

The Consumption Response to
Predictable Changes in Discretionary Income:
Evidence from the Repayment of Vehicle Loans

by

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Abstract. Although the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis is the primary framework for understanding household consumption and savings decisions, only a few studies have used clearly identifiable income changes to test the basic predictions of the model. The estimates produced using this empirical strategy have yet to lead to a consensus of beliefs since the results have both favored and rejected the model. This paper contributes to this literature by examining the consumption reaction to predictable increases in discretionary income following the final payment of a vehicle loan. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the results show that a ten percent increase in discretionary income due to a loan repayment leads to a two to three percent increase in non-durable consumption. Additional analysis suggests that these findings may be explained by the presence of borrowing constraints.

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1. Introduction

Whether households “smooth” consumption in response to predictable changes in income is an open and contentious question. In their survey of the micro data studies that followed Hall’s (1978) seminal paper, Browning and Lusardi (1996) note that the range of estimates that have been produced is wide enough that one may reasonably interpret the results either as favoring or rejecting the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCPIH). In fact, the authors of the survey disagree with one another as to whether the accumulated evidence is strong enough to reject the LCPIH.¹

A number of empirical issues are responsible for the variability in the estimates found throughout the literature. The high degree of measurement error in consumption data (Shapiro 1984) - exacerbated by the use of consumption changes as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis - is a contributing factor. Predictable income changes, which are typically estimated by the econometrician, may be an even more important reason for the range of results due the construction of these measures. The lack of powerful instruments when predicting income changes will attenuate the corresponding parameter estimates (Altonji and Siow 1987). Alternatively, the instruments themselves may belong in the consumption equation which will bias the coefficients in favor of rejecting the LCPIH. It is not surprising, given these potential empirical pitfalls, that this literature is unable to reach a consensus.

One method to overcome these empirical difficulties is to examine the consumption response to clearly identifiable income receipts. The earliest studies to take this approach are by Bodkin (1959) who examines the consumption response of U.S. World War II veterans to the 1950 National Service Life Insurance dividend payout and by Kreinin (1961) who analyzes the impact of restitution payments made by Germany to members of the Israeli population. The former study finds evidence to reject Friedman’s (1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis while the latter cannot reject the model. These two exogenous income changes have been re-analyzed in subsequent studies but the differing implications for the Permanent Income Hypothesis were never fully reconciled (Reid 1962, Bird and Bodkin 1965, Landsberger 1966). Even in its infancy, this methodology yielded much debate on empirical validity of the model.

In recent years the literature has returned to using clearly identifiable income receipt and income changes to test the LCPIH. As with both strands of the literature discussed above, these studies also have produced a set of results that both favor and reject the LCPIH. Studies of the different seasonal income fluctuations across workers in Thailand (Paxson 1993), the semi-annual income changes in Spain (Browning and Collado 2001), and the annual oil dividend payments to residents of Alaska (Hsieh 2003) fail to reject the hypothesis. However, studies of bargained union wage changes (Shea 1995), the variation in income due to the U.S. payroll tax system (Parker 1999), and U.S. income tax refunds (Souleles 1999) all reject the hypothesis.

In an attempt to reconcile the recent evidence, Browning and Crossley (2001) suggest that households are more likely to smooth consumption when the utility losses from not doing so are large. While this proposed paradigm of consumption responses loosely fits the estimates, the relatively small number of empirical studies upon which this categorization is based means that any such conclusion is, at best, tentative. Indeed, given the importance of the LCPIH in formulating (and debating) numerous fiscal policies (e.g. savings, retirement, and tax policies), the lack of a strong core of evidence regarding the basic predictions of the model is rather surprising. Moreover, the smaller income changes that are not smoothed are typically the focus of stimulative fiscal measures (e.g., tax rebates and permanent tax cuts). Thus, in addition to establishing whether or not the LCPIH can be rejected by the data, further research is needed to gauge the magnitude of the consumption response to expected income changes in order to predict the impact of fiscal policies.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining a clearly identifiable change in household discretionary income that occurs upon the repayment of a vehicle loan. Vehicle loans specify a number of payments (or maturity) for repaying the loan at the loan's inception. Upon making the final loan payment, the household's monthly discretionary income increases. Since the amount and the date of this increase in discretionary income are known to the household well in advance of the loan's repayment, household consumption should not increase when the vehicle loan is paid off. This observation is the basis of the LCPIH test performed in this paper.²

The U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) is used to implement this test of the LCPIH. The CEX surveys households each quarter for four consecutive quarters. For

each car loan held by a household, the CEX collects information on the date that the loan payments began, the loan's maturity, and the amount of the monthly payments. This information is used to determine the date and the amount by which the household's discretionary income will increase when the loan is paid off. This study measures the impact of the predictable increase in quarterly household income due to the loan repayment on quarterly household consumption.

The prevalence of vehicle loans in the population as well as the characteristics of these loans suggest that the approach used in this paper provides a strong and useful test of the LCPIH. Tabulations using the CEX show that from 1984-2000 roughly 30 percent of households at any point in time possess a vehicle loan.³ Among these households, the median fraction of after-tax income devoted to vehicle loan payments is eleven percent and the median loan maturity is 36 months. Thus, the inability to smooth consumption around the loan repayment would represent a sizable deviation from the LCPIH for a substantial number of households.

The analysis presented in this paper shows a significant consumption response to the repayment of vehicle loans. The estimates imply that a ten percent predictable increase in discretionary income corresponds to a two to three percent increase in non-durable consumption. The results are shown to be robust to a number of sample specifications. The findings also indicate that the consumption increase is a permanent rather than a temporary increase in spending following the loan repayment. The impact of liquidity constraints on this excess sensitivity finding is also explored. When defined by age or by wealth, the results are suggestive that borrowing constraints play a role in explaining this response. However, no difference between the response of constrained and unconstrained households is found when loan maturity (i.e., the number of loan payments) is used to proxy for the presence of these constraints. This finding is noteworthy since prior studies that have rejected the LCPIH using exogenous income changes have not consistently found liquidity constraints to be an important reason for the excess sensitivity finding. Finally, the consumption response is concentrated among the categories of goods (e.g., luxuries) that are expected to have higher intertemporal elasticities.

The paper is set out as follows. The next section provides a simple model relating the impact of loan repayment on household consumption. The following two sections discuss

the data used and the empirical methodology, respectively. The empirical results are then presented and the final section concludes.

