Note for CPW participants:

Thank you very much for reading this very rough draft of my dissertation theory chapter. Over the past year, I have dedicated the majority of my time to coding party outreach to ethnic minorities in Europe. Unfortunately, I could not get the final version of this data into this draft of the theory chapter. Thus, this chapter is an amalgam of portions of old drafts and insights generated from the data.

Other significant portions of my theory that are not included in this draft include the following: a discussion of the consistency of party appeals (or lack thereof); a discussion of which groups center-right parties are most likely to court; and a clear distinction between the determinants of long- and short-term strategies. This draft is also missing a works cited page, but that is neither here nor there.

At the end of this document is the outline guiding this chapter, which shows what I have failed to include in this version of the draft. Any suggestions regarding the structure and content of this outline would be very much appreciated.

Finally, I would appreciate specific recommendations on how to code my polices. I am currently in the process of gathering all policies, the party(ies) that proposed these policies, and the number of votes these policies received by party (when applicable) in all six countries. I would like to weigh these policies somehow. So far, I only consider if it is a major policy (meaning that it represents a new act, and not an amendment to a pre-existing policy). Many of these policies enacted are a result of the EU Race Directive, which stipulated that all member states implement a set of anti-discrimination policies in accordance to these directives. Some countries did the bare minimum (the Netherlands), whereas others not only implemented additional antidiscrimination policies unrelated to the EU requirements, but also went above and beyond the EU’s stipulations in the legislation enacted to fulfill these requirements (France). I am thinking of using the work of the non-profit group “European Network of Legal Experts in the Non-Discrimination Field” to determine the level to which the country adhered to the requirements of the EU directive (did not meet requirements, met requirements, exceeded requirements). The network is managed by the Human European Consultancy and the well-respected Migration Policy Group (MPG).

Once again, thank you for your time and your feedback.

Jennifer Miller-Gonzalez
Redefining the Nation: Center-Right Party Outreach Toward Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe

Chapter 1: Theory

Introduction

The face of Europe is changing. Between 1950 and the early 1970s, approximately 30 million people entered Western Europe, placing this wave of mass immigration among the largest in history (Castles 1985; Coleman 2006). The majority of these migrants came from non-Western countries. Many were Muslims. Demographers project that by 2050, foreign-origin populations will comprise between 15 to 32 percent of the total population in a number of Western European, assuming current immigration and fertility rates (Coleman 2006). The impetus for this massive demographic change derives from the need of many Western European countries for labor in the wake of World War II. To fulfill labor shortages and rebuild war-torn economies, governments contracted guest workers from their colonies or nearby states. The expectation was that these laborers would work for a short period of time and then return to their country of origin. Following the influx of migrants as a result of family reunification, decolonization, and general instability in developing states, it became apparent to elites and the public that the hitherto temporary workers were not only permanent residents, but, in some cases, citizens.

Immigration has wielded profound political and social ramifications. Most notably, the presence of millions of culturally, religiously, and racially diverse immigrants challenges the state’s dominant cultural self-conception: its national identity. While immigration may pose a threat to national identity in any context, this challenge is especially pronounced in Western Europe for two reasons. First, immigration is a new phenomenon for many of these countries. With the exception of France, from the seventeenth century until the post-World War II period, most European countries have been countries of emigration (Coleman 2006). Moreover, most of the insignificant number of non-Europeans who did migrate to Western Europe eventually integrated into the dominant society (Lucassen et al. 2006). Second, these countries possess more ethnoculturally-rooted conceptions of nationhood, which, at minimum, emphasize cultural homogeneity.¹ Thus, the presence and seemingly increased demand for cultural recognition of immigrants and their descendants are likely to be perceived as a threat to a nation’s distinctive identity (see Koopmans et al. 2005).

How political parties, specifically center-right parties, respond and manage to this threat in the context of the growing electoral strength of ethnic minorities is the focus of this dissertation. Conventional wisdom states that center-right parties not only ignore this population’s vote, but also activate and mobilize fear of minority populations for electoral gain. In contrast, parties of the left have been more welcoming to ethnic minority voters, or

---

¹Even in France, considered the apotheosis of “civic” nationhood, more organic conceptions of nationhood emerge in public debates, such as during the Dreyfus affair (Zimmer 2003, 181), and by the frequent distinction made between citizens of immigrant descent and “Français de souche” (a person with only French ancestors – literally, of “French stock”).
those voters of immigrant descent. Yet anecdotal accounts of center-right party strategies calls into question this prevailing belief.

