
No other area of psychology displays the linking of scientific projects to the social order quite as strikingly as the investigation of intelligence. It is hardly surprising that this area has attracted the attention of historians of science who are interested in exploring such links. Indeed, some of the best modern work in the history of psychology has centered on this topic. We know a great deal about the origins of intelligence tests, their role in World War I, the history of nature-nurture debates, controversies about the unitary nature of intelligence, and so on. Do we need another monograph devoted to these and related topics? Well, we certainly need the kind of study that John Carson presents in this book.

As its subtitle indicates, this volume examines two cases, the French and the American. In other words, this is a work of comparative analysis, which means that the truly characteristic features of each case emerge much more clearly than they might have done had the study confined itself to one case only. This more distanced view enables Carson to put into perspective a vast array of relevant scholarship (the reference notes run to more than a hundred pages) and to identify the issues at stake in historical developments that were mostly divergent in spite of a fundamental convergence.

Choosing France and America for comparison is far from arbitrary. First, there is the well-known historical contingency that links the American industrialization of intelligence tests to their prior invention in France. Carson breaks with a linear historical tradition for which the French contribution is essentially that of curtain raiser for the main event. Instead, he pays as much attention to French as to American developments, both before and after Binet and Simon’s first attempts at measuring something called “intelligence.” No one can do that without being struck by the irony of intelligence testing’s lack of success in the country of its origin. A careful exploration of this massive divergence between the French and the American case leaves little doubt about the factors at play: the requirements of very different educational and military systems and contrasting cultures of expertise being particularly prominent.

Although the chapters that deal with these matters will be of most direct interest to psychologist-historians, the earlier chapters should not be neglected. For it is in these that Carson supplies not only a comparative view but a historical depth perspective for topics that are too often seen purely through a twentieth-century lens. This perspective reveals a more profound link between the French and the American cases, the common dilemma of justifying the unequal distribution of resources, power, and opportunity in supposedly egalitarian societies. Meritocratic answers to the problem go back to the late eighteenth century in both societies, often expressed in a language of human “talents.” In a fascinating analysis, Carson traces the transformation of these notions into the concept of a singular, biologically based, measurable intelligence.

In twentieth-century America, this concept acquired enormous cultural significance and provided major opportunities for professional advance as well as theoretical debate. The French had little use for it, relying on well-entrenched institutions to do the job of sorting people and distrusting the pseudo-objectivity of the testing apparatus. “French and American psychologists, in the end, created distinct versions of intelligence” (p. 233), providing Carson...
with the material for presenting what is probably the best researched case of the mutual constitution of the psychological and the social order. In view of the fact that other psychological concepts are as much products of history as “intelligence,” this book may well come to play an exemplary role.

Reviewed by KURT DANZIGER, Professor Emeritus, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada.


Sociology, social theory, and the 1960s, are intimately linked in twentieth-century intellectual and social history. The connections and the tensions between the most politically left-wing academic discipline, a broad and historically rich intellectual tradition of social theory, and the decade and mythology we call the 1960s, is explored creatively and usefully in this excellent collection of autobiographical essays pulled together by two prominent social theorists of the generation shaped by the events of 1968. Alan Sica and Stephen Turner were able to gather together an impressive list of influential scholars born between 1944 and 1952 to produce a collection of essays that is useful for intellectual historians and entertaining for students, scholars, and general readers.

We live, the editors remind us, in an era in which the public (even the academic public!) is fascinated with autobiographies, celebrities, and personal confessions. The editors clearly did a substantial amount of hands-on work ensuring that the authors of the chapters made a serious effort to rise above the self-promotion of listing publications and the narcissism of telling personal stories that do not connect to the larger theme of social theory and the 1960s. We will focus on issues raised by Andrew Abbott, Michael Burawoy, Erik Olin Wright, Stephen Turner, and Saskia Sassen to help us think about the larger experience of 1960s’ generation.

The Abbott contribution is a model for what can be accomplished in such autobiographical pieces. Abbott’s essay succeeds because he uses the sociological skills he developed over the years as an empirical researcher to do an analysis of the social organization of the draft. Abbott, of course, had once set the agenda for the study of professions for a generation of sociologists in his path-breaking *The System of the Professions* (1988). Most of the other essays in the book discuss the draft, but Abbott uses his experience in writing about professions to undertake an analytic discussion of the social processes that sent the poor, the principled, and the unlucky to Vietnam, allowing others to establish themselves successfully in careers and families without risk of death, injury, and the trauma of war. Any serious discussion of the idealism of the 1960s generation must surely take into account the ugly and complex realities of how the draft operated as a zero sum game—for every person who got out of the draft, another was required to go to Vietnam.

