


49. He made the observation to de Gaulle, it seems, who responded with equanimity, "Que voulez-vous, la France est radicalement-socialiste." The story is recounted in Duquesne, *Les Catholiques français*, p. 225.


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**Remembering the Battle of Paris**

**17 October 1961 in French and Algerian Memory**

_Joshua Cole_

_University of Georgia_

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**Being There**

Begin with this: On the 16th there was a meeting of our FLN cell in our dormitory. We received the order to demonstrate against the curfew on the next day at 8 pm at [place de la] Concorde. The order was clear: not even a pochette on you. We were happy to be able to finally express ourselves in front of the cops. Always with our hands in the air—the humiliation was too much. We left in small groups after work, wearing our Sunday clothes. I arrived at the Madeleine metro station around 6:30, but the train stopped, the police had blocked it. There were police everywhere. They made all the North Africans get out and lined us up in the station tunnels. There were hundreds of us. They marched us outside and hit us to make us get into busses. I heard shots coming from Concorde. They took us to the Palais des Sports, at the porte de Versailles. More arrived every quarter hour. There were more than 10,000 of us. We stayed there one week, sleeping on cement. I suffered from rheumatism. The CRS [Compagnies républicaines de sécurité, or riot police] sold us snacks for 15 francs, cigarettes for 20 francs. To go the toilet we had to pass between two lines of police and they beat us in turn, saying "Fellagha, go back to your Ferhat Abbas." So we preferred to piss in our pants. Afterwards we were transported to a triage center, an old barracks in Vincennes. I stayed there 33 days. My compatriots told me that when they released us they had to cross the woods on foot and that other police would recapture us and throw us in the Seine. But instead they tortured us with hot iron rods to learn the names of the leaders. At night they woke us with jets of water. I was never released. They took me to Algeria in a plane and put me in a camp until the end of the war. Afterwards I came back because I didn't have any family there. They killed them. My only family was the fédération de France du FLN. It didn't agree with Ben Bella. So there you have it. I'm not bitter. We were at war. [On était en guerre.]"
Kader was there on 17 October 1961—at the Madeleine metro station at about 6:30 in the evening. He was also there at the Palais des Sports three days after the demonstration, and for 33 days at the police department’s Identification Center at Vincennes. In 1981, when Kader gave this testimony to Libération, he was still “there”—in France—living in the same worker’s dormitory that had been his home in 1961. After being held in a camp in Algeria, he had returned to the country where he felt humiliated and where he had been tortured, because his family had been killed and his political allies exiled. He was not bitter. “We were at war.” Who is this “we”?

Here is another “we”:

Bullets are fired in the direction of our procession. The shots become louder. We stop short. In the crowd of men who go before us I have time to see the bare heads of protesters who, in the space of an instant, disperse, exposing more clearly a row of uniforms, a homogenous blue-black line of police who are still standing. The bodies of Algerians fall. We are one hundred meters from the bridge at Neuilly. The ranks of women and children were overcome by panic.2

Monique Hervo was also there—100 meters from the bridge at Neuilly at about 8:30 pm on 17 October 1961. These words are an act of testimony, but they are also a political statement, because Hervo was French like the police were French, not Algerian and Muslim and French like the protesters who fell to the ground. Monique Hervo was a social worker who lived among Algerian laborers and their families in a shantytown to the west of Paris from 1959 to 1962, and who marched with them on 17 October 1961 to the bridge at Neuilly. Because she was there, some people will want to believe her when she says she saw people die. But because she said “we,” others will not.

And here is another “we”—like Kader’s, delivered in the more colloquial and more distancing third-person singular by Raoul Letard, a police officer who was there, on the bridge at Neuilly on 17 October 1961. Letard and his colleagues arrived just in time for the last confrontation between demonstrators and the police:

We threw ourselves into what we called “a bit of hunting” which took us into an area of housing blocks in Colombes. It was already eleven o’clock. The residents who were afraid called to us [...] We went up to their apartments in order to see better, and we shot at everything that moved. [...] It was horrible, horrible.

For two hours it was a real manhunt, terrible, terrible, terrible! [...] Finally, we had to leave, lacking opposition. There was a van that followed us, a police van that was responsible for collecting the demonstrators. In that van there were quite a few dead bodies. But that caused a ruckus because the commander was unhappy that we brought back the corpses. We should have left them there. We were so out of our minds that we had become uncontrollable.3

Letard’s “we” is the familiar one of any corporate body, a “we” produced by the cloistered world of an organization that sets itself apart from the world at large, and lives largely by its own rules. His “we” is one of the rank and file—it does not, for example, include his commander, though elsewhere in his account of the evening, Letard made it clear that his superiors knew how to take advantage of the strong sense of solidarity that bound together the men in his unit. And it is precisely these bonds of solidarity that were broken when Raoul Letard consented to be interviewed in 1993, and when excerpts from this interview were published in L’Express in 1997. Standing alone, stripped of the tight bonds of fraternity that bind together the members of a police force, do his words carry the same weight?

The problem of testimony can be reduced to this: proximity lends an unquestionable legitimacy to any account (who else are we going to ask?), but it also taints the narrative with the stain of the particular, a specific location—“there”—and a corresponding inability to see the whole. At best, a witness possesses only an incomplete picture, and it is always possible to say that their specific location in a social world fraught with discordant ideologies gives their voice a partisan tone. This makes witnesses suspect in the eyes of a conventional history that values objectivity above all. Those who do not wish to hear can claim a principled deafness and go about their business in good conscience, hearing nothing. Since 1985, at least six books and two collections of essays have been published in France about 17 October 1961, with the participation of both French and Algerian writers, including historians, militants, and witnesses.4 Literally hundreds of articles in all the major French and Algerian newspapers have appeared regularly since the early 1980s about this event. In spite of this, or perhaps because of this, no consensus about what happened has emerged. On the fortieth anniversary in October 2001, it was still possible for Jean Tiberi, the ex-mayor of Paris, to say “we still don’t know exactly” what happened on 17 October 1961.5 One might ask whom Tiberi meant when he said “we.” After all, Tiberi, too, was “there” in Paris on that day, as a young student at the law faculty on the left bank of the river Seine. He saw nothing.

17 October 1961

Taken literally, of course, Tiberi’s statement is true: we still do not know exactly what happened on 17 October 1961. We know enough, however, to realize that Tiberi’s rhetorical ploy is less about addressing vexing questions of historical uncertainty than it is about minimizing the extent and significance of the repression. We know that on this evening, six months before the end of the French-Algerian war, between twenty and forty thousand North Africans converged on central Paris. They came by foot, by bus and by train, from shantytowns on the city’s periphery and from working-class neighborhoods in the northern and eastern districts of the capital. The immediate occasion for their demonstration was a discriminatory police curfew that prohibited Alger-
ian Muslims from circulating freely in the city between 8:30 pm and 5:30 am. The prefect of Police, Maurice Papon, had established the curfew in order to break the hold of the FLN over the immigrant Algerian population in the capital. An increase in FLN attacks against police officers in the summer and fall of 1961 provided Papon with the pretext he needed—and on 2 October Papon himself had set the tone while speaking at the funeral of an assassinated police officer: "For every blow we receive, we will give them ten in return!" The FLN leadership in France—the Fédération de France du FLN—called the demonstration to challenge the curfew and to demonstrate the depth of FLN support among Algerian laborers in France.7 In practical terms, the curfew made it difficult for the Fédération to raise needed funds from the immigrant Algerian community in France. There were political reasons for calling the demonstration as well. The Fédération leadership calculated that a show of force in the capital would raise the organization’s standing within the nationalist movement as a whole. The stakes in this calculation were high, because different factions within the FLN were already maneuvering for position and power within the anticipated postwar government.8

The Paris police responded to the demonstration with extraordinary brutality. At the place de la Concorde, the place de l’Étoile and in the Latin Quarter they refused to allow the protesters to gather, and they beat them and arrested them in large numbers. They killed many in more than one neighborhood. On the Neuilly bridge in the northwest suburbs and on the grands boulevards on the right bank, the police opened fire on marching protesters. Recently published estimates of the total number killed range from 31 to 200.9 Numerous witnesses reported seeing police throw the bodies of unconscious protesters over the parapets of the city’s bridges and into the river Seine. The police themselves recorded nearly 12,000 arrests on the night of 17 October, and by the end of the week over 14,000 prisoners were being held in stadiums and amphitheatres in outlying neighborhoods of the city. In the coming weeks, over 500 of these detainees were summarily deported to Algeria. Others remained in prison until the war ended in March 1962.

