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Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making *Inside* the European Parliament

GEORGE TSEBELIS

This article revisits two mistaken impressions about the process of European integration. The first is that the European Parliament (at least before Maastricht) is a weak Parliament. The second is that in a Europe of mutual recognition of standards (Cassis de Dijon), the natural level of harmonisation standards is the lowest common denominator (or close to it) because countries with low standards have no incentive to vote for improvements.

The article makes the argument that the basis for both of these mistaken impressions is lack of understanding of the European Parliament's role as 'conditional agenda-setter', which is specified by the co-operation procedure of the European Union. According to this procedure, the Parliament can make a proposal which, if accepted by the Commission, is easier for the Council to accept than to modify. Elsewhere, I have argued that this procedure places significant decision-making powers in the hands of the Parliament. Here I make two extensions. First, I explain how this conditional agenda-setting role of the Parliament (as well as the Commission) is responsible for the adoption by the EU of the most advanced social regulation policies of the world. Second, while in the past I had assumed the EP to be a unitary actor, here I relax this restrictive assumption and examine the possibilities generated at both the theoretical and the empirical levels by an EP composed of 518 members (or because of German unification 567, or after EU expansion 639). I argue that because of the internal organisation of the EP (more specifically the role of bill 'rapporteurs' and the co-operative decision-making process taking place inside Parliamentary committees), the power of the EP as a 'conditional agenda-setter' holds for the actual EP, not merely for an idealised unitary actor.

INTRODUCTION

There are two common misperceptions regarding the European Union. The first is that it has a weak Parliament. The second is that it converges to the 'lowest common denominator' of countries' members.

The weakness of the parliament is an impression propagated not only in

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scholarly articles, but also in the informed press. For example, *The Economist* under the title ‘Europe’s Feeble Parliament’ argues that it is ‘an ineffectual body … powerless to initiate legislation or vote governments out of office’. ‘More recently’, *The Economist* argues, ‘the parliament won the right to amend laws on the single market, which gave it a bit more clout’. The article concludes that after Maastricht the powers of the parliament may increase because in the future ‘it will both approve future commissions and their presidents, and have veto on legislation’. The ‘key’ to this development is ‘the right of veto that comes with co-decision’.

With respect to convergence to the lowest common denominator, the argument is best expressed by Rehbinder and Stewart, who (with reference to environmental protection) argue: ‘In the case of process regulation it is difficult to see why there would be any harmonization at all above the lowest common denominator level, since it would never be in the interest of polluter states to agree to more stringent controls’.

In contrast to this literature, I have argued that according to the co-operation procedure, the European Parliament has been given a conditional agenda-setting power that has passed unnoticed in the relevant literature (both scholarly and journalistic). I have also argued that conditional agenda-setting power may lead decisions of the European Union to be not only far away from the lowest common denominator, but on exactly the other side, even higher than the highest member state. The essence of my argument, which can be given in a very simple graphic, is the following. Consider that legislation, in order to be enacted, requires the agreement of two bodies: the Parliament and the Council. Consider also that each of these bodies (here idealised as single players) has an ideal point in space, and that between two bills each body prefers the one that is closer to its own ideal point. Consider also that the status quo is located somewhere in space, as Figure 1 indicates.

In Figure 1, the shaded area indicates the possible compromises between the Parliament and the Council. However, if the Parliament can propose a solution it will propose *Pp* and the Council will accept, while if the Council can propose a solution it will propose *Pc* and the Parliament will accept. This figure indicates that the power to propose is much more important than the power to veto. In fact, it can help us understand why the American Congress, which cannot ‘vote governments out of office’ (see quote from *The Economist*, above), is probably the most powerful legislature on earth, since it has the right to propose bills to the President who can only veto, not modify them. It can also help us understand why Parliaments are weak on the other side of the Atlantic, since they have essentially delegated proposal power to governments.

How does the co-operation procedure and the role it gives to the European Parliament fit into this broad picture where Presidential and
Parliamentary systems are reduced to a simple principle of who proposes and who accepts legislation? It does not fit very well, since the Parliament does not quite have the power to propose, and the Council can do more than veto (it can modify legislation unanimously). However, the co-operation procedure resembles more a Presidential than a Parliamentary system, and consequently, the use of inappropriate parliamentary models may be seriously misleading when trying to understand European institutions.

This article is organised into four sections. The first section presents a series of examples from the European Union’s social legislation which indicates that in the areas of health and safety at work, Europe has legislation more advanced than any of the countries members, and probably than any country of the world. It also explains how such legislation went through the institutions of the European Union. The second section will summarise the relevant parts of an argument presented elsewhere. I show that the surprising decisions observed in the field of health and safety are neither surprising nor extraordinary, but inscribed in the logic of European institutions. In fact, I show that the EP has a significant ‘conditional agenda-setting power’ that enables it to influence legislation. However, the argument is based on the simplifying assumption that the EP is a unified actor. The third section presents a model that relaxes the restrictive unified actor assumption and comes to essentially the same conclusions, even when
the EP is composed of hundreds of MEPs. However, this section assumes that decision-making inside the EP is co-operative (that is, agreements between different parties are enforceable). The last section argues that the existing internal organisation of the EP (in particular the institution of rapporteurs and the decision-making process inside parliamentary committees) makes the assumption of co-operative decision-making a reasonable approximation of reality.

I. HOW WAS HEALTH AND SAFETY AT WORK ADOPTED?

In this section I will do three things: First, I will summarise the logic of some of the arguments presented in the professional literature; according to these arguments deregulation should prevail in the European Union. Second, I will describe some of the provisions of the European legislation pertaining to health and safety at work, so that the reader understands how sharply European legislation differs from expectations. Third, I will describe how this legislation was adopted. In the next section, I will use the model developed previously* to explain that there is nothing extraordinary about this legislation and that results that are beyond the prevailing situation in any member country are within the logic of European institutions.

The ‘Lowest Common Denominator’ Expectations

The argument about harmonisation at the lowest common denominator (other names for it are social and ecological dumping) is simple and straightforward. In a Europe of free circulation of products (defined by the famous Cassis de Dijon decision of the European Court of Justice), if we divide countries into two groups, one with higher product standards (and more expensive products) and one with lower standards (and cheaper products), the pressure for harmonisation of standards will lead to the adoption of the lowest ones, because there is no incentive for the lower standard countries to adopt higher standards. Indeed, in the absence of agreement their cheap (lower standard) products will compete successfully with the more expensive (higher standard) products throughout the community. Consequently, one of three countries with lower standards would be sufficient to block harmonisation decisions in the Council of Ministers. Consequently, high harmonisation standards have no chance of being adopted. Rehbinder and Stewart⁸ made clearly the argument with respect to environmental policy:

In a federal system requiring unanimous consent, there will, in the case of product regulation, be support from both polluter and environmental states for harmonization through mutual adoption of
uniform standards. To the extent that a Cassis de Dijon principle restricts the ability of environmental states for excluding polluter states' products, the support of environmental states for harmonization will be increased and the support of polluter states will be decreased. Since, however, there is a rule of unanimous agreement, the net impact of such a rule will be to significantly reduce the stringency of harmonized measures. In the case of process regulation it is difficult to see why there would be any harmonization at all above the lowest common denominator level, since it would never be in the interest of polluter states to agree to more stringent controls.