If some of the 1960s generation can be accused of avoiding dangers and risks, that certainly cannot be said of Michael Burawoy, the former American Sociological Association...
president and the author of a fascinating piece, “Antinomian Marxist.” Burawoy has done path-breaking workplace ethnographies in Zambia, Hungary, and Russia. Burawoy’s essay helps explain his now familiar commitment to “provincializing” American social science by listening to the perspectives and ideas of scholars from outside the United States. The punch line of the essay relates to a letter of “recommendation” that Burawoy once had written for him by the University of Chicago sociologist Edward Shils, one of the most important sociologists of intellectuals in the twentieth century. The letter was, unbeknownst to Burawoy at the time, clearly designed to sabotage his career. The Shils incident reminds us of the many underhanded tactics that were used to keep the left out of the academy earlier in the twentieth century.

Despite Shils’s efforts, the left is now in the academy, but do they have anything to say? There are few better examples of the value of the post-1960s left academy than the work of Erik Olin Wright. Wright is interesting because he is an example of an almost purely “professional” academic leftist who is motivated by political principles but undertakes his work in the most rigorous and scholarly ways possible. Wright describes himself as a multivariate Marxist, and central to his story about the development of what is often called analytic Marxism is a small network of scholars who have been meeting almost very year since 1979 in London, Oxford, and New York. This group is a perfect illustration of what the sociologist Michael Farrell calls collaborative circles. Skeptical of perspectives in the scholarship that stress individual genius as the source of insight and innovation in the social sciences, Farrell shows how small networks of thinkers who are dissatisfied with the state of work in their chosen field of cultural production, and are cut off from established mentors, sometimes create new perspectives through the support networks and ritualized activities forged by collaborative circles. Wright’s network of analytic Marxists (including G. A Cohen and Jon Elster, among others) developed a distinctive and rigorous version of academic Marxism that has had enormous influence on contemporary social science. Contrary to contemporary intellectual trends toward eclecticism, Wright’s essay and the example of his own work highlight for us the value of a disciplined engagement with a theoretical tradition that is creating new ideas, even if dedicated theorists always run the danger of reproducing dogmatism.

Stephen Turner’s essay “High on Insubordination” lays out the story of his successful career on the relative margins of the American academic world while making the case for the value of social theory and intellectual commitments not wed exclusively to the orthodoxies of American sociology. Turner manages to weave together thoughtful comments on race relations in the United States, reflections on his culturally conservative parents, his experience with the draft, and the ups and downs of his academic career, all organized around the theme of insubordination to authority.

Turner is an articulate and sharp critic of mainstream sociological theory in the United States. He suggests that “Parsonian and Mertonian sociological theory had the same kind of agenda—progress for them meant little more than accumulating more power and getting rid of their critics” (p. 295). The coauthor of an influential institutional history of twentieth-century sociology entitled The Impossible Science (1990), Turner outlines a powerful critique of American sociology’s theoretical insularity, power plays, and careerism, drawing by analogy from his observations of the technocratic advisors to the Vietnam era American presidents and his own experiences of being closed out of journals, jobs, and disciplinary status.

Is Turner right about American sociology? Is American sociology more insular and more cutthroat than, say, American economics, political science, or philosophy? Is it not reasonable for disciplines to try to enforce some kind of consensus around what the enterprise is attempting to do, and does not this type of boundary work also go on within the natural sciences?
and the humanities today? Turner does not really make a strong case that boundaries against insubordination are enforced in a more authoritarian way in sociology when understood from a comparative disciplinary perspective. And surely the European social theory and academic establishment that serve as a counterpoint hero to Turner’s villain of the professionalized American mainstream sociologist are hardly free from careerism, elitism, and an aggressive approach to accumulating resources and academic status. Nonetheless, the issues Turner has raised are important, and can and should be explored in sociological context through intellectual history and the empirical sociology of ideas.

Saskia Sassen’s essay “Always a Foreigner, Always at Home” also illustrates the value of intellectual work that comes from the professional margins. As a University of Chicago and London School of Economics professor, Sassen has produced numerous writings on global cities, the Internet, immigration, and political economy that are essential for anyone interested in how globalization is reshaping the world around us. Yet Sassen was once a young scholar, we learn here, who had her PhD thesis rejected at Notre Dame and was told by her chair that she should not even bother attempting to go up for tenure at the City University of New York’s Queens College.

In many ways, Sassen did everything wrong. Originally a young Dutch woman who lived in Latin America and Italy, she came to the United States as an illegal immigrant, spent an enormous amount of her time working on music and political activism, and rejected the intellectual orthodoxies of both sociology and economics. Showing little interest in traditional academic career strategies, Sassen worked on developing a political economic perspective that was forged partly out of her experience of working with both radical activists and elite intellectuals such as Richard Sennett. A dangerous strategy, perhaps, for young scholars today who lack the networks Sassen was born into and created for herself, but this kind of scholarship from the margins exemplifies the intellectual excitement and creativity that is the best legacy of the social theory that we have inherited from the generation of the 1960s.

