralized political freedom based on the fear that radical and dangerous opinions can take hold. Arendt is very aware of this danger and identifies filtering measures that can be adopted to counter such possibilities, including the American Senate, the Bill of Rights, and constitutional separation of powers.⁴⁰ Arendt claims that it is when unrestrained opinions do not have a "medium to pass them through ... [that] a 'strong man' [emerges] to mould them into a unanimous 'public opinion', which spelled death to all opinions."⁴¹ While every person can express their opinion and participate in government, there is a system of checks-and-balances in place to safeguard the opinions of others and the integrity of the state.

Arendt concedes that her conceptualization of the ward system is unlikely to be implemented, but it is the courage to build a chance at a new way of life that keeps the spirit of spontaneity in pluralistic political freedom alive.

IV. Conclusion

Arendt's work on political freedom highlights how the centralization of political action and opinion into a sovereign constitutes a sacrifice of plurality. A plurality of political freedom and power without sovereignty can exist in a state through "the world-building capacity of man in the human faculty of making and keeping promises."⁴² Political freedom requires that we collectively make-with as a moral and ethical responsibility of being together in this particular place and time, to perform this particular action. We are never working towards an end; rather, we must be critically conscious and in constant awe of the world and its unpredictable and imperfect nature. A lack of uniformity is fundamental to Arendtian political freedom, making it incompatible with early modern notions of sovereignty that conform their citizenry to the general will.

³⁵ Letter to Thomas Jefferson Smith, 21 February 1825, in *On Revolution*, Hannah Arendt (New York: Penguin Classics, 1963), 245.

³⁶ Jeffrey C. Isaac, "A New Guarantee on Earth: Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity and the Politics of Human Rights." *The American Political Science Review*, 90, no. 1 (1996): 69.

³⁷ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 246.

³⁸ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 246.

³⁹ Gaffney, *Political Loneliness*, 191.

⁴⁰ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 134/139/162/219-220.

⁴¹ Arendt, *On Revolution*, 220.

⁴² Arendt, *On Revolution*, 166.

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The Arendtian importance of making-with one another and reclaiming spaces of political freedom from the sovereign will is vital for our present reality. Our present conditions are defined by alienation from our communities and the political world. People around the globe are dissatisfied with democracy⁴³ and the disproportionate influence of elites in government.⁴⁴ We lack the ability to articulate the practice of “good” citizenship due to neoliberal markets that have commodified politics and political education.⁴⁵ Political science terms such as the “hidden Trump supporter” make all too apparent the inversion of political subjectivity.⁴⁶ There is a feeling of separation from the political realm as people grow disillusioned from their ability to enact meaningful change. Dangerous futurisms “position that the game is over, it’s too late, there’s no sense trying to make anything any better.”⁴⁷ We have lost the fundamental underpinnings of political freedoms that allow us to construct meaningful worlds, and to embrace our subjectivity. It seems like we have given up on world-making capacities for lives that can be substantive and deaths that can be good. These feelings are linked to the centralization of authority and political power into the will of the sovereign. The present function of sovereignty which drives political apathy, disunity, and alienation is setting the stage for a failure to address issues such as climate change, pandemics, and human rights.

Earthly survival depends on our ability to come together locally and internationally, disrupting traditional conceptions of sovereignty and freedom, and making a habitable world with one another. It is likely inconceivable to entirely do away with sovereignty, but I assert that we must move forward with the conscious intent of building spaces of collective politics for sharing opinion and recognizing both human and more-than-human subjects. In bending, stretching, and pulling sovereignty, we may find a sovereign formation capable of living side-by-side with political freedom. Maybe then we could begin to understand how to care for the world, one another, and adopt the Arendtian maxim of *amour mundi*.⁴⁸

⁴³ Richard Wike, Alexandra Castillo, “Many Around the World are Disengaged From Politics: But could be motivated to participate on issues like health care, poverty and education,” *Pew Research Center*, October 17, 2018, accessed February 06, 2023, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/10/17/international-political-engagement/>.

⁴⁴ Richard Wike, Laura Silver, Alexandra Castillo, “Many Across the Globe are Dissatisfied with How Democracy is Working: Discontent is tied to concerns about the economy, individual rights and out-of-touch elites,” *Pew Research Center*, April 29, 2019, accessed February 06, 2023, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/>.

⁴⁵ Wendy Brown, *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution* (New York: Zone Books, 2015), 175/200.

⁴⁶ Gaffney, *Political Loneliness*, 177-180.

⁴⁷ Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble*, 3.

⁴⁸ “Love of the world.”

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The Legality of the Death Penalty: Analyzing the Intersection Between *The Code of Hammurabi*, *Jus Cogens Norms*, and the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*

Alessandra Curry

Introduction

What does it mean to hold a “right to life,” and can a person's right to life be taken away? What about someone who commits murder, stripping someone else of their right to life? As punishment, do they, in return, forfeit their right to life? This essay will argue that the death penalty should not be utilized under any circumstance, even for someone who has committed murder, because it violates international law and order. The main focus will be examining the intersectionality of various topics in the realm of international human rights law and concluding the legality of the universal use of the death penalty through a careful analysis of other academic literature.

This paper will cite different legal scholars and their respective work to provide context to the earlier questions. The report is split into multiple sections to discuss each piece of evidence adequately. The first section will give a background on the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, the concept of *jus cogens norms*, and their intersection points. Next, the second section will discuss in more depth Article Three of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and how the “right to life” is defined from the perspective of international law. The third section answers the instance mentioned above: if someone commits murder, do they forfeit their right to life? Next, the fourth section will introduce the “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”¹ and its predecessor, the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” This section takes a more modern approach to analyze the moves the United Nations has taken concerning the death penalty. Finally, the fifth section will be a case study revolving around the United States’ current approach to the death penalty. This section will discuss it not only in the domestic sense but also in the response of international institutions to it. Ultimately, the conclusion reaches a verdict on the question of whether someone forfeits their right to life in the instance that they commit murder.

I. *Universal Human Rights & Jus Cogens Norms: A Match Made in Heaven*

The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (UDHR) is a non-legally binding, international document ratified in 1948 at the United Nations General Assembly.² Its adoption occurred after the catastrophic two world wars and the horrors seen during the Holocaust. The world was looking for a beacon of hope and a long-term method of promoting global peace and stability. The Declaration's goal was to avoid a similar situation from arising in the future that could display a complete disregard for human rights.³ Eleanor Roosevelt drafted it, intending to preserve “basic principles of human rights and freedoms” for the global population, no matter the nation from which someone

¹ “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty,” United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), accessed October 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/second-optional-protocol-international-covenant-civil-and->

² Chandler Green, “70 Years of Impact: Insights on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations Foundation (United Nations, December 5, 2018), <https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/70-years-of-impact-insights-on-the-universal-declaration-of-human-rights/>.

³ Christian Tomuschat, “Protection of Human Rights under Universal International Law,” UN Chronicle (United Nations, December 2016), <https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/protection-human-rights-under-universal-international-law>.

