Redefining the Nation: Center-Right Parties and Visible Minorities in Europe

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Dear CPW participants,

Thank you for reading my prospectus. I must warn you all that it is unfinished, and thus, unpolished. I look forward to any and all comments; however, I seek your collective wisdom on the following topics:

1. My current dependent variable for my statistical model is based on the Comparative Manifesto Project. However, I would like to test whether or not outreach occurred at a national level and/or regional level using content analysis of major and regional newspapers, which are available for most countries on Lexis-Nexis. The program Sim-Stat allows content analysis in all major European languages. I would like to code these articles based on emphasis on policies, organizational changes, as well as instances of counter-outreach (tough talk on immigration and racist rhetoric).

2. Is this advisable? Would you suggest running separate models with each of the above as dependent variable, or combining these codings as a single dependent variable?

3. Any advice on how to compress or eliminate my numerous hypotheses would be much appreciated.

Once again, many thanks.

Best,

Jennifer Miller
1. Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, the countries of Europe have experienced unprecedented waves of immigration from non-Western countries (Roemer et al. 2007). The conventional wisdom states that conservative parties remain unwavering in their refusal to target visible minorities as a potential constituency (i.e., Ignazi 2003; Meguid 2005; Minkenberg 2002). Moreover, these parties have been willing to prey on white voters’ fears of growing minority populations (i.e., Brubaker 1995). Conversely, parties on the left have been more welcoming, both organizationally and programmatically toward visible minority groups. Yet party manifesto data and organizational shifts within parties challenge these assumptions and indicate that the relationship between minority voters and center-right parties is more complicated than originally perceived: conservative parties have indeed appealed to minority populations. This reality directs us to the central questions guiding the dissertation:

- Why do center-right parties seek the votes of visible minorities at some times and not others?
- Under what conditions do center-right parties reach out to visible minorities?

These questions are pressing in light of the changing face of Europe. Among some of the largest countries in Europe—Great Britain, Germany, and France—ethnic minorities make up more than ten percent of the population. Members of these groups are disproportionately poor and bear the brunt of unemployment. They are also the frequent targets of discrimination. Violent events in Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Spain all raise questions about the level of integration of visible minority groups.

How major political parties respond to these populations is paramount given that, as Meguid (2005) points out, they are uniquely poised to direct national debates. These parties command loyalty among the electorate, possess sizeable monetary resources, and garner significant levels of media attention. The center right’s stance toward visible minorities becomes more important when examining the future of substance of national identity and the boundaries of acceptable discourse. As the self-proclaimed guardians of national identity, center-right parties adopt the most stringent anti-immigrant measures, which many consider to be tantamount to anti-visible minority, and often inject nativism in national debates. As sociologist Rogers Brubaker states, when discussing the tone of debates over immigration in Europe:

1. This dissertation focuses on those immigrants and their descendents that comprise the category of “visible minorities”. This choice is because the most disadvantaged and discriminated groups in the countries under scrutiny are those whose members have dark skin and are visibly different. While many “white” migrant populations have been racialized (see Lucassen 2005), Roemer, Lee and Van der Straeten (2007) rightfully point out that most postwar immigration control was intended to curb “nonwhite” migration.

2. While resistance to immigration does not equal opposition to ethnic minorities per se, the two issues are closely intertwined. First, work on Hispanics in the United States find that visible minorities may use the language of debates surrounding immigration policy and the contents of the policy itself as a litmus test of the receiving society’s openness toward their presence. Second, voters, and native citizens, often do not distinguish between immigrants and ethnic minority citizens. Using ethnicity as a cognitive shortcut, as Kachan (2004) suggests ordinary people do, citizens are likely to lump the categories together. In this
“I would argue that in immigration policy debates, as in other policy domains, the boundaries of legitimate discussion are one of the crucial stakes of the debates...there is a chronic struggle to define the boundaries of legitimate discussion, a bidirectional struggle both to stigmatize, exclude and marginalize certain themes as illegitimate and to legitimate or ‘naturalize’ previously illegitimate themes” (1995, 905).

Consequently, welcoming and inclusive positions assumed by center-right parties could do much to improve the climate surrounding race relations in many European countries.

As such, in the past five decades center-right parties, on the whole, have adopted an unwelcoming position toward visible minorities. Indeed, even models of political competition embed in their assumptions the right’s antagonistic relationship to ethnic minorities. For instance, in models of group-oriented voting, it is the party on the right that fails to include ethnic minorities through chicanery (Fraga and Leal 2004; Frymer and Skrentny 1998; Glazer et. al. 1998). In a recent work on the effect of race on party competition and redistribution, parties on the right are assumed a priori to offer more xenophobic and racist policies (Roember et. al. 2005).

Politically, by running inflammatory campaigns, the center right lends credence to these assumptions. For instance, in 1964, the British Conservatives touted the following slogan: “If you want a nigger for a neighbour – vote Labour”. Racism continued to permeate the party ranks into the 1990s. In 1992, the sole black conservative running for office, John Taylor, faced opposition from his own party. It was widely reported by the British press that party members actively campaigned against him, with some on record of calling him a “bloody nigger” (Gifford 1998, xi).

Xenophobia and racism are also present among center-right parties on the continent. In Germany, the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU) 1982 party platform included a restrictive immigration policy intended to restrict immigration policy intended to reduce the number of visible minorities in Germany by promoting repatriation and preventing further immigration (Boswell and Hough 2008: 337; Herbert 2001; Ignazi 2003). In 1988, Edmund Stobier (CSU), who became the CDU’s candidate for chancellor in 2002, proclaimed that Germany must not become a “multinational society, mixed with different races”.