2. A (Simple) Model of Vehicle Loan Repayment and Consumption

The literature examining the vehicle purchase decision encompasses a number of theoretical and empirical methodologies. One set of papers estimates (S,s) models of vehicle purchases (Eberly 1994; Attanasio 1995). These papers are concerned with the underlying structural parameters of the purchase decision and abstract from the consumer's method of financing the vehicle purchase. Another set of papers uses an Euler Equation framework to examine vehicle purchases with a focus on the role of liquidity constraints (Chah, Ramey, and Starr 1995; Alessie, Devereux, and Weber 1997). Although this set of papers explicitly incorporates the fraction of the vehicle's cost that may be financed to demonstrate how liquidity constraints may affect the timing of vehicle purchases, they do not examine the subsequent relationship between loan payments and consumption behavior. One paper that explicitly models the repayment of vehicle loans is by Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2000) who do so within the context of a life-cycle model. The emphasis in their paper is on the relationship between interest rates, borrowing constraints, and the features of the loan chosen at the time of purchase. As such, although they derive the consumer's Euler Equation during the loan period, they do not examine consumption behavior upon the final repayment of the loan.

The impact of the final loan payment on household consumption can be illustrated using the Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou model. This three-period model assumes that there is no uncertainty and that non-durable consumption is both intertemporally separable and separable from vehicle consumption. Relative prices of non-durables and vehicles are fixed at one and there is no depreciation on the vehicle. Vehicles can only be purchased in the first period, cannot be resold, and the loan must be re-paid in its entirety in the second period. Consumers can only borrow to finance the vehicle purchase and can finance a fraction ϕ of the vehicle's value where $0 \leq \phi \leq 1$. Consumers are allowed to save in an asset although this asset cannot be negative. The interest rate on this asset, r^l , is assumed to be less than the interest rate for financing the vehicle, r^b .

For the consumer's problem, C_t is non-durable consumption for periods $t = 1, 2, 3$, y_t is income in period t , and K is the value of the vehicle. The vehicle loan, which is valued at ϕK , must be repaid in period two which means the loan payment is $\phi K(1 + r^b)$. Allowing β to be the discount rate, the consumer's problem is

$$\max_{C_1, C_2, C_3, K, \phi} U(C_1) + \beta U(C_2) + \beta^2 U(C_3) + V(K)$$

subject to the inequality constraints

$$C_1 + K(1 - \phi) \leq y_1 \tag{1}$$

$$C_2 + \phi K(1 + r^b) - (1 + r^l)(y_1 - C_1 - K(1 - \phi)) \leq y_2 \tag{2}$$

$$C_3 - (1 + r^l) [y_2 - C_2 - \phi K(1 + r^b) + (1 + r^l)(y_1 - C_1 - K(1 - \phi))] \leq y_3 \tag{3}$$

$$\phi \leq 1 \tag{4}$$

$$-\phi \leq 0 \tag{5}$$

These constraints have corresponding Kuhn-Tucker multipliers $\lambda_k \geq 0$, $k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5$.

It is straightforward to derive the Euler Equations linking non-durable consumption between the second (loan repayment) and third periods.⁴ If assets are non-zero at the end of period two then the standard Euler Equation holds

$$U_{C_2} = \beta(1 + r^l)U_{C_3} \tag{6}$$

where U_{C_t} is the marginal utility of non-durable consumption in period t . According to equation (6), changes in the marginal utility of non-durable consumption at the time of loan repayment should not depend upon the magnitude of the loan payment. However, if end of period two assets equal zero then the Euler Equation becomes

$$U_{C_2} = \lambda_2/\beta + \beta(1 + r^l)U_{C_3}. \tag{7}$$

The latter result is equivalent to the Zeldes (1989) Euler Equation when the consumer is borrowing constrained. The marginal utility of consumption will be greater in period two than in period three if households are unable to borrow in order to "consumption

smooth.” For these constrained households, increases in discretionary income following the loan repayment will lead to increases in non-durable consumption.

Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly discuss the intuition for the above results. In order to smooth consumption in the standard life-cycle model (i.e. with only non-durable consumption), households can borrow from their future income to finance current consumption. Implicit in the standard model is the use of consumer loans as a mechanism for smoothing. Household consumption, however, always behaves according to the Euler Equation which, in turn, is not affected by the repayment of the consumer loan. The same intuition applies to the current model: households smooth consumption between periods and the Euler Equation is not affected by the vehicle loan repayment.⁵

The model also illustrates a potential pitfall with the proposed test of the LCPIH. In particular, the interest rate that a household faces while the vehicle loan is outstanding may differ from the interest rate available after the loan is entirely re-paid. If the interest rate falls when the household repays the loan, then the household may rationally increase consumption at this time since the intertemporal price of consumption has decreased. While the price of borrowing rapidly changes at the date of loan repayment in the discrete time model presented above, the updating of credit information by real world lenders means that the interest rate consumers actually face likely follows a smoother path. For example, in their study of how credit card liquidity affects consumer behavior, Gross and Souleles (2002) note that credit issuers in their sample of U.S. credit cards usually update information regarding credit scores and balances on other credit cards at either a monthly or a quarterly frequency. Since credit issuers maintain nearly up-to-date information on outstanding balances and credit worthiness, it is more likely that credit access (e.g., lower lending rates) is gradually increased as the remaining principal on the vehicle loan decreases rather than discretely jumping upon the date of loan repayment. Thus, changes in interest rates at the date of loan repayment are likely to be small and to have little impact on the results of the proposed test.

Of course, modifying the household’s objective function to allow for non-durable consumption and other goods to be non-separable potentially confounds tests of the LCPIH. The current test is not immune to such adjustments. However, the most plausible sources

of such non-separabilities are unlikely to be important for the test presented here. One possibility is that there exists a non-separability between leisure and non-durable consumption. If the change in income were driven by a change in the wage rate, it would be important to account for this relationship. Since wage rates are not affected by the repayment of the vehicle loan, it is unlikely this potential bias is important. Another possibility is that non-durable consumption and the *service flow* of vehicle consumption are non-separable. Although vehicle payments change abruptly at the repayment date, it is unlikely that vehicle services exhibit a similar discontinuity. In addition, the maturity length of vehicle loans varies across households which further decreases the likelihood that there is any change in the service flow of vehicle consumption that occurs on the date the loan expires.