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Humans perceive the world through concepts, and the introduction of new conceptualizations enables the discovery and understanding of previously unknown or incomprehensible features of the social world. The term internationalization may connote the propagation of Americanized psychology around the world, but it also could mean a move away from an American to a genuine global psychology. A global psychology involves a process of assimilation, by which mainstream psychology incorporates non-Western concepts into the discipline; but more importantly, it involves a process of accommodation, by which the very nature of mainstream psychology changes based on ideas from around the world. For a long time internationalization meant the distribution of American psychology to the rest of the world, and the
globalization of psychology meant a process that ended with assimilation. Yet, if one assumes that any local psychology (and that term includes American psychology) could learn from other local perspectives, then an international psychology requires more than a process of incorporation.

The editor Adrian Brock has the full complexities of the problem in mind for this book, and thus it contributes to the program of a genuine internationalization of psychology. His theoretical position and the framework for this book are well articulated in his Introduction as well as in his Postscript. Being a historian of psychology, he argues that the international history of psychology is “an essential basis for a more international psychology” (p. 7). He provides historical, theoretical, and anthropological arguments for why American psychology is not a universal science.

Any reader of this book will come to the question: Why should we assume that American psychology is (not) an indigenous psychology? Some traditionalists might argue that psychology is not indigenous because it is based on scientific study. But certainly many of the psychological concepts involved in scientific study are indigenous, and more radically, the methods used in psychology could be indigenous. Even if one does not agree with this argument, the time has come for psychologists to demonstrate that American psychological concepts are universally meaningful. Brock points out that cultural familiarity with concepts makes them appear natural when they are indeed social. One could argue that psychologists are greater inventors than discoverers (to use a Kantian distinction) and much in psychology is not discovered but created for socio-historical purposes. Once these creations are accepted, they appear as natural to members of a socio-historical group. Many chapters in this book provide insight into these theoretical problems of psychology from a historical perspective.

It has become a cliché but edited books are often cursed with unevenness (and the editor is aware of this problem in his book). Internationalizing the History of Psychology also shows unevenness in historical times, historiographic quality, and theoretical expertise, which is at least partially required if one not only presents a neglected perspective but also reflects upon the reasons for the exclusion of a marginalized perspective. The contributors to the book do not share the same ideas about history but, of course, one could make the argument that this is part of the internationalization of the history of psychology itself. However, only 4 of the 13 contributors live outside Western Europe and North America, and all of them should have been aware of the discussions surrounding the old versus new histories.

Indeed, the majority of contributors address the methodological discussions surrounding history and internationalization, and thus they provide theoretically informed histories that allow for an informed critique of mainstream psychology: Johann Louw discusses the problem of the construction of subjectivity in South Africa; Anand Paranjpe reflects on the history of psychology in India from a postcolonial perspective; Aydan Gulerce investigates the history of psychology in Turkey from the perspective of globalization; Adrian Brock discusses whether psychology has an affinity with a particular political system; Fathali Moghaddam and Naomi Lee specifically challenge the unbridled spread of American psychology around the world; Irmingard Staebble provides a postcolonial social history and critique of the Eurocentric nature of the social sciences; and Kurt Danziger pleads for a polycentric history of psychology.

The book also contains an enlightening but more traditional history of the reception of Wundt and Freud in Argentina (Cecilia Taiana) and a highly informative history of the origins of psychology in China (Geoffrey Blowers). But it also includes a chapter on the internationalization of behavior analysis (Ruben Ardila), the goal of which seems to be to promote it, in pointing out that “behavior analysis as an area of scholarship and professional applications
exists on five continents and in most of the countries of the world” (p. 128). For Ardila, behavior analysis has provided “a science of great development” (p. 113). This celebratory chapter is somewhat in contradiction to the postcolonial chapters that challenge the very idea of a universal psychology. The fact that a psychology is practiced in all continents does not make it a universal psychology, as the theoretical analyses of many contributors emphasize. Another outlier in the book is the chapter by John Hogan and Thomas Vaccaro, who explore the European origins of developmental psychology, which is pretty much an accepted notion for historians familiar with the history of developmental psychology. Certainly, for the idea of internationalization as developed by Brock, it would have been more interesting to analyze the historical ideas of Asian, African, South American, and aboriginal populations regarding the development of children. Again, this chapter fits less with the theoretical model of the editor and would have been more appropriate for a traditional history of developmental psychology.

