onism, damaging the morals of the people, and discouraging people from hard work. By violating "timeless" Confucian norms of behavior, communists (and complicit dissenters) proved to be "less than human" and therefore deserving of extermination. The fascists promoted themselves as selfless combatants inspired by Sun—who was recast as a "machine-age Confucian sage" (193)—and as willing to sacrifice themselves for the revolutionary struggle to save the morals and productivity of the nation.

With such self-justifications, China's fascist cliques set out to transform the masses into disciplined cogs for the national industrial machine through the New Life Movement campaign, as well as through art and literature. "Via campaigns to militarize, aestheticize, and productivize everyday life, the minds and bodies of Chinese citizens would become accustomed to the temporal rhythms of mechanized factory and agricultural work, and ever prepared to mobilize against domestic and foreign enemies" (130). Confucian principles were invoked to naturalize a set of proscribed behaviors (no spitting!) and modest dress that Blue Shirt operatives enforced in public spaces. Fascists promoted Confucian ethics as timeless Chinese values, but in fact their simplified formula suggested a new relationship between the leaders and the led in Chinese society that omitted the reciprocity embedded in imperial-era hierarchies. Instead, the masses should blindly follow the instruction of experts for the purported good of the nation. "Realism" in Chinese fascist literature, art, and film would provide reinforcement through simple, easy-to-understand morality lessons. For those who did not cooperate, Chinese fascists felt no qualms about using assassination, kidnapping, and "repentance camps" to eliminate dissent. Clinton closes her last chapter by describing some of the remorseless violence that ensued as the fascist discourse made national unity under a singular voice a moral imperative.

This book seeks to "clarify the totalizing nature of fascist desires" (158). Clinton describes how fascist discourse was meant to "resonate" with the broader public. There is, however, little discussion of how it was received, though she notes that the New Life Movement did not gain traction until after 1937. One will have to refer to other works to understand more fully why fascism was influential but did not turn into a genuinely popular movement in China. Clinton, like prior scholars, portrays a pattern of right-GMD disdain for the masses. She also cites the "weak and fractured nature of the Nanjing regime" along with "socioeconomic unevenness of the vast territory that they claimed" as affecting implementation and reception of fascist schemes (191), factors that are explored more thoroughly by others. Clinton presents a valuable, convincing analysis of broad similarities between the CC Clique and the Blue Shirts, but further discussion of their differences (and of why they were bitter enemies) perhaps would have revealed more about why "mobilization" was problematic within this distinctly Chinese version of fascism.

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Xiaoping Cong. *Marriage, Law, and Gender in Revolutionary China, 1940–1960*. (Cambridge Studies in the History of the People's Republic of China.) New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. xvi, 327. $99.99.

Xiaoping Cong begins her book *Marriage, Law, and Gender in Revolutionary China, 1940–1960*, with a famous 1950 Ping opera (评剧), *Liu Qiao'er*, which was based on an influential 1943 legal case, *Feng v. Zhang*, in the Chinese Communist base area Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region (BR). This fascinating case serves as a linchpin that links together multiple historical processes to form a complicated historical narrative of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Empirically rich and conceptually innovative, Cong's book presents a detailed investigation of the development of the Communist judicial system in the BR as well as a close examination of the social and cultural implications of Chinese revolutionary legal practice for women and gender relations.

When the CCP began to implement a marriage regulation informed by the May Fourth discourse and reflecting an urban bias, with "freedom" as the principle in opposing "arranged, forced, and buying/selling marriages" in the BR (144), many local folks, especially fathers with betrothed daughters, were emboldened by the newfound "freedom" to annul their daughters' betrothal contracts, made years earlier, in order to offer their daughters to men who could afford betrothal gifts (*caili*) of higher value. The plaintiff in the legal case, Feng, abandoned the betrothal contract of his daughter, Peng'er, to Zhang Bo, and arranged her betrothal to a new suitor. Peng'er seemingly consented to her father's decision, but when she saw Zhang Bo by chance, she expressed her wish to be with him. With her consent, Zhang's family staged a "kidnapping" of Peng'er to prevent her from marrying another man. They then hosted a wedding for the young couple immediately. While kidnapping of brides had been a local practice before the rule of the CCP, Feng was now able to sue Zhang Bo for kidnapping his daughter. The county court arrested Zhang for kidnapping. His father was sentenced to six months of labor, and the marriage was annulled (3).

Up to this point in the book, the story has foregrounded a few key points that Cong will elaborate later: the conflicts between local marriage practices and the new government's revolutionary goal of social and cultural transformations; the challenges of applying an imported concept of "freedom of marriage" to rural patriarchal families—a concept that was often manipulated by patriarchs with daughters; and the animosities that the CCP's local courts might generate among the rural communities, whose support the new government was eager to gain. Cong's major sources for this book were the precious documents produced by the Shaan-Gan-Ning High Court from 1937 to 1949, which convey rural illiterate women's voices on marriage, love, and sexuality. These documents enabled Cong to investigate the local sexual practices and gender norms as the culturally specific context within which local women were able to demonstrate

their autonomy in love and sexuality. They also enabled her to trace the interactions and dynamics between the local communities and the new Communist state that were manifested over numerous marriage disputes, as well as to examine the implications these disputes had for the CCP's program of state building.