3. The Data

This study uses data from the 1984-2000 Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) Interview Survey (United States Department of Labor, various years).⁶ The CEX is an on-going rotating panel dataset where consumer units (households) participating in the survey are interviewed up to five times with a space of three months between each interview. In any given calendar quarter, approximately 5,000 consumer units (CUs) are interviewed with some CUs beginning their participation in the survey and others completing their fifth (final) interview. The initial interview collects household demographic information which is updated during subsequent interviews to reflect any changes in household composition. The second through fifth interviews each collect consumer unit expenditure information for the three calendar months immediately preceding the interview. Thus, each consumer unit will have up to four quarterly observations of expenditure data.⁷ In addition, information on household income, referring to the twelve months prior to the interview, is collected only during the second and fifth interviews. Income data are collected for each member of the CU age fourteen and above. Following the advice of the BLS staff, federal, state, and FICA (Social Security) taxes for each CU are calculated by using the NBER's TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Coutts 1993). All dollar figures are deflated to the January 2000 CPI-U using information on the interview month and year. Additional information on

the CEX data used in this study including the construction of the data for use with the TAXSIM program are detailed in the Data Appendix.

The CEX also collects data during the initial interview covering all types of vehicles including cars, trucks, motorcycles, and boats. A variety of data is collected for each vehicle including information on the vehicle model, the purchase date, and, if one exists, the vehicle loan. Loan information includes the date of the first payment, the number of payments contracted, and the amount of each payment.⁸ During the second through fifth interview, information is collected detailing whether the CU disposed of any vehicles, or if a new vehicle has been purchased. In addition, the status of each existing vehicle along with any corresponding vehicle loan is updated throughout the CU's participation in the survey.

For this study, some consumer units are deleted due to missing data. The primary reason for deleting CUs is when they are deemed by the BLS to have incomplete income data (20 percent of the sample). This designation is in general based upon the reporting of values for major sources of income such as wages and salaries, self-employment income, and Social Security income. These households are not used because the BLS sets all income data to zero (even for categories in which data is reported) for this set of CUs.⁹ In addition, CUs with top-coded before-tax income are deleted. Vehicles with outstanding loans that have missing or top-coded information for the vehicle purchase date, date of first payment, or monthly payment amount are excluded from the analysis. In addition, vehicles are excluded if the recorded monthly payment amount changes by more than ten dollars between interviews or if the vehicle purchase date is more than six months before or one month after the first loan payment.¹⁰ Vehicles that are disposed of by the CU prior to the final loan payment are also excluded from the analysis.¹¹ This exclusion is very important for the identification strategy as it restricts the analysis to those loan repayments that occur at the loan maturity date. Loan payoffs made prior to the maturity date are not pre-determined and therefore removed from the sample. Finally, consumer units must complete at least two consecutive interviews in order to contribute at least one first-difference observation to the analysis.

Table 1 compares the characteristics of consumer units with vehicle loans, as well the subset of such consumer units with a loan expiring during the survey, to the overall

sample. The information is taken from each CU's first quarterly interview from the sample of households with at least one first-difference observation. Slightly less than one-third of all consumer units have outstanding vehicle loans and one-seventh of these loans will end while the CU is participating in the survey. Consumer units with outstanding loans are slightly younger, have larger incomes and family sizes, and have more vehicles relative to the overall sample. As the Table indicates, total vehicle loan payments constitute roughly eleven percent of monthly after-tax income.¹² The Table also reveals differences between all consumer units with loans and those whose loans expire. Total monthly payments are slightly higher while the number of payments are lower for CUs that pay off their loans. The reason for these latter discrepancies is that consumer units are more likely to keep a car until the loan is paid off if the loan is of a shorter duration. Furthermore, loans that are contracted for a shorter maturity have larger monthly payments.¹³

4. Empirical Methodology

The test of the LCPIH in this paper requires a measure of the after-tax income change between two consecutive quarters due to the loan repayment.¹⁴ This measure is constructed in two steps. First, the reduction in quarterly vehicle payments between quarters t and $t + 1$ due to the repayment of a vehicle loan, $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$, is calculated. Note that the change in payments will depend upon exactly when the loan ends. If the final loan payment occurs during the last month of quarter t , then quarterly discretionary income will be increased for all three months of quarter $t + 1$ relative to quarter t . If the final loan payment occurs during the second month of quarter $t + 1$, then quarterly income in quarter $t + 1$ will be higher for just one (the third) month relative to quarter t . If the final loan payment is made during the second month of quarter t , then quarterly income will be increased for one month during quarter t as well as all three months of quarter $t + 1$. In this case, the relative increase in quarterly income between quarters t and $t + 1$ will be only two months of discretionary income. Note that the $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$ variable may be non-zero for a given consumer unit during more than one first-difference observation for a given vehicle.¹⁵

The second step in constructing the measure of increased quarterly income is to divide the $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$ variable by after-tax income to create the ratio

$$\Delta P_{t+1} = \frac{-\Delta Payments_{t+1}}{After-tax\ income_t}.$$

This ratio represents the percentage increase in discretionary income between two consecutive quarters due to the loan repayment. Total vehicle payments are decreasing when the loan is paid off, so this measure has been multiplied by -1 to represent the increase in discretionary income. Since income is only reported during the second and fifth interviews, $After-tax\ income_t$ is constructed by applying the income information from the second interview to the TAXSIM program. Since $After-tax\ income_t$ remains constant for a given CU across all of its observations, all of the variation in ΔP_{t+1} for that consumer unit is due to variation in $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$.¹⁶

The empirical specification for testing whether consumption is excessively sensitive to increased discretionary income due to a loan repayment is

$$\Delta \ln C_{i,t+1} = \alpha \Delta P_{i,t+1} + \beta \Delta X_{i,t+1} + \gamma MONTH_{t+1} + \delta YEAR_{t+1} + \epsilon_{i,t+1} \quad (8)$$

where $\Delta \ln C_{i,t+1}$ is the change in log consumption between quarters t and $t+1$, $\Delta X_{i,t+1}$ are controls for changing demographic characteristics (age, age squared, changes in the number of adults and changes in the number of children), $MONTH_{t+1}$ are calendar month effects, $YEAR_{t+1}$ are calendar year effects, and $\epsilon_{i,t+1}$ is a household specific error term.¹⁷ The test of the LCPIH is the coefficient on the percentage increase in discretionary income, α . The null hypothesis is that this coefficient should equal zero. Rejection of this null is considered evidence against the standard LCPIH. Equation (8) is estimated using OLS and correcting the standard errors to account for the correlation within households due to the use of multiple observations per consumer unit.