Indeed, it is unclear from a theoretical perspective why the editor—given his critical theoretical framework—has included some of the chapters. It also would have been useful if the editor had addressed and laid out the complex relationship between the history and theory of psychology so that the reader understands the importance of an international theoretical framework for international historical research. Unfortunately, even enlightened historians of psychology still believe, sometimes hesitantly, that the history of psychology is the history of experimental psychology as outlined by E. G. Boring. Thus, the importance of the book lies in having inaugurated a historical project that, strangely enough, seems crucial for the future of psychology. There should be no doubt that the publication of this book is a highly significant event in the history of psychology.

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This book is one of those types of histories on scientific topics that are all too uncommon, a history of a laboratory. This is particularly unfortunate because, as Dewsbury’s history of the Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology demonstrates, such histories provide often important and sometimes unique perspectives on scientists, scientific inquiry, and the politics of science where science really takes place, in the laboratory. In some ways the history of twentieth-century science is the history of laboratories and their funding, the sources of the funding, and the influence of funding on the nature of research. Nowhere is that more clearly shown than in the history of the Yerkes Laboratories.

The Yerkes Laboratories are important because they were scientifically significant, existed over a long time span, and made use of a number of funding sources. The laboratory was founded as the Laboratories of Comparative Psychobiology of Yale University. While Dewsbury emphasizes the Orange Park years, 1930–1965, he also reviews early primate research at his
summer home in Franklin, New Hampshire, and the first formal laboratory at Yale, which functioned between 1925 and 1930. He also deals with the years at Emory University after 1965. The laboratories were the world's largest research collection of chimpanzees and became perhaps the most important research facility of its type.

The funding received during the Depression provided much needed support for graduate students who would go on to great fame in psychobiology, behavioral psychology, and other fields. It is somewhat astounding to consider the hard-nosed Kenneth Spence taking anecdotal data on the chimps during his time there. It is not hard to see the influences of many of these individuals on the research and the research on the individuals.

The primary emphasis of the book, however, is on Orange Park. Here Dewsbury gives us details of every aspect of the creation and the development of the facility. He emphasizes throughout the methods and difficulties surrounding the acquisition and continuance of funding as well as the compromises that sometimes had to be made for it. This is not a dry recitation of budgets and research, though, but a fascinating study of the interaction among the researchers and administrators, of successes and failures, of politics and misunderstandings. We see clearly the changes in the laboratory due to the changes in directors. Robert Yerkes, Karl Lashley, Henry Nissen (followed by Lelon Peacock as interim Director), Arthur J. Riopelle, and finally, Geoffrey Bourne all had differing visions and approaches to the laboratory, some more realistic and successful than others. We also see the changes in funding for science over the period and the effect these changes had on the nature of the research conducted and intellectual atmosphere.

There are many very interesting photographs, though unfortunately they sometimes come out a bit muddy because of modern publishers' insistence on not inserting glossy pages that would present them better. Still, it is better than not having the photos at all.

The scholarship in this book is what we would expect from Dewsbury. Though he entered the field of historical research late in his career, he has become one of its most respected researchers and writers. The positions and statements are meticulously supported by documentary evidence, oral histories and interviews, and published sources. Along with this, there are also keen evaluations that come from Dewsbury's insight into these various individuals and institutions. Dewsbury's own background in comparative psychology and the vicissitudes and difficulties of funding have served him well. This book is a good model for the study of other laboratories. It should be read by anyone interested in the way scientific laboratories actually work.

Reviewed by RAND B. EVANS, Emeritus Professor of Psychology, East Carolina University.
development of psychology as a science. Volume VI adds descriptions of 17 more pioneers. If only on the basis of the volume’s continuing contribution to a biographical history of psychology, it should be counted as an important publication. However, under the direction of a new editorial team, Volume VI maintains this tradition and takes the series in two new and satisfying directions.

The first can be seen among the 18 contributors chosen for Volume VI, which represents a substantial shift away from the series’ earlier use of former colleagues and past students as authors. Continuing a move begun in Volume V, editors Donald Dewsbury, Ludy T. Benjamin, Jr., and Michael Wertheimer recruited a “dream team” of scholars for Volume VI, with the prefatory description of contributors that reads like a “who’s who” of historians of psychology. Moreover, contributions come out of what are much larger programs of focused scholarship (e.g., Alexandra Rutherford’s treatment of early behavioral child psychologist Mary Cover Jones) if not major, career-long biographical studies (e.g., Michael Sokal on James McKeen Cattell). Common in earlier volumes of the series was the inclusion of expanded conference talks by psychologists who were often personally close to their subjects and not historians. The blending of biography with what often feels like autobiography may have a place in psychology’s history of itself, however the scholarly weight of the series is increased substantially (and unalterably, one hopes) by moving toward more critical, and less celebratory, biographical portraits.

