Chapter 1

Good governance is at the top of the international policy agenda. An honest, efficient government apparatus that is accountable to citizens is acknowledged by policymakers, social science researchers and the international donor community alike as a necessary precondition for economic development. Moreover, participatory development schemes, in which citizens take a more active role in making decisions has “moved up” the discursive agenda. The major focus of studies that examine economic development in general and public goods provision in particular, however, focus on formal institutions of electoral accountability as central to government responsiveness. This dissertation argues that elections are not the only tool, or even the best mechanism, to provide public services. To better understand variation in public goods provision, scholars must attend to coproduction, whereby state and non-state actors conjointly produce goods and services with complementary inputs.

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2 See Grindle 1996; Evans 1995; Tendler 1997, and Ackerman 2004, for example.
This research demonstrates the role that transnational migrant collective agents play in coproducing public works projects in their places of origin. Migrant hometown associations use collective remittance financing they collect in the immigrant host society to collaborate with sending state governments and local citizens to improve social welfare in migrants’ hometowns. This migrant-state coproduction creates an alternative collective mechanism to the electoral process in the provision of public goods and services. In places where government is remiss in providing public goods and services, migrant hometown associations inject the requisite physical capital to generate the organizational basis for coproduction and in some cases create, energize and scale-up social capital to build enduring relationships between government and civil society spanning the public and private spheres. The dissertation theorizes and empirically examines the process of transnational coproduction by studying localities in Mexico. The research uncovers compelling evidence that migrant-state coproduction better explains the variation in public goods provision and demonstrates when state and non-state collaborative partnerships affect state-society relations.

The Puzzle

The four-hour bus ride from the capital city of Guadalajara, Jalisco to the northern municipality of Colotlán is not for the faint of heart or stomach – even for many locals. I hoped to get some rest while en route to my next field site after the four bus changes and seven hours of travel it took to get from the municipality of Calidad, Guanajuato\textsuperscript{3} to Guadalajara. Rest soon became a challenge not 45 minutes into the journey. The bus hugs

\textsuperscript{3} The name of this locality has been changed and others have been slightly altered at the request of citizen respondents.
the shoulder of the narrow two-lane road as it zigzags route 23 through the Sierra Madre Occidental mountain range. During the trek, the bus weaves through the states of Jalisco and Zacatecas passing through agave fields and small towns to pick up and drop off travelers. Many of the places along this route have beautiful old churches in the central plaza often with small gardens, benches and a kiosk where locals congregate, children play and merchants line the streets selling food staples and artisan crafts. Even if you cannot assess the quality of local public goods in each town by looking out the window—electricity, potable water, health and education, for example—you certainly can draw some conclusions about the extent to which towns have updated from antiquated cobblestone and dirt roads to asphalt by the amount of times you and other passengers are thrown against the windows and ceiling of the bus and the speed slows down to a crawl to maneuver through mud traps and deep potholes.

I labored through this maiden voyage from Calidad across the mountainous terrain to Colotlán to assess and compare government provision of public goods and services in Mexican localities, especially in places experiencing out-migration. With the advent of widespread changes to Mexico’s adolescent democracy over the last three decades including more robust electoral competition at the local, state and federal tiers of government, socioeconomic modernization, and decentralization reforms devolving greater decision-making authority to subnational political units – variables typically associated with improved government public service delivery – I was curious to compare places with varying levels of migration intensity and how significant population

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4 The terms locality and municipality are used interchangeably in this dissertation. ‘Community’ refers to a residential neighborhood of a municipality located outside the cabecera municipal (county seat), but still within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality. Typically, the county seat has the greatest population density.
movement affects local governments’ provision of social welfare. Researchers are only beginning to explore the effects of widespread and protracted emigration on labor sending places. A multi-tiered federal system experiencing incremental democratization over time and varying intensity of out-migration, Mexico provides a rich landscape to evaluate the variation in public goods provision across localities.

Calidad, Guanajuato a medium-sized municipality with a population of roughly 20,000, illustrates the ways in which migration can have adverse affects on public goods provision in labor sending communities. Calidad’s church was in need of serious repair, the central plaza was cracked and grown over with weeds, almost all streets were made of dirt, riddled with potholes, garbage and big pools of water that collected roadside from the clogged, outdated drainage system. The indelible mark of northern migration was evident as well: There were several houses with dirt floors along side large American style houses with tiled, inclined roofs, circular driveways and garages to shelter big SUVs with Texas and Georgia license plates. A former municipal official explained to me they simply did not have the requisite resources to complete more than a couple public works projects in his administrative tenure, even with resources that filtered down from the state and federal revenue-transfer funds earmarked for local infrastructure. He asked rhetorically, “even if I wanted to raise the taxes, who is going to pay, the little old ladies and the wives of all the migrants that live in the U.S.?” By all anecdotal accounts of the deleterious effects that substantial emigration can have on local governments capacity and willingness to invest in public works, the trip to Colotlán would prove a more puzzling experience.
I was taken aback by the stark contrast in public goods provision when I arrived in Colotlán. In contrast to Calidad, Colotlán’s municipal center has a large brick plaza with central kiosk, newly constructed concrete highway overpass, statues, sitting benches, a fountain and flower gardens. The streets are paved with drainage and sewage system, most every residence in the cabecera municipal is connected to the electrical grid, potable water and sanitation system. In fact, once I reached the state of Jalisco more often than not the towns more closely resembled Colotlán than Calidad, even though Jalisco has a long history of emigration that affects every municipality in the state.

While these municipalities are bound by the same legal, financial and constitutional configurations, they display pronounced qualitative differences in public services. It is not so surprising that local officials in Calidad provide a modicum of public goods given severe budget constraints, but how was Colotlán able to supply new public works projects with a similar level of wealth? What accounts for the observable improvements in public works in places across Jalisco, like Colotlán, in which a large segment of the population lives abroad? How is it that many localities classified as medium, high or very high by the Mexican Census’s migration intensity index have better public goods provision that wealthier places with less emigration? What explains the variation in public goods and services across these Mexican localities?