One such example is the case of the French Gaullists from 1997 to 2008. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the party virtually ignored ethnic minorities with citizenship as a potential constituency, even as the second generation became politically active (Geisser 1997). In 1997, the RPR dramatically altered its strategy toward ethnic minorities, though not on immigration control, even as the radical right National Front (FN) took progressively more of its vote share (Meguid 2005). In its 1997 manifesto with the centrist Union for a French Democracy (UDF), the RPR avowed its attachment to the values of “tolerance” and “brotherhood” (Marthaler 2008). In 1999, the RPR-directed Haut Conseil à l’Intégration (High Council of Integration), published Lutte contre les discriminations (Fight Against Discrimination), a report in which the Council advocated the creation of an independent administrative authority to monitor discrimination, creating a civil, rather than penal, law procedure to deal with discrimination, recognition of indirect discrimination, and a shift of the burden of proof to the accused party (Joppke 2007). RPR party leader Alain Juppé declared that implementing these recommendations would “preserve ‘national cohesion’ as unemployed immigrant youths felt that [they] did not have the same rights as others” (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004, 345). Yet the Minister of Social Affairs of the Socialist government ruled against these suggestions, her reluctance stemming “from the fear that immigration-related issues were too explosive in the French context to be worth spending political capital on and risking losing votes” (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004, 345).

In 2002, the RPR disbanded and its party leader, Jacques Chirac, created the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP); the newly formed party subsequently increased the intensity of ethnic minority outreach. Upon taking control of both the government and presidency in 2002, the party orchestrated a series of appeals to ethnic minorities. First, the UMP founded the “French Council of the Muslim Faith” (CFCM) in 2002, an institution meant to mimic the extant Jewish and Christian versions (Geisser and Zemouri 2006). It then began to champion affirmative action programs in 2003, a particularly bold move in light of the French republican model’s strict universalism. Later the same year the UMP created the aforementioned independent authority against discrimination. In 2005, the party inaugurated the ministerial post “Advancement of Equal Opportunity” (Zebag 2007). In 2007, the party appointed three ethnic minorities to high-profile cabinet posts, including the Justice ministry. It passed legislation in 2008 to gather data on origin in the census in

---

2 For stylistic reasons, I use ethnic minority and immigrants and their descendants interchangeably for the remainder of this chapter.

3 The RPR did court _harkis_, those Algerian Muslims who fought alongside the French during the French-Algerian War and who later settled in France.

4 The party was initially called the Union for a Presidential Majority, and it renamed itself Union for a Popular Movement soon after at its founding conference (Haegele 2004).

order to craft policies to fight discrimination; however, the Constitutional Council declared this policy unconstitutional.⁶

This shift in strategy by the center-right (CR) is not confined to France. From 1990 through 2008, a period characterized by the rising saliency of immigration in Europe (Givens and Luedtke 2005, 2), many CR parties altered their positions toward migration-based ethnic minorities. Among those shifting from neglect to inclusion are the British Conservatives, the German Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Swedish Moderates. For instance, the British Conservatives steadily increased the number of parliamentary candidates of migration-based descent. As of 2005, the party fielded a higher proportion of ethnic minority candidates than both the Liberal Democrat Party and the Labour Party (Norris 2005). Upon entering government in 2006, the Swedish Moderates, as part of the center-right Alliance for Sweden coalition, created the Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality, and named as Minister Nyamko Sabuni, making her the first Swedish Minister of African descent. The party also focused on economic advancement, promoting a policy that grants businesses tax breaks if they hire ethnic minorities.⁷ Other parties have defied this trend. Both the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Danish Conservative People’s Party (C) have become increasingly more exclusive after adopting more inclusive stances toward ethnic minorities earlier.

To what extent do data on center-right positions on policy benefiting ethnic minorities confirm these impressionistic accounts? One policy that clearly benefits ethnic minorities is antidiscrimination policy. These policies aim to protect citizens with different ethnic or cultural backgrounds from discriminatory exclusion by the majority society, and include the following measures: Provisions in criminal law regarding racial abuse, defamation, and discrimination by non-state actors; existence of specific antidiscrimination legislation in civil law; and the establishment by the state of antidiscrimination bodies with investigative and/or decision making powers (Koopmans et al. 2005, 32). Table 1.1 presents the number of major antidiscrimination policies enacted by center-left and center-right parties in Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden. In accordance with Givens and Luedtke (2005), The definition of policy is kept as wide as possible: executive regulations, decrees, administrative rulings, and acts of parliament all constitute policy. (CPW READERS: THIS COLLECTION PROCESS IS NOT FINISHED. THUS, IN THIS DRAFT I ONLY EXAMINE VARIATION ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES AS THIS IS THE CODING THAT I AM CLOSEST TO FINISHED).

---

⁶ Mathieu Castanget and Laurent de Boissieu. 2007. La Croix. “En politique la ‘diversité’ se lit surtout dans les programmes.” June 27.
Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>CL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a All policies were in fulfillment of the European Union Race Directives.
B CR and CL governed together.
Note: Future versions will report what proportion of these policies were a result of EU Race Directives.

Table 1.1 demonstrates that all anti-discrimination policies were the result of government initiatives, indicating that a party’s status as member of the opposition or government constrains its ability to implement these. Thus, given the near-dominance of the Swedish Social Democrats, it is unsurprising that the CR has not implemented many antidiscrimination policies. Yet in the two terms that the Moderate Party was in government, it managed to propose and implement a major anti-discrimination policy. In other states, center-right parties did not implement antidiscrimination policies despite a long tenure in government. Great Britain is one such example. The Conservative party did not implement a major piece of antidiscrimination policy despite governing X years. Both France and the Netherlands represent states where the center-right has implemented more antidiscrimination provisions than their center-left counterparts.

