Dissertation: When Patriots are Bigots – Nativism, Xenophobia & Radical Right Support

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Chapter 2: Bridging the Macro/Micro Divide

“For More Security” Swiss People’s Party Campaign Slogan (2007 campaign)

Comparative Workshop Participants: This is the first draft of the theory chapter for my dissertation, so it is extremely rough! I briefly go over the puzzle (which will be explained in more detail in the introductory chapter with a much more lengthy literature review) in the first section of this chapter to give you all some context for the dissertation. I have already done some empirical analyses, but am pausing to write my theory chapter to be precise in my thinking about causal mechanisms and implications of my theory. I welcome your feedback on the theory and hypotheses. If you think of any additional implications that I should consider testing, that would be awesome, too.
I. Introduction

“When an alien lives with you in your land, do not mistreat him. The alien living with you must be treated as one of your native-born. Love him as yourself, for you were aliens in Egypt.”

The Bible (New International Version), Leviticus 19: 33-34

“As I discussed in my literature review in chapter 1, the scholarship on radical right populist parties states that the defining feature of such parties is their nativist ideology (e.g. Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, Eatwell 2000). This ideology is one that “holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde 2007, p. 19). According to Eatwell (2000), radical right parties have a core doctrine, and “this is nationalism—which is often expressed through a demonisation of the ‘Other’ as much as by a precise definition of the sacred homeland” (Eatwell 2000, p. 412). It is clear from a survey of the literature of the radical right that, as Anderson points out, it is “common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals (particularly in Europe?) to insist on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism” (Andersen 1983, p. 141). This is not surprising, given that a cursory look at campaign slogans and advertisements (see just one example above) illustrates how closely tied national symbols and the radical right anti-immigrant agenda appear to be. This assumption that nationalism and nativism are inherently associated with disdain for and mobilization against foreigners is not unique to the literature on radical right supporters. Much of “contemporary research on intergroup relations, prejudice, and discrimination appears to accept, at least implicitly, the idea that ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity are reciprocally related.” (Brewer 1999, p. 430).
Despite these assumptions, however, the literatures in comparative and American politics come to mixed conclusions about the relationship between different forms of national attachments and xenophobic attitudes. Using data from six survey datasets (waves of the WVS, GSS, and ISSP), de Figueiredo and Elkins (2003) find that pride in and attachment to the nation-state has a negligible effect on xenophobia, while feelings of nationalism (beliefs about national superiority) are associated with xenophobia. The authors do not look at nativism, but conclude that those who express group attachments do not tend to disparage out-groups to any appreciable degree (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, pp. 175-176). Similarly, Huddy and Khatib (2007) use multiple measures of different national attachments and find that national identification, nationalism, and national pride are related yet distinct constructs with differential behavioral implications in the United States. Maddens et al. (2000) find that in Belgium, the relationship between national identity and xenophobic attitudes varies widely by region. Citizens residing in Flanders with a strong Belgian identification feel positive toward outsiders, while citizens in the region of Wallonia with a strong Belgian identification have negative attitudes toward foreigners; the relationship between national attachment and xenophobia is different depending upon the region in which Belgians dwell. While there is little empirical work on nativism – defined as beliefs about the characteristics of “natives” (Higham 1963, p. 4) – Carter and Perez (2008) find that nativism has different effects for black and white Americans when it comes to predicting hostility to immigrants. In sum, several studies indicate that, contrary to assumptions throughout the radical right literature, the story is not simply one in which those who have strong national identity or nativism are consistently anti-immigrant. Rather, scholars find a very muddy relationship between national identity, nationalism, and nativism on the one hand and xenophobic attitudes on the other. Recognizing that patriots are not universally bigoted, under
what conditions can we expect national attachments to be associated with prejudice and support for political mobilization against “foreigners”? 

In this chapter, I look to answer this question by addressing a gap in the literature on radical right party support. As Mudde (2007, p. 230) has argued, in studies of the radical right electorate, “how macro-level factors exactly influence micro-level behavior remains largely undertheorized.” Predisposing factors – even the presumably fundamental ones, such as nativism – should not be explored in a vacuum. Rather, I integrate social identity theory with realistic group conflict theory to generate an explanation for how macro-level factors, such as economic or population threats, trigger the relationship between micro-level predispositions, such as nativism or nationalism, and xenophobic attitudes and behaviors.