The major focus of studies that examine public goods provision investigate the conditions underlying the responsiveness of government to the preferences of its citizens for services through analysis of formal institutions of electoral accountability, namely the nature of electoral institutions. However, formal institutions are insufficient to explain the stark contrast in public goods provision in Calidad and Colotlán. Both local governments
were Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) incumbents and both were in states governed by
the PAN; both localities had experienced multi-party competitive elections; and both
localities had similar levels of economic development. I learned from speaking with
neighbors, the local Priest, and the head of the Patronato, the association that organizes
the municipality’s annual Patron Saint Festival, Colotlán’s citizens were an active bunch
and on occasion would band together to repair potholes on their street and donate
proceeds to make repairs to the local church. However, when I inquired about specific
projects – the statue at the entrance to the town, the newly tarred segment of route 23 that
passes through Colotlán, the water and pavement projects in several outlying
communities, the revamped central plaza – the residents explained it was los migrantes
(the migrants). Unlike in Calidad where emigration is frequently identified as the obvious
explanation for why there is a dearth of public services, by contrast, emigration explains
the improvements in public goods in Colotlán.

As I journeyed from town to town in the traditional labor-sending region of
Mexico, the central western plateau states, I began to notice more and more the signage
next to new schools, health clinics, bridges, and sidewalks along paved roads bearing the
names of different migrant clubes de oriundos (hometown clubs)—migrant voluntary
civic associations based in the immigrant host society comprised of members from the
same place of origin that support social welfare projects in their hometowns (most often)
in partnership with sending state public agencies. In fact, once I noticed the signs I saw
them everywhere and they were all some variation of the same: project name, year and
matching amounts of each contributor, (sometimes) the name of the migrant club, and the
name of the social development sponsoring program: the Programa 3x1 para Migrantes
(the 3x1 Program for Migrants). But why are migrant clubs active in Colotlán and not Calidad? How do we explain migrants’ economic, political and social participation in places in which they no longer reside?

The Argument

I argue the answer lies in the recognition that while the delivery of public goods and services is a central tenet of good government performance and an activity traditionally conducted by state public agencies, non-state actors are increasingly becoming important providers of social welfare. Separating the analytic focus of public goods provision to emphasize either the importance of the nature and structure of state institutions, especially electoral institutional of government accountability or the ability of non-state actors, civil society, to use non-electoral participatory methods to pressure government responsiveness misses an important opportunity to explain constructive mutual support where public goods and services are co-produced. State and non-state actors conjointly produce services when each set of agents provides complementary inputs to the production endeavor. This complementarity enables coproduction of essential services that neither organization would be able to produce as efficiently (or at all) in isolation and helps make democracy work when formal institutional mechanisms are weak or absent.

Complementary inputs are a necessary condition for coproduction to occur and local citizens often do not have the endowments of human, social or physical capital that are necessary to foster collective action either independently or with government.

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5 E. Ostrom (1996)
authorities.\textsuperscript{6} I find that moving beyond the confines of the nation state, that is, widening the analytic lens to encompass transnational non-state actors helps us understand more of the variation in public goods provision. Opening up the core activities of the state to \textit{migrant} societal participation and their collective remittances improves the provision of goods and services of consequence to citizens and government. The improvements in public goods and services described in Colotlán results from the resources and collective action of migrant non-state actors, a kind of non-state provider of social welfare that is understudied in political science research.

Though members of migrant HTAs are no longer territorial residents of their communities of origin, they maintain social obligations and networks of affiliation to their hometowns and use their remittances and matching funds from the Mexican government to coproduce infrastructure projects in their hometowns. Launched in 2002 during President Fox’s administration, Mexico’s \textit{Programa 3x1 para Migrantes} (3x1 Program), is a program whereby each level of the Mexican government, local, state and national levels of government match peso-for-peso the collective remittances of migrant HTAs for public works projects in their communities of origin. Through transnational, public-private partnerships between migrant hometown associations (HTAs), migrant sending-state public agencies and local citizens remaining behind in migrant-sending communities – migrant-state coproduction negotiates an alternative

\textsuperscript{6} Adida and Girod (2010) argue that family remittances enable local citizens to become non-state providers of specific public utilities across Mexican municipalities in the 1990s. They find evidence that municipalities with more households receiving remittances have better citizen access to some public utilities because citizens use the additional remittance income to improve local utilities of consequence to them. They argue that remittances enable local residents to improve public utilities independent of local government or hometown associations. This is an important preliminary study on the welfare-enhancing effects of family remittances.
collective mechanism to the electoral process in the provision of public goods and services.

Research Question(s)

The core puzzle motivating the dissertation is why public goods and services, which are important for individuals’ quality of life everywhere, are provided more effectively in some places and not others. As was mentioned in the previous section, what is missing from extant explanations is a more thorough understanding of the extent to which non-state agents play a significant role in producing public goods and how and under what circumstances they are engaged with public institutions in pursuit of development ends. To this end, I study a particular kind of non-state agent, transnational migrant groups, that continue to stay connected to and participate in the affairs of their hometowns. Migration scholarship is only beginning to scratch the surface deciphering myriad ways in which state and societies external ties to organized migrant Diasporas affect migrants’ places of origin.

It is estimated that more than 180 million people currently live in countries other than where they were born and send $338 billion back to their countries of origin (World Bank estimate 2008). In Mexico, for example, remittances increased from $16 billion in 2004 to $23 billion in 2006 and $27 billion in 2008 sent through official monetary channels (Bank of Mexico, Balance of Payments 2008). Given the sheer volume of remittances flowing into countries with significant emigration it is no wonder that that the bulk of remittance studies focus mainly on either the mechanisms of transfer or evaluate the development impact of this valuable source of hard currency on labor sending
countries domestic political economies. However, migrants also actively participate in civic associations that coalesce around their topophilic or hometown attachments and pool resources into *collective remittances* to finance social welfare projects in their places of origin. While collective remittances are only a drop in the bucket compared to family remittances sent directly to households (by an order of magnitude) they have important development and political effects of their own. Moreover, in the Mexican case, over a quarter of all municipalities currently participates in formal coproduction partnerships with about 600 active Mexican migrant hometown associations. Neither interdisciplinary migrant transnationalism scholars nor political scientists have paid adequate attention to this source of transnational currency, especially the extra-economic linkages created through cross-border partnerships. This dissertation seeks to build on existing scholarship and begin to fill theoretical and empirical holes.

This project enriches our understanding of the factors that explain public goods provision through the identification of emerging non-state agents, their collective endeavors and collaborative partnerships with the state. To understand why public goods are provided better in some places and not others we must also begin to understand the role of transnational migrant non-state agents and their corresponding state partnerships producing a range of related questions: What accounts for emergence and consolidation of migrant-state coproduction? How and why do these public-private partnerships vary across emergent cases? And, what are the outcomes produced by coproduction?

