COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM:
THE EMERGENCE AND DYNAMICS OF HYBRID REGIMES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Steven Levitsky
Harvard University

Lucan A. Way
University of Toronto

This piece combines parts of Chapter 1 (Introduction) with Chapter 2 (theoretical framework) of an early draft of our book manuscript. The chapters that will eventually follow cover each of five regions: the Americas, Central Europe, former Soviet Union, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
"Politics...is not like football, deserving a level playing field. Here, you try that and you will be roasted."

---Former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi.¹

The end of the Cold War posed a fundamental challenge to authoritarianism. Single-party and military dictatorships collapsed throughout post-communist Eurasia, Africa, and much of Asia and Latin America during the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the same time, the formal architecture of democracy—particularly multiparty elections—diffused widely across the globe.

Transitions did not always lead to democracy, however. In much of Africa and the former Soviet Union, and in parts of Central Europe, East Asia, and the Americas, new regimes combined electoral competition with varying degrees of autocracy. Unlike the single-party or military autocracies that predominated during the Cold War era, regimes in Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and elsewhere were competitive, in that opposition forces used democratic institutions to contest vigorously—and at times successfully—for power. Nevertheless, these regimes were not democratic. Government critics suffered harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent attacks, and electoral fraud, unfair media access, and abuse of state resources skewed the playing field heavily in favor of incumbents. In other words, competition was real, but unfair. We call such regimes competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2002).

Competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated during the post-Cold War period. In 1995, at least 36 regimes were competitive authoritarian,² which exceeded the number of democracies among developing and post-communist countries.³ Nevertheless, these regimes received strikingly little scholarly attention.⁴

¹Quoted in Munene (2001: 24).
²Albania, Armenia, Benin, Belarus, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Georgia, Gabon, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Tanzania, Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
³See, for example, the scoring of Diamond (2002: 30-31) and Schedler (2002b: 47).
⁴Exceptions include the cluster of articles in the April 2002 Journal of Democracy, as well as Ottaway (2003) and Schedler (forthcoming).
This inattention was rooted in a pronounced democratizing bias that pervaded the post-Cold War literature on regime change.\textsuperscript{5} Viewed through the lens of democratization, hybrid regimes were categorized as flawed, incomplete, or “transitional” democracies (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Carothers 2002). During the 1990s, for example, Russia was widely viewed as a case of “protracted” democratic transition (McFaul 1999), and as late as 2004, observers described it as “evolving democracy.”\textsuperscript{6} Cambodia was labeled a “nascent democracy” that was “on the road to democratic consolidation” (Brown and Timberman 1998: 14; Albritton 2004); Haiti was said to be undergoing a “long” (Gibbons 1999: 2), “ongoing” (Erikson 2004: 294), and even “unending”\textsuperscript{7} democratic transition; Cameroon, Georgia, and Kazakhstan were characterized as “democratizers” (Siegle 2004: 21), and Central African Republic and Congo-Brazzaville were called “would be democracies” (Chege 2005: 287). Where transitions failed to bring democracy, they were described as “stalled,” “protracted” or “flawed.” Thus, Kenya was said to be in a state of “arrested democratic consolidation” (Harbeson 1998: 162); Zambia was described as “stuck in transition” (Rakner and Svasand 2005); and Gabon was said to have “remained in transition throughout the 1990s” (Decalo 1998: 165).

These characterizations are misleading. They assume that hybrid regimes are—or should be—moving in a democratic direction.\textsuperscript{8} Such assumptions lack empirical foundation. Although some hybrid regimes democratized during the post-Cold War period (Mexico, Slovakia, Taiwan), most did not. In many cases, regimes either remained stable (Malaysia, Tanzania) or became increasingly authoritarian (Belarus, Cambodia, Russia, Zimbabwe). Others were unstable and authoritarian: autocratic incumbents fell but their successors were also autocrats (Georgia, Ukraine, Zambia). By 2006, many regimes had been competitive authoritarian for 15 years or more,\textsuperscript{9} which

\textsuperscript{5} Carothers (2002) offers an important critique of this bias.
\textsuperscript{8} Carothers (2002) makes a similar critique.
\textsuperscript{9} Examples include Belarus, Cameroon, Gabon, Malaysia, Russia, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
easily exceeds the life span of most Latin American military regimes from the 1960s and 1970s.\textsuperscript{10}

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is time to stop treating hybrid regimes as “incomplete,” “transitional,” or “would be” democracies. As scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell (1996) and Thomas Carothers (2002) have argued, to characterize such cases as “prolonged,” “flawed,” or “failed” democratic transitions is teleology. Instead, we must conceptualize and theorize them for what they are: distinct, non-democratic regime types. Rather than assuming that post-authoritarian regimes are “in transition” to democracy, it is more useful to ask why some of them democratized during the post-Cold War period while others did not. In other words, the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes needs to be explained, rather than assumed. That is the goal of this book.

This book examines the post-Cold War (1990-2005) trajectories of 37 regimes that were or became competitive authoritarian between 1990 and 1995. The study spans five regions. It includes six countries in the Americas (Dominican Republic, Guyana, Haiti, Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua); seven in Central Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia); three in East Asia (Cambodia, Malaysia, Taiwan); six in the former Soviet Union (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine); and 15 in Africa (Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The book seeks explain why some competitive authoritarian regimes democratized (e.g., Mexico, Peru, Slovakia), while others remained stable and authoritarian (e.g., Malaysia, Russia, Zimbabwe), and still others underwent transitions without democratization (e.g., Georgia, Malawi, Zambia). Our central argument, which we present in detail in Chapter 2, is that two factors are of central importance: ties to the West and the strength of governing party and state organizations. Where linkage to the West is extensive, competitive authoritarian regimes democratized between 1990 and 2005. Where linkage was low, regime outcomes hinged on incumbents’ organizational and coercive capacity: where

\textsuperscript{10}Contra Huntington (1991: 137), then it appears that halfway houses often \textit{do} stand. For similar critiques, see Case (1996b) and Brownlee (2004).
incumbent capacity was high, regimes remained stable and authoritarian; where incumbent capacity was low, regimes tended to be unstable and authoritarian.

What is Competitive Authoritarianism?

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which fraud, civil liberties violations, and abuse of state and media resources so skew the playing field that the regime cannot be labeled democratic. Such regimes are competitive, in that democratic institutions are not a façade: opposition forces can use legal channels to seriously contest for (and occasionally win) power; but they are authoritarian in that opposition forces are handicapped by a highly uneven—and even dangerous—playing field. Competition is thus real but unfair.

Defining Democracy and Closed Authoritarianism

We employ a “midrange” definition of democracy: one that is demanding but nevertheless mainstream and procedural (Diamond 1999: 13-15) Following Dahl (1971), scholars have converged around a “procedural minimum” definition of democracy that includes four key attributes: (1) regular elections that are competitive, free, and fair; (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association; and (4) the absence of non-elected “tutelary” authorities (such as militaries, monarchies, or religious bodies) that limit elected officials’ effective power to govern.11 These definitions are essentially “Schumpeterian,” in that they center on competitive elections (Schumpeter 1947; Huntington 1989). However, scholars have subsequently “precised” the concept of democracy by making explicit criteria—such as civil liberties and effective power to govern—that are implicitly understood to be part of the overall meaning, and which are viewed as necessary for competitive elections to take place (Collier and Levitsky 1997)

11See, for example, Huntington (1991: 5-13); Schmitter and Karl (1991); Collier and Levitsky (1997); Diamond (1999: 7-15), and Mainwaring et al. (2001). Other scholars, most notably Adam Przeworski and his collaborators (Alvarez et al. 1996; Przeworski et al. 2000), have maintained a more minimalist definition that centers on contested elections and electoral turnover.
Although we remain committed to a procedural minimum conception of democracy, we precise it by adding a fifth attribute: the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition. Obviously, some incumbent advantage—in the form of patronage jobs, pork-barrel spending, clientelistic social policies, and privileged access to media and finance—exists in even the most established democracies. However, these advantages neither systematically advantage one party nor seriously undermine the opposition’s capacity to compete. Where incumbent manipulation of state institutions and resources is so excessive that it “impedes political competition,” it becomes undemocratic (Chu 1999: 63).

We classify as closed or full-scale authoritarian regimes that are non-competitive, in that no viable channels exist through which opposition forces may contest legally for power. This category includes regimes in which democratic institutions (i.e., multiparty elections, civil liberties) do not even exist on paper, as in China, Cuba, or Saudi Arabia. Yet it also includes regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are reduced to façade or “window dressing” status in practice. In these regimes, which are often characterized as pseudodemocratic or electoral authoritarian (Diamond 1999: 15), elections are so marred by repression, restrictions on opposition candidates, and fraud that there is no uncertainty about their outcome. Though legally tolerated, much opposition activity is forced underground by repression, and leading regime critics are often imprisoned or exiled. Thus, in Nicaragua under the Somozas, Mexico at the height of PRI hegemony, and post-Cold War Egypt, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, formal democratic institutions served primarily a legitimizing function; they were not viewed by the opposition a viable means to achieve power.

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12 Thus, although U.S. congressional elections are clearly marked by an uneven playing field, incumbents of both major parties enjoy these advantages.  
13 A level playing field is implicit in most understandings of democracy. Few analysts would call democratic a regime in which governing parties virtually monopolize access to the media and finance. Indeed, much of what we associate with an uneven playing field could be considered aspects of “free and fair elections” or “civil liberties.” However, there are at least two reasons to make this attribute explicit. First, some aspects of an uneven playing field (including disparities in access to media and resources) have a major impact between elections and are thus often missed in evaluations of whether elections are “free and fair.” Second, an uneven playing field often does not directly affect individual rights—the focus of most measurements of civil liberties—as much as collective entities such as political parties or oppositions as a whole. For example, whereas closing down a newspaper involves a clear violation of civil liberties, de facto governing party control of the private media, achieved via patronage deals or illicit proxy arrangements—does not.
Our category of closed regimes thus includes a wide range of autocracies, including monarchies, sultanistic regimes, bureaucratic authoritarianism, and single party regimes. The differences among these regimes are enormous and of great theoretical importance (Munck and Snyder 2004). For the purposes of this study, however, these regimes are all closed, in the sense that they lack significant legal contestation for power.

**Situating Competitive Authoritarianism**

Competitive authoritarian regimes may be distinguished from closed authoritarian regimes in that legal channels exist through which opposition parties compete seriously for power. Elections are held regularly, and opposition parties are not legally barred from contesting them. Opposition activity takes place above ground. Civil liberties are sufficiently respected for opposition parties to open offices, recruit candidates, and organize campaigns, and leading opposition figures are generally not exiled or imprisoned. In short, democratic procedures are meaningful, and opposition groups take them seriously as arenas through which to contest for power.

Yet competitive authoritarian regimes are not democracies. Although democratic institutions are sufficiently respected to permit real competition, they are violated to such a degree that competition is unfair, and opposition parties are seriously handicapped in their effort to challenge incumbents in elections, the legislature, the courts, and other public arenas. Competitive authoritarian regimes fall short on at least one—and usually more—of three defining attributes of democracy: (1) free elections; (2) broad protection of civil liberties; and (3) a reasonably even playing field.

**Elections**

In democracies, elections are free, in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters, and fair, in the sense that opposition parties are able to campaign on relatively even footing: they are not repressed, harassed, or systematically denied access to the media and other resources. In closed regimes, multiparty elections either do not exist (e.g., China, Saudi Arabia) or exist but are non-competitive competitive in practice. Elections may be considered non-competitive when (1) major candidates are excluded (via bans, imprisonment, or exile); (2) repression or legal controls make it
impossible for opposition parties to sustain public campaigns; or (3) fraud is so massive that there is no observable relationship between public preferences and electoral results.

Competitive authoritarian regimes fall in between these extremes. On the one hand, elections are competitive, in that major opposition candidates are not excluded, and opposition parties are able to campaign publicly, and there is no massive fraud. On the other hand, elections are often unfree and almost always unfair. In some cases, elections are marred by at least some fraud, in the form of manipulation of voter lists (Dominican Republic 1994), ballot stuffing (Ukraine 2004), or falsification of results (Belarus, Cameroon, Gabon). They may also be marred by large-scale voter intimidation of opposition activists, voters, and poll watchers, including the establishment of opposition “no go” areas in some territories (Cambodia, Kenya, Zimbabwe).

In other cases, vote and vote counting processes are reasonably clean, but a highly uneven playing field renders the overall electoral process manifestly unfair. Sources of unfairness include incumbent control over the bulk of the media, massive incumbent abuse of state resources, restrictions —via security laws or state/paramilitary harassment—on opposition parties’ ability to campaign on equal footing, and numerous forms of petty abuse by politicized state agencies. In many cases, these abuses make elections unfair even in the absence of major election-day irregularities. Thus, in Malaysia, elections “have not been characterized by widespread fraudulent practices such as ballot-box stuffing or blatant physical pressure on voters, and there has been no serious legal barrier to parties wishing to contest” (Crouch 1996: 57), but vast disparities in access to resources and the media have so “heavily loaded” elections that the governing UMNO has been “unbeatable” since the 1950s (Case 1996: 182). Similarly, although Mexico’s 1994 elections were relatively clean, electoral competition was marked by such “scandalous unfairness” that one observer compared it to a “soccer match where the goalposts were of different heights and breadths and where one team included 11 players plus the umpire and the other a mere six or seven players” (Castañeda 1995: 131).

Civil Liberties

In democracies, a broad range of civil liberties, including rights of free speech and association, and a free press, are broadly protected. Although these rights may be
violated,\textsuperscript{14} such violations are infrequent and do not seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to challenge incumbents. In closed regimes, basic civil liberties generally either do not exist or exist on paper but are so systematically violated that citizens, civic and opposition groups, and media are not even minimally protected from state abuse (e.g., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan). As a result, much opposition activity takes place either underground or in exile.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, basic civil liberties are formally guaranteed and are to some extent protected in practice. Independent media exist and civic and opposition groups are able to operate above ground, opening offices, holding public meetings and demonstrations, and criticizing the government in the media. Yet civil liberties are frequently violated. Opposition politicians, independent judges, journalists, human rights activists, and other government critics are subject to harassment, arrest, and in some cases, violent attacks. Independent media are frequently threatened, attacked, and in cases, they are suspended, closed, or taken over by government allies. In some regimes, overt repression—including the arrest of opposition figures (Belarus, Cambodia), killing of opposition activists (Cambodia, Haiti, Kenya, Zimbabwe), violent repression of protest (Cambodia, Ethiopia, Kenya), or closure of independent media (Russia, Zimbabwe) is widespread, pushing regimes toward full-scale authoritarianism. In other cases, repression takes more subtle forms, including surveillance and blackmail, blacklisting, denial of credit, licenses, contracts, or other state benefits to opponents and their private sector backers, denial of licenses, newsprint, or state advertising to independent media outlets, and numerous forms of “legal” persecution, including use of libel or defamation laws against media and opposition leaders and politicized use of the courts or tax and anti-corruption agencies to target government critics.\textsuperscript{15}

Although civil liberties violations in competitive authoritarian regimes are not systematic or severe enough to force opposition underground or into exile, they clearly exceed what is permissible in a democracy. By raising the cost of critical media coverage (and thus inducing much of the media into self-censorship) and opposition

\textsuperscript{14}In the U.S., examples include the 1970 Kent State killings and the Nixon administration’s illegal surveillance of Democrats and other critics.

\textsuperscript{15}Examples of this third tactic include the withdrawal of television magnate Baruch Ivcher’s citizenship (and thus, his right to own a television station) in Peru, the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim on corruption and sodomy charges in Malaysia, and the imprisonment of oil magnate Mikhail Khodorkovskii in Russia.
activity (and thus convincing all but the boldest activists to remain on the sidelines), even intermittent civil liberties violations can seriously hinder the opposition’s capacity to organize and challenge the government.

*An Uneven Playing Field*

Finally, competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by a highly uneven playing field between incumbents and opposition. Although a degree of incumbent advantage exists in all democracies, and although many new democracies are characterized by widespread clientelism and politicization of state bureaucracies, not all forms (and levels) of incumbent advantage are compatible with democracy. At some point, incumbent abuse goes “beyond the usual concept of ‘incumbent advantage’” to the point where it undermines political competition (Chu 1999: 63). The question of where to draw the line between “acceptable” incumbent advantage and a truly uneven playing field is a difficult one. We employ the following criteria: an uneven playing field exists where (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; (2) the incumbent party is systematically favored at the expense of the opposition; and (3) the opposition’s ability to organize and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources; media access; and access to the law.

**Access to Resources.** Access to resources is uneven where incumbents use the state to create or maintain resource disparities that hinder the opposition’s ability to compete. This may be done in several ways. First, incumbents may make direct partisan use of state resources, while denying other parties access to those resources. In a few cases, this state financing is legal. In Guyana and Zimbabwe during the 1980s, special public ministries existed to finance the activities of the governing party. More frequently, state financing is informal. A classic case is the Mexican PRI, which “enjoyed virtually unlimited access to government funds” (Cornelius 1996: 58; Morris 1995: 98). During the early 1990s, the PRI reportedly drew an estimated $1 billion in illicit state finance, usually disguised in the budget the form of public works.

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16 For detailed discussions of uneven playing fields in hybrid regimes, see Schedler (2002a, 2002b); Mozaffar and Schedler (2002); and Ottaway (2003: 138-156).
(Oppenheimer 1996: 88). In Cameroon, the governing CPDM enjoyed “unlimited access to the government treasury” (Fombad 2004: 372-3). Virtually all of its expenses, including salaries, rent, and phone bills, were covered by state agencies (GERDDES-Cameroon 1995: 89-92). In Senegal, there was “no effective separation of [governing Socialist Party] and government spending” (IFES 1992: 31). The executive branch made use of large “secret funds” to finance Socialist campaigns, which went “a long way to compromise equal chances of candidates” (Gueye 1995: 155).

Incumbents may also make systematic use of the state’s infrastructure—including buildings, vehicles, communications equipment, and personnel—for electoral campaigns. In poor countries with weak private sectors, such as Cambodia, Guyana, Nicaragua, and Tanzania, this has given incumbents a vast resource advantage over opponents. In numerous countries, public employees were mobilized in large numbers to work for the governing party. In Ukraine and other former Soviet states, this mobilization included not only low level bureaucrats but also teachers, doctors and other professionals. Security forces may also be mobilized on behalf of governing parties. In Guyana, for example, the army was “practically an arm of the ruling PNC,” (Griffith 1997b: 275), routinely supporting PNC electoral campaigns; in Peru, the army helped substitute for a weak governing party, collecting signatures for the party’s registration, putting up posters, and distributing food and t-shirts for President Fujimori’s campaign (Rospigliosi 1994: 49; Arias 2001: 63).

Incumbents may use the state to monopolize access to private sector finance. Governing parties may use discretionary control over credit, licenses, state contracts, and other resources to enrich themselves via party owned enterprises (Taiwan), benefit crony proxy-owned firms that then contribute money back into party coffers (Malaysia), or simply corner the market in private sector donations (Mexico, Russia). In Taiwan, the KMT’s business empire—valued at more than $4.5 billion—made it “the richest party in the world” (Fields 2002: 121-127; Tien 1997: 147). Hundreds of millions of dollars in annual profits gave the KMT “an independent financial base which operated on an unheard of scale in any representative democracy” (Chu 1992: 150). In Malaysia, UMNO used its discretionary control over state policy build a network of proxy-

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17Examples include Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Guyana, Malaysia, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
controlled firms into a vast business conglomerate with at least $1 billion in assets.\textsuperscript{18} In Mexico, the PRI raised hundreds of millions of dollars in donations from business magnates who had benefited from government contracts, licenses, or favorable treatment in the privatization process (Oppenheimer 1996; Philip 1999).

The state may also be used to starve opposition parties of resources. In Ghana, for example, the 1992 political parties law imposed strict limits on private contributions (while providing no public subventions), thereby leaving opposition parties at a major disadvantage vis-à-vis Jerry Rawlings’ NDC (Abdulai 1992: 70; Pinckney 1997: 173; Boafo-Arthur 1998a). Entrepreneurs who backed the opposition National Patriotic Party (NPP) in the 1992 election “were blacklisted, denied government contracts and [had] their businesses openly sabotaged” (Oquaye 1998: 109), which left the NPP under-financed in the 1996 election (Boafo-Arthur 1998a: 86). Likewise, in Cambodia, the only full-time opposition party, the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), was “starved for funds by a business community told by [the government] that financing SRP was committing economic suicide” (Heder 2005: 118).