Parties may enact other policies besides antidiscrimination provisions to appeal to ethnic minorities. Graph 1.2a represents the total number of proposed, and implemented, major policies by the Dutch and French center-left and center-right parties in three areas: antidiscrimination policies, excluding those enacted to fulfill the European Union’s Race Directive; affirmative action in the labor market policies; and policies establishing state-sponsored advisory bodies or councils to deal with immigration and integration issues (Koopmans et al. 2005). Affirmative action policies include those policies that aim to improve the labor market opportunities of immigrants and their descendants. These policies including those measures that aim to combat socio-economic disadvantages in areas where many ethnic minorities live, and specifically state in their legislative or administrative texts that immigrants and their descendants are their targets.
This graph of measures by both left and right demonstrate that the Dutch VVD, the major party of the right, and the French Gaullists have, at one time outpaced the efforts of the center-left with regards to the proposal and implementation of policies.\(^8\) Graph 1.2b provides a clearer picture of the change in these parties actions by removing the CL.

---

\(^8\) It is worth noting that the Dutch VVD was in government throughout most of the 1980s. From the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the PvdA, or Dutch Labor Party, governed with the Christian Democrats. Beginning in 1994, the PvdA joined the VVD and the social-liberal D66 in a government coalition. The VVD governed throughout the last period, at times with the far-right.
A clear temporal dynamic emerges from Graph 1.: the number of policies enacted by the Dutch center-right decreases whereas those for the French center-right increases. This dynamic holds despite their similar positions as governing parties. For the VVD, there are two distinct patterns visible during times when it was in government. During the 1980s, the VVD implemented a number of major policies aimed at improving the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities. In contrast, the party was relatively inactive during the 2000-2008 period. The French RPR headed the government and presidency during the mid 1990s, and once again beginning in 2002. These distinct trajectories also occur despite similarly large numbers of immigrants with voting rights, sizeable second- and third-generations with voting rights, and visible manifestations of the failure of immigration policies – the riots in the French suburbs by primarily minority youth in 2005 and the murders of Dutch filmmaker Theo VanGogh and Dutch far-right politician Pim Fortuyn in response to their positions on Islam.

The variation in strategy during this time frame by the parties that are at the heart of this analysis—center-right parties with a strong conservative tendency—prompts the following questions. First, when and why do center-right parties reach out to migration-based ethnic minorities? Is outreach simply an attempt to gain more votes for the next election? As the French example above shows, despite the quantity and intensity of the outreach, there is no guarantee these appeals will yield a pay-off at the polls. Is this outreach rather a long-term strategy by which the party aspires to transform constituencies? Or perhaps outreach is merely one way by which a party attempts to change its reputation?
Second, why do parties adopt wildly different approaches to reaching out to ethnic minorities? Across the region we witness CR parties offering affirmative action programs in employment to implementing symbolic language in their appeals. By specifying the determinants of different types of appeals, we gain leverage as to the rationale behind outreach, its timing, and, more importantly, what ramifications this outreach has, if any, on the representation of minority interests and the future contours of the boundaries and substance of national identity.

In light of these perceived threats, work on partisan politics and immigrant integration maintains that conservative parties militate against expansive immigrant integration policies, while parties of the left support them (e.g. Givens and Luedtke 2005; Money 1999; Ogden 1991; Esser and Korte 1985). Importantly, both conservative and social democratic parties are likely to support similar types of immigration control policies. Simply put, “[C]onservative parties are the only parties that have gone into coalitions with radical right parties, and left parties still tend to be the ones that promote immigrant naturalization, antidiscrimination policies, and other measures related to integration” (Givens 2007, 76). While reasons for conservative antagonism toward ethnic minorities are assumed rather than identified, with the exception of the presence of a far-right threat, the literature posits two explanations for left parties’ inclusiveness. The first is political. Money (1999) argues that left parties adopt inclusive integration policies as immigrants will most likely vote for parties of the left and the left will receive an immediate political payoff. The second is ideational. Lahav (2004) argues that partisans of the left are more likely to believe in the need to demolish social inequalities and extend immigrant rights, although he ignores ideological differences between the Old and New Left. He also fails to consider the effects of liberalism, present among parties of the right in many party systems, on presenting an ideological foundation for inclusiveness among parties of the right.

If we apply this logic to CR parties, then political and ideological reasons impede ethnic minority outreach. Politically, these parties may sacrifice votes to far-right competitors if they court ethnic minority voters; furthermore, gains in ethnic minority support would not offset these potential losses. With or without a far-right competitor, CR parties’ reputations as anti-immigrant would undermine the credibility of their appeals, thus delaying the electoral payoff of outreach in terms of ethnic minority votes won (Bowler 1990; Budge and Farlie 1983). The graph in Figure 1 shows that in 2001 respondents closest to center-right parties are more likely to think that immigration made their country a worse, rather than better, place to live. Conversely, across party systems, partisans on the center-left have a more positive outlook on the effect of immigration.
The CR also faces a mobilizational dilemma. By pursuing ethnic minority votes, CR parties dilute their positions on central issues, diminishing their ability to mobilize their core voters. Przeworski and Sprague (1986), writing about the transformation of social democracy in the 20th Century, describe a similar conflict facing European social democratic parties. By expanding their coalition to include middle-class voters, and thus broadening their appeal, “socialist parties dilute the general ideological salience of class and, consequently, weaken the motivational force of class among workers” (45). Reaching out to ethnic minority voters diminish the parties’ appeals on core issues in two ways. First, CR parties are perceived as protecting “us” from “them” in their efforts to preserve the status quo (Bale 2008: 322). As such, these parties are dedicated to preserving a national way of life. In appealing to ethnic minorities, CR parties blur a previously crisp boundary, and seemingly compromise on the preservation of the country’s distinct way of life. A loss in core support would most likely ensue.