Conversely, parties on the center-left have received the majority of visible minorities’ electoral support (Dancygier and Sanders 2006). The center left’s ability to appeal to and mobilize visible minorities is due, in part, to their position in the labor market, which corresponds to that of their “natural” constituency (Leaveau and Withol de Wenden 2001;
Philosophically, adherents of the Old Left can find justification for visible minority outreach in proletarian internationalism. Among adherents of the New Left, one of their primary goals includes advancing equality of marginalized identity groups, such as women, homosexuals and minorities (Eley 2002, 472). Indeed, the New Left’s Habermasian critique of the Old Left is that it privileged “relations to production over ‘relations of social recognitions’ among human beings” (Kitschelt 1994, 260). Thus, both new and older veins of left political thought provide rationale for outreach to visible minorities.

In recent years, and intermittingly in the past decades, center-right parties have shifted their positions toward visible minorities, with many center-right parties become more racially inclusive. The one notable exception to this is the Dutch center-right parties the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), which have become more exclusive in their rhetoric. For instance, van Kersbergen and Krouwel (2008) point out that after the success of the far-right Fortuyn List, the liberal VVD stressed in its party documents the superiority of western civilization. Conversely, the French have made more programmatic overtures toward visible minorities. In 2002, for example, the French center-right pushed for positive discrimination, essentially affirmative action à la française. The British Conservatives have also engaged in a campaign to diversify the party’s ranks. In 2005, the Tories ran 50 ethnic minority candidates for parliament, compared to Labour’s 33 and the Liberal Democrats’ 35.

The Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) Klingemann et. al. 2006) provides a more systematic, though not exhaustive, measure of outreach toward visible minority group. The appropriate variable to gauge party outreach toward ethnic minorities is the number of favorable mentions to underprivileged minority groups in party platforms (Variable 705: Favorable references to underprivileged minority who are defined neither in economic nor in demographic terms, for example, the handicapped, homosexuals, immigrants, etc.).

In Figure 1, it is evident that the British parties oscillated in their appeals toward ethnic minorities. Conservative appeals rise in 1976, flat-line through the 1980s, and escalate in 2000. Concurrently Labour declines steadily from 1970 through 1992, and then increases its mentions in 2001. Clearly 1997 was a critical year in that all three major parties converged. These trends match qualitative accounts from the literature. As Rich (1998) reports in his detailed analysis of the relationship between the Conservatives and ethnic minorities, in 1976, the party made an effort to reach out to ethnic minorities, while simultaneously positioning itself as anti-immigration. Rich also points out that outreach rose after Thatcher’s tenure. This corresponds with the slight increase in 1979, and again in 1992.

[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]

3 While the center left’s working class constituency may view many visible minorities as competition, the left continues to include both the working class and visible minorities in their coalition.

4 This variable does not include favorable mentions to women or linguistic groups.
Another example of the Tory’s evolving stance toward visible ethnic minorities is the number of ethnic minorities parliamentary candidates the party. Using The British parliamentary Constituency, 1992-2005 (Norris 2005) data, we see that in 1997, 2% of all Conservative candidates were ethnic minority candidates, equal to Labour’s 2% and slightly below the Liberal Democrat’s 3%. In 2005, ethnic minorities constituted 8% of the Tory’s parliamentary candidates, whereas ethnic minorities comprised only 5% of Labour’s candidates and 6% of the Liberal Democrat’s candidates, respectively.

Outreach in France has also varied. In Figure 3, it is evident that the French center-right party, the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), at one time made the most number of appeals of all the major parties. These appeals dropped slightly in 1997, and rose again in 2002. These data contradict the conventional wisdom that the French right has been categorically unwelcoming to ethnic minorities. While offering fewer mentions than the Socialist Party (PS) through most of the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, in the 1990s, it offered more favorable mentions than the socialists.

The UMP’s reputation may derive from its emphasis on law and order. Figure 4 shows that the comparatively high number of appeals, relative to the other major parties, is matched by tough rhetoric on law and order. The then newly formed Union for a Presidential Majority—later to be called Union for a Popular Movement—made a total of 18.78 mentions of law and order in its manifesto. This total exceeded those made even by the National Front!

In the Netherlands, the trend has been the reverse of the British Conservatives, with the center right retreating from inclusion to exclusion. Both of the center right parties—the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and the liberal People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)—made more favorable mentions toward underprivileged minorities than Dutch Labor Party (PvdA). 1989 appears to be an important years as all three parties peaked in the number of appeals. By 1994, there was a precipitous drop in mention by the CDA and VVD. Notably, the far-right party Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), which broke through in 2002, is not included in the Comparative Manifesto project. Moreover, Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV), the other far-right party to break through, formed in 2004 and thus is absent from this analysis.

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5 The UMP was once the Rally for the Republic (RPR), which emerged after the Gaullists split. It is considered the true progeny of the Gaullists.

6 See Marthaler 2008. Conversely, the French literature notes an increase in outreach toward ethnic minorities (e.g., Geisser and Soum 2008; Geisser and Zemouri 2006; Brouard and Tiberj 2005). Geisser and Soum (2008) go as far as to say that the UMP is considered the party of anti-discrimination (137). This discrepancy results from the tendency of American political scientists to focus solely on immigration policy and ignore party strategy toward minority constituencies.
This cursory glance of the Comparative Manifesto Project data demonstrates that the center right is invariant in its approaches to ethnic minorities. Rather, these parties can be seen as trending toward more inclusiveness in Great Britain, more exclusiveness in the Netherlands, and vacillating between the two in France. Consequently, outreach toward ethnic minorities by the center right has not been static.