In these cases, resource disparities far exceeded anything seen in Western democracies. In Mexico, for example, the PRI admitted to spending thirteen times more money than the two major opposition parties combined during the 1994 elections, and some observers claim that the ratio may have been 20-to-1.\textsuperscript{19} In Malaysia, resources are “overwhelmingly in the hands of the governing coalition” (Funston 2000: 21), and consequently, “the opposition’s prospects of defeating the government at the polls are…minimal” (Crouch 1996b: 115). In Taiwan, the KMT spent more than 50 times more than the opposition DPP during the 1994 election (Wu 1995: 79). In 2000, the Taipei Times reported that the KMT held in $6.7 billion in assets, compared to just $900,000 for the DPP (Rigger 2001: 950). These resource disparities made it “extremely difficult for the opposition to defeat the ruling party” (Alagappa 2001b: 14).

**Access to Media.** Where opposition parties do not enjoy access to (state or private) media that reaches the bulk of the population, there is no possibility of fair competition. Media access may be denied in several ways. Frequently, the most important disparities existed in access to electronic media (television and radio),

\textsuperscript{18}Milne and Mauzy (1999: 60-1); Searle (1999: 103). On party-business ties in Malaysia, see Gomez (1990, 2002a) and Searle (1999)

combined with highly biased and partisan coverage. In many post-Cold War regimes, the state maintained a monopoly over television and most—if not all—radio broadcasting. Although print media was often pluralist, with a diversity of independent newspapers and magazines circulating freely, these papers were often confined to a small urban elite. In poor, predominately rural societies (e.g., much of Africa), only a tiny fraction of the population read newspapers. In such cases, if radio and television are in the hands of the state, and state-run channels are biased in favor of the governing party, opposition forces are effectively denied access to the media.20

In other cases, private media is widespread but major media outlets are closely linked to the governing party—via proxy ownership, patronage ties, cronyism, and other forms of corruption. In Malaysia, for example, numerous private newspapers and television outlets exist, but nearly all of them are controlled by individuals or companies linked to the governing Barisan Nasional (Nain 2002; Rodan 2004: 25-6). Thus, Malaysia’s private media “can best be thought of as the main propaganda apparatus for the UMNO party state or as a semi-privatized appendage of the information ministry” (Slater 2003: 93). Similarly, the PRI controlled Mexico’s largely private media “through co-optation” (Lawson 2002: 26). The country’s leading television station, Televisa, and the vast majority of private radio stations, were in the hands of “sympathetic private owners” (Lawson 2002: 26). In Peru, private television stations received regular monthly payments of up to $1.5 million from the National Intelligence Service (SIN) during the late 1990s. Many signed informal “contracts” in which they agreed to limit their coverage of opposition parties (and even refuse to the opposition’s paid advertisements) during the 2000 electoral campaign (Bowen and Holligan 2003: 360-61).

Biased Referees: Uneven Access to the Law. In many competitive authoritarian regimes, the courts, electoral authorities, and other nominally independent arbiters of the rules of the game are not only controlled by incumbents (via packing, blackmail, bribery, or intimidation) but also are systematically employed as partisan tools against the opposition. Consequently, in electoral, judicial, and other critical disputes, agencies that are designed to act as referees rule systematically in favor of incumbents.

20 This was the case, for example, in Cameroon, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua in 1990, Guyana through 1992, Senegal though 1993, and Ghana and Kenya through the mid-1990s.
Incumbent manipulation of the legal system may affect political competition in several ways. First, where the judiciary is solidly under the control of the governing party, the government may violate democratic procedure with impunity. For example, the Fujimori government’s control over judicial and electoral authorities enabled it to violate legal and democratic procedure with impunity. Illegal acts included bribery, illegal surveillance, the stripping of media owner Baruch Ivcher’s citizenship, the massive forgery of signatures on behalf of the governing party, and the passage of dubiously constitutional legislation permitting Fujimori’s bid for a third term in 2000 (Cameron 2006).

Second, incumbents may engage in “legal” repression, or the discretionary use of legal instruments—such as tax, libel, or defamation laws—as a weapon against opponents or the media. Although such repression may involve the technically correct application of the law, its use is selective and partisan, rather than universal. Thus, government allies who fail to pay taxes are be protected from prosecution, whereas critics are vulnerable to prosecution for even the slightest infraction. “Legal” repression takes numerous forms. One is the use of tax law to target opposition. In Peru, for example, the Fujimori government “perfected the technique of ‘using the law to trample the law’”(Youngers 2000a: 68). The courts and the tax agency (SUNAT) “were converted into institutions of political persecution” (Ames et al 2001: 220), becoming “a shield for friends of the regime and a weapon against its enemies” (Durand 2003: 503, 459).

Rivals—particularly internal rivals—may also be prosecuted for corruption. In Malaysia, for example, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad used corruption and sodomy charges to purge and eventually imprison his chief rival, Anwar Ibrahim.

Perhaps the most widespread form of “legal” repression is the use of libel or defamation laws. In Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Russia and elsewhere, governments routinely used libel and defamation laws to arrest journalists and editors and/or suspend and even close down media outlets. In many cases, the repeated use of costly lawsuits led to the disappearance of many independent media outlets (Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Russia), or the threat of legal action led to widespread self-censorship (Malaysia, others?). Defamation laws were also used against opposition parties. In 2005, for example, the Cambodian government used a flurry of
libel and defamation charges against the opposition Sam Rainsy party, arresting and convicting of several SRP leaders and legislators and forcing SRP leader Sam Rainsy to flee into exile.\textsuperscript{21}

Finally, partisan control over nominally independent electoral authorities may allow incumbents to engage in fraud and other forms of electoral abuse. In numerous cases, including Armenia, Belarus, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Ukraine, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, biased electoral authorities either directly engaged in fraud or tolerated fraud and other illicit acts committed by incumbents. In other cases, electoral and judicial authorities issued rulings that had a decisive impact on opposition chances. Examples include the legalization of Fujimori’s presidential candidacy in 2000 and the decision to ban Kenneth Kaunda from the 1996 presidential race in Zambia.

\textit{Competition without Democracy: Contestation and Uncertainty in Non-Democracies}

Table 1.1 summarizes the major differences among democratic, closed, and competitive authoritarian regimes. In democracies, formal democratic institutions are systematically respected. Opposition parties enjoy sufficient freedom, legal protection, resources, and media access to compete with on a reasonably fair basis. Consequently, elections and other democratic processes are characterized by considerable uncertainty (Przeworski 1986: 58). Such uncertainty of outcomes is often said to be a defining feature of democracy. In closed regimes, formal democratic institutions do not exist or are largely a façade. Political opposition is either banned outright or so severely repressed that the bulk of opposition activity is forced underground or into exile. Elections are non-existent or non-competitive. Hence, there is no effective legal contestation for power, and the political process is characterized by low levels of uncertainty.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions exist and are meaningful. Major opposition parties are legal, operate above ground, and compete seriously in elections, occasionally even winning them. However, they are subject to surveillance, harassment, and occasional violence, their access to resources and media is

limited, electoral and judicial institutions are packed by incumbents and used as weapons against them, and elections are often marred by fraud, intimidation, and other abuse. In such a context, outcomes are not as uncertain as in democracies. With the playing field tilted against them, oppositions usually lose their battles in the electoral, legislative, and judicial arenas. Nevertheless, real uncertainty exists. Unfair competition does not preclude serious opposition challenges and, occasionally, even opposition victories.\footnote{Arguably, these include Nicaragua 1990, Zambia 1991, Guyana 1992, Belarus, Malawi, and Ukraine 1994, Croatia 2000, and nearly Zimbabwe 2002.}

What this suggests is that uncertainty and even incumbent turnover are not defining features of democracy. Influential scholars, particularly Adam Przeworski and his collaborators (Przeworski 1986, 1991; Alvarez et al. 1996), have argued that what distinguishes democratic from non-democratic regimes is uncertainty of outcomes and the possibility of electoral turnover. As Przeworski famously put it, democracy is a “system in which parties lose elections” (1991: 10). According to this conceptualization, a regime characterized by uncertainty of outcomes and especially electoral turnover must be democratic. Such a conceptualization is misleading. Elections in Mexico in 1988, Nicaragua in 1990, Cameroon in 1992, Ghana in 1992, Kenya in 1992 and 1997, Cambodia in 1993 and 1998, Gabon in 1993, Belarus and Ukraine in 1994, Armenia and Russia in 1996, Serbia in 1997 and 2000, Peru in 2000, Zimbabwe in 2000 and 2002, Madagascar and Zambia in 2001, and Malawi and Ukraine in 2004 were characterized by considerable uncertainty and—in a few cases—incumbent defeat. However, none of them were democratic, and some were not even remotely so. We must therefore be able to conceptualize regimes that are sufficiently competitive to generate real uncertainty (and even turnover), but which fall short of procedural minimum standards of democracy. As this book shows, such regimes were widespread during the post-Cold War period.

In sum, a central characteristic of competitive authoritarianism is \textit{unfair competition}. Whereas fully closed regimes are characterized by the absence of legal competition (and hence, of uncertainty) and democracy is characterized by fair competition, competitive authoritarianism is characterized by competition that is real (and often intense) but unfair. Put another way, whereas officials in closed regimes generally rest easy on the eve of elections, as neither they nor opposition leaders expect
anything but an incumbent victory, competitive authoritarian incumbents do not. Government officials fear a possible opposition victory (and must work hard to thwart it), and opposition leaders believe they have at least some chance of victory. In competitive authoritarian regimes, incumbents are forced to sweat.

The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism

Competitive authoritarianism is a post-Cold War phenomenon. Although a few competitive authoritarian regimes existed during the interwar and Cold War periods,\(^{23}\) they proliferated after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Key changes in the international environment created conditions that were highly favorable to the emergence and survival of competitive authoritarian regimes. First, the end of the Cold War led to a withdrawal of external support for many superpower-sponsored dictatorships. Beginning in the late 1980s, both Soviet- and U.S.-backed dictatorships faced a precipitous decline in external military and economic assistance, which eroded the capacity of many autocrats to maintain themselves in power. States became bankrupted, patronage resources disappeared, and in many cases, coercive apparatuses began to disintegrate, leaving autocrats with little choice but to liberalize or abandon power (Herbst 1994; Joseph 1997).\(^{24}\)

The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to a marked shift in the global balance of forces, with the liberal West—and particularly the United States—emerging as the dominant center of military and economic power. The disappearance of viable alternative models created an “almost universal wish to imitate a way of life associated with the liberal capitalist democracies of the core regimes” (Whitehead 1996b: 21), which encouraged the diffusion of Western-style institutions (Schmitz and Sell 1999; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). Moreover, the main sources of external assistance were now located in the West. Effectively “[r]eading the handwriting on the (Berlin) wall,” many autocrats adopted formal democratic institutions in an effort to “position their countries favorably in the international

\(^{23}\)Interwar Central Europe, competitive authoritarian regimes emerged in much of Central Europe during the 1920s (Janos 2000). In the postwar period, regimes that were arguably competitive authoritarian include Argentina under Perón (1946-55), Dominican Republic during much of the first Balaquer period (1966-78), Senegal after 1976, and post-colonial Botswana, Guyana, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe.

\(^{24}\)Autocracies that were particularly hard hit by the end of the Cold War include those in Benin, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Liberia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.
Another critical change in the international environment was a shift in Western foreign policy in favor of democracy promotion.\(^{25}\) With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the U.S. and other Western powers stepped up efforts to encourage and defend democracy, through a combination of external assistance, military and diplomatic pressure, and unprecedented political conditionality. In 1990, the U.S., Great Britain, and France each announced that they would link future economic assistance to democratization and human rights, and during the 1990s both governments and multilateral institutions began to condition loans and assistance on the holding of elections and respect for human rights (Nelson and Eglinton 1992; Stokke 1995a).\(^{26}\) Though never applied consistently, the use (or threat) of political conditionality induced many autocrats to hold multiparty elections.\(^{27}\) The “new political conditionality” was accompanied by efforts to create permanent international legal frameworks for the collective defense of democracy (Franck 1992; Halperin 1993; Farer 1996a; Pevehouse 2005). Thus, the 1990s saw the emergence of an “international architecture of collective institutions and formal agreements enshrining both the principles of democracy and human rights” (Diamond 1995: 38). These efforts went furthest in Europe, where full democracy was an explicit requirement for membership in the EU. Yet they were also seen in the Americas, where the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted new mechanisms for the collective defense of democracy in 1991 and 1992 (Farer 1993, 1996b; Halperin 1993).

A final component of the post-Cold War international environment was the growing transnational infrastructure of organizations and networks—including international party foundations, election monitoring agencies, and a burgeoning community of international organizations and NGOs—committed to the promotion of human rights and democracy.\(^{28}\) Strengthened by cheaper air travel and new information technologies such as the internet, transnational human rights and democracy networks drew international attention to human
rights abuses, lobbied Western states to take action against abusive governments, and helped to protect and empower domestic opposition groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). Due to the presence of these networks, human rights abuses often triggered a “boomerang effect,” as they were widely reported by international media and human rights groups, which often led Western governments to take punitive measures against the violating government (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13). At the same time, the growing number and sophistication of international election observer missions helped call international attention to fraudulent elections, which increasingly deterred governments from attempting fraud.29

These changes in the post-Cold War international environment raised the cost of openly autocratic rule. In many developing states, the prohibitive external costs—in terms of international isolation and the loss of external assistance—associated with large-scale repression or fraud undermined elites’ capacity to establish or maintain closed regimes. At the same time, the power of the West and the disappearance of internationally legitimate regime alternatives created a “global democratic ‘zeitgeist’ of unprecedented scope and intensity” (Diamond 1993: 53). These changes created a strong incentive for peripheral elites to adopt the formal architecture of liberal democracy, particularly multiparty elections (Joseph 1997). This dynamic was most striking in sub-Saharan Africa: in 1989, 29 African countries were governed by de jure single party regimes; by 1994, not one single party regime remained (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 8).

Yet if the post-Cold War international environment undermined existing autocracies and encouraged the diffusion of multiparty elections, it did not necessarily bring democracy. International democratizing pressure was limited in important ways. First, it was applied selectively and inconsistently (Nelson and Eglinton 1992; Carothers 1999; Lawson 1999; Crawford 2001), with important countries and regions (such as China and the Middle East) largely escaping pressure. Second, international democratizing pressure was often superficial. In much of the world, Western democracy promotion was markedly “electoralist” (Karl 1986), in that it focused on multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties and a level playing field. As Fareed Zakaria put it,

In the end,…elections trump everything. If a country holds elections, Washington and the world will tolerate a great deal from the resulting government….In an age of

29See McCoy et al. (1991); Rosenau and Fagen (1994); Carothers (1997b); Chand (1997); and Middlebrook (1998).
images and symbols, elections are easy to capture on film (How do you televise the rule of law?) (1997: 40).30

Thus, although autocratic governments faced strong external pressure to hold multiparty elections and refrain from large-scale human rights abuses during the post-Cold War era, they were nevertheless left with substantial room to maneuver. Over time, governments “learned that they did not have to democratize” in order to maintain their international standing and access to external assistance (Joseph 1999a: 61). Because partial liberalization (often in the form of holding passable elections) was often “sufficient to deflect international system pressures for more complete political opening” (Young 1999: 35), governments learned how to “impose enough repression to keep their opponents weak and maintain their own power while adhering to enough democratic formalities that they might just pass themselves off as democrats” (Carothers 1997a: 90-1).

In sum, the post-Cold War international environment raised minimum standards for regime acceptability, making single party or military rule difficult to sustain, but the new standard was electoralism, not democracy (Joseph 1999a, 1999b; Carothers 2000a; Ottaway 2003). In most of the world, democratization continued to require a domestic “push” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Ottaway 2003). Where favorable domestic conditions—such as a strong civil society, effective political institutions, and a rule of law—were absent (e.g., much of the former Soviet Union and Sub-Saharan Africa), the new international environment was more likely to give rise to regimes that combine multiparty elections with various degrees of electoral manipulation, repression, and incumbent abuse.31 These are precisely the characteristics of competitive authoritarianism.

The post-Cold War international environment was thus particularly favorable to the emergence and survival of competitive authoritarian regimes. Indeed, as military and single party regimes disappeared across much of the world after 1989, competitive authoritarian regimes proliferated. In 1985, just prior to Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to power in the Soviet Union, perhaps six—and certainly fewer than 10—competitive

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30Also see Carothers (1999); Diamond (1999: 55-6); Lawson (1999); and Ottaway (2003).
31See the set of articles on this subject in the April 2002 issue of the Journal of Democracy, as well as Carothers (1997a, 2000a, 2002), Zakaria (1997); Joseph (1999a), Lawson (1997); Young (1999); and Ottaway (2003).
regimes existed in the world. In 1995, four years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 36 countries were competitive authoritarian. Thus, although the end of the Cold War triggered an unprecedented wave of democratization, it triggered an even larger wave of *hybridization*. The “fourth wave” (McFaul 2002) was at least as competitive authoritarian as it was democratic.

**Diverging Outcomes: Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories, 1990-2005**

Contra the assumptions of much of the literature, competitive authoritarian regimes did not uniformly democratize during the post-Cold War period. Rather, they can be said to have followed three broad regime paths during the post-Cold War period (1990-2005). These paths are summarized in Table 1.2. The first path is *democratization*, which entails the establishment of free and fair elections, the broad protection of civil liberties, and a leveling of the political playing field, such that no single party dominates access to state, media, and other critical resources. Such reforms may be overseen by established autocratic incumbents, as in Mexico and Taiwan, or they may occur after autocrats fall from power, as in Croatia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Serbia. Although the removal of autocratic incumbents is not necessary for democratization (arguably, democratization occurred in Mexico and Taiwan before incumbents lost elections), all of our democratizing cases experienced such a turnover by 2005. As Table 1.2 shows, 14 of our 37 cases democratized between 1990 and 2005: Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ukraine.

The second path outcome is *unstable competitive authoritarianism*, or cases that undergo one or more transitions but nevertheless fail to democratize. In these cases, autocratic incumbents are removed from power, but the architecture of competitive authoritarianism remains intact. Successor governments inherit an uneven playing field and politicized state and regime institutions, which they use to weaken and/or disadvantage their opponents. Democratization in such cases requires that new governments consciously

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32The clearest cases are Botswana, Guyana, Malaysia, Mexico, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Panama, the Philippines, and Nicaragua might also be placed in this category.
under-utilize their power, an outcome that is relatively rare. In a few cases, successors govern democratically but are later replaced by governments that revert to competitive authoritarianism. We classify these cases as unstable competitive authoritarianism. Twelve cases fall into the unstable competitive authoritarianism category during the 1990-2005 period: Albania, Belarus, Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Senegal, Zambia.

The third regime outcome is stable authoritarianism. In these cases, autocratic incumbents or their chosen successors remain in power—by means of an uneven playing field, electoral manipulation, and civil liberties violations—through 2005. In some cases (Armenia, Malaysia, Tanzania), regimes remain competitive authoritarian. In others (Russia, Zimbabwe), they become increasingly closed. Eleven of our 37 cases remained stable and authoritarian during the 1990-2005 period: Armenia, Botswana, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Russia, Zimbabwe.

The diversity of regime outcomes shown in Table 1.2 fundamentally challenges the notion—implicit in much of the recent literature—that the collapse of authoritarianism and the holding of multiparty elections can be equated with the initiation of a democratic transition. In nearly two thirds (23 of 37) of our cases, no democratization occurred between 1990 and 2005. The evidence also makes clear that turnover—or the removal of established autocrats—cannot be equated with democratization. As cases such as Belarus, Georgia, Malawi, and Zambia show, the defeat of autocratic incumbents may result in little or no regime change, and successors may also govern in a non-democratic manner. In some cases (Albania, Georgia, Macedonia, Madagascar), two or more transitions occurred without democratization. Such transitions without democratization are too numerous to be treated as exceptions.

Nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear that many post-Cold War regimes were neither democratic nor democratizing. To characterize these cases as “prolonged” or “flawed” democratic transitions is tautology. It is essential to abandon the assumption that post-authoritarian regimes are “in transition” to democracy. Instead, we

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33Examples include Mali and post-2004 Ukraine. If (as is reasonable to assume) incumbents seek, above all, to remain in office, then the most likely outcome—indeed, the path of least resistance—is continued competitive authoritarian rule.
must examine (and explain) the diversity of regime paths that really exist. It is to this task that we now turn.

**Explaining Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories:**

*International Linkage and the Organizational Power of Incumbents*

This book seeks to explain diverging paths followed by post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regimes. Why did some competitive authoritarian regimes democratize while others remained stable, and still others experienced one or more transitions without democratization? In the pages that follow, we present our central argument.

Theories of regime change have evolved considerably over the past four decades. The dominant theories of the 1960s and 1970s focused on domestic structural factors.\(^{34}\) Notwithstanding the vast differences among them, modernization, neo-Marxist, and culture-centered theories shared two characteristics: (1) they emphasized the role of long-term historical causes rather than contingency or human agency; and (2) they treated regime outcomes as rooted primarily in domestic processes.