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originates.⁴ It consists of thirty articles outlining the fundamental rights to which everyone should be entitled. The ratification of this declaration served as a basis for other documents surrounding international human rights law moving forward that cite the UDHR.⁵

Lastly, it is important to note that this document is classified as a “declaration” and not a “treaty.” The articles within it represent something states came to a common understanding on, but it is not a binding agreement. Thus, the document is widely considered a fundamental constitutive document of the United Nations that all countries in the United Nations have to follow. To quote Eleanor Roosevelt:

“It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.”⁶

Jus cogens norms refer to the fundamental and general principle of international law—a set of universally accepted standards due to their moral importance. These standards apply to each nation-state, despite not being laid out in official law.⁷ If a treaty or document breaches a *jus cogens norm*, that document is deemed invalid. This regulation is laid out in the *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties*, specifically in Article 53 and Article 64:

A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.⁸

Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*) If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.⁹

A general list of *jus cogens norms* includes acts of genocide, slavery, torture, military conflicts outside of self-defense (wars on peace), piracy, and refusing asylum seekers who face danger in their home nation. However, there is no defined list of *jus cogens norms*. Many are left ambiguous. This uncertainty leaves much disagreement over which norms domestic and international governments recognize, outside of those listed above.¹⁰

Due to the overlap between the UDHR and *jus cogens norms*, some scholars have attempted to argue that the UDHR is representative of *jus cogens norms*. However, *jus cogens norms* can be both broader and narrower than universal human rights law (UHRL) due to how they incorporate many peremptory norms that UHRL leaves out. For example, UHRL sees all human rights as absolute, while *jus cogens norms* do not. Furthermore, under both, smaller nations are subjected to nation-state power and are protected under international legal standards, while larger states are held accountable.¹¹ Finally, there is also evidence that suggests that these two act in a fiduciary relationship. This relationship is between the citizens under power and the states themselves, with the general idea that the state must provide its citizens with freedom and security. It operates under two principles: intermediate and regulative. Intermediate principle refers to a Kantian maxim principle of non-instrumentalization, and regulative principle refers to a republican principle of non-domination.¹²

II. How Does One Define the “Right to Life?”

⁴ Green, “70 Years of Impact: Insights on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

⁵ “United Nations,” United Nations §, accessed October 2022, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

⁶ “Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),” YouTube (YouTube, September 24, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XH2tWa06J_Q.

⁷ M Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: ‘Jus Cogens’ and ‘Obligatio Erga Omnes,’” *Law and Contemporary Problems* 59, no. 4 (1996): pp. 63-74, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1192190>.

⁸ “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” Article 53, Treaty Law (The Website of the Organization for the Study of Treaty Law, October 13, 2015), <https://www.treatylaw.org/vienna-convention-law-treaties-1969/>.

⁹ “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,” Article 64.

¹⁰ Bassiouni. “International Crimes: ‘Jus Cogens’ and ‘Obligatio Erga Omnes.’”

¹¹ “Human Rights and Jus Cogens,” Ebrary.net, accessed October 2022,

https://ebrary.net/77416/law/human_rights_cogens.

¹² “Human Rights and Jus Cogens.”

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The term “right to life” is described in both Article Three of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and Article Six of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” as something every individual holds. Article Three states, “Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person,”¹³ while Article Six says, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”¹⁴ In other words, any person, as a human, has the right to life and for it not to be taken from them.¹⁵ This includes external (someone else) causes and internal (ending one’s own life) causes. It also indicates that their right to life is protected under not just national law, but international law as well.

After defining the “right to life,” can it be classified as a *jus cogens norm*? The short answer is yes. The right to life is morally viewed as a fundamental human right displayed in many, if not all, other international human rights.¹⁶ It is even often described as a “supreme right of the human being” by Article Six.¹⁷ Due to these reasons, the right to life is recognized as one of the most vital *jus cogens norms*.

III. The Intersectionality of Jus Cogens Norms and Murder

As previously discussed when referencing the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*¹⁸ and defining *jus cogens norms*, one is entitled to their right to life simply for being human. However, in the instance of committing murder, therefore stripping someone of their right to life, do they, in return, forfeit their right to life? To answer this question, one can look into the *Code of Hammurabi*¹⁹ and the work of philosopher Immanuel Kant. Both the *Code of Hammurabi* and Kant’s book *Science of Right*²⁰ mention the right of retaliation. This concept is referred to as *lex talionis* in the *Code of Hammurabi* and *jus talionis* in the *Science of Right*. The underlying principle is that the punishment someone receives for a crime must fit the crime’s severity—a widely accepted thought process.

Through reading Kant, the reader can denote that he supports the concept of *jus talionis*. However, he adds to this viewpoint with his belief that the evils a person commits against another person are equally committed against themselves. He writes, “If you slander another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from yourself; if you strike another, you strike yourself; if you kill another, you kill yourself.”²¹ This belief further promotes the concept of *jus talionis* by equating the punishment received to the crime one has committed. This reasoning justifies utilizing the death penalty for a crime that resulted in taking someone else’s life.

Kant also argues that an individual should be given a choice between a life of servitude or being put to death but asserts that any honorable man would choose death and only a “knave” would choose servitude. His logic is that an “honorable man values his honor more highly than even life itself, whereas a knave regards a life, although covered with shame, as better in his eyes than not to be.”²² Moreover, an honorable man will take

¹³ United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

¹⁴ “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), accessed October 2022, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights>.

¹⁵ “Article 2: Right To Life,” Equality and Human Rights Commission, accessed October 2022, <https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-rights-act/article-2-right-life>.

¹⁶ Karen Parker, “Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights,” *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 12, no. 2 (1989): pp. 412-463,

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¹⁷ Paul M Taylor, “Article 6: The Right to Life,” Cambridge Core (Cambridge University Press, June 11, 2020), <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/commentary-on-the-international-covenant-on-civil-and-political-rights/article-6-the-right-to-life/D428D1C302FB358CDF671E44CA0CBA41>.

¹⁸ United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”

¹⁹ Hammurabi and William Walter Davies, *The Codes of Hammurabi and Moses* (Champaign, Illinois: Book Jungle, 2007), <https://archive.org/details/cu31924028541856/page/n1/mode/1up>.

²⁰ Kant, *Science of Right*.

²¹ Kant, *Science of Right*.

²² Kant, *Science of Right*.

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accountability for his actions that lead him to this point, therefore valuing a punishment of death above his will to live. However, a knave would esteem their will to live above receiving an adequate punishment for their actions, failing to take a sufficient level of accountability.

Lastly, Kant notes that the punishment of death is not opposed by the perpetrators of murder or the general public. He writes, “never been heard of that a criminal condemned to death on account of a murder has complained that the sentence inflicted on him more than was right and just; and any one would treat him with scorn if he expressed himself to this effect against it.”²³ This point is interesting but essential to call attention to, as it points to the convicted criminals’ perspective. Based on Kant’s accounts the punishment of death is more than fitting to the crime of murder, and to complain that it is not would be shameful and bring ridicule to themselves.

Citing the evidence above, one can infer that Kant was a proponent of using the death penalty within specific stipulations. These stipulations can be assumed to mirror the consensus of the death penalty for the time period. During the 18th century, although the use of many executions was as a method of asserting political power, those conducted as punishment for murder were held to a higher standard than the former. This implication can be attributed to the agreement that one who commits murder forfeits their right to life. The earlier quote can support this, as no individual on death row complains about being on death row. And even after a person commits murder, they are still entitled to their right to life unless they choose to give it up by Kant’s standards. They are open to selecting death or life imprisonment. However, an honorable man would choose death, while a knave would prefer life imprisonment. Under the Kantian viewpoint, the death penalty would be justified in murder.

IV. *An Abundance of Protocols*

In addition to discussing historical thoughts surrounding the death penalty, it is essential to analyze its use more modernly. As of April 2022, at least ninety countries have signed off on the “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,”²⁴ which works towards the abolition of the death penalty on an international scale. The preamble to this document discusses the United Nations’ belief that the “abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights.”²⁵ With this goal at the forefront, it also cites Article Three of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and Article Six of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” to further support its points. Both articles center around an individual’s right to life, which the death penalty takes away.