Second, CR parties have issue ownership on law and order. The events of the turn of the century, specifically 9/11, the Madrid bombing, the London bombing, and the assassination of national figures in the Netherlands, link Islam to violence. Furthermore, minorities are overrepresented among

Ideologically, center-right politicians, and principally those of the conservative tendency, resist change and revere an idealized past (Sargent 2009; Seiler 1980). They would be most likely to consider that integration is a one-way process, by which immigrants and their descendants conform to the culture of the receiving state. Moreover, a core tenet of conservatism – rejection of the use of government to improve the human condition –
implies that these parties would be loath to support policies intended to ameliorate the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities.

Given these daunting challenges, why do we see CR parties engaging in ethnic minority outreach? Existing literature on party strategy toward immigrants and their descendants provide few answers. The majority of this work conflates two distinct categories: immigrants, who do not have citizenship and thus cannot vote, and ethnic minorities who are citizens and thus can vote. To appeal to ethnic minorities with citizenship is to reach out to a constituency and potentially expand the party’s vote share; to appeal to immigrants threatens the party’s identity without the concomitant gain in votes.

A body of literature has examined party strategy toward immigrants, whether it is the terms and requirements of naturalization or the extension of rights to legal residents, and extrapolates these positions to those regarding ethnic minorities with citizenship. Yet immigration policy is not the only issue dimension that large-scale migration brings to fore. Ethnic relations politics, or a state’s policies dealing with resident migrants and minorities, also becomes a domain of political competition (Joppke 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2000). Work on party’s positioning on this dimension remains underdeveloped and lacks analytical rigor. This oversight is glaring. Party strategy on ethnic relations policy is worthy of its own analysis, especially in light of high naturalization rates and the political coming-of-age of the second generation (Coleman 2006; Money 1999). Unlike immigration politics, ethnic relations politics directly implicate a segment of the electorate. Parties are then forced to weigh a different set of costs and benefits when formulating their strategies on this dimension.

The distinction between citizens and non-citizen is critical in explaining the timing of CR party outreach, and the future contours of ethnic minority political integration and representation. By separating these two categories of migration-based ethnic minorities – those with citizenship and those without – and differentiating between party position on two issue dimensions – immigration control and ethnic relations – we gain analytic leverage as to how parties both maintain and expand their bases. That is, parties may employ inclusive positions on ethnic relations with tough positions on immigration, though not necessarily enacting harsh immigration policy, making these dimensions strategic complements. Yet it need not always pair a stance on one issue with a compensatory approach to the other, and this strategy’s success is not preordained. Rather, the party’s

---

9 While some states do allow non-EU citizens to vote in local elections, no West European state has extended voting rights to the national level (Messina 2007; Koopmans et al. 2005).
10 There is significant conceptual confusion over what policies constitute immigration policy. Much of this work distinguishes between two types of immigration policies: immigration control and immigrant integration. The former policy comprises illegal immigration, political asylum and refugees, family reunification, and legal labor immigration and visas, while the latter includes citizenship and anti-discrimination policies (Givens and Luethke 2005). The classification of integration policy is ad-hoc. By including among immigrant integration policy anti-discrimination policy, which applies to both minority citizens of immigrant descent and to immigrants without citizenship, among other social categories, we lump together two policies that have potentially different sets of determinants.
11 Of course, immigration policies may affect ethnic minorities with citizenship; however, this relationship is not a logical one whereas the one between ethnic minorities and ethnic relations is.
decision to engage a dual approach depends on the competitive environment, namely the presence and strength of a far-right party. Features of the ethnic minority population with citizenship in relation to the immigrant population, and the strength of the feeling of a linked fate between both groups dictate the strategy’s success, in terms of gains in ethnic minority votes.

Consequently, CR parties encounter the following two tradeoffs in deciding to reach out to ethnic minorities. First, they face an immediate trade-off between the support of ethnic minorities and of current constituents. Second, by using restrictive positions on immigration control, the party confronts a long-term trade-off between maintaining their current coalition and incurring the votes of those immigrants who acquire citizenship. The magnitude of both trade-offs depends on the institutional and competitive environment, as well as the features of the ethnic minority and immigrant population.