Building on the state-society synergy and coproduction scholarship I introduce a transnational dimension, theorize and test the factors that explain the emergence, structural forms and impact of migrant-state coproduction across Mexican localities.
Moreover, since state and non-state agents are motivated by different constellations of incentives and operate within different internal organizational structures, migrant-state coproduction partnerships are not uniform across emergent cases. I also seek to examine the underlying conditions that produce variation on migrant-state coproduction organizational forms. To elucidate how insight into structural variation may matter to the research endeavor, in the following section I provide a brief anecdote of two outlying communities both in the municipality of Colotlán. The corresponding communities’ different experiences with migrant-state coproduction help to demonstrate why it is important to analyze the structural variants of migrant-state coproduction forms.

*Migrant-State Coproduction Structural Variation*

An eight-minute drive north up route 23 leads to the Colotlán community of San Diego Tlatelolco, which is home to about 300 families and where one in every three houses has a family member that lives or has recently lived in the United States. Tlatelolco is a mix at once of past and present, old and new. The newly paved access road takes you towards fields of cows, tomatoes, corn and orange trees to the community residences. Tlatelolco boasts no central plaza, garden or recreation area and there are two street lamps in total; residents use flashlights to navigate at night. Neighbors ride their donkeys and horses up and down the dirt streets. Several residences still use an outhouse and wood-burning hot water heaters. The majority of households that have made significant improvements to their dwellings do so with remittance income – savings accrued by migrants in the host society sent back to their country of origin. There is no techno thumping Internet café like in many municipal centers, market or even a
restaurant, and only one *abarrote* (corner store) for residents to pick up small groceries and make domestic and international long-distance phone calls. A plaque that hangs on the dilapidated public building commemorates the last public works project implemented before 2007: the expansion of electricity and potable water to the community in 1976 during the heyday of the ruling hegemonic party, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI).

Before 2007, half the residents of this community lived in almost complete isolation during the rainy season by the river that bifurcates the community, too treacherous to pass with donkeys or cars; only the truly brave would cross the rickety, wood bridge plucked right out from a scene in Indiana Jones. However, in the midst of Tlatelolco’s dusty charm a concrete vehicle bridge designed by civil engineers now connects the community (a bridge, locals tell me, they have pestered municipal authorities for since a resident drowned while crossing 15 years ago). Four of the main streets are recently paved and sidewalks have been built along the perimeter of the elementary school building. A migrant hometown association with roots in San Antonio Texas coproduced the first two major public works projects (bridge and road pavement/sidewalk project) that the community had received since 1976. However, new projects slated to begin back in 2009 have stalled and the hometown association is not planning any future projects. Instead, a local civic association, Tlatelolco’s Patronato, has recently partnered with the local government to coproduce a new public lighting project *without* the migrant club. Tension between the HTA and local community residents culminated in a breakdown in communication and eventually all migrant-state coproduction collaboration. With election season approaching local government
authorities showed favor with the local residents instead of the HTA stymieing transnational coproduction efforts, but creating new opportunities for local government and community residents’ to work together in the coproduction of public works.

About an hour and a half southeast of the cabecera nestled up in the mountains is the community of El Carrizal and El Plateado, a small municipality that hugs the Jalisco border, but technically part of the neighboring state of Zacatecas. The only way to get there is in a truck, hopefully with 4-wheel drive, able to navigate the bumpy dirt mountain road. After the hour-plus ride standing in the flat bed of an old Dodge Ram, I expected Carrizal and Plateado, being even more geographically isolated to more closely resemble Tlatelolco, at best, but most likely akin to the neighborhoods in Calidad. Not so. The migrant hometown associations active in these communities have made important changes to residents’ social welfare.

Before 2000, the residents of these communities described how Carrizal and Plateado looked more like Calidad, but now residents, their children and animals traverse paved streets with sidewalks flanking both sides. Trees line the entry road. Every house, less a few, is connected to the extended electrical grid and while residents alternate days with access to the water supply, there are plans currently in progress to overhaul the entire system. Community residents chat with neighbors in the pueblitos cancha (recreation court), while neighborhood kids play basketball and volleyball under the concrete roof. Regular rodeos happen at the newly minted lienzo charro (rodeo ring) for residents of Carrizal and Plateado to compete and demonstrate their skills on horseback. The public service delivery in these towns is frankly, impressive, and residents believe
that without migrant-state coproduction they would never have seen a single project in their remote, mountain community.

The variation in the public goods projects supported through migrant-state coproduction is in part explained by the amount of collective remittance financing the respective hometown associations can fundraise back in the U.S. and the budget constraints of local government partners. After all, complementary inputs are a necessary condition for coproduction to occur. But, hometown associations also have different organizational capacities, instrumental and expressive motivations for coproducing projects in the places of origin. Not surprisingly, local citizens and government authorities are also driven by their own constellation of incentives that can (often) conflict with the objectives of different migrants clubs.\(^7\) In short, state and migrant clubs are not ‘reified monoliths’ to borrow a term from Evans (1995), thus migrant-state coproduction relationships are not the same and the structural variation in the organizational form of these partnerships is important to understand the their degree of effectiveness and impact on state-society relations and local governance.

I argue when migrant-state coproduction partnerships are *inclusive* of the active participation and contributions of local residents and when local government authorities are *engaged* in the process beyond contributing complementary resources, government and civil society become embedded in the coproduction process and public-private partnerships approximate the Weberian ‘ideal type’ (although not typical) case: *synergistic migrant-state coproduction*. On the other extreme of the spectrum is

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\(^7\) I use ‘migrant clubs’, ‘migrant hometown association’ (HTA), and ‘migrant association’ interchangeably throughout the dissertation. I also abbreviate ‘public goods and services’ to public services and public works, as well.
predatory migrant-state coproduction, where local governments tastes for extracting ‘rents’ prevails, the complementary inputs of migrant clubs and local citizens devolves into corruption and inevitably, failure of the partnership. In order to fully understand why a couple of projects were completed and then stalled in Tlatelolco, but continue apace in Carrizal and Plateado, for example, we need to understand the extent to which (and of course why) coproduction partnerships have varying levels of the structural variants engagement and inclusiveness\(^8\) and when the amalgam of the two factors produce embeddedness. Moreover, the dissertation examines intermediary cases that result from variation in coproduction partnerships structural forms.\(^9\) I show how non-state actors cooperate with government, drawing out the incentives that motivate the respective agents, the key structural factors that account for variation, and the mechanisms through which coproduction affects state-society relations.