These two authors were writing before the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA), at a time when unanimity was the de facto decision-making rule in the Council of Ministers. If we replace 'unanimity' with 'qualified majority', the logic of their argument extends to the contemporary European Union. A blocking coalition of member states can prevent the Union from adopting high product standards.

However, instead of extending the author's logic to contexts for which it was possibility not intended, let us turn to more contemporary texts with similar conclusions. Streeck and Schmitter expect that the requirements of unanimity or qualified majority voting adopted by the European Union will strengthen the hand of groups which are interested in preventing a high standard harmonisation of European social policy. Indeed, one to three governments can veto such legislation in the Council with the result that 'integration and deregulation becoming one and the same'. Streeck and Schmitter who revealingly entitle their article: 'From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism' argue that 'a class like business, whose interest was and is essentially not in shaping but rather in preventing a centralized European social policy, could always hope to find allies in national governments concerned about their sovereignty'.

In a similar argument, Scharpf expects harmonisation decisions at the lowest common denominator even after the adoption of SEA.

Under the qualified majority rule, Brussels' harmonization decisions are still blocked by grave interest conflicts (e.g. between the advanced and the underdeveloped industrial countries) and by at least equally grave direction conflicts (e.g. between the British and the German environmental policies). Hence, the high level of health protection, of safety at work, or environment protection and of consumer protection required by the Single European Act (Art. 100a(3)), can not be enforced jointly, but comes either to harmonization decisions at the lowest common level or to mutual recognition of the respective national regulations.
Levels of harmonisation (and, consequently, expectations about them) are by no means secondary matters within the European Union. As Majone has argued, the main task of the Union is regulation. Indeed, because the Union has a very small budget (compared to federal countries), and in addition has delegated the most important decisions about distribution of this budget to the meetings of the government heads of the member countries, European institutions are deprived of one of the most important tasks of governments. Another task that is usually delegated to national governments and that European institutions do not perform, is implementation of policies. One of the tasks that remains for European institutions to perform is regulation. In fact, one can think of the European Union as a giant regulation related machine. I say 'regulation related' and not regulating, because for every regulation at the European level, twelve national regulations have to be cancelled, or altered so that the decision from Brussels becomes national law in the countries members.

Were these expectations which were formulated by the literature born out by the facts?

**Social Policy Outcomes**

In a well-substantiated monograph about social policies in the European Union, Volker Eichener examines the legislation generated by a series of directives issued by the Council of Ministers, notably the 'Health and Safety at Work' directive (89/391/EEC), the 'Machinery' directive (89/392/EEC), and the 'Display Screen Equipment' directive (90/270/EEC). His main result can be summarised as follows: 'The European Community definitely adopted the highest health and safety at work level which is to be found among the 12 Member States.' He goes on to explain that sometimes it is difficult to compare different regulations because the underlying philosophies are different (for example, electrical safety is reached by safe electrical utensils in Germany, but by safety switches in France) and that the assessment he makes involves all health and safety regulations in European countries;

To be sure, looking at single provisions, there are some Member States with somewhat tighter regulations, such as Denmark's regulations regarding carcinogenous substances, the Netherlands' regarding working time at visual display terminals or Germany's regarding radiation. But if levels of health and safety at work can be compared at all, the overall assessment is that the Community established a coherent health and safety at work concept with a level of protection which is certainly at the very top of the ranking and which even appears to exceed the protective levels of all 12 Member States.
Similarly, Majone makes the following assessment: ‘It is difficult to find equally advanced principles (like the ‘working environment’ – see infra) in the legislation of major industrialized countries, inside and outside the EC. In order to explain such policy outputs we need new, more analytic theories of the policy process in the Community’.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to the extension of the legislation’s scope of application,\textsuperscript{18} according to Eichener there are at least five innovative principles adopted by the European legislation which account for the assessment that the European legislation exceeds the protection provided by all member states.

(1) Employer’s obligation to provide and improve occupational health. According to article 5(1) of the directive (89/391/EEC) ‘The employer shall have a duty to ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect related to the work’. The employer has the obligation to remain informed about the latest state of the art and act accordingly. The employer can be made responsible even if national labour inspection does not find fault with the working conditions. In fact, the directive provides ‘minimum requirements’ (according to article 118a of the SEA) which, as will become evident, establish higher standards than existing levels in all countries.

(2) Comprehensive concept of health, including psychological aspects. The regulations include in the concept of health not only physical health but also psychological aspects like monotonous work and fatigue. Directive 89/392/EEC goes so far as to prescribe that ‘the interactive software of a machine must be user-friendly’ (Annex I, #1.2.8). Directive 90/270/EEC prescribes that ‘Principles of software ergonomics must be applied, in particular to human data-processing’ (Annex #3).

(3) Introduction of the concept of ‘working environment’. The directives include aspects like work organisation, training, medical examinations, and participation which used to be decided through autonomous arrangements between the concerned parties, not by legislation.

(4) Risk assessment approach. Risks have to be assessed throughout the foreseeable lifetime of the machinery, including the phases of assembly and dismantling, even where risks of accident arise from foreseeable abnormal situations. Risk assessment has to take into account the additional and/or combined effects of risks.

(5) Definition of absolute safety requirements regardless of the state of the art. Usually regulation lags behind technology, and remains below the technologically achievable level of safety. In contrast, the machinery directive provides absolute requirements: ‘The essential health and safety requirements laid down in this directive are mandatory.
However, taking into account the state of the art, it may not be possible to meet the objectives set by them. In this case, the machinery must, as far as possible, be designed and constructed with the purpose of approaching those objectives' (89/392/EEC, Preliminary Observations #2).

This analysis indicates that the expectations of the existing literature have not materialised. Far from establishing social dumping, European legislation can be criticised for being too advanced, utopian one might say. A sincere question (or obvious objection) concerning this analysis would be to request whether this legislation is implemented in any European country. The answer to this question can be provided in two steps. The first is that European legislation supersedes national legislations, and national parliaments have the obligation to pass legislation congruent with the directives of the Union. According to Vogel, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and the Netherlands have already voted legislation harmonising their standards with the ones prescribed by the directives. Information for the other countries is not readily available. The second step is that of actual implementation: even if it is the national law, is it applied in the different European countries? This is a much more complicated question, requiring empirical investigation in all countries members, and definitely beyond the scope of this article.

