For the last two decades, external actors have channeled millions of dollars into the Arab world on initiatives designed to promote democracy. Resources for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), funds for democracy awareness workshops, campaigns for winning hearts and minds, policies to enhance the economies of these regions, and efforts to increase public awareness about the virtues of democracy are but a few of the ways in which external actors, especially the US, have engaged the democratization paradigm in the Arab world. These democratization strategies are informed by a bottom-up approach to democracy, where individual political preferences matter for the type of political institutions that emerge and endure.

Yet, despite greater appreciation for democracy and advancements in human and economic development, the Arab World today remains one of the last bastions of authoritarian rule across the globe. So frustrated are the citizens of the Arab world with existing corrupt governments and dismal economies that the dearth of democratic revolutions from below is indeed surprising. Although the last two decades have witnessed greater appreciation and support for democracy, more democratic contestation, modernization gains, and economic growth, the Arab world today is still removed from democracy. And even while we monitor developments in Egypt, Winter 2011, there are serious questions about whether we’ll witness a democratic transition, or whether Egypt will gradually withstand pressures for democratization. This state of affairs remains one of the more pervasive puzzles of Arab politics.

The truth is that in conversations with ordinary citizens across the region, I found significant pockets of support for existing authoritarian regimes, even among citizens who were most disaffected by such dictatorial rule. Similarly, these citizens continue to profess support for existing authoritarian
regimes, even while simultaneously holding strong democratic values. This paper, therefore, analyzes the relationship between Arab societies and their governing institutions. Why do citizens in the Arab world who appear not to be direct beneficiaries of governmental perquisites and benefits continue to support existing authoritarian leadership while they also profess strong democratic values?

I argue that any examination of the reasons behind citizens' continued support of existing leaderships in the Arab world must take into account the ways citizens assess the strategic utility of existing authority in relation to a country’s position in the international system. In my interviews with citizens across the region, a dominant theme emerges. Citizens were making decisions about the suitability of democracy for their states based on international factors. Citizens across the region are cognizant of the client status of their regimes vis-à-vis external actors. Arab countries are highly dependent on the US for security, and today, as in the case of several other countries like Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, and Palestine, the relationship also extends to aid. Even while they simultaneously resent the US, citizens across the region understand the necessity of their regime's relationship with the US for longevity and stability. Thus, citizens leverage their support towards existing authoritarian rule according to their assessment of the strategic utility of existing leadership in maintaining the status quo with the external patron, the US.

Yet, stark variation surfaces across the region. Some societies are far more supportive of their regimes than others. For example, I find that significant variation exists between the two monarchies of Jordan and Kuwait when comparing levels of support for political authority. Citizens in each country were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with these decisions.”¹ While rentier formulations hold that recipients of rentier services and aid should overwhelmingly support their regimes since they leverage their political rights for economic benefits, I find that only 26% of Kuwaitis

¹ Surveys were conducted as part of the Arab Barometer Project. See www.arabbarometer.org for more information.
wholeheartedly do so. What is even more compelling is that 50% of the Jordanian population says it supports its government unequivocally. Given that Jordan is struggling with dismal economic and unemployment conditions, this larger percentage of support when compared to Kuwait is indeed astonishing.

I argue that the variation in levels of support for existing leadership emerging between Jordan and Kuwait is influenced by the ways citizens evaluate the essential roles existing leaderships play in maintaining the alliance with the United States. The position of a state in the international arena shapes the ways citizens engage their regimes. More specifically, I argue that in a country like Jordan, support for the Hashemite monarchy is considerably higher when compared to levels of Kuwaiti support for the Sabahs because of Islamist opposition opinion. Despite similar levels of support for Islamist movements, at roughly 35-60% in both Jordan and Kuwait, the Islamist opposition in Jordan is much more anti-American than the opposition in Kuwait. Jordanian citizens are therefore more likely to worry about the potential international ramifications of democratic regime change in Jordan. Three mechanisms structure their concerns. First, given that the mainstream Islamist movement enjoys considerable support, Islamists non-supporters worry that democracy has the potential to bring a new government to power that will be less willing to maintain a close alliance with the US, thereby jeopardizing the national well-being of Jordan as a whole. It is questionable whether the US will desire to keep a close alliance with any new government likely to emerge from democratic elections. The second mechanism that results in support of the regime is worry that democracy could give anti-American extremist groups more space and opportunity. For instance, increased liberties and protections under democracy could allow followers the necessary political space to stage attacks against US interests in Jordan, such as the 2002 targeting of US diplomat Laurence Foley in Amman by al-Qaeda members. A 2006 Harvard study covering 186 countries

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2 It is difficult to find accurate data on actual support for the movement. Yet most accounts agree that Islamists enjoy anywhere between 35%-60% support in Jordan (based on analysis of their successes in local associational elections, and other patterns of Islamist mobilization strategies). See Jillian Schwedler (2007) and Greg Gause (2006).
found that, on average, a single standard deviation increase in a country's terrorist risk rating can lead to as much as a 5 per cent drop in that country's foreign direct investment. For the average developing country, that amounts to millions of unrealized dollars that might have been used to induce economic growth. A strong monarchy is important to ensure that these radical Islamists don’t jeopardize the economic well-being of the country. Finally, the suitability of democracy in Jordan is questionable because it could weaken the monarchy to the extent that it will be unable to control its internal opposition movements. As a result, the monarchy will no longer be able to serve its role in maintaining strong ties to the US.

These concerns about the importance of the monarchy for the client relationship with the US do not preoccupy Kuwaitis to the same extent that they do Jordanians. In Kuwait, Islamist opposition opinions are more favorable towards the United States. Increasing legislative powers or bolstering levels of political and civil liberties in Kuwait through democratization will not disrupt the relationship Kuwait enjoys with the US. Hence, levels of support for existing authority in Kuwait are much lower than those in Jordan.

Examining Kuwait and Jordan allows me to demonstrate how concerns about a country’s international relations shape state-society relations more broadly. Jordan and Kuwait are two parliamentary monarchies with similar levels of international clientelism but possess very different levels of anti-American sentiment among Islamist opposition forces. This variation is my key explanatory variable. Kuwait and Jordan do differ in their economic structures; Kuwait is a classic rentier economy, while Jordan is not a distributive rentier state in the same way. According to rentier formulations, however, Kuwaitis should be more supportive and not less supportive of their government than Jordanians. In order to further isolate the effects of my argument that levels of anti-Americanism among the main opposition movements matter for the ways in which citizens across the region engage their

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3 http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~aabadie/twe.pdf
governments, I briefly extend my argument to Morocco and Saudi Arabia. These additional cases allow for more systematic paired comparisons among two sets of countries with more similarity, further demonstrating the robustness of my argument. Jordan and Morocco are both monarchies that lack mineral resources and have similar economic structures, and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are two oil-producing states located in the Gulf region. Further, the analysis will also be applied to Palestine's democratic experience that resulted in Hamas' parliamentary victory of 2006. These cases will illuminate the causal logics citizens employ under conditions of regime clientelism.

**Political Cultural and Political Economic Explanations as They Pertain to the Arab World**

Two overarching macro-explanations have been most prevalent in explaining the lack of democratization in the Arab world. Both approaches focus on societal determinants of authoritarian tendencies and attempt to explain why citizens have not launched a more vocal democratic contestation of the established orders. The first theoretical approach is grounded in political culture explanations, and the second focuses on explanations confined to the region's political economy. At the core of both approaches is the notion that Arab societies have not attained the necessary levels of political and economic modernization that equip citizens with the requisite values and economic interests to pose significant challenges to existing authoritarian rule. Absent these by-products of modernization, citizens remain locked into supportive relations with their regimes (Huntington, 1993; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Welzel, 2008).

While most third wave democratizations occurred in regions outside the Arab world, it was not the case that the Arab street disapproved of democratic values; nor was it the case that the Arab world continued to stagnate in its economic development trajectory. Public opinion data from the region reveals that since 2000, support for democracy is overwhelming. Polls across the region indicate that democracy
enjoys support from close to over 80% of the region’s population.\textsuperscript{4} Further, the many countries in the Arab world have gradually begun to enjoy greater economic growth, lower poverty rates, a more stable middle class, privatization and globalization, and greater rates of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). These independent explanations, however, did not result in an effective and protracted wave of democratic contestation. The third wave, it appeared, halted at the doorsteps of the region. Why? More problematic still, evidence presented in this manuscript illustrates that citizens—despite domestic and global changes—remain committed to authoritarian rule. And where we do see less support for regimes, it’s in countries that, according to these very economic and political culture models, would have us believe otherwise.

\textit{Political Culture:}

The scholarly literature on political culture emphasizes the importance of two mechanisms crucial to democratic forms of contestation (Weiner and Huntington 1994). First, modernization is assumed to be linked to values and orientations that would serve as democratic pre-requisites. These models have been advanced by renowned scholars in the field from Almond and Verba (1963) to Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989); from Inglehart (1990) to Huntington (1993) and Putnam (1993). Through modernization, citizens would not only acquire better economic opportunities, but they would also develop the norms necessary for democracy.\textsuperscript{5} That is, development “encourage[s] supportive cultural orientations [of democracy]” (Inglehart, 1990). Thus, economic development was deemed important to generating pertinent values useful to democratization.

\textsuperscript{5} In a similar vein Kiren Aziz Chaudhury highlights value changes linked to economic development which are important for the building of economic markets. She highlights the importance of economic development for creating economic markets which are structured by market cultures. In such cultures, individualism is seen as an important norm that replaces pre-capitalist values. See also Albert Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977). 30. Stephen Holmes, "The Secret History of Self-Interest." in Jane Mansbridge. ed.. Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 267-286.
A second strand of the political culture literature highlights the importance of civil society for democracy. As societies develop, so too should their civil societies develop in ways that would make democracy a more viable outcome. This strand in the political culture literature looks at the role of civic associations as schools for civic virtue (Toqueville, 1956) and generators of social capital (Putnam, 1993), and therefore they form major counterweights to existing authoritarian rulers. Larry Diamond, for instance, highlights the importance of civil society for democracy. Civil society can check the powers of the state; it encourages citizen participation, helps the development of a democratic culture of tolerance and bargaining, creates new channels for representing interests, creates cross-cutting cleavages, serves as forum for the retention of development of new political leaders, and allows for the enrichment and circulation of information to citizens. Thus, civil society has a vital role to play in shaping democratic attitudes and behaviors among populations. Where democratic contestation is weak or lacking, one plausible arena to explore for such weakness is civil society (Larry Diamond 1989).