While Mexico is the core case motivating the empirical and theoretical puzzles of the dissertation, migrant-state coproduction of public goods and services is not exceptional to Mexico. In fact, migrant-state coproduction has become a way of life for many communities experiencing extensive out-migration (internal and international) to improve public goods provision in places as far reaching and divergent as India, the Philippines, China, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire, to name but a few country examples. Before presenting the central argument of the dissertation in

\(^8\) The concepts ‘embedded autonomy’, ‘complementarity,’ and ‘synergy’ I borrow from Evans (1995; 1997), Ostrom (1996) and Tendler (1997). While I appropriate the terminology in the same spirit of the original applications, the concepts are altered to fit my theoretical framework and the sets of agents engaged in the coproduction activities.

\(^9\) Thus, the term ‘structural form’ is used as shorthand to represent the building blocks (with complementary inputs) that characterize the organizational dynamic of the coproduction partnerships under investigation.
greater detail, the following section explains the rationale for focusing on public goods and services before engaging more traditional explanations of public goods provision.

**Why Study Public Goods?**

Public goods and services – water, electricity, health services, safety, education, and roads – are intrinsic components of social welfare. Inadequate provision of clean drinking water, sanitation and hygiene, for example, often leads to disease outbreaks. Access to quality health care services reduces complications during maternal childbirth and infant mortality rates. Paved, easily navigable roads connect important market centers and economic outposts where agricultural producers can sell and export commodities to earn a living. Public service delivery is, in short, important for individual wellbeing everywhere.\(^{10}\) Understanding the conditions that produce more or less effective public goods is both of practical importance to policymakers and political science researchers alike.

Since multiple individuals enjoy public goods and services without diminishing the value of consumption to others, and because individuals cannot prevent others from enjoying the goods whether or not the consuming individuals pay, private voluntary citizens face obstacles to public service delivery including opportunism, shirking, and free-riding. Thus, government (public) provision and management of these kinds of goods and services is the norm.\(^{11}\) Government agencies have the economies of scale,

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\(^{10}\) Relative income is often the most important measure used to assess poverty levels and economic development of which access to public goods and services is certainly a part. I restrict the focus to public goods and services in the dissertation.

\(^{11}\) Of course, not all public goods are *pure public goods*, those goods that are completely non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
technological prowess and knowledge capacity to ‘deliver the goods’ to the people. And, government agencies of the state exist primarily to provide public goods to people in exchange for their quiescence to their authority and taxation. In light of this fact, investigating the conditions underlying the responsiveness of government in public service delivery through analysis of formal institutions of accountability is also an important reason for studying the politics of public goods provision. Equating public goods provision with government responsiveness is not a hyper-restrictive focus. On the contrary, in Mexico the municipal (local) level of government’s responsibility for the provision of public goods and services is clearly stipulated by Article 115 of the Mexican constitution. The municipal level is responsible for potable water, drainage, sewage systems, treatment and disposal of residual water; public lighting; cleaning, collection, removal and treatment and disposal of waste materials; markets and supply centers; monuments; slaughterhouses; streets, parks, gardens, and their equipment; and public security. Moreover, in a 2001 Mexican national sample survey where citizens were asked which political representative best represents their interests, respondents named their local mayor (*presidente municipal*) more frequently than any other office except the national presidency (Cleary 2010). Local citizens know whom to blame. Learning about the supply of public goods tells us something about the efficacy of democratic instruments to induce better government performance and improve the public service delivery (e.g. electoral and non-electoral methods) and what other mechanisms make democracy work when these institutions are weak or absent.

12 Author’s translation from Spanish
Explaining the Provision of Public Goods and Services

One of the most important observations of the 20th century is the correlation between socio-economic modernization and democracy that holds across a cross-section of countries. Lipset (1959), Dahl (1971) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997) and others posit the relationship between increasingly levels of income per capita and democracy – as individuals become wealthier they are more likely to demand better government performance, goods and services, and good governance further fosters economic development. Socio-economic development is an important condition underlying stable and effective democratic government because politicians understand that if they do not comply they face the threat of losing office come election time or more violent reprisals in the form of social unrest and revolution.

While the causal mechanisms and empirical evidence linking economic development and democracy still bedevil students of democratization, it is an instructive relationship for those interested in understanding public goods provision. Baum and Lake (2001), for example, demonstrate that public service delivery is better in democracies than in other types of regimes providing some additional empirical weight to the generally posited mechanism: as incomes grows and citizens are more capable of organizing themselves to demand better goods and services, government performance is institutionalized and democracy stabilized. Moreover, Diaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming) in their study of the politics of social spending programs in Mexico, find that poverty alleviation programs had marginal effects on citizens access to public services; rather, economic development accounts for most of the improvement in service delivery across localities in the 1990s with one important exception: places where migration has
outpaced modernization. Considering the cases of El Plateado, Colotlán, and Calidad we are also confronted with the limitations of the economic modernization hypothesis for explaining better provision of public works: places with high out-migration and similar levels of wealth had very different public goods provision (Colotlán and Calidad), while more geographically isolated and poorer municipalities had better public service delivery than their richer counterparts (El Plateado).

Several authors have provided additional macro-structural explanations for improved provision of public services. For example, Rogowski (1987), Persson and Tabellini (2000), and LaPorta et al. (1999) emphasize the importance of different constitutional design and legal frameworks affecting the incentives and instruments to constrain policy makers from abusing public office for personal gain. LaPorta et al. (1999) emphasize the role of cultural norms and practices, namely the influence that the Protestant religion has on demanding good governance. However, these explanations are unable to explain the variation across subnational political units embedded in regimes with the same constitutional and legal structure.