Yet CR parties do not have to accept these trade-offs as immutable, but rather can attempt to mitigate them through outreach and policy. Outreach is defined as the set of appeals a party makes in its capacity in the electorate, as an organization, and as a governing institution, to win the electoral support of a constituency. Engaging in outreach is a short-term, electoral strategy by which parties seek to shift the boundary between “us” and “them” by employing diverse set of appeals, such as inclusive language and a diverse roster of candidates. The parties hope to garner minority support without sacrificing that of its core constituency.

The second strategy comprises the party enacting policies targeted toward ethnic minorities. This strategy is an electoral investment, one that aims to redefine constituencies. Through these policies, the party intends to integrate ethnic minorities, whether it is in the domain of economic or educational achievement, so that individuals within this category vote based on their social values or economic interests, rather than on ethnic group concerns. The party is essentially diffusing a potential political cleavage, one that would be most likely to support a competitor. It is also minimizing the trade-off between current immigrants and future citizens of immigrant descent (WHY?), as well as its core clientele and ethnic minority voters. Policies that improve the socio-economic status of ethnic minorities diminish the differences between citizens of foreign descent and the rest of the party clientele, and thus reduce this party trade-off.

\Parties implement these respective strategies based on two different rationales. The first strategy, outreach, is an electoral strategy that parties implement based on their expectations about the future configuration of party competition. The party will choose this short-term strategy only if its electoral fortunes have been changing rapidly, indicating that it is attempting to settle on a successful strategy and is unsure whether its source of support at the previous election will be present at the next, all else held equal. The strategy also allows them to position themselves as potential coalition partners to parties of the center and the left. Yet the party will not couple this outreach with policy. Voters ultimately care about policy. To include policy implementation as an appeal for the next election would assuredly cost the party votes from their core voters, many who support integration policies of integration rather than liberal multiculturalism, or policies that ensure equality
for minorities and work toward leveling the playing field. A cosmetic approach, through outreach, would not entail as steep a cost.

For parties to implement a long-term strategy of constituency shaping, they must be secure in their electoral fortunes. Moreover, the size and growth of the ethnic minority population with citizenship should be both large and positive. This strategy is a long-term investment aimed at winning portions of ethnic minority support. A consistently high vote share gives these parties the latitude to pursue this strategy as it may initially cost them support from their core clientele in order to make a long-term investment of winning portions of ethnic minority support.

While these policies aspire to reduce the salience of ethnic identity as a determinant of political behavior. That is not to say that the parties endeavor to promote assimilationist policies, but rather policies of a “liberal multiculturalism” stripe (Ireland 2004) – those that ensure equality for minorities that work toward leveling the playing field. Crucially, CR parties only accept cultural separatism insofar that it is limited to the private sphere, or does not supersede the public status already enjoyed by majority religions. While states differ in their regulation and acceptance of cultural differentiation, CR parties are unlikely to support policies that maintain identities that are thought to be superordinate to national identity.

This theory draws together three common sets of explanations that account for the variance in center-right party strategy toward ethnic minorities – institutions, the structure of competition, and internal politics – by examining how their interactions influence both short- and long-term trade-offs in seeking minority support. Alone, the prime elements of these theories fail to explain cross-sectional and temporal variation in party strategy. For instance, the institutions literature predicts that parties operating in proportional systems with high district magnitude should focus on mobilizing their core supporters (Cox 2005) and occupy a distinct ideological niche. In single member districts with plurality electoral formulas, parties strive to amass the greatest number of voters (e.g. Frymer 1999; Downs 1956). Parties should also focus their efforts on winning swing districts in which ethnic minorities cast a decisive vote (Messina YEAR, Persson and Tabellini 2000). In two-tier systems consisting of single-member districts and a compensatory, proportional tier, parties also encounter centripetal pressures (CITE). These theories broadly predict that in proportional systems we should not see outreach whereas in majoritarian systems we should.

Yet institutional theories fail not only to explain temporal variation, but also cross-sectional differences. For instance, why did the British Conservatives reach out to ethnic minorities in the mid-1970s and from the late 1990s onward, but not during the 1980s and early 1990s? These theories provide little leverage as to why the Swedish Moderates reached out to ethnic minorities from 2002 onwards, while their ideological counterparts in Denmark, the Conservative People’s Party, did not. Similarly, the Dutch VVD proposed and enacted, with partners in opposition, the Greens (Groen Link) and liberal D66, the 1994 Law to Promote Proportional Employment for Minorities. Both governing parties, Labor (PvdA) and the centrist Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), opposed this policy, although
the PvdA did eventually support it. Other explanations privilege competitive exigencies, namely the presence of a far-right competitor and growth in the ethnic minority electorate. Upon facing competition from the radical right, the CR's best response is to move to the right as well, staking out a nativist position to diffuse the populist threat (Meguid 2008, 2005). Yet in France, home the National Front (FN), one of the most successful radical right parties, the center-right RPR altered its strategy toward ethnic minorities in 1997, even as the FN progressively took more of the RPR’s vote share (Meguid 2005). The number of ethnic minorities with citizenship and naturalization rates may also encourage CR parties to court minority votes (Rich 1998). Yet this explanation ignores this strategy’s disadvantage. Namely, the inclusion of a politically relevant, though largely unpopular, group may actually destroy the party’s coalition (Frymer 1999; Glazer et. al. 1996). This explanation is silent as to how a party may convincingly appeal to a new constituency, which it previously ignored, and, in some cases, vilified, without alienating its core constituency? Indeed, these theories suffer from a limited view of public opinion and the way it factors into party decision-making. They leave unexplained the determinants of broad opinion change that permit parties to alter their strategies without incurring astronomical costs.