In contrast to other notorious occasions of police violence in the 1960s—Charonne, Kent State, Stonewall—17 October 1961 has no name other than its arbitrary date. This day stands alone, as if to emphasize the importance of a truth that can have no name other than that which points to its sudden eruption into history. For both French people and Algerians, however, there is still a considerable amount of disagreement about what this truth might be. In France, 17 October is now officially a day of remembrance, but a large part of what is now remembered is the forgetting of 17 October 1961—the disappearance from public discourse of a massacre that occurred in plain sight. For Algerians, too, the memory of 17 October is beset with difficulty, but for the opposite reason. Those who marched in Paris in 1961 were separated from their nationalist compatriots at home by the very fact of their presence in France. In the long history of French colonial atrocities, therefore, 17 October 1961 is exceptional because it occurred in the capital, in the heart of Paris. For the French it was the most public of their crimes; for Algerians it was the most distant and removed of their many traumas. In both countries the anomaly of the event’s location made its subsequent effacement all the more necessary, and all the more paradoxical for those who want to explain the event’s curious afterlife in history and memory.

Numbers and Responsibility

Since the days immediately after the demonstration, the discussion of 17 October in France has focused largely on two questions: government responsibility and the number of dead. After the demonstration, however, the French state used all the means at its disposal to silence those who sought to publicize the extent of the repression, including censorship.10 This effort culminated in 1968 when President de Gaulle annulled all military and police personnel for war crimes and acts of treason committed during the French-Algerian war. As a result no police officer has ever been charged with murder in connection with the demonstration of 17 October. The prefecture of Police did not permit historians to view the police archives relating to the demonstration until 1999. Without the kinds of legal cases that could bring renewed scrutiny to the demonstration, and because any works of history on the event were limited either to FLN sources or to the testimony of individuals, a more complete rendering of the event has not been possible until very recently. Uncertainty about the number of deaths has been deftly translated by irresponsible commentators, beginning with Maurice Papon himself, into an uncertainty about the event as a whole. Faced with such denials, it is perhaps not surprising that most media attention to the event has concentrated on the question of numbers—but it is also true that this discussion has prevented any meaningful assessment of overall responsibility.

How many people were killed by the police? Although disagreement remains about the extent of the repression, nobody still stands by prefect Maurice Papon’s official report, which attributed the deaths of two protesters to the police and a third to cardiac arrest. The police took responsibility for two more deaths on 18 October in related demonstrations. Since 1961, Maurice Papon has repeatedly asserted that any other bodies found after 17 October were the result of fratricidal struggles between different factions within the Algerian nationalist movement. From the point of view of the greater French public, this story possessed a certain surface plausibility, as French cities had been the sites of fierce struggles between the FLN and Messali Hadj’s Mouvement national algérien (MNA) since 1955.11 In 1957-58 this conflict, which historian and former FLN militant Mohamed Harbi called a “war within the war,” accounted for 100 deaths in the eighteenth arrondissement of Paris alone.12 This violence often followed a specific pattern: the MNA opted for indiscrimi-
inate shooting attacks on hotels or cafés where FLN members gathered, whereas the FLN preferred to assassinate MNA leaders and leave the door open for lower-ranked members of the MNA to switch sides. What the French public could not have known at the time was that by 1961 the FLN had largely won this struggle, through its successful co-optation of the Algerian immigrant population, especially in the Paris region. Given the extent of the FLN’s victory in this civil war, it would have been unnecessary for the Fédération to choose 17 October to settle scores with any remaining sympathizers of the MNA in the capital, and it is doubtful whether the MNA had the resources or the will to mount any such attacks on FLN members.

The press, however, generally accepted Papon’s account at the time. As a result, public protest against the repression was limited to a few isolated individuals or groups who never succeeded in igniting a wider discussion about police responsibility. On 18 October the political bureau of the French Communist Party published a statement condemning the “colonial policy of the Gaullist government” which it said was responsible for the “bloody events of yesterday.” On the same day, the editorial board of Les Temps Modernes released an “Appeal to French Intellectuals” which gathered 300 signatures in several days. Other protests followed by the end of the month from a group of Catholic curés in the thirteenth arrondissement, from the Conseil de l’Ordre des Avocats de Paris, and from the Union des Syndicats. Many elected officials spoke out against the repression, most notably Claude Bourdet of the Paris Municipal Council, Eugène Claudius-Petit and Gaston Defferre in the National Assembly, and Jacques Duclos in the Senate. Claudius-Petit explicitly compared Papon’s curfew to the Nazi’s requirement that Jews wear a yellow star during the German occupation. None of these protests received more than passing attention from the press.

From 1961 to the early 1980s few people in France ever spoke about the event, but when they did they usually mentioned something close to the original estimate of 300 deaths given by the FLN at the time. This number is almost certainly an exaggeration, but given the scarcity of information—and a quick count of the people who did not come home that evening—it was within a reasonable order of magnitude and certainly no more wild a guess than Papon’s initial count of two deaths. Constantin Melnik, a somewhat shadowy government fixer who worked closely with Michel Debré (prime minister in 1961), shocked many of his former colleagues in 1988 when he suggested in his memoirs that the number of deaths on 17 October was at least 100, and this figure was often cited in the years that followed. A new consensus emerged in 1991, especially in the media, following the publication of a book by Jean-Luc Einaudi, La Bataille de Paris, 17 October 1961. Repeatedly denied permission to examine the police archives, Einaudi relied on the testimony of witnesses, information from FLN documents, and corroborating evidence from the archives of the Paris morgue to come up with an estimate of 200 deaths. Journalists cited this figure more often than any others during the mid-1990s, and Einaudi’s version of the event seemed poised to become the standard reference among historians.

In 1997, however, the numbers debate was transformed as the controversy over 17 October converged with a growing media storm over another scandalous aspect of Maurice Papon’s extraordinary career: his participation as a young provincial official in the deportation of nearly 1,500 Jews from Bordeaux to Auschwitz during the Second World War. Jean-Luc Einaudi’s book, which had been generally well received by historians but largely ignored by a wider reading public, received renewed public attention in October 1997, when prosecutors called Einaudi to testify at Papon’s trial for crimes against humanity. Einaudi’s detailed testimony, which visibly troubled both Papon and his team of lawyers, was widely quoted in the press. Commentators began to speak of a trial within the trial, a second tribunal that linked the history of the French-Algerian war with the history of France’s collaborationist government under the German occupation. The court eventually convicted Papon and sentenced him to ten years in prison in April 1998. While his case was in appeal, he sued Einaudi for libel, obviously hoping that a victory in the lawsuit would help overturn his conviction. Much to the former Prefect’s discomfort, however, in February 1999 the court recognized Einaudi’s right to use the word “massacre” in writing about 17 October. The judge concluded that Einaudi had not exceeded his rights as an author in asserting that Papon was responsible for the deaths of protesters in 1961. Central to the court’s opinion in the case was the testimony of two archivists working for the city of Paris, Brigitte Lainé and Philippe Grand, who challenged the customary silence maintained by many members of their profession and corroborated some of Einaudi’s most important claims about the deaths of protesters and the disposal of their bodies in the city morgue in 1961.