However, the absence of satisfactory answers to these questions should not distract us from the puzzle we discovered: how is it possible for such a discrepancy between expectations about harmonisation and reality to exist? Or, how (on earth) were such directives adopted?

**Legislative Procedures of Social Policy**

The legislative procedure under which all these directives were adopted was the co-operation procedure. According to this procedure, the Commission introduces draft legislation to both the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. This legislation shuttles between the EP and the Council and is modified twice by each one of these bodies. At the end of the process, the amendments adopted by the EP (by absolute majority of its members) are accepted or rejected by the Commission. The Commission proposal (including the Parliamentary amendments accepted by the Commission) can be accepted by the Council of Ministers by qualified majority (54/76), or modified by unanimity. Here is an extensive legislative history of the health and safety at work directive (89/391/EEC).

(a) Health and Safety at Work Directive (89/391/EEC): The initial Commission proposal was introduced to the European Parliament. The
Parliament adopted 100 amendments to the text. Of these amendments the Commission accepted 57, and the Council 50 (in fact, the Council accepted four amendments that the Commission refused to adopt). Among the most important amendments were the following:

(1) the principle that the directive cannot justify the reduction of the level of protection achieved in each member country;
(2) the principle that the objective of the directive is not only the preservation but also the improvement of the health and safety of workers;
(3) the extension of the scope of the directive to the families of workers;
(4) the principle of participation of workers in the design of measures required for their health and safety;
(5) the principle that questions of health and safety are not subordinate to (purely) financial considerations.

In addition, the Council accepted a series of specific modifications:

(6) monitoring of health in regular intervals;
(7) workers' consultation and workers' right to make proposals for all subjects related to health and safety at work;
(8) the right of workers to withdraw from any activity, without administrative consequence, if faced with imminent danger;
(9) reinforcement of the professional education clause (particularly in case of the introduction of a new technology);
(10) recognition of the principle that the present directive as well as ones that amend it will be introduced on the basis of article 118A (which provides for minimum standards).

In the second reading the EP introduced 29 amendments. Of these amendments, 15 were accepted by the Commission, and 17 by the Council. The major accepted amendments were the following:

(1) the principle that monotonous work has to be alleviated;
(2) the principle that the employer should provide all necessary information to his workers or their representatives;
(3) the principle that workers or their representatives have to be consulted before measures are taken, and in appropriate time;
(4) the right of workers to submit proposals for appropriate health and safety related measures.

As part of the same package of measures related to health and safety
three more directives were accepted (89/654, 655, 656/EEC). The parliamentary amendments relevant to these directives were also accepted.

In the second part of this section, I mention two more directives which were part of the innovative conception of health and safety regulation. Here is their legislative history:

(b) Machine Directive (89/392/EEC): The Parliament introduced 18 amendments to the Commission proposal. The Commission adopted 13 of them, and the Council 7. In the second reading the Parliament did not introduce any amendments. The major amendments were the following:

1. the goal of preservation and improvement of the level of protection was added to the preamble;
2. it was added that opportunities for participation of the social partners in the harmonisation of standards should be created;
3. a standing committee for execution of the directives should be created;
4. essential requirements were tightened up (including the absolute requirements, the risk assessment [machines are to be designed to prevent abnormal use if such a use engenders a risk], and the user friendly software).

(c) Display Screen Equipment Directive (90/270/EEC): In the first reading the Parliament introduced 53 amendments, of which 17 were adopted by the Commission and 17 by the Council. In the second reading the Parliament introduced 33 amendments out of which 17 were accepted by the Commission and seven by the Council. The major modifications to the bill were the following:

1. the obligation of the employers to keep themselves informed about the latest advances in technology and scientific findings concerning workstation safety was added in the preamble;
2. work organisation was tightened up (regular breaks from work on a display screen);
3. workers' participation was expanded to all aspects of the directive;
4. regular ophthalmological examination and protective measures free of charge for workers;
5. several provisions added (like footrest at the request of worker instead of 'if necessary');
6. Ergonomic software design was formulated more precisely.

In conclusion, despite expectations of social (and environmental) dumping articulated in the literature, EU legislation provides unprecedented
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protection of health and safety at work. The way these documents were adopted was a series of proposals by the Commission and the Parliament, which the Council of Ministers accepted, despite the fact that as a whole they provided higher standards of protection than any legislation in the Union. How was this possible? In the next section, it will become clear that there is nothing extraordinary about this outcome: the cooperation procedure, instead of converging to the lowest common denominator, can produce outcomes exactly in the opposite direction.

II. THE 'CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING POWERS' OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The Co-operation Procedure is one of the possible venues through which European legislation is approved by the three major institutional actors, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. According to this procedure, it is easier for the Council to accept a proposal supported by the Parliament and the Commission than to modify it. Indeed, qualified majority is required for acceptance, but unanimity for modification. Consequently, if the EP can make a proposal that makes the Commission and a qualified majority of the Council better off than legislation that could be voted unanimously by the Council, this proposal will be adopted. Figure 2 presents the strategic calculations of the Parliament.

Consider that the members of the Council are concerned about two different issues simultaneously.23 Figure 2 offers a graphic representation of the position of the members of the Council. I assume that the Council is composed of seven members, that a qualified majority of five is required for acceptance of the EP’s proposal and that the members of the Council have circular indifference curves (Euclidean preferences); that is, each is indifferent between proposals of equal distance from their ideal point. The reason I assume seven members instead of twelve is to simplify matters, while keeping a reasonable approximation of the qualified majority requirement. The co-operation procedure requires 54/76 (=.710) qualified majority, while the qualified majority I will use in the Figure is 5/7 (=.714).

Consider that the status quo (SQ) is outside the heptagon 1–7 that represents the Council, as indicated in Figure 2. Consider also that the positions of the Commission and the EP are on the other side of the heptagon: the points C and P respectively. The points in the Figure are selected so that the horizontal axis represents health and safety (according to the account of the previous section, the EP and the Commission are in favour of high standards of protection at work).

If the EP is able to discover what the Council can do on its own (that is, unanimously), and present a proposal that makes the Commission and a
qualified majority of the Council better off than either the status quo or what the Council can do on its own, this proposal will be accepted by both the Commission and the Council and will be the outcome of the co-operation procedure. Let us follow the EP in its calculations.

The Council can unanimously adopt any proposal inside the area indicated by U(SQ) (shorthand for unanimity set of the status quo). This area is generated by the intersection of all circles that pass through the status quo and whose centres are the ideal points of the members of the Council. This area is included between the circles around the two states closest to the status quo (1 and 2 in the figure).