**Theory**

The theory that best explains the actions of center-right parties toward visible minorities is one predicated on value change and issue co-option. While early flirtations with visible minorities were an attempt to rebrand the party as inclusive in the eyes of the centrist voters, conservative parties increasingly have to fight a two-front battle. First, parties to the immediate left of the party are co-opting the economic issues championed by the right. For Great Britain, this would be New Labour. Voters, who previously may have preferred center-right parties yet shied away from them due to the center-right parties due to their intolerant and hard-lined images, may cast their parties for the reformed party. At the same time, the center-right party has to maintain its right flank. Thus, the party will promote stringent immigration standards, and differentiate between the “bad other” and the “good other.” The former is marked by illegality and crime, while the latter is a citizen who contributes to the country. The success of this strategy depends on voters making a distinction between immigrants and visible minorities who are legal citizens.

Without economic convergence, it is unlikely that parties will engage in visible minority outreach at a national level. For example, the Danish Social Democratic Party did not engage in the “third way” until 1994 (Green-Pedersen and van Kerbergen 2002). It is 1994 that we see the Conservative People’s Party implementing favorable mentions to underprivileged minority groups in its party platforms. Prior to that, in 1990, when parties were battling voraciously on the economic dimension, all parties had zero favorable mentions toward underprivileged minority groups. This information corroborates the theory of economic convergence stimulating ethnic minority outreach. This theory posits, however, that in fragmented party systems with no economic convergence, there will be little to no outreach to visible minorities in the case that the center-left is already engaging in high levels of outreach. In these systems parties have more incentives to engage in product differentiation.

[FIGURE 6 HERE]

Ethnic mobilization will occur if the density of ethnic group and the electoral system necessitates a party stripping away a portion of ethnic minority support from the left. These are very real electoral contingencies that faced the Tories in 1976 (Rich 1998) and possibly the French UMP today. This type of outreach is less likely in plurality systems with large districts, such as the Netherlands.

Finally, the positions of the median voter on these dimensions are important. If the median voter does not have an inclusive stance on the issue of ethnic minorities, parties may be better of playing the race card. This would describe the position of the center-right in Austria.
Road Map
Below, I discuss the potential motives behind visible minority outreach. I then list the means by which parties can change their strategies. Parties are not unrestrained and as such, I enumerate both the constraints and opportunities center-right parties face. From these discussions, I generate a set of hypotheses I will test in the dissertation.

2. What are the motives?
Why are center-right parties altering their strategies toward ethnic minorities? The literature offers two competing explanations for why traditionally homogeneous parties seek the votes of a non-white constituency: the party reaches out to visible minorities to keep its coalition intact (Fraga and Leal 2005), or it is an attempt to enlarge their coalition to include ethnic minorities (Glazer et. al. 1998). The literature operates in the framework of two-party competition and remains silent as to what conditions favors the motives of outreach they provide. Moreover, the literature portrays these rationales as orthogonal; however, they can exist simultaneously. The question becomes what are the force driving the logic for coalition maintenance and expansion?

To grasp why parties change strategies broadly, I implement the framework developed by Harmel and Janda (1994). That is, one can only understand changes in party strategies in the context of party goals. For center-right parties, which are often governmental actors, these goals are vote-seeking in majoritarian electoral systems and office-seeking in fragmented proportional systems. These goals matter in terms of the value of longer time horizons and the kinds of impetuses necessary to embark on strategic changes. Namely, in majoritarian systems, where legislative power and bargaining power are correlated, parties are more likely to lower the discount of future votes (Strom 1990).

The first motive is that of coalition expansion: parties engage in visible minority outreach when facing a burgeoning electorate whose votes are vital for the party’s survival. A Harmel and Janda (1994) explain parties are most likely to change their strategies when an environmental change threatens the party’s primary goal. In the case of vote-seeking parties, the number of ethnic minorities is so large that center-right parties cannot afford to ignore them. In the case of office-seeking parties, the number of ethnic minorities is large enough to matter in the translation of legislative seats to bargaining power. That is, if there is less distortion between the two, then ethnic minority votes matter more in that extra votes more easily translate into more bargaining power in government formation. While the literature does not address the possibility, party leaders may have longer time horizons and realize the future potential clout of minority voters. That is, a party’s reputation takes time to build (Bowler 1990). While the support of visible minorities may not make a perceptible difference in achieving party goals at time t, their growth rates indicate that at times t + 1, their votes will. Strom (1990) finds that lower discounts of future votes are prevalent among vote-seeking parties and office-seeking parties in

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7 Not all parties are simultaneously vote-seeking and office-seeking. For majoritarian systems, vote-seeking is indeed tantamount to office-seeking; however, in proportional systems, a party may be more concerned with entering a coalition government than amassing the most votes possible as they may not be translated into legislative seats (Strom 1990).
institutional arrangements in which there is a high correlation between legislative and bargaining weights.

**H1:** Vote-seeking parties are more likely to court ethnic minorities as a means of expanding the coalition when their demographic size renders their support necessary for electoral survival.

**H1.1:** Office-seeking parties are more likely to court ethnic minorities if there is a strong correlation between legislative seats and coalition bargaining power.

**H1.2:** Vote-seeking parties are more likely to have lower discount rates for votes and will be more likely to engage in a long-term strategy of courting ethnic minority voters.

Regardless of whether parties are seeking to expand their coalition in the current or future electoral cycles, they must include in their calculus the loss in votes such a strategy would incur. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) state, “[E]lectoral trade-offs can perhaps be found between almost any two groups: if a party appeals to one constituency, it may suffer in its relation to some other constituency” (60). In Przeworski and Sprague’s seminal work, socialist parties faced a trade-off between garnering working-class support and extending social democratic appeal to non-working classes. Socialists are faced with the dilemma of whether to choose a strategy that reaches the party’s maximum carrying capacity, where the marginal gain of non-workers is exactly offset by the loss of workers. The trade-off between the two is fixed.