In the context of the Arab world, therefore, the region’s political culture—a general lack of the democratic values linked to modernization and developed civil societies—remains one key set of variables explaining the persistence of authoritarian rule. That the political culture of the region might not be compatible with democracy is yet another theme captured in studies that link the support for authoritarianism to Islam. The political culture of Islam, it has been argued, impedes the development of modernization pre-requisites because Islam and democracy simply don’t mix well together. These arguments maintain that, first, Muslims are more likely to accept the status quo, however disadvantageous it may be, as part of a doctrine of divine destiny (Kedourie, 1992; Pipes, 1983; Berger, 1964). Citizens of the region are more likely to attribute their political situations to “Allah’s way.” Such adherence to the status quo bars any contestation of the established order. Second, as Samuel Huntington has argued in his seminal work on the clash of civilizations, Islam and democracy are inherently incompatible because Islam recognizes no division between “church” and state because it emphasizes the community over the
individual. Individualism, Huntington maintains, is a key asset to liberal democratic orders. Third, as other scholars like Frances Fukuyama argue, Islam poses a grave threat to liberal democracy because its doctrinal emphasis lacks a liberal democratic orientation. Fourth, Islam does not advocate political freedoms and in fact mobilizes people against democratic values (Tibi, 1991). The political culture of Islam arguments have been so pervasive in the study or Arab political development that even if Arab societies are able to attain the necessary levels of modernization, this strand of the literature questions whether Muslim societies can appreciate and function within the norms of a democratic polity.

*Political Economy:*

Juxtaposed with such political cultural explanations are those models that describing the persistence of authoritarianism as a function of the economic structures of these societies. Two main formulations have been advanced to explain how existing economic structures shape citizen support for their authoritarian regimes in the context of the Arab world. The first is an extension of modernization formulations. In essence, because Arab societies have not developed economically, or at least because their economic trajectories have been marked by slow progress, the Arab world has not developed autonomous middle class groups that can place the necessary constraints on regimes (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992, Fukuyama, 1992; Lipset, 1959; Pye, 1990, Bellin 2002; Tsai 2005). Scholars who work on the economic and political development of the Arab region like Eva Bellin (2002), Pete Moore (2005), Melanie Cammett (2007), Jill Crystal (1995) and Kiren Aziz Chaudhry (1997) have all examined the ways in which existing business interests remain tied to the regimes in power. This lack of business and middle class autonomy explains authoritarian persistence. Absent the development of independent economic interests separate from the regime, citizens remain bound up in close supportive relations with them. These relations further solidify authoritarian rule.

The growth of autonomous middle class sectors has been documented as a key factor explaining the emergence of democracy across the globe. The importance of creating new economic forces in society
through economic development again is highlighted in the major scholarly works of Barrington Moore (1966) and Samuel Huntington (1993). This expansion of the middle class, consisting of businesspeople, professionals, shopkeepers, teachers, civil servants, managers, technicians, and clerical and sales workers, gradually began to see democracy as a means of securing their own interests. As Huntington reminds us, “Third wave movements for democratization were not led by landlords, peasants, or (apart from Poland) industrial workers. In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class.”

The crucial role played by the commercial-industrial elite in the emergence of democratic institutions has been emphasized by analysts including Lerner (1958), Lipset (1964), Deutsch (1961), Lindblom (1977) and Huntington (1964,1993). The development of the middle class, removing citizens from their loyalty to authoritarian regimes, is vital, they argue, for democratic forms of contestation.

The second line of argumentation emerging from the political economy explanations looks to rentierism. That states have an abundance of wealth derived from oil or soft budgets allows them to buy citizen acquiescence in the face of authoritarian rule. In the context of the Arab world, rentier state formulations suggest the ability of wealth to stifle citizen dissent or protest in ways that harm democratic accountability (Anderson, 1995; Bellin, 1994; Luciani, 1999; Ross, 2001). Because they do not rely on taxes, rentier states remain above the concerns of citizens. Further, citizens who are recipients of rentier largesse are more likely to be supportive of their regimes. In the familiar formulation, “No representation without taxation,” citizens are seen as subjects who have exchanged their right to contestation for services provided by the government. Because citizens are over-pampered, they are more likely to support their regimes and less likely to engage in contested forms of participation. Why should citizens challenge the state when “cradle to grave” benefits are generously offered to the population at large?

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6 Third Wave, page 67.
Several countries of the Arab world are treated or classified as rentier economies either because they possess massive resource wealth or they are the direct recipients of foreign aid (Anderson, 1995). Essentially, the concentration of resources in the hands of government has allowed these governments the ability to offer services and deliver goods, without citizens directly mobilizing and demanding such representation. Hazem Beblawi (1987) argues that the state plays a crucial role in the rentier formulation, for it is the recipient and distributor of rents writ large. Society is on the receiving end of these rents. Because the society is a recipient of rents and not a payer of taxes, economic interests are less likely to form in meaningful interest-group articulations. Hence, society remains supportive of the regime and not an arena of contestation. In this classic formulation of the rentier model, citizens don’t need to contest the state; rather, they lend the state support, because the state already distributes and offers goods and services (Luciani, 1999, Ross 2001, Smith 2004, Chaudhury 1997, Anderson 1987, Crystal 1990, Vandewalle 1998, Bellin 1994, Herb, 2002; Okruhlik, 1999; Crystal, 1995). In rentier states, that is, citizens remain passive and compliant.

Revisiting Prevailing Models: Theoretical Limitations and Empirical Realities in Jordan and Kuwait

These two prevailing models explaining the lack of democratization in the region—models with roots both in political and economic culture—don’t necessarily reflect the empirical realities on the ground in the Arab world. Not only does the empirical record contradict many of the models’ predictions, but the implicit assumptions underlying the logic of these approaches are faulty as well. Both approaches are explicit about the fact that democratic preferences and orientations are lacking due to existing cultural values and economic structures. In such political cultural models, whether they are about civil society, Islam or modernization, society has yet to acquire the necessary values important for democracy. In economic formulations, the rentier effect model suggests that there is little reason for citizens to embrace democracy given that the existing economic rewards are more valuable than democracy, and the lack of
autonomous middle classes explains why there aren’t greater demands for democracy. If the Arab world is able to experience value-change through more modernization and civil society activity, and if Arab states could become less reliant on oil and soft budgets to allow for a growing autonomous middle class, then societies will more likely adopt democratic preferences. These preferences, then, should result in less authoritarian support and greater demands for democracy. According to these models, societies are solely responsible for the types of regimes that continue to prevail.

An examination of the empirical realities of the Arab world, especially the cases—Jordan and Kuwait—under consideration here, raise several questions about the applicability of the political culture and political economic formulations. In Jordan, almost two decades of privatization and structural adjustment and almost a decade of greater economic integration into the global economy have given the middle classes new hopes and opportunities. Despite these advancements in human development and strong support for democracy, however, support for the regime remains high in Jordan, especially among the very middle class sector\(^7\) that should comprise the vanguard of regime contestation. Further, whereas rentier formulations would predict that support for authority should be higher in states, like Kuwait, that derive most of their revenue from oil, the empirical evidence shows that support for authority is greater in Jordan than in Kuwait. In fact, only a quarter of the oil-rich country professes strong support for the government. Finally, formulations relating to the political culture of Islam have not been able to systematically account for democratic consolidation in Muslim countries outside the Arab world, like Indonesia and Turkey. These models fall short in capturing the observed facts on the ground in the Middle East.

*Political Culture and Political Economic Formulations: A Critique of Bottom-Up Paradigms to Authoritarian Support*

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\(^7\) This category of individuals as substantiated by qualitative interviews also includes those who support greater economic reforms and want to see increased globalization as a way to improve the economic status of the kingdom.
For decades, policymakers and scholars have analyzed the role societies play in the emergence, sustenance, and durability of political regimes across the globe. Especially in the context of the Arab world, these models have focused on the citizens' role in supporting authoritarian political regimes. These formulations emerge from a central assumption: citizens have the potential to shape domestic institutions. That is, a mutually reinforcing relationship exists between a society and its political institutions. These bottom-up models maintain that existing cultural and economic conditions stifle democratic contestation and therefore explain authoritarian support. If these conditions were to change, then more democratic contestation would ensue.

These bottom-up cultural and economic models of political change continue to occupy a significant space in comparative politics and appeal to both policy makers and scholars of democracy. The glamour of these bottom-up models of democracy is the simplicity of a straightforward, accessible mechanism of cause and effect. If key democratic values and higher levels of education, civil society, and viable economic structures can cause change favorable to democracy, then these changes can induce citizens to make democratic demands on their states. This equilibrium between a society and its political institutions relies, however, on a major unexamined premise: existing political institutions derive the foundations of their legitimacy from their own societies. Such theoretical approaches, which simultaneously explain the role of citizens in supporting authoritarianism and the conditions under which democracy may emerge, assume that states are sovereign, self-contained units, legitimated by their societies, and thus are likely to reflect the political preferences of its people. Ignoring the position of states in the larger international context, this premise insists that states are monolithically autonomous and linked to their societies in a mutually reinforcing process shielded from external influence (Kohli, 1993). But what happens in weak states that are clients of world powers? What happens when these client states do not derive legitimacy from their own people, but rather rely on winning the approbation of the external
Revisiting State and Society Relations in Clientelistic Settings: “Real Congruence” VS. “Contrived Congruence”

Citizens of client regimes, first and foremost, view their regimes as protectors of the established order vis-à-vis the external patron. In client regimes, I argue, the fundamental synthesis of state-society relations underlying political culture and political economic explanations is radically altered. The client relationship diffuses direct accountability mechanisms between states and societies which are at the heart of these bottom-up approaches to democracy. The hypothesized mutually-reinforcing impact of societies on institutions is disrupted. States are not solely accountable to their citizens; they are also accountable to the external patron. This reality is not lost on ordinary citizens. Three implications emerge from this analysis. First, the feedback process between state and society is disturbed. In client states, institutions are no longer solely expressions of society’s preferences; in many cases, the patron shapes the configuration of domestic institutions. As such, society’s preferences and orientations in client societies matter less for the durability and stability of existing institutions. Congruence between society and its political institutions need not be the only reason a country shows remarkable authoritarian stability. Existing political institutions can derive their stability and durability from their patrons.

When states are not autonomous and rely on external actors for security, aid, and economic progress, as do many Arab states, the mutually reinforcing process between society and institutions is disrupted in a second way as well: society’s agency is hampered. Thus, preferences towards more democracy need not induce greater demands on the state for political accountability, because it is obvious to the citizenry that the state is also “accountable” to larger outside forces. A diffusion of the rentier effect and the emergence of new economic interests, for instance, need not result in direct contestation of the existing establishment, despite the fact that states may no longer be able to purchase loyalty. In societies that are already authoritarian, an increased appreciation of or desire for democracy, as a result of value
change or new economic relations, need not result in democratic demands on the state. Democracy entails the possibility of regime change. For citizens of client states, then, an additional layer of negotiation is introduced. In order to maintain cohesive state-society relations, the emergent domestic power needs to recognize the external patron and the external patron needs to accept the outcome of any possible alternation of power. If democracy might jeopardize the base of external support for the regime, then the likelihood of contestation is reduced. Democratic appreciation and orientations, new economic opportunities, and expanded civic qualities are not sufficient to structure democratic societal demands. Citizens need to guarantee that their national well-being (the security and resource base of the nation) will not be jeopardized if they choose to exercise their newly acquired democratic civic world-views, whether acquired through cultural or economic change.