Einaudi’s testimony in the Papon trial and the verdict in the Papon-Einaudi case forced Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to admit that the “official” version of 17 October could no longer be allowed to stand unchallenged. Jean-Pierre Chévenement and Elisabeth Guigou, the ministers of Interior and Justice, both called for investigations of their respective archives, which had been closed to historians. Dieudonné Mandelkern’s report for the Interior Ministry stated that no more than 32 people were killed by the police on 17 October. Jean Geronimi, reporting to the Justice Ministry in May 1999, found evidence of 48 deaths for 17 and 18 of October, though he stated that this number was “very likely less than the reality, to the extent that we are not certain that all of the submerged bodies—particularly numerous during this period—were found.” Geronimi’s report also noted that 17-18 October was only a peak in a year in which saw 246 bodies of North Africans pulled from the river and registered at the morgue, including 37 in September and 105 in October, though the average had never been above “a dozen” in previous months. In the meantime, the Prefecture of Police, no doubt uncomfortable with the public scrutiny of their procedures for granting access to their
archives, gave permission in the spring of 1999 to Jean-Paul Brunet, a historian who holds positions at both the École Normale Supérieure and the University of Paris. Brunet’s book, _Police contre FLN: Le drame d’octobre 1961_, published at the end of 1999, reinforced the lower figure given by the ministry of Interior’s report, and accused Einaudi of inflating the death toll. Einaudi was denied permission to view the police archives until over a year after Brunet’s book appeared.

Ultimately, neither Einaudi’s nor Brunet’s work succeeded in clarifying this difficult history. Einaudi’s 1992 book and a companion volume that he published in 2001 are both based primarily on eye-witness accounts, corroborated when possible with archival documents. In discussing his informants’ stories, Einaudi rarely sought to place their political engagements or allegiances in context, and he generally acceded their accounts at face value. When his witnesses claimed to have seen a dead body, Einaudi accepted it as evidence of a death—and he was as committed to the task of giving voice to those whose stories had long been ignored as he was to assigning responsibility. Einaudi was annoyed to have been denied access to the police archives, but he had little faith in the validity of the documents he found there once he was allowed in. Brunet, on the other hand, presented himself as a dispassionate empiricist, determined to escape the tendency of commentators to reproduce the ideological divisions of the 1950s in their historical accounts. Accordingly, Brunet paid less attention to the testimony of eye-witnesses and based his account entirely on the police archives, to which he was given privileged access. Brunet refused to count a death unless he had an identifiable corpse registered at the morgue—and for this reason alone he was bound to have a smaller total than Einaudi. Brunet concluded that in thirteen cases of registered deaths he is certain the police were responsible, with eight more likely, four probable, and six possible, making a total of 31.

Brunet cast his own objectivity into question, however, when he claimed that the FLN bore a large part of the responsibility for the deaths because they ordered the demonstration at a moment when “France was in a state of war [...] a war that the FLN had imported to France.”27 It is true that the FLN leadership must have expected casualties—the last time Algerian nationalists had demonstrated in the capital was 14 July 1953, when Messali Hadji’s Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) chose Bastille Day to demonstrate for Algerian independence. The police opened fire on the crowd, killing seven and injuring 48. The logic of Brunet’s argument only works to attenuate the responsibility of the police hierarchy in 1961, however, if one assumes that France and Algeria were two qualitatively different places and that what happened on one side of the Mediterranean had no relationship at all to what happened on the other. Brunet’s argument assumed that the war somehow belonged only in Algeria, and the fact that French troops were there had no relation to the situation in the metropole. One does not need to take the side of the FLN to point out that the cycle of violence that bound the French and Algerians together during this period was a great deal more complicated than Brunet characterized it—and to make this assertion was to slip into precisely the Manichean opposition that he so earnestly sought to reject at the outset of his book. In spite of their best efforts, then, Einaudi and Brunet have merely succeeded in reproducing the ideological divisions of 1961 in the historical arena—both in their estimates of the number killed and in assigning blame. Ever mindful of France’s libel laws, journalists have now resorted to the unwieldy formulation of “between 32 and 200” or simply “dozens” to speak of the number of dead. It is not hard to see how painful such approximations are to the families of victims, nor how much comfort they give to those whose political interests still require a degree of damage control.28

A Day With No Name

The persistent uncertainty about the number of deaths has also tended to obscure other difficult problems of memory and forgetting posed by October 1961. In so far as one can measure the collective memory of an event by tracing its presence in public discussion, it is safe to say that many French people and many Algerians largely “forgot” about 17 October almost immediately after it occurred.29 The reasons for this are both simple and complex. The months from October 1961 to the establishment of an independent Algerian government in the fall of 1962 were a breathless succession of dramatic developments. In the fall of 1961, both the French and Algerian populations were transfixed by an escalating wave of violence committed by the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), acts of terrorism committed by deserters from the French army acting in tandem with extremist elements in the European population in Algeria. These attacks culminated in February 1962 when the OAS assassinated over 500 people in both France and Algeria. Several weeks later the Evian accords of March 1962 ended the war. This agreement precipitated the mass departure of one million pieds noirs (Algerians of European descent), as well as the abandonment and murder in Algeria of thousands of harkis (Algerian Muslims who had served with the French military or police). Before the summer was over, fighting broke out between competing factions of the Algerian nationalist movement, and perhaps thousands were killed before a stable government was formed in September.30 While all this was going on, the Paris police violently put down other demonstrations—most famously, at the Charonne metro station on 8 February 1962, where eight people were crushed to death as a crowd protesting OAS violence fled to escape a police charge.31 One would never want to say anything that diminished the singular horror of any of these events, but the fact remains that there were plenty of bad days to keep the average reader of newspapers busy during this exceptionally traumatic year.
After March 1962, both the French and the Algerian governments seized
upon narratives of national renewal that left little room for commemorating
the events of October 1961. Charles de Gaulle, seeking to reunite the country
after a costly war that had brought a significant number of ranking military
officers to commit treason, had no wish to dwell on the excesses committed by
Parisian police. He presented decolonization to the French people as a trans-
formation of France's relationship to Algeria, rather than the end of relations
between the two countries. In Algeria, on the other hand, the dynamics of the
brief civil war that accompanied Algerian independence brought the man who
was to become Algeria's first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, into conflict with the
provisional Algerian government (GPRA) that had signed the Evian Accords in
the summer of 1962. The Fédération de France du FLN, which organized the
demonstration of 17 October, took the side of the GPRA against Ben Bella, and
in this tense and hostile political context, the new FLN regime worked hard to
isolate and marginalize anyone too closely associated with Ben Bella's oppo-
nents. Members of the Fédération de France found themselves excluded from
the new president's inner circle, even as Ben Bella moved to establish a more
cooperative relationship with the French government that had so recently
been his nation's enemy.

The split within the FLN at the moment of independence deprived Alge-
ria of many of the most prominent leaders of the revolutionary movement—
Mohamed Bougdif went into exile in Morocco, and the head of the GPRA,
Benyoucef Ben Khedda, retired from politics. Hocine Aït Ahmed retreated to
his home base in Kabylie to create a new opposition front, the Front des Forces
Socialistes (FFS). The departures of Ben Khedda and Aït Ahmed underscored
the extent to which the conflict between Ben Bella on the one hand and the
GPRA and the Fédération de France on the other overlapped a persistent eth-
nic split between Arabs and Berbers, especially Kabyles, within the nationalist
movement. Both Ben Khedda and Aït Ahmed were Kabyles and for historical
reasons, Kabyles were generally over-represented among those who emigrated
from Algeria. Berber concentrations in France included the Paris suburbs of
Nanterre, Puteaux, Courbevoie, Saint-Ouen, Saint-Denis, and the eighteenth
arrondissement of Paris, precisely those neighborhoods which provided many
of the protesters on 17 October. These neighborhoods were also key to the
organization of the Fédération de France, which recruited many of its mil-
itarian among emigrants in these areas.