Treatments of trade-offs in ethnically diverse polities are also treated as fixed (Fraga and Leal 2004; Glazer et. al. 1998). For instance, Glazer et. al. (1998) present a general model of the incentives for reaching out to unpopular minorities. In this model, parties face an electoral context comprising of three mutually exclusive types of voters—conventional voters, disliked voters, and group-oriented voters—with the last group’s support or opposition contingent on its expectations of each candidate’s support coalition. Glazer et. al. find that an increase in disliked voters can scare the group-oriented away from the left candidate. Beyond a certain point however, the *disliked voters become an important part of the electorate* (emphasis mine). In the case of the center-right, what does the ratio of disliked voters to group-oriented voters need to be in order to justify the pursuit of minority votes?

**H2:** If there are a large number of group-oriented voters in the party’s coalition, it is less likely that the party will engage in ethnic minority outreach.

The other dominant explanation for center-right outreach toward visible minorities is that parties are trying to maintain their extant coalitions. Against the electoral volatility that marks European party systems, parties have to struggle to preserve centrist voters in their coalitions (e.g., Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). For many social democratic parties, these electoral contingencies necessitated embracing the “third way” between Keynesian social democracy and neoliberalism, which, at an ideological level is an acceptance of the market as a superior mechanism for arriving at certain outcomes (e.g., Giddens 1998;
Kitschelt 1994). In a system in which mainstream parties are office-seeking, the logic of coalition governments in which center-right and center-left governed in tandem explains the adoption of the third way by social democratic parties (e.g., Green-Pedersen and van Kerbergen 2002). Either way, the center-left moved center on economic issues, or voters perceived such a convergence. For vote-seeking parties, the right is thus forced to compete for voters in the center, whose economic preferences traditionally matched their policies. Yet these voters may be repelled by the party’s racist imagery and rhetoric. In this case, to keep inclusive voters in the coalition, center-right parties are attempting to change the party image, or the totality of political symbols that exemplify a party, including issue positions, candidates, and insignias (Philpot 2004). Office-seeking parties may also change their images to win the votes of centrist voters as well as appear as acceptable coalition partners.

**H3: Convergence on economic issues by major parties of the center-left and center-right will make coalition maintenance a more likely motive for party outreach.**

A perfect empirical example is the electoral rout suffered by the Tories in 2005. For the first time since women have had the right to vote, the Conservatives received fewer votes from women than men, and the party also lost support among college graduates and white-collar workers.iii The oft-cited reason for the Conservative’s dismal performance is the party’s emphasis on immigration and its damaging rhetoric; both the ethnic press, as well as mainstream media, accused party leader Michael Howard of engaging in racist language.iv

The party may also be pursuing one of two mixed strategies in order to expand and retain the coalition, or to expand the coalition while ensuring the support of far-right voters. In the first case, the party may appeal to centrist voters at then national level, and mobilize ethnic minorities at the local level. This strategy corresponds with theories of coalition expansion and retention. That is, the party is securing the support of moderate whites while including visible minorities in the coalition. For such a strategy to be rational, the party must confront both demographic and competitive pressures.

**H4: If H1/H1.1 hold, depending on the party goal, and there is also economic convergence by parties (H6), then parties are more likely to implement a maintenance and expansion strategy.**

The second case arises when the right is purposefully inclusive at the national level while mobilizing racist voters on the sub-national level. By guarding its center and right flanks, the center-right party is pursuing the ultimate preservation strategy. Undergirding this strategy is solely competitive pressures: support from visible minorities is unnecessary for the party’s survival.

**H5: If there is economic convergence by the major parties, but there are strong pressures from the far-right and/or large numbers of spatially concentrated group-oriented voters, then parties are more likely to engage in the ultimate preservation strategy.**
After this discussion of the motivations underlying outreach, one may question the relevance of these distinctions. Simply put, they are of utmost importance. We care about the rationales propelling outreach because they have ramifications for the quality of representation of visible minorities. If a demographic group provides unwavering support to a single party, the party has little incentive to deliver policies to this group and the other parties may forfeit the group’s support. Thus, veritable competition for the group’s votes may increase policy responsiveness. Conversely, if center-right outreach toward ethnic minorities is an act of political marketing to quell the fears of white centrists, then the policy preferences of these populations may go unmet. The lack of responsiveness of the political system, in turn, may lead to feelings of alienation.

3. What are the means?
This dissertation will examine how parties change their strategies. The operating assumption is that the strategies a party selects are a function of its motives for engaging in outreach. That is, those means that are most likely to engender minority support, such as policy offerings, indicate that the party is expanding its coalition. More cosmetic changes indicate that the party is motivated by coalition maintenance concerns. The totality of strategies at a party’s disposal includes offering policy proposals targeting ethnic minorities, injecting a new dimension of conflict in the political arena, altering the party’s organizational structure, and changing the party’s image. Below, I include a brief analysis of each strategy. I discuss the party’s opportunities, or lack thereof, to pursue these means in the next section.

Extend Club Goods
The first means by which a party can attract a new segment of the population is by extending “club good”—or targeted and excludable benefits for a defined constituency. During the era of the mass party, parties habitually relied on club goods to secure the support of an electorate, however, with the rise of the catch-all party, elites focused on providing public goods (Blyth and Katz 2005). Nevertheless, by making policy promises or delivering public services specifically aimed at visible minorities, the party makes its commitment to the constituency clear. Examples of such policies include language policies, anti-discrimination policies and geographically concentrated services that reach a spatially concentrated minority group.

H6: If parties are fully or partially motivated by coalition expansion, then they will be more likely to offer club goods to visible minority groups.