In contrast to studies that treat voter preferences as exogenous, other studies suggest (a) that voter preferences are also objects of party competition (e.g., Iversen 1994a,b; Gerber and Jackson 1993; Przeworski and Sprague 1986) and that (b), internal politics account for party decisions to “guide” preferences. Iversen (1994a,b) hypothesizes that party elites adopt more extreme positions than their supporters not only to mold voters’ preferences on policies, but also to forge new political identities and beliefs (1994a, b; Przeworski and Sprague 1986). CURVILINEAR DISPARITY. ACTIVIST SUPPORT. Yet these theories do not consider how long-term goals of opinion formation interact with other party goals, nor do they identify how political institutions affect strategies. Finally, they do not specify the party structure that allows parties to implement a strategy of opinion formation nor maintain party cohesion in light of splits with regards to this strategic decision. For instance, the perceived “softness” of the VVD on immigration and ethnic minority citizens (CHECK) contributed to the split and the rise of Wilder’s party.

Undoubtedly, institutions, the structure of competition, and internal politics all matter in predicting CR party strategy towards ethnic minorities. Yet by examining the interaction of these classes of explanations and how they alter the two trade-offs confronting center-right parties – between ethnic minorities and core voters, and maintaining the current coalition versus accruing future citizen support – can we pinpoint when parties will appeal to ethnic minority voters, and whether these appeals are a short-term or long-term strategy. Below, I consider the principle dynamics produced by each class of explanation. I then combine these explanations and delineate the types of policies CR parties will be most likely to

---

support. From this discussion, I generate a set of core propositions that I will test in the following chapters.

The set of electoral and legislative institutions in which a party competes provides incentives to amass votes and moderate. First, whether parties compete in plurality or proportional systems influences whether parties develop strategies that attract the greatest number of votes or generate narrow appeals. In plurality systems, parties moderate (Schattschneider 1942), and pay most attention to voters in marginal electoral districts (Persson and Tabellini 2000). Conversely, proportional systems allow parties to generate appeals that resonate with a relatively narrow segment of the electorate, even if the individuals in question are geographically dispersed. District magnitude is the critical determinant in setting the level of proportionality versus plurality. The more deputies that are to be elected in the district, the smaller the percentage of the vote that is necessary to win at least one more seat. Consequently, plurality systems produce incentives for parties to persuade voters, whereas parties in proportional systems ought to focus on mobilizing core voters, or if competing against an adjacent candidate, coordinate support by altering the number and character of alternatives among which voters select (Cox 2005, 1999).

Another critical institutional component affecting party strategy is the process of government formation. The literature of partisan outreach toward ethnic minority was largely developed in the context of single-member, plurality systems; consequently, these theories overvalue vote share exigencies over office strategies. We must then consider how important seat share and moderation are to predicting government participation. The three critical variables include the predictability of vote share translating into seat share in the legislature, the anticipated correlation between seat and portfolio share, and the importance of government participation to policy influence. In systems with coalition governments, we can distinguish between those processes of government formation in which seat share accurately translates into portfolio allocation, and those in which bargaining weight depends more on policy positioning than legislative weight. For parties in the former situation, they will most likely seek to expand their vote share to improve their chances of government participation. Otherwise parties may alter their policies to increase their potential coalition partners, as voter retribution will not diminish their office-seeking prospects. Parties that operate in legislative systems with frequent minority governments and strong committee systems will not be as concerned with government participation as they may influence policy from within the legislature (Powell 2000; Strom 1990).

The structure of competition also bears on party strategy, namely through the presence of a competitor to the right and demographic considerations. Competition on the right sharpens the trade-off between current core support and ethnic minority support as disgruntled partisans can exercise their exit option. This threat may be potent enough that the party may pair outreach with exclusionary positions on immigration control. If the threat is strong enough, which may be the case in more proportional systems, the party may forgo outreach completely. The far-rights presence also alters the party’s set of potential governing coalition, as it may opt to enter government with the far-right, or consistently draw upon its support from the legislature if the center-right enters government (Powell 2000).
The key demographic considerations include the number of ethnic minorities who are citizens, their participation rates, their intermarriage rates, and their history of how they entered the state. These factors can be distilled into those that diminish the current trade-off between current constituent support and minority support and/or the long-term trade-off, and those that raise the trade-off currently and/or in the future. The results of these cost-benefit analyses also explain why parties specifically target some groups within the migration-based ethnic minority population and not others. The first important determinant is the size of the ethnic minority population with citizenship. With regards to the current trade-off, parties will reap more rewards if this population is large enough to impact vote/seat share. In the case of high naturalization rates, parties may pursue a long-term strategy, despite the lack of an immediate electoral payoff. The current trade-off is mitigated when migrants are former colonials rather than guest workers unfamiliar with the state’s official language. If the participation rates of ethnic minorities are low, then this may cancel out the effect of their sheer size. The party may still engage in a long-term strategy as participation rates are often low among the earlier generations, and for individuals with low educational attainment and socio-economic resources. Finally, the intermarriage rate of sub-groups with the domestic population matters for two reasons. First, intermarriage rates act as proxies for cultural closeness between the domestic and immigrant populations (Lucassen and Laarman 2009; Alba and Nee 2003; Simon 2003). If these rates are high, the trade-off between current constituency support and ethnic minority support is not as sharp as intermarriage rates are linked to cultural and social proximity to the native population, and also is linked to general upward social mobility (Lucassen and Laarman 2009). Second, this rate indicates that a long-term strategy may implicate a larger population than that predicted by demographic trends in the ethnic minority population alone. Rather, if the children of intermarriages self-identify, or are treated as, ethnic minorities, then parties may pay a higher price for not investing in outreach early.