The third wave of democratization posed a major challenge to these theories. If widespread democratization in Latin America during the 1980s called into question theories that emphasized the role of structural factors (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Karl 1990), the spread of multiparty regimes to much of sub-Saharan Africa and post-communist Eurasia after 1990 seemed to bury them. In Albania, Bolivia, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua and elsewhere, democratic (or near-democratic) regimes emerged in poor, overwhelmingly rural, non-Protestant societies with high illiteracy rates, tiny middle and working classes, weak civil societies, and no democratic tradition.

Scholars responded to the proliferation of democratic anomalies in two ways. Some abandoned the search for structural explanations, focusing instead on the role of contingency and human agency in “crafting” democratic outcomes (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Di Palma 1990).\(^{35}\) Within this tradition, numerous scholars examined how

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\(^{34}\)See, for example, Lipset (1959, 1960); Almond and Verba (1963); Moore (1966); Huntington (1968); and O’Donnell (1973). Exceptions include Rustow (1970) and Linz (1978).

\(^{35}\)This literature drew on earlier work by Rustow (1970) and Linz (1978).
constitution design and other institutional arrangements shaped democratic outcomes.\textsuperscript{36} Although these analyses de-emphasized the role of structural causes, they retained the classical theories’ focus on domestic explanations. For the leading “transitologists” of the 1980s, democratization was viewed as “a domestic affair *par excellence*” (Schmitter 1996: 27), with external factors playing only an “indirect and usually marginal role” (Schmitter 1986: 5).\textsuperscript{37}

Other scholars responded to the spread of democratic anomalies not by abandoning structural explanations but by examining how the causes of democratization had changed. Many of these scholars turned to the “international dimension” of democratization (Whitehead 1996a).\textsuperscript{38} Thus, international actors such as the EU were said to have played an “essential, even perhaps crucial” (Pridham 1991: 7; Pridham et al 1997; Pevehouse 2005; Vachudova 2005) in Southern and Central European democratization, and in Africa, transitions were characterized as “largely externally engineered” (Young 1993: 299; Joseph 1997, 1999b). Over the course of the 1990s, scholars increasingly took the international environment seriously as a cause of democratization.\textsuperscript{39}

In recent years, then, the debate over the international dimension of post-Cold War democratization turned from whether external factors mattered to how much they mattered. On the one hand, some scholars posited the primacy of external factors, arguing, in effect, that international effects outweigh those of domestic variables.\textsuperscript{40} In this view, international pressure may so decisively change actor calculations that that “the influence of many traditionally important domestic variables may be mitigated” (Pevehouse 2005: 209). Other scholars argued that the international environments plays a “secondary” role

\textsuperscript{36}The literature on institutional design in new democracies is vast. For example, see Linz (1990); Stepan and Skach (1993); Linz and Valenzuela (1994); Reynolds (1999, 2002); Fish (2001, 2005); and Zielonka and Pravda (2001).

\textsuperscript{37}In their classic work on transitions from authoritarianism, O’Donnell and Schmitter concluded that it “seems fruitless to search for some international factor or context which can reliably compel authoritarian rulers to experiment with liberalization, much less which can predictably cause their regimes to collapse” (1986: 18).

\textsuperscript{38}See, for example, Huntington (1991); Pridham (1991a); Starr (1991); Pridham et al. (1997); Diamond (1992, 1995); Whitehead (1996a); Grugel (1999a) Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Schraeder (2002a) Levitsky and Way (2005, forthcoming); Mainwaring and Perez Liñan (2005); Pevehouse (2005).

\textsuperscript{39}Indeed, even leading proponents of domestic-centered explanations acknowledged that it was “time to reconsider the impact of the international context upon regime change” (Schmitter 1996: 27). Comparative studies that take seriously both domestic and international factors include Huntington (1991); Snyder (1992); Brownlee (2002); Bellin (2004); Mainwaring and Perez Liñan (2005).

\textsuperscript{40}For example, see Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Gleditsch (2002); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005): and Vachudova (2005).
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 30; Linz and Stepan 1996; McFaul 2001), or that its effects tend to be superficial or short-lived, yielding “virtual” (Joseph 1999b) or “artificial” (Pinkney 1997: 216) democracies rather than real or sustainable ones.

We offer a somewhat different take on this debate. Rather than assert the primacy of international or domestic factors, we argue that their relative causal weight varies across countries and regions. External forces reshape domestic incentives and power distributions, often in ways that are decisive to regime outcomes. However, they do so to varying degrees across cases. In regions with extensive ties to the West (particularly Central Europe and the Americas), international influences were so intense that they often contributed to democratization even where domestic conditions were unfavorable. In these cases, we concur with those who posit the primacy of international variables. However, where ties to the West were less extensive, post-Cold War international democratizing pressure was weaker, and consequently, domestic factors weighed more heavily. In these cases, regime outcomes are explained primarily by domestic structural variables, particularly the strength of state and governing party organizations.

**The International Dimension: Leverage and Linkage**

Post-Cold War regime patterns compelled scholars to take the international environment seriously. Since the mid-1990s, analyses of the international dimension of democratization have proliferated. These studies highlighted several different mechanisms of international influence. These include:

*Direct democracy promotion by Western states, particularly the United States.* Here the primary force for regime change was the “efforts by the world’s most powerful liberal state to promote democracy abroad” (Peceny 1999: 185), via diplomatic persuasion, threats, and, in a few cases (e.g., Panama, Haiti), the military force (Peceny 1999; von Hippel 2000).

*Multilateral conditionality,* in which external assistance or membership in international organizations is linked to countries’ democratic or human rights

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41 Summaries of the different forms of international influence can be found in Diamond (1993, 1995); Schmitter (1996); Whitehead (1996a); Grugel (1999b); Burnell (2000b); and Schraeder (2003).

42 Whitehead (1996b: 8-15) calls this democratization “by control.” See Carothers (1991); Lowenthal (1991); Smith (1994); Robinson (1996); Whitehead (1996c); Peceny (1999); Cox et al. (2000); Rose (2000); von Hippel (2000); and Schraeder (2002a).
performance.\textsuperscript{43} Forms of political conditionality ranged from “negative conditionality,” or the withdrawal of external assistance to recalcitrant autocrats, to the “positive” or membership conditionality employed by regional organizations such as the EU.\textsuperscript{44} By linking authoritarian behavior with sanctions or exclusion from regional organizations, conditionality is said to “increase the costs of remaining a non-democracy” for autocrats and their supporters (Pevehouse 2005: 199).

*\textit{Democracy assistance.} The 1990s saw the emergence of a “virtual ‘democracy promotion industry’” (Schraeder 2002c: 218), as Western governments, party foundations, and international organizations dramatically increased funding for civic education programs, electoral assistance, legal and legislative reform, and independent media and civic organizations.\textsuperscript{45} These programs have been said to have “an enormous political impact, shaping people’s expectations and standards for future elections and establishing a model of what constitutes a free and fair election” (Ottaway and Chung 1999: 104).

*\textit{Transnational advocacy networks.} Human rights, democracy, and election-monitoring NGOs grew rapidly in size, number, and influence during the 1980s and 1990s.\textsuperscript{46} Bolstered by cheaper travel and communication and the spread of new information technologies, transnational networks drew international attention to human rights violations, electoral fraud, and other democratic abuses and lobbied Western governments to respond to them. In this context, state abuses often triggered a “boomerang effect,” in which they were widely reported by international media and human rights groups, leading Western states to take punitive measures against norm-violating governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12-13; Risse and Sikkink 1999).

*\textit{Diffusion,} or the “relatively neutral transmissions of information” across borders (Whitehead 1996b: 5).\textsuperscript{47} Diffusion may take the form of “demonstration effects” in neighboring countries or modeling on (and borrowing from) successful democracies. Facilitated by the spread of new information and communication technologies such as

\textsuperscript{43}See Nelson and Englinton (1992); Sorensen (1993); Stokke (1995a); Crawford (1997, 2001); Zielonka and Pravda (2001); Linden (2002); Schimmelfennig (2002); Ethier (2003); Clinkenbeard (2004); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudova 2005; and Pevehouse (2005).

\textsuperscript{44}On EU conditionality, see Pridham (1991); Pridham et al. (1997); Schimmelfennig et al. (2003, 2005); Jacoby (2004); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse 2005: Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); and Vachudova (2005).

\textsuperscript{45}See Diamond (1995); Carothers (1999, 2000b); Ottaway and Chung (1999); Erklit (1999); Burnell (2000a, 2000b); Ottaway and Carothers (2000); Ethier (2003); and Ottaway (2003). U.S. funding for democracy assistance programs “took off” in the 1990s (Burnell 2000b: 39-44), increasing from near zero in the early 1980s to $700 million at the turn of the century (Carothers 1999: 6; Burnell 2000b: 49).

\textsuperscript{46}On transnational human rights networks, see Sikkink (1993); Keck and Sikkink (1998); Risse et al. (1999); and Florini (2000a). On electoral observation, see McCoy et al. (1991); Rosenau and Fagen (1994); Carothers (1997b); Chand (1997); and Middlebrook (1998).

\textsuperscript{47}Whitehead (1996b: 5-8) calls this democratization by “contagion.” On democratic diffusion, see Huntington (1991); Starr (1991); Drake 1998; O’Laughlin et al. (1998); Schmitz and Sell (1999); Kopstein and Reilly (2000); Brinks and Coppedge (2001); and Gleditsch (2002).
the internet, diffusion is said to account for the “wave-like” temporal and regional clustering of democratic transitions.

Notwithstanding growing attention to the various external forces shaping post-Cold War democratization, however, the relationship between the international environment and regime change remains poorly understood. Two problems stand out. First, there has been little effort either to adjudicate among the various mechanisms of international influence cited above or to integrate them into a coherent theoretical framework (Pevehouse 2005: 204). Most studies either simply present a laundry list of the various mechanisms of international influence or limit their focus to a single mechanism.

Second, most studies of the international dimension of democratization fail to account for the fact that it varies considerably across cases and regions. For example, studies have found democratic diffusion to be “spatially dependent,” or contingent upon geographic proximity. Diffusion effects were far more pronounced in the Americas and Central Europe than in Asia and the former Soviet Union. Regional variation was also manifest in Western efforts to promote democracy. Whereas Western powers invested heavily in democracy promotion in Central Europe and Latin America during the 1990s, democracy continued to be trumped by “power politics” in much of East Asia (Igoguchi 2000), and in Africa, Western policy was characterized by “indifference and neglect” (Alden

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48 On the role of the internet in democratization, see Ferdinand (2000a); Deibert (2002); Simon (2002); and Kalathil and Boas (2003).
49 See Huntington (1991); Starr (1991); O’Laughlin et al. (1998); Brinks and Coppedge (2001); Gleditsch (2002); and Beissinger (2005).
50 Indeed, recent research has raised questions about the democratizing impact of many of these mechanisms. For example, analyses of both U.S. democracy promotion and multilateral conditionality have found their impact to be—at best—mixed. Likewise, democracy assistance programs have been found to have “limited effects” (Carothers 1999: 308-10) that “can look akin to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic” (Burnell 2000b: 23), and that the impact of the internet has been found to be “more modest than might have been expected” (Ferdinand 2000c: 177-8).
51 On this variation, see Schmitter 1996: (28, 47); Whitehead (1996e: 395-6); Kopstein and Reilly (2000) and Gleditsch (2002).
52 Kopstein and Reilly (2000: 1-2); also see Starr (1991); O’Loughlin et al. 1998; Gleditch 20002: 4-5
53 Starr (1991); Bostrom (1994); Chu et al. (1997); Prizel (1999); Whitehead (1999); Kopstein and Reilly (2000).
54 Western funding for democracy assistance programs followed a regional pattern during the 1990s. Both the U.S. and the EU consistently spent more on democracy promotion in their neighboring regions than in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Crawford 2001: 109, 113). In the early 1990s, seven of the top ten U.S. political aid recipients were located in Latin America (Crawford 2001: 109), and U.S. spending on democracy assistance in Latin America was more than three times greater than its spending in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East combined (Carothers 1999: 51).
and democracy promotion was largely “rhetorical” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 241). The effectiveness of conditionality also varied by region. Whereas EU membership conditionality is widely viewed as effective, and the threat of U.S. or OAS sanctions was often successful in the Americas, the democratizing effects of conditionality were more limited in Russia and sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the impact of globalizing forces such as transnational advocacy networks and the internet also varied across regions. Transnational democracy and human rights movements were more influential in Central Europe and Latin America than in other regions of the world. At the same time, Middle Eastern and Sub-Saharan African countries are “severely underrepresented” in transnational networks (Florini and Simmons 2000: 7).

In sum, post-Cold War international democratizing pressure varied considerably by region (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Gleditsch 2002). The international dimension was decidedly “thicker” in some regions (Central Europe, Latin America) than in others (Africa, the former Soviet Union). To capture and explain this variation, and to integrate the seemingly disparate mechanisms of international influence discussed above into a single theoretical framework, we organize the post-Cold War international environment into two dimensions: Western leverage and linkage to the West.

**Western Leverage**

Western leverage may be defined as governments’ vulnerability to external democratizing pressure. Our conceptualization of leverage includes both (1) the probability that Western powers will use threats, conditionality, or other forms of pressure to punish

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55 As Larry Diamond put it, “The United States and the international community demand real democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean….For Africa, a lower standard is set by the major Western powers: opposition parties that can contest for office, even if they are manipulated, hounded, and rigged into defeat at election time” (1999: 55-6).

56 Linden (2002); Kelley (2004); Pevehouse (2005); Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005); Vachudova (2005).


60 Likewise, the influence of new information technologies was far greater in Central Europe and Latin America than in Africa and the Middle East (Corrales 2002: 38-9; Florini 2000b: 221; Ott and Rosser 2000: 143-4). Indeed, internet use in Central and Southern Europe during the 1990s was between nine and twelve times greater than in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union (Calculated from the World Bank World Development Indicators).
autocratic abuses and/or encourage political liberalization and (2) the potential economic, security, or other impact of Western action on target states. Where Western action is both likely and consequential, leverage is high. Where Western action is unlikely to occur or have a significant impact on target states, leverage is low.

Leverage is rooted in three factors. Perhaps the most important is the size and strength of countries’ states and economies. Governments in weak states with small, aid-dependent economies (such as much of sub-Saharan Africa) are more vulnerable to external pressure than those in larger countries with substantial military and/or economic power (such as China, India, or Russia) (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20, 47). In these latter states, the mechanisms of leverage commonly employed by Western powers—such as aid withdrawal, trade sanctions, and the threat of military force—are both less likely to be employed and, if employed, less likely to inflict significant damage.

Second, Western leverage may be limited by competing foreign policy objectives. In countries where Western powers have countervailing economic or strategic interests at stake, autocratic governments may ward off external demands for democracy by casting themselves—and regime stability—as the best means of protecting those interests (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Uvin 1993: 69; Crawford 1997: 87). Thus, the U.S. and other Western powers have exerted little democratizing pressure on major energy producing states—such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia—that are deemed strategically important. In such cases, external democratizing pressure is likely to be limited. Efforts to take punitive action are likely to divide Western governments, thereby diluting the effectiveness of those efforts (Crawford 2001: 211-227).

Third, the degree of Western leverage is affected by the existence or not of countervailing (usually regional) powers—what Hufbauer et al. (1990: 12) call “black knights”—that provide alternative sources of economic, military, and/or diplomatic support, thereby mitigating the impact of U.S. or European pressure. Russia, China, Japan, France, and South Africa all played this role at times during the post-Cold War period, using economic, diplomatic, and other assistance to buttress or bail out autocratic governments in neighboring (or in the case of France, former colonial) states. Examples include Russian backing for governments in Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine, France’s support for autocrats in former colonies such as Cameroon, Gabon, and Ivory Coast, and
South Africa’s support for the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe. In Central Europe and the Americas, by contrast, no countervailing power (regional or otherwise) to the EU and the U.S. existed during the post-Cold War period. For countries in those regions, then, the EU and the U.S. were “the only game in town,” which heightened their vulnerability to Western democratizing pressure.

Leverage raised the cost of building and maintaining authoritarian regimes during the post-Cold War period. In externally vulnerable states, autocratic holdouts were frequent targets of Western democratizing pressure after 1990 (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 20; Crawford 2001: 210-227; Vachudova 2005). Western punitive action often triggered severe fiscal crises, which, by eroding incumbents’ capacity to distribute patronage and pay the salaries of civil servants and security personnel, seriously threatened regime survival. Indeed, even the threat of punitive action or—in the case of Central Europe, the promise of external reward—may powerfully shape the calculation of autocrats and their backers. Thus, Western pressure has at times played a central role in toppling autocratic governments (Haiti, Panama, Serbia), forcing authoritarian regimes to liberalize (Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua), deterring military coups (Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay), and rolling back coups or stolen elections (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Ukraine) (Clinkenbeard 2004; Pevehouse 2005).

By itself, however, the use of leverage was rarely sufficient to bring democracy, for several reasons. First, outside the EU and its potential member states, Western powers employed leverage inconsistently during the post-Cold War period, allowing many autocrats to escape sanction (Stokke 1995b; Crawford 1997; Lawson 1999; Ethier 2003). Even where Western powers exerted leverage, these efforts were limited in important ways. First, Western democracy promotion strategies (again, with the exception of EU membership conditionality) were markedly “electoralist” (Karl 1986), in that they focused on the holding of multiparty elections while often ignoring dimensions such as civil liberties (Diamond 1999: 55-56; Zakaria 1997). Thus, while coups and other blatant acts of authoritarianism often triggered strong Western responses, “violations that are less spectacular yet systematic tend[ed] to be left aside” (Stokke 1995b: 63). Even in internationally-monitored elections, incumbents often got away with widespread harassment of opponents, massive abuse of state resources, near-total control over the media, and substantial manipulation of the vote (Geisler 1993; Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 202; Carothers 1996, 1997b; Lawson 1999).
Moreover, Western pressure tended to ease up after the holding of elections, even if the elections did not result in democratization. During the mid-1990s, for example, autocratic governments in Kenya, Peru, Tanzania, and Zambia faced little external pressure after elections had been held.\footnote{As Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze reportedly assured an associate after flawed elections triggered international condemnation, “Don’t you know how these Westerners are? They will make a fuss for a few days, and then they will calm down and life will go on as usual.” (Quoted in Kuramidze and Wertsch (2005: 24)).}

Electoralism was exacerbated by difficulties in monitoring and enforcing conditionality. Although external pressure may be used effectively for easily-monitored “one shot” measures, such as blocking coups or forcing governments to hold elections, it is less effective at guaranteeing other aspects of democracy, such as the protection of civil liberties and the maintenance of a reasonably level electoral field (Nelson and Eglinton 1992: 35; Stokke 1995b: 63-67; Ottaway 2003). Outside of the EU, the mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement required to impose the full package of democracy were largely absent. Hence, it is not surprising that cross-national studies have found the impact of political conditionality to have been limited during the post-Cold War period.\footnote{See Nelson and Eglinton (1992); Stokke (1995b); Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Crawford (1997, 2001); and Burnell (2000b: 26-7).} According to one study, conditionality made a “significant contribution” to democratization in only two of 29 cases during the 1990s (Crawford 2001: 187). Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where Western leverage is greatest, scholars have found no positive relationship between conditionality and democratization (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

By itself, then, leverage is a blunt and often ineffective instrument of democracy promotion. Even where political conditionality was applied during the post-Cold War period, autocrats frequently enjoyed substantial room to maneuver. Though compelled to hold elections and avoid massive human rights abuses, they routinely got away with minimal reforms—such as holding elections without ensuring civil liberties or a level playing field—that fell short of democracy.\footnote{See Ottaway (2003: 193-4); Carothers (1997a, 1999, 2000), Joseph (1999a, 1999b); Levitsky and Way (2002), and Schedler (2002a, 2002b).} In other words, leverage was often effective in forcing transitions from full-scale autocracy to competitive authoritarianism, but it was rarely sufficient to induce democratization.
Linkage to the West

We define linkage to the West as the density of ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of capital, goods and services, people, and information) between particular countries and the U.S., the EU, and Western-dominated multilateral institutions. Linkage is a multidimensional concept that encompasses the myriad networks of interdependence that connect individual polities, economies, and societies to Western democratic communities. Though hardly an exhaustive list, six dimensions of linkage are of particular importance for this study:

* **Economic linkage**, or flows of trade, investment, and credit.

* **Diplomatic linkage**, which includes both bilateral diplomatic and military ties and participation in Western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations.

* **Technocratic linkage**, or the share of a country’s elite that is educated in the West and/or has professional ties to Western universities or Western-led multilateral institutions.

* **Social linkage**, or flows of people across borders, including immigration, exile and refugee flows, diaspora communities, and tourism.