The variety of “pioneers” chosen for Volume VI is another new direction for this series. A series on pioneers of a field is likely to write itself out of existence once its acknowledged forefathers and foremothers have appeared. Perhaps aware of this, recent volumes shifted toward individuals making a wide range of important theoretical, empirical and applied contributions across the preceding “Psychological Century.” This continues in Volume VI with portraits of two remaining pioneers from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (e.g., C. James Goodwin on E. C. Stanford and Michael Sokal on James McKeen Cattell); with chapters on major figures in the history of clinical psychology (e.g., Nicole Barenbaum on Henry A. Murray, Deborah Coon on Abraham Maslow, and Gail A. Hornstein on Frieda-Fromm Reichmann); and from valuable historiographic lessons on the cultural complexity of psychology’s history, including John P. Jackson’s insightful contribution on Kenneth Clark and the social struggle for civil rights in post-World War II America. This expansion is completed with chapters devoted to key figures in the early application of psychology to industry (Laura Koppes and Adrienne Bauer on Marion Almira Bills), psychological testing (David Baker on Donald G. Paterson), and sports psychology (Christopher Green on Coleman Robert Griffith).

Regarding mainstream popular culture, it can be said that we now live in an age of the sequel, in which originality and creativity are valued below what is familiar and safe. Historians and students of the behavioral sciences should be grateful that the editors of Volume VI of Portraits of Pioneers in Psychology have found a way to give them what they have come to expect from this series—detailed, individual biographical portraits of influential psychologists—while at the same time enhancing its scholarly weight and expanding the conception of what it means to be a pioneer.

Reviewed by Trey Buchanan, Associate Professor of Psychology, Wheaton College, Wheaton, IL 60187.

In the final chapter of Craig Calhoun’s edited volume Sociology in America, Alan Sica remarks that “[t]here are no definitive, comprehensive histories of sociology as practiced in the United States (or elsewhere) which can be compared favorably with the leading extant accounts of biology, chemistry, economics, philosophy, or psychology” (p. 713). Sica’s point resonates with the overall goal of this volume, which is, more or less, to help the history of sociology to catch up with the more extensive histories of these other fields of inquiry. No one here makes the (incorrect) claim that Sociology in America represents the beginning of the history of sociology; the editor and authors are careful to acknowledge their forebears. Calhoun himself points to important recent work in the history of sociology, including Jonathan Turner and Stephen Turner’s The Impossible Science (1990) and Donald Levine’s Visions of the Sociological Tradition (1995).

Calhoun is to be praised for admitting certain limits in this project. While editors of volumes so large (731 pages of tightly packed prose) and so closely aligned with a major professional association (the volume is packaged as “An ASA Centennial Publication”) might be inclined toward more grandiose claims, Calhoun sees the necessary constraints of this project. In his preface, Calhoun strikes a balanced tone, remarking without regret that this is history by sociologists—not by historians—and yet promising that this “is not the sort of naïve history of thinkers and ideas that sociologists too often write of their own field” (p. xiv). The chapters in the volume help Calhoun to keep this promise.

The organization of the volume is largely chronological, as the first 13 chapters wend their way from the nascent nineteenth-century American sociology to that of the late twentieth century. There is an explicit presentist tinge in many of these chapters. For instance, Michael Burawoy’s call for “public sociologies” (2004) has led some authors here to examine the public dimension of sociology (or the lack thereof). In this vein, we see attention paid to how social work once represented a link between sociology and the public, and a teasing out of the public strains of sociological work in the 1960s. After these chronologically arranged chapters, the remaining eight chapters isolate dimensions of sociological work across time, including chapters on feminist sociology, the sociology of race, the sociology of education, internationalism, and Alan Sica’s aforementioned final chapter on the historiography of U.S. sociology.

The quality of chapters here is kept very high, and the chapters are carefully edited so as to move comfortably from one to the next. At their best, the chapters merge counterintuitive conclusions with careful research. Charles Camic’s chapter, “Sociology During the Great Depression and the New Deal,” shows how sociologists during that time negotiated their way through a system of social sciences (and other professions) in a manner that found them seeking distinction through a rejection of the topics already treated by other fields such as economics and political science. Also of note is Andrew Abbott and James T. Sparrow’s “Hot War, Cold War,” a chapter that shows how World War II and the Cold War presented sociology with new inroads to influence while also selectively pushing sociology into particular methodological and intellectual approaches. Aldon D. Morris’s chapter, “Sociology of Race and W. E. B. DuBois: The Path Not Taken,” argues persuasively that “a great deal more analytic accuracy and predictive power could have been developed if DuBois’s conceptualizations of race had guided the field” (p. 504).
One of the strengths of Sociology in America is the fact that sociologists are writing their own—very sociologically-attuned—history in the volume. This sociological approach to the history of sociology may lead to one shortcoming of the volume: a lack of archival depth. Many chapters focus only on published work in sociology or on headcount data concerning the makeup of departments, associations, or editorial staffs of journals. Only rarely does support in these chapters come from personal correspondence or other unpublished archival material. Though by no means a fatal flaw, it may strike some of the more historically oriented as a problem.