Internal politics matters as well given that external pressures need not translate into party responses. Rather, there must be pressures from within to generate the change in party strategy. Such pressures may take the form of pragmatists pushing the party to adopt a long-term strategy, or from activists and ideologues who consider outreach to be anathema to the party’s policy goals. In the case of activist exerting voice, questions of party structure are paramount. Namely, how much influence do they wield on party positioning? The answer to this question depends on the party’s level of centralization, permeability of recruitment structures, and mechanism for holding the leadership accountable (Strom 1990). The trade-off increases when outreach threatens party unity; however, in the case of a lean party organization that promotes pragmatists, outreach is less likely to fragment the party. Moreover, the party leadership may then adopt a more long-term strategy to reform political identities as activists are less likely to be able to unseat them (Strom 1990). The threat from unhappy factions is a more real threat in the case of CR parties, which rely less on activists than their counterparts on the left. In this case, outreach may split the party internally, based on ideological commitments. Consequently, a party leader will be less likely to engage in outreach if this strategy may result in the party’s implosion.

These explanations combine in ways that either magnify or minimize the trade-offs center-right parties confront. Below I enumerate the ways by which these three features—institutional configuration, the competitive environment, and internal politics—interact to make the impact of the number of ethnic minority voters more or less important, and thus set the size of the long and
short-term trade-offs a party faces. In turn, these trade-offs are more or less palatable given the party’s expectation of future competitive configuration. Given stable vote shares, the party may be more willing to accept the long-term trade-off if the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship and naturalization rate are high enough. Fluctuating party vote shares and an expectation for a strong showing by the center and center-left parties mean that the party may be willing to accept the trade-off and adopt a short-term, electoral strategy.

Model Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Considerations</th>
<th>Party Considerations</th>
<th>Size of Trade-Offs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Number of ethnic minority voters</td>
<td>• Value of votes</td>
<td>• Short-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Growth rates</td>
<td>• Value of moderation</td>
<td>• Long-Term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Naturalization rates</td>
<td>• Competitive environment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Internal politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of ethnic minority persons with citizenship and the naturalization rates of ethnic minorities set the boundaries on how many votes a party can hope to win in the next election, and future elections. The institutional configuration either increases or decreases the importance of these additional votes to the party for entering the legislature as well as government. The potential loss in votes, on the other hand, is higher or lower in concert with the credibility of a far-right exit option, and the features of the ethnic minority population. If votes are not important for government participation, then moderation on the issue of ethnic relations may still be attractive if a party would like to expand its portfolio options. This decreases the importance of the number of ethnic minorities and their naturalization rates. A party may see the trade-off rise if internal factions are not in agreement about the correct course of ethnic relations policy and the electoral system is permissive enough to facilitate the formation of breakaway parties. If exit options are not credible, then the activist threat looms larger, as they will most likely exert influence through voice, rather than exit. If the party is streamlined, however, the threat from activists may be contained.

If these propositions are correct, we should see the following:

1. In a proportional system without a far-right competitor, and in which there is a predictable allocation of portfolios based on seat share, the center-right will engage in outreach if its vote-share has been unstable and if the number of ethnic minority citizen is high and appears to be culturally close to the native population. The instability of vote share means that the party cannot depend on core support anyway, and the appearance of cultural closeness and size of ethnic minority population with citizenship indicates that the trade-off may be net positive for the party. In a proportional system without a far-right threat and a predictable allocation of portfolios based on seat share, a center-right party will engage in constituency creation if the number of ethnic minorities is high and party is able to mitigate the current trade-off due to demographic trends, such as intermarriage rates.

2. In a proportional system without a far-right competitor, and in which portfolio allocation is unpredictable, the center-right will engage in outreach to signal potential coalition
partners if vote share is fluctuating. A party will engage in constituency creation if its vote share is high enough to render it one of the principal gatekeepers of coalition participation and both the number of ethnic minorities with citizenship and naturalization rates are very high. In this institutional arrangement, vote share expansion is not critical to government participation (Powell 2000), meaning that a long-term strategy is only attractive in as far as the demographic trends indicate a large change to the composition of the electorate.