II. Micro-level factors

Here, I discuss two key micro-level explanations in the literature on radical right support – insecurity and anti-immigrant attitudes. As I discussed in my literature review in chapter 1, the insecurity hypothesis sees supporters of the radical right as losers of modernization. As Betz (1994, p. 32) states, such losers – either unemployed or unskilled workers – are unable to cope with the “acceleration of economic, social and cultural modernization.” This hypothesis is closely related to the economic interest explanation, which derives from a traditional neoclassical trade model, as immigrants can be seen as a cross border flow of people. According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, increases or decreases in the costs of international trade should affect the domestic political cleavages depending on factor endowments in each country. The theory argues that trade liberalization benefits owners of factors in which that society is abundantly endowed, but harms owners of factors in which that society is poorly endowed (Rogowski 1987). While immigration is not a form of international trade, it is comparable to trade as a flow – of
labor rather than products – across international borders. This explanation is useful for predicting which individuals in society would benefit from or be harmed by immigration, or what insecurity theory would call the losers of modernization in post-industrial societies. Empirical research (e.g. Norris 2005, Lubbers et al 2002) does show that unskilled workers and the lower education strata are over-represented in radical right electorates. However, demand side studies of right wing party supporters in Europe find that much of the support for the right wing comes from the middle class and the mid-education stratum (Norris 2005, Arzheimer and Carter 2006, Rydgren 2007 p. 149). In other words, something beyond insecurity must explain radical right support; Mudde (2007, p. 224) concludes, “as far as micro-level analyses are concerned, results do not seem to provide strong evidence for the thesis that economic insecurity plays a dominant role in the motivation of voters of the populist radical right.”

Supplementing the insecurity hypothesis, the literature that looks at micro-level explanations for radical right party support points to anti-immigrant attitudes as the key micro-level explanatory variable for radical right support (Norris 2005, Mayer 2002, Minkenberg 2000, Van der Brug et al. 2000). Norris (2005) contends that supporters of right wing parties tend to oppose multiculturalism and immigration, and that such attitudes explain radical right support controlling for the traditional socioeconomic predictors of insecurity (unemployment, low education, and low income). “In short, most electoral studies show that within the electorates of populist radical right parties more people are nativist (quantity) and they are more nativist (quality) than within the electorates of other parties.” (Mudde 2007, p. 221). However, while such attitudes are strong predictors of support for the radical right, the explanation for this finding is ad hoc, and often relies on macro-level factors – such as globalization and population change – to explain these micro-level attitudes (e.g. Norris 2005). Measurement is also a
problem in this literature, as nativism and xenophobia are treated as the same. Mudde (2007, p. 222) points out that “the immigration issue” (or xenophobia) is treated as a proxy of nativism.

Work in both American and comparative politics on anti-immigration attitudes and xenophobia look to social identity theory to explain such attitudes. Early social identity psychologists explored group dynamics at the individual level, and found that even when removing the socio-historical context of long-standing group conflicts, we still find group competition in minimal group experiments (Tajfel 1981, Tajfel and Turner 1986). Social identity theory contends that in order to maintain a positive self-esteem, people strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity (thus boosting their self-esteem) and that this positive identity derives largely from favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and relevant outgroups. The key mechanisms at play are categorization and positive distinctiveness. Minimal group experiments conducted by Tajfel and Turner showed that when individuals are randomly categorized in arbitrary groups (categorization), they favor (positive distinctiveness) their in-groups in allocation games. Social identity theory argues that individual strive to have a positive view of the self and that therefore, they will attach themselves to identities that are viewed favorably compared to out-groups. One proposed implication of this theory is that if people favor their own group (positive distinctiveness), and attribute different characteristics to the in-group than out-groups, then people should see their own group as superior. Accordingly, we should expect that those expressing group attachments (such as to their nation) to denigrate out-groups (such as immigrants).