* **Information linkage**, or flows of information across borders, via telecommunications, internet connections, and Western media penetration.

* **Civil Society linkage**, or local ties to Western-based NGOs, international religious and party organizations, and other transnational networks.

Linkage is rooted in a variety of historical factors, including colonialism, military occupation, and geopolitical alliances. It is enhanced by capitalist development, which generally increases cross-border economic activity, communication, and travel, as well as by

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65 This conceptualization draws on Keohane and Nye’s work on “complex interdependence,” a central characteristic of which is “multiple channels of contact among societies” (Keohane and Nye 1989: 33-4). However, whereas Keohane and Nye focus on linkage among Western powers, we examine countries’ ties to Western powers. Our conceptualization of linkage is broadly similar to those of Geoffrey Pridham (1991b, 1991c) and Barbara Stallings (1992), as well as to Rosenau’s use of the term “penetrative linkage” (1969b: 46), Li’s (1993) use of “penetration,” and Kopstein and Reilly’s (2000) use of the term “flows.” Our conceptualization differs, however, from international relations work on “linkage diplomacy,” which has been defined as government attempts to project power “from an area of strength to secure objectives in areas of weakness” (Oye et al. 1979: 13; also Hass 1980; Stein 1980; Li 1993).
sustained periods of political and economic openness. However, the most important source of linkage is geographic proximity (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Brinks and Coppedge 2001: 11; Gleditsch 2002). Proximity “induces interdependence among states” and creates “opportunity for interaction” (Gleditsch 2002: 4-5). Countries in regions that are geographically proximate to the U.S. and the EU, such as Latin America and Central Europe, generally have closer economic ties, more extensive diplomatic contact, and higher cross-border flows of people, organizations, and information than countries in less proximate areas such as sub-Saharan Africa or the former Soviet Union.

Linkage serves as a transmitter of international influence. Many international effects that are commonly described as “global” are in fact rooted in concrete ties—networks, organizations, and flows of people, information, and resources—between states (Gleditsch 2002: 13). For example, diffusion is facilitated by “intensive and long term contacts” (Bostrom 1994: 192), which are rooted in “networks of communication” (Brinks and Coppedge 2001: 11-12) and flows of resources and people between countries (Kopstein and Reilly 2000: 13). Similarly, transnational pressure has a greater impact where NGO networks are “strong and dense” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 206) and inter-state relations are characterized by extensive interaction (Risse-Kappan 1995b: 30-1; 1995c: 286-287). In short, many “globalizing” forces are not felt evenly across the globe. Post-Cold War demonstration effects, “CNN effects,” and “boomerang” effects were most pronounced in countries with extensive ties to the West (Whitehead 1996e: 395-6; Kopstein and Reilly 2000). Where ties to the West were minimal, international influences were “weaker and more diffuse” (Whitehead 1996e: 396).

Linkage contributed to democratization in three important ways during the post-Cold War period:66 (1) it heightened the international reverberation caused by autocratic abuse, thereby raising the cost of such abuse; (2) it created new domestic constituencies for democratic norm-abiding behavior; and (3) it reshaped the domestic distribution of power and resources, strengthening democratic and opposition forces and weakening and isolating autocrats.

Shaping Incentives: International Reverberation and the Cost of Autocratic Abuse

Linkage heightens the international reverberation triggered by autocratic abuse, thereby raising the cost of non-democratic behavior. All else equal, extensive media, intergovernmental, and NGO penetration and cross-border flows of people and information increase the likelihood that fraud or repression will become “news” in Western capitals. The activities of transnational NGO networks, exile communities, and multilateral organizations have an amplifying effect, turning what would otherwise be a minor news item into an international scandal (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 18). In such a context, even relatively minor abuse of democratic procedure may gain substantial attention in the West. Whereas stolen elections in Armenia, Cameroon and Gabon went virtually unnoticed in the U.S. media during the 1990s, fraud in two of Mexico’s gubernatorial elections gained widespread U.S. media coverage in 1991 (Dresser 199b: 332; Mazza 2001: 84). Similarly, the 1994 Zapatista uprising attracted a massive influx of international media and human rights organizations to Southern Mexico (Dresser 1996b: 334), and consequently, government efforts to repress the guerrillas “inspired an overwhelming reaction from civic groups throughout the United States” (Kumar 2000: 117). In Central Europe, a dense array of multilateral organizations allows for perpetual monitoring at a level of detail not witnessed in other parts of the world (Schimmelfennig 2002; Pridham 2002). For example, the Slovak government was once cited for violating informal parliamentary norms of committee assignment (Vachudova 2005: 158). By contrast, where Western media and INGO penetration is weak, even egregious abuses often fail to make international headlines. In parts of Africa, even regimes that “rely overwhelmingly on violence and exclusionary tactics…manage to slip almost completely beneath the radar of the international media” (Joseph 2003: 160). Similarly, months after the 2005 massacre of more than 100 protesters by Uzbek security forces, even Western regional experts knew “very little” about what happened.67

Linkage also increases the probability that, all else equal, Western governments will take action in response to reported abuse. Extensive media coverage and lobbying by INGOs, exile and diaspora communities, and religious and party networks often generates a “do something” effect that puts pressure on Western governments to act (von Hippel 2000:

102-3). In Haiti, for example, intense lobbying by Haitian refugee organizations, human rights groups, and the Congressional Black Caucus played a critical role in reversing U.S. policy and pushing the Clinton Administration to take action against Haiti’s military regime in 1994 (Malone 1998: 166; Martin 1999: 725-726). Western governments are also more likely to take action in high linkage cases because they perceive direct interests to be at stake. For the U.S. and EU members, the potential social, political, and economic effects of instability in the Caribbean Basin and Central and Southern Europe are greater than those of instability in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the domestic impact of large-scale refugee flows helped trigger U.S. military action in Haiti in 1994 (von Hippel 2000: 102) and European intervention to resolve the Albanian political crisis in 1997 (Johnson 2001).

Similarly, Serbia’s proximity to Western Europe played a helps explain why NATO opted for a military response to abuse in Kosovo, but took little action in response to similar or worse crises (in terms of number of refugees and internally displaced persons) in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, and Sudan (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000 194).\footnote{On a per capita basis, refugees in the Balkans received ten times more aid than refugees in Africa (Chinkin 1999, 847). Similarly, the EU’s choice of which countries to offer potential membership was directly tied to proximity and security concerns. Most strikingly, the decision in 1999 to promise (or in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, speed up) possible membership to underdeveloped countries in the Balkans (while ignoring more distant Moldova and Ukraine), was directly tied to threats of instability in the region. \footnotemark}

Where linkage is low, the probability of Western response is lower. For example, due to limited media coverage, weak intergovernmental ties, and the relative weakness of African diaspora communities and Africa-oriented human rights networks, Western governments have felt little domestic pressure to take action against autocratic abuses in Africa (Herbst 1991: 165-6; Moss 1995: 198-9; Schraeder 2001: 391-394).\footnote{South Africa under Apartheid is an exception to this pattern.} U.S. politicians thus view it as “politically unwise to incur the possibility of alienating their constituencies by focusing on Africa,” and consequently, even fairly major problems—such as the Congo civil war in 1999—have often “failed to rise to the level of a policy making crisis” in Washington (Schraeder 2001: 392). A similar pattern of limited response can be seen in the former Soviet Union. For example, there existed relatively little pressure on Western governments to take a strong stance against large-scale Russian human rights abuses in Chechnya (Goldgeier and McFaul 2003), or to punish the 2005 massacre of unarmed protestors in Uzbekistan.
In sum, linkage increases the probability that government abuses will gain the attention of—and trigger responses by—Western powers, thereby narrowing autocrats’ room for maneuver. In such a context, even leaders who engage in relatively minor abuses, such as Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia or Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, are likely to be tagged as rogue autocrats, even though they are often less repressive than governments in low linkage countries (e.g., Zenawi in Ethiopia, Chiluba in Zambia) that are accepted—and even embraced—by the West.

Shaping Preferences: The Emergence of Domestic Constituencies for Democratic Norm-Abiding Behavior

Linkage also shapes the distribution of domestic preferences, increasing the number of domestic actors with a stake in adhering to regional or international democratic norms. Where linkage is extensive, a plethora of individuals, firms, and organizations maintain personal, financial, or professional ties to the West. Because regional or international isolation triggered by flawed elections, human rights abuses, or other violations of democratic norms would put these ties—and consequently, valued markets, investment flows, grants, job prospects, and reputations—at risk, these internationally-linked domestic actors have a stake in avoiding such norm-violating behavior. For example, economic integration with the West increases the number of businesses for whom a sudden shift in trade or foreign investment flows would be costly. In such a context, economic actors may be expected to develop a stake in their governments’ adherence to regional democratic norms (Pridham 1991c: 220-225; Pevehouse 2005). As a European official describing the effect of integration put it,

You can never prevent an adventurer trying to overthrow the government if he is backed by the real economic powers, the banks and the businesses. But once in the Community, you create a network of interests for those banks and businesses…; as a result, those powers would refuse to back the adventurer for fear of losing all those links.70

Linkage also increases the number Western-educated technocrats with ties to Western universities, INGOs, and international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF. Not only are technocrats sensitive to developments in the international arena, but

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they often aspire to either funding from, or positions in, Western universities or international agencies in the future.\(^1\) Fearing the professional or reputational costs of association with a norm-violating government, they are more likely to advocate reforms that improve the country’s international standing and/or oppose abusive acts that threaten international rebuke. Likewise, close ties to the West may induce politicians within authoritarian governing parties to seek to reform those parties from within, as occurred in Croatia, Mexico, and Taiwan, or to defect to the opposition, as occurred in Slovakia and (to a lesser extent) Romania during the mid-1990s (Vachudova 2005: 161, 163, 172).

Linkage may even shape voter preferences. Citizens in Central Europe, Mexico, or Central America who expect integration with the Europe or the U.S. to bring prosperity are likely to vote against parties whose behavior appears to threaten the process of integration. Thus, oppositions in Bulgaria in 1997, Croatia in 2000, Romania in 1996, and Slovakia in 1998 focused their campaigns on a promise to end their countries’ relative estrangement from the EU (Vachudova 2005, 177).

Linkage thus creates new domestic constituencies for adherence to regional and international norms. By heightening domestic actors’ sensitivity to shifts in a regime’s image abroad, linkage blurs international and domestic politics, transforming international norms into powerful domestic demands. When a large number of political, economic, and technocratic elites perceive they have something to lose from international isolation, it becomes very difficult to sustain a coalition behind authoritarian rule. For example, when Alberto Fujimori’s presidential “self-coup” threatened to disrupt Peru’s re-integration into the international financial system, technocrats and business allies convinced him to abandon plans for dictatorship and call early elections (Mauceri 1996: 89).\(^2\) Likewise, Serbia’s increasing isolation from the West in the late 1990s led key military and security officials to defect, which undermined Milosevic’s ability to crack down on opposition protest (Cohen 2001, 214; Bujosevic and Radovanovic 2003: 24-26). By contrast, in countries such as Armenia, Belarus,

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\(^1\) For example, Mexican President Carlos Salinas aspired to be President of the World Trade Organization after her terms ended (Kaufman 1999: 185), and his successor, Ernesto Zedillo, became head of Yale University’s Globalization Center after leaving the Mexican presidency. Both leaders were highly sensitive to international opinion perceptions during their presidencies.

\(^2\) Similarly, Jonathan Hartlyn argues that economic elites in the Dominican Republic opposed a coup during the 1990s—despite a severe political and socioeconomic crisis—because they feared it would “hurt the country’s economic prospects, affect tourism, and impact on relations with the United States” (1993: 166).
Cambodia, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, where Western-linked economic, political, and technocratic elites were less numerous and influential, authoritarian coalitions remained cohesive in the face of criticism and even isolation from the West.

*Shaping the Distribution of Power and Resources*

Linkage also reshapes the balance of power and resources within countries in ways that favor democratization. For one, ties to the West help to protect opposition leaders and groups who would otherwise be vulnerable to repression. Because individuals who gain extensive Western media exposure and have powerful allies in the West are more difficult for governments to imprison or kill, governments in high linkage contexts are often forced to tolerate persistent voices of criticism and opposition that they otherwise would have silenced. For example, although the Mexican army possessed the raw coercive capacity to destroy the Zapatista rebels, heavy international media attention and the presence of thousands of international human rights observers “made it literally impossible for the Mexican government to use repression” against them (Castells 1997: 80). In Romania, Western condemnation brought about by intense European engagement during the early 1990s helped to convince the Iliescu government to cease violent harassment of opposition by miners (Vachudova 2005, 102).

Second, ties to Western governments, transnational party networks, international agencies, and INGOs may provide critical resources to opposition and pro-democracy movements, helping to level the playing field against autocratic governments. Where autocratic monopolize—or nearly monopolize—access to the media and sources of finance, opposition parties are often so starved of resources that they cannot mount effective national electoral campaigns. External ties may help compensate for these resource asymmetries, by providing assistance in organization-building and financing for independent media, human rights, and electoral observation groups. In Slovakia, support from the EU and European party networks helped a relatively weak and fragmented opposition defeat Vladimir Meciar in 1998 (Pridham 1999: 1229-1239; Vachudova 2005: 170-171), and in Serbia, U.S. and European assistance in 2000 helped level the playing field against the Milosevic government by injecting an enormous amount of money to

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73 Also see Wager and Schultz (1995: 173-5) and Dresser (1996b: 334).
support independent media, opposition activists’ salaries, and a massive get-out-the-vote campaign (Carothers 2001). Similarly, in Nicaragua, where a weak and fragmented opposition stood little chance of wresting power from the Sandinistas on its own, U.S. officials helped unify the anti-Sandinista forces, select their presidential candidate, and—through extensive finance of civic, party, and media organizations—build a national infrastructure capable of defeating the Sandinistas at the polls (Robinson 1992; López Pintor 1998: 41-44). In East Asia, by contrast, few opposition parties benefit from strong international party ties (Sachsenroder 1998: 13), and power and resource asymmetries have been more difficult to overcome (Gomez 2002a; Rodan 2004).

Third, ties to the West may also enhance domestic support for democratic opposition groups. Western media penetration heightens citizen awareness of their country’s international standing—and its consequences. The wide availability of the internet, international cable, and other news sources in Central Europe and the Americas has made it harder for autocrats to hide foreign criticism of their governments from citizens. In such a context, opposition politicians who enjoy close ties to the West may gain prestige and support, either because they become identified with valued Western ideals or, more concretely, because they can credibly claim to be able to improve their country’s international standing (for example, by securing entry into the EU or improving relations with the U.S.). Thus, in Nicaragua, where the Sandinista government suffered a costly U.S.-sponsored war and trade embargo, the National Opposition Union’s (UNO) ties to the U.S. allowed it to “claim with confidence that if it won the election, the United States would end its economic embargo…and open the floodgates of U.S. economic assistance” (Moreno 1995: 240), which proved to be a critical source of electoral support (Anderson and Dodd 2004: 152-154).

At the same time, linkage may erode domestic support for—and even politically isolate—autocratic incumbents. Leaders whose pariah status is perceived to threaten their countries’ regional or international standing may pay a significant cost in terms of domestic support. In Slovakia, for example, most voters and politicians viewed Vladimir Meciar as an obstacle to European integration, which was widely seen as a leading priority (Vachudova 2005: 174-5; Schimmelfennig et al. 2005: 40). Not only did Meciar’s pariah status become a major issue in the 1998 election, but it undermined his
party’s ability to find coalition partners with which to form a government—despite the fact that it had won a plurality of votes (Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 515). Similarly, in Croatia and Romania, where the EU actively discouraged alliances with parties that were viewed as non-democratic, governments pushed those parties out of ruling coalitions.

Finally, linkage may alter the balance of power within autocratic parties, helping strengthen reformist tendencies. In Croatia, for example, widespread frustration with international isolation helped reformists wrest control of the Croatian Democratic Union from radical nationalists after the death of Franjo Tudjman (Fish and Krickovic 2003). A similar reformist takeover occurred in Guyana after the death of Forbes Burhnam.

Unlike mechanisms of leverage such as military force, diplomatic pressure, or conditionality, the effects of linkage are generally subtle and diffuse. Linkage affects a variety of non-state actors, generating decentralized forms of pressure that frequently operate below the radar screens of international observers. This does not mean that linkage effects are confined to the normative or ideational realm, however. Although linkage may facilitate the diffusion of ideas and norms, it also shapes actors’ interests and incentives, as well as domestic power and resource distributions. Indeed, our linkage argument focuses exclusively on the realm of power and interests.

**Linkage, Leverage, and Democratization**

Both linkage and leverage raised the costs of authoritarianism during the post-Cold War era. However, they did so in distinct ways and to different degrees. Although mechanisms of leverage (such as conditionality) often received greater attention, linkage was a more consistent and potent democratizing force in the post-Cold War period. As noted above, leverage alone generates inconsistent and often superficial democratizing pressure. Where linkage is low, external monitoring and sanctioning is usually limited to elections and large-scale human rights violations, which leaves autocrats with considerable room to maneuver. Even where external pressure succeeds in removing autocrats from power, transitions frequently do not result in democracy. Generally without extensive ties to the West, and usually facing little external pressure in the post-transition period, new governments have weaker incentives to rule democratically. Indeed, in low linkage countries such as Belarus, Ethiopia, Georgia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Moldova, Ukraine (in 1994), and Zambia, transitions have routinely resulted in the establishment of new autocratic governments, rather than democracies.

Where linkage is high, leverage is considerably more likely to contribute to democratization. For one, linkage greatly enhances the effectiveness of leverage vis-a-vis autocracies. It does so in three ways. First, linkage vastly improves external monitoring. In a context of extensive penetration by international media, INGOs, and multilateral organizations, autocratic governments face intense scrutiny, and crucially, that scrutiny extends beyond elections and gross human rights violations to include civil liberties, press freedom, and a range of electoral procedures—in other words, the full package of democracy. Moreover, monitoring tends to be permanent, rather than limited to crises or election cycles. Consequently, Western attention is likely to wane after elections or after autocrats have been removed.

Second, linkage increases the probability that Western states will actually employ leverage. Because autocratic abuses—even relatively minor ones—are more likely to reverberate in Western capitals and trigger demands for a response from Western powers, norm-violating governments are more likely to suffer punitive action. In other words, the “boomerang effect” discussed by scholars of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1997; Risse and Sikkink 1999) is more likely to be set in motion in a context of extensive linkage.

Third, linkage magnifies the domestic impact of leverage, by increasing the likelihood that external pressure will trigger broad domestic opposition to the regime. Because economic elites, politicians, technocrats, and voters are more aware of how their country is perceived abroad and are more likely to believe they have something to lose from international isolation, governments that violate international norms confront a double boomerang effect: abuses trigger hostile reactions on both the international and domestic fronts. A clear example is Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano’s 1993 “self-coup.” After the U.S. government condemned the coup, the “threat of international economic and diplomatic isolation loomed in the minds of both economic and military elites, both of which valued their international contacts” (Pevehouse 2005: 192). “[F]ear of the international consequences of allowing the coup to stand” induced them to mobilize against Serrano, forcing his resignation (Pevehouse 2005: 190-2).
Linkage also increases the likelihood that, when autocrats are removed from power, transitions will result in stable democracy. Where linkage is extensive, failed autocrats are likely to be replaced by democratic governments for at least two reasons. First, opposition forces will almost inevitably establish close ties with the West and rely heavily on Western support. In many cases (Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Slovakia), opposition leaders extensive relationships with Western politicians, political parties, and NGOs, and they often rely heavily on Western resources (and protection). In many cases, their domestic public support is rooted in their promise to deliver better relations with the West. Thus, once opposition leaders such as Violeta Chamorro (Nicaragua), Mikulas Dzurinda (Slovakia), Leonel Fernández (Dominican Republic), or Alejandro Toledo (Peru) come to power, they are unlikely to “bite the hand” that helped get them there. Second, because the infrastructure of international monitoring remains in place, new governments face the same level of scrutiny—or nearly so—as their autocratic predecessors. Hence, even if they prefer to abandon their role as Western-backed democrats, they face strong domestic and international pressure to govern democratically.

In sum, the democratizing impact of Western leverage varies with linkage. In the absence of linkage, the effects of leverage are too limited and too inconsistent to contribute in a significant way to democratization. But where linkage is extensive, more rigorous monitoring, more systematic sanctioning, and greater domestic pressure for international norm-abiding behavior raise considerably the cost of autocratic abuse—making authoritarian rule much more difficult to sustain. In such a context, leverage is often highly effective in bringing down autocratic governments. Moreover, transitions in high linkage cases are more likely to result in stable democratization.