3. In a proportional system, intraparty splits on the issue of outreach will depress the chance of outreach as party splits are more plausible.

4. In majoritarian systems, the number of ethnic minorities, their perceived social and cultural proximity, as measured by whether or not they are from former colonies and their intermarriage rates, and their spatial distribution matters for predicting outreach. All else held equal, a party will engage in ethnic minority outreach if ethnic minorities reside in marginal districts, and the number of these districts influence the party’s ability to enter government.

5. In a majoritarian system with a far-right party, the current trade-off matters, indicating that the party will engage in tough talk on immigration control. If there is volatile vote share, the party will not engage in outreach. If there is a steady vote share and a large number of ethnic minorities, the party will attempt to reshape constituencies along with their tough talk on immigration control. This may sharpen the future trade-off, but the distortionary character of the electoral system will make far-right success a less serious threat than in PR systems.

6. In a majoritarian system without a far-right party, the CR will engage in short-term electoral outreach if the ethnic group’s history and level of intermarriage indicate that it is socially proximate, and if the party’s vote share is vacillating. The CR will engage in long-term outreach through policy if the ethnic group’s history and level of intermarriage indicate that it is socially proximate, its naturalization rate is high, and the party has high and steady vote shares.

7. In a majoritarian system, intra-party debates on outreach are less likely to preclude the strategy as the party is less likely to split. The premium on vote share indicates that pragmatists may be more likely to convince members who are against outreach, though they may have to include tough talk on immigration control as a concession. The exertion of an activist control, however, is higher, unless the party structure is such that their impact is minimized.

The following chapters test the interactive effects of these three classes of explanations on the type and timing of outreach and policy offerings. Specifically, I examine how the competitive environment, in terms of a far-right threat and demographic considerations, and internal party politics affect the likelihood, timing and form of outreach. I focus my analysis on the following four parties: the British Conservatives, the Dutch VVD, the French UMP, and the German CDU. For each party, I construct the dependent variables—outreach, policy offering, and strategy on immigration control—by year. I also collect these data for all parties winning at least 3% of the vote nationally in France, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. At the end of each chapter, findings from these four cases are then compared with findings drawn from two shadow cases, the Danish Conservative People’s Party and the Swedish Moderates.

Given my limited number of observations, I seek to maximize variation on two key independent variables, institutional configuration and changes in vote share (King et. al. 1994).
As such, these parties provide the variation necessary to examine whether electoral systems and government formation processes filter competitive and intra-party considerations. Both France and Great Britain boast single-member electoral systems. The Dutch system is one in which seat share does not predictably translate into portfolio allocation (Kedar 2005), whereas government participation in Germany is more closely linked to seat share. The shadow cases of the Swedish Moderates and Danish Conservative People’s Party provide more observations of party strategy on proportional systems and government formation processes. Vote share stability varies by party both within and across countries.

(Here is what my data show thus far with regards to this type of outreach discussed above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Majoritarian?</th>
<th>EPP</th>
<th>EM Citizens</th>
<th>Far Right?</th>
<th>OUTREACH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Med</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>MEDIUM</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>LOW</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>HIGH</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Road Map of Dissertation:

1. Section One: A Changing Electoral Landscape
   a. Chapter Two: Center-Right Parties and Their Challenges
      i. Longer discussion of center-right parties?
      ii. Trade-Offs: Short-Term and Long-Term
         1. Factors Responsible for These Trade-Offs
      iii. The Left: How These Trade-Offs Differ For the Left and Right
         1. Multinomial model using European Social Survey data

2. Section Two: Strategic Choices and Their Determinants
   a. Chapter Three: Mitigating Short Term Trade-Offs: Outreach
   b. Chapter Four: Mitigating Long Term Trade-Off: Policy

3. Section Three: Impact of These Choices on National Identity
   a. Chapter Five: Categories of Outreach
Chapter Outline

- **Introduction**
  - **Party Responses**
  - **Variations in Appeals**
    - Policy Outreach Table
    - Outreach Table

- **Puzzle**
  - **Justification of Puzzle**
    - Party Responses to New Populations
      - Political Parties
      - Identity
      - Immigration and Integration
    - Center-Right Parties
      - When and Under What Conditions Conceptions of Identity Change
      - Nixon Goes To China
  - **Existing Explanations**
    - Why Parties Choose to Incorporate Underprivileged Groups
    - Why CR parties do not conduct outreach
      - Trade-offs faced by parties of the Left

- **Theory**
  - Immigrants vs. citizens; Trade-offs; timing of outreach and policy;
    *perceptions that outreach won't be that costly (identity of the group?)*
  - **Perspective of Trade-Offs**
    - Trade-Offs Faced by the Right
  - **Mitigating Trade-Off**
  - **Determinants of When We Should See Outreach vs. Policy**
    - Size of Trade-Off
    - Timing
      - Role of critical events (opportunity structure?)

- **Road-Map of Dissertation**

“This dissertation examines the role that electoral motivations have on the decision to enact policies.”

- How do certain determinants of policies (e.g., policies as solutions to societal problems) facilitate the implementation of policy to advance electoral goals?