Yet, despite these expectations, empirical research has shown that the story is not one in which patriots are all bigots. These national attachments structure attitudes – such as political interest and intolerance – and behaviors – such as voting (Schatz et al. 1999, de Figueiredo and
However, the relationship between national attachments and attitudes or behaviors depends on the nature of the attachment that an individual holds. For instance, scholars find that while nationalism – belief in national superiority – increases prejudice towards out-groups such as immigrants, patriotism – pride in one’s nation – does not (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Li and Brewer 2004). Similarly, while nativism – beliefs about the characteristics of natives – is associated with prejudice towards immigrants among white Americans, it is not among African-Americans (Carter and Perez 2008). Discussions of nativism’s influence can be found in historical accounts of U.S. immigration (Higham 1955, King 2000), and while Mudde (2007) borrows from this historical literature on American nativism in defining the basic feature of radical right ideology, empirical research is scarce on the influence of nativism (as opposed to xenophobia) at the individual level. These findings have underscored the need for more theorizing about the causes of out-group denigration. Therefore, below I describe in more detail the nature of national identity predispositions.

According to recent work in political and social psychology, national attachments cannot be reduced to one essential attitude or attachment, but rather such attachments are symbolic predispositions (defined below). Political symbols are socially constructed and developed when political objects or ideals are infused with meaning. National symbols are particularly salient in modern nation-states, where “whether implicitly (e.g. a flag) or explicitly (e.g., a memorial), national symbols crystallize the group’s past into an historical entity that can be glorified, romanticized, and mythologized” (Schatz and Lavine 2007, p. 333). Elder and Cobb (1983) argue that such political symbols are “likely to be the objects of the broadest and most enduring attachments” (p. 36). Several researchers of American national identity who discuss the
multidimensionality of such attachments (Citrin et al. 1990, Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2007) contend that national identity is an attachment to both political symbols and ideals, what they term a “symbolic predisposition,” that individuals form very early in life and use to make sense of the political and social world. Sears et al. argue that individuals’ symbolic predispositions form as “stable affective preferences through conditioning in their preadult years, with little calculation of the future costs and benefits of these attitudes. The most important of these are some rather general predispositions, such as (…) nationalism or racial prejudice.” (Sears et al. 1980 p. 671). Comparative work on nationalism by Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) suggests that education early in life socializes young children “to think and categorize the world more in terms of the general and the abstract than in terms of the practical categories based on experience. The nation and their place in it was one of the abstract categories that children acquired in school.” (p. 99). These symbolic predispositions – nationalism, national identity, and nativism – formed early on are then “reinforced throughout one’s life, enable psychic economy, constrain and facilitate political discussion, dictate behavioral norms, and, by definition, delineate identities.” (Schildkraut 2005, p. 24). Furthermore, the content of these symbolic predispositions vary to some degree across time, space, and individuals (Schildkraut 2005, Schildkraut 2007).

As noted above, national identity and even nativism do not always translate into xenophobic attitudes, while nationalism does seem to have a consistent positive relationship with xenophobia in research to date (Carter and Perez 2008, Huddy and Khatib 2007, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003, Maddens et al. 2000, Brewer 1999, Hjerm 1998).\(^1\) Because in-group favoritism does not seem to translate automatically into out-group derogation, social identity theorists have

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\(^1\) Most work that looks at the effects of nationalism do not control for nativism, which although conceptually related are distinct concepts. Carter and Perez (2008) find that measures of these concepts are correlated, but only weakly.
looked beyond categorization and distinctiveness alone to predict when out-group hostility will be associated with in-group identity (Brewer 1999). For example, the minimal group experiments conducted by Tajfel and Turner do show that group members favor their in-group, but this does not necessarily mean that the out-group is viewed hostilely. It is logically possible for two groups to both have positive distinctiveness, but on different dimensions. Brewer (1999) suggests that beliefs of moral superiority of the in-group, context of threat, and common goals can cause positive distinctiveness to be associated negative views of the out-group. Thus, we should expect in-group identities that imply moral superiority – such as nationalism and nativism – to be a more likely breeding ground for out-group derogation. However, the mechanisms of context and common goals cannot be understood outside the intergroup context (more on this in the macro-level section).