The consumption measure examined is expenditure on non-durable goods. For this study, non-durable goods are defined as food and alcohol (both at home and away from home but excluding meals received as pay), house-furnishings (excluding furniture, major appliances, and floor coverings), apparel and services, entertainment, personal care, reading, and tobacco-related items. The difference between this measure of non-durables

and that previously used in the literature (e.g., the Parker and Hsieh papers) is that public transportation and gas and motor oil are excluded to avoid spuriously attributing any contemporaneous changes in these vehicle-related categories to the vehicle loan repayment.

The primary analysis is restricted to those first-difference observations in which $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is non-zero, i.e. where the loan expires during one of the two quarters. As mentioned above, a given consumer unit may contribute more than one first-difference observation depending upon when their loan expires. Thus, the impact of loan repayment on household consumption is identified both by the differential impact of the loan repayment on discretionary income across consumer units and by the differential magnitude of the impact within consumer units across quarters. The primary reason for excluding observations where $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is zero is the lack of an obvious control group. However, the impact of including control observations is also examined. To maximize the comparability with observations where a vehicle loan is repaid, control observations are the subset of observations with at least one vehicle loan that will be repaid in less than one year from the first month of the first-difference time period.

5. Results

The main empirical results from estimating equation (8) are presented in Table 2. Three sets of results are presented. The first column restricts the analysis to the primary sample, those observations in which $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is non-zero. The second column includes as controls observations from the quarters prior to the final loan payment from the set of households whose loans expire during their survey participation period (i.e., CUs with at least one observation with a non-zero $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$). The final column of the table adds all observations with at least one loan that will expire in less than one year as controls. The estimated coefficients for age and its square are statistically insignificant across all specifications in Table 2. The coefficients on the variable controlling for changes in the number of adults is statistically significant across all three columns while the impact of changes in the number of children is (marginally) significant in the last two.

The coefficients on the main regressor of interest, ΔP_{t+1} , show evidence of excess sensitivity to the increased discretionary income following the repayment of a vehicle loan.

In the primary sample (column 1), the coefficient on ΔP_{t+1} is statistically significant. The results imply that a 10 percent increase in after-tax income will increase non-durable consumption by 2.8 percent. When pre-loan repayment observations for the households with loans expiring are added to the sample (column 2), the coefficient of interest is still significant and only slightly smaller in magnitude. Including all observations with loans set to expire within a year, the implied impact of 10 percent increase in discretionary income on non-durable consumption falls to 1.8 percent. Note that each of the coefficients on ΔP_{t+1} are well within the 95 percent confidence intervals for the estimates in the other columns.

One potential concern with the results in Table 2 is that they may be due, in least in part, to spurious correlation. If households whose loan payments comprise a large fraction of their after-tax income also have faster consumption growth relative to other households, then the coefficient on ΔP_{t+1} may be picking up this correlation. One might especially be concerned about a spurious relationship since younger households have relatively faster consumption growth and are also likely to have vehicle loans that comprise a larger fraction of their income.

To examine this potential problem with the interpretation of the results in Table 2, a set of falsification tests is performed. Equation (8) is modified to allow the increase in after-tax income due to the loan repayment to affect consumption not only in the period when the loan expires, but also in the periods prior to the final loan payment. Thus, the modified equation is

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta \ln C_{i,t+1} = & \pi_1 \Delta P_{i,t+1}^* + \pi_2 \Delta P_{i,t+1}^* * PAIDOFF \\ & + \beta \Delta X_{i,t+1} + \gamma MONTH_t + \delta YEAR_t + \epsilon_{i,t+1} \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

where *PAIDOFF* is a binary indicator for whether or not a vehicle loan expired during either period t or $t+1$. The estimate of π_1 will capture the portion of consumption growth that is spuriously related to the loan's relative share of household income. After controlling for this effect, π_2 measures the increase in consumption due to the the loan repayment.

Note that equation (9) uses a modified version of $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$. For observations in which the loan expires, $\Delta P_{i,t+1}^*$ equals $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ as previously defined. For observations in which the loan does not expire, a measure of the increase in after-tax income if the loan were to

expire in the current period is not straightforward to construct since this measure depends not only on the size of the loan but also on which month during the observation period that the loan is re-paid. The following approach is used here. If the household is observed with a loan expiring during the survey period, then $\Delta P_{i,t+1}^*$ for this household's observations prior to the loan expiration is $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ from the first observation in which $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is positive.¹⁸ If the household is within the final year of its loan but does not have a loan expiring during its participation in the survey, then $\Delta P_{i,t+1}^*$ equals the monthly amount of each loan that will run out within the year multiplied by 1.8.¹⁹

The results of estimating (9) are presented in Table 3. Column 1 of the Table matches column 2 of Table 2 in that only observations from households whose loans expire during the survey are used as controls. The estimate of π_1 is insignificant which indicates that there is not an underlying correlation between the percentage of income committed to the vehicle loan and consumption growth. The estimated π_2 is significant, positive, and nearly identical to the results found in Table 2.²⁰ When observations from households whose loans will expire within one year but after their participation in the survey are also included in the analysis (column 2), the results are nearly identical to the analogous result in column 3 of Table 2 although the result is now marginally significant. These results indicate that the estimates in Table 2 are indeed due to the increase in income once the loan expires and are not spurious findings.

It is useful to interpret the results in Tables 2 and 3 in the context of other papers that have rejected the LCPIH using exogenous changes in household income. Parker finds that a ten percent increase in after-tax income due a reduction in U.S. payroll taxes increases non-durable consumption by five percent. Using a framework that allows the computation of marginal propensities to consume, Souleles finds that each additional dollar of income due to an income tax refund increases a subset of non-durable consumption by ten cents.²¹ Thus, the results shown here are comparable to previous findings although using a different source of variation in household income.

Robustness of the Results

Table 4 presents the results from estimating (8) on a variety of sample specifications to examine the robustness of the results. The first row of the Table shows the main result found in Table 2. Concerns that excessive weight given to observations with large consumption changes may affect the parameter estimates has led some previous studies to “trim” these observations from the sample. However, recent work by Bollinger and Chandra (2003) indicates that well-intentioned trimming of the dependent variable will bias the point estimates towards zero. For purposes of comparison, row 2 of Table 4 shows the result from eliminating observations with consumption changes that exceed 100 percent.²² As expected, trimming the observations reduces the point estimate although it is still (marginally) significant. An alternative method to control for the potential influence of outliers on the results is to use a median regression. The estimate in the third row of Table 4 using this estimation method produces an estimate that is comparable to the main result shown in row 1.²³

The last three rows of Table 4 show the robustness of the results across different restrictions regarding the vehicles included in the analysis. The main results exclude vehicles that were disposed by the household prior to the vehicle’s loan being completed. This restriction amounts to eliminating vehicles that the CU possesses during the first month of the first quarter of a first-difference observation but disposes prior to the loan’s contracted completion date during the period covered by that observation. Row 4 of Table 4 indicates that including these vehicles in the analysis does not affect the estimates. Another restriction on the sample removes vehicles for which loan information is missing, changing, or top-coded. For vehicles that have changing or top-coded vehicle loan information, $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ can be calculated assuming that this information is correct as it appears in the data for the quarter in question. Including these observations does not impact the results (Row 5 of Table 4). Finally, restricting the vehicles examined in the analysis to cars, trucks, and motorcycles (Row 6 of Table 4) slightly increases the estimated impact of loan repayment on non-durable consumption. In all, the various robustness checks do not change the qualitative interpretations of the main estimate.