The most promising avenues available to explain the variation in public goods provision across localities are the presence of social heterogeneity and the role of democratic instruments of accountability. First, Alesina et al. (1999) finds that ethnic fractionalization is associated with under-provision of public goods in their examination of the U.S. case since co-ethnics distrust outsiders. The more socially heterogeneous
groups are, the more conflict there is, which produces trouble overcoming collective action to produce public goods that align with the preferences of different groups.\(^\text{13}\)

Second, in democratic regimes where electoral institutions exist, greater political competition is believed to produce more responsive government. Citizens use their vote to select candidates and punish poor incumbent performance. Since incumbents prefer to stay in office and they face punishment for poor performance and/or the threat of losing office to a more competitive candidate in the next election, incumbents ensure their own survival through better performance during their administrative tenure in office. The citizenry uses prospective and retrospective accounting to select new representative officials and ‘throw the bums out’ when they need to (see Key 1966; Fiorina 1981; Downs 1957; A. Campbell et al. 1960; Riker 1982).

In the case of Mexico, there are prima facie reasons to believe that political competition does induce better government performance as O’Donnell (1991) and others have suggested (see Coppedge 1993; Lujambio 2000; Beer 2001). Mexico underwent considerable transformations during the 1980s and 1990s that should have had

\(^{13}\) Also, Banerjee and Somanthan (2001) argue that social heterogeneous preferences emanating from fractious groups might help us understand why some places have more of one type of good than another. In a follow up analysis these same authors also suggest that ethnically heterogeneous groups might have preferences (tastes) for one kind of public goods than homogenous groups so rather than ethnic fractionalization driving the outcomes, divergent preferences for different goods explains the provision of public goods (Banerjee and Somanthan 2006). While these studies offer additional evidence of the correlation between social heterogeneity and public goods provision, it is less clear what mechanism explains more or less government provision. Posner (2004), for example, asserts difficulty in identifying whether the ethnic conflict is internalized by the political system where public goods provision decision-making is located. Regardless, ethno-religious and linguistic heterogeneity is a likely factor in the Mexican case. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (forthcoming: 106), find that religious fractionalization in Mexico accounts for under-provision of public goods across localities and indigenous communities (which they proxy for with an indicator of monolinguism) have better public service delivery.
demonstrative effects on government provision of public goods. First, the
decentralization of decision-making to sub-national levels of government initiated with
reforms of the de la Madrid administration in 1983, promised to improve efficiency,
greater equity and higher responsiveness of governments to citizens’ demands (Oates
1972; Agrawal and Gupta 2005). When decision-makers have greater access to
information regarding the needs and preferences of the citizenry and must compete to
garner the support of local constituencies to win electoral office or to advance within the
ranks of the political party, the provision of public goods is believed to be more
responsive to local needs. Second, Mexico also experienced significant aperture of the
political system during this period. Opposition parties at both the municipal and state
level of government defeated the hegemonic ruling party in important elections leading
up to the national presidential election in 2000, in which the PRI was defeated in a clear
and fair election to the PAN (Dominguez and Lawson 2004). Moreover, previous studies
of public goods provision have demonstrated qualitative improvements in water
provision, sanitation and electricity between 1985 and 2000 (Hiskey 1993; Moreno 2004;
Cleary 2007).

However, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to suspect that the
effectiveness of elections to produce better local government performance through the
accountability mechanism is limited. First, even though political competition has become
more robust over the last two decades at all levels of the Mexican federal system, local
incumbents may find that targeted transfers through patron-client ties and vote buying are
more effective strategies for winning elections than investing in local public goods.
Second, electoral institutional design in Mexico makes it difficult for citizens to sanction
officials for poor government performance because there is a strict constitutional law prohibiting incumbent re-election and a 3-year term limit for local mayors. While local officials may still be inclined to garner the approval of the electorate while in office to ensure future victory for their political party or their own personal career advancement, Grindle (2006) reminds us that “day to day governance in municipalities is in the hands of short-lived political representatives rather than a professional civil service (see also Guillen Lopez 1996). Third, while decentralization brings elected representatives closer to the needs and preferences of the people by devolving the locus of decision-making to subnational levels of government, decentralization reforms are often implemented incrementally. In Mexico, fiscal decentralization has lagged behind administrative and political decentralization to lower tiers of government creating local governments that rely heavily on the state and federal government to fund public goods; 60 percent of total local budgets are participaciones and aportaciones, revenue transfer funds trickling down from the state and federal tiers. This system of intergovernmental finance creates perverse incentive for local taxation allowing local government to remain rather unaccountable to citizens in the provision of public goods at the local level (Diaz-Cayeros 1997; 2003). Moreover, the uneven sequence of decentralization reforms (Falleti 2005) creates institutional constraints on more ambitious, reform-minded mayors and local officials that need to find novel ways to liberate additional resources to be responsive (Grindle 2007). Finally, recent scholarship that empirically examines the link between electoral competition and improved government performance (measured by public works expenditures and access to aggregate public goods and services) does not uncover a significant relationship (see Moreno-Jaimes 2007; Cleary 2007; and Ibarra
In fact, Ibarra (2009) finds that political competition is associated with substantial decrease in the levels of investment in infrastructure and while there has been “an increasing trend in the coverage of both sewage and drinking water services over the 1990-2000 period, the changed cannot be associated with the increasing pattern of electoral competition” (2009:19). Elections are limited as instruments of local government accountability in Mexico and public officials are no more likely to be responsive in places with competitive elections than elsewhere (Cleary 2010).

Incremental ‘bottom-up’ changes in the Mexican political system culminated in the defeat of the PRI in 2000 after 71 years of national rule to the PAN party that currently retains office. Clearly, elections are not irrelevant in Mexico and provide citizens some measure of control over their representatives in government, even if they favor elections to ‘select good types’ rather than sanction incumbent performance (Fearon 1999). When it comes to accounting for factors that rightly explain the variation in public goods provision across localities in Mexico, elections are not necessarily the only or best mechanism to induce more responsive local government in the provision of public goods. Alternative non-electoral forms of political participation afford citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government officials to pressure them to respond and, as I argue, directly engage in the core functions of the state through coproduction (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Campbell 2003).

It is important for researchers to move beyond the role that “democracy” broadly understood has on improved government performance in favor of theorizing and empirically testing the role of additional non-electoral methods. Political participation –
activities that have the intent or effect of influencing government action either directly by affecting the making or implementation of policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies – for example, pestering, protesting, petitioning, coproducing work to improve government performance and the provision of public goods as several recent studies of Mexican localities have demonstrated (Hiskey 1993; Jaimes-Moreno 2004; Cleary 2007). Participatory strategies can be complementary to robust political competition (Hirschman 1970), but may also influence responsiveness directly (Putnam 1993; Verba et al. 1995).