However, the point inside U(SQ) that would be selected by the Council is not clear. This depends on how convincing different governments are in proposing their alternatives for a vote. In Figure 2, no ideal point of the member countries is included inside U(SQ), so the different countries would be forced to come to a compromise. Since the unanimity position is not unique, I will impose on Parliamentary proposals a severe restriction. I will require that in order to be accepted, they must be preferred by the Commission and by a qualified majority of the Council to any proposal that can be voted unanimously by the Council. This way we will have an estimate (very conservative) of the conditional agenda-setting power of the EP.
In Figure 2, five out of the seven members of the Council can be made better off by proposals inside the area $Q(U(SQ))$ (shorthand for qualified majority set of unanimity set of the status quo). Indeed, members 3–7 prefer any point inside this area over any point inside $U(SQ)$. $Q(U(SQ))$ is generated by the intersection of five circles going through the edge of $U(SQ)$, with centres the points 3–7. Therefore, the EP can select the point it prefers most inside the area $Q(U(SQ))$, that is, the point closest to its own ideal point (provided that the Commission prefers it over $U(SQ)$, which is the case in the figure). This is point X in Figure 2.

Figure 2 could be a graphic representation of the verbal account presented in section I, except for one significant detail: the final outcome X provides less protection than the most advanced countries members (in our case #5). Is it possible that the co-operation procedure produces outcomes outside the heptagon 1234567? Figure 3 presents such a case.

Figure 3 replicates the argument of Figure 2 with the difference that the most advanced countries are clustered together along the horizontal axis. The outcome X is now outside the heptagon 1234567, that is, outside the Pareto set. Weber and Wiesmeth have analysed the co-operation procedure and have come to the conclusion that the outcomes are always included in the Pareto set. My conclusions at this point are different. Besides providing the empirical evidence of section I, I now present an argument for why outcomes outside the Pareto set of the Council are possible. While it is
true that all members of the Council would prefer some point in the Pareto set (say X') over X, and therefore, they could unanimously modify the EP's proposal to X', it is possible that one of them (like country 1) is so strongly against solutions so far away from its own ideal point, that it refuses to vote for a proposal so distant. In this case, the countries 34567 do not have the option X', and consequently have to settle for X.

However, such a winning proposal (whether inside or outside the Pareto set) does not always exist. It may be that the Commission does not adopt the Parliamentary amendment, or that the members of the Council are able to adopt an alternative by unanimity. In addition, there is another reason that we will analyse in more detail in this article: Parliamentary amendments in the second reading require absolute majority on the floor to be adopted. In practice, the 260 required votes constitute a two-thirds majority of members present. Moreover, given that the 518 MEPs of the 12 countries are organised into ten (cross national) parliamentary groups, and that voting alignments occur more frequently by political group and less frequently by country, and given too that voting discipline is weak, 260 votes is a stringent requirement. The most likely combination to achieve an absolute majority is a coalition of Socialists and Christian Democrats (European People's Party – EPP), who together controlled 301 seats in EP during the 1989–94 period.

If a winning proposal does not exist, or if the EP cannot adopt one by an absolute majority of its members, or if it makes the wrong choice, then the agenda is transferred into the hands of the Council, which can modify the EP's proposal by unanimity. For this reason, I characterise the EP's agenda power under the co-operation procedure as conditional.

In conclusion, a supranational actor (EP) is provided with conditional control of the agenda. Anytime the EP exercises this power, the outcome is more integrationist than that which the members of the Council would have selected on their own (by unanimity). The outcome is also more integrationist than the positions of the Council's pivotal members, and can even be more integrationist than any single member of the Council (outside the Pareto set). Moreover, if efficiency gains from the common policy are high (if the status quo is far away), the Council can resolve redistributive issues on its own (that is, in this case, the EP has no agenda-setting power). However, if efficiency gains are low (that is, the status quo is close to or in the Pareto set), the EP is empowered to solve the problem of equilibrium selection. Accordingly, equilibrium selection is one feature of the conditional agenda-setting mechanism.

In addition, conditional agenda-setting by the EP presents some more desirable features: the speed of integration is under the final control of governments. Indeed, most of the time the outcome will be inside the Pareto set of the Council, but in any case, the Council is able to overrule an EP that
pushes integration too fast. Finally, another important advantage of European institutions is that they diffuse responsibility for unpopular measures for national governments to some combination of supranational institutions who were able to impose their will despite existing objections.

In all the arguments of the formal analysis the EP was considered a unified actor who could select the closest position to its own ideal point and present it to the other two actors. Occasionally I reminded the reader that forming absolute majorities inside the European Parliament is not an easy task. This simplification did not go unnoticed. Bowler and Farrell (forthcoming) argue that 'a large part of his [Tsebelis'] analysis is based on the assumption that the EP can act as a unitary actor ... Even if the EP were granted quite sweeping powers, legislation may still be shackled by an inability to form and maintain cohesive voting blocks.' In fact, one could go one step further and argue that the difficulty of forming majorities may completely (an not just incidentally) undermine the argument I presented. For example, I have argued that multidimensionality of the issue space is likely to increase agenda-setting powers of the parliament. What if the existence of multiple dimensions makes agreement inside the Parliament itself more difficult? Then the conclusions presented in this part would have been undermined, if not reversed. For this reason, in the next section I will take the multiplicity of actors inside the EP seriously, and show that the results presented in this section hold even with a 518 (or because of German unification 567, or, after EU expansion 639) member European Parliament.

III. CONDITIONAL AGENDA-SETTING WITH A MULTIMEMBER EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Consider now a multimember Parliament that must make a proposal inside Q(U(SQ)). Previous research of voting in committees has demonstrated that if a collective actor (committee) makes decisions under a symmetric agenda, and its members are sophisticated (Ordeshook and Schwartz) the outcome will be located centrally in space (technically, inside the uncovered set of the collective actor). Further research has indicated that if decision-making is co-operative, if the number of outcomes is finite, and if there are no ties the outcome will be in some subset of the uncovered set: the Banks set or TEQ.

However, the problem facing the Parliament is not to select a point from the n-dimensional Euclidean space, but rather a point from Q(U(SQ)). The existence of Q(U(SQ)) significantly modifies the decision problem of the EP. First, the uncovered set of the EP may be of no relevance at all: for example, a European Parliament whose members were in the vicinity of point P in Figure 2 would produce an uncovered set which does not intersect
with $Q(U(SQ))$. In this case, it makes no sense for a sophisticated EP to propose a point in its own uncovered set, since it will be defeated. But even if the (unconstrained) uncovered set of EP intersects with $Q(U(SQ))$, selecting the intersection would produce a biased result because the uncovered set has been calculated considering all the points in space, while a sophisticated EP will consider only points within $Q(U(SQ))$.