The effects of these splits were to have long-term consequences for the
memory of 17 October. Ben Bella's victory over the GPRA and the Fédération
de France in 1962 set the stage for his ambitious program of "arabisation" and
"islamisation" after independence, policies of cultural renewal that sought to
build a common sense of Algerian national identity around religion and the
Arabic language. Ben Bella's overtures to Islamic leaders and to those who
favored Arabic over French made sense as a way to deflect criticism of his post-
war cooperation with the French government. For many Berbers who contin-
ued to speak their own dialects of Tamazight, however, Ben Bella's cultural pol-
icy relegated them to second-class status within their new country. Because
Algeria lacked the kinds of political institutions that could resolve these per-
sistent splits within the national community, Ben Bella and his successor
Houari Boumediene turned to a mythologized history of the revolution as a
way to create at least the illusion of a unified national identity. In this mytho-
logy, they presented the nationalist revolution as a spontaneous uprising of
rural Algerians against the French military throughout the countryside of
Algeria. Conspicuously absent, however, were the stories of urban workers in
the emigration and the role of the Fédération de France in supporting the
struggle for independence.

A break in this relative silence came in 1968, when Boumediene's gov-
ernment celebrated for the first time a new holiday on 17 October, the
"Journée nationale de l'émigration." Even here, however, the Algerian govern-
ment did little to give voice to the victims of the French police, or to the vet-
 erans of the Fédération de France. Instead, the holiday was largely designed to
fulfill the ideological needs of Boumediene's authoritarian government in
the aftermath of several years of crisis following his military coup in 1965. In
this political context, the very public celebration of the "Journée nationale de
l'émigration" served primarily to bolster the government's position as the only
legitimate representative of Algerians, both at home and abroad. For Boume-
dienne's government, 17 October marked the point at which "Algerian work-
ers loudly proclaimed their participation in the struggle for liberation." These
emigrant workers, the announcement continued, "have always shown the
most profound attachment to their country of birth, showing an unquenchable faith in the promise of freedom and a spirit of sacrifice worthy of
that possessed by the entire Algerian people." In fact, however, Algerians in
the emigration remained problematic for Boumediene. He continued to
require exit visas of all Algerians who sought to move to France, and although
he remained publicly committed to the policy of "reinsertion" he was forced
to recognize the Algerian economy's growing dependency on the remittances
sent home by emigrant laborers abroad. The FLN's official newspaper, El
Moudjahid, continued to use 17 October as the moment to celebrate the
nationalist commitments of the emigration, but this did not mean that the
regime had rehabilitated the leaders of the Fédération de France. In fact, as
Jean-Luc Einaudi discovered in the 1980s when he first traveled to Algeria to
research the 1961 demonstration, nobody, including the official veteran's
group, the Organisation nationale des moudjahidines (ONM), had ever bother-
ed to undertake a systematic collection of first-hand accounts by witnesses
or victims of police violence. The reassessment of the history of 17 October that began in France in the
1980s thus did not come because of a push emanating from official sources
in Algeria. Instead, it emerged from within discussions on the French left
about how to confront the legacy of French colonialism. Before 1980 only a
few anti-racist organizations, such as the Maoist Mouvement des travailleurs arabes and the publishers of a small alternative journal called Sans Frontière explicitly commemorated the events of 17 October. On 17 October 1980, however, Jean-Louis Penino took advantage of the nineteenth anniversary of the demonstration to publish a commemorative article in Liberté, a left-wing Parisian paper with wide readership. Penino noted that the French Left's ability to mobilize effectively around acts of anti-Semitic violence by right-wing extremists contrasted sharply with their silence about the history of colonial atrocities. Penino's article was accompanied by a multi-page spread about 17 October and photographs taken in 1961 by Elie Kagan were reproduced for the first time in a daily newspaper. These photos have now become icons of the event and are reproduced whenever journalists write about the demonstration.

Seven months after Penino's article, the context of 17 October was forever transformed when the satirical investigative weekly Le Canard Enchaîné published documents revealing Maurice Papon's participation in the deportation of Jews from Bordeaux between 1942 and 1944. At the time of these revelations Papon had risen to become minister of the Budget under president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Le Canard Enchaîné's revelations initiated the long and tortuous legal process that concluded in 1998 with Papon's conviction for crimes against humanity. The sixteen-year Papon affair and the sensational trial in 1997-98 were extraordinary media events, and Papon's dual role—loyal servant of Vichy and Gaullist police enforcer—created an indelible connection between the memory of the Shoah and the memory of the French-Algerian war in the mainstream press. For twenty years, from 1981 until the 40th anniversary of the event in October 2001, this connection was the engine that drove widespread public discussion of 17 October 1961 in France.

In order to understand how the repression of 17 October came to widespread public attention in France, one cannot avoid an examination of the scandal's connection to the Papon affair and subsequent trial. The two controversies seem to be linked in so many ways by their common themes: repressed memory, official complicity with atrocity, and the impression—however mistaken—of a public taboo being broken. Nevertheless, the connection and the presumed parallels between the two affairs misleads as much as it illuminates. In the first place, nobody in France seriously questions any longer that Vichy's activities during the German occupation were criminal and deserving of punishment, though some former Gaullist officials and a few journalists and historians have questioned the desirability or justice of making Papon stand in for the regime as a whole. When it comes to the Fourth and Fifth Republic's handling of the Algerian war, on the other hand, there is no consensus. The question remains extremely divisive because it is impossible to say of de Gaulle's government in 1961 what de Gaulle himself said of Vichy in 1944, namely, that it was not a republic and not French and therefore no stain on the history of France's commitment to republican values. Getting Papon to trial in 1997 took sixteen years from the moment his wartime activities became public knowledge (and 53 years from the moment they actually took place), in spite of the fact that the French state had largely acknowledged the complicity of the regime he served with Nazi genocide. Imagine the difficulties faced by Algerian or French families of the victims of 17 October 1961 who seek legal redress for their loss from a country that amended the perpetrators of all such crimes in 1968 and did not even officially recognize that what happened in Algeria between 1954-62 was a “war” until 1999.

Too much attention to the Papon-Vichy connection has also obscured the extent to which the more recent discussion of 17 October in France has been shaped by Algerian politics in the 1980s and 90s. The first substantial work on the role of the Fédération de France in the revolution was Ali Haroun's La Septième Wilaya, and it is no accident that it was not published in Algeria but in France by Éditions Seuil in 1986. Haroun's book, occasionally dismissed by French commentators as an apology for the FLN, is in fact an attempt to rehabilitate only one particular part it—the Fédération de France. Haroun claimed that the Conseil national de la révolution algérienne (CNRA) consecrated the Fédération as the seventh “wilaya” or military district in the summer of 1959—the six wilayas being the primary unit of the struggle against the French in Algeria. Haroun asserted that this status—which elevated his own position within the movement as one of the five directors of the Fédération—was “hidden, and then unrecognized, as soon as independence was acquired and the faith of militants was so often replaced by political opportunism [arrivisme politique].” Haroun's implicit criticism of the FLN establishment as it had developed since 1962 was part of a series of works that appeared in the 1980s—all published in France—that sought to reclaim the legitimacy of a revolution that had been diverted from its course by Ahmed Ben Bella and his successors, Houari Boumediene and Chadli Bendjedid. This need to stimulate discussion of the Fédération de France and its role in the revolution also explains why Ali Haroun gave the historical archives of the Fédération in 1986 to Georges Mattei, who had been an important clandestine supporter of the FLN during the war years in France. Georges Mattei passed the archives to his friend Jean-Luc Einaudi, who used the documents to write La Bataille de Paris. When this book was published in 1991, as we have already seen, the public attention to 17 October spread beyond the parochial boundaries of the French Left and became a subject of widespread discussion in France, and this media storm was only intensified by Einaudi's testimony in the Papon trial in October 1997.