It is also worth pointing out that the emphasis on creating a “comprehensive” history of sociology has led authors for this volume to focus very much on central tendencies in the field of sociology. Many are the chapters that address the Columbia, Harvard, and Chicago departments during their periods of well-nigh unquestioned dominance. Less frequent here are explorations of departments or intellectual orientations whose existence has been more marginal to the profession. There are crucial exceptions to this, including Stephen Turner’s excellent and archives-informed “A Life in the First Half-Century of Sociology: Charles Ellwood and the Division of Sociology,” in which Turner’s biographical emphasis on Charles Ellwood leads him to address the patterns of sociology exemplified by Ellwood at the University of Missouri (and elsewhere). Calhoun’s own chapter, coauthored with Jonathan VanAntwerpen, addresses the functions, meanings, and origins of the term “mainstream sociology,” with an emphasis on how the term has functioned as a “discursive strategy” (p. 410). This is historically informed sociology of sociology at its best, casting into doubt the taken-for-granted terms by which sociology has understood itself, attending to the interaction between margins and the center.

No single volume could ever sufficiently address both the central and marginal tendencies of a field as large and diverse as sociology. In this sense, let us hope, Sociology in America represents a new beginning—not a capstone—to the practice of studying the history of sociology.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by DAVID W. PARK, Assistant Professor of Communication, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045-2399.


Assumptions of sexual difference have largely been premised on anatomical or reproductive differences—that is, “visible” differences. External structures were tied to internal structures and processes, so sexual difference was presumed to exist throughout the body. Nineteenth-century studies of the brain incorporated sexual difference in the same way, contending that male brains functioned differently and were superior to female brains. However,
scientific theories of a gendered brain were not without influence from cultural beliefs; scientists also looked to society to inform as well as to substantiate their own theories about sexual difference in the mind (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Rachel Malane advances this point in her book *Sex in Mind: The Gendered Brain in Nineteenth-Century Literature and Mental Sciences* by examining how the notion of “gender” brought together science and culture. Malane explores specifically how Victorian literature had portrayed “sex in mind” as compared to the prevailing science on the brain and sexual difference at that time. Using selected works of Charlotte Brontë, Wilkie Collins, and Thomas Hardy, Malane exposes these authors’ epistemological commitments to empiricism by citing the ways they apply science in their narratives to inform and simultaneously support existing cultural beliefs about sexual difference in the mind.

Beginning with an examination into the influences of various sciences on brain research in the nineteenth century, Malane highlights the contributions of biology, evolutionary theory, psychology, phrenology, and craniology to explaining sexual difference in the brain and its effects on mental functions and abilities. The substance of Malane’s analysis occurs, however, in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 with a thorough investigation into the particular ways Brontë, Collins, and Hardy portray the minds of their male and female characters, in line with scientific theories of a gendered brain. Examples abound depicting the superior reasoning of the male mind and the inferior emotional susceptibility of the female mind. Yet her analysis also reveals the nuances between authors in their individual portrayals of “sex in mind” in their work. For instance, Malane highlights Brontë’s use of phrenology to talk about the “boundaries” of male and female minds and the interaction between their respective brains spaces. Collins, by contrast, relies on nervous- or sense-based evidence to account for the emotionally susceptible brain of his female characters and the intellectually superior brain of his male characters. Finally, Malane emphasizes Hardy’s use of evolutionary theory, craniology, and phrenology to exemplify the female mind as inert and ruled by feeling and the male mind as progressive and ruled by intellect in his work.

*Sex in Mind* is a coherent and insightful cross-disciplinary analysis into the ways scientific theories of the brain permeated cultural knowledge of the mind. The central points of each section are clearly stated, and examples are elaborated to fully exemplify the author’s claims. Overall, the analysis itself is straightforward and easy to follow, and although the conclusion nicely recapitulates the salient points of the book, Malane does fall short of suggesting any implications of these conclusions. For instance, considering the technological advancements in scientific research over the last 100 years, methods of investigation in the mental sciences have undoubtedly changed—but what about ontological assumptions of sexual difference? How is “sex in mind” understood today in science, or in what ways does it currently exist? Simon LeVay’s (1993) work contends that sexual orientation originates at least in part in the brain, suggesting this notion of “sex in mind” has been expanded in contemporary research to include sexuality as also biologically determined. Nevertheless, Malane offers a unique look into the interplay of science and culture in the nineteenth century.

REFERENCES


Reviewed by Melissa K. Houghtaling, PhD candidate, Department of Sociology, Queen’s University, Kingston, ON.