Linkage effects are often obscured by formal mechanisms of leverage, leading observers to overstate the latter’s causal impact. For example, scholars have attributed the region-wide success of democracy in Central Europe and the Americas to the leverage exercised by regional organizations such as the EU and the OAS (Halperin 1993; Pevehouse 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2005). Although conditionality was indeed effective in these cases (particularly in Europe), its effectiveness was rooted, to a considerable extent, in linkage.74

The dimensions of leverage and linkage are essential to understanding cross-national variation in international pressure for democratization. Different combinations of leverage and linkage create distinct external environments. Across these environments, the relative influence of domestic and international forces over regime outcomes varies considerably (Levitsky and Way 2005, forthcoming).

Table 2.1 summarizes these different international environments and their effects. Where linkage and leverage are high, as in much of Central Europe and the Americas, external democratizing pressure is consistent and intense. Autocratic abuses frequently gain international attention and trigger costly punitive action, which is often magnified by opposition among domestic constituencies. In such a context, autocracies are unlikely to survive. Moreover, turnover is likely to result in democratization. It is in this context, then, that international influences are most pronounced. Democratization is likely even in countries with relatively unfavorable domestic conditions (e.g., Nicaragua, Romania).

Where linkage is high but leverage is relatively low (Mexico, Taiwan), external democratizing pressure will be diffuse and indirect, but nevertheless considerable. Notwithstanding the absence of direct external pressure, governments face intense scrutiny from international media, transnational human rights networks, and internationally-oriented domestic constituencies. Consequently, governments—particularly those with many Western-educated technocrats, as in Mexico and Taiwan—will be highly sensitive to shifts in international opinion. Even if not directly pushed to democratize, the pursuit of international legitimacy creates incentives to avoid egregious abuse and may even induce governments to build increasingly credible democratic institutions.

In low linkage countries, international democratizing pressure is weaker. Where both linkage and leverage are low, as in parts of East Asia and the former Soviet Union, external pressure is likely to be minimal. In such a context, even serious abuses may fail to trigger a strong international reaction, and when punitive action is undertaken, it is unlikely to have a significant impact. Consequently, governments will have substantial room to maneuver—including the use of large-scale repression or fraud—in building or maintaining authoritarian regimes. In this context of relative international permissiveness, regime
outcomes will hinge primarily on domestic factors. Democratization in such cases thus requires a strong domestic “push.”

Where linkage is low but leverage is high, as in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, international pressure may be influential, but it tends to be limited and sporadic. Governments that fail to meet minimal international standards with respect to elections and human rights may confront debilitating cuts in external assistance. However, such pressure is often limited to the holding of minimally acceptable elections, thereby leaving autocrats substantial room for maneuver. Even when autocrats fall, regimes may not democratize. In the absence of extensive linkage, international pressure often ceases after an electoral turnover, which may allow successor governments to violate democratic norms at low external cost. Hence, although a high leverage/low linkage environment may raise the cost of authoritarianism, it is less propitious for democratization.

The Domestic Dimension: Organization and Power

Drawing on both classic structuralist analyses of regime change (Skocpol 1979) and more recent work that highlights the role of state and party organization and social mobilization,75 our domestic-level analysis treat regimes outcomes “foremost as a matter of power” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992: 75). Specifically, it centers on the balance of organizational power between autocrats and their opponents. Much of the recent literature has focused on the opposition, or societal, side of this story. Thus, an important body of scholarship has highlighted the centrality of organized labor and other class actors,76 civil society,77 mass protest,78 insurgency,79 and opposition cohesion80 in undermining authoritarianism and/or installing democracy.

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75See Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992); Collier (1999); Wood (2000); Way (2002, 2005a); Slater (2003); Brownlee (2004); Bellin (2004); Smith (2005).
76See Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992); Collier (1999); and Bellin (2000).
77See Fish (1995); Diamond (1999); and Howard (2003).
79See Wood (2000).
80Howard and Roessler (2005).
Yet regime outcomes also hinge on *incumbents’ capacity to resist opposition challenges*. Autocratic governments vary considerably in terms of their ability to co-opt and divide opposition movements, control civil society, repress protest, and steal elections. Consider the story of the three little pigs. Setting aside one’s normative preferences, imagine that the pigs are autocratic incumbents, their houses are their regimes, and the wolf represents pro-democracy movements. The wolf approaches all three houses, but the impact of his huffing and puffing varies across cases: whereas houses of straw and sticks quickly collapse under the strain of the huffs and puffs, the house of brick remains intact. The key to explaining this variation lies not in the wolf and his behavior, but rather in differences in the houses’ strength.

The contemporary regimes literature has focused almost exclusively on democratic huffing and puffing, while largely ignoring the considerable variation that exists in the strength of authoritarian houses. In some countries, bankrupt states, weak, underpaid, and disorganized security services, and fragmented elites left regimes vulnerable to collapse in the face of minimal protest (Herbst 2001; Way 2002; 2003; 2005a). As Jeffrey Herbst has argued, it was “the weakness of African states rather than the strength of democratic opposition” that drove many regime transitions in that region (Herbst 2001: 364). Many African democracy movements confronted states that “were rotting from within. With a mere push many would collapse” (Herbst 2001: 361). A similar dynamic can be seen in parts of the former Soviet Union. For example, in Georgia, where police had not been paid in three months, Eduard Shevardnadze abandoned the presidency in the face of “undersized” crowds, largely because he “no longer controlled the military and security forces” and was thus “too politically weak” to order repression (Mitchell 2004: 345, 348). In Kyrgyzstan, it took only 5,000-10,000 protesters to overthrow President Askar Akayev (Silitski 2005). Finally, in Haiti, the Aristide government was “toppled by a rag-tag army of as few as 200 rebels.” The Haitian rebels “did not fight a single battle. The police simply changed out of their uniforms, grabbed bottles of rum, and headed for the hills” (Dudley 2004: 27).

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81 On this issue, see Skocpol (1979); Luckham (1996); Snyder (1998); Brownlee (2002); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004); and Way (2005a, 2005b).
In other cases, the story played out differently. Where state and governing party institutions were strong, autocrats often thwarted serious opposition challenges. In Armenia, for example, the government, backed by army veterans who had recently returned from a successful war with Azerbaijan, faced down crowds of up to 150,000 protesting a rigged presidential election in 1996 (Fuller 1996: 45; Way 2005a: 261). In Zimbabwe, opposition plans for “mass action” to protest the flawed 2000 elections were “deferred indefinitely” in the face of brutal police repression. Two years later, opposition leaders were “unwilling to consider” mass protest “given the vast repressive machinery that would confront them” (Raftopoulous 2002: 418). In Malaysia, although the 1998 arrest of Anwar Ibrahim gave rise to a vibrant Reformasi movement, regime opponents confronted a “highly effective and repressive police force” (Slater 2003: 89). Protest was “met forcefully” by riot police (Hilley 2001: 151) and ultimately “posed no threat to the government’s stability” (Felker 1999: 46). Finally, in Serbia, the opposition to Milosevic was highly mobilized throughout the 1990s, but autocratic breakdown occurred only after four military defeats and a severe economic crisis had eroded the power of the state and the governing party. Opposition forces in Armenia, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia were stronger than those in Haiti, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. The fact that regime change occurred in the latter cases (or in Serbia, only after the state was battered by successive military defeats) suggests that the fate of authoritarian regimes rests not only on the opposition forces but also on the robustness of the regime they are up against.

Variation in incumbent capacity is particularly important in the study of competitive authoritarianism. The regimes analyzed in this study had not democratized by 1990 (or, in a few cases, suffered authoritarian reversals between 1990 and 1995), despite a highly favorable international environment. In nearly all of these cases, the domestic impetus for democratization—the “push” from civil society—was weak. With a few exceptions (Mexico, Taiwan), civil societies lacked the organization, resources, and rural presence to sustain the kind of robust democracy movements seen in countries such as Poland, South Korea, or South Africa. Given this lack of variation, societal or opposition-centered variables are of limited utility in explaining diverging outcomes.

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83 Africa Today, January 2001, p. 25; Also Raftopoulos (2001: 23)
Incumbent Capacity: The Organizational Bases of Authoritarian Stability

Our approach to incumbent power is organizational. As Samuel Huntington observed, organization is “the foundation of political stability” (1968: 461). Building and sustaining authoritarianism is a complex and costly endeavor. It entails dissuading diverse social and political actors from challenging the regime (through co-optation, intimidation, or repression), as well as maintaining the loyalty and cooperation of powerful actors within the regime, such as the security forces. These organizational challenges are especially great in competitive authoritarian regimes, for incumbents must tolerate—and yet at the same time control—myriad actors (political parties, media, judges, NGOs) and arenas of contestation (elections, legislatures, courts) that do not exist—or exist merely as a facade—in fully closed regimes. In all but the most traditional societies, these tasks require organizational mechanisms for coordination, monitoring, and enforcement (Selznick 1960; Slater 2003; Brownlee 2004).

Our analysis focuses on two types of organization that are essential to autocratic survival: states and parties. Effective state and party organizations enhance incumbents’ capacity to prevent elite defection, co-opt, repress, or deny resources to opponents, defuse or crack down on protest, win (or steal) elections, and maintain control over the legislative process. Where states and governing parties are strong, autocrats are often able to survive despite vigorous opposition challenges. Where they are weak, incumbents may fall in the face of relatively weak opposition movements.

The State and Coercive Capacity

As Vladimir Lenin observed, military and police forces are “the chief instruments of state power” (1975: 52). Nevertheless, the role of coercive capacity has received relatively little attention in recent regime studies. Recent analyses have highlighted the importance of state strength to democracy. As scholars such as Guillermo O’Donnell (1993, 1999) and Stephen Holmes (1997, 2002) have argued, an effective state, grounded in the rule of law, is

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84Recent exceptions include Thompson (2001); Brownlee (2002); Way (2002; 2005a, 2005b); Slater (2003); Bellin (2004), and Darden (forthcoming).
essential to protecting the basic rights that are central to democracy.\(^85\) Yet as an earlier generation of scholarship made clear, strong states also enhance autocratic stability (Huntington 1968; Skocpol 1979). Whereas some state institutions check executive power and uphold a democratic rule of law, others provide key mechanisms to suppress opposition and maintain political hegemony. Authoritarian state institutions—from security forces to local prefects to intelligence agencies to informal patronage and corruption networks—furnish governments with tools to monitor, co-opt, intimidate, and repress potential opponents, both in civil society and within the regime itself.\(^86\) Although these state institutions often perform illiberal and illegal functions, they may nevertheless be effective (Darden forthcoming). And the more effective they are, the more stable authoritarian regimes will be. State-building is thus as important to authoritarianism as it is to democracy (Way 2005a, 2005b). Where post-Cold War autocrats inherited weak states and failed to rebuild them (e.g., Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar), they rarely endured in power. Where autocrats invested seriously in state-building, as in Nicaragua and Zimbabwe during the 1980s, Cambodia and Armenia during the 1990s, and Russia under Putin, the result was not democracy but more robust authoritarianism.

Coercive capacity has, of course, long weighed heavily in regime outcomes. In her classic critique of Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol argues that the erosion of the English monarchy’s monopoly over political power was rooted not only in the rise of commerce but also in the fact that it lacked a centralized standing army (Skocpol 1973). Skocpol’s work on social revolutions (1979) similarly pointed to the centrality of state coercive power. Only where states’ coercive apparatus was weakened—often by war—did autocracies fall prey to revolution. More recently, Eva Bellin (2004) has highlighted the role played by strong security apparatuses in sustaining authoritarianism in the Middle East. As Bellin argues, “democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it” (2004: 143). At the same time, Lucan Way (2002, 2005a) has shown how weak coercive capacity undermined autocratic consolidation in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s.

\(^{85}\) Also see Linz and Stepan (1996); Sperling (2000); Carothers (2002: 16); van del Walle (2002: 76); Bunce (2003: 180-81); Joseph (2003: 16); Mengisteab and Daddieh (2003); Gonzales and King (2004); and Bratton (2005).

\(^{86}\) A variety of other state agents—including local, finance, and educational officials—may also be used to both intimidate opposition and manipulate elections (Way 2006).
We treat coercive capacity as central to authoritarian stability. A strong coercive apparatus enhances incumbents’ capacity to monitor, intimidate, and when necessary, repress opponents. The greater is incumbents’ capacity to crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in the first place, the greater are the prospects for stable authoritarianism. States may employ two broad types of coercion. *High intensity coercion* refers to highly visible (at home and abroad) acts of violence or abuse, usually involving well-known figures or large groups. This includes the large-scale violent repression of mass protest (e.g., the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in China), the assassination of major opposition figures, and the cancellation or outright theft of elections. Such acts are usually extraordinary measures aimed at thwarting an immediate and serious challenge to the regime. Although competitive authoritarian incumbents occasionally resort to high intensity coercion (e.g., Yeltsin’s military assault on parliament in 1993; Hun Sen’s violent attack on Cambodian royalists in 1997; the assassination of leading opposition figures in Belarus in 1999), the domestic and international visibility of such acts make them particularly high risk and relatively rare ventures.

*Low intensity coercion* involves less visible—but often more systematic—efforts to suppress opposition activity. These include police surveillance, harassment, and detention, grassroots intimidation campaigns, and various forms of electoral manipulation undertaken by paramilitaries, pro-government thugs, or local prefects, and various forms of “legal” harassment, such as selective investigation by tax or regulatory authorities and the use of libel or defamation lawsuits against independent media.\(^7\) Low intensity coercion may also be directed within the regime (often in the form of surveillance, blackmail, and other threats), as a means of ensuring discipline within the security forces or the governing party.\(^8\) Whereas high intensity coercion is employed in response to large and imminent opposition challenges, low intensity coercion is often aimed at preventing such challenges from emerging in the first place. Where it is effective, many opposition supporters will conclude that anti-government activity is simply not worth the risk, leaving only the most die-hard activists to openly oppose the regime. By deterring opposition protest (or nipping it in the bud), successful low intensity coercion thus

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\(^7\) For a useful description of low-intensity coercion in the Ukrainian context, see Allina-Pisano 2005.  
\(^8\) For example, surveillance and blackmail were widely used to ensure internal cohesion in Peru and Ukraine during the 1990s. On Ukraine, see Darden (forthcoming).
reduces the need for high intensity coercion. Where opposition movements are so thoroughly beaten down that they do not pose a serious challenge, incumbents have little need to cancel elections or order police to fire on crowds.

Coercive capacity may be measured along two dimensions: scope and cohesion. Scope refers to the effective reach—across territory and into society—of the state’s coercive apparatus. Specifically, we focus on the size and quality of the “internal security sector,” or the “cluster of organizations with direct responsibility for internal security and domestic order” (Weitzer 1990: 3). This includes army and police forces, presidential guards, gendarmes and riot police, secret police and other specialized internal security units, and the domestic intelligence apparatus (Weitzer 1990: 3; Luckham 1996: 8), as well as informal paramilitary organizations such as death squads, militias, and armed “youth wings” (Roessler 2005). Where scope is extensive, as in Belarus, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, Taiwan, and Zimbabwe, states possess a developed internal security sector—including extensive intelligence networks and specialized police and paramilitary units—whose presence is felt throughout the national territory. Security forces are well paid, trained, and equipped, and often have a proven capacity to monitor and suppress opposition activity. Where scope is low, as in Albania, Georgia, and Haiti, armed forces are small, poorly-equipped, and sometimes even lacking in specialized intelligence and internal security agencies. Security forces do not effectively penetrate the national territory; law enforcement agents are non-existent, or maintain only a token presence, in much of the country; or alternatively are underpaid to the extent that they largely ineffective and refuse to obey orders.

Scope is particularly important for low intensity coercion. Systematic surveillance harassment, and intimidation of opponents require an infrastructure capable

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89 In Belarus, for example, the government reportedly relies on “hundreds of thousands” of informants placed in virtually every population center to monitor opposition and limit dissent (Way interview with Sergei Anis’ko, former Belarusian KGB official, 14 July 2004). In Malaysia, the government possessed “highly developed coercive institutions” (Slater 2003: 83), including a “powerful counter-insurgency and surveillance infrastructure” that was “renowned for [its] expertise in ‘intelligence’ gathering” (Munro-Kua 1996: 22). In Zimbabwe, the Mugabe government inherited “a remarkably efficient and brutal state” (Herbst 2000: 17), whose vast internal security sector maintained “an elaborate and pervasive system of social control” (Weitzer 1984b: 81; 1990).

90 In Haiti, for example, the Aristide government dissolved the army, and its 4000-man police force was one of the smallest per capita in the world (Erikson and Minson 2005: 4). The police “often lack[ed] lacks the means to conduct basic operations” (Schulz 1997-98: 85) and were largely non-existent in rural areas (McCoy 1997: 18)
of directing, coordinating, and supplying agents across the national territory. Where such an infrastructure is absent or ineffective, incumbents’ ability to monitor and check grassroots opposition activity is sporadic, at best. This (often de facto) space to organize makes it easier for opposition groups to mobilize large-scale electoral or protest movements. Indeed, the (attempted) use of high intensity coercion is often evidence that mechanisms of low intensity coercion are weak or have broken down.

Cohesion refers to the level of compliance within the state apparatus. For coercion to be effective, subordinates within the state must reliably follow their superiors’ commands. Where cohesion is high, incumbents can be confident that even highly controversial or illegal orders—such as firing on crowds of protesters, killing opposition leaders, or stealing elections—will be implemented systematically on the ground. Security officials will obey executive orders to repress, and rank-and-file soldiers, police, and bureaucrats will carry out those orders. Where cohesion is low, leaders cannot be confident that such orders will be complied with, either by high level security officials or by the rank-and-file. Noncompliance may take a variety of forms. In extreme cases, top security officials may openly disobey presidential orders and even cooperate with (or defect to) the opposition, and rank-and-file bureaucrats or soldiers may desert en masse (e.g., Haiti in 2004).

Cohesion is particularly critical during periods of regime crisis, when incumbents must often employ high intensity coercion to retain power. Acts of high intensity coercion (such as firing on crowds of protesters) are high risk ventures. Because they are likely to trigger strong negative reactions both at home and abroad (even in low linkage countries), such acts often exacerbate regime crises and may even contribute to regime collapse. State officials responsible for ordering or carrying out the repression thus run considerable risks, for if the repression fails and the regime collapses, they will be vulnerable to retribution. Hence, acts of high intensity coercion pose a particular threat to the chain of command, increasing the likelihood of internal disobedience. Breakdown

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91 For example in Ukraine in 1994, local officials in the eastern part of the country actively worked against the incumbent’s reelection as President (Way 2005a).
92 More subtle forms of non-compliance include calling in sick when coercive action is expected, promising compliance but failing to carry it out, and carrying out orders in ritualistic or formalistic ways that are intentionally ineffective. For example, in Belarus during the 1994 Presidential elections and Moldova during the 1996 elections, heads of local administrations and state controlled enterprises promised full cooperation in mobilizing voters in support of the incumbent but in fact did virtually nothing (Way 2006).
of the coercive command structures undermined incumbents’ capacity to engage in high
intensity coercion in Benin in 1990, Madagascar in 2002, Georgia in 2003, Russia in
1993 and Ukraine in 2004. Only where the state apparatus is characterized by substantial
cohesion (e.g., Armenia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe) can incumbents confidently order acts of
large-scale repression or abuse.

Variation in state cohesion is rooted in several factors. One is fiscal health
(Decalo 1998: 27; Gros 1998: 9-10). Unpaid state officials are less likely to follow
orders, especially high-risk orders such as repression or vote-stealing. Thus, in much of
Africa and the former Soviet Union, deep fiscal crises severely eroded discipline within
states during the immediate post-Cold War period. In extreme cases, such as Benin,
Malawi, and Georgia, the non-compliance of under-financed or unpaid security forces
left incumbents’ without means to crack down on opposition protest.

However, material resources are neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure
cohesion. In Armenia, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, state apparatuses remained intact
despite severe fiscal constraints. Indeed, as we show throughout this book, incumbents
who rely exclusively on material payoffs are often most vulnerable to insubordination
during periods of crisis. Thus, although a minimum of fiscal health can be essential, the
highest levels of cohesion are usually found where material payments are complemented
by one of four alternative sources of cohesion. One is personal ties. As the literature on
sultanistic regimes has shown, the appointment of family members and cronies to head
army, police, intelligence, and other state agencies is often an important means of
enhancing intra-regime trust and reducing the likelihood of elite defection (Chehabi and
Particularly in deeply divided societies (e.g., Guyana, Malaysia), autocrats have enhanced
loyalty within security agencies by packing them with ethnic allies to (Enloe 1976;
Decalo 1998: 19-21). Third, cohesion may be enhanced where state elites are bound by
shared (usually nationalist or revolutionary) ideologies, as in Moldova, Nicaragua, and
Serbia. ³³ Finally, elite cohesion may be rooted in solidarity ties forged during periods of

³³Both Theda Skocpol (1979: 169) and Philip Selznik (1960) argue that ideology plays an important role in
sustaining the cohesion of revolutionary leaderships.
shared military struggle, such as war, revolution, or liberation movements.\textsuperscript{94} Thus, where top positions in the state are controlled by a generation of elites that won a war (Armenia) or led a successful insurgency (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe), state actors are more likely to possess the cohesion, self-confidence and “stomach” to use force.\textsuperscript{95}

Measuring cohesion is tricky. One cannot know for certain how cohesive an organization is until it is seriously tested. However, using responses to regime crisis during the post–Cold War period as an indicator of cohesion risks tautology. To avoid this problem, we rely on two types of indicator. First, wherever possible, we examine previous levels of cohesion in response to crisis. For example, coercive apparatuses in Mozambique and Nicaragua remained cohesive despite serious external challenges during the 1980s, while those in Albania, Benin, Georgia, Haiti, and Ukraine showed evidence of repeated indiscipline long before regime crises. Second, we look for evidence of non-material sources of cohesion, including kinship, ethnic, or ideological ties, or solidarity ties rooted in shared military struggle. Where evidence of either prior discipline under stress or non-material bases of cohesion exist, we score cohesion as high.