I build on this strand of research and argue that citizens and migrant non-state actors can assume more than the ‘watchdog’ function by breaking the state’s monopoly on the responsibility of public goods provision and directly participating in one of (if not the most important) core functions of local government – the co-production of public goods and services (Tendler 1996; Fox 2000; Ackerman 2004).

*Migrant-State Coproduction of Public Goods and Services*

This research builds on the state-society synergy literature as well as studies of non-state actors and social welfare, government performance, social capital and remittances and economic development. Politicians and voters become linked through the coproduction of community projects when HTAs act as intervening institutions that incentivize government responsiveness with collective remittance funds as complementary inputs. Through the process of migrating and capitalizing on the wage differential between sending and receiving place, migrants changing resource base creates the organizational basis for coproduction of community projects. These public-
private partnerships serve as an alternative collective mechanism to formal institutions of accountability in the provision of public goods. The dissertation demonstrates that participatory models, in which non-state actors take more active roles positively affect both public goods provision and local government responsiveness, provided migrant-state coproduction is autonomous eluding elite capture, local government officials are embedded in the coproduction process beyond simply matching resources and most importantly, inclusive of citizen participation beyond migrant HTAs family and friends to extended groups.

For some migrants, coproduction is motivated by social obligations to family and friends remaining behind, topophilic attachments to their places of origin or social and political institutions that requires the continued participation of extra-territorial community members that have migrated. For others, they are motivated by expressive and instrumental incentives including the pursuit of status valorization, consolidation of political power or future political career ambitions and re-affirmation of community membership that is perhaps, absent for the migrant club members in the host society. Moreover, government coproduction partners are driven by their own political and economic incentives. These factors that drive migrant-state coproduction partnerships – facets of pre- and post-migration contexts, individuals’ place in the migration life cycle and sending local, state and national political economies – are neither the same across cases nor are they frequently congruent. The sets of factors that bring migrant hometown associations and government agents together to coproduce community projects do not have to be harmonious for tangible goods and service to be produced. Each group of actors on either side of the public-private divide through the mobilization of their
respective resources can derive their own mutually beneficial, even if divergent, ends.

The organizational basis for migrant-state coproduction, public matching funds and migrant collective remittances, is the only necessary condition for migrant-state coproduction to emerge. The relative amount of matching funds is proportional to goals and objectives, organizational capacity and commitment from each of the set of actors involved. And, given the different incentives motivating participation on either side of the public-private boundary – electoral incentives, rent-seeking, and improving development for government agents and altruism, social and political status, and other instrumental ends, for migrant collective agents – there is both systematic variation in where migrant-state coproduction emerges and in the outcomes produced.

Since migrant collective actors and state cooperative partners are motivated by different goals and the nature and extent of their ties and internal structures diverge, coproduction arrangements are not uniform. The use of ideal types and conceptual devices sometimes give the impression that all public-private partnerships should be structured accordingly. Let me say at the outset that few arrangements closely approximate the specified ideal types: synergistic and predatory. Intermediate cases offer variations on the ideal types captured by different levels of embeddedness.

The benefit of explicating the structure of migrant-state partnerships according to ideal types simplifies the outcomes by situating them on opposite sides of a continuum. The drawback to this approach is that this crude method does not capture the complexities in non-archetypical cases; in reality, most cases are much messier because the factors that structure the underlying relationships are not static, but dynamic and change through the experience of coproduction itself.
However, this approach does illuminate important structural variations in coproduction partnerships and the corresponding aggregate effects. When migrant-state coproduction is *synergistic* the public-private distinction collapses and the core activities of the state are inclusive of societal (migrant and local) participation. This creates positive spillovers in the following ways: 1) it generates more direct information to local authorities on the preferences of the citizenry that is otherwise a challenge through the simple casting of a single ballot 2) it produces a more engaged citizenry that routinely participates in community affairs and 3) it improves the access to and quality of public works because citizens are more likely to feel ownership of the project and are inclined to monitor before, during and after implementation.

This research highlights the important additional role that non-electoral models can have for improving representative government and accountability both in the presence and absence of competitive elections. In some places with long-standing traditions of clientelism, the introduction of migrant-state coproduction has worked to displace the power of local political elites when migrant-state coproduction is *inclusive* of local community voice. Moreover, through direct participation with government actors, HTAs and locals are more capable of holding local officials to account because they have more information and influence over public funds.

Civil society and local government become embedded through hometown associations social relations through bonding and bridging ties. Bonding ties refer to the connection to people who are similar in terms of their demographic characteristics and typically include family, neighbors, and close friends of migrants (in Spanish the useful analogy is *compradazgo*). Bridging tiers refers to connections to people who do not share
many characteristics and are usually beyond migrants’ social circles (Grootaert et al. 2003; Woolcock 2004). Bonding ties frequently influence who in the community will be involved (if at all) in the activities of coproduction – selecting, volunteering and donating labor and resources to projects and monitoring stages of implementation. However, if migrant hometown associations fail to integrate local political elites, preexisting committees and organizations in the hometown – making intra-community or bridging ties – this will often stymie their coproduction efforts. Voice after exit can create contentious relationships when migrants are no longer seen as members of a common community. When hometown associations are inclusive of a broad swatch of citizen participation through bonding and bridging ties in the coproduction process public-private partnerships are more successful at producing public goods.

Ties that bind actors of the government apparatus to the hometown association and indirectly to society, if the HTA boasts high levels of inclusiveness, describe embeddedness. The more that a migrant club embeds local officials in the coproduction of public works projects – technical design, contracting labor for project development, overseeing that all contributors meet their material obligations, monitoring progress and quality control, for example – in addition to providing the complementary inputs that set the stage for coproduction the more successful coproduced projects. Embedded resources in social networks enhance the outcomes of purposive actions because it facilitates the flow of information about useful opportunities, choices and access to government officials that would otherwise not be available or a serious challenge to citizens. In turn, citizens reveal needs and preferences to their elected officials directly or indirectly through the migrant-state coproduction process.
When hometown associations use their structural position and act as brokers or intermediaries between state and local societal actors this facilitates transactions between other actors that do not have the access or may lack trust in their government officials. As the preexisting or newly created social capital of local community actors becomes “scaled up” (Fox 1995) through their active participation in the process of coproduction, the migrant HTAs role as intermediary abates and local groups are more willing and capable to communicate directly with political officials. The social capital that migrant clubs generate by connecting community and government when inclusiveness of society and government engagement are at their maximum creates an alternative means of conducting relations (outside the electoral process) between state and society in the provision of public goods and services. Even when civil society has no or limited prior stocks of social capital, hometown associations *import* the social energy and connections that help mobilize social capital to where it becomes politically and economically efficacious for state-society relations.