Create New Dimensions of Conflict
While the trade-offs a party faces are largely outside its control, the party can inject a new dimension into the sphere of competition in order to improve its electoral fortunes. An extensive literature argues that new politics, specifically regarding social issues and national identity, are ready to be primed in European politics (Inglehart 1977; Kitschelt 1994; Meguid 2008). Scholars of party competition find that when parties are losing on one dimension, then they could benefit from activating another dimension conflict (Miller and Schofield 2003). By injecting a new issue dimension, in this case diversity and inclusiveness, the party may maintain its coalition. Indeed, as Meguid (2008) points out,
in addition to shifting their policy positions, parties also compete by altering the salience and ownership of an issue dimension in the political arena. Parties increase the salience of the issue by intensively highlighting it, where intensity is a function of the prioritization, frequency, and duration of party tactics (Meguid 2005, 351).

**H7:** If parties are guided by a logic of coalition maintenance, then they will be more likely to highlight another issue dimension of competition.

One could argue that the party could perform the same logical exercise, but come to the conclusion that positioning itself as more exclusive on national identity would be more electorally beneficial. That is, the party could inject the same dimension into party competition, but position itself in the opposite location. After all, the countries of Europe have had largely homogeneous ethnic self-understandings. Moreover, the literature abounds with examples of center-right parties garnering electoral support based on questionable tactics that prime racial attitudes (i.e., Meguid 2005; Mendeberg 2001; Roemer et al. 2007). These tactics, despite being reviled, are considered highly effective. In this dissertation, I will identify the conditions under which parties amass support when they appear more inclusive, and lose support when their rhetoric is virulent. These opportunities are enumerated in the following section.

**Altering Organizational Structures**

Another method by which parties may change their strategies is to alter their organizations. As Scarrow (1996) writes, “[O]rganizational change within a party may thus occur because party leaders deliberately alter structures and practices in order to make membership more appealing to individuals with distinct interests or characteristics” (46-47). By altering recruitment structures, fielding more visible minority candidates, and creating internal party divisions intended to improve the party’s relationship with visible minorities, the party is sending a clear signal that it is open to visible minorities. These organizational changes also work to establish issue ownership given that a party’s constituency is one of two sources of issue ownership (the other is the incumbent’s record) (Petrocik 1996).

**H8:** Parties that court visible minorities will be more likely to alter organizational structures to attract ethnic minorities.

**H8.1:** The logic of coalition maintenance means that parties will widely advertise the changes in its organizational structures.

**H8.2:** Parties aspiring to win centrist voters will run visible minorities in districts with high number of educated white moderates.

**H8.3:** Parties that wish to include visible minorities in their coalitions will run visible minority candidates in districts with high numbers of visible minorities.
H8.4: Parties that have an ultimate retention strategy will run visible minorities in districts with high number of educated white moderates and white candidates in districts with a high population of visible minorities, based on Allport’s contact theory.

Refurbishing the Party Image
A party’s image acts as a stereotype; parties may thus alter the image, leaving its policy positions untouched, and influence voter’s perceptions of the parties. As Philpot (2004) points out, changing a party image is less likely to repel voters than changing policies. Bower corroborates this finding; shifts in policy positions tend to result in loss votes as it creates voter uncertainty. A party’s image is the public face of the party, which includes the candidates the party fields, the perception of its membership, and the public statements a party makes. Philpot warns that these new symbols have to relate to previous symbols so not to anger the base. Thus, if an ethnic minority is touted as the new face of the party, his or her story must resonate with the party’s predominate narrative, such as enterprise, piety, or integration.

H9: Parties will be more likely to concentrate solely on changing the party image if they are pursuing a maintenance strategy.

4. Opportunities and Constraints
Party leaders do not have unfettered freedom when selecting strategies; rather, they are constrained by the competitive configuration within which they operate, their reputations, the internal party organization, and the minority groups in the polity. I will address how each of the above factors constrain or provide opportunities for center-right parties.

Competitive Configuration
Operating from Kitschelt (1994), the competitive configuration a party confronts consists of the factors influencing party dispersion or cluster—the electoral system and the number of parties—and the median voter on the relevant dimensions of competition, and the incentives for office-seeking, “combine to make the probabilities that a certain objective can be met and render its pursuit more or less attractive” (Kitschelt 1994, 116). With regards to the first element, Cox (1990) identifies the elements that affect whether or not parties will engage in product differentiation or ideological dispersion. Namely, in proportional systems where the number of parties and candidates in a district (m) is larger than two times the number of votes cast by each voter, \( v \), or \( m > 2v \), then parties are more likely to diverge. Conversely, centripetal forces will dominate in plurality systems and proportional systems where the number of votes per voters is high compared to the number of parties competing for election (Cox 1990). Kitschelt (1994) also finds that the balance of fractionalization to a party’s left and right determines its electorally rational appeal on the main dimension. That is, the more fractionalization to a party’s flank, the more attractive movements to the center are. Finally, if incentives for office-seeking are strong, then parties have more incentives to move center. These are important as they affect (a) the probabilities that parties will converge on the primary dimension of party competition, economics and (b) whether parties need to amass substantial cross-demographic support.
H10: There will be fewer incentives for center-right outreach toward visible minorities in systems with centrifugal forces.

H10.1: There will be more incentives for center-right outreach toward visible minorities in systems with centripetal forces.

H10.2: There are more incentives for center-right outreach toward visible minorities if their office seeking incentives and coalitions cross ideological lines.

The motivation for outreach, whether it is to retain the coalition, expand the coalition, or both, is influenced by the location of the median voter. With regards to the economic dimension, the location of the median voter influences where the parties converge, if at all. More importantly, the position of the median voter on this dimension affects whether the party will seek to play on its inclusiveness or play the race card.

H11: If the median voter is located toward the exclusive end of the national identity dimension, then visible minority outreach toward visible minorities is less likely.

H11.1: If the median voter is located toward the more inclusive end of the national identity dimension, then visible minority outreach toward visible minorities is more likely.