Consequently, the problem for a sophisticated EP is to consider only the points of $Q(U(SQ))$, and find the most appropriate ones (according to some solution concept). I will call the operation, the location of the 'induced (on $Q(U(SQ))$)' solution concept. In the remainder of this section I select the uncovered set solution concept for two reasons: first, because it is the wider concept (all others produce subsets of the uncovered set); second, because there is an independent algorithm for the calculation of the uncovered set. Accordingly, the real question for a multimember Parliament is to locate its induced uncovered set on $Q(U(SQ))$ and to make a proposal in this area. Let us now define the terminology in a precise way and calculate where the induced uncovered set of the Parliament lies in an $n$-dimensional Euclidean space.

**DEFINITION 1** (median hyperplane of a committee): an ($n$-1) dimensional hyperplane will be called median if a majority of members of the committee have ideal points on it or on one side of it, and a majority of members of the committee have ideal points on it or on the other side of it.

**DEFINITION 2** (yolk): the yolk of a committee is the smallest sphere intersecting with all median hyperplanes.

**DEFINITION 3** (covering relation): for a pair of points, $x_1 y \in \mathbb{R}^n yCX$ (read $y$ covers $x$) iff $1. y \in W(x)$ (y belongs to the winset of x) and 2. $W(y) \subset W(x)$ (the winset of y is a subset of the winset of x).

**DEFINITION 4** (uncovered set): $UC = \{x \in \mathbb{R}^n \forall y \in \mathbb{R}^n, not yCX\}$ (read the set of all points that are not covered by any point in space).

**DEFINITION 5** (induced on $Q(U(SQ))$ uncovered set): $IUC = \{x \in Q(U(SQ)) \forall y \in Q(U(SQ)), not yCX\}$ (read: the induced (on $Q(U(SQ))$) uncovered set is the set of points in $Q(U(SQ))$ not covered by any point in $Q(U(SQ))$).

Miller *et al.* have demonstrated that the location of the uncovered set can be found by elimination of points $z$ of space that can be defeated by another point $x$ directly ($xPz$, read $x$ is preferred to $z$) or indirectly ($xPy$, and $yPz$).
Similarly, the location of the induced (on \( Q(U(SQ)) \)) uncovered set can be found by elimination of points \( z \) of \( Q(U(SQ)) \) that can be defeated by another point \( x \) directly (\( xPz \), read \( x \) is preferred to \( z \)) or indirectly (\( xPy \), and \( yPz \)). In the remainder of this section I will locate the induced (on \( Q(U(SQ)) \)) uncovered set of the EP. I will demonstrate that this set is located inside a sphere homocentric to the yolk of the EP, and calculate its radius.

Consider a point \( X \) at distance \( d \) from the centre \( C \) of the yolk of the EP. It is known that \( X \) defeats any point \( Y \) whose distance from \( C \) is bigger than \( d+2r \) (where \( r \) is the radius of the yolk) (Ferejohn et al. (1984)). Consequently, \( X \) covers any point \( Z \) with distance bigger than \( d+4r \) from \( C \) (since \( X \) defeats \( Y \) and \( Y \) defeats \( Z \)). However, these results are calculated with the assumption that any point in space can be compared to any other. Moreover, the points that can defeat \( X \), and are at a distance close to \( d+2r \) from the centre of the yolk are located on the other side of \( C \) from \( X \). Consequently, if the set of points is restricted in one area of space (as in the case in point), we may be able to pinpoint the induced uncovered set more accurately.

For a moment, ignore the council and concentrate on the status quo and the winset of the status quo with respect to the Parliament (all the points that the Parliament prefers by a majority to the status quo). We know that this winset is included inside a cardioid which is given in polar coordinates by the equation \( 2(r+dcos\theta) \). Call \( x \) the distance of the centre of the yolk from the point \( Y \) of the cardioid at angle \( \theta \) from \( X \).
The distance $x$ is given by the formula:

$$x^2 = d^2 + 4r^2 + 4dr\cos\theta$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Proof: $x$ is the third side of a triangle with sides $d$, $2(r+dc\cos\theta)$ and angle $\theta$ in-between. Applying the Pythagorean theorem to the triangle $CYY'$ we get:

$$CY^2 = CY'^2 + YY'^2$$ which after substitutions and simplifications reduces to (1).

Note from (1) that $x$ is a decreasing function of $\theta$ since $\cos\theta$ is a decreasing function of $\theta$. Consequently, if instead of examining the sphere that includes the whole winset of $X$ we are concerned with a sphere including some part of it, it is possible that $\theta$ has a lower bound $\theta^*$ which would produce a smaller sphere surrounding the part of $W_c(X)$ in which we are interested. The radius of this sphere would be

$$x^* = d^2 + 4r^2 + 4dr\cos\theta^*$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

This is exactly the problem facing a sophisticated EP. Consider $Q(U(SQ))$, and the yolk of EP with centre $C$. Call $C'$ the point of $Q(U(SQ))$ closest to the centre of the yolk. Call $r$ the radius of the yolk and $d$ the distance of the centre of the yolk from $Q(U(SQ))$. Call $R$ the radius of $Q(U(SQ))$ at $C'$ ($R$ is the radius of the indifference surface of some member of the Council of Ministers, call her $MC$).

Consider now the outer cardioid associated with point $C'$ (call it first generation cardioid), and its intersection with $Q(U(SQ))$. Call $\theta^*$ the angle of the cardioid. The winset of $C'$ for the EP is included in the intersection of two spheres: one with centre $MC$ and radius $R$ (which is the relevant part of $Q(U(SQ))$) and one with centre $C$ and radius $x^*$ (given from (2)).

Call $C''$ the point where the two spheres intersect in Figure 4. Repeating the same enterprise with the outer cardioid of point $C''$ produces another angle $\theta^{**}$, and associated radius $x^{**}$. The induced uncovered set is included in the intersection of the spheres $(MC,R)$ and $(C, x^{**})$.