The protocol uses both of these documents to push the abolition of the death penalty. However, the protocol offers an exception for when the death penalty can be used “in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military nature committed during wartime.” In this case, the country must still communicate such measures to the United Nations, and they must notify the United Nations Secretary-General at the beginning and end of the conflict before taking any actions.

This protocol contrasts with its predecessor, the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” as it states that the “sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime.”²⁶ In this case, the definition of serious crimes is “intentional crimes that have ‘lethal or other extremely grave consequences.’”²⁷ Therefore, under the qualification of the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” murder would constitute a “serious crime” and warrant the use of the death penalty. But under the “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” it would not.

²³ Kant, *Science of Right*.

²⁴ United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty”

²⁵ United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), “Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty”

²⁶ United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”

²⁷ United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”

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V. The Use of the Death Penalty in Modern-Day Nation-States

Because a universal consensus has not yet been reached internationally, each country must decide if death is an adequate punishment on both a moral and constitutional spectrum. The United States has undergone much discourse on the legality of the death penalty. The death penalty has been brought before the Supreme Court multiple times and altered the country's legal and moral standpoint.

One of the more significant challenges to the death penalty was in 1972, with the case of *Furman v. Georgia*. This case was the first time someone challenged the legality of putting an individual to death on the basis that it violated both the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment.²⁸ Each of which respectfully states:

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”²⁹

“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”³⁰

Five of the nine Justices on the court agreed with this argument—Justices Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, White, and Marshall. Justices Marshall and Brennan both believed imposing the death penalty was unconstitutional under all circumstances, and the use of it would inevitably trigger greater patterns of inequality between those who were convicted. Justices Stewart, Douglas, and White agreed that imposing the death penalty as a punishment was unconstitutional but disagreed that it would promote greater patterns of inequality. Each of these Justices also criticized it for different reasons. Justice Stewart criticized it for being “capriciously indiscriminate,”³¹ Justice Douglas criticized it for the outcomes being “invidiously discriminatory,”³² and Justice White criticized it for being “arbitrarily infrequent.”³³ They deemed the death penalty unconstitutional, but the same would not necessarily be true if it was conducted under different procedures and conditions.

What was occurring outside the United States also contributed to the court's decision to abolish the death penalty. Abolition was gaining a following globally, and among the Western democracies, the United States remained an anomaly as it continued to maintain its use of the death penalty.³⁴ The “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” was passed in 1966, detailing that the “right to life” shall be protected by the law and imposing more restrictions on the death penalty globally. As soon as 1968, a vast majority of Western European countries had abolished the death penalty, and during the 1960s alone, the number of countries that abolished its use doubled.³⁵ Abolition was becoming an international movement, and the global political climate significantly influenced the United States further to abolish its use.

In response to *Furman v. Georgia*, 35 states enacted new death penalty statutes to work around the court's ruling.³⁶ These were intended to address the concerns brought forth by Justice Stewart and Justice White. These statutes included a large proportion of states which adopted some method for jury discretion.³⁷ This became a common practice in the trial and sentencing process, which featured “bifurcated” elements. There were also a minority of states that instituted a mandatory death penalty for those convicted of certain crimes.³⁸ Most often, those crimes were some category of murder. Georgia's

²⁸ Corinna Lain, “Deciding Death,” *Duke Law Journal* 57, no. 1 (October 2007): pp. 3-83, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.977565>.

²⁹ “The Bill of Rights: A Transcription,” National Archives (The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) 2022, <https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript>.

³⁰ “Fourteenth Amendment,” Constitution Annotated (Congress.gov), accessed October 2022, <https://constitution.congress.gov/constitution/amendment-14/>.

³¹ James S Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment,” *Columbia Law Review* 107, no. 1 (January 2007): pp. 3-130, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=faculty_scholarship.

³² Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

³³ Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

³⁴ Lain, “Deciding Death.”

³⁵ Lain, “Deciding Death.”

³⁶ Lain, “Deciding Death.”

³⁷ Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

³⁸ Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

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statute notably invoked this by “establishing a limited number of aggravating circumstances that triggered death penalty eligibility.”³⁹ However, when evaluating the constitutionality of these two methods, the court would refer back to the approaches of Justices Stewart and White, respectfully. Justice Stewart was fervent in ruling on the unconstitutionality of mandatory death sentences, which the court upheld with majority votes that would strike down state laws in *Roberts v. Louisiana* and *Woodson v. North Carolina*.⁴⁰ The court concurred with Justice White in letting the states provide the jury a certain level of discretion when ruling the death penalty cases, which resulted in the ruling in the *Gregg v. Georgia* case. This decision let states “premise death eligibility on any aggravating factor that was more likely to persuade jurors to impose death than to tempt them to grant mercy.”⁴¹

Following the immediate aftermath of *Gregg v. Georgia*, the use of the death penalty skyrocketed in the United States. The first execution to resume was in 1977 by firing squad, and although several hundred people were sentenced to death within the next decade, there were only ten executions. The court’s decision in *Gregg v. Georgia* has been described as a “judicial surrender to political pressure” in response to the court’s considerable shift in their stance in just four years.

In the 21st century, the use of the death penalty within the United States has created moments of international controversy. In 2016, for the sixth time in a decade, the United Nations approved a mandate “calling for a worldwide moratorium on the use of the death penalty.”⁴² Out of the 157 countries that could vote either in favor or against this mandate, only forty voted against it. One of those countries was the United States, which argued that “capital punishment decisions rest with each Member State individually, since capital punishment in general is not in violation of international law.”⁴³ This action is the latest demonstration of the United States’ disagreement with international institutions and a majority of other nations on the legality of the death penalty. As a result, the United States feeds into the global rhetoric that “countries that still authorize the death penalty are ... ‘less democratic and less committed to the protection of human rights.’”⁴⁴ This contrasts with European countries that have mainly chosen to outlaw the use of the death penalty out of morality. This, along with other reasons, leaves only a small number of nations that still utilize it as a form of punishment.⁴⁵

VI. Conclusion

The question is, “in the case of an individual who commits murder, do they, in return, forfeit their right to life?” By examining the cross sections of earlier points, it can be concluded that the death penalty should not be utilized under any circumstance, even for someone who has committed murder, because it violates international law and order.

Making a note of countries that employ the death penalty, specifically the United States, there is a pattern in the death penalty’s common use as punishment for crimes such as murder.⁴⁶ A quote mentioned by Kant earlier in the paper states, “if you kill another, you kill yourself.”⁴⁷ This aligns with the concept of *jus talionis*, which refers to the idea that the punishment one receives must fit the crime they committed. However, in international law, as in most developed countries, the use of the death penalty is outlawed or deeply disesteemed. This provides a stark contrast between countries that allow the death penalty to punish crimes and those that have outlawed it entirely. Taking this all into account, even when based on someone who commits murder, it is hard to come to a singular conclusion on the legality of the death penalty on a global scale.

³⁹ Lain, “Deciding Death.”

⁴⁰ Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

⁴¹ Liebman, “Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment.”

⁴² Lexi Thiel, “Capital Punishment- an International Perspective,” JLIA Blog (Penn State Law, September 29, 2020), <https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/capital-punishment-an-international-perspective/>.

⁴³ Thiel, “Capital Punishment- an International Perspective.”

⁴⁴ Thiel, “Capital Punishment- an International Perspective.”

⁴⁵ Thiel, “Capital Punishment- an International Perspective.”

⁴⁶ “Aggravating Factors by State,” Death Penalty Information Center (Death Penalty Information Center), accessed October 2022, <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/crimes-punishable-by-death/aggravating-factors-by-state>.

⁴⁷ Kant, *Science of Right*.