Reputations
Party reputations act as a constraint on party behavior because they affect the credibility of the party’s appeals. The literature states that in order to be credible, a party must be minimally consistent with the party’s past positions and commitments (Budge and Farlie 1983; Klingemann et. al. 1994). If a party is not credible in its appeals, then it may lose the support of undecided voters, who do not believe the party will enact its proposed changes, as well as witness a decline in support form the party bases, as they may not approve of the party’s new direction (Bélanger 2003; Popkin 1994). Moreover, changes in a party position can produce voter uncertainty, which results in vote loss (Bowler 1990). For this reason, parties may have more latitude in changing non-policy portions of its image. Yet for some voters, change only means altering policy positions; for others, simple superficial changes are enough to signal a shift in the party’s positions. When only doing the former, parties can expect to succeed only among those for whom the party’s actual issue position is less salient (Philpot 2007).

The micro-foundations of credibility also indicate how prior positions encumber center-right parties. In her study of Republican Party outreach to African Americans, Philpot (2004) finds that party reputations act similarly to stereotypes. That is, individuals will only change their conceptions of the party if they continue to face inconsistent information. In light of this new information, the individual will update his or her views. However, if the existing information is strong, then it will be harder to incorporate new information. For this reason, Philpot concludes, “In the case of race, I expect African Americans to be the least resistant to party image change since they have been the targets (either real or rhetorically) of racialized policies” (2004, 255).
Another consistent finding in the literature is the transaction costs of changing party images. Results are not immediate and the image lags behind the parties’ efforts (Bowler 1990). While party leaders may be chary of engaging in ethnic outreach if their time horizons are long enough. While party leaders may be chary of engaging in ethnic outreach because their past positions toward visible minorities, they may pursue outreach if their time horizons are long enough (Bowler 1990). To be effective, however, these outreach efforts should remain consistent and ethnic minorities should be aware of them.

**H12:** Parties who were more virulent in their rhetoric will be less credible in their appeals.

**H12.1:** Liberal parties will have more cache among visible minorities who are entrepreneurial.

**H12.2:** Christian Democratic and Conservative parties will attain more ground by appealing to pious and socially conservative visible minorities.

**Internal Party Organization**

According to Kitschelt (1994), internal party organizations effect the substantive direction and temporal stability of appeals. The former, in turn, depends on the dominant coalition within a party (Harmel and Janda 1994). The organization’s rules determine how quickly new contenders can displace dominant coalitions. The latter is subject to the preferences party activists hold. Many argue that these elements are epiphenomenal to the broader context, and it is true the views of party activists are subject to external conditions; however, “once the party’s initial organizational format has been chosen…the party organization becomes in independent variable” (Kitschelt 1994, 212).

Consequently two features of the organizational structure, the membership entrenchment and the leadership autonomy, influence a party’s strategic flexibility. Membership entrenchment includes mass membership, the formalization of internal interaction of members, and the emergence of a specialized bureaucratic staff. As such, bureaucratic mass parties experience little innovation from below and this type of innovation is likely to be critical for a party’s performance in a changing electoral market place. Leadership autonomy indicates that a party is able to innovate from above; only where leaders themselves are subjected to myriad rules of decision-making, or accountability, is strategic flexibility inhabited. Yet complete flexibility may have pernicious effects in that party may overreact to small defeats and engage in wild strategic swings. Nevertheless, in this basic prospectus I formulate hypotheses based on strategic flexibility only. Later, I would like to analyze the effects of types of coalitions within the party, such as pro-business lobbies.

**H13:** Parties with high levels of membership entrenchment and minimal leadership autonomy will be less able to pursue visible minority votes.
H13.1: Parties with low levels of membership entrenchment will be more likely to recruit visible minorities.

H13.2: Parties with minimal oversight on the leader’s actions will be able to engage in outreach, if and only if the leader is a pragmatist.

Minority Groups
The features of the minority group(s) in the country in question will affect outreach in two ways. First, it will influence whether outreach is pursued at all. Second, the groups’ characteristics will have an effect on which group will be the target of outreach. The variables of interest include the size of the category, the spatial density of its members, their history with the country, the country’s citizenship regime, and the degree to which its members perceive themselves to have a collective identity.

Scholars of ethnic minority political participation emphasize the importance of the first two factors, the size and the spatial density of the group, for mobilization and collective action (Bird 2005). The size of the group is important in that it affects its attractiveness as a target for mobilization. If the number of visible ethnic minorities is negligible, then one can hypothesize the outreach will be less likely. The spatial density of the group may also influence the ease of mobilization. Furthermore, in certain electoral systems, such as plurality systems with single member districts, spatial density may make a group more desirable. That is, to win certain districts, a party must woo ethnic minority voters. Moreover, the more densely populated members of group are, the more likely they will be perceived as a coherent group and the higher the likelihood of explicit outreach. yet if the group is densely populated and highly segregated, with little true acquaintances outside the group, it is more likely that the group is perceived as “different” by the society at large and less likely to be palatable to mainstream voters (Allport 1979; Perrineau 1985).

H14: The larger the visible minority group, the higher the chances for outreach.

H14.1: The smaller the visible minority group, the lower the chances for outreach.

H14.2: The more spatially concentrated the visible minority group is in plurality, single-member districts, the more likely outreach is.

H14.3: A highly segregated group can also lower the chances of outreach in that their separateness may alarm party members who are not visible minorities.