Finally, state clientelism disrupts the hypothesized mutually-reinforcing process between societies and political institutions in a third way. The durable stability that many Arab countries enjoy today is less about institutions mirroring society’s “real” values and preferences. Rather, it is more about a “contrived” or “manufactured” congruence between citizens and their political institutions. In clientelistic settings, the “actual” values of society matter less than the “contrived” values that are shaped by the status of a country as a client in the international order.

**Main Argument: A Country’s Position in the International System Matters**

Any examination of the reasons why citizens continue to support authoritarian rule in client regimes needs to take into account assessments about the strategic utility of the regime in maintaining the external ties so crucial for national well-being. More specifically, I argue that the variation in levels of support for existing leadership emerging between Jordan and Kuwait is influenced by the ways citizens evaluate the essential roles existing leaderships play in maintaining the alliance with the United States. In a country like Jordan, support for the Hashemite monarchy is considerably higher when compared to levels of Kuwaiti support for the Sabahs, because of Islamist opposition opinion. The Islamist opposition
in Jordan is much more anti-American than the opposition in Kuwait. Jordanian citizens are therefore more likely to worry about the potential democratic ramifications of regime change in Jordan. A disruption of US ties can result in weakening of the client relationship which can lead to economic and security repercussions for Jordan. If a new democratically elected regime is hostile to the US, the US may choose to resort to sanctioning such a regime. These concerns about the importance of the monarchy for the client relationship with the US do not preoccupy Kuwaitis to the same extent that they do Jordanians. In Kuwait, Islamist opposition opinions are more favorable towards the United States, so an alteration of Kuwaiti power structures brought on by increasing levels of democracy will not disrupt the relationship Kuwait enjoys with the US. Hence, levels of support for existing authority in Kuwait are much lower than those in Jordan.

**Empirical Tests**

In order to test my argument, I use two different sources of information—ordinary least squares regression models and qualitative analysis of open-ended structured interviews of Jordanians and Kuwaitis. In my quantitative analysis, response to one question, “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with these decisions,” captures both support for government and also an authoritarian predisposition, which is to allow the government to rule with little accountability. This variable, support for government, is my dependent variable. Again, noticeable variation exists between Jordan and Kuwait, with Jordanians almost as twice as likely to support this position (50%-26%). My key explanatory variable looks at security vulnerability. The logic behind this inclusion is that those citizens who support giving up human rights and civil liberties for security are

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8 PIs Mark Tessler and Amaney Jamal. See [www.arabbarometer.org](http://www.arabbarometer.org) for more information. 1,200 Jordanians and 750 Kuwaitis were randomly sampled in each country. See Appendix for Sampling techniques, question wording and operationalization, and distribution of key independent variables.

9 Question wording: To what degree would you agree that the violation of human rights in Jordan is justifiable in the name of promoting security and stability? Do you believe it is:


10 Question wording: To what degree would you agree that the violation of human rights in Jordan is justifiable in the name of promoting security and stability?
more likely to be invested in preserving the status quo. I expect to find this variable significant in Jordan and not Kuwait. I also control for several pertinent demographic variables like age, gender, religiosity, and employment status. I further control for competing hypotheses that can plausibly explain why citizens continue to support their regimes in the states under analysis. Specifically, I will look at the effects of education, fear, clientelism, patriotism, and national origin in the case of Jordan.

Qualitative analysis further draws out the causal mechanisms of my argument and allows for a more in-depth analysis of the sources that structure concerns about the national well-being in these societies. In particular, interview data is crucial in explaining how these concerns translate into support for existing authoritarian rule.

Alternative Hypotheses:

Education

Theoretical models examining the persistence of what is perceived as citizenship support of authoritarianism have looked to socio-economic factors emanating from modernization formulations (Inglehart 1990; Norris 1993; Huntington, 1964). Modernization models hold that societies lacking basic levels of education will be less knowledgeable and therefore lack a strong appreciation of democratic rights and responsibilities. It is hypothesized that citizens who lack education are less likely to appreciate democratic rights and responsibilities—hence are more likely to support authoritarianism writ large. In order to tap into this hypothesis, I examine the impact of education on support for authoritarian rule in Jordan and Kuwait.

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11 Open-ended interviews were conducted by two research teams under the supervision of the PI (Amaney Jamal) in Jordan and Kuwait. 220 interviews were conducted in 2005 and 2006. The interviewees were selected through a variety of techniques. Respondents were randomly approached in coffee shops, taxis, hair salons, markets, malls, grocery stores, and university campuses. Utilizing snowball sampling techniques, some respondents offered names of other potential participants. Each interview lasted for about 60-90 minutes. Targeted sampling techniques were also employed to maximize socio-economic and geographic diversity across each country. 140 interviews were conducted in Jordan during the summer of 2005; and 71 total interviews were conducted in Kuwait during the winter of 2006. It is important to point out that these samples are not representative of the entire Jordanian and Kuwaiti populations.
Models examining continued support for authoritarianism in the Arab world have often looked at the ways citizens directly benefit from the regime in power. The logic of this argument holds that individuals engage the state through the lens of cost-benefit analyses. This strand of the literature focuses on clientelism and political access. Access to direct benefits through clientelistic or rentier channels have also been seen as a common feature sustaining authoritarian support among the population (Jamal, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Lust-Okar, 2006; Luciani and Chaudhry, 1997). Citizens who are direct beneficiaries of the state are more likely to support it, regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian. This line of argumentation is also closely linked to theories about the rentier state. In order to test this alternative explanation, I include three additional questions that gauge levels of clientelism and political access. The first looks at whether individuals have ever used a Wasta (or clientelistic channel); a second measure also taps into government evaluations of existing services, and a third gauges the citizen assessments of the ease of filing complaints against the government. These three different variables measure their perceptions about government services and responsiveness and the extent to which citizens have access to government.\(^\text{12}\)

Further, models assessing citizenship in authoritarian regimes have often looked to the role of repression in impeding and stifling active forms of political engagement and contestation. Citizens fear for their everyday well-being, for their economic livelihoods, and for their loved ones (Linz, 2000; Huntington, 1993; Bellin, 2004). Because citizens fear their regimes, they are more likely to support them not out of conviction but out of the fear of possible repercussions. Thus, any examination of continued

\(^{12}\) These three questions do not tap into similar dimensions and their alpha scale reliability stands at only 2741. Thus, there is ample justification to include each of these measures separately in the equation. See Appendix for question wording.
support for regimes, must look at the role of fear. In order to tap into this dimension of regime support, I look at whether citizens in Jordan and Kuwait believe they can join political parties without fear.

**Patriotism and National Pride:**

The role of patriotism and loyalty to the state has also been seen as a key explanation of regime support. The logic driving this claim is that citizens who espouse patriotic pride are more likely to support the regime. Patriotism, defined as a sense of national loyalty, a love of national symbols, and specific beliefs about a country’s superiority, is a significant feature that can structure support for authoritarian rule (Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1999; Spinner-Halev and Theiss-Morse, 2003; Sullivan, Fried, and Dietz, 1992). In fact, blind—or what is often referred to as uncritical—patriotism is defined as an “unwillingness both to criticize and accept criticism of the nation” (Schatz and Staub, 1997; Schatz, Staub, and Lavine, 1999). According to Huddy and Khatib, “uncritical patriotism is linked to authoritarianism, which is characterized, in turn, by a tendency to defer to authority figures and support them unconditionally.”

Do higher levels of patriotism drive support for authority in Jordan and Kuwait? In order to tap into this dimension I include a question asked on the Arab Barometer that asks whether respondents are proud to be of the national origin of the country.

Further, another important control variable in the context of Jordan is national origin. It is imperative to examine whether the differences between supporters and non-supporters of the regime are driven by differences among Palestinians and Jordanians in the kingdom. Most people will expect those Jordanians of Palestinian origin to be less supportive of the government. Respondents in Jordan were asked to identify their national origin as either Jordanian or Palestinian. Thus, I include this variable as an important control.

**Findings and Discussion:**

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13 Huddy, Leonie and Nadia Khatib (2007) page 64.
An examination of the OLS models reveals that there is the preliminary support for my main argument. Security vulnerabilities matter for support of leadership in Jordan and not Kuwait. Those Jordanian citizens who worry about security to the extent that they are willing to give up their human rights and civil liberties to ensure stability are those most likely to be supportive of government. This is not the case in Kuwait. In Kuwait, this variable is not significant in explaining levels of support for the regime. Jordanians linked their security vulnerabilities to maintaining regime support, but Kuwaitis did not. Thus, the statistical analysis here initially confirms the main hypothesis driving this analysis. Jordanians who worry about security and stability are far more likely to embrace the existing regime than their counterparts in Kuwait. Although, admittedly, the regression models demonstrate that a strong correlation exists between concerns about the national well-being, through security and stability, and support for existing leadership, I am less able through these models to demonstrate the causal logic that guides citizen support for their regimes. Therefore, I also rely on over 210 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Kuwait and Jordan.\textsuperscript{14} I demonstrate the ways security vulnerabilities, shaped by the anti-American sentiments of Islamist opposition in each state, structure the degree to which citizens embrace their regimes.

\textit{Examining the Effects of Alternative Hypotheses:}

\textit{Education:}

One would expect that the more a society is educated, the more willing it is to hold its regime accountable. Since Jordanians are more educated (27\% of Jordanians carry degrees of higher education compared to 20\% of Kuwaitis), one would expect Jordanians to be less supportive of their regime; however, this is not the case. Furthermore, in regression analysis presented below, the effects of education on patterns of support for government are insignificant in both cases. It does not appear that support for government is a function of education in either Kuwait or Jordan.

\textsuperscript{14} Interviews were conducted in Summer 2005 in Jordan and Winter 2006 in Kuwait.
Individual Assessments:

Rentier formulation would predict that citizens of oil wealthy states like Kuwait should be more supportive of their government. This is not the case, however, as Jordanians are more supportive of their government than are Kuwaitis. Thus, at the aggregate level it appears that the rentier story does not hold. At the individual level, however, we find a higher level of support for the government among those citizens in both Jordan and Kuwait who believe that the government does everything in its power to provide services. Further, citizens in Jordan who feel that they could file a complaint with ease are more supportive of the regime, while this was not the case in Kuwait. It appears, therefore, that there is systematic evidence to support the supposition that citizens more satisfied with government services are more likely to be supportive of government. Political access in the way of wassta or clientelism did not prove to be a pertinent variable in either Kuwait or Jordan. Those who have used clientelistic recourse did not appear to be more supportive of their regimes that those who didn’t.