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Ultimately, one can come to many conclusions based on the side they choose to cite: that of individual nations or of the global position. However, after discussing the changing views of Westphalian sovereignty following the atrocities conducted in Nazi Germany, an attempt was made to set a new standard of international law that would take precedence over a nation-state's domestic law. With this added knowledge, the decisions of an international body such as the United Nations, with documents that state, "Each State Party shall take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction,"⁴⁸ should take precedence over an individual nation's domestic laws.

Therefore, the answer to the question "if in the case of an individual who commits murder, do they in return forfeit their right to life" should coincide with the international order. Thus, the death penalty should not be utilized for someone who has committed murder, because it violates international law.

⁴⁸ United Nations Human Rights (United Nations), "Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty"

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Section 4:

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Featuring:

“The Role of Marxist-Leninist Ideology in Protests for Government Reform in South Korea and Japan”

Written by Sammy Moore
University of California, Santa Cruz, Politics and Philosophy Major, Class of 2023

“An Economic Perspective on Democratic Erosion and Faltering Levels of Regime Consolidation”

Written by Irene Sung
Brown University, Political Science Major, Class of 2023

The Role of Marxist-Leninist Ideology in Protests for Government Reform in South Korea and Japan

Sammy Moore

Introduction

During the second half of the 20th century, South Korea and Japan both experienced government protests based upon Marxist-Leninist ideology. In 1980s South Korea, under the regime of Chun Doo-Hwan, pro-democratization movements organized by students and intellectuals demanded that the authoritarian regime be removed and that democratic elections be held. Japan, while already a democratic state as a result of the United States occupation post-World War II, experienced a period of rapid economic development that spurred the beginning of communist-Marxist movements among citizens who fought for economic reforms. Marxist groups incorporated communist ideology in both states; however, the ideology was incorporated in separate ways to suit the predominant social and cultural structures already in place in the two countries. Despite these differences, similarities in movement formation and ideology existed between South Korea and Japan, including in the role of student protests and the influence of interstate relations. Therefore, it must be examined how Marxist-Leninist ideology influenced movements for governmental reform in South Korea and Japan after World War II, and what the effects were. Marxist-Leninist ideology was employed specifically for democratization in South Korea and economic reform with anti-imperialist sentiments in Japan. However, students in both states used this ideology as a basis for organizing protests and arguing for revised interstate relations. Despite these similarities, Marxist-Leninist movements had greater success in South Korea than in Japan due to key differences in their movement structure and goals.

I. South Korea's Ideological Development

In South Korea, Marxist-Leninist movements originated from a civilian desire for the removal of an authoritarian government and state labor reform. Specifically, during the 1970s and 1980s, socialist and Marxist-Leninist ideology began to permeate throughout South Korea, as the authoritarian rule generated inequality and limited rights or freedoms. This created the “image of a polarized society, where the workers, peasants, and shopkeepers suffer from the oppression of the ‘ruling class’ composed of the state elite, conglomerate capital, and foreign power.”¹ Consequently, people began to see socialism as “the ultimate symbol of the good that would provide wealth, equality, and a restored community.”² This development originated in direct opposition to the South Korean state, which enforced staunch anti-communist policies stemming from its alliance with the United States and the impending threat of communist North Korea. Marxist South Korean groups advocated strongly for labor reform and the “release of political prisoners, reintroduction of the local government system which had been suspended in 1961, press freedoms, an end to police brutality, and the repeal of draconian anti-communist laws... [and] redistricting to reflect population changes.”³ Uniting under these common goals, the proletariat formed an official movement called the minjung, which “supplied a major ideological basis for social movements by calling for political democratization.”⁴ Thus, Marxist-Leninist ideologies began to develop and

¹ Koo, Hagen. “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea.” *Theory and Society*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1991, pp. 503.

² Lee, Namhee. “Representing the Worker: The Worker-Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South Korea.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 64, no. 4, 2005, pp. 922.

³ Bedeski, Robert E. “State Reform and Democracy in South Korea.” *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1992, pp. 156.

⁴ Kim, Ho-Ki. “The State and Civil Society in South Korea, 1987-1999: Civil Movements and Democratic Consolidation.” *Asian Perspective*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2001, pp. 234.

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gain prevalence because of civilian unification against the government in a pro-democracy movement.

The minjung in South Korea was vital to the triumph of its democratization movement. Originally spurred on by a Leninist organization, the Sonoryon, which urged the populace to “develop revolutionary consciousness” and “openly [carry] out political agitation among workers,” the minjung movement took form.⁵ The movement focused on democratization and labor reform, arguing about “issues of labor — low wages, harsh working conditions, violation of the basic labor laws — through statements, manifestos, hunger strikes, prayer services, and street demonstrations.”⁶ Ultimately, the minjung, led by intellectuals, white-collar workers, and students, “facilitated bringing the issue of labor into the public domain,”⁷ while playing “a critical role in the formation of the working class,” through the provision of opposition ideology and organizational resources.⁸ This was vital for exerting pressure on the authoritarian regime and creating an opening for democratic transition.⁹ Without the support of labor, the movement would have lacked a significant amount of power needed to impact institutional decisions. Therefore, it was the strong desire and demand for political reform by Marxist-Leninist movements among the middle class and labor that helped push the national government into democratizing the South Korean state. This movement toward political democratization then played a key role in influencing the development of labor and student Marxist organizations.

II. Japan’s Ideological Development

Japan began developing Marxist ideology much earlier than South Korea, beginning with the creation of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) in 1922. Initially, the JCP affirmed Soviet ideology, calling for the creation of a Soviet-style government,¹⁰ as the Comintern believed that “Japanese capitalism still demonstrates characteristics of former feudal relationships,” and that Japanese state power was “semifeudal.”¹¹ The original goal of the JCP was to “forge an alliance of workers and peasant organizations like unions, bypassing their opportunistic leaders,”¹² and to generate social consciousness.¹³ Despite these initial intentions, the JCP struggled to bring their goals to fruition as Marxist ideology is based upon Western economic and political concepts that differed greatly from the cultural and social conditions that existed in Japan. This led to an ideological pivot for the JCP, which took on more moderate, yet undoubtedly Marxist, viewpoints. During this time, the JCP opted to call for the image of an unthreatening Communist Party, willing to set aside its socialist goals to focus on creating a broad democratic front, a people’s government, and the completion of a bourgeois-democratic revolution.¹⁴ One major reason for this change was the difficulty of justifying the position of an emperor in a communist society.

Following Japan’s military defeat in 1945, Marxist ideology became especially prevalent. Due to many changes in Japanese society as a result of the U.S. occupation, capitalism became especially intertwined with Japanese economics. However, intellectuals revived Marxist thought, creating a period in which “discussion of civil society has been inseparable from the tradition of Marxian thought and from debates about the nature of Japanese capitalism and, more broadly, about the significance of the imperial system and its failure for Japan’s historical development.”¹⁵ A plethora of reasons contributed to this

⁵ Lee, Namhee. “Representing the Worker: The Worker-Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South Korea.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 64, no. 4, 2005, pp. 928.

⁶ *Ibid* 914.

⁷ *Ibid* 930-931.

⁸ Koo, Hagen. “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea.” *Theory and Society*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1991, pp. 505.

⁹ *Ibid* 498.

¹⁰ Koschmann, J. Victor. *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan*, University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 27.

¹¹ *Ibid* 26.

¹² *Ibid* 27.

¹³ Takeuchi, Yoshitomo. “Marxism in Japan.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 28, no. 107, 1974, pp. 54.

¹⁴ Koschmann, J. Victor. *Revolution and Subjectivity in Postwar Japan*, University of Chicago Press, 1996, pp. 34-35.

¹⁵ Barshay, Andrew. “Capitalism and Civil Society in Postwar Japan: Perspectives from Intellectual History.” *The State of Civil Society in Japan*, 2003, pp. 63.