Peng'er did not assent to the county court's verdict. A young woman with bound feet, she walked about twenty-four miles in two days to lodge an appeal with the BR judge Ma Xiwu, who eventually overturned the court's verdict after conducting various local inquiries (3). Cong weaves her close reading of Ma's adjudication through a detailed examination of the structural and ideological transformations of the judicial system in the BR. Through careful scrutiny, Cong finds meaningful changes in keywords signifying changing principles for marriage regulations, from *ziyou* (freedom) to *zi-yuan* (self-willingness) and *zizhu* (self-determination). Prefect Ma adopted self-determination as the legal principle in his ruling validating Peng'er's marriage to Zhang Bo. Cong convincingly posits that these changes in terminology signify the Communist legal system's shift from a formalistic adherence to legal principles that originated in the urban setting to a more sensitive recognition of local specificities and more flexible accommodation of traditional practices in order to reduce tensions with local communities. They also demonstrate the CCP's recognition of local women's autonomy. The changing legal practices enabled women to detach themselves from patriarchal families in defending their own rights. This last point is emphasized in Cong's explicit argument against a long-held view that the CCP abandoned women's liberation programs as a result of catering to male peasants' gender interests once the party relocated to the northern base areas.

"Ma's Way" of handling the case was later celebrated by the CCP as exemplary of cadres' practicing the Maoist mass line: from the masses, to the masses. Cong illuminates that "a process of interaction, interplay, negotiation, and mutual penetration established the CCP's practice of a mass-line policy and its relationship with local communities" (176). She finds in this process of exploring new legal practices no "imperialistic mentality" of an authoritarian state but rather "a strategic state that presented a flexible image" (177–178). The flexibility of the revolutionary state included, for example, adopting the traditional practice of mediation in rural communities, a legal practice that was to be inherited by the PRC legal system. Cong treats the "mutual penetration" with particular nuance and delineates clearly a tension-ridden process of establishing "new democracy" in rural communities in which the legal workers strove to create a public space where villagers could articulate their demands or grievances even as they remained constantly alert to the need to guide the opinions of the masses so that a judicial adjudication would not diverge from revolutionary principles.

In the last part of the book, Cong follows the case of *Feng v. Zhang* to the realm of cultural production, analyzing the changing meanings of the legal case, from an exemplar of the CCP's pursuit of New Democracy that was to represent the interests of the masses to a celebration of a heroine, Liu Qiao'er, whose new subjectivity was shaped under the Communist marriage reform. Cong identifies female writers, actors, and Women's Federation officials who created or promoted the new cultural symbol of women's liberation. But rather than utilizing the opportunity to trace patterns of feminists' activities in the party, Cong stops at claiming that such phenomena constituted a "feminine side" in a masculine party-state (236–237). In my view, perhaps a monolithic concept of "party-state" hinders the author from further delineating the gendered aspirations, other than a shared goal of a creating a Communist state, of diverse groups of Communists.

Deftly moving between legal history and cultural history, and deploying interdisciplinary approaches to tackling historical puzzles, Xiaoping Cong has made a significant contribution to the history of the Chinese Communist Revolution.

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Carter J. Eckert. *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2016. Pp. xii, 472. $39.95.

Korea sits uncomfortably next to Japan, which has invaded the peninsula many times, most importantly in 1592 and 1876, the latter time a case of gunboat diplomacy that set a pattern for the eventual annexation of Korea in 1910. If the past seventy years betray little evidence of Japan's military tradition, until 1945 it was a defining characteristic of that country: samurai, bushido (the way of warriors), exemplary sword craftsmanship, and of course one civil war after another before the Tokugawa seclusion began in 1600. Korea, by contrast, was known not for its warlords but for its scholars—more particularly, scholar-officials—who despised the military, at least in times of peace. The old Korean army, before 1910, was scolded for its poor organization, low morale, questionable strategies (for example, the illogical disposition of provincial garrisons), and a tendency to concentrate too many troops in the capital, Seoul. Korea's soldiers could fight fiercely, as U.S. Marines discovered when they invaded in 1871, but fathers reared their sons with an eye to civil service exams, not civil wars.

Any of those scholars would be amazed to learn that, a century later, there is not one Korea but two, and both are among the most militarized countries on earth. The Korean People's Army ranks fourth in the world in size, with 1.3 million troops, and has been the core of the ruling elite's power since it was formed in 1948. South Korea's military numbers 650,000; military leaders seized political power in the country in 1961 and did not relinquish it until forced out by popular rebellion in 1988. Perhaps more surprising to scholars (anywhere) is the paucity of literature on such a central aspect of modern Korean history. The two Korean armies are the elephants in the room, unusually large ones at that. Carter J. Eckert's study *Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism, 1866–1945*, is thus more than wel-