Haroun had clearly hoped to take advantage of the ongoing discussion in France to promote a historical debate that would also advance the cause of his political allies in Algeria. In the short term, this was in fact the case, but ultimately the debate about 17 October had more long term consequences in
France than in Algeria. The publication of Ali Haroun's *La Septième Wilaya* in 1986 came in the midst of a serious political crisis for the FLN, as a younger generation began to express its unhappiness with an increasingly bureaucratic political and military establishment. Economic stagnation and widespread popular dissatisfaction with the FLN regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s forced the government of Chadli Bendjedid (1979-92) to undertake economic reforms that had been long postponed under his predecessor, Houari Boumédiennne. The result was a period of increasing instability and unrest in Algeria that culminated in civil war in the 1990s. Initially Bendjedid sought to shore up support for his policy of economic liberalization by wooing conservatives and leaders of the "arabisant" movement, even as he alienated the FLN cadres who were reluctant to give up the socialist vision the revolution had been founded upon. The extraordinary difficulty of this balancing act was illustrated by renewed outbreaks of popular unrest in Kabylia in 1980 and widespread strikes throughout the country after 1985, when falling oil prices forced Bendjedid's government into an austerity program that it could ill afford. These disturbances, serious though they were, turned out to be only a prelude, however, to the much more dramatic conflicts that broke out in October 1988, when thousands of rioters clashed with police and military forces in Bab-el-Oued, a poor and densely populated suburb of Algiers. After several days in the chaos spread to other Algerian cities, the government declared a state of siege and gave troops the order to shoot on sight. By the time it was over the security forces—especially the greatly feared Sécurité militaire (SM)—had killed between 200 and 500 protesters. In addition, 3,500 young people were arrested, many of them literally children. Most disturbing to those Algerians old enough to remember the period of the French-Algerian war was the fact that many of the young people arrested in Algiers in October 1988 were tortured by the FLN security forces. This disturbing development was made all the more poignant by the evident close relationship that the FLN government continued to have with the French, which had privileged its bilateral relationship with Algeria since 1962.

October 1988 revealed the enormous gulf that now separated the FLN government and the Algerian population—the FLN regime now stood accused of crimes that were demonstrably comparable to those perpetrated by the French. Ten days after the declaration of martial law in Algiers, the country observed the 27th anniversary of 17 October 1961, and in official publications like the *Actualité de l'émigration*, published by the Amicale des Algériens en Europe, the FLN regime tried to deflect international protests over the Algerian government's treatment of protesters by invoking the history of colonial repression: "So many voices cry out now in October 1988 to denounce and condemn Algeria after the recent riots in Algiers; but no voice is raised to remember 17 October 1961, and still fewer show the images of the ferocious repression between 1954 to 1962 [...]" One does not have to read this statement as a purely cynical attempt to co-opt the memory of 17 October to meet other needs—one hears rather the accumulated bitterness resulting from decades of international silence over the French government's wartime policies, a silence broken only when the Algerian government revealed itself to be capable of a similar brutality. Still, the fact that the repression in 1988 occurred so close to the anniversary of October 1961 forced many to ponder the connections. During the mid-1980s the *Actualité de l'émigration* had become accustomed to running a special issue devoted to 17 October every year on the anniversary, at times running to over 40 pages of interviews, historical summaries, and photographs, including the front cover. In 1988, on the other hand, there was only a brief note of several paragraphs, accompanied by several photographs in the interior of the magazine. In the aftermath of the riots of October 1988, the subject was, for once, too close to home. This chastened silence was soon followed, however, by a significant change in the coverage of 17 October in Algeria. The 1988 demonstrations that destabilized Bendjedid's regime also created pressures for reform, pressures that forced Bendjedid's government to challenge the FLN's control over the political process and to allow for the development of legal opposition parties. The result was a brief experiment in a more pluralistic society, culminating in the formation of Sid Ahmed Ghozali's government in June 1991. Ghozali's administration had at least the appearance of an independent, secular administration with a social democratic complexion. The cabinet included a member of Hocine Ait Ahmed's FFS, Hocine Benissad, as economics minister. In this atmosphere, former members of the Fédération de France were able to take advantage of a law permitting the formation of private associations and create their own veteran's group, the Association des moudjahidine de la fédération de France du FLN in 1990. In the ceremonies that marked the 30th anniversary of the event, members of this group appeared alongside members of the ONM at a colloquium in Algiers, and in a marked departure from previous years, the history of the "Septième Wilaya" was given wide attention in the proceedings. This opening up of the commemoration to members of the Fédération de France continued in 1992, when for the first time, the 17 October was celebrated as a national holiday with the same status as other key dates in the official calendar.

By this time, however, it was too late for those who hoped that a more complete rendering of the history of the war years would foster a renewed sense of civil society in Algeria. For the younger generation that had grown up since independence, neither the traditional myth of the FLN nor the rehabilitation of the Fédération de France had any effect on their dissatisfaction with a clanish regime that had grown increasingly disconnected from the Algerian people. Lacking viable political alternatives for an Algerian future they could believe in, many people turned to Islam, and it was the Islamic party, the Front Islamique du salut (FIS) that profited the most from increasing democratization in the early 1990s. In January 1992 Bendjedid's government collapsed on the eve of elections that the FIS seemed poised to win.
Military leaders suspended elections and imprisoned thousands of Islamic militants, while at the same time bringing back Mohamed Boudiaf, the long-exiled former leader of the FLN, to serve as president. In June 1992, Boudiaf himself was assassinated, perhaps by factions within the military who resented his attempts to root out corruption. The resulting civil war claimed tens of thousands of lives, and among the many groups targeted by Islamic militants for assassination—secular intellectuals, women, journalists—were the once-venerated mujahidin, veterans of the war with France. The FLN’s long attempt to create a unified national identity around the myth of the first nationalist revolution had failed, and with the death of this vision, the experience of 17 October 1961 seemed more remote than ever from the more immediate concerns of Algerians.55

Fraternity and Fratricide

For both the French and Algerian governments, then, the meaning of 17 October has been framed and distorted by the necessity of constructing a coherent narrative of national renewal in the years since Algerian independence in 1962. For Gaulists in France, this meant talking about the war in ways that preserved the French Republic’s reputation for protecting individual rights and liberties. From this perspective, the struggle against the FLN was a fight to preserve such liberties, and the deaths of 17 October were the unavoidable result of a brutal but necessary war against a violent and implacable enemy. In Algeria, on the other hand, successive post-independence regimes required a unifying myth of national revolution that could cover up the nationalist movement’s violent divisions during the difficult years between 1954 and 1962. In the 1960s, Ben Bella’s regime accomplished this by giving most of the credit for the Algerian revolution to the rural fellagh, rather than to any particular group or faction of revolutionary militants. The urban laborers of 17 October had no place in either story of national renewal—the French could not recognize them either as citizens or as victims, and the Algerian government would not recognize them as active agents in the struggle for independence.