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emergence, including Marxism being “the only ideology able to put forward, on a “scientific” basis, a consistent opposition to war and fascism, and to offer a historical Gesamtbild (total view) of Japanese society, indispensable to the post-war rebuilding effort.”¹⁶ This view of Marxism, as well as the Japanese’s disdain towards capitalism and their desire “to preserve the values which centered around the family and the state,”¹⁷ led to the hope that socialism “could protect and nurture the Japanese people; and old values like social harmony, which many felt had been compromised by the rapid growth of industrial capitalism, could be preserved without abandoning the progressive dream of Marxian socialism.”¹⁸ This movement towards a more moderate version of Marxism, while more widely accepted by the majority of Japanese civilians, led to great disillusionment from students who demanded a more radical transformation of the state. This provocation engendered a factionalization of the Communist Party in Japan and a de-emphasis on Marxism as a whole, though not occurring until after the drive for a Marxist revolution came to a head with the outbreak of student protests in the late 1960s.

III. Student Protests

A key component of the development and role of Marxist-Leninist ideology is how it was employed in student protest movements. While this ideology was the basis for a revolutionary movement in both states, student protests in South Korea were aimed at democratization and labor reform, while in Japan the student movement was directed towards economic reforms, expanded rights, and anti-imperialism. South Korean student movements were inspired by the earlier attempts to protest the government, and were done in alliance with intellectuals in the minjung movement to “mobilize the working class against the government to push for democratization.”¹⁹ Students were successful with these attempts, gaining the support of the middle class through plunging “into the world of the factory worker, forgoing university diplomas, job prospects, and middle-class lives in the hope of bringing about ‘revolution.’”²⁰ This movement peaked in June 1987, when students and intellectuals organized massive protests against South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan, who refused “to amend the constitution for a direct presidential election,”²¹ and was conducted with the support of the middle class. The 1987 protests were a key reason for the official democratization of South Korea, as it proved that the people were united against the authoritarian government. Without the support of Marxist-Leninist ideology, the role of the middle class will diminish, and the movement will not gain as much support or influence, possibly leading to state suppression and continued authoritarian rule.

In contrast, Japanese students mobilized against the government’s continuing industrialization and implementation of capitalist policies, but lacked the support of the middle class that was found in South Korea, leading to the violent suppression of the movement. Students initially became enchanted by Marxist ideology as a result of “economic growth and urbanization” which “rapidly transformed Japanese society,” making “individuals [grow] alienated from their original communities, precipitating a surge in independent voters with no strong party affiliation, especially among young city-dwellers.”²² This alienation fostered “criticism of capitalism and modernization as the forces responsible for disturbing social transformations.”²³ Due to the previously established political party, the JCP, Japanese society was familiar with Marxist ideology. Students took this opportunity to read Marxist-Leninist literature supplied through

¹⁶ Takeuchi, Yoshitomo. “Marxism in Japan.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 28, no. 107, 1974, pp. 62-63.

¹⁷ Hoston, Germaine A. “Tenkō: Marxism & the National Question in Prewar Japan.” *Polity*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1983, pp. 108.

¹⁸ Hoston, Germaine A. “Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan: The Case of Sano Manabu.” *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 18, no. 1, 1985, pp. 30.

¹⁹ Lee, Namhee. “Representing the Worker: The Worker-Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South Korea.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 64, no. 4, 2005, pp. 911-937.

²⁰ *Ibid* 912.

²¹ Koo, Hagen. “Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea.” *Theory and Society*, vol. 20, no. 4, 1991, pp. 491.

²² Eiji, Oguma. “Japan’s 1968: A Collective Reaction to Rapid Economic Growth in an Age of Turmoil.” *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, vol. 13, no. 1, 2015, pp. 6.

²³ *Ibid* 10.

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university bookstores, which radicalized many of them and ultimately created the Zenkyōtō movement.²⁴ Many students chose to join the JCP; however, due to the party adopting more moderate policy initiatives, students were disillusioned and were removed from the party for advocating for ideas deemed too radical.²⁵ These actions led to a student rebellion initiated by university Marxist-Leninist groups, specifically employing the ideologies of “Communist Party Marxism, Socialist Party Marxism, and anti-Stalinist Marxism.”²⁶ This movement was met with a strong government reaction: students were “physically eliminated from any space outside of the university when the riot police entered campus”²⁷ and due to a lack of support from the middle class and “overly sophisticated and jargonized” factional controversies,²⁸ the movement was suppressed by the police and failed to bring about any constitutional or economic reforms. Without a united front, students could not achieve sufficient national support to influence state reform in the way they desired.

IV. Interstate Relations

Interstate relations — specifically the countries’ diplomatic relationships with the United States — played a large role in the development of Marxist ideology in both South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, the government applied “rigid anti-communism” laws as a “basic element of...foreign policy and a source of legitimization for the maintenance of authoritarian rule.”²⁹ This anti-communist ideology employed by the state finds its origin in the relationship between the United States and South Korea, in which the United States provided military support to help South Korea defend against North Korea in exchange for South Korea complying with U.S. anti-communist ideology. Many became disillusioned by this relationship, leading to South Korea’s relationship with North Korea becoming a key factor in the development of Marxist ideology. This development gave rise to many reunification advocates adopting North Korea’s communist ideology, gaining influence from the population’s strained relationship with the U.S. after the 1980 Kwangju uprising, when U.S. troops did nothing to stop state violence against pro-democratization protestors, fueling the anti-U.S. movement.³⁰ The anti-U.S. movement, accompanied by Korean unification efforts that advocated for “North Korean anti-Americanism” and “the church’s (self-reliance) ideology”, which was “a mixture of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and nationalism,”³¹ coincided with the “disenchantment with Western liberal democracy.”³² Essentially, Marxist-Leninist movements in South Korea were fueled by anti-American sentiments and North Korean communist and nationalist ideologies. While these movements did not result in a socialist society, they did lead to South Korea democratizing.

Marxist-Leninist movements were also highly influenced by interstate relations with the United States in Japan. Due to the United States’ occupation of Japan after World War II, many Japanese citizens developed a dislike of Americans who forced Western ideals and policies onto the public. Marxist movements in Japan often originated from “a fusion of Marxism with nationalistic elements that draws its energy from both cultural pride and resentment against the inroads of Western imperialism on traditional

²⁴ Prey, Rob. “Visions of Democracy: The Communication and Transformation of Revolutionary Ideologies in South Korea.” *Global Media Journal*, vol. 3, no. 4, 2004, pp. 5.

²⁵ Sunada, Ichiro. “The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 9, no. 6, 1969, pp. 459.

²⁶ Tairako, Tomonaga. “A Criticism of Postwar Japanese Marxism in the Context of Postwar Japanese History.” *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies*, vol. 62, no. 1, 2021, pp. 1-30. Takeuchi, Yoshitomo. “Marxism in Japan.” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, vol. 28, no. 107, 1974, pp. 49-68.

²⁷ Nagasaki, Hiroshi. “Japan’s Student Movement and the Revolutionary Politics of 1968.” *Jacobin*, 2021.

²⁸ Sunada, Ichiro. “The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 9, no. 6, 1969, pp. 461.

²⁹ Chung, Chien-peng. “Democratization in South Korea and Inter-Korean Relations.” *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 1, 2003, pp. 21.

³⁰ Choi, Hyaewool. “The Societal Impact of Student Politics in Contemporary South Korea.” *Higher Education*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1991, pp. 177.

³¹ Shin, Gi-Wook. “South Korean Anti-Americanism: A Comparative Perspective.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 36, no. 8, 1996, pp. 791.