\textit{The Role of Party Organization}

Much of the recent literature on political parties and regimes has focused on the relationship between parties and democracy (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002). Analyses of Latin American politics, for example, have associated weak parties with a range of phenomena—such as low democratic accountability, severe executive-legislative conflict, electoral volatility, and the rise of neopopulist “outsider” candidates—that undermine the quality and stability of democracy.\textsuperscript{96} Similarly, students of Russian politics have argued that Boris Yeltsin’s failure to invest in a governing party weakened democratic forces and contributed to democratic failure in the 1990s (White 1993: 312; McFaul 1994: 312. 2001: 316-17).

\textsuperscript{94}The different literatures on the origins of both states and parties have long emphasized the important role played by histories of conflict in generating strong and cohesive organizations (Tilly 1975, 1992; Huntington 1970; Shefter 1994; Hale 2006).
\textsuperscript{95}Along these lines, Mark Thompson (2001) and Andrew Nathan (2001) argue that the survival of the original revolutionary generation in the Chinese Communist Party was key to its decision to crack down on protestors in 1989.
\textsuperscript{96}See Mainwaring and Scully (1995); Mainwaring (1999); Weyland (1999); Levitsky and Cameron (2003).
Like states, however, strong parties may also serve as pillars of authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{97} As Barbara Geddes (1999) and Jason Brownlee (2004) have argued, governing parties help manage elite conflict, usually through the organization and distribution of patronage. Strong ruling parties “encourage continued cooperation over defection” (Brownlee 2004: 57), by providing institutional mechanisms to reward loyalists (with public posts, policy influence, and patronage resources), and by lengthening actors’ time horizons through the offer of future opportunities for career advancement (Geddes 1999; Brownlee 2004). As long as the party is expected to remain in power, even short-term losers in struggles over policy and patronage are likely to remain loyal in the expectation of access to spoils in future rounds (Geddes 1999: 129, 131). Where governing parties are weak or absent, elites will see fewer long-term opportunities for political advancement from within and are this more likely to seek power from outside the regime (Brownlee 2004: 55; Way 2002). Such elite defections are often a major cause of authoritarian breakdown.\textsuperscript{98}

Strong parties also contribute to authoritarian stability “on the ground.” First, they help incumbents mobilize support. Grassroots party organizations can be used to deliver votes, distribute clientelist goods, and to mobilize supporters for a variety of pro-government campaigns. In Serbia, for example, the ruling Serbian Communist Party—along with the security apparatus—played a key role in mobilizing up to five million supporters in the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that helped Slobodan Milosevic overcome local opposition and consolidate power in the late 1980s (Thomas 1999: 45). In Mexico, the PRI’s “gigantic human network of clientelist relations” (Pacheco 1991: 255) was critical in “organizing, supporting, and controlling popular demands” (Centeno 1994: 53), helping it become “one of the world’s most accomplished vote-getting machines” (Cornelius 1996: 57).

Second, strong parties may enhance coercive capacity (Widner 1992). Autocratic governments may use local party cells, “youth wings,” and other grassroots structures to monitor and suppress opposition, effectively transforming them into an “extension of the

\textsuperscript{97}See Zolberg (1966); Huntington (1968: 400-01), Huntington and Moore (1970); Widner (1992); Geddes (1999); Brownlee (2004); Smith (2005); Way 2005a.

\textsuperscript{98}This argument is made by Geddes (1999) and Brownlee (2004), and is line with earlier work by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).
state’s police power” (Widner 1992: 8). For example, Kenyan autocrat Daniel arap Moi used the governing KANU as an “adjunct to the security forces in monitoring and controlling opposition,” deploying KANU’s “youth wing” to “patrol the country, instill support for the party, and monitor dissent” in markets and other public places (Widener 1992: 7, 132, 170). In Taiwan, the KMT’s “extensive network of secret police and informers” (Gold 1997: 170) was used to “keep watch over neighborhoods, factories, military units, businesses, and government offices” (Hood 1997: 59). Grassroots party structures were also used for surveillance and intimidation in Cambodia, Guyana, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

Parties are of particular importance in competitive authoritarian regimes. Unlike single party regimes, incumbents in competitive authoritarian must retain and exercise power through nominally democratic institutions. Strong parties are essential to controlling these institutions. For example, parties enhance incumbents’ capacity to manage the electoral process. First, they reduce the likelihood of challenges from within. In countries with weak civil societies and oppositions, government officials often pose the most serious challenge to incumbents (cf. Way 2005a). Given the paucity of resources and media access outside the state, prime ministers, cabinet members, and other regime insiders are often best positioned to launch viable presidential bids (Way 2005a). Name recognition, access to media, and control over administrative resources give regime insiders an opportunity to build support that most opposition leaders lack. Where high level insider defections occur, incumbents are more vulnerable to defeat (Way 2005a, 2005b). By providing mechanisms to manage elite conflict, strong parties help to limit such defections.

Strong party organizations also help win elections. Elections in competitive authoritarian regimes are often hard fought contests. Winning them usually entails some mix of voter mobilization and fraud—both of which require organization. Mass parties provide an infrastructure for electoral mobilization, through large-scale clientelism, door-to-door campaigning, public rallies, and other means. Similarly, illicit electoral strategies such as ballot stuffing, vote buying, and other forms of fraud often require a considerable
degree of coordination and discipline: a large number of lower level authorities across the territory must reliably carry out controversial orders and keep them secret.\footnote{For example, the PRI, which possessed a large and disciplined organization, was notoriously effective in organizing fraud. The PRI was sufficiently disciplined that instructions issued by the Interior Ministry were effectively passed on to governors and then carried out by local party officials (Carbonell 2002: 85). The party infrastructure permitted organized ballot stuffing strategies, such as “flying brigades,” in which voters were trucked from precinct to precinct so that they could vote multiple times (Cornelius 1996: 60).}

In addition, parties are critical to controlling the legislature. Legislative control is critical in competitive authoritarian regimes, for several reasons. It enhances the executive’s capacity to manipulate and control other areas of politics. Because top judicial and electoral authorities are often directly chosen by legislatures or require legislative approval, executive control over constitutional courts, national electoral commissions, and other agents of horizontal accountability often requires a reliable legislative majority. Control over the legislature (usually with a two-thirds majority) may also allow the governing party to modify the constitution (for example, eliminating presidential term limits) to enhance or extend authoritarian rule. Finally, legislative control has a defensive purpose: to eliminate the legislature as a potential arena for contestation. When not effectively controlled by the incumbent, legislatures may challenge autocratic incumbents in various ways: they may thwart key presidential appointments (including, in some countries, prime ministers), conduct embarrassing investigations into executive corruption or abuse, create new mechanisms of oversight over the electoral process, provide an institutional home for opposition media, and protect key opposition leaders from prosecution (via parliamentary immunity) (Way 2005c).\footnote{For a discussion of the powers and importance of legislatures, see Fish 2005.}

Most importantly, opposition-dominated legislatures may directly threaten an incumbent’s survival by voting to remove him from office (as occurred in Madagascar in 1996 and as nearly occurred in Russia in 1993 and 1999).

Strong parties facilitate legislative control in two ways. First, they are more likely to win legislative elections. Presidents without strong parties (e.g., Soglo in Benin, Fujimori in Peru, Yeltsin in Russia; Kravchuk in Ukraine) have weaker coattails: they often fail to translate their own electoral success into legislative majorities. By contrast, where governing parties are strong (e.g., Malaysia, Tanzania, Mexico under the PRI), incumbent victories frequently generate solid legislative majorities. Second, strong
parties help to maintain legislative control between elections. Strong parties offer incumbents a variety of mechanisms (patronage distribution, a valuable label, ideology or other sources of cohesion) that help keep legislative allies in line. Where governing parties are weak, legislative factions are more prone to internal division, rebellion, and defection (Way 2005c). Such internal crises create opportunities for which opposition forces to gain control of the legislature, which can lead to serious parliamentary challenges that result in the weakening (Benin, Malawi, Moldova, Ukraine), paralysis (Haiti, Russia 1992-3), or removal (Madagascar) of incumbent governments. Where governing parties are strong, as in Cambodia, Malaysia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, such parliamentary challenges rarely emerge.

Finally, strong parties facilitate executive succession. Succession is a difficult challenge for most authoritarian regimes. Because they must worry about prosecution (for corruption or rights abuses) after leaving office, incumbents generally place a high value on finding a successor who will ensure their protection (Way 2002). This requires not only winning the election, but doing so with a candidate who can be trusted or controlled. Strong parties facilitate succession in several ways: they have a larger pool from which to draw strong candidates; they offer mechanisms to prevent the defection of losing aspirants; and they possess electoral capacity that is independent of the outgoing executive. Thus, it is not surprising that smooth competitive authoritarian successions almost always occur in countries with strong governing parties (e.g., Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, Tanzania). Where parties are weak, succession is more traumatic: candidate pools are smaller; the likelihood of internal conflict and defection is greater, and the party’s electoral viability is less certain. In such a context, incumbents often face a dilemma. On the one hand, the most electable alternatives are often (non-party) figures with independent resources or support bases, which make them difficult to control. On the other hand, loyal regime insiders can be trusted but often lack the stature to ensure electoral success. This dilemma has often undermined regime stability. In Ukraine, President Kuchma chose Viktor Yanukovich, a corrupt official with a criminal past, apparently because he could be controlled through blackmail; but Yanukovich’s past undermined his ability win the 2004 election (Way 2005d). In Peru, the absence of a
viable successor within Fujimori’s personalistic parties induced him to seek an illegal third term, which contributed to the unraveling of the regime.

Like state coercive capacity, party strength may be measured in terms of scope and cohesion. Scope refers to the size of a party’s infrastructure, or the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Where scope is extensive, as in the KMT in Taiwan, UMNO in Malaysia, the PRI in Mexico, the Communist Party in Moldova, and the CCM in Tanzania, parties possess mass organizations with large activist and membership bases. Party networks penetrate the national territory, including the countryside, operating actively in virtually every population center. For example, UMNO’s two million members and 16,500 branch organizations (Case 2001a: 52), allowed it to penetrate “every village in the country,” assigning a party agent to every 10 households in each village (Case 2001b: 37; Slater 2003: 90). Similarly, the CCM maintained an “extensive apparatus” with two million members and a neighborhood-level “ten-house” cell structure (Barkan 1994: 16; Berg Schlosser and Siegler 1990: 81), and the KMT developed a “massive Leninist organizational network” (Kau 1996: 292), with “complex local political machines…throughout the island” (Chu 1994: 101). In these and other cases, mass organizations enhanced parties’ capacity to mobilize voters, orchestrate fraud, and systematically monitor and intimidate opposition.

Where scope is low, as in Benin, Peru, Ukraine, Russia under Yeltsin, and Moldova in the 1990s, parties lack any real organization, membership, or activist base. Party operations are confined to urban centers, and in some cases, the presidential palace. Party infrastructure is often non-existent, or limited to the capital or the president’s home region. In Ukraine, for example, President Leonid Kravchuk had “did not have the support of any political force in parliament” (Kravchuk 2002: 248) and “no political team” (Markov 1993, 34) in the country as a whole. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori’s New Majority was characterized by its “near non-existence as an organization” (Conaghan 2000: 281). It “had scarcely any organizational presence outside the national congress” (Roberts 2002: 18), and after the 1995 election, “there wasn’t even…a party headquarters where the president could celebrate his victory” (Degregori 2000: 62). Such parties

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generally lack capacity for voter mobilization, ballot stuffing, or intimidation. They often perform poorly in elections, often failing to secure legislative majorities.\textsuperscript{102}

Cohesion refers to incumbents’ ability to secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level. Cohesion is crucial to preventing elite defection, particularly during periods of crisis, when the incumbent’s grip on power is threatened. Where cohesion is high, as in Malaysia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zimbabwe, allied ministers, legislators, and governors routinely support the government, implement presidential directives, and vote the party line. Internal rebellion or defection is rare, even in the face of major crises or opposition challenges, and when defections occur, they tend not to attract many followers. For example, the Sandinista party leadership did not experience a single public schism during the 1980s, despite a civil war and severe economic crisis that eventually led to the party’s defeat.\textsuperscript{103}

Where cohesion is low, as in Benin, Georgia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Russia under Yeltsin, parties are little more than loose coalitions of relatively autonomous actors, many of which derive their power and status from outside the party. Incumbents routinely confront insubordination, rebellion, or defection within the cabinet, in the legislative bloc, and among regional bosses. Consequently, regimes are vulnerable to internal crisis triggered by splits within the governing coalition, which give rise to opposition takeovers of the legislature or strong electoral challengers from erstwhile regime insiders. Indeed, in several cases, crises emerged \textit{even in the absence of a significant opposition challenge}.

Sources of cohesion vary. The most common—but also the weakest—source of cohesion is patronage. Parties based exclusively on short-term patronage ties are vulnerable to elite defection during periods of crisis. When economic crisis threatens incumbents’ capacity to distribute patronage, or when incumbents appear politically weak

\textsuperscript{102} At a medium level of scope are organizations that extend across the national territory (i.e., party offices and networks exist in most population centers, including those in rural areas), but which are not mass based and do not penetrate deeply at the grassroots level. Examples include patronage-based governing machines such as UNIP in Zambia, KANU in Kenya, Senegal’s Socialist Party, and the PRSC in the Dominican Republic. Unlike non-parties in Benin, Peru, Yeltsin’s Russia, and Ukraine, these parties possessed minimal infrastructures, but unlike mass parties in Malaysia, Moldova, Taiwan, and Tanzania, their organizations and activist bases were relatively inactive.

\textsuperscript{103} Similarly, ZANU in Zimbabwe experienced relatively little internal dissident, even during the severe crisis of 2000-05.
and vulnerable to defeat, patronage-based parties often suffer massive defections. For example, in Zambia, where a severe fiscal crisis undermined President Kaunda’s access to patronage resources, UNIP legislators defected en masse to the newly formed MMD shortly before UNIP’s 1991 electoral defeat. Cohesion is somewhat greater where patronage distribution is institutionalized in the form of consolidated machines (e.g., PRI, UMNO, KMT, CCM). In such parties, established norms of patronage distribution and career advancement, often reinforced by institutionalized mechanisms of centralized control, stabilize expectations and lengthen time horizons. These expectations are reinforced by time and success. A track record of successful cooperation generates confidence in the party’s capacity to overcome crises, and repeated electoral success enhances the value of the party label, thereby raising the cost of defection.

Although most parties rely on patronage, some benefit from additional sources of cohesion. One is personal ties. In charismatic parties (e.g., Fujimori’s parties and perhaps Banda’s Malawi Congress Party), where cadres’ political careers hinge almost entirely on their ties to the incumbent, cohesion is often high. Cohesion may also be enhanced by shared ethnicity (e.g., PNC in Guyana) or ideology (FSLN in Nicaragua, Socialist Party in Serbia, Communist Party in Moldova). Perhaps the most robust source of cohesion, however, is a shared history of struggle, particularly violent struggle. Thus parties whose leadership emerged out of successful revolutionary or liberation movements (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe) tend to be highly cohesive, at least while the founding generation survives.

We use two types of indicator for party cohesion: (1) instances of discipline during previous (i.e., pre-1990) periods of crisis and (2) evidence of non-material bases of cohesion. Newly constructed parties whose internal glue is clearly nothing more than short-term patronage deals (e.g., new governing parties in Benin, Belarus, Malawi, Ukraine, and Russia) are thus scored as low cohesion. Charismatic parties (Peru), ideological or ethnic parties (Guyana, Moldova), parties that emerged out of revolutionary or liberation movements (Mozambique, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe), and consolidated machines with proven track records of discipline under crisis (Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan) are scored as high cohesion.
Economic Control as a Substitute for Coercive and Party Organization

It is worth noting that discretionary state control over the economy may also enhance incumbent capacity to pre-empt or thwart opposition challenges (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005; Greene 2005), and that in some cases, it may serve as a substitute for powerful coercive and party organizations. Incumbents’ economic power may be considered high resources are concentrated in state hands and governments enjoy substantial discretionary power in allocating those resources. Economic resources are concentrated where the state maintains control over key means of production and finance, as in many partially reformed command economies (Fish 2005), or a large percentage of national income takes the form of rents controlled by the state, as in many mineral-based rentier states (Ross 2001). Rulers exert discretionary control where they can routinely use the tax system, the financial system, licensing, and government jobs and contracts, and other economic policy levers to punish opponents and reward allies.104

Discretionary economic power furnishes autocratic governments with powerful tools to compel compliance and punish opposition. Where the livelihoods, careers, and business prospects of much of the population can be easily and decisively affected by government decisions, opposition activity becomes a high risk venture. Businesses linked to the opposition may be denied access to government credit, licenses, contracts, or even property rights; independent media may be deprived of access to credit, newsprint, or advertising; public employees may be compelled to work for the governing party; and government critics may be fired, blacklisted, or denied access to essential goods and services.

104 In the absence of substantial discretionary power, even extensive state intervention may be compatible with democracy (e.g., Sweden). At the same time, where states have vast discretionary power, they may be put to autocratic ends even in predominantly private economies (e.g., Nicaragua under Somoza; Malawi under Banda).

105 For example, the Putin government engineered a takeover of one of the world’s largest oil companies, Yukos, in response to its owner’s financing of opposition groups. In Ukraine, an ex-head of the security service reported, “If [your business is] loyal to the authorities, they will ignore or overlook anything. If you are disloyal, you or your business will be quashed immediately” (Razumkov Center 2004: 21).

106 In Zimbabwe, for example, the government pressured businesses not to advertise in independent newspapers and used debts to state banks to compel media owners to soften their editorial line (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000: 208-210; Ronning 2003: 205). Similar behavior was widespread in Mexico through the early 1990s (Lawson 2002).

107 On Serbia, see Thomas (1999); on Russia, see Fish (2005); on Ukraine, see Allina-Pisano (2005) and Way (2005b).
By providing governments with tools to co-opt potential critics and punish dissent, discretionary state economic power starves oppositions of resources (Greene 2005). For political oppositions to be viable, they must have access to resources. Unless those resources are distributed equitably by the state, they must come from the private sector and civil society. Where states control most means of production or monopolize the main sources of wealth, private sectors will be small and civil societies will be poor (Dahl 1971: 48-61; Fish 2005: 156-157; Greene 2005), leaving “no conceivable financial base for opposition” (Riker 1982: 7). Where vast discretionary power allow governments to punish businesses in the economic arena for their behavior in the political arena, opposition parties, independent media, and other civil society groups will have few reliable channels of finance.\(^{108}\)

In extreme cases, then, discretionary economic power may at least partially substitute for strong party and state organizations in limiting elite defection and thwarting opposition challenges. Where the state’s power of economic coercion is extensive, as in Belarus and Gabon, it may be so costly for elites to defect and so difficult for opposition forces to mobilize resources that incumbents go largely unchallenged even in the absence of strong state or party organizations (Way 2005a: 237).