The interest group constellation of a specific minority group is very important in predicting the choice to pursue a certain ethnic minority group for two reasons. First, a large number of interest groups will affect the success of conservative outreach in that these groups are often allied with parties on the left. Second, interest group often co-opt leaders within the ethnic minority group, making it more difficult for conservative parties to recruit potential candidates. Regarding the first point, recent work on race and ethnicity challenges the majority of work on visible minorities, which consider conceptualizes bounded social groups an empirical reality, endows it with
interests, and fails to consider the existence of competing notions of identity, both within the group and outside it (Brubaker et al. 2004). In these analyses, the perceptions of interest groups substitutes for the interests of the members within the group itself. That is, there may be competing notions of identity and interests within the category itself (Brubaker et al. 2004). Those interest groups that advocate for members of a specific visible minority group are often compelled by feelings of systematic discrimination. Empirically, these groups are frequently aligned with parties on the left and are vocal critics of outreach by center-right parties. This relationship will only matter, however, if there is a high level of connectivity between the interest groups and the minority population.

H15: If visible minority interest groups have few ties with the community, then they will not hinder visible minority outreach.

The second factor of import is the ability of the group to recruit ambitious members of the visible minority group. Moreover, given the connection between center-left parties and interest groups, those members who have acquired skills and experiences amenable to politics within the interest group will be likely to seek political advancement within the ranks of the parties of the left. In this regard, parties on the right will have a difficult time recruiting skilled candidates. However, there may be a curvilinear dynamic to this situation. That is, if the parties on the left do not advance visible minorities to high profile positions, or remain unresponsive with regard to policy demands, then the right will have a significant ability to co-opt skilled candidates, and will have more luck in engaging the interest groups. 8

H16: The more opportunities for visible minorities to rise within the ranks of parties to the left, then the less likely the center-right will be able to recruit able candidates.

H16.1: the center-right will have more success with visible minorities the more they feel the left takes their support for granted.

The resources of the visible minority group(s) also affect outreach. Resources refer to the economic means at the members’ disposal. Occupationally and economically diverse visible minority groups will have more chances of being mobilized (Bird 2005). This is especially true for center-right parties with a liberal bent. If the visible minority group is economically segregated and poor, then the right will not reap many rewards from reaching out to them as they will be less likely to vote, more likely to be perceived as delinquent or illegal by the native population, and less receptive to the economic policies parties of the center-right expound.

H17: The more financial resources and labor market integration attained by visible minorities, the more attractive this group will be to center-right parties.

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8 For an example of how this occurred in France, read Vincent Geisser and El Yamine Soum’s Discriminer pour Mieux regner: Enquête sur la diversité dans les partis politiques.
Another important element that may constrain party outreach is the history of the visible minority group(s) with the receiving country. The relevant histories include the surrounding circumstances during the initial migration, and the history of early immigrants from this minority group in the receiving country. The circumstances surrounding initial migration are also of utmost importance. In cases where the center-right represent a country that allowed the migrants to flee a regime for political reasons, and the conservatives continue to hold a tough line against the offending regime, then the right will find a receptive constituency. One need not look farther than Cubans and the Republican Party, or Harkis and Gaullists. If the circumstances engulfing the entrance of a visible minority group, then it is more likely that they would already be targeted by the left.

**H18:** The more a visible minority group has a positive relationship with the receiving country, the more likely it is the center-right party will pursue its votes.

**H18.1:** If the visible minority group originally migrated for economic reasons or experienced harsh colonial rule, then the less likely it will be targeted by the center-right.

The citizenship regime, the access to legal citizenship rights and cultural rights, also acts as an important factor in deciding to conduct outreach. Namely, if it is difficult to attain citizenship, then there will be fewer visible minorities able to vote. This would make ethnic minority outreach less appealing then if attaining citizenship was facile. For instance, in France, if an immigrant couple ahs a child in France, the child cannot be a French citizen until the age of 18, when he or she can decide whether or not to become a French national. In this case, the number of ethnic minorities and the potential electoral clout may not covary. Cultural rights of citizenship refer to whether the country follows a policy of cultural assimilation or cultural pluralism. In countries where ethnic minorities are recognized as possessing a distinct cultural and set of interests, they should be more likely to mobilize (Bird 2005). These factors can favor the left in the case that the center-right has a dominant liberal strand, which emphasizes the individual.

**H19:** If the citizenship regime is restrictive, then there will be fewer visible minority voters. Consequently, visible minority outreach is less likely.

**H19.1:** The more the country follows a policy of cultural assimilation, the more likely it is that center-right parties will target visible minorities.

**H19.2:** The more the country follows a policy of cultural pluralism, the less likely it is that center-right parties will target visible minorities.

5. **Feasibility**

To test these hypotheses, I will employ a mixed-methods approach. Namely, I will test the motives hypotheses with a pooled time series model. The countries in the model will include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway,

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9 Harkis are Algerians who sided with the French during the Algerian war. They have uniformly supported the right (Geisser 1997; Geisser and Soum 2007).
Sweden Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Italy. Center right parties at each national election closest to 1970 will be the unit of observation. The components of the model will include the following:

Model:
- **DV**: Change in Favorable Mentions of Underprivileged Minorities\(^{10}\)
- **IVs**:
  - Lagged Variable of Social Democratic Position on this variable
  - Lagged Variable of Centrist/Liberal Party Position on this variable
  - Lagged Variable of Far Right on this variable
    - These three variables are trying to pinpoint how and if movements of parties’ in close proximity to the Center Right party affect their positioning.
  - Lagged variable demonstrating the convergence (or lack thereof economic platforms— the “Third Way”).
    - Possibilities and Possible Measurements
      - **401: Free Enterprise** Favorable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; favorable mentions of private property rights, personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises.
      - **402 Incentives** Need for wage and tax policies to induce enterprise; encouragement to start enterprises; need for financial and other incentives.
      - **407 Protectionism: Negative** Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative.
    - **Measurements**: Difference in positioning of Social Democratic Party and Conservative Party; Difference between Liberal Party and Conservative Party.
  - Permissiveness of Electoral System: Logged magnitude of median legislator’s district.
  - Popular Opinions about parties and race relations (possible sources):
    - National Election Surveys
    - World Values Surveys
    - Voters opinions on parties (more right or left)
    - Voters opinions on race relations (probably from World Values Survey)
    - Party Affiliation vs. Extent of Swing Vote?