In sum, despite assumptions about the motivating force of national identity/nativism/nationalism (which are used interchangeably) in the populist radical right scholarship, demand-side studies of radical right-wing party support do not measure these different predispositions, and rely instead on measures of xenophobia as a proxy for these concepts instead. The literature on xenophobia has shown that it is a poor proxy for these national attachments. Furthermore, the literature lacks careful examination of social identity theory, which explains the causal mechanisms for why we would expect national attachments to matter (through categorization and distinctiveness), and how exactly they translate into anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviors. A representation of the current state of the literature is shown in Figure 1, where the dashed line indicates assumptions and the solid line indicates what has been tested:
Given the complex picture painted by the political psychology literature on national attachments (such as nativism and nationalism) and their relationships with xenophobic attitudes or behaviors, it is appropriate for scholars to delineate the expectations with regards to each type of attachment. As the empirical work on xenophobia and radical right support show, these micro-level factors do not exist in a vacuum. For example, why would the relationship between nativism and xenophobia differ for black and white Americans? Or why would national identity have a positive relationship with xenophobia in one region of Belgium, but a negative one in another region? It appears group context matters as Brewer (1999) suggests. Thus, I turn now to macro-level explanations.

III. Macro Level Factors

I will discuss two key macro-level explanations that dominate the literature on support for the radical right – modernization theory and realistic group conflict theory. Contemporary modernization arguments (reviewed more deeply in Chapter 1) on the radical right focus on the macro-level socioeconomic changes, such as post-industrialization, transition from state socialism to capitalist democracy, and globalization. According to these arguments, losers of the economic changes that have come with modernization – such as the working class and small business owners – will hold immigrants in contempt and support radical right movements (Betz 1994, Givens 2002, Swank & Betz 2003). While there is some support for this at the micro-level (see discussion of the insecurity hypothesis above), there are several problems with modernization theory at the macro-level. As Mudde (2007 p. 203) points out, “irrespective of the
specific form of modernization, all theses have theoretical and empirical problems.” In other words, while these theories may be helpful in understanding the initial emergence of modern radical right parties (Lipset 1955), they are unclear with respect to the causal mechanism of how contemporary macro-level processes, such as globalization, lead to the variations in radical right support. The empirical evidence is weak both for the globalization and post-industrialization hypotheses (Mudde 2007; Veugelers, John and Andre Magnan 2005; Swank and Betz 2003; Keohane and Nye Jr. 2000), and authors find that wide variation within much of Western Europe is unexplained by these hypotheses alone.

The second macro-level theory in the literature on the radical right is realistic group conflict theory, which subsumes several explanations in the literature, such as the “ethnic backlash” (Mudde 2007) explanations or the economic crisis/material threat (Mudde 2007, Golder 2003) explanations. Realistic group conflict theory (Bobo and Hutchings 1996, Sniderman et al. 2004) draws from Blumer’s group position theory (1958) that contends inter-group hostility results from historically developed views that group members form about the proper social order, where members of dominant groups in societies see those from out-groups as threats to the domination of their own in-group. Realistic group conflict theory takes the key explanatory mechanism to be perceived competition for dominance and resources, and the driving motive for groups is to be better off. From this theory follows two key implications for work on xenophobia and radical right support. First, majority populations should perceive immigrants as an ethnic threat to the dominant in-group, and thus we should expect mass immigration to be associated with xenophobic attitudes and radical right support. This is the ethnic backlash explanation often found in the literature on the radical right. Second, when immigrants are flowing into a country, during times of economic crisis, immigrants who are
competing with natives for scarce resources will particularly threaten native citizens. This is similar to the economic crisis hypothesis in the literature, but it is important to note that according to realistic group conflict theory, significant immigration is a necessary condition for economic crisis to instigate competition between native and non-native groups, since without immigration there would be no need for natives to scapegoat non-natives as competition. In immigrant sender countries or in countries with few immigrants, dominant group members will instead scapegoat native minorities who are perceived as the lower social order groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). The literature on both of these implications of realistic group conflict theory – ethnic backlash and economic crisis – come to mixed conclusions about whether there is empirical support for the theory. Some find a positive correlation between radical right support and number of immigrants (Swank and Betz 2003, Golder 2003), while others find a negative or no correlation (e.g. Dulmer and Klein 2005). Similarly, very contradictory findings exist in the literature on poor economic conditions as related to electoral support for the radical right (see Mudde 2007, pp. 205-206 for a lengthy discussion on the mixed empirical results in the literature). However, only Golder (2003) takes into account the theoretically important role of immigration as a necessary condition for economic crisis to trigger radical right support, and he finds support for the expected implication that unemployment combined with immigration is associated with radical right electoral support.