³² Lee, Namhee. “Representing the Worker: The Worker-Intellectual Alliance of the 1980s in South Korea.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, vol. 64, no. 4, 2005, pp. 919.

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economies and values.”³³ Two key initiatives of the student movements and the JCP were to stop the renewal of the Japan-United States security alliance, as many wanted to “abolish the military tie with the U.S.,” and to stop the progress of industrialization and capitalist development in Japan.³⁴ However, these movements failed and the treaty was approved, as the movements lacked the solidarity and strength needed to influence the government and bring about policy and international agreement reforms.

V. Analysis/Impacts

Marxist-Leninist ideology played a key role in anti-government movements in both South Korea and Japan; however, influential factors differed between the two and precipitated success in one and failure in the other. While both movements employed Marxist ideologies born out of anti-American sentiment and a strong desire for a more equitable and democratic society, the development and level of success each movement achieved proves how vital a movement’s structure and support base is for a Marxist revolution. South Korean students and intellectuals mobilized the middle class against the authoritarian government and employed the threat of North Korean communist ideologies to their advantage, forcing the government to democratize in fear of the population mobilizing in solidarity against them. It was the support of the middle class that allowed this movement to succeed and granted the movement the ability to have a strong influence on “the process of democratic transition and consolidation.”³⁵ The role of the middle class was the key aspect that differed between the two movements, ultimately deciding their defeat or victory.

Marxist movements in Japan, conversely, lacked both internal cohesion in ideology and popular support. Without the support of the middle class or a strong coalition of student activists, the government was able to suppress the movement and maintain moderate policies. Despite this discrepancy, Marxist ideologies still persist in Japan, while they are less prevalent in South Korea. Although South Korea had moved towards a fully democratic government with liberal economic policies, “it is no exaggeration to say that close to one-half of the economists in Japan today are of Marxist orientation.”³⁶ The JCP still exists, but it lacks substantial power to influence policy. Therefore, though Marxism played a key role in the democratization process in South Korea and contributed to a lower demand for economic reform in Japan, it is in Japan, the state in which Marxist-Leninist movements were less successful, that this ideology is still regularly employed.

One major question that arises is why Marxist protests in South Korea were successful yet led to the implementation of liberal democracy instead of a socialist society. One potential answer is that democracy, while not being as egalitarian as a Marxist society, has the capacity to “acknowledge injustice, reform institutions to better serve the public interest, and pass laws that would bring the reality of political and economic life more in line with the promise of individual rights and equal citizenship.”³⁷ In other words, while liberal democracy might not have been ideal, the changes implemented by the government were enough for most to be satisfied. Citizens achieved the ability to elect representatives and have a voice in governmental policies, which was the ultimate goal for a large percentage of the minjung who was not as radical. Despite not achieving a Marxist revolution, radical students did gain positive social change, which can be seen in the lasting effects of Marxist movements. This persists in the level of equality that currently exists in these two states, both scoring as more equal on the Gini Coefficient, which

³³ Hoston, Germaine A. “Emperor, Nation, and the Transformation of Marxism to National Socialism in Prewar Japan: The Case of Sano Manabu.” *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 18, no. 1, 1985, pp. 25.

³⁴ Sunada, Ichiro. “The Thought and Behavior of Zengakuren: Trends in the Japanese Student Movement.” *Asian Survey*, vol. 9, no. 6, 1969, pp. 459.

³⁵ Kim, Ho-Ki. “The State and Civil Society in South Korea, 1987-1999: Civil Movements and Democratic Consolidation.” *Asian Perspective*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2001, pp. 230.

³⁶ Tsuru, Shigeto. “Survey of Economic Research in Postwar Japan.” *The American Economic Review*, vol. 54, no. 4, 1964, pp. 79.

³⁷ Berkowitz, Peter. “Liberal Democracy Vs Communism.” *Capitalism, Socialism, and Freedom*, The Hoover Institution, 2020.

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measures the levels of inequality within a state, than the United States.³⁸ Therefore, while Marxist ideology no longer plays a major role in both South Korea and Japan, its lasting legacies are still prevalent today.

VI. Conclusion

Marxist-Leninist ideology played a key role in anti-government movements in South Korea and Japan, fueled by anti-American sentiments and a desire for state reform. While Japan developed Marxist ideologies much earlier than South Korea, South Korea had more success in getting the government to cooperate. Protests in South Korea organized by groups with Marxist ideologies mobilized the middle class against the authoritarian government and created the opportunity for democratization. Protests in Japan were heavily initiated by students, and due to a lack of cohesion and student-worker solidarity, they were suppressed by the government. This contrast reveals the powerful role that Marxist ideology played in movements for governmental reform, and how these movements can have lasting effects, as seen by many current Japanese economists employing Marxist ideologies and the further democratization that South Korea underwent after the protests. The differences also illuminate the key role of the middle class in these movements, as without popular support, Marxist protests have less of a chance of success, paving the way for future governmental reforms, and elucidating what key factors are needed for change.

³⁸ World Bank. "Gini Index." The World Bank Group, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_year_desc=false.

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https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_year_desc=false.

An Economic Perspective on Democratic Erosion and Faltering Levels of Regime Consolidation

Irene Sung

The Middle East raises key implications on democratic consolidation due to the starkly different outcomes from the Arab Spring movement, some resulting in new democratic regimes and others in full-blown civil wars. The wave of mass political mobilization and civil resistance for reform was sparked by decades of suppression and lack of freedom, and people grew inspired by the successful case of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia that struck down its long-time, brutal dictator Ben Ali.¹ This mass mobilization led to rapid region-wide democratic emergence and social revolutions driven by riots and protests. However, the immediate nature of the region's democratization undermined regime consolidation, leaving many states with power vacuums, political turbulence, and ethnic cleavages that exacerbated the level of divisiveness in their approach to governance.² As one of the Arab Spring's primary success stories, Tunisia sheds light on how democratic emergence does not necessarily translate into consolidation without a strong economy—economic power vitalizes states with resources to organize and build political foundations and networks such as parties or institutions, combat corruption, and address both physical and non-physical societal conflict, which are all core principles of a functional democracy.

“Repeatedly harassed by police demanding bribes,”³ the young street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to draw attention to government corruption and economic hardship in Tunisia. His sacrifice quickly unraveled into a national symbol that instigated anger and erupted into a massive wave of protests. Bouazizi's political effort was effective, as the nation was forced to re-emerge as a democracy. However, from a constructivist perspective, Tunisia's democratic social revolution, including the downfall of Ben Ali, does not eliminate its history of corruption and illegitimate governance. A regime influences freedom levels, but its long-term political effects are often too deeply entrenched socially, economically, and institutionally to be easily reversed through a sudden revolution. In particular, Tunisia has struggled with lack of police regulation or an independent judiciary, preventing “officials' misdemeanors and felonies from being sanctioned.”⁴ This has enabled elite politicians to assume additional power and operate above the law, in direct contrast to basic democratic values. Moreover, the “political spectrum remains fragmented” as “parties are not yet highly institutionalized and are facing questions about their internal democratic processes,”⁵ revealing that democratic institutions have not been solidified both before and after the Jasmine Revolution. Tunisian civilians are still being challenged by prominent economic grievances and are directly witnessing their decaying democracy.

Through the lens of Tunisia's socioeconomic position, the reasons for its wavering democratic consolidation are made clear. Regime emergence costs are relatively low, but consolidation is expensive. Primarily, Robert Dahl states that the necessary conditions to solidify a polyarchy (a form of democratic governance that invests power in multiple people) include liberalization and inclusiveness. Liberalization embodies competition and a fair number of elections because public contestation holds leaders accountable, and inclusiveness frames the required rights to participate in civic life.⁶ When these two prerequisite conditions are established, party systems begin to form and politicians “seek the support of groups that can now participate more easily in political

¹ BBC News, n.d. “Arab Uprising: Country by Country - Tunisia.” www.bbc.com/news/world-12482315.