Combining State and Party Capacity

Strong states and parties contribute to authoritarian stability in different ways. State coercive and economic power enhances incumbents’ capacity to suppress opponents and critics and defuse or pre-empt potential opposition movements through intimidation,\(^{108}\) By contrast, where economic liberalization and integration shifted resources into the private sphere and stripped governments of tools of economic coercion, as in much of Central Europe and the Americas, entrepreneurs often played a major role in financing opposition.\(^{108}\) In Mexico, for example, where economic liberalization and integration into the North American Free Trade Agreement dramatically reduced the state’s coercive economic power (Teichman 1997; Greene 2005), business leaders helped finance the growth of National Action Party during the 1980s and 1990s and underwrote Vicente Fox’s successful presidential candidacy in 2000 (Chand 2001; Preston and Dillon 2004: 480-1, 294-5). Limits on state economic power may also be de facto. In countries with large informal economies, states may possess vast economic power on paper but exercise little in practice. Thus, in the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s, governments had vast nominal control over economies but very little actual ability to dictate the behavior of enterprise directors (Way 2005a). De facto weakness was also widespread among neopatrimonial regimes in Africa. For example, economy of nominally Marxist Benin was “almost entirely informal” during the late 1980s (Bierschenk et al. 2003: 162), with an estimated 90 percent of all trade generated by smuggling (Allen 1992: 45), and in Senegal, the rapid growth of black markets led to “de facto deregulation of trade” and a “weakening of the state…as an administrative apparatus” during the 1980s (Boone 1992: 352-3).
co-optation, and deprivation of resources. Strong parties help incumbents manage intra-
elite conflict, mobilize support, and win or steal elections.

State and party functions often overlap, and to some degree, they may be
substitutable. For example, strong parties may be so successful at mobilizing support and
maintaining elite cohesion that incumbents are able to survive even in the absence of
particularly strong states (Mozambique, Tanzania). In addition, strong parties facilitate
efforts to establish tight control over a wide range of state institutions through the
provision of a pool of loyal cadres bound by a strong partisan identity. Finally, well-
organized parties may also perform state-like coercive functions, including surveillance
and other forms of low intensity coercion.109

Strong states may also substitute for weak parties. For example, state agencies
may also be deployed as “party substitutes” (Hale 2005). In Peru and Ukraine, state
intelligence agencies played a central role in maintaining elite cohesion, largely through
surveillance, blackmail, and bribery (Darden forthcoming; Cameron 2006). In other
cases, incumbents have used state agencies as party-like mobilizational tools. In
Ukraine, governments mobilized public teachers and doctors for electoral campaigns
(Allina-Pisano 2005; Way 2005b); in Peru and Serbia, army, police, and other security
branches were used for campaign activities (Planas 2000: 357-8; Le Bor 2002, 200-1).

There are limits to substitutability, however. In Peru and Ukraine, for example,
succession crises and legislative weakness—both exacerbated by party weakness—
contributed to crises that ultimately toppled regimes. Although such crises did not occur
in Belarus and Russia through 2006, party weakness—and consequently, the potential for
elite defection—remained a point of vulnerability. Moreover elite conflict rooted in party
weakness may eventually erode state cohesion by undermining incumbent control over
coercive and other state agencies (Way 2005a: 238). When the governing elite is divided,
security forces may be paralyzed by conflicting orders, and state officials may resist
carrying out risky coercive action on behalf of any side. Incumbents may lose control
over entire security agencies—or be sufficiently uncertain about their loyalty that they
cannot order repression.

109Such party-based repression has been observed in Cambodia, Kenya, Malawi, Nicaragua, and Taiwan.
Incumbent capacity is thus greatest where both states and parties are strong. These are clear cases of brick houses: strong state and party organizations give incumbent governments the capacity to hold together even under serious crisis, and to thwart even relatively strong opposition movements—both at the ballot box and in the streets. Malaysia, Taiwan, and—to a somewhat lesser degree—Mexico, Nicaragua, Serbia, and Zimbabwe fall into this category.

Incumbent capacity is most limited where both state and party organizations are weak. These are unambiguous cases of straw houses. Incumbents lack substantial capacity to win (or steal) elections or to crack down on protest. Moreover, they routinely suffer intra-elite conflict and defection. As a result, governments are vulnerable to collapse in the face of even very modest opposition challenges. Examples include Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Moldova in the 1990s, and Ukraine under Kravchuk.

Other cases exhibit mixes of state and party strength. A few cases, including Mozambique, Tanzania, and Moldova under the Communists, are characterized by strong governing parties but relatively weak states. In these cases, incumbents’ capacity to win elections and limit elite conflict may be sufficient to ensure regime stability. However, these regimes remain vulnerable to medium or large-scale opposition mobilization. In other cases, including Armenia, Belarus, and Russia under Putin, incumbents possessed considerable state capacity but relatively weak parties. Although such regimes may be less vulnerable to mass protest, they are probably more vulnerable to internal conflict than those with strong governing parties.

**The Impact of Opposition Strength**

The other side of the story in explaining regime outcomes is, of course, opposition capacity. The strength and behavior of societal opposition forces are widely viewed as critical to regime outcomes. Scholars have pointed to robust civil societies,\(^{110}\) societal mobilization and protest,\(^{111}\) and opposition cohesion\(^{112}\) as critical to democratization. Strong opposition movements shift the balance of power and resources away from state

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\(^{110}\)Diamond (1999) and Howard (2003).

\(^{111}\)Bratton and van de Walle (1997); Collier (1999); Wood (2000); Thompson (2001).

\(^{112}\)Corrales (2001); Howard and Roessler (2006).
elites, which raises the cost of sustaining authoritarian rule. Where opposition forces are able to mobilize large numbers of people for elections or protest movements, incumbents must employ more nakedly autocratic means to retain power (e.g., blatantly stealing elections or cracking down violently on street protest), which, erode public support, generate tension within the regime elite, and risk international punitive action. Thus, the greater the opposition’s mobilizational and electoral capacity, the greater the likelihood—all else equal—that incumbents will opt for toleration (even at the risk of losing power) over repression (Dahl 1971).

Opposition strength is clearly important to explaining regime outcomes. During the Third Wave, opposition mobilization played a central role in democratization in Argentina, Poland, Spain, South Africa, South Korea, and elsewhere. Among our cases, opposition strength was critical to democratization in Mexico and Taiwan. In both countries, political and civic organizations developed the capacity to mobilize large numbers of citizens across the national territory, which gave opposition forces the ability to launch sustained nationwide protest, compete effectively in elections, and monitor electoral processes. This organizational capacity greatly increased the cost of repression and fraud, which contributed in an important way to democratization.

Opposition strength was less important in shaping post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regime outcomes, however, largely because most of these regimes confronted strikingly weak oppositions. Because they were poor, predominantly rural societies with tiny middle classes (Cambodia, Haiti, Nicaragua, and much of sub-Saharan Africa), or because they had recently emerged from decades of Leninism and state socialism (Central Europe, former Soviet Union), most of the cases examined in this study lacked the raw materials for a strong opposition movement: private sectors were weak, civil society was small and narrowly based, and political parties lacked organization and any significant presence in the countryside (Howard 2003). In none of these cases did opposition forces possess the infrastructure or resources to sustain a large-scale pro-democracy movement. Hence, although civil society and opposition strength is clearly an important determinant of democratization in general, it has less explanatory power in our cases.

113 Again, Mexico and Taiwan are exceptions.
It is also worth noting that in many regimes, opposition strength is to at least some extent endogenous to incumbent capacity. For example, where incumbents possess powerful instruments of physical and/or economic coercion, they may use them to systematically undermine opposition organize. Thus, systematic coercion may weaken opposition movements by making civic political participation so risky that all but the most diehard activists exit the public sphere. In Zimbabwe, for example, the emergence of an independent labor movement and the well-organized Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) gave rise to a vibrant democracy movement during the late 1990s (Alexander 2000: 391; Raftopoulos 2001: 17). However, violent repression, restrictions on NGO activity and foreign finance, and heavy pressure on the private sector undermined the movement’s organizational bases (Raftopoulos 2002: 425). By 2002, the labor movement was a “penniless, drifting shambles” (Blair 2003: 281), and the MDC “barely functioned” in much of the countryside (Blair 2002: 246). Systematic repression also badly weakened opposition forces in Armenia and Cambodia. In Malaysia, Belarus, and Russia, effective low intensity coercion helped to deter strong opposition movements from emerging in the first place. Discretionary economic power may also be used to weaken or deter opposition movements. In Belarus, Gabon, and Russia, economic coercion and co-optation helped governments starve opposition movements nearly out of existence.

At the same time, incumbent weakness may contribute to opposition strength. In Georgia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Ukraine, and Zambia, much of the financial and organizational muscle of successful opposition movements came not from “society” but from political, economic, and military actors who defected—in some cases, just weeks before the transition—from the governing coalition. In many cases, defectors provided sources of finance or rural penetration that opposition forces could never have achieved on their own (Myagkov and Ordeshook 2001; Way 2005b). In Ukraine, for example, much of the financial and organizational muscle of the Orange Revolution was provided by leading business “oligarchs” who had only recently defected from the Kuchma

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114 Brownlee (2004) and Greene (2005) make similar arguments.
116 In Armenia, although opposition forces demonstrated considerable mobilizational capacity through the mid-1990s, arrests, infiltration, and other repressive measures weakened them considerably, and protests following the fraudulent 2003 election were easily suppressed (Hakobyan 2004; Danielyan 2004). In Cambodia, heavy repression in 1997 destroyed royalist party structures in the countryside, leaving the opposition much weaker than it had been in the mid-1990s (Hughes 2003: 122-123)
government (Way 2005b). In Senegal, much of the opposition’s electoral strength in 2000 was rooted in political and religious leaders who had defected from the Socialist Party (Galvan 2001; Mozaffar and Vengroff 2002). In these cases, then, it was ultimately incumbent weakness, rather than opposition strength, per se, that drove transitions.

**Synthesis of the Argument**

Our explanation of post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regime outcomes (summarized in Figure 1) synthesizes the international and domestic arguments presented above. We make a two step argument. First, where linkage was high, as in most of Central Europe and the Americas, competitive authoritarianism was unsustainable and regimes almost invariably democratized. Among our 10 high linkage cases, not a single autocratic government or chosen successor survived through 2005. Moreover, turnover almost always resulted in democratization. Only Macedonia, which experienced severe ethnic conflict, failed to democratize, and even there, autocrats repeatedly failed to consolidate power. In high linkage cases, then, international influences wiped out the effects of domestic balances of power: democratization occurred even where incumbent capacity was high and oppositions were weak.

Where linkage was combined with high leverage, as in most of Central Europe and the Americas, external democratizing pressure was particularly intense. Due to penetration by international media, transnational human rights networks, and multilateral organizations, even minor abuses reverberated in the West and were likely to trigger responses from Western powers. Because numerous domestic actors maintained ties to the West, the threat of external punitive action often triggered considerable opposition at home. Consequently, the cost of fraud and repression was exceedingly high. Indeed, it

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117Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Guyana, Macedonia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia. This represents those cases that receive the top third score for linkage to the US and EU in the 1990s. Linkage is measured by four components: (1) extent of trade with the US and 15 EU member countries (exports/imports over GDP); (2) population movements as measured by the log of the yearly average travel (for all purposes, business, education, tourism) by country residents to the US and EU 1990-2000; (3) Communications ties are measured by per capita internet and cable access 1990-2000; (4) membership in the OAS or potential membership in the EU. Each of these components has been converted into a 5 point scale relative to data for all non-Western countries in the world and added up and divided by the highest score so that the lowest score = .2 and the highest score=1.

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was so high that even incumbents with strong state and party organizations chose to
tolerate—and be defeated by—opposition challenges that, in a different international
context, they could have easily suppressed. Thus, even autocrats with vast
organizational capacity eventually ceded power, although in some cases (Nicaragua,
Serbia) only after considerable Western intervention. Moreover, because opposition
forces maintained close ties to the West (and often viewed Western support as critical to
their success), and because they faced the same external constraints that had toppled their
predecessors, successor governments almost always ruled democratically.

Where high linkage was combined with relatively low leverage (Mexico and
Taiwan), autocratic parties also fell, but the process was more protracted and required a
domestic “push.” The PRI and KMT governments faced less direct external pressure to
democratize. However, media and NGO penetration, economic integration, close
diplomatic ties to the U.S., and the prominence of U.S.-educated technocrats enhanced
their sensitivity to their international standing. The pursuit of international legitimacy
created an incentive not only to avoid large-scale abuses but also to maintain themselves
in power via credible political institutions. Here opposition strength mattered. As long
as oppositions were weak, incumbents could win via internationally credible electoral
processes. However, when serious opposition challenges arose, governments were
trapped by their efforts to maintain international credibility. Unwilling to pay the
external and domestic costs of a large-scale crackdown, they accepted defeat and left
power peacefully. For the reasons cited above, successors governed democratically.

Where linkage was low, regime outcomes were driven largely by domestic
factors. In the absence of extensive linkage, autocratic abuse was less likely to gain
international attention or trigger external punitive responses. Even where punitive action
was taken, it was rarely sustained and—due to the paucity of domestic actors with close
ties to the West—rarely triggered substantial opposition at home. As long as they avoided
large-scale repression or fraud, then, autocrats enjoyed considerable room for maneuver.

The second step of the argument thus centers on incumbent capacity. In low
linkage cases, where autocrats possessed strong state and/or party organizations,
competitive authoritarian regimes generally survived. In these cases, governments
possessed the organizational tools to manage elite conflict and thwart opposition
challenges in the streets and at the ballot box. In most cases, these tools were sufficient to prevent the emergence of serious opposition challenges, but where such challenges arose (e.g., Armenia 1996, Malaysia 1998-99, Zimbabwe 2000-2002), governments possessed the cohesion and the coercive power to survive them. In 11 of the 14 cases of higher than median incumbent capacity, incumbent governments or chosen successors remained in power through 2005. Where Western leverage was low, limited international pressure permitted the consolidation, in some cases, of increasingly closed regimes (Gabon, Russia). Where leverage was high, incumbents’ external room for maneuver was more limited, and regimes remained competitive (Moldova, Mozambique, Tanzania).

Where incumbent capacity was low, competitive authoritarian regimes were less stable. Incumbents were more vulnerable to elite defection and ill-equipped to co-opt critics or thwart street protests or electoral challenges. Of 12 cases of low incumbent capacity, only one (Russia) remained stable. Among such cases, weak incumbent capacity combined with weak opposition left regime outcomes more open to contingency at any particular moment. Thus, where leverage was low due to strategic and/or economic important (i.e. Russia under Yeltsin), or the support the support of “black knights” (Belarus), even relatively weak incumbents often survived. Where leverage was high, autocratic incumbents were more likely to fall. In Benin, Georgia, Madagascar, Malawi, and Zambia, where incumbents lacked organizational or repressive capacity and where highly dependent on the West, external pressure (or the failure of external powers to intervene on behalf of incumbents) often helped tip the balance, contributing to the collapse of autocratic governments.

Turnover in low linkage cases rarely brought democratization, however. In the absence of extensive linkage or a strong civil society-based opposition, successor governments had a weak incentive to govern in a democratic manner. In such cases, democratization required effective pro-democratic, which frequently involved the under-utilization of power. Such leadership was relatively rare, and as a result, transitions more frequently resulted in another round of competitive authoritarianism (Benin, Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania).

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118 Incumbent capacity was measured by adding the scores for scope and cohesion of state and party (high=3; medium = 2; Low = 1). For a list of indicators, see Table 2.2. For all but two cases, the level of incumbent capacity did not change significantly over the post-Cold War period, so a single score is provided. Separate scores were calculated for Moldova and Russia for the 1990s and the 2000s. In these cases either party capacity (Moldova) or state capacity (Russia) increased dramatically.
Malawi, Ukraine 1994; Zambia). Thus, where incumbent weakness is combined with high leverage, the most likely regime outcome is *unstable competitive authoritarianism*.

**Alternative Approaches**

Before proceeding to the case analyses, it is worth examining a few alternative approaches to explaining competitive authoritarian regime trajectories: specifically, we examine approaches that focus on modernization, leadership, and institutional design.

*Modernization*

One alternative approach to explaining competitive authoritarian regime outcomes is economic modernization.\(^{119}\) It is plausible to hypothesize that the stable democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes will be more likely in wealthier countries with higher rates of literacy and urbanization, larger working or middle classes, and more developed civil societies than in poor, rural societies with high rates of illiteracy. Indeed, there is little question that economic development contributed to democratization in two of our cases: Mexico and Taiwan.

However, the explanatory power of modernization in our study is limited. In large part, this is due to the nature of our sample. Students of the relationship between development and democracy generally agree that the relationship is clearest at high levels of development. Wealthy industrialized countries are highly likely to be—and remain—democratic. However, with the exception of Taiwan, all of our cases fall unambiguously into the middle and lower income categories. In none of them (except Taiwan) would the level of development lead scholars to confidently predict the installation or survival of democracy. Not surprisingly, then, the relationship between level of development and democratization among our cases is relatively weak. The bivariate correlation between democracy and development within our sample is not statistically significant and much less robust than for all countries in the world. Among our wealthier countries (above $1,000 GDP per capita in 1995), several competitive authoritarian regimes democratized

\(^{119}\)For various interpretations of the relationship between economic development and democracy, see Lipset (1960); Rueschemeyer et al. (1992); Przeworski and Limongi (1997); and Boix and Stokes (2003).
between 1990 and 2005 (Bulgaria, Mexico, Croatia and Slovakia, Taiwan), but several others remained authoritarian (Belarus, Gabon, Malaysia, Russia). Likewise, among our least developed countries (GDP per capita below $1,000 in 1995), many competitive authoritarian regimes failed to stably democratize (Cambodia, Haiti, Ethiopia, Zambia), as predicted by modernization theory, but a surprising number of them did (or very nearly did) democratize (Albania, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Nicaragua). The number of democratizations in low income countries (and, to a lesser extent, non-democratization in relatively developed countries such as Russia and Malaysia) suggests that modernization is, at best, only part of the causal story.\footnote{Indeed, as we have shown elsewhere (Way and Levitsky 2005), linkage is more highly correlated with democracy than with GDP per capita. Controlling for a variety of other explanatory factors, linkage explains a larger share of the variance in regime outcome among our cases than does GDP per capita.}

However, economic development may indirectly shape competitive authoritarian regime outcomes in two ways. First, and most obviously, it enhances opposition capacity. Economic (particularly capitalist) development expands, enriches, and strengthens civil society vis-à-vis the state (Lipset 1960; Dahl 1971; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Higher levels of wealth, urbanization, and literacy, together with large bourgeoisies and working classes, provide the raw materials for a robust civil society. It is therefore not surprising that strong opposition movements emerged in Mexico and Taiwan during the 1990s, or that opposition forces remained weak in poor, predominantly rural countries such as Cambodia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, and Tanzania. Second, development enhances linkage to the West. Capitalist development increases economic integration, cross-border communication, travel, and education, and more extensive ties to transnational civil society, which raise the cost of authoritarianism. Thus, relatively industrialized countries such as Malaysia and Taiwan are more closely linked to the West than is Cambodia. Hence, although modernization is less helpful than linkage or incumbent capacity in explaining post-Cold War competitive authoritarian regime outcomes, its effects—via opposition strength and linkage—are nevertheless important.

\textit{Political Leadership}

Another alternative approach to explaining competitive authoritarian regime outcomes centers on political leadership. During the 1980s and 1990s, democratization...
in countries with seemingly formidable structural obstacles triggered a paradigm shift in regime studies. Following the influential work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), scholars began to treat transitions as periods of “extraordinary uncertainty” (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1983: 3), in which contingent events and the choices of political elites could be decisive in shaping regime outcomes.\footnote{See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Przeworski (1986); Di Palma (1990); Karl (1990); Higley and Gunther (1992).} Many of these scholars highlighted the role of leadership in “crafting” successful transitions (Di Palma 1990; Fish 1998). For example, M. Stephen Fish pointed to Mongolia’s democratization as a “triumph of choice, will, leadership, agency, and contingency over structure, history, culture, and geography” (1998: 140). Other analyses focused on the negative effects of “poor elite decisions” (Moser 2001: 10; McFaul 2001; Fish 2005). Scholars also stressed the importance of political leaders’ democratic values democracy and compromise (Fish 1998; McFaul 2002).

Leadership clearly matters in shaping regime outcomes, particularly in the short run. It is difficult to understand the emergence of competitive authoritarianism in post-Cold War Serbia, Slovakia, and Venezuela, for example, without reference to the committed, risk-taking leadership of Milosevic, Meciar, and Hugo Chavez. At the other end of the spectrum, surprising levels of pluralism in Russia during the 1990s and Ukraine after 2004 were at least partly rooted in the unusual tolerance of incumbents.\footnote{In Russia, Boris Yeltsin’s close aids report that Yeltsin was willing to allow open criticism in the media “as long as the situation did not become mortally dangerous for him and his power” (Baturin et al. 2001, 504).} Leaders also vary considerably in their will to face down—violently, if necessary—mass protest. In this sense, Hun Sen in Cambodia and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe differed markedly from Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia or Julius Nyerere in Tanzania.

However, evidence suggests that over time, leadership is far less important than international and domestic structural variables in shaping competitive authoritarian regime trajectories. The distribution of regime outcomes during the post-Cold War period was in fact much more patterned or “structured” than the early transitions literature would lead us to expect. (The fact that all eight Latin American countries covered in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule democratized suggests that outcomes were far less contingent than initially expected). Widespread democratization in the
Americas and Central Europe, and considerably less democratization in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union suggests that—unless we are prepared to believe that leaders in the former regions were exceptionally skilled democrats—regime outcomes were not particularly open to contingency and leadership choice.