Fear:

While fear remains a factor that suppresses active political participation and engagement, it is more prevalent in totalitarian societies than in many of the authoritarian countries in the Arab world. Further, in an era of increased global awareness and demands for better human rights records, regimes cannot rely on repression as the sole mode of political control. In logistical regression analyses (see Table 1 Appendix), I find that while fear is insignificant in explaining levels of support for government in Kuwait, in Jordan it has a significant effect; in Jordan, those less fearful also more supportive of the regime. One would expect that if fear were mediating levels of support it would be in the opposite direction: citizens who are fearful should be more supportive of the regime and not less so. Thus, fear alone cannot explain why citizens in Jordan are more supportive of their regimes. The hypothesized relationship between fear and support for the regime is substantiated in neither Jordan nor Kuwait.

Patriotism:
I find that levels of patriotism (measured here as national pride) matter in Jordan and not Kuwait. Those who are more proud to be Jordanian are also more supportive of the government. This is not the case in Kuwait, where national pride does not matter. Hence, patriotism is another factor, in addition to security vulnerabilities, that explains support for the government in Jordan. Other demographic variables had consistent effects on support for government across the two regime types as well. Primarily, men were more likely than women to be supportive of government in both countries. Perhaps women are more likely to feel politically marginalized in these two societies. Other demographic variables did not have systematic results. For example, religiosity mattered in Kuwait and not Jordan, with Kuwaitis who pray more often professing stronger allegiance to government. That religiosity is not significant across cases raises doubts about the claims that Islam reinforces authoritarianism. Further, older Jordanians are more likely to support government, while this was not the case in Kuwait. Finally, in Jordan, the Palestinian-Jordanian divide was insignificant in explaining levels of support for government. Those Jordanians who identified as Palestinian were just as likely to be supportive of the regime as those who identified as Jordanian.

Concerns about Stability and Security: Domestic Sources vs. International Concerns:

Quantitative statistical analysis demonstrates that concerns about security and stability matter for support for government in Jordan and not Kuwait. These findings, however, tell us little about the sources of security vulnerabilities. For example, potential domestic factors inducing instability—fear of civic strife or fear that violence may emerge among different segments of the population if democracy is pursued—can be of major concern. (Snyder, 2000). In a country like Jordan, for instance, security concerns about potential Palestinian-Jordanian rivalry or exacerbated cleavages between the tribal and urban sectors could lead to civic decay and outright civil unrest. In Kuwait, there are tensions between the Sunnis and Shias, and between the Bedouin (Badu) and the urbanites (Hadr) as well. Finally, other sources of domestic tension might concern the divide between secular and religious forces. More
democracy might empower Islamists to adopt sharia-oriented policies that could marginalize secular segments of the populations. Monarchies have been instrumental in maintaining the delicate balances that exist between different societal divisions (Waterbury, 1970; Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002). Thus, by playing such cleavages against one another, monarchies enhance their strategic utility to the population.

However, in my open-ended interviews in Kuwait and Jordan, I did not find concern about internal conflict to be the major factor motivating support for the regime. I did find, however, that citizens were greatly concerned about the country’s position in the larger international context. People were more concerned about the external client relationship with the US rather than internal domestic cleavages. Although the potential for internal conflict was discussed, it became readily obvious that citizens were first and foremost more likely to leverage their fears about national stability towards the international order as a means of guaranteeing the longevity of the regime. The variation that emerges between Kuwait and Jordan on levels of support for authority is, I argue, a function of the degree of anti-American sentiment among Islamist opposition movements over the client relationship Jordan and Kuwait share with the US. Both Kuwait and Jordan are US clients. Without such support, both countries could face serious economic and security repercussions. To get a full picture of these contextual factors, I carefully describe both the parameters of regime clientelism and the variation in levels of anti-Americanism that exist between Islamic opposition movements in Kuwait and Jordan. Finally, in the last section, I turn to open-ended interviews to illustrate how citizens use these contextual frames to mediate their levels of political engagement with their regimes.

**Argument: The International Context Matters: Securing the National Well-Being of the State through Clientelism**

Most of the regimes in the Arab world are clients of the United States. The longevity of these regimes depends upon maintaining strategic alliances to the United States. This condition of clientelism mediates citizen political engagements with their regimes. Therefore, any examination of citizens' continued support of their regimes must take into account the ways they view the strategic utility of the
existing leader for the US alliance. The strategic utility of the existing leader for maintaining the client relationship with the US is higher in societies where the Islamic opposition resists the client relationship, as in Jordan. In Kuwait, there is more opposition acceptance of the US, and therefore the strategic utility of the existing leadership is less salient to maintaining the client relationship.

David Lake offers the concept of “international hierarchy” to capture the degree of clientelism between a dominant power and one that is subordinate. International hierarchy between one state and another, Lake argues, “exists when one actor, the dominant state, possesses authority over another actor, the subordinate state. Authority is never total, of course, but varies in extent.”¹⁵ This domineering relationship between the US and other, weaker states normally extends to both security and economic relations. The degree to which a country can secure and economically sustain itself largely determines its levels of sovereignty.¹⁶ States can enter into a hierarchical relationship either by direct intervention or invitation.¹⁷ Thus, a weaker state, like many of those in the Arab world, can invite the US to secure their interests, as do many of the states in the Gulf that rely on the US for military security. In other cases, where countries in the Arab world do not conform to US interests—as was the case under Saddam’s Iraq—the US has shown the ability to intervene militarily. Economic sanctions are another tool that the US patron has used against countries in the region. Iran, Syria, and the Palestinian Hamas-led government have all been on the receiving end of US sanctions.

¹⁶ Lake indicates that he follows common practice in International Relations to tap into these two dimensions of sovereignty.
Over the last decades, several Arab states have increasingly become clients of the US, and their strategic utility to the US continues to grow as well. The US seeks to maintain regional stability, ensure Islamists do not seize power and terrorism does not spiral out of control, secure oil fields, and protect Israel. Thus, US ties to existing Arab regimes first and foremost guarantee these strategic priorities for the US. These objectives are evident in its relations with Jordan and Kuwait as well.

**Jordan and the US: Deepening Clientelism**

Jordan has always been a client of external actors. On the eve of state formation, the British economically sustained the struggling kingdom with allowances and aid packages. This relationship extended into the post-WWII era. By the late 1950s, Jordan had become a key US client, receiving economic and military aid. The US deemed Jordan important for containing both the Soviet Union and pan-Arab nationalism. The client relationship only grew after the 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel, which was orchestrated by the US. Further, after the events of 9-11, Jordan has grown even more dependent on the United States. Caught between the tensions of both Palestine and Iraq, Jordan felt even more at risk. As Abdallah II turned to the US to energize the Jordanian economy further, the capital city of Amman also became more useful to the US, providing intelligence on al-Qaeda post 9-11. Further, Jordan served as a key site from which the US could launch its devastating attack on Iraq in 2003. The US organized a reduced debt-rescheduling timetable at the Paris Club for Jordan and then doubled its aid package between fiscal years 2002 and 2003. By the end of 2003, Jordan was the fourth largest recipient of US aid worldwide, after Israel, Egypt, and Columbia. According to Robbins, “Jordanian low-key, ‘deniable’, yet extremely useful help to the American military in the eastern desert [during the 2003 Iraq war] has cemented the client relationship anew. Eight decades after its founding, Jordan’s position now is eerily reminiscent of its position in the early years of its existence: A favored dependency of the regional superpower of the day” (Robbins 204).

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Abdallah’s adamant support of the Americans during the Iraq war and post 9-11 has paid off for the kingdom in numerous ways. Jordan became the fourth country after Canada, Mexico, and Israel to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US. The United States became Amman’s largest trading partner, with almost a third of all its trade exports in 2007 headed to the US.\textsuperscript{19} (Textiles constitute the bulk of Jordanian exports to the US.) This is a marked increase from previous years. Between 2001-2006, Jordan exported 21\% of all its exports to the US. The American Chamber of Commerce in Amman has calculated that the kingdom’s exports to the United States have rocketed by 453\% between 2001 and 2005, while imports from the states grew by 18\% year after year as well. Iraq is Jordan’s second biggest export market, making up 11.3\% of all exports, and the stability of that country rests overwhelmingly in the hands of the Americans.\textsuperscript{20} Among Jordan’s other key trading partners is another strong US ally, Saudi Arabia. 80\% of Jordanian imports come from Saudi Arabia’s energy sector. Not only does Jordan overwhelmingly depend on the US (and US allies) for trade, but the Jordanian currency is strongly pegged against the American dollar. These economic programs have been successful for the kingdom. Jordan’s external debt has decreased by 75\%. Further, its foreign currency reserves have grown from less than 100 million in 1989 to slightly over 3.5 billion in 2002. These numbers have been vital in attracting foreign investment from Europe, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The Jordanian stock exchange has also done extremely well during this period, rising over 53\% in 2002, with trading volume increasing by over 83\% in 2001. These encouraging numbers are absolutely vital in terms of Jordan’s future economic trajectory. It must continue growing at least 6\% a year if it is going to be able to absorb the 45,000-65,000 new workers that enter the Jordanian workforce annually.\textsuperscript{21} Jordan’s increasing economic dependence is further captured in its increasing levels of economic and military assistance. In 2003 and 2004, Jordan received substantially more economic and military aid than in years prior. Total

\textsuperscript{19} Jordan Looks near and Far for Economic Growth
\textsuperscript{20} Jordan Looks near and Far for Economic Growth
\textsuperscript{21} \url{http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/events/event_02032003.htm}
economic aid in 2003 (the year of the Iraqi invasion) stood at close to $1 billion, with military assistance at close to $600 million. In 2004, Jordan received $348 million dollars in economic aid and an additional $204 million dollars in military aid. Since 2000, Jordan has received a total of $2.78 billion in U.S. economic assistance, not including debt relief or military assistance. (Tristam, 2008)

Strong relations with the US have become the cornerstone of Jordan’s vision for a better economic future. Where King Hussein realized the importance of this relationship to Jordan and moved cautiously to adopt it by such means as signing the peace treaty, his son, King Abdallah II, has wholeheartedly endorsed the vision. The US thus emerged as Jordan’s main economic and security backer (Greenwood 2003, Lucas 2004, Lynch 2004, Schwedler 2002, Curtis 2004). According to Robbins, “Abdallah has learnt the lesson of his father and great-grandfather before him that the swiftest and most effective way of aiding an ailing economy in Jordan is to seek strategic rents from abroad.”22 Thus, Abdallah immediately strengthened Jordan’s ties to the United States and “further linked the kingdom’s fortunes to major international economic institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade organization” (Curtis 2004). As a result of Abdallah II’s vision for greater economic development and a more integrated global economy, Amman has become a key site where investors from across the globe bring their business. Scrapping over one hundred laws on economic and trade regulation, Abdallah continues to foster economic growth and development.23 Year in and year out, visitors to Amman are shocked by the rapid pace of construction throughout the city. Not only do local investors from the Arab world—primarily from the Gulf and other war-torn areas like Lebanon and Iraq—bring their investments to Jordan, but Western investment has grown as well.24 Abdallah’s policies have resulted in growth rates of almost 6% a year.25 These facts and figures are not lost on ordinary Jordanian citizens. They see that their country is growing and becoming more globally integrated, and they know that if they

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22 Robbins, 204.
24 (Beehner, 2005) http://www.cfr.org/publication/9200/
are not enjoying the fruits of the boom now, they may down the line. If anything, when they compare the
economic boom of Amman with the devastation of neighboring Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, they see
that they are better off than the rest. They also fully understand that their strong political and economic
ties with the US have allowed for the continued stability and economic growth. With increasing levels of
security and economic growth, however, have also come increased levels of dependency and reliance on
the US. By the year 2011, virtually all barriers on goods traded between the US and Jordan will be
eliminated, thus giving US exporters more incentives to export to the monarchy.  