The Appendix produces two different conservative estimates of $x^{**}$ in the case that $Q(U(SQ))$ is on one side of the yolk of EP. They are:

$$x^{**} = d^2 + 8r^2 + 8\sqrt{R^2 + Rd - r^2}/(R + d)$$ \hspace{1cm} (3'A)

and

$$x^{**} < \sqrt{d^2 + 16r^2}$$ \hspace{1cm} (3''A)

The geometric construction of (3'A) is simpler than the algebraic formula. Figure 4 shows that in order to construct $x^{**}$ one draws a perpendicular to $CC'$ on $C'$ and takes a segment $2r$ on it. $x^*$ is the hypotenuse of the right angle triangle, and $C''$ is the intersection of the circle $(MC,R)$ with $(C, x^*)$. Drawing the chord and expanding it by $2r$ produces the point $A$. $x^{**}$ is the distance $CA$. (3''A) can be constructed just by taking a segment $4r$ on the perpendicular to $CC'$. It is easy to verify that even this very conservative estimate is an important improvement over the expectation of $d+4r$ (see above).
If $Q(U(SQ))$ intersects with the yolk of the committee, or if it surrounds it, $d+4r$ is a good approximation of the locus of the induced uncovered set. If the centre of the yolk is included in $Q(U(SQ))$ the induced (on $Q(U(SQ))$) uncovered set coincides with the uncovered set. Finally, if the majority of members of the EP lies in the shaded area of Figure 5, then there is only one possible parliamentary proposal (identical to the one calculated in the previous section).

The conclusion of this analysis is the following: the induced ideal point of the single member EP of the previous section, is now replaced by an area around it. This area always includes the point calculated by the (simplifying) single member parliament assumption. In addition, the size of the area where the parliamentary proposal will be located is reduced as the distance of the centre of the yolk of EP from $Q(U(SQ))$ increases. At the

**FIGURE 5**
limit (presented in Figure 5) the proposal of a single and a multimember parliament become identical.

The analysis in this section indicates that the simplifying assumption of a single member parliament can be relaxed without loss of the conclusions of the analysis. It must be replaced, however, either by restrictive agenda procedures or, more realistically, by a co-operative decision-making process which essentially ignores agendas and enables majorities to make contracts and support different alternatives. In a co-operative voting setting since contracts are enforceable, a majority would never vote to replace an alternative x unless it preferred the replacement to x. Schwartz has defined a set inside which the recontracting processing is likely to occur. This set is a subset of the uncovered set, and consequently, co-operative majority voting would lead to an outcome inside the shaded area in Figure 4. Is co-operative majority voting a reasonable approximation of the decision-making inside the European Parliament? The last section of this article will answer this question in the affirmative.

IV. COMMITTEE REPORTS AND CO-OPERATIVE DECISION-MAKING

The work of the European Parliament is organised and facilitated by both institutional and partisan structures. The first is the formal committee system; the second is the underlying division of power and responsibilities agreed upon by parliamentary groups. I will examine the pertinent characteristics of each one of them individually.

(1) The Committee System

The European Parliament currently has 19 committees. The most prestigious are those with the most members: Foreign Affairs and Security (56 members); Agriculture, Fisheries and Rural Development (45 members); Budgets (30 members); Economic and Monetary Affairs, and Industrial Policy (49 members); Regional Policy, Regional Planning and Relations with Regional and Legal Authorities (35 members); and Environment, Public Health and Consumer Protection (50 members).

More than two-thirds of MEPs (68 per cent) serve on one committee only, while most of the rest serve on two committees. The general rule is that each MEP serves on one committee as a full member and on another as a substitute (I discuss the role of substitutes below). The composition of committees is proportional to both nationality and ideology. In this sense, committees are representative of the parent chamber in every respect. However, there is a tendency of committees to be composed of individuals sympathetic to the purpose of the committee (for example, more MEPs from the South on the agriculture committee).
Each committee has one chair and three vice-chairs, who together constitute its Bureau. They are elected at the committee's constituent meeting (normally during the July session of a new Parliament). Their term is for two-and-a-half years. In the middle of the legislative term, the whole Parliamentary leadership is replaced or rotated. Other powerful members within each committee are its co-ordinators (leaders and spokespersons of each political group). Once a bill has been delegated to one particular political group (see below) the co-ordinator of that group selects the 'rapporteur'.

The institution of 'rapporteurs' is unknown to anglo-Saxon parliaments, but common in continental Europe. Rapporteurs are responsible for preparing initial discussion within the committee, presenting a draft text and amending it, if necessary, according to the positions developed in the committee. Once the report is adopted by the committee, the rapporteur presents it on the floor of the EP. He also speaks on behalf of the committee on any plenary amendments. In the co-operation procedure, the rapporteur follows the developments concerning the bill and prepares a recommendation before the second reading. The rapporteur may also ask the Commission's point of view before the final vote of a proposal by the EP.\(^4^4\)

Discussion in committees were informal before 1981 when committees met in small rooms in the building on Boulevard de l'Empereur. They have since become more formal, with new committee meeting rooms at Rue Belliard, where the bureau of the committee faces the rest of the committee members who are organised in groups. Some of the meetings are open while others are closed (depending on the committee and the subject), but in general, EP committee meetings are more open than corresponding national parliament committee meetings on the continent. Because exchange of opinions is more spontaneous, it is frequent that committee members use each other's language instead of the official translating system, and in meetings of group co-ordinators there are sometimes no translators at all (English or French is used).\(^4^5\)

It is standard practice for committee reports to be put to a vote on the floor of the EP. It is possible (although for the time being rare) that the committee deliberates *instead* of the Parliament. According to Rule 37 of the Parliament's Rules of Procedure, a report can be adopted by the committee without involving a vote on the floor. This rule originates in the Italian Parliament where committees can legislate (*sede legislativa*). A request for such a deliberation is made by the committee itself, by the President of the Parliament, or by 23 MEPs. The Parliament decides on the request, but the decision is negative if ten per cent of MEPs object to the delegation. Even if the delegation is granted, one member of the committee can refer the matter back to the plenary session.\(^4^6\)
These are the relevant rules of the formal organisation of the EP. A closer examination, however, reveals a process which is closely followed and controlled by the political groups of the Parliament. To this point I now turn.

(2) The Role of Parliamentary Groups

There are currently ten political groups in the European Parliament. The Left Unity (CG), the United European Left (GUE), the Greens, the Rainbow (ARC), the Socialists (SOC), the Independents (NI), the Liberals (LDR), the Christian Democrats (PPE), the European Democratic Alliance (RDE) and the European Right (DR). These parliamentary groups design what happens in the committees and on the floor of the European Parliament.

First, the groups agree on the division of committee bureaus, and they enforce their agreement. The actual allocation is determined proportionally (d'Hondt system) to the size of the groups. Once a chair is offered to a particular group, the individual that receives it is selected on the basis of the size of the national delegation, and expertise (oddly enough, seniority does not play an important role in the process). The same procedure is followed for the selection of the first, second, and third vice-chairs. Nominations backed by this system are very rarely disputed. If they are, the nominee backed by the pact of political groups gets elected, and the challengers get punished. For example, after 1989 the group of the European Right challenged the nomination system, and placed candidates against the official nominees in most committees. The outcome was that not only were these nominees defeated, but the only official nominee of the Group (for the position of the third vice-chair of the Transport committee) also got challenged and was defeated, leaving the group with no representation in committee bureaus (Jacobs et al., 1993: 105).