Indeed, our case analyses suggest that leaders’ choices are often heavily structured by the domestic and international context in which they operate. In numerous cases, autocratic leaders (Iliescu, Kaunda, Kerekou, Rawlings) and parties (Nicaraguan FSLN, Mexican PRI, Taiwanese KMT, Croatian HDZ, and Bulgarian and Romanian Socialists) have behaved democratically, allowing free elections and leaving power peacefully. At the same time, a striking number “democratic” opposition leaders, including Sali Berisha in Albania, Levon Ter Petrosian in Armenia, Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus, Menes Zenawi in Ethiopia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia, Bakili Muluzi in Malawi, and Frederick Chiluba in Zambia, governed in an autocratic fashion after coming to power.

Even where leaders’ behavior had important short-term effects, these effects frequently did not endure much beyond that leader’s tenure in office. Thus, Boris Yeltsin’s tolerance of media criticism during the 1990s did little to prevent Putin’s authoritarian crackdown in the early 2000s. Similarly, the relatively benign rule of Viacheslav Kebich in Belarus (1992-1994) quickly gave way to Lukashenka’s autocratic regime. Likewise, abuse of democratic procedure by Tudjman (Croatia), Balaguer (Dominican Republic) and Meciar (Slovakia) during the mid-1990s did little to prevent their successors from consolidating democratic rule later in the decade. Hence, with a few exceptions, leadership has generally had only a marginal impact on longer-term competitive authoritarian regime outcomes.

It is more useful, therefore, to assume that incumbents in competitive authoritarian regimes seek to maintain themselves (or, in some cases, their successors) in power, using both democratic and—when available—non-democratic means. What determines whether these leaders behave democratically is thus less their beliefs than the opportunities and constraints that confront them. Where leaders possess effective coercive apparatuses and few international constraints (i.e., low linkage), as in Belarus, Malaysia, Russia, and Zimbabwe, they will generally use those instruments to govern
autocratically—especially when their power is at stake. By contrast, where leaders lack a strong coercive apparatus (Benin, Moldova in the 1990s, Ukraine under Kravchuk) and/or face heavy international constraints (Mexico, Nicaragua, Romania, Taiwan), their behavior is more likely to be consistent with democratic norms.

Once we have identified the opportunities for and constraints against autocratic behavior, the impact of leadership may be more fruitfully analyzed. The role of leadership is often most significant when behavior and regime outcomes run counter to these opportunities and constraints. For example, because external incentives for democratic behavior were far stronger in Serbia and Slovakia than they were in Armenia and Belarus, the leadership of Meciar and Milosevic was arguably important in shaping the competitive authoritarian regimes that emerged in the 1990s. Similarly, the fact that external incentives for fully democratic behavior were relatively low in Ghana (compared to, say, Bulgaria or the Dominican Republic) suggests that Jerry Rawlings’ leadership may have been especially important. Thus, although leadership always “matters,” identifying, a priori, the structural opportunities and constraints in which leaders operate permits a more systematic of when and how it matters.

The Role of Political Institutions

Finally, another alternative approach focuses on institutional design. Over the past two decades, a vast body of literature has emerged that examines how constitutional and other formal institutional arrangements shape regime outcomes. Such approaches have frequently applied to the cases under study here. For example, Andrew Reynolds argues that the “effects of institutional design” must be “at the center of an explanation of democratic success and failure in Africa” (1999: 4). According to Reynolds, consensus-oriented institutional arrangements such as parliamentarism and proportional representation electoral systems generate “improved prospects for democratic consolidation” in Southern Africa. Arguing along similar lines, scholars have associated powerful presidencies with authoritarian outcomes (McClintock 1994; Fish 2001, 2005,
According to M. Stephen Fish, “superpresidentialism”—defined as a “constitutional arrangement that invests greater power in the presidency and much less power in the legislature”—has “inhibited democratization” in Russia and other post-Soviet republics by undermining accountability and inhibiting the emergence of strong institutions, parties, and experienced political elites (2005: 248-250). In a distinct institutionalist argument, Timothy Colton and Cindy Skach (2005) point to semi-presidentialism as a cause of Russia’s slide into authoritarianism. In their view, semi-presidential systems are prone to inter-branch conflict and immobilism, which create incentives for presidents to “dominate the political process and rule by decree,” placing new democracies on a “slippery slope to dictatorship” (2005: 116-117). Finally, numerous studies have highlighted the role of constitutional courts, electoral commissions and other nominally independent institutions in deterring or blocking autocratic abuse (Ganev 2001, 194-196; Erklit and Reynolds 2002).

There is reason to be skeptical about the role of institutional design in shaping competitive authoritarian regime outcomes. Institutionalist analyses hinge on the assumption that formal institutions are: (1) regularly enforced; and (2) minimally stable, in that they survive minor fluctuations in the distribution of power and preferences (Levitsky and Murillo 2005). In other words, they take for granted that the rules that are written on parchment actually constrain actors in practice, and that they “stick” long enough for actors to develop shared expectations based on past behavior. Indeed, it is only under these conditions that institutional design can be expected to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Although these assumptions hold up relatively well in most advanced industrialized democracies, they travel less well to other parts of the world. As Samuel Huntington (1968) argued nearly four decades ago, polities vary considerably on the dimension of institutional strength. Indeed, a major characteristic of polities in much of the developing world is the generalized weakness of formal institutions. In much of Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, formal institutions are often neither stable and nor systematically enforced.

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This work builds on earlier work on presidentialism by Linz (1990); Shugart and Carey (1992); Mainwaring (1993); Stepan and Skach (1993); Linz and Valenzuela (1994); and Mainwaring and Shugart (1997).
Many competitive authoritarian regimes are characterized by striking levels of institutional instability. In Madagascar, constitutional arrangements have been “tampered with so much…as to be unrecognizable” (Marcus 2004: 2). Thus, Madagascar’s constitution has “functioned less as a constraint on the behavior of elites than as the object of elite manipulation,” and as a result, formal institutions “have neither served their intended purpose nor provided the means toward the end of democratic consolidation” (Marcus 2005: 156). In Kenya, the “rapid-fire constitutional amendment process” has “undermined the stability of institutions…, rendering them ineffectual” (Institute of Economic Affairs 2001: 19); and in Malaysia, the governing UMNO can “change the constitution at will” (Crouch 1996b: 115), leading former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to complain that “the manner, the frequency and the trivial reasons for altering the constitution” had reduced it to a “useless scrap of paper.”

Many competitive authoritarian regimes are similarly characterized by weak enforcement of formal institutions. For example, on paper, Mexico’s 1917 constitution was “an advanced liberal democratic charter” (Whitehead 1995: 250) that prescribed a weak executive, a strong legislature, and an independent Supreme Court (Weldon 1997; Domingo 2000: 713). In practice, however, PRI presidents enjoyed vast “metaconstitutional” powers (Garrido 1989: 425; Weldon 1997); while Congress was transformed into a “rubber stamp for presidential decrees” (Eisenstadt 2004: 40). In Romania, politics was characterized by the “non-observance of the Constitution, its letter, its spirit, and its guarantees” during the 1990s (Weber 2001: 213); and in Cambodia, many of the constitution’s democratic provisions “have remained dead letters” (Jennar 1995: 2).

In such weakly institutionalized polities, constitutions routinely fail to constrain powerful actors. Thus, in Croatia, observers noted that “the problem is not that the president has strong constitutional powers but that [President Franjo] Tudjman is going beyond them” (Uncaptive Minds 1994: 41). Likewise, although the Yugoslav constitution gave the federal executive “very little formal power,” Slobodan Milosevic enjoyed “almost unlimited informal power” as president (Sekelj 2000; von Beyme 2001: 16). In Haiti, “no head of state has felt constrained by constitutions, even his own” (Weinstein and Segal 1992: 62).

In a weakly institutionalized context, constitutional courts, electoral commissions, and other formal checks on executive power are frequently “independent on paper, but intimidated, colonized, or neutralized in practice” (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002: 15). In Fujimori’s Peru, for example, the checks and balances prescribed by the 1993 constitution “were transformed into facades” (Degregori 2000: 377), and constitutional procedures were seen as “obstacles to overcome rather than effective structures of institutional order” (Cameron 2000: 5). In Gabon, the nominally independent constitutional court and electoral commission that were purportedly “designed to provide checks and balances” (Neher and Bakary 1993: 3) never escaped the Bongo government’s control. The electoral commission “proved neither autonomous nor competent” (Freedom House 2004: 1), and in 1998, many of its functions were unconstitutionally transferred back to the Interior Ministry (Gardinier 2000: 236). In Zimbabwe, the Electoral Supervisory Commission is “largely impotent” (Makumbe and Compagnon 2000: 47) and “does not seem to be able to fulfill its role as envisioned by the constitution” (DNI 2000: 18).

When nominally independent bodies attempt to exert their constitutional authority, they are often emasculated or shunted aside. Thus, when Malawi’s Electoral Commission Chair Anastazia Msosa asserted her independence in 1998, the Muluvi government “promptly removed her” (Patel 2002: 157) and packed the commission with allies. In Haiti, when the President of the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) refused to endorse the 2000 legislative election results, death threats forced him to flee into exile—after which a “reconstituted” CEP made the results official (Fatton 2002: 116-17; Maguire 2002: 33). In Russia, when the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Yeltsin’s 1993 decree disbanding parliament, Yeltsin responded by cutting off the Court’s phone lines and withdrawing all security forces before eventually disbanding it. Finally, Peru’s Constitutional Tribunal “had a short life” (Youngers 2000a: 29). In 1997, one year after its creation, the TC ruled that legislation permitting President Fujimori’s bid for a third term was “inapplicable.” Shortly thereafter, Congress sacked three TC members, leaving the body dormant for the next three years (Youngers 2000a: 30).

The failure of formal institutions to constrain executives is also seen in the case of presidential term limits. Although term limits were imposed throughout much of Africa during the first half of the 1990s, Bruce Baker observed in 2002 that “in political circles
across the continent the talk is of altering constitutions to allow [Presidents] to stay on for a longer term, another term or for an unlimited number of terms” (2002: 286). In Gabon, Namibia, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, Presidents modified or eliminated constitutional term limits to extend their stay in office (Baker 2002; Brown 2004: 329; Cheater 2001: 7). Term limits were similarly overturned in Ukraine, Belarus, and Peru (where Fujimori first eliminated the ban on re-election and then violated his own constitution’s two term limit).

In weakly institutionalized polities, then, political outcomes are frequently products of de facto power relations, rather than formal rules. In Slovakia, for example, Prime Minister Meciar—who was backed by a strong party and various informal mechanisms of control—exercised near dictatorial control over the legislature despite the fact that constitutionally, the Prime Minister was “weak” (Malova 2001: 369). In Moldova, due to the organizational strength of the Communist Party, the post-2000 transition from semi-presidentialism to parliamentarism resulted in greater authoritarianism rather than democracy (Way 2003). In Russia, Yeltsin’s partisan weakness led to serious legislative challenges despite a super-presidentialist constitution (Troshel 2003), whereas Putin, operating within the same constitutional framework, emasculated parliament (Remington 2001).

Where formal rules do not effectively constrain the behavior of powerful actors, they are unlikely to have a significant independent effect on regime outcomes. Indeed, the causal story is often reversed: rather than shaping regime outcomes, formal institutional arrangements are frequently endogenous to those outcomes (Easter 1997). For example, although presidentialism may contribute to democratic breakdown in some cases (Linz 1990; Stepan and Skach 1993), it has also frequently been imposed by regimes that were already authoritarian. In post-colonial Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Senegal, Zambia and Zimbabwe, the consolidation of autocratic power preceded—and surely facilitated—shifts from parliamentary to presidential constitutions. In Zimbabwe, for example, Westminster parliamentarism was
replaced by presidentialism after violent repression of the opposition ZAPU had created a “de facto one party state” (Nordlund 1996: 153-4; Kriger 2003: 308).

Similarly, many contemporary “super-presidentialist” constitutions were products, rather than causes, of authoritarianism. For example, Peru’s 1993 constitution, which greatly expanded presidential power (Conaghan 2005: 57-8), was drawn up after Fujimori’s 1992 coup had dissolved the previous constitution, closed Congress, and exiled the most important opposition leader. Throughout much of post-communist Eurasia, autocratic governments similarly imposed highly presidentialist systems after they had concentrated power (Easter 1997). In Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, superpresidentialist constitutions were imposed by leaders who had already monopolized political control by the time Mikhail Gorbachev introduced semi-competitive elections in 1990. Russia’s superpresidentialist 1993 constitution was drawn up only after Boris Yeltsin had closed the legislature in a presidential coup; Belarus’ highly presidentialist constitution was imposed after Alyaksandr Lukashenka had disbanded the legislature (Way 2005a); and Romania’s relatively strong presidentialist (1991) constitution was passed after the autocratic National Salvation Front had consolidated power and violently put down opposition protest (Sellin 2004: 122-4). At the same time, stronger parliaments have often been a product, rather than a cause, of democratization. In Croatia, for example, parliament and the judiciary were strengthened after opposition forces had removed the autocratic HDZ from power.

We are not making a general argument that formal institutions don’t matter. Rather, the impact of institutions—the degree to which formal rules actually shape expectations and constrain behavior—varies across cases. Where formal institutions are

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125 In Gabon, Prime Minister Leon M’ba called a constitutional convention to replace parliamentarism with presidentialism only after declaring a state of emergency and jailing leading defenders of parliamentarism (Barnes 1992: 40-1, 52; Yates 1996: 106). Senegal adopted a French-style “semi-presidential” constitution at independence (1960), but in 1963, with leading dissidents in prison, President Leopold Senghor abolished the prime minister’s post and strengthened the presidency. A weakened prime minister position was restored in 1970, abolished again in 1983, and then restored again in 1991 (Villalon 1995: 86; Gellar 1982: 35).

126 RFE/RL Newsline November 10, 2000. Observers have often noted that all eight of the Central European countries admitted to the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, and Lithuania) had either parliamentary systems or presidential systems with weak presidencies (Stepan 2005; Colton and Skach 2005: 123). Yet seven of the eight countries established full democracies immediately following the collapse of Soviet rule. It is at least worth considering the idea that the more democratic constitutions in these countries were themselves the products of successful democratizations rather than the other way around.
regularly enforced and minimally stable, as in most advanced industrialized democracies (as well as some new ones, like Chile, Poland, and South Africa), the causal power of institutional design may be considerable. In much of the developing world, however, formal institutions are weak: rather than constraining political elites, they are routinely circumvented and manipulated by them; rather than structuring the political game and determining winners and losers, they are repeatedly restructured by the winners at the expense of the losers. In such cases, the capacity of formal institutions to independent influence regime outcomes is likely to be limited. Such weakly institutionalized polities are far too numerous to be ignored or treated as exceptions.

Rather than take institutional strength as given, then, we treat it as a dimension along which regimes vary. In a few of our cases, including Mexico, Slovakia, Taiwan, and Ghana, transitions were characterized by the creation of stable and effective formal institutions. In these cases, formal institutions arguably did shape regime outcomes. Yet such outcomes need to be explained, rather than taken for granted. We develop some hypotheses regarding this question in the conclusion.

**Conclusion: A Structuralist Argument**

Our argument is structuralist. Rather than leadership or institutional design, explanation centers on international and domestic factors whose origins lie in long-term historical processes—and which are not easily changed by individual leaders. At the international level, linkage to the West is (with the partial exception of EU-related integration) less the product of elite decisions than of geography, economic development, colonialism, and longstanding geo-strategic alliances.

Our domestic variables are similarly structuralist. The strong coercive and party organizations that underlie incumbent capacity cannot easily be crafted or designed into existence by political leaders. As an extensive literature has shown, strong states and parties are usually rooted in past periods of conflict and mobilization.\(^{127}\) Indeed, among our cases, high coercive capacity was usually a legacy of previous regimes or military

\(^{127}\)On war and state formation, see Tilly (1975, 1992); Skocpol (1979); Cohen, Brown and Organski (1981); Jaggers (1992). On party formation, see Huntington (1970); Shefter (1994); Smith (2006); and Hale (2006).
conflicts. Some governments inherited a powerful coercive apparatus built up colonial (Malaysia) or settler (Zimbabwe) regimes to defeat insurgencies (Weitzer 1990; Stubbs 1997). Others (Belarus, Ukraine, Russia) inherited the vast security infrastructure (including the KGB’s extensive surveillance apparatus) of the Soviet Union, much of which was not fully dismantled after 1991. In still other cases, states developed powerful coercive apparatuses in response to major security threats (Nicaragua, Taiwan).

Cohesion is also rooted in periods of conflict. Coercive apparatuses were most cohesive where they were created or taken over by a successful insurgent force (Nicaragua, Mozambique, Zimbabwe), or where states had recently fought and won a major war (Armenia). 128

Strong parties are also rooted in periods of mobilization and conflict (Smith 2006). Most of the cohesive, well-organized mass parties covered in this study emerged out of periods of intense mobilization and conflict, including revolution (Mexico, Nicaragua), liberation movements (Mozambique, Zimbabwe), and civil war (Taiwan). These conditions are not easily replicated. Party-building is a costly and time consuming process. Sitting executives, who can rely on state resources and often averse to fostering the development of independent power centers, have little incentive to invest in party building (Zolberg 1966: 125; Shefter 1977, 1994). Disincentives for party-building were particularly strong in the post-Cold War period, as politicians could rely on the mass media, rather than organization, to make electoral appeals (Levitsky and Cameron 2003). Consequently, where post-Cold War incumbents did not inherit strong parties, governing parties were almost invariably weak. 129

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128 In other cases (Albania, Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Malawi), incumbents inherited weak state apparatuses with neither cohesion nor a minimal infrastructure. These governments had to start virtually from scratch in building state capacity.

129 Examples include Belarus, Benin, Georgia, Russia, Ukraine, Peru, Haiti, and Zambia.
Table 1.1: Comparing Democratic, Competitive Authoritarian, and Closed Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Competitive Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Closed Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of Core Democratic Institutions (Elections, Civil Liberties)</strong></td>
<td>Systematically respected</td>
<td>Exist and are meaningful, but systematically violated in favor of incumbent</td>
<td>Non-existent or reduced to façade status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Widely viewed as only route to power</td>
<td>Widely viewed as primary route to power</td>
<td>Non-existent or reduced to façade status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of Opposition</strong></td>
<td>Competes on more or less equal footing with incumbent</td>
<td>Major opposition is legal and able to compete openly, but disadvantaged by incumbent abuse, harassment</td>
<td>Major opposition banned, or largely underground or in exile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Uncertainty</strong></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Some uncertainty; incumbents often “sweat”</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1.2: Competitive Authoritarian Regime Trajectories, 1990-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratization</th>
<th>Unstable Authoritarian/Competitive Authoritarianism</th>
<th>Stable Authoritarian/Competitive Authoritarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guyana, Mali, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Taiwan, Ukraine</td>
<td>Albania, Belarus, Benin, Georgia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar, Macedonia, Malawi, Moldova, Senegal, Zambia</td>
<td>Armenia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malaysia, Mozambique, Russia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.1: How Variation in Linkage and Leverage Shapes External Pressure for Democratization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Linkage</th>
<th>Low Linkage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Leverage</strong></td>
<td>Consistent and intense democratizing pressure</td>
<td>Intermittent and limited (“electoralist”) pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Leverage</strong></td>
<td>Consistent but diffuse and indirect democratizing pressure</td>
<td>Weak external pressure; permissive international environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>Party</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Extensive mass membership; organizational penetration into virtually all population centers</td>
<td>Extensive, specialized and well funded and trained security and surveillance apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Relatively low mass membership; organization in major population centers</td>
<td>Minimal security presence throughout country; no evidence of serious &quot;brown areas&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Low membership; little or areas&quot;; security no organization outside of apparatus</td>
<td>Extensive &quot;brown areas&quot; under-funded (wage arrears, shortages)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong></td>
<td>Single party; organized patronage; &quot;something else&quot; (history of struggle, salient ideology, ethnicity)</td>
<td>Past history of successful conflict (war, revolution, counter-insurgency); ethnic, kin or other ties between incumbent and coercive apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td>Organized patronage; single party; no “something else”</td>
<td>No open disobedience but no past success in conflict or non-material ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong></td>
<td>Little or no systematic patronage; no single party; no “something else”</td>
<td>Serious past non-compliance by security/local prefects (i.e. open rebellion; attempted coups, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Linkage, Incumbent Capacity and Regime Outcomes

- Democracy
  - High Western Linkage
    - Low Incumbent Capacity
      - Low Unstable Authoritarianism
      - High Stable Authoritarianism
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