While some localities possess pre-existing state-society linkages that make synergistic migrant-state coproduction more likely, for example, indigenous communities with ethno-religious institutions of self-government (*usos y costumbres*) this is not the defining scarcity for synergy to occur. Rather, the internal structure of the local government (bureaucratic coherence and political entrepreneurialism), HTA organizational capacity and migrant social networks, explain kinds of government engagement and community inclusiveness that produce variations on idea typical coproduction. The amalgam of engagement and inclusiveness achieved through migrant bonding and bridging ties and local governments internal and inter-government dynamics
create the mechanisms through which HTAs link state and society together connecting public and private groups in an enduring set of coproduction relations.

Civil society explanations for improved institutional performance are often a) too broad of concepts to have any real analytic leverage b) frequently fail to specify the causal mechanisms through which civic engagement works to induce government responsiveness and c) take as given the availability of social capital. I overcome these limitations by specifying and empirically substantiating how structural variation in migrant-state coproduction organizational forms affect social relations and generates additional social accountability mechanisms that are additive to electoral institutions.

This research also contributes to the international migration and remittances literature by demonstrating how transnational coproduction demonstratively affects social welfare, creates agency and aids collective action creating powerful non-state migrant political actors. While previous studies of remittances focus almost exclusively on the individual and household level of analysis, widening the analytic lens to encompass HTAs and their resources at the community level reveals new understanding of how migrants continue to engage and change their hometowns.

**Overview of the Dissertation**

Localities in Mexico comprise the empirical context of the dissertation. While Mexico is the core case, theoretical arguments are intended to travel and provide a foundation for studying transnational coproduction of public goods and services. Chapter two theorizes the origins and the structural variations of migrant-state partnerships through the coproduction-synergy framework with collective remittances as the critical
complementary inputs. The extant literature that empirically examines aspects of the relationship between migrant collective agents and sending state governments compartmentalize the different agents and the outcomes produced and we are without a theoretical understanding of how the component parts fit together. This chapter builds a theoretical foundation and develops conceptual devices to aid navigation of the complex process of cross border partnerships. In order to understand the emergence of migrant-state coproduction it is necessary to situate the enterprise within the broader historical context. Coproduction is not an automatic outgrowth of migration – public-private partnerships emerge from specific historical contexts and are contingent and variable. In chapter three, I explain how decentralization during the period of sub-national democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s shaped political opportunities for government and migrant associations’ collective action. While migrant organizations predate Mexican state outreach, the density and organizational capacity of migrant associations expanded in response to government activities. The 1990s were a decade of institutional reconfiguration and re-purposing between different levels of the Mexican government and migrant HTAs in the United States, which resulted in the federal 3x1 Program for Migrants, the matching funds program whereby each level of the Mexican local, state and federal government matches peso-for-peso the collective remittances of migrant hometown clubs.

Chapters four through six comprise the empirical chapters of the dissertation. In Chapter four, I evaluate to what extent theorized features of the migration life cycle, pre-post- and individual characteristics impact where migrant-state coproduction emerges in the U.S. and Mexico. While the previous chapter evaluates emergence independently
from each side of the cross-border context, chapter five examines the factors that explain the variation within emergent coproduction cases and the development impact. The first objective of the chapter is descriptive: how are migrant hometown associations similar and different and what accounts for differences in their organizational form? The second goal is to test how the structural variation in coproduction partnerships affect several different outcome variables including citizens access to public goods, proportion of projects completed over municipal active years, the total and average coproduction costs per capita, the frequency of project completion as well as additional measures that proxy for municipal government responsiveness, and community civic participatory engagement. The final empirical chapter, chapter six, compares ideal types (synergistic and predatory) and intermediary cases (corporatist) of coproduction. These cases compare how the causal mechanisms specified in the theory chapter affect the organizational form and outcome of public-private partnerships in different political, social and economic contexts. While the previous chapter established correlation between key variables of interest, this chapter links the micro-foundations that produce different aggregate state-society outcomes.

The concluding chapter recounts the central argument and summarizes the main findings. While the results uncover several positive externalities for coproduction communities, the salutary effects may need to be tempered. First, in country cases with substantial out-migration, coproduction financed through collective remittances may do more to subsidize municipal budgets than increase overall local public goods investment creating a dependency on this source of external investment in lieu of additional decentralization and electoral institutional design. Second, in contexts where migrant
hometown associations are remiss in including the participation of the local citizenry, normative questions emerge about who should have the ability to make representative decisions on behalf of citizens – voice after exit – especially in Mexico where the coproduction of public infrastructure has been institutionalized into a national program in which over a quarter of all municipalities participates annually. Finally, drawing on the lessons gleaned from the Mexican case, I offer suggestions for future research on the non-state provision of social welfare and generalize the argument beyond the country case of Mexico to other countries with extensive internal and international migration.

Research Design, Data and Methods

Explaining the emergence, structure and impact of migrant-state coproduction on public goods provision and state-society relations requires a creative research design that can study the interplay of multiple actors and structures operating at different spatial scales and the outcomes produced in the transnational context in which it is conducted. It would be incomplete to focus exclusively on the role of the migrant-sending state in shaping the institutional framework of coproduction relationships. This approach would be overly deterministic and ignore the agency of migrant actors and their collective associations’ ability to “act back upon the state” (Smith and Bakker 2008). Focusing exclusively on migrant-state coproduction as a migrant-led process would minimize the migrant sending local, state and federal governments ability to act on their own incentives and condition the coproduction process to meet their own set of objectives. To reconcile the interaction of different sets of agents operating across national borders and with different tiers of the Mexican federal system, I adopt a transnational comparative
approach. This multi-methodological research strategy makes comparisons across multiple units within the migrant-sending state of Mexico, across multiple units within the U.S. migrant receiving-state, as well as collapsing national borders to make comparisons across migrant hometown associations within the transnational space.