What both of these views had in common was a need to simplify the lines of conflict that had characterized the French-Algerian war. Both stories needed to reduce this struggle to its lowest common denominator, to an axis that separated two irreducible national communities whose violent one hundred and thirty year experiment in co-existence had come to an end. Agreement on this question meant denying the obviously fratricidal elements of the conflict—the murder of thousands of Algerian Muslims by Algerians Muslims as rival factions struggled for control of the nationalist movement, the treason of French officers who sought to assassinate de Gaulle, and the corresponding “national betrayal” of the harkis, who fought on the side of the French. Rather than giv-
he returned to power in 1958, became an important part of the new president’s ambitious (but ultimately unsuccessful) Constantine Plan for the economic development of Algeria. Under this plan, de Gaulle and his ministers established offices to encourage the immigration of qualified Algerians to France, and to give them the training and assistance necessary for their integration into the metropolitan population. Less than two weeks after coming to power in 1958, de Gaulle centralized responsibility for this program by creating a Secrétariat général pour les affaires algériennes (SGAA), and naming as secretary general an old associate and former diplomat, René Brouillet, who had directed the general’s staff during the Liberation in 1944.

Under Brouillet’s authority, the new government took charge of a broad range of social assistance programs aimed at Algerian Muslims that had developed within the ministries of Interior, Health, Labor, Information, Education and Defense.60 For Algerian Muslims living in metropolitan France—such as those who ended up marching on 17 October 1961—the most important of these programs was the Service des affaires musulmanes et de l’action sociale (SAMAS), created in April 1958 within the ministry of the Interior.61 The SAMAS directed the activities of 25 functionaries (conseillers techniques pour les affaires musulmanes or CTAM) who were placed throughout the administration with the rank of sub-prefect. Together, the CTAMs supervised the 135 organizations of social assistance that received funding from the government. Programs for employment, vocational and language training, medical assistance, and housing were among the most important, but they also included specialized radio broadcasts and aid for many local friendly societies that offered support to immigrant laborers and their families. Central to the proliferation of these offices was the paradoxical assumption that the integration of this population into French society required its own apparatus for the provision of social services.62 Because of the narrow connection that was seen between the work of social assistance and the maintenance of public order, however, the CTAM were used by the administration not only to assist the Algerian immigrant population, but also to collect information about the their activities in the metropolie.63 One can see here how Papon’s curfew of October 1961, which seems blatantly racist in retrospect, grew out of a long tradition within the administration of creating a separate set of rules for the Français musulmans d’Algérie.

This confusion between surveillance and social assistance was compounded by Papon’s activities at the prefecture of Police. Under pressure from Michel Debâé to produce results in the struggle against the FLN, Papon and Interior Minister Roger Frey pushed through an extremely aggressive set of repressive measures that combined intimidation with arbitrary arrests, secret detention, and what appears to have been routine use of beatings and torture. Before being named prefect of Police in March 1958, Papon had been prefect in the Algerian department of Constantine, where he established a reputation for brutal efficiency in the struggle against the FLN. According to Jean-Luc Einaudi, Papon’s tenure in the Constantine marked the moment where torture and summary execution became routine practices in the government’s conflict with the FLN in the region.64 In 1959, Papon began importing military officers with experience in Algeria to Paris to head up a new police office for infiltrating the North African population in the capital, the Bureau de renseignements spécialisé or BRS, which in turn supervised the four offices of the Service d’assistance technique aux Français musulmans d’Algérie (SATFMA).65 Papon described the BRS’s and the SATFMA’s activities as “psychopolitical” in character, and stated that the offices constituted “the active social element of the offices of the prefecture of Police.”66 In practical terms, this meant recruiting over 700 harki military personnel from the ministry of Armies, and organizing them into a Force de police auxiliaire (FPA) that operated outside of the normal judicial or police hierarchies. These units—known as the caïrets bleus for their blue caps, or simply as the harkis of Paris—were given free rein to arrest, detain without charge, and torture the very same people who were being assisted by the Constantine plan.67 Algerian Muslims in Paris soon learned to fear them.

Obviously, any program of social assistance that was too closely associated with Papon and the BRS would have little credibility among the target population of Algerian Muslims in Paris. In January 1959, René Brouillet tried to remedy this problem by creating a new coordinator for what was now known as the “Action sociale pour français musulmans d’Algérie.” This official would report directly to the prime minister’s office, rather than the minister of the Interior, which had authority over the police. Brouillet appointed a young government functionary named Michel Massenet to fill the post.68 Michel Massenet had been working in the offices of a former governor-general of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, and he had made a name for himself in 1957 by writing a pamphlet defending the government against charges that it condoned torture by the military in Algeria.69 From 1959 until the declaration of Algerian independence in 1962, Massenet was the only person of rank in the French government whose job it was to represent the interests of Algerian Muslims. Knowing what was expected of him, Massenet dealt with the problem of abuses by Papon’s harki units by absenting himself from any meetings in which the prefect of Police was present and in which the policing of the North African population was on the agenda.70 By keeping his hands clean in this fashion he hoped to maintain the trust of the immigrant community in France—but of course, this also meant that he could in no way moderate the extraordinary powers granted to the police during this period. In the aftermath of 17 October his own notes—carefully preserved in the papers of his office at the National Archives—attest to his awareness of the brutality of the repression on 17 October, but he never publicly challenged the official version put out by Papon.71 This two-faced policy was more than a simple good cop-bad cop routine, and it would be a mistake to see the policy of social assistance to the Algerian
Muslim population as a cynical alibi, or a veneer of good intentions that hid a more harsh reality. In fact, these good intentions were indispensable to the workings of government repression in the last years of the war, and the institutions that executed this repression came to life largely as a result of the government’s creation of a network of offices that both provided assistance to Algerian Muslims in France in the name of integration and legitimated their continued surveillance as a separate and unassimilated population. Constantin Melnik pointed out the contradictions inherent in the government’s Janus-faced policy in his memoirs of his time as an aide to Prime Minister Debré:

If the Muslims were French, then it was necessary to grant them the rights and liberties of French citizens—with the atrocious corollary that a continued rebellion necessitated the abominable extremes of civil war. If, on the contrary, the Algerians were members of a nation committed to independence, then a street demonstration on our territory—in contrast to Algeria where we allowed them to express themselves to the great despair of the Europeans—constituted an act of war whether we liked it or not, since we were at war with this nation.72

Melnik’s paradox gives us a clue as to how to approach the excuse that Papon gave whenever he was confronted with apparent evidence of police excess on 17 October: “We were at war.”73 For Papon’s actions to be justified, the fact that Algerian Muslims were French citizens had to be less important than the protesters’ support for the FLN and the cause of independence—in other words, Papon and his supporters could not admit that the conflict could be represented as a fratricidal war rather than a struggle between different national groups. Furthermore, Papon’s excuse—“We were at war”—obscured the extent to which republican institutions of social assistance had been used to justify the segregation, surveillance, and persecution of a specific group of French citizens.

For anyone on the receiving end of a police baton or an assassin’s bullet in 1961, the difference between a war of brothers and a war of irreconcilable enemies might have seemed beside the point. After the fact, however, such nuances loomed large in establishing the context for judging the actions undertaken both by the police and by the FLN. Melnik’s implication is clear enough: a civil war was inconceivable, because the bonds of fraternity could not possibly reach across the Mediterranean—this was a war of two different peoples, who could be distinguished on sight. And here, of course, is where the French government’s position found itself perfectly congruent with the FLN’s nationalist message. When all other explanations for atrocity fail, both sides resorted to cliché and the gestures contained in the word “we”: “We were at war.” This logic could only make sense, of course, if one conveniently forgot the huge effort that the Fourth and Fifth Republics had devoted to integrating Algerian Muslims into the French polity, and the extent to which the prefect of Police had taken advantage of these institutions in the months leading up to the fall of 1961.