Longer-Run Effects on Consumption

Another question of interest is whether these increases in consumption when the vehicle loan expires represent a permanent increase in consumption or reflect a one-time increase following the final loan payment. If households “reward themselves” or “splurge” after the repayment of a loan, then we may see a temporary increase in consumption following the repayment of the loan. Unfortunately, the relatively short duration of the CEX participation period limits the examination of the longer-run impacts to less than one calendar year. On the other hand, most changes in consumption will likely occur within this time frame and examining changes over a longer horizon (e.g., annual consumption changes) increases the likelihood of falsely attributing consumption changes to the vehicle loan repayment.

To examine the longer-run impacts on consumption, Table 5 presents the results of using the change in consumption between quarter t and quarter $t + 2$ as the dependent variable. This longer time frame for the dependent variable allows the analysis to focus on the before and after effects of the loan change rather than examining the immediate response to the loan repayment. As such, the regressor $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is replaced with the total percentage increase in quarterly income due to the loan repayment.

Column 1 of Table 5 presents the results for the impact on non-durable consumption between quarters t and $t+2$ if the vehicle loan expires in quarter $t+1$. The point estimate of 0.282 is nearly identical to the main estimate found in Table 1 although the estimate is now insignificant.²⁴ Of course, the consumption response at this interval may still reflect one-time increases in consumption. To examine the response over a longer duration, column 2 of the Table examines the response to loans that expire during period t .²⁵ Again, the point estimate is nearly identical to the previous result and is statistically significant. Overall, these results suggest that the increase in consumption upon repaying a vehicle loan is a longer-run rather than only a short-run response.

The Role of Liquidity Constraints

Since the influential paper by Zeldes (1989), a finding that consumption exhibits excess sensitivity to predictable income changes is explored to see if liquidity (borrowing) constraints can explain such a result. The methodology typically used is to split the sample

into two sets of households - those likely to be borrowing constrained and those who likely are not - using a measure of household wealth to implement the sample split. As discussed in section 2, constrained households are expected to violate the standard Euler equation. However, unconstrained households should not violate the traditional null hypothesis.

Before continuing, it is important to ask whether households that have vehicle loans can be considered borrowing constrained. In the sense of having *any* access to capital markets, the answer must be that they are not constrained since they do in fact have a loan. However, this loan is one that uses the vehicle as collateral. The potential loss to lenders due to a household's inability to repay such a loan can be minimized by repossessing the vehicle. A non-collateralized loan, e.g. a consumer loan, is the type that underlies the standard life-cycle model. Consumers may have difficulty obtaining these loans to increase current non-durable consumption. As such, households with vehicle loans may be considered borrowing constrained with regards to debt that cannot be collateralized.

The analysis here proceeds along the same lines as prior studies but uses three methods to split the sample: age of the consumer unit, liquid wealth of the consumer unit, and the maturity (number of payments) of the expiring loan. Each of these splits proxies for the presence of borrowing constraints. Younger households have, relative to older households, steeper earnings profiles which increases the likelihood that they are currently borrowing constrained (Gourinchas and Parker 2002). Households with less liquid wealth may have less access to capital markets than wealthier households (Zeldes 1989). Households with a longer loan maturity are more likely to be borrowing constrained than those with a shorter maturity. Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou (2000) show that unconstrained and constrained households will be differentially sensitive to the characteristics of vehicle loans. Loan demand by unconstrained households will be sensitive to the price of the loan, i.e., the interest rate. Loan demand for constrained households, however, will be more sensitive to the amount of credit extended to them by lenders. Additional credit can be obtained by lengthening the maturity of the loan which in turn lowers the household's monthly payments. Attanasio et al. find empirical evidence consistent with these predictions. Thus, one would expect constrained households to be more likely to obtain loans with longer maturities.

Table 6 presents the results of the borrowing constraint analysis. The top panel of the Table divides consumer units into those below the sample median age and those above the median age.²⁶ The consumption response is large and significant for the younger households; a ten percent increase in discretionary income yields a four percent increase in non-durable consumption. For the households above the median age, the consumption response is small and insignificant. Note, however, that the relatively large standard errors for the point estimates cannot reject the null hypothesis that the effects are the same for both age groups.²⁷

The middle panel of Table 6 splits the sample based upon the consumer unit's place in the liquid wealth-to-income distribution. Liquid wealth is calculated as the sum of the balances in the consumer unit's checking and savings accounts. Wealth information is only asked during the fifth interview and thus is only available for households that do not leave the sample prior to their final interview. Furthermore, a number of households have missing data for wealth information. The combination of these two restrictions yields wealth information for roughly two-thirds of the observations. Liquid wealth is then normalized by the household's annual after-tax income. Household's with a liquid wealth-to-income ratio less than or equal to 0.012 (approximately the first, or lowest, quartile) are those most likely to be borrowing constrained. Those households with a ratio of 0.192 or greater (approximately the highest quartile) are used as a comparison group. The point estimate for the low wealth ratio consumer units is relatively large but insignificant. The estimate for the high wealth ratio CUs is smaller than the full sample estimates and insignificant. Even given the magnitude of the difference between the estimates for the two groups, the difference is not statistically significant.

The final sample split is based on loan maturity. As discussed above, loans that are longer in duration are more likely to be taken by constrained households. As can be seen in Table 1, the average loan maturity among consumer units with loans that end is 36 monthly payments. The sample is divided between those with maturities of not more than 36 months (roughly 60 percent of the observations) and those whose maturity exceeds 36 months. The bottom panel of Table 6 shows that the estimates do not differ greatly between these two sets of households. The impact on consumption is only slightly

greater for the longer maturity households and the estimates for both groups of households are (marginally) statistically significant. Hence, using maturity as a proxy for borrowing constraints cannot explain the results found in this study. One reason for the inability to find a differential response by loan maturity is that maturity length reflects the presence of borrowing constraints at the time the vehicle is purchased but may not be a strong indicator of these constraints upon the repayment of the loan.