These two interesting collections mark the 100th anniversary of the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the 40th anniversary of the Australian Sociological Association. They are structured on somewhat different principles, reflecting the situations of the two national sociologies. The American collection is the loyal opposition to the official celebration; another book on the conventional history of the U.S. discipline (*A History of American Sociology*, edited by Craig Calhoun), sponsored by the ASA, is to appear, while this one, from its Section on the History of Sociology, deals with minority, nonmainstream, and neglected areas of the history. The Australian collection is an official one; it reprints significant founding documents and past historical accounts or commentaries and also includes several new chapters, so it is a resource as well as a new historical work. Against those backgrounds, it is not surprising that contributions to the American volume deal with relatively early work and, in particular, the role in that time frame of women and members of minorities, while the Australian one comes up to the present day and is preoccupied with the local emergence of sociology as a discipline and with questions of its national identity.

Papers in the American volume are unevenly scattered across the potential field. Some deal with subjects, such as the roles of W. E. B. DuBois and other African Americans, that have become relatively familiar, while others, such as those on women in the South or on a Catholic working at a Catholic university, offer new angles on the position of minorities of different kinds. A paper on the perhaps too familiar Robert Park deals with a hitherto undiscovered aspect, his marriage and his attitude to his wife’s voluntary work—it is suggested that she was better known than him until relatively late in his career—and how that may be related to his sociological work. Another paper, on the influence of Julian Samora on the development of research on undocumented migration, exemplifies the value of work on locally important individuals not normally mentioned in general histories of sociology. At the institutional level, a paper on a short-lived National Sociological Society, founded in 1903, which brought whites and African Americans together to discuss “the race problem,” throws fresh light on the circumstances that led to the founding of such bodies and the survival of some and the collapse of others. One paper on pre-1940 sociology at women’s and black colleges shows how in both the curriculum was strongly influenced by the social position of the groups catered for, and provides valuable data on the early courses offered by each. Many chapters raise the issue of what should be regarded as “sociology,” and make the case that we cannot deal adequately with the emergence of its modern form without taking into account ambiguous cases and currently unfashionable ancestors.

All the examples mentioned—and others—draw our attention to topics well worth retrieval for our historical knowledge. However, one would sometimes like to know more than the papers offer. The one on Samora, for instance, oddly fails to discuss his and some of his students’ Latino origins, dealing with the emergence of a subspecialism, with little data on the networks and setting within which this took place. The material on women’s and black colleges would be made more interesting if more systematic comparison with what
happened at the same time in colleges for white men had been made. Some other papers present large bodies of data, but their effective new content is mainly (useful) annotated lists, while what others offer is interpretive rather than fresh historical material. Not all the papers are good ones. Those are critical comments, but in a way they miss the point. I think that this book should be regarded as a work in progress and an important invitation to carry that work forward. There are many more neglected histories of departments, specialisms, and individuals waiting to be written. The task of comparing and theorizing such material and bringing it into the “mainstream” history of sociology needs to be done, and it has been started.

Some of the Australian papers are about the history of sociology in Australia, while others constitute part of that history; some offer interpretive accounts from the point of view of participants, while others provide useful systematic data on names, dates, and numbers. They vary in ambition and merit but collectively give a good feel for the issues that have preoccupied Australian sociologists as well as for their disciplinary prehistory. The story shows how, as in other countries, sociology gradually emerged from a variety of disciplinary and activist settings, and how its position as a university subject was influenced by preexisting disciplinary organizations and power structures. In the most recent period, sociology is seen as strongly affected by the university response to national politics and to changing student demand, leading to a situation some writers see as threatening the loss of disciplinary identity through fragmentation. To the British reader, that is a remarkably familiar complaint, and raises questions that give this work added value as part of the worldwide history of sociology. To what extent have there been really distinct national histories? Are similarities accounted for by cross-national influence, or do they show that the appropriate generalizations are about the independent emergence and reception of national sociologies in response to similar contextual social situations? Once a national sociology has started its growth, is it to be expected that it will follow a trajectory paralleling the developmental processes at comparable stages elsewhere, or one that is historically unique?

It is slightly disappointing that some features of Australian society that might have been expected to make differences, interesting as absences if not as presences in its sociology, are not given special attention. Its colonial history (though Connell writes on its status as “a branch office of metropolitan sociology”), its reception of migrants, and its population size and distribution are mentioned only briefly—and no equivalent of the recent Melbourne University Press book on the sheep in Australian cinema figures! But such factors might be seen as primarily relevant in a comparative context, while this is history for Australians. It often takes for granted background knowledge of social and political developments that the non-Australian reader may well not possess; more developed general historical work would surely fill that gap. It is not surprising that some of the reprinted historical papers overlap in their content where they refer to the same periods. While in one way this repetition seems wasteful, it offers the interestingly reflexive possibility of comparing the narratives within which particular events appear in the historical accounts given at different periods. The editors list what they see as needed for the full history of Australian sociology that remains to be written, and the book ends with a listing of resources that could be used toward this task. Clearly, this too is the useful first step in a longer-term enterprise, and we may look forward to its continuation.