The FLN’s celebration of the “Journée nationale de l’émigration” can be seen as an attempt to deal with a symmetrical paradox facing Algerian nationalists. The declaration of independence in 1962 made the revolutionary movement a success, but it also placed emigrant Algerians in France in an ambiguous position. Many decided to stay in France, and the number of Algerians in France increased from 350,000 in 1962 (sixteen percent of the total immigrant population) to 711,000 in 1974 (21 percent of the total).74 Many of these families did not return, creating a “second generation” of French-speaking French-Algerians whose religious and national identities were subject to a great deal of tension, and whose cultural loyalties and relationships to the experience of the war years remained difficult to pin down. During the 1960s, 70s and 80s an organization funded by the Algerian government, the Amicale des Algériens en Europe, worked hard to maintain connections between the home country and Algerian families in the emigration. These activities contributed in important ways to the political identity claimed by second generation children of emigrants in the 1980s, but by continually evoking the memory of 17 October to mobilize this generation, the FLN inadvertently expressed its nostalgia for a period when the national boundaries were much easier to discern, produced as they were through the gruesome crucible of violence. Not surprisingly, many of these second generation children of emigrants found their parents very reticent and unwilling to talk about the choices that they had made during the war years.75

By the mid-1980s, both the French and Algerian governments were forced to recognize the reality of a large and permanent minority in France of Algerian descent, many of whom had opted for French citizenship. Many young people in this second generation interpreted the French government’s persistent silence about October 1961 as a continual reminder of their second-class status within the French polity. The result was a proliferation of ceremonies organized by groups like SOS Racisme and Au nom de la mémoire, who sought to bring together members of this hybrid generation and to educate the French public about the repression of the 1961 demonstration.76 This work seemed all the more necessary given the rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front and a spate of disturbing attacks against those who appeared to be “Algerian” in French cities during the 1980s.77

In a colloquium organized in Paris on the 25th anniversary of 17 October in 1986, Ali Ammar, the president of the Amicale des Algériens en Europe, showed how much the group had moved beyond the ritualistic formulations of a narrow nationalism, in calling for a “solidarist memory capable of honoring with the same emotion those drowned in the Seine and those killed at Charonne.” He suggested that this solidarity could be found in the fact that in these last months of the war, “the Algerian community in France and the French democratic movement were attacked by the same adversary: colonialism.”78 Ali Ammar’s evocation of solidarity formed through memory of a common struggle was an important step in forging an alliance between orga-
nizations like the Amicale des Algériens and the French Left, at a time when his constituency, Algerians living in France, was facing great hostility from an increasingly xenophobic electorate in France. As history, however, Ali Ammar’s claims for a solidarist memory obscured a basic irony: in 1961 the only people preaching solidarity between Algerians and the French Republic, however cynically, were the right-wing extremists in the OAS. In the 1980s, of course, the Right and Left had reversed themselves, with Le Pen (himself a former paratrooper in the French-Algerian war) mobilizing against immigration and much of the mainstream Left espousing a rather traditionalist vision of republican integration, if not assimilation. Absent in this discussion was any acknowledgement of the extent to which republican institutions had been implicated in the repressive treatment of Algerians in France in the last years of the war.

**Entering History**

Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing in the 1990s, 17 October entered history: in France by way of the glare cast by Maurice Papon’s trial for crimes against humanity, and in Algeria in the aftermath of a political crisis that challenged the FLN’s monopoly on the history of the nationalist revolution. The demonstration has now been the subject of several films—both documentary and fictional—that appeared on television or in movie theatres in France, and these films continue to be shown in both France and Algeria on the anniversary of the event. Jean-Luc Einaudi and Jean-Paul Brunet appeared on television and radio programs debating the extent of the police repression, and Lionel Jospin’s government called upon archivists to be more forthcoming with documents relating to the Algerian war. Associations such as *Au nom de la mémoire, 17 Octobre 1961 Contre l’oubli*, and *Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l’amitié entre les peuples all maintain websites with information on 17 October, including testimony by witnesses and statements of support from prominent personalities. There is evidence, too, that the message of these “militants de mémoire” has penetrated mainstream political parties. One of the founding members of *Au nom de la mémoire*, historian David Assouline, who was instrumental in organizing the first commemorations of 17 October in the 1980s, is now an aide to the socialist mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë. In October 2001, Mayor Delanoë broke the official silence of the Parisian municipal government by dedicating a memorial plaque to the 1961 victims of police repression on the Saint-Michel bridge, only steps away from the headquarters of the préfecture de Police. In the debate about this commemoration in the Paris Municipal Council, a Green Party member, Sylvain Garrel, spoke of “a large scale crime ordered and covered-up by the highest state authorities,” mentioning the names of General de Gaulle, Maurice Papon, Roger Frey, and Michel Debré. At the mention of these figures, right-wing members of the council briefly walked out of the chamber in protest.

The bitterness of this continuing debate reveals the extent to which a Manichean opposition—between Right and Left, French and Algerian—still structures all attempts to talk about what happened between 1954 and 1962. No matter how one decides to tell this story, it seems impossible to render it on its own terms. What would these terms be? When one relates the events of 17 October 1961 can one really discern if the protesters were Algerians demanding independence, or French people demanding the rights to public space in the city, or simply frightened laborers and their families with few options, caught between the fear of punishment by the FLN for not participating and the fear of certain violence from a police force that had been unhinged by attacks on its members? All of these possibilities are both more or less true, and more or less inadequate to address the complexities of a situation that cannot be entirely mastered by any particular historical account—or any particular act of commemoration. It is clear, however, that the opposition we are now faced with, between the “militant journalism” of Jean-Luc Einaudi and the cautious but unself-consciously political empiricism of Jean-Paul Brunet will not be resolved until both parties recognize the extent to which their claims for historical veracity are inseparable from the political controversy which engulfs any discussion of the memory of 17 October. The work of history, like the work of citizenship, requires an ability to hear the multiplicity of voices that constitute the social realm, and to be self-conscious about the ways in which the necessary institutions of public life—governments, political parties, universities, archives—determine which voices are more easily discerned, and which are forgotten.

**Notes**

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6. Between 1958 and October 1961, 47 police officers in France were assassinated in France, and a further 140 wounded. Twenty-two of these deaths occurred between January and October 1961. Brunet, *Police contre FLN*, p. 82.


11. The split originated from the FLN’s insistence at the beginning of the war that all prewar nationalist parties be dissolved and absorbed by their new revolutionary organization. Historian Benjamin Stora cited figures from the French ministry of the Interior for the period 1955-61 stating that the FLN-MNA conflict accounted for 11,567 separate attacks in France, with 3,889 deaths and 7,678 people wounded on both sides. In Algeria, the same conflict accounted for 6,000 deaths and 14,000 people wounded. Stora, *La Gangrène et l’oubli: Le Mémoire de la Guerre d’Algérie* (Paris: Découverte, 1998), pp. 143-44.


14. By the end of 1960, the MNA had only about 6,000 dues-paying members in France, concentrated in Lorraine, the department of the Nord, and the Lyonnais region. In contrast, the FLN had over 120,000. Brunet, *Police contre FLN*, pp. 32-33.

15. Jean-Marc Berlière, the police officer in France, agreed that Papon’s claim that the dead on 17 October were the result of FLN-MNA violence is untenable. See Berlière’s interview with Annette Levy-Willard, “On risque de ne trouver dans les dossiers que des coupures de presse,” *Libération*, 18-19 October 1997, p. 3.


19. Einaudi’s was not the first full-length book to be published on 17 October, (see for example, Levine, *Les Ratiomnades*) but it was the first to be widely reviewed and discussed, and it was the first to have made much impression on the community of professional historians in France.

20. For example, the entry “17 Octobre 1961” in the most widely used historical dictionary of twentieth-century French political life largely follows Einaudi’s version of events, with only a few caveats. See Jean-François Sirinelli, ed., *Dictionnaire historique de la vie politique française au XXe siècle* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1995), pp. 362-68.