Thus, Jordan’s ties to the US have become extremely important for its economic viability. Jordan
is even more dependent on the US for trade and aid, and now more than ever, its foreign policy is linked
to that of the US. This relationship, however, finds its roots in a long history of reliance and dependence
on the US. Laurie Brand has elegantly analyzed the systematic links between Jordan’s foreign policy and
that of the US. Economic security was and remains a key Jordanian foreign policy consideration. Since
the 1991, Jordan’s dependence on the US has only been heightened.  

Kuwait and the US: Deepening Clientelism

The US-Kuwaiti relationship grew close as Kuwait became increasingly vulnerable to regional
instability, especially during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s. In 1987, the US agreed to fly US flags on
eleven Kuwaiti oil tankers, signaling to Iran that an attack on Kuwait would be perceived as an attack on
the US. And although in 1990, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs, John Kelly,
stated that America had no defense obligations towards Kuwait, the US was the central figure in Kuwait’s
liberation after its fall to Iraq. According to Andrew Terrill, “the 1990 Iraqi invasion left an indelible
mark on Kuwaiti attitudes about the country’s vulnerability.”  It led the Kuwaitis to conclude a 1991
military security agreement with the United States. Today, much of Kuwait’s security rests with its

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27 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion on the importance of economic security see Laurie Brand’s
   Page 33.
protectorate, the US. In 2004, the George W. Bush administration designated Kuwait as a major US non-Nato ally. Kuwait today hosts one of the largest US military bases in the Gulf region. Camp Arifjan, about 40 miles south of Kuwait City, has replaced Camp Doha as the center of US military activity. On the eve of the War on Iraq (2003), close to 140,000 US troops were positioned in Kuwait.

With Iran emerging as the key center of power in the Gulf, Kuwait finds itself all the more vulnerable. First, Kuwait worries about the ongoing tensions between the Sunni and Shia in Iraq spilling over into Kuwait. With close to 35% of its population of Shia background, this remains a significant concern. And second, Iran has been most vocal against US troop presence in the Gulf region; however, Kuwaitis view the US presence as a necessity to the regime’s survival. Kuwait today remains extremely vulnerable to regional developments and finds itself increasingly dependent on the US for security.

Although Kuwait struggled long and hard to avoid openly clientelistic engagement with the US, the events surrounding Iraq’s occupation pushed Kuwait firmly into that role; citizens across the tiny kingdom explained their gratitude for the Americans. The Kuwait government continues to pay for all in-country military costs such as maintenance, food, and fuel, even allowing foreign companies to aid in the discovery of oil in the Northern fields so as to intimately tie its security interests to the strategic interests of the US and other countries. Despite concerns that military supplies might end up in the wrong hands, Kuwait today is a major purchaser of US military equipment. The US hopes to standardize US and Kuwaiti equipment while enhancing interoperability among the two nations. In 1999, Kuwait spent $3.3 billion dollars on military equipment from the US; in 2007, it was reported that the US sold another $20 billion worth of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and five of its Gulf protectorates, including Kuwait. $13 billion worth of military equipment was supplied to Jordan and Egypt in the same year.

After 9-11 the relationship between the Kuwaitis and Americans grew even stronger. Kuwait invested in a public relations campaign to demonstrate its unwavering support of the US (Yetiv, 2002).

Kuwait bolstered its efforts to protect US forces in Kuwait and continues to work with the Americans in weeding out al-Qaeda suspects.\textsuperscript{31} Since 9-11, Kuwait has become more integrated into global economic institutions as well. In 1994, Kuwait became a founding member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In February 2004, the United States and Kuwait signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), often viewed as a prelude to a free trade agreement (FTA), which Kuwait has said it seeks.\textsuperscript{32} Kuwait has also been on a serious track to diversify its economy. On the advice of the IMF and World Bank, Kuwait began to encourage international investments throughout the 1990s. In 1995 it allowed foreign participants to buy shares in the Kuwaiti stock exchange (Pfeifer, 2002). Kuwait’s direction of trade has also shifted in favor of the US. The Kuwaiti dinar is formally tied to a several currencies, primarily the US dollar, and interest rates in Kuwait now float directly with US interests.\textsuperscript{33} The US has become the second-ranked purchaser of Kuwaiti exports, a shift from less than 10\% in the 1980s up to 20\% in the 1990s (Pfeifer, 2002). Oil accounts for 90-95\% of all its exports but only two-fifths of its GDP. Wholesale and retail trade, real estate, finance, construction, and business services account for the other three-fifths of Kuwait’s GDP. 10\% of Kuwait’s revenue is channeled into the “Future Generations Fund” for the day when oil dries up. The bulk of this reserve is invested in the US. With approximately 65\% of the population under the age of 25 and close to 90\% percent of employees in the private sector, creating jobs to absorb this youth bulge remains an immediate Kuwaiti priority. Kuwait hopes to attract Foreign Direct Investment and has started a program to privatize state-owned businesses. In 2001, the Kuwaiti National Assembly passed the Foreign Direct Investment Act, which eased restrictions on foreign banks, provided long-term protection to foreign investors against nationalization or confiscation, and eliminated the requirement for foreign companies to have a Kuwaiti sponsor or partner.

\textsuperscript{31} Congressional Research Report 2006.
\textsuperscript{32} Congressional Research Report, 2006.
Kuwait’s current and future economic success is deeply linked to the US. First of all, Kuwait’s security agreements provide the necessary protection to Kuwait’s oil fields and secure its ability to export to world markets. Second, Kuwaiti efforts to build its non-oil sector are linked to enhancing relations with external partners, namely the US. Finally, Kuwaiti investments are predominantly located in the US and other Western countries, directly tying Kuwait’s current and future security and economic needs to those of the US.\[34\]

**Islamist Opposition Opinion on the Role of the US in Kuwait and Jordan:**

Islamist Opposition opinion matters for the ways in which citizens relate to political authority. In countries where Islamist opposition is more anti-US, like in Jordan, I expect citizens to be more supportive of their regimes out of fear that Islamists can disrupt the client relations between their country and the US. This next section outlines the key variation in my explanatory variable.

*Jordan:*

Both the Islamic Action Front [IAF] (or Islamic Jabha) in Jordan and the Islamic Constitutional Movement [ICM] (or HADAS) in Kuwait have linkages to the larger Muslim Brotherhood organization of Egypt. However, the IAF in Jordan has maintained a platform that is anti-US and anti-normalization with Israel, while the ICM has not. In fact, many of the tensions emerging between the IAF and the Jordanian monarchy have revolved around political developments in the region—namely the US-brokered Peace Agreement with Israel, the US war in Iraq, and the War on Terror. When King Hussein felt that the Islamists were not going to side with the peace process, he did not hesitate to use repression to limit their influence. King Abdallah has continued in the same path.

With the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, anti-US sentiment developed stringently among the IAF. In fact, the IAF has consistently expressed its anti-normalization stance since the 1994 Peace Treaty. It blames the US for creating advantages for Israel at the expense of Jordanians. Further, it also despises

the US role in Iraq. Among the opposition, then, increased anger against the US emerged as a result of the US invasion of Iraq and its continued support of the Israeli occupation. The IAF also accuses the Jordanian regime of being complicit in regional US imperial ambitions. After the Jordanian regime agreed to side with the US in the War on Terror, IAF criticism against the US, Israel, and the regime has grown (Schwedler 2007; Curtis 2002; Lynch 2006; Lucas 2004; Clark 2006).

Kuwait:

Among the Islamist opposition in Kuwait, the ICM, one notes acceptance of the role the US plays in the monarchy. Although the ICM supports the Palestinian cause, “its position towards the United States is quite mild; the ICM has not been critical of the security relationship between Kuwait and the United States.”35 The ICM’s pro-US stance can be traced to the Gulf War (1990), when a rift emerged between it and the larger Muslim Brotherhood movement of the Arab world. The direct source of the fissure between the two was the US role in liberating Kuwait and sanctioning Iraq. The mainstream Muslim Brotherhood movement objected to such direct US intervention in the region. The Kuwaiti Islamic Constitutional Movement was not as critical of the US role in the region as was the Muslim Brotherhood, because Kuwaiti survival was directly linked to US liberation efforts. For the ICM, it was a national obligation to support the Americans during the Gulf War. Even after the Gulf War, the Brotherhood remained critical of the US presence in Kuwait. According to Ismail Shati, a senior member of the ICM, while prominent Brotherhood branches visited Baghdad and issued statements condemning the US presence in Kuwait in language that seemed to support Saddam, “the ICM had no other choice than to sever its ties to the larger Muslim Brotherhood movement.”36 Not only did divisions emerge between the Islamist movements about the role of the US, but Kuwaitis in general were very disappointed with Arab and Muslim responses to Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait. Many a Kuwaiti felt betrayed that Arabs rallied behind Saddam. This

struck out the heart of pan-Arab national aspirations. This disappointment in Arabs and Muslims induced many Kuwaitis to prioritize national sovereignty at all costs, even if it meant an open alliance with the Americans. Kuwaitis across the board explained this relationship with the Americans as necessary to the longevity and security of their regime. This support for the US extends to all sectors of Kuwaiti society, even among its Islamist movements. In fact, mosques, too, have become sites that foment support for the US. In 2005, when Nabil al-Awadi—an Imam in the Southern region of al-Surrah—began preaching against the Americans in his Friday Khutbah, congregants cut him off. In fact, congregants in other mosques who heard about the anti-American statements emanating from al-Awadi’s mosque stood up to say “O Allah make Islam and America stronger.”

An attack on the US was seen by many as an attack on their Islam.