The literature on radical right macro-level factors is full of contradictory findings – that immigration matters or does not, that economic crisis matters or does not. The micro-level factors literature is theoretically underdeveloped, and does not necessarily test the underlying mechanisms (e.g. national attachments) that are purported to be the doing the causal work. Moreover, little scholarship brings the macro and micro explanations for radical right support
together. Debate continues on what matters most with regard to radical right support, macro or micro level factors, and “the most important source of disagreement is the difference in research designs and data used in the studies: often (micro) individual behavior is explained on the basis of (macro) state-level variables (and vice versa), leading to the well-known ecological fallacy.” (Mudde 2007, p. 201). How macro-level factors influence micro-level attitudes/behaviors remains unexplored. My explanation, described in the next section, attempts to reconcile this problem with an explanation that draws from both the micro and macro level theories described above.

**IV. When Patriots are Bigots – Macro Level Triggers of Micro Level Predispositions**

The insecurity/economic interest and modernization hypotheses are closely related with respect to the implications they predict at the individual level, and provide clear expectations about what the demographic predictors of radical right support should be (e.g. unemployment, low-skill occupation, generation). However, as work in this subject has shown, this only tells part of the story. Explanations about the roles of nativism/national identities and macro-level changes in migration levels and the economy are theoretically appealing, but the empirical results are contradictory. Although they are often studied in isolation due to different levels of analysis, realistic group conflict theory and social identity theory are not mutually exclusive. One might ask, as Sniderman et al. (2004, p. 36) did, “How do predisposing factors and situational triggers in combination shape reactions to ethnic minorities?” Understanding the psychological nature of identity predispositions alone does not explain why patriots are not universally xenophobic, as the mixed empirical findings on the subject of xenophobia show. Similarly, group competition over resources during times of ethnic and/or economic threat alone is not enough to explain who supports the radical right, as the mixed empirical results for such macro-level explanations
shows. In fact, Blumer’s original group position theory (1958) treated perceptions of in-group superiority and out-group hostility as necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for intergroup conflict.

Sniderman et al. (2004, p.36) propose “concerns about both economic well-being and national identity underlie reactions to immigrant minorities in Western Europe, to some discernible extent.” Schildkraut (2007) asserts that national identity predispositions can vary across time and space, which begs the question of why such predispositions – socialized from a young age – would change in their influence on political attitudes and behaviors. Brewer argues that “whether actual or imagined, the perception that an outgroup constitutes a threat to ingroup interests or survival creates a circumstance in which identification and interdependence with the ingroup is directly associated with fear and hostility toward the threatening outgroup and vice versa” (Brewer 1999, pp. 435-436). Similarly, in his experimental study of the impact of national identity predispositions combined with primes of situational threats, Sniderman et al. (2004, p. 36) hypothesize that the environment makes individual predisposing characteristics salient.

A great many, care about their country’s national identity and culture, again not on a continuous basis, but when a risk to the national way of life becomes salient. A large portion of the public accordingly should be ready to respond to circumstances triggering a concern about their economic well-being and their country’s way of life above and beyond those immediately concerned about either.

This type of interactive causal mechanism, where the environment triggers some predisposing factor, has also been tested in the personality psychology literature. Stenner (2005) finds that a personality predisposition like authoritarianism becomes activated when circumstances of threat challenge that predisposition. I propose that the way in which identity is translated into prejudice against out-groups is a dynamic process in which the individual symbolic predisposition is primed – made salient – under certain environmental conditions. This would help to explain why
macro-level explanations and micro-level explanations taken in isolation do a poor job of explaining opposition to immigration and support of the radical right. According to Stenner, “the relationship between the predisposition and its manifest products depends upon the environment, that is, that societal conditions affect the extent to which those predispositions are expressed in racist and intolerant attitudes and behaviors.” (Stenner 2005, p. 13).

What threats should prime this relationship? In his historical analysis of anti-immigrant movements in the United States, Higham (1955) found that nativism has ebbed and flowed depending on the national ethnic and economic contexts. There are many ways in which the national social environment could be under threat from “outsiders”, particularly perceived changes in the national ethnic makeup/population and poor national economic conditions. Both of these are collective threats to the nation-state. The literature on sociotropic interest suggests that concern with the national financial climate is equally or more important than individual level economic circumstance in determining attitudes toward immigration (Citrin 1997, Lahav 2004). Such ethnocultural and economic environmental threats will trigger the relationship between national attachments and xenophobic attitudes and behaviors; this interactive relationship between micro-level predispositions and macro-level threats will help to better explain variation in the relationship between these explanatory variables on the one hand and anti-immigrant attitudes and support for the radical right on the other.