The more nuanced hypotheses will be tested both temporally and spatially, using statistical methods and qualitative methods. These cases will include France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. I will research these cases from the 1960s to the

\(^{10}\) Source: Comparative Manifesto Project.
I will now describe my methods for analyzing outreach in France, which will be replicated in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

In France, I will gather data that will allow me to test three hypotheses, derived from the literature on party strategy, regarding the rationale for visible minority outreach by the right. These three hypotheses are that outreach (a) is an attempt by the center-right to refurbish its image in the eyes of moderate voters, (b) is a response to competitive pressures in certain départements with a high concentration of visible minorities whose votes are vital for electoral victory, and (c) that both pressures exist simultaneously. These differing motivations matter in terms of the representation of minority interests in the party and the visibility of outreach: outreach as a form of political marketing will result in less representation but improved discourse due to higher visibility, whereas outreach arising from competitive pressures at the departmental level will bring about better representation, but it will most likely leave the national debate unaffected. When both are combined, then there may be enhanced representation and tone in the national debate.

To test these hypotheses, I will (1) conduct elite interviews, (2) administer small surveys in cities with medium to high numbers of visible minorities, and (3) engage in archival research. With regards to elite interviews, I plan to discuss with party elites at the national level the internal debates behind the decision to pursue outreach, the specific forms party appeals would take, and which groups they thought would be most receptive to them. Given the Republican model of integration, I expect party members to emphasize achieved characteristics, such as small-business owners, as opposed to ascribed characteristics, such as disillusioned beurs. For instance, in 2007 the UMP implemented La Cercle diversité républicaine within the party. What does it do? How much power does it have? What were the arguments for and against behind its establishment? Which party factions of the party supported its foundation?

I will also interview low and high level party functionaries the reasons behind outreach and methods implemented, in both the national office and departmental federations. I will contact former ethnic minority candidates, such as Khalida Sellali and Fathia Rahauoi, about their experiences running under the party’s banner. This outreach does not occur in a vacuum and thus I plan to interview party elites in the Socialist Party, the centrist Union for French Democracy, and the Front National to establish when party outreach occurred and how intense it was. I have contacts with these parties as a result of my preliminary research in 2007. To understand how the minority community responds to the efforts I will interview leaders of SOS Racisme and Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN). Specifically, has the party contacted them? What to they tell their communities, if anything, regarding these efforts?

The second goal is to conduct small survey to know whether party outreach, from either the national party or local party, has occurred at the departmental level. I will target the following activities to these cities with medium to large visible minority populations: Marseilles, Lyon, Lille, Vichy, and Nice. I plan to survey minority associations and mosque imams of whether or not they were contacted or met with the UMP. Moreover,
local party elites could inform me of the nature of their relationship with visible minority communities.

I also plan to investigate this question across time as variation in outreach is essentially time dependent. Thus I will systematically read and code instances of outreach in both local and national newspapers from the 1960s through the 1980s. Instances of outreach reported by national periodicals will demonstrate that the party broadcast their efforts. The classic constituencies of these papers will uncover who knew what about the actions of the center-right. Conversely, information from regional papers will allow me to ascertain how much information and counter-information, in terms of vitriolic rhetoric on immigration, was only made known to select areas. These efforts will be matched by historical research to understand how the right’s relationship to visible minorities has evolved. Prior experience conducting archival work in France leads me to know that there exist relevant documents in the Patirck Weil archives at the Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po, as well as the Archives Nationales, Site de Fontainebleau.

In doing this research, I hope to obtain the data necessary to test my hypotheses both qualitatively and quantitatively. Information regarding internal diversity sections of parties, proportion of media coverage in targeted areas, survey responses and where outreach was most intense, as measured by interviews with local leaders and informal survey, can be analyzed quantitatively. This method will be coupled with qualitative analysis to identify the causal mechanisms behind the correlations. Namely, why and how did the party act in the way it chose? What decisions did party elites and how constrained were they in targeting visible minorities due to the Republican model of integration?

The results I hope to obtain include verification that my hypotheses that party competition, and specifically pressures from the far right National Front and the Socialist Party, compels the party to engage in minority outreach at a national level. Moreover, the party uses the analytically distinct issue of immigration as a means of protecting its far right flank. Competitive pressures in certain départements force the party to engage visible minorities at a local level. Finally, my results may show that demographic pressures in competitive districts propel outreach at the departmental level, but competition from the center and left on economic issues forces the right to make national overtures.
Figures

Figure 1

Favorable Mentions Toward Underprivileged Minorities, Great Britain

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al. 2006)

Figure 2

Ethnic Minority Candidates Fielded by Major Parties, Great Britain

**Figure 3**

Favorable Mentions Toward Underprivileged Minorities, France

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al. 2006)

**Figure 4**

Law and Order, France

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al. 2006)
Figure 5

Favorable Mentions Toward Underprivileged Minorities, Netherlands

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al.)

Figure 6

Favorable Mentions to Underprivileged Minority Groups, Denmark

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al.)

Source: Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann et. al. 2006)
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(iv) *e.g.*, Laura Smith. “Immigration debate: ‘This is a brave move. I don’t think it is right to call it racist’: Reaction, desperation, or too little, too late?,” *The Guardian*, 5 January 2005; Guardian Home Pages; “Fear and loathing on the campaign trail: politicians are pandering to prejudices and stoking anxieties,” *The Financial Times*, 18 April 2005; Leader.