Committee membership is also agreed upon by the parliamentary groups. While, as stated above, the composition of most committees is proportional to the whole EP, position trading can result in alternate committee structures. For example, after the 1989 election the Socialist and the Christian democratic groups, which together control a majority in the Parliament, agreed to trade some positions in the Agriculture and the Environment committees. As a result, the Christian Democratic group is over-represented on the former, and the Socialist group on the latter. However, the foremost way that parliamentary groups control committee assignments is through the institution of substitute members.

The 1972 Rules specified that substitution was in the hands of individual committee members: ‘Any member of a committee may arrange for his place to be taken at meetings by another Representative of his choice. The name of the substitute shall be notified in advance to the chairman of the committee’ (art 40.3). In the 1989 version, the right to appoint substitutes is
granted to party groups: 'The political groups may appoint a number of permanent substitutes for each committee equal to the number of full members representing them in the committee' (art 111.1). This transfer of powers is particularly significant since there is no difference in rights between full and substitute members. Substitutes can participate in the meetings and speak. They cannot vote – only in the case where their vote would cause the number of their group's votes to exceed the number of full members of their groups. Consequently, both committee membership and leadership are in the hands of political groups. The question of the rapporteurs, who are so important for the legislative work of committees, remains.

The appointment of rapporteurs is also in the hands of parliamentary groups through the following auction mechanism. Each group receives a number of points proportional to its size. The group co-ordinators decide the number of points each subject is 'worth'. Following the announcement of the official price of different bills the different groups are allowed to bid against each other (with a maximum of five points per bill). If two groups offer the maximum price, they are supposed to trade different bills with each other. This mechanism is quite often subject to the 'winner's curse' characteristic of auctions: the winners pay too much in order to get a bill from other groups who are not interested in the bills but who want their opponents to use their points so that they will get their preferred bills cheaper. If a group has a member who is considered a specialist on a particular issue, it announces the name of the rapporteur to discourage other groups from bidding.

To conclude this (partial) description, it becomes clear that the European Parliament is very well organised as a legislative body, and its committees are able to make decisions through co-operative decision-making (that is, to compare alternatives and enforce agreements). Not only is its committee system almost as developed as the US Congress, but in addition, all the essential processes of selection are in the hands of parliamentary groups which control committee membership, committee leadership, and committee rapporteurs. These rapporteurs, once selected, are responsible 'to build coalitions in committees'. Consequently, it is the duty of the rapporteurs to see that the amendments they propose not only get the support of the committee, but that they also clear the floor with the required majority, and, finally, get adopted by the Commission and the Council.

It is possible that rapporteurs adopt partisan views, in which case their position is defeated in the committee (but their point of view becomes a matter of record). However, more frequently, they try to put together a majority coalition supporting their proposal. Particularly with respect to the second reading of the co-operation procedure (or, in the future of the co-
decision procedure) where an absolute majority is required, the effort is made in committee to create a broad consensus so that the final text will receive the required majority. For obvious reasons, the role of rapporteurs is very important in this process. They must meet with party co-ordinators and the bureau of the committee in order to assure broad support of the amendments that they propose. Committee meetings are informal, with more spontaneous exchange of opinions, so that different proposals can come under consideration without being eliminated by stringent agenda requirements. Consequently, amendments to the rapporteurs report that are voted in the committee are preferred by a majority to actually replace the report.

In short, the decision-making mode of committees in the European Parliament approximates co-operative majority voting, with the rapporteur responsible for drafting the legislation that can be supported by a coalition, and the rest of the members proposing alternatives that can actually replace the rapporteur's proposal.

CONCLUSIONS

I began this article with an empirical puzzle: the EU produced the most advanced health and safety regulation instead of social dumping. I solved the puzzle by evoking the conditional agenda-setting powers of the EP. This is not the only possible explanation. For example, both Eichener, and Dehousse and Majone argue that these laws became possible because of the agenda-setting role of the Commission. I do not wish to minimise the role of the Commission in European legislation. Obviously, they produce the initial document on which the Parliamentary amendments are grafted. In addition, these amendments have to be accepted by the Commission in order to be subject to the qualified majority/unanimity procedure. I have enumerated the Parliamentary amendments that were included in the law, so the reader can make up her own mind about the relative weight of each one of the two institutions. However, which one of the two institutions has the major role in European legislation is a minor issue compared to the fact that conditional agenda-setting power has been delegated to institutions with supranational interests.

The initial model on the basis of which I produced the explanation was based on a very restrictive assumption: that the European Parliament is a unitary actor. In the third section, I demonstrated that this power exists even if we relax the unitary actor assumption and replace it by co-operative majority voting. In the last section, I demonstrated that the committee system of the Parliament, and in particular the institution of rapporteurs, enables the Parliament to make co-operative decisions. Consequently, all
the conclusions made under the restrictive and unrealistic assumption of a unitary EP are valid under the more general setting of co-operative majority voting in parliamentary committees (which is a very realistic assumption).

The whole argument presented in this article should be understood as an exploration of the possibilities open to the EP, not of its actual practices. I have demonstrated that these possibilities exist, and that sometimes the EP makes use of them. The next question is how frequently do MEPs make use of all these powers? In order to answer this question, one should follow the legislative process more closely, and examine frequencies in each legislative step: how frequently do rapporteurs get defeated in the committee or on the floor? How frequently do they propose partisan alliances as opposed to broader ones? How easy is it for a committee report to get the required (by the co-operation and the co-decision procedures) absolute majorities on the floor? How frequently do these amendments get accepted by the Commission? by the Council? And most of all, how important are these amendments in European legislation? These empirical questions will be the subject of subsequent investigations.

NOTES


5. In this article I will limit my analysis to the co-operation procedure which is responsible for the laws of the single market. For a comparison between this procedure and the codecision
procedure introduced by Maastricht see my ‘Will Maastricht Reduce the “Democratic Deficit”?’ (APSA – Comparative Politics Newsletter, Feb. 1995), where I make the argument that despite good intentions, the treaty reduces the potential role of the Parliament because it replaces the agenda-setting role with a veto.