This insight that the environment is important in shaping attitudes is not a new one. Work in comparative politics suggests that the context of inter-group relations has a significant effect on whether political group competition and xenophobia emerge in countries (e.g. Quillian 1995, Golder 2003, Posner 2004, Sniderman et al. 2004, Weldon 2006). Quillian (1995, p. 591) argues “threat and the effect of individual characteristics on expressions of prejudice, then, are
not completely separate.” Yet, scholars of xenophobia and/or the radical right electorate have not tested the modifying effects of social context and threat on the relationship between native citizens’ identities and attitudes about outsiders. Sniderman et al. (2000) in their study of xenophobia and radical right wing parties in Italy acknowledge that prejudice is embedded in the context of changes in the economy and society, but that “the design of [their] study does not permit [them] to get a direct grip on it.” (Sniderman et al. 2000, p. 9) Their later experimental survey work in the Netherlands (Sniderman et al. 2004, p. 46) priming perceived threats suggests that immigrant attitudes are a product of both predisposing factors and situational threats, but the experimental design does not explore whether actual threats in the environment interact with predispositions in real world political attitudes and behaviors. Similarly, in Schildkraut’s work on the relationship between the American national identity predispositions and public policy clashes over immigrants, she suggests “it is certain that conflicts such as these are becoming more and more common in the United States. The ethnic composition of the population has undergone dramatic changes over the past thirty years” (Schildkraut 2005, p. 1). Yet, despite her suggestion that environmental change has been a catalyst in activating national identity predispositions, the literature has not yet tested this interactive relationship across time or space. Quillian (1995) finds that population threats – measured using immigration levels – interact with individual-level variables in Europe to amplify prejudice, but he looks exclusively at demographic variables rather than psychological predispositions, such as national identity.

In other words, cross-national or time-series research on xenophobia and radical right support has not yet explored how national level situational triggers – such as economic or population threats – interact with citizens’ national identity predispositions. Research on demand for the radical right looks either at micro-level factors or macro-level factors, without
theorizing how these variables interact with each other. Thus, I hope to contribute to the literature by bringing together social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory. National identity predispositions will be triggered to shape political attitudes and behaviors when that identity is made salient by a threat to the national in-group’s environment. Specifying the interactive relationship between national threats (macro-level) and national identity predispositions (micro-level) will help to explain the mixed empirical record for these different explanations for radical right support. Moreover, this explanation accounting for the interaction between levels of analysis will help to overcome the ecological fallacy committed by much of the literature on this subject.

IV. Implications of the Explanation – Hypotheses

As noted above, despite theoretical expectations of social identity theory, it is not always the case that holding all else equal that nativism and nationalism are associated with xenophobia. Bringing the causal mechanisms of social identity theory together with realistic group conflict theory, I expect that certain threats that I expect to prime the relationship between these predispositions and xenophobic attitudes and behaviors – ethnic and economic. An ethnocultural threat should trigger national identity predispositions – such as nationalism and nativism – to be salient in forming a variety of attitudes about “foreigners” and the radical right.

First, ethnocultural threat should make national attachments salient in forming attitudes towards immigration. Under conditions of ethnocultural threat – due to high immigration – I expect individuals’ national identity predispositions to be related to opposition to immigration and negative attitudes towards immigrants. Moreover, this type of threat should particularly prime negative attitudes about the negative cultural impact of immigrants, e.g. opposition to multiculturalism, belief that immigrants can’t assimilate, or that immigrants are bad for society.
Given that we know such attitudes – xenophobic, anti-immigrant attitudes – are associated with radical right support, I also expect that under conditions of ethnocultural threat, national identity should be associated with radical right ideology. The literature treats radical right ideology as self-placement on the left-right ideology scale at the far right end of the scale (e.g. Betz 1994). Lastly, regarding radical right partisanship and/or voting, given the important effects of both internal and external supply-side factors described in my literature review in chapter 1– such as electoral permissiveness, party leadership, and mainstream party competition on anti-immigrant issues (Mudde 2007, Meguid 2005, Norris 2005, Golder 2003) – I expect that the relationship I propose will be dampened. For example, in some countries, there may be no viable radical right party for structural reasons, which would dampen the effect of the mechanisms proposed here.