It is interesting to note that among the papers using exogenous income variation to test the LCPIH and have rejected the model (Shea 1995, Parker 1999, Souleles 1999), none find evidence entirely consistent with liquidity constraints as the sole explanation for the findings. In contrast, the response to vehicle loan repayment is concentrated among households typically believed to be credit constrained. Unfortunately, the lack of precise estimates precludes drawing strong inferences regarding the role of liquidity constraints. Nonetheless, the results are highly suggestive that such constraints are important in the current study.

The Response Across Consumption Categories

The final question examined in this paper is whether the consumption response to the final vehicle loan payment varies across the category of expenditure. Parker (1999) discusses a bounded rationality scenario in which consumption goods with higher intertemporal elasticities of substitution are more likely to vary with changes in income since the utility loss from delaying consumption of these goods is relatively small. Using a more conventional framework, Browning and Crossley (2000) prove that luxury goods have a higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution and are thus “easier to postpone”. Therefore, one would expect to find a heterogeneous response across consumption categories with larger responses for luxury goods.

Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (8) across sub-categories of non-durable consumption. For ease of comparability, the first row of the Table presents the result for non-durable consumption from Table 2. Food and alcohol consumption generates a relatively small and insignificant response to loan repayment. Entertainment and personal care expenditures exhibit an insignificant response that exceeds the overall non-durable consumption response in magnitude.²⁸ Apparel expenditures also show a larger

response than total non-durable consumption although the point estimate is insignificant. Although none of the individual point estimates is statistically different from one another, the results in Table 7 are broadly consistent with the hypotheses regarding the types of goods that are likely to be substituted intertemporally.

6. Conclusion

The Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis is the foundation for understanding how households formulate consumption and savings decisions. The basic predictions of the model concerning how household consumption responds to the receipt of income have far reaching implications for the design of fiscal policy. In stark contrast to the stature of this model, only a small number of studies have provided strong tests of the LCPIH by examining the consumption response to clearly identifiable income changes.

This paper adds to this literature by examining whether household consumption is excessively sensitive to predictable changes in discretionary income due to the repayment of a vehicle loan. The date and amount of a final vehicle loan payment are known to the household for a substantial length of time before it occurs. Under the Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis, consumption should not be excessively sensitive to the increase in discretionary income caused by paying off a vehicle loan. For the population as a whole, the results presented here are evidence against this implication of the LCPIH. A ten percent increase in discretionary income due to the final repayment of a vehicle loan increases non-durable consumption by two to three percent. The results are robust to a number of sample specifications. When the influence of liquidity constraints on these findings is tested using age and wealth as proxies, the results are highly suggestive that such constraints are the reason for the excess sensitivity finding. Finally, the non-durable items that are more likely to be luxury goods and have higher intertemporal substitution elasticities exhibit the largest response.

The current study adds to the small but growing set of papers that examine the consumption response to exogenous income changes. The studies in this literature tend to find that households “smooth” consumption in response to predictable seasonal income fluctuations while there is excess sensitivity to less frequent, but expected income changes.

Browning and Crossley (2001) suggest that these differential findings are consistent with households “getting it right” when the utility losses from not doing so are large. In the case of vehicle loans considered in this paper, notice that the results imply that household consumption is lower throughout the *entire* duration of the loan which, at the sample median, is 36 months (among loans that expire before the household disposes of the vehicle). On the one hand, assuming consumption is constant (or exhibits constant growth) between the vehicle purchase and loan repayment dates, this relatively long period of time with less than optimal consumption suggests that the utility losses implied by the results here may be substantial. On the other hand, the results in Table 6 suggest that most of this behavior can be explained by borrowing constraints in which case the welfare losses are due to capital market imperfections and not non-optimal behavior on the part of consumers.

Data Appendix

The data for this study are taken from the 1984-2000 Consumer Expenditure Surveys. Consumption information is calculated from the detailed expenditure files. The expenditure data are summarized such that the month and year of purchase matches the three month period covered by the quarterly interview. A small fraction of expenditures are dated outside of the interview period. Following previous studies, these expenditures are moved to the interview quarter that covers the date of purchase. Expenditure data are deflated to the January 2000 CPI-U using the monthly CPI-U corresponding to the interview month and year.

The primary regressor of interest, ΔP_{t+1} , has some extremely large outlier values since it is the ratio of the change in quarterly payments to the consumer's unit after-tax income. These outliers are removed from the analysis using the following procedure. First, the household's ratio of the monthly vehicle payments to after-tax income is constructed. This ratio is considered to be an outlier if it is less than zero (which can occur if the CU reports large business losses) or exceeds 0.50. For outlier observations, ΔP_{t+1} is set to its actual value if it lies between zero and 0.50.²⁹ The remaining outlier observations are removed from the analysis. The results are robust to other methods of treating outlier values for this regressor.

Federal, state, and FICA taxes for each consumer unit are calculated using NBER's TAXSIM program. Although consumer units may not correspond to taxpaying units, for the purposes of this paper consumer units are considered to be the taxpaying unit. This assignment is necessary since a) only relationships to the reference person are known and not relationships among other CU members and b) some income information such as interest, dividends, and welfare, unemployment, and worker's compensation payments are collected for the consumer unit as a whole.

The consumer unit is considered to be married if the reference person is coded as married (the variable MARITAL1=1).³⁰ For married households, the number of dependents equals the number of members of the consumer unit (FAM_SIZE) minus two.³¹ For all other consumer units, the number of dependents equals the family size minus one.³² Among the non-married households, if there are no dependents present, then the CU's tax status is

single. If dependents exist in these CUs, the CU's tax status is head of household. Age exemptions (ages 65 and up) are based on the age of the reference person and their spouse.

The various components of CEX consumer unit income are used to construct the income data necessary for the TAXSIM program. The taxpayer's wage and salary income and the wage and salary income of the taxpayer's spouse are taken from the CEX member files (SALARYX). In married households, the male is considered the taxpayer for consistency purposes. Dividend income is taken from the variable FININCX. Other property income is the sum of the variables INTEARNX, INCLOSSA, INCLOSSB, ALIOTHX, OTHRINCX, and EARNINCX minus the sum of SALARYX among the taxpayer and their spouse. Taxable pension income is taken from PENSIONX while gross Social Security income is from FRRETIRX. Other non-taxable transfer income is the sum of FSSIX, COMPENSX, WELFAREX, CHDOTHX, and JFDSTMPA.³³ Unemployment compensation is taken from the variable UNEMPLX.