**Citizenship Engagements with Authority in Jordan and Kuwait:**

These differential stances toward America among the opposition in Jordan and Kuwait, then, structure the extent to which citizens support their regimes. Both Jordanian and Kuwaiti citizens recognize the importance of the US client relationship to the stability, security, and economic well-being of their regimes. Although citizens across these countries disagree about whether the US is there by invitation or imperial design and coercion, one thing is dramatically clear—the clientelistic relationship enables their stability, a goal of paramount importance for these societies.

Indeed, when comparing Jordanian and Kuwaiti levels of monarchical support, an immediate source of variation emerges. Jordanians are far more likely to support the monarchy, even when they do not derive direct sources and benefits from the regime. Jordanians are far more likely to link their support for the monarchy to the stability and economic well-being of Jordan. This stability and economic well-being is secured by the client relations Jordan has with the US. I found Jordanians to be extremely well-versed in democratic discourse, with majorities agreeing that indeed democracy was the best form of

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government. Yet, citizens across the country are hesitant about its applicability as a model form of governance for Jordan, and are therefore more likely to rally around the authoritarian monarchy than their Kuwaiti counterparts. The Hashemite monarchy, to citizens across the Kingdom, is seen as instrumental if not vital to maintaining strong ties to the US. These clientelistic ties are overwhelmingly important to a politically and economically vulnerable country like Jordan.

Among Kuwaitis, I did not find that citizens assessed their support for the monarchy based on strategic evaluations of the patron-client relationship with the US. The vast majority of Kuwaitis interviewed believe that the client relationship with the US is useful and necessary for Kuwait, similar to the Jordanian sentiment. In Kuwait, however, very few people were worried about Islamist forces holding anti-West or anti-US viewpoints. Kuwaitis are keen to point out that their opposition forces—including the Islamists—are not only moderate but also a crucial part of the democratic polity. I found that support for the monarchy revolved around straightforward evaluations of services and democratic performance. Seldom did anyone link support of the monarchy to the necessity of maintaining the client relationship with the US. As such, I also found among Kuwaitis a greater willingness to discuss the appropriateness of holding the regime accountable. Kuwaitis neither juxtapose their support for the regime against worries of anti-US forces coming to power nor believe they needed to rally around the monarchy to secure their interests with the US.

Qualitative Data: Reckoning with Clientelism in Jordan and Kuwait

Jordanians and Kuwaitis count their blessings. In a region struck with terror, war, conflict, and insecurity, Jordan and Kuwait enjoy enviable levels of tranquility. Both Jordanians and Kuwaitis understand the benefits of US patronage for these levels of security. Bilal, a citizen of Jordanian origin who has an engineering degree praises the levels of stability his country enjoys. He says, “People come here from Saudi Arabia and Dubai. They respect the King because he keeps a peaceful country.” Bilal believes that Jordanian levels of stability are quite commendable, given the strife in neighboring
countries. Not only is the King able to keep a peaceful country, but according to Bilal “He [also] knows how to keep good ties with the Americans.” These good ties are essential for Jordan’s stability and economic well-being. This sentiment is echoed by Hamzeh, a cosmetic surgeon of Palestinian descent. He supports the monarchy because the King continuously works to secure the welfare of the Kingdom. “Look,” he says convincingly, “We have peace and security.” This is because the King “knows how to work with our allies [US] to protect us.”

Regional instability has dealt Jordanian sense of security a tremendous blow. Jordanians feel extremely fortunate that, unlike Iraqis and Palestinians, they are safe and secure. They also worry about the future of Syria, since that country has made enemies of the Americans. Lebanon, they point out, is also unstable, and Iran and Syria play significant roles in that country’s political affairs. Jordan, in their opinion, is much better off than the rest of these neighboring countries. Take what Hashim, a corporate credit officer, had to say: “Jordan has the most stability in the Arab world…. Look at Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq.” In Hashim’s tone is a sense both of reassurance and pride, but also of shame. He continues to say that “Jordan is the most stable country for reasons that everybody knows. The US protects us.” Like Bilal and Hamzeh, Hashim understands how important the US is for Jordan’s overall well-being, but unlike the two, but he is neither as enthusiastic nor as enthralled by this reality, Hashim believes that the US does not care for Jordan but rather prioritizes its own interests. In fact, he says the US “uses us as puppets.” Further, Hashim believes both King Hussein and King Abdallah II of Jordan are important for this ongoing relationship with the Americans. He says, “Both our Kings have been successful. And both Kings know how to move the way the US wants them to. They have to do this to survive.” In Hashim’s analysis is a sympathetic rationalization of the existing status quo. The Arab world, he tells us, is weak and lacks unity. His Jordanian leaders lack autonomy, and they as citizens are cognizant of this lack of autonomy and thus clinging to the monarchy; as a result, Jordan is that much more
secure and stable. In other words, this leadership has been crucial to maintaining the status quo that ensures Jordan’s stability and overall well-being.

Hence, Jordanians, especially those from middle class backgrounds, feel they are better off supporting the monarchy than demanding democracy. Bilal, for example; worries about the Islamists who use the name of Islam “to do bad things. They are not invested in the present day. Their thinking of Islam is not positive all the time.” He tells me that Hamas is not bad, because in Palestine Hamas is “doing good things like they try to stop the war between Israel and Palestine. But the Jabha [IAF] also wants to stop our ties to the US which will be very bad.” This sentiment was pretty consistent across Jordan. Hamas in Palestine was more justified in its use of violence and anti-US stances because it was fighting an Israeli Occupation. However, Jordanians cannot justify such stances, since they are not directly occupied by Israel. In other words, resistance should occur in Palestine and not Jordan. This stance was found among both Jordanians of Palestinian and Jordanian descent.

Further, Bilal understands what democracy is, and he is fully aware that Jordan is not a democracy. He wishes that Jordan could be more democratic, but, as he clearly states, it has to “worry about its security first.” Hamzeh concurs. He explains that he wishes Jordan were more ideal as a country. There is a lot of corruption, a lot of poverty and the monarchy does not rule by democratic procedures. He, a physician, is well-versed in democratic discourse; however, he also says, “Democracy cannot be compatible when you have extremists on the ground who want to fight anything that is West.” This, he argues, will “spin” Jordan out of control. When asked whether he thinks other Arab countries respect Jordan, this is what Hamzeh had to say: “All the Arab countries make us feel like we did something wrong because we have close ties with the Americans. They always place this guilt on us. But it should not be this way. We need to take care of ourselves and of this country and we cannot worry about all the other countries….Look, at least this country is now secure.” In other words, Jordanians have to look after their own interests even if it means they have to ignore the anti-American preferences of other states.
Hamzeh is willing to compromise his ideals for security and the prospects of a better future. Hashim joins Hamzeh and Bilal: “Anything that is too extreme is not good.” He takes issue with the way Islamist movements fight the West and target innocent civilians, arguing that “It’s wrong because you can’t kill people in Islam without a reason, but the extremists use religion a tool which is wrong. Unless they’re fighting for their country, like Palestine, I can’t see any justification….It hurts Islam and hurts our interests.” He goes on to ask, thinking about whether the Islamists gain political power, “what will happen to us, if the US strikes back?” Hashim understands what democracy means, and under different conditions, he would support “Letting people rule themselves.” He also believes that democracy can create more equality “and put people at the same level…yet, some groups will use democracy to harm the country as a whole.”

Across Jordan, I found citizens like Bilal, Hamzeh, and Hashim, who recognize the importance of the client relationship with the US for the future stability and prosperity of their country. Although they are not fans of such a relationship, they understand its importance. As such, they are also more likely to worry about the direct consequences on the relationship should Islamists gain more power through democratic channels. Bilal, Hamzeh, and Hashim, like so many other Jordanians, prefer clinging to the existing status-quo rather then risk losing US patrimonial privilege.

Kuwaitis, like their Jordanian counterparts, recognize the importance of the US client relationship to their overall levels of security and stability. Kuwaitis feel exceptionally vulnerable given the size of their country amidst regional heavyweights like Iran and Iraq. Kuwait’s stability not only explains its enviable levels of prosperity, but if Kuwait ever hopes to transition to a more diversified economy, it must remain stable and secure in order to attract foreign direct investment. Hence, the importance of the US is even more vital. Unlike Jordanians, however, Kuwaitis did not view their monarchy as essential for maintaining the client relationship with the US. Kuwaitis in general, even the leaders of the Islamic
opposition movements, are pro-American. There is no fear concerning anti-American Islamist leaders or radical groups who could jeopardize the relationship with the US.

These sentiments are captured across Kuwait. Take Ali, a religious Imam, for instance. He says “There is a need for the Americans, this is well-understood by everyone.” Ali worries about the ongoing unstable situation of Iraq and worries that hostile leaders there can have devastating effects on Kuwaiti security. These sentiments are reiterated by Ghada, a technical assistant, who also values the safety and security of her country. She values living in a safe place and not being worried, and she understands that the “Americans are important for that safety.” Asma concurs. Like the majority of Kuwaitis interviewed, Amsa worries about the security of Kuwait. She is worried that if the US leaves Kuwait, “Iraq will attack us.” Asma tells us that all Kuwaitis believe that the US is vital for the security of Kuwait: “You find this opinion among Islamists, democrats, liberals and others.” Interestingly, Asma makes no mention of the need to maintain these security arrangements with the US through the monarchy.

Badr, a journalist, like so many other Kuwaitis supports the role of the Americans. In fact, he is bitter with the fact that Kuwait had to learn this lesson the hard way. Kuwait, he maintains, is to blame for its own occupation by Iraq. He says, “Why was it so easy for Iraq to conquer Kuwait? Because Kuwait was the only Gulf country that would not allow US forces on its land prior to 1990 due to pan-Arab commitments to keep the Americans out of the Gulf. So Kuwait feels they paid for the price of pan-Arab slogans and were stabbed in the back. Then the Gulf War happened, and the Arabs did not stand with Kuwait.” And although he did not support the 2003 war in Iraq, he believes that Saddam needed to be removed from power. Badr believes the US is important for Kuwait’s security; like most other Kuwaitis interviewed, not once did he express a worry about the Islamists sabotaging the Kuwaiti alliance with the US. Hence, Badr was able to talk about his democratic aspirations and his criticisms of the regime with ease.
In fact, most Kuwaitis maintain that the Islamists are not anti-West and accept the national priorities of Kuwait. Because of this understanding, Kuwaitis are more likely to demand more accountable and democratic forms of governance, and they are also more likely to ask that the existing monarchy be held to democratic procedures and norms. Interestingly, Kuwaitis are more likely to be worried about the influence Islamists could potentially have on internal, rather than external/international, politics. Some Kuwaitis have little tolerance for the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) or Salef conservative Islamic understandings. Nevertheless, a consensus emerges among those committed to democracy: Islamist conservatism should not preclude their participation in domestic politics. The democratic process, they maintain, necessitates involvement of all groups and sectors. Finally, among those who did support the monarchy, it was rare to find that security concerns are a driving force for their levels of support. In other words, support of the Sabahs is rarely linked to geo-strategic considerations, as they are in Jordan. Rather, love for al-Sabah revolves around his kindness, generosity, and other credentials far removed from maintaining the alliance with the US. Because Kuwaitis are not threatened by anti-US opposition movements that might jeopardize the client relationship the way Jordanians are, their levels and the quality of engagement vis-à-vis the regime are more likely structured by local issues and concerns, rather than international ones.