² Manfreda, Primoz. 2019. “These Are the 6 Ways Arab Spring Impacted the Middle East.” *ThoughtCo*, July 1, 2019. www.thoughtco.com/arab-spring-impact-on-middle-east-2353038.

³ Abouaoun, Elie. 2019. “Tunisia Timeline: Since the Jasmine Revolution.” United States Institute of Peace, n.d. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/tunisia-timeline-jasmine-%20revolution>.

⁴ Weilandt, Ragnar. 2018. “Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia's Democratic Transition.” *European View* 17 (2): 210-217. doi:10.1177/178168581880568

⁵ Weilandt, “Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia's Democratic Transition,” 210-217.

⁶ Dahl, Robert. 1971. *Polyarchy*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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life.⁷ Though Dahl's explanations for the consolidation of a democratic polyarchy seem formulaic, the conditions' implementation is complex and extremely costly.

The costs of liberalization, or public contestation, are high because running fair elections requires extensive oversight, sufficient funding, reliable democratic institutions, established parties, organizations, and national platforms to encourage debates and civic participation. The costs of inclusiveness are even higher because it demands change not only in political structure but also in culture. The process of granting freedoms and rights to the people requires the development of a new constitution that both leaders and constituents agree upon, which takes resources an unstable government may not have. In addition, inclusiveness is often unable to be socially integrated because of the unfamiliar concept of civic participation, particularly in countries that historically had repressive regimes that crushed political activism and all forms of dissent.

Dahl also elaborates on how the costs of repression for a government *must* be higher than the costs of toleration for a polyarchy to solidify.⁸ The costs of repression include measures of surveillance and censorship, which can be enforced through state-sanctioned violence. In many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, the costs of repression are usually low due to the concentration of power in government elites, leaving constituents with little to no resources to resist or retaliate. Costs of toleration are high because providing the people the networks and political means to engage civically is difficult. Stable institutions and systems must be set to establish rules, procedures, and precedents in a legitimate manner to ensure democratic accountability and responsiveness. Therefore, the costs of repression are only dependent on the government's access to assets, whereas toleration requires the establishment of economic, social, and political equality in broader society. From this perspective, Dahl reveals how democratic regimes can be expensive.

Another explanation as to why democratization is costly is that social capital is "significantly related to multiple interrelated indicators of socioeconomic development and to institutional indicators of democratization."⁹ Democratization theories have long emphasized the role of "collaboration through a diverse range of informal organizations in the voluntary sector, like parent-teacher associations, local recycling groups, and village cooperatives" as it can "provide local solutions to community problems."¹⁰ Through these organizations, people can participate in grassroots politics and obtain social capital to widen their associational networks, increasing their accessibility to political resources; social capital is correlated and "closely tied to patterns of socioeconomic and democratic development."¹¹ People are given the power to exercise their political rights through electoral voting, exercising freedom of speech liberties, or forming alliances with established groups and parties—the fundamental core of a democracy. Moreover, Putnam's social capital theory that "rich and dense associational networks facilitate the underlying conditions of interpersonal trust, tolerance, and cooperation" highlights the significance of unifying social cleavages to further foster political solidarity and collective democratic action.¹² However, the construction of healthy democratic institutions requires extensive fiscal investment, and the government must be convinced that the costs of toleration through these mechanisms are lower than the costs of repression. Otherwise, the regime will not lean towards providing the necessary capital if repression is simply a cheaper option.

Applying Dahl and Putnam's theoretical principles to the case study of Tunisia relies on the assumption that Tunisia's main incentive behind revolutionizing was private gain for the government. Democratization occurs due to "the transitory nature of de facto political power,"¹³ which is inherently unpredictable. The goal of the Tunisian people in pushing for democratic reform was stable institutional consistency that does not threaten their long-term rights and freedoms. However, Tunisia's economic fragility causes fluctuations in the legitimacy of political leaders and their ways of governance,¹⁴ leading to more riots and protests even after the Jasmine Revolution in 2011. In other words, economic crises spark uncertainty and political distrust within the people, which instigates new revolutions that do not always lead to consolidation. As a result of the

⁷ Dahl, *Polyarchy*.

⁸ Dahl, *Polyarchy*.

⁹ Norris, Pippa. 2001. "Making Democracies Work: Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies." *British Journal of Political Science*.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4892578_Making_Democracies_Work_Social_Capital_and_Civic_Engagement_in_47_Societies

¹⁰ Norris, "Making Democracies Work: Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies."

¹¹ Norris, "Making Democracies Work: Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies."

¹² Norris, "Making Democracies Work: Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies."

¹³ Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁴ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

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nation's wavering socioeconomic status, Tunisia's new democracy functions on a lack of established political structure with low levels of legitimacy. Specifically, in 2017, Tunisia's rate of "unemployment was at 15% ... and 28% in some regions" with "a third of university graduates without a job," leaving "large parts of Tunisia's youth ... excluded from the country's political and economic opportunities."¹⁵ This disadvantage has led to lower electoral voter turnout and hence decreased democratic participation, as young Tunisians have been disillusioned by their grave economic circumstances; they cannot afford to engage in civic and associational networks, meaning that their social trust and links to other social groups are scant. Lower participation means less political representation, which undermines the democratic commitment to the majority.¹⁶ Therefore, continued economic distress in spite of a new regime has undermined the strength of Tunisia's democratic consolidation.

A 2014 ArabTrans project poll revealed that the "respondents' idea of democracy is closely linked to socio-economic rights," suggesting that without economic and social capital, people feel unable to exercise any power.¹⁷ With inflation reaching seven percent and a drastic decrease in purchasing power, Tunisia's economic status has eroded. Consequently, the costs of toleration become higher because of growing demands from the constituency, increasing the likelihood of authoritarian tendencies. Moreover, "the dire socio-economic conditions and the lack of prospects for young Tunisians ... seem to be making some youths receptive to the simplistic messages of radical Islam,"¹⁸ which can exacerbate levels of polarization. Putnam argues that "associations have ... external effects on the wider polity... in terms of interest articulation and aggregation,"¹⁹ allowing people's political beliefs to be represented on an institutional level that can be held accountable for, especially in subcultural pluralist countries. However, in Tunisia's case, the lack of access to social capital means that the vast number of people and their diverse ideologies are not being adequately represented by democratic leaders. This leads many young Tunisians to eventually resort to radical groups as replacements for legitimate associational organizations.

The same pattern is seen in Egypt, one of the other countries in the Arab Spring movement that successfully revolutionized into a democratic regime. Similarly to Tunisia, Egypt's post-revolutionary politics are quite bleak due to its unfavorable economic conditions of spiked inflation rates, reduced public spending, cuts to subsidies, and rising unemployment.²⁰ With low access to economic resources and a lack of political structure after the 2011 revolution, the Egyptian government's costs of toleration, liberalization, inclusiveness, and social capital are extremely high. This prompted Mohammed Morsi, the first democratically elected head of state, to continue his abuse of decree power and take unilateral executive action without an electoral mandate.²¹ His government slowly unraveled into a delegative democratic model, mirroring electoral authoritarianism, a hybrid regime that points to the erosion of the proper representative democracies that the Arab Spring movement initially envisioned. Even under the el-Sisi regime, basic civil rights were violated through heavy censorship and surveillance, showcasing the lack of consolidation of the 2011 Egyptian democracy. For Egyptian leaders, the cost of granting participation rights, fair and just elections, and associational networks such as unions and partnerships are too high and risky, as those provisions could pave the way for another political shakedown. In order to maintain their power, they leverage inexpensive methods of repression, taking advantage of the economically disadvantaged who are also "becoming increasingly politically disenfranchised."²² Therefore, evidently, "repression is attractive for elites because it allows them to maintain power without having to make any concessions to the disenfranchised."²³

Returning to the discussion on Tunisia, from a cultural lens, the previous hierarchical arrangements under Ben Ali's autocratic dictatorship hinder the creation of genuine associational networks and a level playing field for all political actors. This ingrained hierarchy has been a major obstacle to the new democratic regime's consolidation. As Hofstede and Bollinger (1987) interpret it, Tunisia's autocratic

¹⁵ Weilandt, "Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia's Democratic Transition," 210-217.