State taxes are calculated based on the CU's state of residence at the time of their first available survey. Note, however, that for confidentiality reasons, state and/or region of residence are masked for some CU's (approximately 20 percent). If state of residence is unavailable but region of residence is available, then the CU's state tax is the average of the state tax they would pay in each of the states in their region. If both the state and region of residence are unavailable, then the CU's state tax is the average of the state tax they would pay in every state in the United States. Beginning in 1996, the procedure for masking of state of residence also includes recoding some state values to the values of other states.³⁴ If the CU's state has been recoded or if the CU lives in a state to which other values are recoded (in both cases STATE_=R), then the CU's state tax is the average of the state tax they would pay in every state in the United States.

The TAXSIM program reports the total FICA taxes paid by *both* the employer and the employee. If the CU's reference person and their spouse are both working for someone else or if only one spouse works and that spouse is employed by someone else, then the FICA tax is divided in half to reflect the share coming from the CU's paycheck(s). If both spouses are self-employed or if the only spouse who works is self-employed then the full FICA tax is assumed to be paid by the CU. In cases where one spouse is self-employed

while the other spouse is working for someone else, the FICA tax is first divided across the spouses based upon each spouse's share of wage and salary income (which is determined by the variable SALARYX in the member files). The self-employed spouse is assigned to pay all of their share of the FICA tax while the spouse who is employed by someone else is assigned to pay one-half of their share.

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Footnotes

1. "...Browning feels that, based on the results...,there is no strong evidence against the standard additive model while Lusardi believes that there is." (p. 1835, Browning and Lusardi 1996)
2. A small number of related studies examine consumption changes in response to fixed payments. Engelhardt (1996) finds that households increase their consumption following a home purchase which is consistent with liquidity constraints imposed upon these households by the necessity of saving for a mortgage down payment. Souleles (2000) finds that households smooth consumption when college tuition payments are made at the beginning of the fall semester.
3. In addition, the fraction of households with vehicle leases grew from two percent in 1988 to six percent in 2000.
4. Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou derive the Euler Equations linking consumption between the first two periods in their paper. The detailed derivation of the Euler Equations linking consumption in periods two and three is available from the author.
5. The choice of maturity length, present in the Attanasio, Goldberg, and Kyriazidou model, is absent here. Even if this option were available in the model, the Euler Equation would still hold. The implication of such a choice for the empirical analysis is unchanged: households should smooth consumption when the vehicle loan expires. If anything, maturity choice would bias the analysis in favor of the LCPIH.
6. Data prior to 1984 is not used since the necessary vehicle information is unavailable in the public use data.
7. Note that quarterly here does not necessarily refer to calendar quarter since interviewing is performed during all twelve calendar months.
8. In the public use data, all loan payment information has been converted to a monthly frequency. Discussions with the BLS staff suggest that only small number of loans have non-monthly payment frequencies that would require such a conversion.

9. See United States Department of Labor (Various Years) for more details.

10. Overall, these exclusions based upon vehicle information affect eight percent of CUs with outstanding vehicle loans. Less than three percent of loans are excluded due to the difference in the purchase date and the first loan payment date. Among these exclusions, the majority are aligned at intervals suggesting that the either the purchase year or the first payment year has been incorrectly entered. (E.g., the first loan payment occurs exactly one year *before* the vehicle is purchased.)

11. The robustness of the results to exclusions based upon vehicle loan data and changes in vehicle status are examined below.

12. Median values are reported for this variable since a few outliers have extremely large, and in some cases negative, ratios. The range of this ratio is restricted in the analysis which affects less than three percent of CUs with ending loans. Details of this restriction are given in the Data Appendix. The results are robust to variations in the method used to impose this restriction.

13. The average vehicle loan length of nearly four years implies that roughly 25 percent of households with loans should have one expire during the survey rather than the fourteen percent figure found in Table 1. The difference is attributable, in part, to the fact that not all vehicles are held until the loan expires. For households that remain in the CEX for an entire year, the data allow for a calculation of the one year vehicle “disposal” rate (e.g., trade-ins, sales) for vehicles owned when the household enters the survey. For vehicles with one year or less remaining before the loan expires, 8 to 10 percent are disposed prior to the loan expiration date. The analogous ranges for vehicles with one to two years, two to three years, and three to four years remaining on the loan are 17 to 22 percent, 14 to 18 percent, and 14 to 16 percent, respectively. Using the midpoints of these ranges, an estimate of the probability that a vehicle with a four-year loan is kept for all four years is 0.52 which is roughly consistent with the 14 percent figure discussed above.

14. As discussed in the Data section, the date of loan repayment is defined by the maturity of the loan. Vehicles that are paid-off prior to the final payment date specified in the

loan are excluded from the analysis to be certain that the date of loan repayment is pre-determined.

15. Suppose a consumer unit's car loan expires during the second month of period $t + 1$. Then, as the above examples illustrate, the variable $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$ will be non-zero for the change between periods t and $t + 1$ as well as the change between periods $t + 1$ and $t + 2$. Another reason for having more than one first-difference observation with a non-zero $\Delta Payments_{t+1}$ is if the household has more than one vehicle loan expire during the survey period.

16. Another result due to *After-tax income* _{t} remaining constant is that the variable ΔP_{t+1} is approximately equivalent to the change in log discretionary income between quarters t and $t + 1$.

17. This empirical specification of the Euler Equation can be generated by assuming an isoelastic utility function for non-durable consumption and has become fairly standard in the literature.

18. Recall that the depending upon when a loan expires during the survey period, the household may have more than one observation where $\Delta P_{i,t+1}$ is positive.

19. Discretionary income will increase by one month of payments if the last payment is in the first month of quarter t or the second month of quarter $t + 1$. The increase will be two months of payments if the final payment is in the second month of quarter t or the first month of quarter $t + 1$ and three months of payments if the final payment is the third month of quarter $t + 1$. Assuming the loan will randomly end during any of these months, the expected increase in income is 1.8 months of payments.

20. However, the point estimate is now significant at the six percent level.

21. Souleles examines a category of expenditures called strictly non-durables which is comprised of the components of non-durable consumption believed to be non-durable at a quarterly interval.