6. Or more restrictive, depending on the political point of view.
9. Rehinder and Stewart, Environmental Protection Policy, p.11.
14. Most of the analysis in this section is based mainly on Eichener’s monograph. The interested reader should consult this text for further information, as well as for arguments that differ from the ones that will be presented in this article.
18. As a result of the adoption of the ‘Health and Safety at Work’ directive, Belgium adopted new legislation which includes family business, apprentices and trainees, the United Kingdom expanded coverage for air transport workers and coal miners; Portugal included self-employed and domestic workers; the Netherlands expanded coverage to firms with less than 500 workers. These data come from Vogel (1991) who does not provide information for other countries.
20. This legislative history is found in EP (1992).
21. According to the internal rules of the EP the amendments introduced in the second reading cannot be new; they have to be either re-introduction of first reading amendments, or some intermediate position between the Parliament and the Council. Consequently, these 29 amendments are either repetition of the amendments rejected in the first round, or some watered down version of these (rejected) amendments.
22. This section presents the main points made in Tsebelis ‘The Power of the European Parliament’ (1994). The interested reader should consult that article for proofs of the propositions, conditions under which they apply, examples of conditional agenda setting powers, as well as the implications of this analysis for European integration.
23. I select a two-dimensional representation instead of the (marginally simpler) one-dimensional one for several reasons. First and foremost, because one-dimensional models typically produce equilibrium results (Shepsle, 1979), while two-dimensional models not only generically lack such equilibria, but they produce chaotic behaviour, that is, cycles all over the space (McKelvey, 1976); the model here includes a mechanism for equilibrium selection which the reader will not be able to identify unless the generic model has the
possibility of producing chaotic results (that is, at least two-dimensional). Second, the results from two dimensions are easily generalisable to more than two-dimensions, which is the most realistic assumption in the politics of the European Community. Third, two dimensions is the minimum required to give EP the possibility of selecting a supporting coalition inside the Council. Finally, as it will become clear later, the one example of the co-operation procedure I will present cannot be represented in a less than two-dimensional space (in fact, at that point it will become clear that the representation of the status quo requires more than one dimension).

24. For example, the Danish parliament is known to have a permanent committee on European Community legislation which extracts statements from the government prior to Council meetings so that the Danish representative in the Council is particularly inflexible (Williams, 1991, p.159). What Denmark does in this case is nest the international game of European policy-making inside its domestic politics game in order to achieve a credible threat (Tsebelis, 1990; Putnam 1988).

25. Strictly speaking the account I presented in the previous section concerning health and safety at work legislation demonstrates that the adopted legislation was more advanced than the previous status quo in the countries members; the account does not necessarily imply that the European legislation was more advanced than the ideal points of all members. It is possible to argue that all countries wanted more advanced regulation, they were just unwilling to adopt it unilaterally and the institutions of the European Union solved the resulting collective action problem. I do not think that this is a plausible argument because although common legislation eliminates competition along the social dimension within the community, it certainly imposes a heavy burden on the ability of European products to compete internationally.

26. The technical term for the area inside the heptagon is 'Pareto set'. If an outcome is inside the Pareto set it is impossible to alter it by unanimity, because at least one country will be worse off with any movement.


28. Tsebelis 'The Power of the European Parliament' (1994) analyses systematically the properties of conditional agenda setting. For example, he finds that in a two dimensional space conditional agenda setting exhibits a curvilinear property (it exists when the status quo is close to the positions of the council, and ceases to exist when it is far away, or in the centre of the positions of the members of the Council); he also finds that as information reaches the EP its conditional agenda setting power increases, and that as issues become more complicated (multidimensional) agenda setting power increases. In order to avoid duplications, I will refer the interested reader to the article.

29. In the remainder of this analysis we will assume that Q(U(SQ)) exists, otherwise there is no agenda setting power whether the parliament is composed of 518 members or of one.


31. For technical definitions, see below.

32. Co-operative decision-making assumes that agreements are enforceable (so that proposals can be compared in any possible way, regardless of the agenda).

33. Both assumptions are violated by spatial modelling, but one can imagine a finite set of points inside Q(U(SQ)) which would satisfy these assumptions.


39. Peter Ordeshook and Thomas Schwartz, ‘Agendas and the Control of the Political

41. Schwartz, 'Cyclic Tournaments and Cooperative Majority Voting'.

42. The analysis here rests heavily on two recent sources that describe committees inside the European Parliament. The first is the book *The European Parliament* (second edition) by Francis Jacobs, Richard Corbett and Michael Shackleton; the second is the forthcoming article in the *British Journal of Political Science*, 'The Organising of the European Parliament: Committees, Specialisation, and Coordination' by Shaun Bowler and David Farrell.


47. Quoted from Shaun Bowler and David M. Farrell, 'The Organisation of the European Parliament'.


49. Volker Eichener, 'Social Dumping or Innovative Regulation?' and Giandomenico Majone, 'The European Community between Social Policy and Social Regulation'.


Locus of Induced Uncovered Set

The cardioid of point C' (first generation cardioid) intersects with the sphere (MC,R) for $\phi^* > \pi/2$. Consequently, the intersection of the cardioid and the sphere (MC,R) is included inside the sphere $(C, x^*)$ where

$$x^* = d^2 + 4r^2$$  \hfill (1A)

In order to find a sphere that includes the second generation cardioids, it is sufficient to calculate a sphere that includes the cardioid of point C". Indeed any other point of the intersection of the two spheres (MC,R) and (C,x*) produces either a smaller distance from C’ or a bigger angle $\phi^{**}$ which according to equation (2) of the text produces a smaller radius $x^{**}$.

As Figure 4 indicates, the point A which is in distance $2x^* \cos \phi^{**} + 2r$ from C" is not included in the sphere (MC,R) consequently, the distance $x^{**}$ is a conservative estimate of the radius of a sphere that includes the induced (by the winset of the status quo) uncovered set.

The angle $\phi^{**}$ can be calculated indirectly, since the angle $C''CC$ is equal ($\pi/2 - \phi^{**}$) and the sides of the triangle are known to be R, R+d and $x^*$ respectively. Consequently,

$$\cos (\pi/2 - \phi^{**}) = \frac{(d^2 + 2r^2 + Rd)}{(R + d)(\sqrt{d^2 + 4r^2})}$$ \hfill (2A)

or

$$\cos (\phi^{**}) = \frac{(2r(\sqrt{R^2 + Rd - r^2}))}{(R + d)(\sqrt{d^2 + 4r^2})}$$ \hfill (2A')

Now the distance $x^{**}$ can be calculated as the third side of a triangle for which the other sides are $x^*$, $2x^* \cos \phi^{**} + 2r$ and the angle in-between $\phi^{**}$.

From equation (2) of the text we get:

$$x^{**2} = x^* + 4r^2 + 4x^* r \cos \phi^*$$ \hfill (3A)

or

$$x^{**2} = d^2 + 8r^2 + 8r^2 (\sqrt{R^2 + Rd - r^2})/(R + d)$$ \hfill (3A')

And since $\sqrt{R^2 + Rd - r^2}) < \sqrt{(R + d)^2 - r^2}) < (R + d)$,

$$x^{**} < \sqrt{d^2 + 16r^2}$$ \hfill (3A'')