¹⁶ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

¹⁷ Weilandt, "Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia's Democratic Transition," 210-217.

¹⁸ Weilandt, "Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia's Democratic Transition," 210-217.

¹⁹ Norris, "Making Democracies Work: Social Capital and Civic Engagement in 47 Societies."

²⁰ Ghafar, Adel Abdel. 2018. "A Stable Egypt for a Stable Region: Socio-Economic Challenges and Prospects."

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²¹ Ghafar, "A Stable Egypt for a Stable Region: Socio-Economic Challenges and Prospects."

²² Ghafar, "A Stable Egypt for a Stable Region: Socio-Economic Challenges and Prospects."

²³ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

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government is characterized by a “high power distance and strong collectivism.”²⁴ These cultural characteristics directly clash with the fundamental philosophy of a democracy where the people wield institutional power and the ordinary citizen share power and enjoy rights equally. According to Dahl, a “political subculture with norms that legitimate negotiating, bargaining, logrolling, give and take, the gaining of consent as against unilateral power or coercion” is essential to universalizing democratic behaviors, which Tunisia lacks. Tunisia’s hierarchical culture increases the costs of toleration and social capital as associational networks are not established, resulting in low social trust and polarized power cleavages.

The discussion of culture is closely connected with the second independent variable of economic inequality and its role in democratic consolidation. It is reductionistic to assume that a nation’s affluence simply means that more people have access to resources and can therefore participate in democratic culture – it is possible for a country to be rich but have an extremely poor and politically deprived population. Merely looking at economic development as a factor is insufficient because it does not account for power imbalances and socioeconomic gaps that influence regime consolidation levels. From a Marxist perspective, inequality damages democratic consolidation because conflicts are driven by class struggles as behaviors of political actors are shaped by their socioeconomic status.

Inequality is a sharp indicator of not only economic development, but also political development. It reveals how well resources are allocated in a society, which largely depends on levels of government corruption. More inequality leads to a higher concentration of wealth within the elite community, widening the gap in access to political resources and opportunities in a heavily polarized society. If inequality is interpreted as levels of political development, is it possible for a democracy to stabilize with extensive socioeconomic gaps? To what extent can corruption exist in order to consolidate this regime? With this second independent variable, we can ask more specific questions. For example, can a democracy successfully consolidate and solidify when it has high economic development overall, but also high levels of inequality?

High levels of inequality foster conditions in which the costs of repression are lower than the costs of tolerance. This is because those that are economically disadvantaged cannot resist repressive policies due to the lack of political outlets as means of protesting or publicly condemning political leaders. Economically developed countries with high levels of inequality such as Russia or Saudi Arabia are rarely democratic—the costs of tolerance for these countries would be not only economic but also political; more equality would leave less affluence for elite leaders, aligned with the rational choice argument. Tunisia still carries “a largely unreformed security sector that maintains close ties to figures associated with the former regime”²⁵ and has continued to “impose curfews, raid homes, and ban protests without a court order.”²⁶ Repression is a political technique for Tunisia’s elites to cling to power, whereas toleration would mean sacrificing political privilege.

In Tunisia, “poverty is 10 times higher in the cities of Kairouan (34.9%) and Kef (34.2%) than in the city of Tunis (3.5%).”²⁷ The extent to which Tunisia neglects its cities showcases the lack of adequate representation and accountability in government. Due to the substantial disparities in poverty rates, people do not have equal access to organizations that further their social capital and develop civic engagement. Their demands and interests are not represented aggregately through an organization where leaders can reach them. Therefore, Tunisian governance does not accurately reflect the holistic needs of the country and only functions for the few that have high socioeconomic status. Moreover, democracy is built on trust between people and the civic links that stem from it. “Social capital is the glue that holds society together” (Stiglitz 2012), thus if individuals believe that the economic and political system is inherently unjust, a democracy cannot function.

Despite the legitimacy of the analyzed hypothesis that high economic development and low levels of inequality nurture democratic consolidation, there is also the valid counter-argument that substantially affluent countries are more likely to be repressive. For instance, China has the second-highest GDP in the world but is notoriously authoritative. As seen in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the costs of repression were lower as the costs of toleration were too high. However, with China, a

²⁴ Budhwar, Pawan S., and Kamel Mellahi. 2006. *Managing Human Resources in the Middle East*. Oxfordshire: Routledge.

²⁵ Fassihian, Dokhi. 2018. “Democratic Backsliding in Tunisia: The Case for Renewed International Attention.” Freedom House. n.d. freedomhouse.org/report/policy-brief/2018/democratic-backsliding-tunisia-case-renewed-international-attention.

²⁶ Fassihian, “Democratic Backsliding in Tunisia: The Case for Renewed International Attention.”

²⁷ Weilandt, “Socio-Economic Challenges to Tunisia’s Democratic Transition,” 210-217.

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different point of view arises. It is possible that the costs of repression are actually more expensive than the costs of toleration because of the vast measures needed to censor negative media, establish high-technology surveillance, control violent outbreaks through police or military force, and effectively block any potential dissent. Could it be that more economically developed countries are less likely to consolidate democracy and are more prone to authoritarianism? Another aspect to note is China's exacerbated levels of inequality, with the top 10 percent earning 41 percent of the share of national income in 2015 (up from 27 percent in 1978), in contrast to the bottom 50 percent of the population earning 15 percent of the national income.²⁸ Economic inequality eventually feeds into political inequality, and not all people will be able to enjoy the same procedural benefits and levels of autonomy needed to participate in the democratic process.²⁹ Moreover, the higher the levels of inequality within a society, the more likely the government will be pressured to pursue redistributive policies, slipping into authoritarian and populist territories. Redistribution also threatens the political and economic power of the elites, which raises the chance of a coup and regime destabilization.³⁰

It is generally true that high levels of inequality threaten democratic consolidation, as seen in the case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and China. With the first independent variable, however, it is still relatively unclear whether or not high levels of economic development favor democratic consolidation. It is crucial to note that different regions can produce different political outcomes, as we saw with the Arab Spring movement and China. Additionally, the costs of repressive measures could be more expensive in one region than the other. The strength of democratic consolidation, just like all political outcomes, cannot be reduced to a singular independent variable, but the most significant takeaway from this analysis is that economic factors heavily dictate levels of corruption, political rights, autonomy, social capital, and cultural liberalization. Therefore, despite the fact that causal relations cannot be established yet, important correlational relationships such as high economic development and high levels of social capital or liberalization can be better understood.

²⁸ Piketty, Thomas, et al. 2019. "Income Inequality Is Growing Fast in China and Making It Look More like the US." *LSE US Centre*, April 8, 2019. blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2019/04/06/.

²⁹ Levin-Waldman, Oren M. 2016. "How Inequality Undermines Democracy." *E-International Relations*, December 10, 2016. www.e-ir.info/2016/12/10/how-inequality-undermines-democracy/.

³⁰ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*.

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