22. To treat the observations symmetrically, log consumption changes that exceeded 0.693 in absolute value were deleted.
23. The median regression standard errors are calculated as the standard deviation of the bootstrapped distribution for the parameter estimate. Each of the 200 bootstrap replication samples were constructed by re-sampling *consumer units* to maintain any within consumer unit correlations.
24. The decrease in the significance level is likely due to the fact that the sample of differences over two quarters is less than half of the size of the primary sample from column 1 of Table 2.
25. Although the regressor used in Column 2 is based upon an entire quarter's increase in income, the increase in discretionary income in period t will depend upon when the loan expires during this period. In fact, the actual increase in income between periods t and $t + 2$ may be less than the total increase in quarterly income. Therefore, the estimate in Column 2 may understate the true consumption response.
26. The median age in the sample is 41. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate that households switch from buffer-stock behavior to standard life-cycle consumers around the age of 40.
27. Although not reported here, pooled regressions allowing for a direct test of the difference in the response between the two groups cannot reject the null hypothesis.
28. Entertainment and personal care includes reading and tobacco along with personal care consumption and entertainment expenditures which include fees, admissions, televisions, radios, and sound equipment.
29. Remember that ΔP_{t+1} can differ from the monthly payment ratio since the former is calculated at a quarterly frequency and depends upon the month during the quarter when the loan expires.
30. All variables are taken from the CEX family files unless otherwise noted.

31. In the few cases where a one person consumer unit is married, the number of dependents is set to zero but the consumer unit is still identified as married for tax purposes.
32. The number of dependents is capped at fifteen which affects one consumer unit.
33. Since the CEX includes the value of food stamps (JFDSTMPA) in total before-tax income, these benefits are included in non-taxable transfer income.
34. Concurrent with undertaking this recoding procedure, the BLS began releasing region of residence for all consumer units.

Table 1: Summary Statistics			
	All Consumer Units	Consumer Units With A Loan	Consumer Units Paying Off Loan
Age	46.8	41.6	42.9
Family Size	2.5	2.9	3.1
Annual Before-tax Income	39,100	51,900	51,200
Annual After-tax Income	31,200	40,200	39,900
Has a Vehicle	0.85	—	—
Number of Vehicles	1.9	2.6	2.7
Has a Vehicle Loan	0.29	—	—
Pays Off a Loan	0.04	0.14	—
Monthly Vehicle Payments		374	406
Payments/After-tax Income (Median)		0.11	0.11
Number of Payments (Months)		45.7	36.4

Notes: Unweighted tabulations using the 1984-2000 CEX. All dollar figures are deflated to January 2000 dollars using the CPI-U. Values in the Table are means unless otherwise noted. Data are taken from each consumer unit's first available interview.

Ind. Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age	0.003 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Age ² /100	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Change in Number of Adults	0.057** (0.028)	0.062*** (0.020)	0.037** (0.018)
Change in Number of Children	0.015 (0.031)	0.043 (0.026)	0.038* (0.022)
ΔP_{t+1}	0.281** (0.140)	0.240** (0.118)	0.179* (0.108)
N	4,583	7,164	10,969
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes
Controls Taken from:			
Consumer Units with Loans Ending	—	Yes	Yes
Consumer Units w/o Loans Ending	—	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in non-durable consumption between quarters. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. Control observations are comprised of observations where the first month of the two quarter period is less than one year prior to the loan expiration date. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 3: Impact of Paying Off a Loan on Non-Durable Consumption

Falsification Tests		
Ind. Variable	(1)	(2)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Age ² /100	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Change in Number of Adults	0.062*** (0.020)	0.038** (0.018)
Change in Number of Children	0.043 (0.026)	0.044** (0.021)
ΔP_{t+1}^*	-0.104 (0.143)	-0.094 (0.113)
$\Delta P_{t+1}^* * PAIDOFF$	0.306* (0.159)	0.237* (0.131)
N	7,164	10,851
Controls Taken from:		
Consumer Units with Loans Ending	Yes	Yes
Consumer Units w/o Loans Ending	No	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in non-durable consumption between quarters. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. Control observations are comprised of observations where the first month of the two quarter period is less than one year prior to the loan expiration date. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 4: Robustness of Results	
Primary Sample (Table 2, Column 1)	0.281** (0.140)
N	4,583
Remove Outliers	0.198* (0.103)
N	4,037
Median Regression	0.293* (0.159)
N	4,583
Include Vehicles Disposed Early	0.306** (0.139)
N	4,750
Include Vehicles With Incomplete Loan Information	0.276** (0.136)
N	5,033
Only Car, Truck, and Motorcycle Loans	0.336*** (0.145)
N	4,502

Notes: The sample is comprised of all observations during which the loan ends. The dependent variable is the change in non-durable consumption between quarters. All regressions include age, age squared, changes in the number of adults and children, as well as dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. Standard errors for the median regression are calculated by using 200 bootstrap replications where each sample replication is constructed by re-sampling consumer units. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Ind. Variable	(1)	(2)
Age	0.004 (0.006)	0.005 (0.007)
Age ² /100	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.007)
Change in Number of Adults	0.050 (0.034)	0.110** (0.045)
Change in Number of Children	0.036 (0.04)	-0.025 (0.059)
Change in Quarterly Loan Payments	0.282 (0.183)	0.382* (0.200)
N	1,681	1,453
Period Loan Expires	$t + 1$	t

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in non-durable consumption quarter t and quarter $t + 2$. All regressions include dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 6: The Impact of Borrowing Constraints	
Less than the Median Age	0.392** (0.195)
N	2,349
Greater than the Median Age	0.128 (0.219)
N	2,231
Low Wealth Ratio (First Quartile)	0.423 (0.366)
N	861
High Wealth Ratio (Fourth Quartile)	0.103 (0.296)
N	790
Low Maturity (≤ 36 Months)	0.268 (0.177)
N	2,806
High Maturity (> 36 Months)	0.268 (0.222)
N	1,777

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in non-durable consumption between quarters. All regressions include age, age squared, changes in the number of adults and children, as well as dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.

Table 7: Response by Consumption Category	
Non-Durables (Table 2, Column 1)	0.281** (0.140)
N	4,583
Food and Alcohol	0.187 (0.177)
N	4,579
Entertainment and Personal Care	0.349 (0.262)
N	4,530
Apparel	0.451 (0.385)
N	4,093

Notes: The dependent variable is the change in consumption in each category. All regressions include age, age squared, changes in the number of adults and children, as well as dummy variables for calendar month and year interactions. Regressions are weighted using CEX sampling weights. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.