Ethnocultural Threat hypothesis:

An ethnocultural threat will trigger a positive relationship between national identity predispositions and 1) generalized opposition to immigration, 2) attitudes about the negative cultural impacts of immigration, 3) radical right ideology, and 4) to a lesser degree radical right partisanship.

Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Ethnocultural Threat Hypothesis
Equation 1 shows my model for testing this hypothesis. Figure 2 represents the marginal effect of national identity predispositions ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 \times$ Ethnocultural Threat).

Equation 1:

\[
\text{Xenophobic Attitudes and Behaviors} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{National Identity} + \beta_2 \text{Ethnocultural Threat} + \beta_3 \text{National Identity} \times \text{Ethnocultural Threat} + \beta_4 \text{Controls} + \epsilon
\]

As noted above, the second macro-level factor that I expect to prime the relationship between nativism and nationalism and xenophobic attitudes and behaviors is an economic threat. An economic threat should trigger national identity predispositions – such as nationalism and nativism – to be salient in forming a variety of attitudes about “foreigners” and the radical right in immigrant receiver countries. Much like we expect trade attitudes and behaviors to be different in importing and exporting countries, we should expect immigration attitudes are different in sender and receiver countries. As I describe in more detail in chapter 3, I will treat immigrant receivership as a categorical variable and test the effect of economic threat in both categories.

In immigrant receiver countries, first, such threats should make national attachments salient in forming attitudes towards immigration. Under conditions of economic threat – due to high national unemployment – I expect individuals’ national identity predispositions to be related to opposition to immigration and negative attitudes towards immigrants. Moreover, this type of threat should particularly prime negative attitudes about the negative economic impact of immigrants, e.g. belief that immigrants take jobs from natives, or that immigrants are bad for the economy. Given that we know such attitudes – xenophobic, anti-immigrant attitudes – are associated with radical right support, I also expect that under conditions of economic threat in immigrant receiver countries, national identity should be associated with radical right ideology and radical right partisanship and/or voting. Note that as with the ethnocultural threat hypothesis,
I expect the proposed relationship to be dampened for radical right partisanship/voting due to the importance of supply-side factors.

**Economic Threat Hypothesis**

An economic environment *in immigrant receiver countries* will trigger a positive relationship between national identity predispositions and 1) generalized opposition to immigration, 2) attitudes about the negative economic impact of immigration, 3) radical right ideology, and 4) to a lesser degree radical right partisanship.

Equation 2 represents the model I will use to test this hypothesis, and Graph 3 illustrates the marginal effect of national attachments in immigrant receiver countries ($\alpha_1 + \alpha_3 \times \text{Economic Threat}$).

Equation 2:

\[
\text{Xenophobic Attitudes and Behaviors} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{National Identity} + \alpha_2 \text{Economic Threat} + \alpha_3 \text{National Identity} \times \text{Economic Threat} + \alpha_4 \text{Controls} + \varepsilon
\]

Figure 3: Graphical Representation of Economic Threat Hypothesis in Immigrant Receiver Countries

In immigrant sender countries, I expect that this economic threat hypothesis will be falsified. In other words, economic threat will not trigger a positive relationship between national identity predispositions and my dependent variables of interest in immigrant sender countries.
This is because in immigrant sender countries, immigrant isn’t a salient category for which to make judgments. Rather, native minority groups would most likely be targeted in downturns in such countries. Based on this implication of realistic group conflict theory, Figure 4 shows what I expect to find in immigrant sender countries.

Figure 4: Graphical Representation of Economic Threat Hypothesis in Immigrant Receiver Countries

V. Conclusion

In this chapter, I proposed a theory that brings together micro-level and macro-level explanations for xenophobic attitudes and radical right support. By combining the insights from social identity theory and realistic group conflict theory, I hope fill the gap in the literature by theorizing about the relationship between micro-level and macro-level determinants of xenophobia and radical right support. I propose a dynamic relationship exists between individual national identity predispositions and environmental threats, such that ethnocultural and economic threats prime the relationship between such dispositions and xenophobia and radical right support. In chapter 3, I test my hypotheses with respect to generalized opposition to immigration
as well as specific attitudes about cultural vs. economic impacts of immigrants. In chapter 4, I test my hypotheses with respect to radical right ideology and partisanship/vote choice.
Works Cited