Mexico is an ideal case for study because over 90 percent of the migrant population settles across the northern border in the United States. The concentration of the Mexican migrant population in one host country allows the researcher to hold constant macro-structural historical conditions such as regime type, political ideology, institutional setup in both countries in order to isolate key variables that explain emergence, structural characteristics of coproduction partnerships and outcome variables. Also, since the U.S. – Mexico migration corridor has a long, storied history and Mexican migrants in the U.S. have been organizing into collectivities in one shape or another since the turn of the century, this enables me to analyze similarities and differences occurring over time. For these reasons, I have bound the scope of the research to migrant-state coproduction that occurs cross-nationally between migrant hometown associations in the U.S. and Mexico.

Locating evidence to provide support for the theoretical claims in this dissertation is challenging. One the one hand, migrant-state coproduction is an interactive process between different sets of agents and their incentives and as such requires in-depth knowledge of the respective actors and their day-to-day interactions. On the other hand, providing a deep understanding of the coproduction process limits the generalizability of the process beyond a few isolated cases. To overcome these obstacles, I adopt a novel research strategy that negotiates both breadth and depth of data collection. I combine
qualitative data based on twelve months of fieldwork in four comparative in-depth case studies in Mexico (and the U.S. cities where the supporting hometown association is located) to trace the causal mechanisms with quantitative data from three original large-N datasets that examine the variation and outcomes of migrant-state coproduction across a multitude of cases.

Starting from either side of the U.S. – Mexico transnational dyad, I first test the hypothesized factors that explain the emergence of migrant-state coproduction partnerships. I first evaluate the systematic differences between places with and without coproduction across all Mexican municipalities and (most) U.S. cities over the 2002 – 2007 period for which data was available. This five year period reflects the active years of the Mexican federal 3x1 Program that matches the collective remittances of hometown associations to finance coproduction public works projects (N=14,000). Socio-demographic data as well as municipal budget information comes from INEGI (the Mexican analogue of the US Census Bureau), 3x1 data is from the Ministry of Social Development, and electoral results come from the Municipal Elections Database compiled by the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) as well as from the Centro de Investigación Para el Desarrollo, A.C. (CIDAC) a prominent Mexican think-tank. This data is also used to test the relationship between migrant-state coproduction and citizens’ access to public goods—drainage and sewerage, electricity and water—simultaneously testing key alternative hypotheses (political competition, party ID, income, among others).

In order to test the hypothesized relationship between immigrant host context and emergence of Mexican migrant-state public-private partnerships, I collected socio-
demographic information and economic characteristics for every city in the United States from the U.S. Census Bureau. The dependent variable in the analysis is a discrete count measure of the total number of different clubs that exist in the U.S. host city and participate in the 3x1 Program. Data for the dependent variable was collected from the Ministry of Social Development (Sedesol) 3x1 Program (N=22,000).

The extant literature that empirically examines aspects of the relationship between migrant collective agents and sending state governments – small-n case studies of migrants grassroots initiatives and state-led outreach efforts at migrant reincorporation – compartmentalize the different agents and analyze a limited set of cases. The small-n case studies focus almost exclusively on select features of the organizational structure of migrant hometown associations and less on the character of their public-private partnerships. Examining the structural variants of coproduction partnerships in the transnational context required original data collection. First, I interviewed over 30 hometown association leaders and Mexican sending-state public officials to learn more about the coproduction process from different organizations and tiers of the Mexican federal government. I also observed hometown association activities including fundraising and social events, club membership meetings and plenary meetings between HTAs and local, state and federal officials in both Mexico and the U.S. Using this qualitative data and secondary literature, I designed a survey instrument that was disseminated to a representative sample of Mexican migrant hometown associations from a large cross-section of Mexican states located across the U.S. The survey questionnaire collected information on the organizational structure and membership of the HTA, characteristics of club leadership, club activities, institutional linkages, and all aspects of
coproduction partnerships. The survey was a paper mail-out survey written in colloquial Spanish and was fielded through September 2008 to January 2009, with the aid of the University of Chicago Survey Lab. For those who preferred to complete the survey electronically, a near-exact copy of the survey was available for online completion.\textsuperscript{14}

While the survey was in the field, I followed the regular activities of five migrant clubs in San Diego, San Antonio, Los Angeles, Detroit and Chicago, conducted additional telephone and face-to-face semi-structured interviews with public officials at the U.S. Consulates in Chicago and Los Angeles and leadership of the state level federations of Mexican clubs. Data collection from the survey served three main objectives: First, to capture variation in migrant-state coproduction partnerships, HTAs organizational forms and capacities. Second, it provided a method of selecting hometown associations and their places of origin for fieldwork. Third, it is the first large-N dataset of representative sample of Mexican HTAs from 24 states in Mexico and 27 states in the U.S., which permits greater generalizability across cases. The response rate is 50 percent (detailed information about the survey is included in the appendix).

Following survey data collection I matched the Mexican municipal dataset to the survey respondent hometown associations that engages in the public-private partnership to create (the first) transnational dataset of migrant-state coproduction. This unique dataset permits analysis of how structural variations in coproduction partnerships impact a variety of public goods and government performance indicators, while simultaneously controlling (and testing) local level factors that might also influence public goods provision. Using the transnational migrant-municipality dataset, I stratified the sample

\textsuperscript{14} Response rates between the two survey dissemination methods was negligible and is 50\%, N=250. A detailed description of survey methods is included in the appendix.
according to relative wealth of the municipality and structural variants of coproduction partnerships. From this sample I randomly selected six hometown associations for in-depth comparative case study stratified by level of wealth. After contacting and meeting with (in some cases) the leadership of the selected hometown associations I conducted fieldwork in their respective communities of origin. I lived in four municipalities in three states for two months each and visited additional municipalities in Jalisco and San Luis Potosi to serve as shadow cases of migrant-state coproduction ideal types.

The case studies provided an important opportunity to analyze and connect microfoundations to aggregate outcomes and trace hypothesized causal mechanisms. The municipalities of Tepeche, Zacatecas, Comonfort, Guanajuato and Colotlan, Jalisco are examples of intermediary cases of migrant-state coproduction, while Salvatierra, Guanajuato and the shadow case of Tuxca, Jalisco are examples of synergistic migrant-state coproduction. Calidad, Guanajuato is a control municipality, while Arriaga, San Luis Potosi serves as an example of predatory migrant-state coproduction.

The breadth and depth of the original data collection provides novel solutions to understand more fruitfully the complexity of the transnational inter-web of structures, relationships, agency, incentives and outcomes involved in the process of migrant-state coproduction of public goods and services.