Kuwaitis in general are less likely to be supportive of the regime and more likely to uphold their democratic ideals. Democracy, according to Kuwaitis, will not jeopardize the well-being of Kuwait as a nation. Ali is a regime supporter who does not link his support to the regime to countering the anti-US influence of the Islamists, as his counterparts in Jordan do. Support for the monarchy results from individual evaluations and not from strategic assessments. Ali tells us he loves the Emir al-Sabah “because the Emir takes the time to talk to the people and go out and meet with them.” Personally, Ali has met the Emir four or five times. This, Ali argues, means that the “rulers are already accountable to the citizens.” He says the monarchy tries to be democratic, and indeed, “compared to all the other Islamic and
Arab countries in the region, it is most democratic.” He goes on to explain that the relationship with the US is very important, especially given the unstable situation in Iraq. “There is a need for the Americans, this is well-understood by everyone.” Ali believes that the Islamists of Kuwait pose no threat to the US's or Kuwait’s national integrity. In fact, he says, “there are the ideologues who have hijacked Islam and made it a terrorist religion. And there are those who operate for the love of Islam and what it stands for. In Kuwait, the Islamists represent the latter tendency.” The Islamists in Kuwait will not jeopardize the status quo.

This sentiment about Islamists is captured among regime supporters and democratic enthusiasts alike. Democrats are more likely to demand more democracy, because citizens are not worried about the consequences of their democratic engagement given the realities of the client status of their regimes. It is possible that this trend occurs because US preferences would be served by any leadership in power; yet, for both Jordanians and Kuwaitis, one theme remains clear. Citizens make decisions about democracy based on the position of their countries in the international system.

**Extending the Findings to Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Palestine**

The monarchies of Morocco and Saudi Arabia are also clients of the US. To a larger degree, Morocco is a client of Europe but I found in Morocco a deep conviction that anti-Americanism among the Islamic opposition could also plausibly jeopardize existing relations with the Europeans, especially France. Citizens view the US as a hegemonic power in the global order that can technically dictate its preferences to Europe. Thus, in Morocco there were concerns about the consequences of deeper democracy. There were those that worried that the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) might have some hawkish elements within its ranks that could sabotage Morocco’s external linkages. These worries are confirmed by some PJD positions. In 2007, when asked about Morocco's relations with the United States and US policy in Iraq, a leading member of the PJD said, "I'm not in favor of meeting Americans who are on official missions. They are killing Muslim people.... I am against any
relation with them. If they say they are going to leave Iraq, I don't have any problem with meeting them. Our position is very clear. We don't approve their policy."38

Others were concerned that deeper democracy, which could result in an alteration of the status quo, may bring members of the less moderate Islamic movement, the Justice and Charity into the mainstream. This movement is more critical of the West and especially the US. Finally, there were those Moroccans still horrified by the 2003 Casa attacks and worried about al-Qaeda operating within the Kingdom. Citizens pointed out that the targets of those attacks were foreign interests in the country. Thus, citizens worried that radical groups could become more empowered through democracy and thereby not only hurt its own people but also undermine Morocco’s economic ties to external actors and future foreign direct investors. For all of these reasons, citizens in Morocco tended to exhibit a pro-Monarchy bias, with close to 60% of the population saying that they would support the government even if they disagreed with its decisions.

Saudi Arabia was not included in the Arab Barometer project, as research clearance was difficult to secure. The secondary literature, however, describes Saudis especially after 9-11 as terribly concerned about the growing influence of al-Qaeda in the kingdom. Saudi citizens, like their Kuwaiti counterparts, understand the importance of global integration and US protection for the regime’s survival. The Saudis continue to fear aggression from neighboring Iran and Iraq. In fact, 94% of Saudis believe that aggression from a neighboring country is a serious threat to the kingdom (WWS, 2003). Thus, with Islamist calls to seize links with the US has grown a concern among the Saudis that the Islamists can sabotage the relationship with the US (Kéchichian 2004). Saudi citizens are therefore cautious to demand reforms in ways that would undermine the Saudis. Even liberal and moderate Islamist demands for reform are made in agreement with the royal family (Hamzawy, 2008). In Saudi Arabia is a firm understanding that the Saudis are vital to the success of the country’s client ties to the US. This sentiment is also shared by

38 http://www.history.navy.mil/library/online/democ%20in%20middle%20east.htm
experts who study democratic development in the region. As Shiley Telhami argues, “Rapid transitions from authoritarianism to democracy in places such as Saudi Arabia are unlikely, but were they to occur, the resulting instability or unpredictable outcomes, such as the possibility of a militant Islamist regime being democratically elected, may seem even more threatening to American interests that then status quo.” It appears this sentiment is shared by Saudi citizens as well. In the World Values Survey 2003, 42% of Saudis worried that democracies were not good at maintaining order. Given the degree of anti-Americanism among its various Islamist groups (Lynch, 2006) this concern appears to be a driving element of regime support.

The Palestinians have learnt the consequences of an anti-American opposition the hard way. Support for democracy was considerably higher right before the 2006 election that brought Hamas to power. In 2006, close to 60% of the Palestinian public felt democracy was appropriate for Palestine. In 2007, after the Palestinian election, that number fell to 40%. Even while support for Hamas remained steady, more and more Palestinians gradually turned from democracy and back to supporting a Fatah government that was voted out of office due to its corrupt and authoritarian practices after witnessing the harsh Western economic sanctions. Citizens in the Arab world see that their existing authoritarian regimes play strategic roles in keeping these stable ties to the US. Ironically, these ties with the US appear to maintain the viability and desirability of authoritarianism, even while they simultaneously fuel increased anti-American sentiment among opposition groups.

**Conclusion: No Room for Democracy?**

The above findings illustrate that citizens do not engage their states in an international vacuum. In client states, like many Arab states today, citizens leverage support for their regimes according to the perceived strategic utility of the leader in maintaining the client relationship with the US. While bottom-

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39 Telhami (2006) page 183
up theories of democracy assume that state-society interactions are shielded exchanges in which the state is sovereign and self-sufficient, my study illustrates that in most Arab states, this is not the case. Citizens will weigh their democratic priorities against the concerns of the patron’s preferences in order to ensure the national well-being of their states. In countries like Jordan, where more democracy can empower anti-American Islamic movements, citizens are more likely to cling to the status quo.

This study shows how anti-Americanism has stifled grassroots efforts towards democratization. The lack of sovereignty in the Arab world has meant that Arab citizens take their cues from the US in order to secure the status quo. While the preference for democracy exists on the street, it needs to be fully endorsed by the external patron. That there are anti-American forces in the region has served to dampen US enthusiasm for democracy, which in turn has stifled democratic demands from below. Given the fact that increasing international dependency has resulted in greater anti-Americanism, the democratic option remains all the more elusive today. This paper demonstrates that one of the key routes to democracy in the region will be to address the sources of anti-Americanism writ large.

Table 1: Support for Authority in Jordan and Kuwait: OLS Regression Analysis (Robust Standard Errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support Government</td>
<td>Support Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.005*</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>0.130*</td>
<td>0.238**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment status:</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Quran</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pray</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>0.765**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Vulnerabilities</td>
<td>0.157***</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>0.121***</td>
<td>0.128**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasta</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 1: Question wording and Operationalization:

1) **Gender**: 1 Male; 2 Female  
2) **Age**: Continuous Variable  
3) **Education**: 1 Illiterate; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary; 4 College Diploma; 5 BA; 6 MA; 7 advanced professional  
   3) **Join Parties**: People are free to join parties without fear  
      1 Strongly Agree; 2 Agree; 3 Disagree; 4 Strongly Disagree  
4) **Strong Leadership**: I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing Jordan. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing Jordan? A strong non-democratic leader that does not bother with parliament and elections:  
      1 Strongly Agree; 2 Agree; 3 Disagree; 4 Strongly Disagree  
5) **Support Government**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with these decisions”  
      1 Strongly Agree; 2 Agree; 3 Disagree; 4 Strongly Disagree  
6) **Wasta**: During the past five years, have you ever used wasta to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem?  
      1 yes; 2 no  
7) **Government Services**: Do you agree with the following statement: “The government does all it can to provide citizens with all services”  
      1 Strongly Agree; 2 Agree; 3 Disagree; 4 Strongly Disagree  
8) **Government Access**: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following administrative or social services from the government? Access to individuals or institutions to file a complaint when your rights are violated:

![Table with statistical data](image)
1-Very Easy; 2-Easy; 3-Difficult; 4-Very Difficult

9) Human Rights for Stability To what degree would you agree that the violation of human rights in Jordan is justifiable in the name of promoting security and stability?
1 Completely Justified; 2 Somewhat Justified; 3 Not very Justified; 4 Not Justified at all

10) National Pride: How proud are you to be (nationality0?
1) Very Proud, 2) Proud, 3) Somewhat Not Proud, 4) Not Proud at all

11) Employment Status: 1 yes (employed); 2 no (unemployed)

12) Read Quran: How often do you read the Quran?
1 Everyday; 2 Several Times a week; 3 Sometimes; 4 Rarely; 5 I don’t read

13) Prayer: Do you Pray? 1 yes; 2 no

14) Origin: 1 Jordanian; 2 Palestinian

Appendix II. Distributions of independent variables: Arab Barometer 2005/2006 (2 X 2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>51% (female)</td>
<td>52% (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25% (post Secondary)</td>
<td>18% (post secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Parties</td>
<td>41% (agree)</td>
<td>75% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Government</td>
<td>50% (yes)</td>
<td>26% (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasta</td>
<td>23% (yes)</td>
<td>33% (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>79% agree</td>
<td>63% Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Access</td>
<td>51% (agree)</td>
<td>26% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights For Stability</td>
<td>35% (agree)</td>
<td>35% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>79% (very proud)</td>
<td>92% (very proud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td>31% (employed)</td>
<td>53% (employed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Quran</td>
<td>29% (everyday)</td>
<td>17% (everyday)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prayer</td>
<td>87% (yes)</td>
<td>97% (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Leader</td>
<td>26% (good)</td>
<td>12% (Good)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Better than Any other System</td>
<td>86% (agree)</td>
<td>88% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy good way for running this country</td>
<td>93% (good)</td>
<td>93% (good)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Appendix 3: Arab Barometer Sampling Methods in Jordan and Kuwait**

**Jordan:** Sample size 1200 individuals.

In Jordan, we have used a three-stage cluster sampling based on the 1994 national census. Jordan has been divided into several strata representing rural and urban population in each governorate (Muhafaza). Also, each of the five main cities (Amman, Wadi al Sir, al Zarqa, Irbid, and al Rusai'feh) represented an independent stratum. Jordan has also been divided into blocs, or clusters, each containing a number of families (with an average of 80 families in each cluster). The number of families in each cluster designated the size of that cluster. The national census provided detailed data on the families as well as detailed maps showing every house in each cluster. The total number of clusters in our recently updated master sample is 800.