Both these books, thus, in their different ways, contribute to disciplinary history some less-studied cases that need to be taken into account in the full story, and open up many avenues for fuller future work.

This volume’s titular “sacred bundle” refers to the dominant perception of anthropology as essentially and necessarily composed of four fields: sociocultural anthropology, linguistic anthropology, biological anthropology, and archaeology. This “four-field” orientation is a reality in most large anthropology departments in North America and an ideal for many smaller departments, and continues to characterize much of the discourse concerning disciplinary identity when anthropologists talk among themselves, as well as to non-anthropologist colleagues and the public. In this view, anthropology as a discipline has the capacity to bridge the gulf between biology and culture, between the sciences and the humanities, in a way that no other discipline can. The editors of this volume assemble a much-needed reality check on these hegemonic discursive moves, bringing together a range of scholars who are committed to examining both the historical and institutional contingency of the four-field structure, as well as the utility of this structure as anthropology moves into the twenty-first century.

In their introduction, the editors point out that even to question four-field “holism” in anthropology is to invite censure from colleagues committed to the “integrity” of the discipline, despite the fact that meaningful dialogue between the four fields, especially between sociocultural and biological anthropology, is difficult to achieve and limited in scope. They point out that anthropology’s diverse interests in non-European peoples, in material artifacts, and in nonhuman primates were woven together in the nineteenth century as a single discipline concerned with evolutionary approaches to the human past. However, this holism is difficult to accommodate today, at least for sociocultural anthropologists, given that social-evolutionary theory has been out of vogue for many decades. Addressing themselves to their colleagues in sociocultural anthropology who are still committed to the four-field “sacred bundle,” the editors provocatively ask, “[W]hen was the last time that research on hominid evolution or primates was helpful to you in thinking about your ethnographic data?” (p. 11). Thus, the tone is set for the opening of a dialogue about four-field holism that is bound to generate vigorous discussion.

The volume’s individual authors examine the history that led to anthropology’s four-field organization and the institutional structures that maintain it. James Clifford, no stranger to scrutinizing anthropology’s disciplinary praxis both before and since coediting *Writing Culture* (1986) with George Marcus, draws on the concept of *articulation*—the historically and politically contingent connections between discursive and social bodies—to examine how and why the “sacred bundle” has remained together for so long, even after predictions of its demise by Franz Boas a century ago. Clifford asks what the articulations have been in
the creation of anthropological holism, and what disarticulations and rearticulations may be necessary for anthropology to develop into the future. In her essay, Rena Lederman discusses the fact that a “two cultures” opposition between essentialist/positivist and contextualizing/interpretive approaches exists not only among the fields of anthropology, but also within each of them and in society as a whole. Lederman advocates a more complex position than either the fusion of holistic anthropology or its fission, a discipline that is able to negotiate a variety of significant public discourses in a creative and pragmatic way. Sylvia Yanagisako’s focus is on the settler colonialist and nationalist processes that brought together the four fields in a single “holistic” discipline in North America. Unifying these different approaches was the project of knowing the Native American “other” as a means of constructing a sense of national identity in the United States; because such a project was not undertaken elsewhere in the world, anthropology as a four-field discipline did not emerge elsewhere either. Michael Silverstein’s analysis focuses on the traditional convergence of sociocultural and linguistic anthropology on bounded “cultures” and “languages” as discreet objects of analysis. Contemporary anthropology’s more recent engagement with theory from other disciplines has led to a deep suspicion of “thingy, boundable wholes called languages and cultures” (p. 112) and has turned sociocultural anthropology away from the “sacred bundle” for inspiration and toward more interdisciplinary engagements. Finally, Ian Hodder questions the very notion that archaeology as a field is best served under anthropology as a four-field discipline, noting the opposition between processual archaeologists committed to a universalizing science within an holistic discipline and postprocessual archaeologists who adopt a theoretical stance relating not only to sociocultural anthropology, but also to phenomenology, philosophy, sociology, and feminism. In the end, Hodder argues for a flexible and strategic set of alliances with a wide variety of disciplines and without the metadiscourse provided by the “sacred bundle.”

The authors of this timely and stimulating volume have taken on the task of raising an issue that is surely thought about a great deal but rarely discussed publicly. The world is not the same today as it was when our four-field discipline first emerged, and the maintenance of a four-field structure into the twenty-first century must at least be subject to some scrutiny and debate. Uncomfortable or controversial issues do not simply disappear because they are avoided. Whatever one’s particular point of view is on the “proper” orientation for the discipline, the authors and editors of this volume ought to be commended for opening an important discussion about the elephant in the room.

REFERENCE


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