A sample of 100 clusters was randomly selected using probability proportionate to size. The sample was selected from our master sample. Clusters were organized according to size (number of families) and geographic location in order to insure representation of all strata and clusters of all sizes. After selecting the cluster sample, 10 homes were selected in each cluster using systemic sampling. Total size of the sample is 1000 adults. The third stage in the sampling process occurs inside the house. Using Kish table our fieldworkers selected an adult (over 18 years of age) from among the adults in the house for the interview. Interviewees were assured of complete confidentiality before starting the interview.

**Kuwait:** Sample Size 750 individuals.

Random Sample based on a database of 10,000 randomly selected Kuwaiti citizens chosen from the register of the Civil Information Authority, which issues public documentation like IDs, and keeps information about everyone living in Kuwait.

60% of the full 750 target were reached through this computerized randomized technique. 40% of the sample was conducted by random door-to-door interviews in each governorate. Depending on the district size a random technique was employed to sample every seventh house in less populated areas and every 13th house in more densely populated areas. At the door, a kish table was used to select an adult over the age of 18 to interview. Professor Ghanim al-Najjar of Kuwait University administered the surveys. He utilized an impressive two-stage area probability sample based on the most recent census, with quota sampling at the governate level for each survey. Combined, these data sources constitute the most accurate, comprehensive, and authoritative sources of public opinion data in Jordan and Kuwait.
Table 5: Jordan: OLS Models on Support for Government and Overt Support for Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support Government (Base Model)</th>
<th>Support Government (Full Model)</th>
<th>Overt Democracy (Base Model)</th>
<th>Overt Democracy (Full Model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Situation</td>
<td>0.090** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.045)</td>
<td>0.037 (0.089)</td>
<td>0.094 (0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.034 (0.023)</td>
<td>0.041 (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.044 (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.063 (0.067)</td>
<td>-0.168** (0.076)</td>
<td>-0.049 (0.142)</td>
<td>0.108 (0.163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.070*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.046* (0.025)</td>
<td>0.192*** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.097* (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>0.059 (0.070)</td>
<td>-0.005 (0.075)</td>
<td>-0.144 (0.153)</td>
<td>-0.084 (0.164)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Quran</td>
<td>0.037 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.032 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.053 (0.064)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence US</td>
<td>-0.086** (0.035)</td>
<td>-0.083** (0.040)</td>
<td>0.201*** (0.072)</td>
<td>0.175** (0.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Services</td>
<td>0.130*** (0.047)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.198* (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.153 (0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasta</td>
<td>0.113*** (0.034)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.267*** (0.068)</td>
<td>-0.411*** (0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Complaint</td>
<td>0.152*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.198* (0.102)</td>
<td>-0.153 (0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Parties</td>
<td>0.138 (0.054)</td>
<td>0.107** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>0.107** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.107** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.111)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.134)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>2.405*** (0.198)</td>
<td>.946*** (0.342)</td>
<td>.832** (0.459)</td>
<td>2.256*** (0.747)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R2</td>
<td>0.03 636</td>
<td>0.11 759</td>
<td>0.04 587</td>
<td>0.04 587</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Kuwait: OLS Models on Support for Government and Overt Support for Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support Government (Base Model)</th>
<th>Support Government (Full Model)</th>
<th>Overt Democracy (Base Model)</th>
<th>Overt Democracy (Full Model)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Situation</td>
<td>0.007 (0.071)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.132 (0.119)</td>
<td>0.134 (0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.010 (0.030)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.062)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td><strong>-0.152</strong> (0.071)</td>
<td><strong>-0.235</strong> (0.096)</td>
<td>0.233 (0.167)</td>
<td><strong>0.462</strong> (0.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.025 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.028 (0.057)</td>
<td><strong>0.139</strong> (0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.082)</td>
<td>-0.053 (0.106)</td>
<td>-0.085 (0.174)</td>
<td>0.092 (0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Quran</td>
<td><strong>0.106</strong> (0.041)</td>
<td><strong>0.144</strong> (0.053)</td>
<td><strong>0.260</strong> (0.083)</td>
<td>-0.192* (0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence US</td>
<td>0.051* (0.024)</td>
<td>0.118** (0.050)</td>
<td>-0.110* (0.058)</td>
<td>-0.350*** (0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.191</strong> (0.056)</td>
<td><strong>0.403</strong> (0.097)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasta</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.006 (0.094)</td>
<td>0.045 (0.200)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>File Complaint</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.092 (0.057)</td>
<td>-0.143 (0.146)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Parties</td>
<td>0.019 (0.057)</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.285</strong> (0.127)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>0.286</strong> (0.102)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.246 (0.263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>1.56</strong> (0.292)</td>
<td><strong>-0.824</strong> (0.576)</td>
<td><strong>3.79</strong> (0.521)</td>
<td><strong>3.45</strong> (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj R2</td>
<td>0.03 (0.12)</td>
<td>0.12 (0.576)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.521)</td>
<td>0.12 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Appendix: Question wording and Operationalization

1. Gender: 0 Male; 1 Female
3. **Education**: 1 Illiterate; 2 Primary; 3 Secondary; 4 College Diploma; 5 BA; 6 MA; 7 Advanced Professional

4. How would you rate the economic situation of your family today?
   1 Very Bad; 2 Bad; 3 Good; 4 Very Good

5. **Join Parties**: People are free to join parties without fear: 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

6. **Strong Leadership**: I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing Jordan. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing Jordan? A strong non-democratic leader that does not bother with parliament and elections: 1 Very Bad; 2 Fairly Bad; 3 Fairly Good; 4 Very Good

7. **Support Government**: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “People should always support the decisions of their government even if they disagree with these decisions”? 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

8. **Democracy may have its problems but is better than any other form of government**: 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

9. I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing Jordan. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing Jordan? **Democratic political system** (public freedom, equal political and civil rights, balance of power, accountability and transparency)
   1. Very Bad; 2 Bad; 3 Good; 4 Very Good
10. Wasta: During the past five years, have you ever used wasta to achieve something personal, family related, or a neighborhood problem? 1 No; 2 Yes

11. Government Services: Do you agree with the following statement: “The government does all it can to provide citizens with all services”? 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

12. Government Access: Based on your experience, how easy or difficult is it to obtain the following administrative or social services from the government? Access to individuals or institutions to file a complaint when your rights are violated: 1 Very Difficult; 2 Difficult; 3 Easy; 4 Very Easy

13. Provide Services: Do you agree with the following statement: “The government does all it can to provide citizens with all services”
1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

14. US Violence: Do you agree with the following statement: “US involvement in the region justifies armed operations against the US everywhere”? 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 3 Agree; 4 Strongly Agree

15. National Pride: How proud are you to be (nationality)? 1 Not Proud at All; 2 Somewhat not Proud; 3 Somewhat Proud; 4 Very Proud

16. Employment Status: Are you employed? 1 No; 2 Yes

17. Read Quran: How often do you read the Quran?
1 I Don’t Read; 2 Rarely; 3 Sometimes; 4 Several Times a Week; 5 Everyday

18. National Origin: 0 Jordanian; 1 Palestinian

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Arab Barometer 2005/2006 (2 X 2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>51% (female)</td>
<td>52% (female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>25% (post Secondary)</td>
<td>18% (post secondary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Economic Situation</td>
<td>64% (V.Good/Good)</td>
<td>95% (V.good/Good)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Join Parties</td>
<td>41% (agree)</td>
<td>75% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Government</td>
<td>50% (yes)</td>
<td>26% (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasta</td>
<td>23% (yes)</td>
<td>33% (yes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Services</td>
<td>79% agree</td>
<td>63% Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Access</td>
<td>51% (agree)</td>
<td>26% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Pride</td>
<td>79% (very proud)</td>
<td>92% (very proud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Status</td>
<td>31% (employed)</td>
<td>53% (employed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Quran</td>
<td>29% (everyday)</td>
<td>17% (everyday)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Leader</td>
<td>26% (good)</td>
<td>12% (Good)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Is Better than</td>
<td>86% (agree)</td>
<td>88% (agree)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Other System</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic political system</td>
<td>93% (good)</td>
<td>93% (good)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(public freedom, equal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>political and civil rights,</td>
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<td>balance of power,</td>
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<td>accountability and</td>
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<td>transparency)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Arab Barometer Sampling Methods in Jordan and Kuwait
Jordan: Sample Size 1000 Individuals

In Jordan, we used a three-stage cluster sampling based on the 1994 national census. Jordan has been divided into several strata representing rural and urban population in each governorate (Muhafaza). Also, each of the five main cities (Amman, Wadi al-Sir, al-Zarqa, Irbid, and al-Rusaifeh) represent an independent stratum. Jordan has been divided into blocs, or clusters, each containing a number of families (with an average of 80 families in each cluster). The number of families in each cluster designates the size of that cluster. The national census provided detailed data on the families as well as detailed maps showing every house in each cluster. The total number of clusters in our recently updated master sample is 800.

A sample of 100 clusters was randomly selected using probability proportionate to size. The sample was selected from our master sample. Clusters were organized according to size (number of families) and geographic location in order to insure representation of all strata and clusters of all sizes. After selecting the cluster sample, 10 homes were chosen in each cluster using systemic sampling. The total size of the sample is 1000 adults. The third stage in the sampling process occurs inside the house. Using the Kish table, our fieldworkers selected an adult (over 18 years of age) from among the adults in the house for the interview. Interviewees were assured of complete confidentiality before starting the interview.

Kuwait: Sample Size 750 individuals

A random sample of 750 individuals was compiled from a database of 10,000 randomly selected Kuwaiti citizens in the register of the Civil Information Authority, which issues public documentation like IDs and keeps information about everyone living in Kuwait.
Sixty percent of the full sample were reached through this electronically randomized technique. 40% of the sample was conducted by random door-to-door interviews in each governorate. Depending on the district size, a random technique was employed to sample every seventh house in less populated areas and every thirteenth house in more densely populated areas. At the door, a kish table was used to select an adult over the age of 18 to interview.

Professor Ghanim al-Najjar of Kuwait University administered the surveys. He employed a two-stage area probability sample based on the most recent census, with quota sampling at the governate level for each survey. Combined, these data sources constitute the most accurate, comprehensive, and authoritative sources of public opinion data in Jordan and Kuwait.

Notes to chapter 4