23. See *Le Monde*, 13 February 1999 and 29 March 1999. Lainé’s and Grand’s participation in the trial, who believed that they had violated their professional obligations to remain silent about the contents of archives that are not open to the public. They were subsequently reassigned and removed from many of their former activities that brought them into contact with researchers at the archives. See *Libération*, 1 June 2001.

24. Mandelkern’s report was commissioned in October 1997 immediately after Einaudi’s testimony in the Papon trial, but Josipin’s government withheld publication until after Papon was convicted in April 1998. *Le Monde*, 5 May 1998.


26. Ibid.


28. In October 2001, after gaining access to the police archives, Jean-Luc Einaudi reaffirmed his commitment to a higher figure, and documented a pattern of murder perpetrated by the police throughout the months of September and October 1961: “393 morts et disparus en septembre et octobre 1961, dont 159 à partir du 17 octobre” (cited in Alexandre Garcia, “Entre 30 et 200 morts: l’impossible bilan,” *Le Monde*, 16 October 2001). The same article cites Guy Pervillé and Jean-Paul Brunet
as historians who continue to disagree with Einaudi’s figures. Note too, that even if one sides with the lowest of the figures now generally suggested by historians, the number 32 put forth by the Mandelkern report or 31 suggested by Jean-Paul Brunet, that both Papon and the FLN were equally wide in their estimates, i.e., they were both off by a factor of ten.


30. Historians are divided in their treatment of this period of conflict within the FLN at the moment of independence. Ruedy wrote of “full-scale war […] in which hundreds and perhaps thousands of Algerians were killed by other Algerians.” (Modern Algeria [Bloomington, Ind.: University of Indiana Press, 1992], pp. 190-94.) André Nouschi minimized the extent of the fighting but spoke of “anarchy” in Algérie amère (Paris: Editions de la Maison des sciences de l’homme, 1995), pp. 230-31. Martin Stone cited estimates of 15,000 deaths. (Stone, *Agony of Algeria* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1997], p. 45.) Mohamed Harbi devoted an entire chapter to “the war of succession” and said that “more than a thousand” were killed in fighting at the end of August 1962. (Harbi, *FLN: Mirage et réalité*, p. 371.) Ferhat Abbas, a former leader of the FLN and GIPRA who was imprisoned by Ben Bella between 19 August and 30 October 1962, gave his view of the events in L’Indépendance confisquée (1962-1978) (Paris: Flammarion, 1984), pp. 27-60.


35. Hocine Aït Ahmed represented Greater Kabylia, the only region in Algeria where Berbers were a majority of the population. In 1964 Aït Ahmed supported a military rebellion against Ben Bella that failed, and he was imprisoned. Many militants within the FLN who were disappointed with Ben Bella saw more in Aït Ahmed’s opposition than a simple expression of regional identity, but the effect of the split and Aït Ahmed’s defeat was to further isolate those who had been too closely associated with expressions of Kabyle identity within the nationalist movement, including many in the Fédération de France. See Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, pp. 201-2; Nouschi, Algérie amère, pp. 243-47.


37. This is the major argument of Stora, *La Gangrène*, see esp. pp. 121-84.


40. Ibid.


45. *Le Canard enchaîné*, 6 May 1981. This article appeared between the first and second rounds of the presidential election that pit socialist François Mitterrand against the centrist Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The election was very close, and some sources have indicated that Mitterrand knew of the article beforehand, and gave permission for the article to be published, in the hopes of dampening the enthusiasm for the centre-right candidate.

46. As Henry Rousso and Robert Paxton have asserted, it is a common trope in writings about Vichy, especially journalistic commentaries, to claim to be revealing a truth that has long been hidden by a veil of silence or a taboo. In fact, as both Paxton and Rousso have shown, these crimes have been an almost constant theme of public discussion since the early 1970s, when Paxton’s groundbreaking book on Vichy was first published. Robert Paxton, *Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972) and Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

47. The National Assembly’s Law of 10 June 1999 officially recognized the conflict between 1954 and 1962 as “the Algerian war.” Prior to this time, official communiqûes always referred to the military action in Algeria as a “pacification” or a “opération de maintien de l’ordre” and the phrase “a war without a name” became a catch phrase of journalists. See Raphaëlle Barque, “La guerre d’Algérie n’est plus une guerre sans nom,” *Le Monde*, 11 June 1999.


See also the long article published on the 1993 anniversary of 17 October, "La Lutte contre terre énervée," EL MOUDJAHID, 17 October 1993.

Stora pointed out that the resurgent 1990s of controversy France over the government's use of torture during the French-Algerian war has elicited almost no response from the Algerian government. The FLN regime had no interest in a debate about human rights abuses at a moment when they were countering the theme from the Islamic movements with repressive measures that included mass arrests and torture. Stora suggested that this debate is necessary, however, if Algeria hopes to make the transition from military rule to the rule of the law. See Stora, "Algérie: Les retours de la mémoire," pp. 471-73.


The reasons for this are obvious. The discussions of 17 October have largely been driven by militants who sought above all to publicize the brutality of the colonial repression. Because criminal charges against Papon would be the best way of getting public attention, they have focused much of their attention on Papon's undeniable individual responsibility.

On the importance of reconciliation and assimilation up to 1962 see Le Sueur, UNCIVIL WAR, pp. 15-27, and 55-86.


Because the special powers act of 1956 had declared a state of emergency in Algeria, all matters pertaining to the Algerian Muslim population were considered a matter of national security, and the SAMAS was therefore not placed under the authority of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, but rather of the Ministry of the Interior, traditionally responsible for the policing function of government.

Mary Lewis found that many metropolitan social welfare offices used the existence of segregated services for North Africans used to shift this unwanted population out of their purview, even when in fact the workers qualified for support. See Mary Lewis, "The Company of Strangers: Immigration and Citizenship in Interwar Lyon and Marseille" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 2000), esp. pp. 299-367.

Viet, LA FRANCE IMMIGRÉE, pp. 186-87.


Viet, LA FRANCE IMMIGRÉE, p. 188.


Viet, LA FRANCE IMMIGRÉE pp. 188-89. See also Paulette Péju, Les Harkis à Paris; and Brunet, POLICE CONTRE FLN, p. 65.

The official title was "Délégué à l’Action Social pour les Français musulmans d’Algérie en métropole."


At times, however, he even failed to do this—on 28 September 1959 Massenet was embarrassed to discover that two figures from the minister of Justice's office had leaked to Le Monde the fact that he was present in a meeting with Papon in which, among other things, the prime minister gave the prefecture of police authority for the registration of newly arrived immigrant Algerian Muslim workers in Paris. "Note concerning the indications coming to the subject of the Committee resident at the Hotel Matignon sous la présidence de Monsieur le Premier Ministre le 28 Septembre 1959," Centre des Archives Contemporaines. CAC: 770391, Article 2. Comité interministériel d’Action Sociale. 1959-1964.

Centre des Archives Contemporaines. CAC: 770391, Article 8. "Événements d’octobre 1961."

Melnik, MILLE JOURS À MATIGNON, p. 213.

See, for example, Papon's statements in Eric Pelletier, "Nous étions en guerre," Figaro, 5 May 1998, p. 2.


Leila Sebbar's novel about the memory of 17 Oct 1961 begins with a dialogue between a mother, a veteran of the struggle for independence, and her daughter, a child who has grown up in the generation raised in France. See PASSAGE HOMME as the psychological costs of the silences of the parent's generation, as well as the insufficiencies of the political vocabulary that the young woman's parents inherited from the revolutionary years and its inapplicability to their lives in France in the 1990s: Sebbar, LA SEINE ÉTAIT ROUGE, pp. 13-16. See also the perceptive article by Philippe Bernard, "Les enfants de la guerre d’Algérie Trente ans après les événements du 17 octobre 1961 à Paris, les beurs, les fils de harkis et de pieds-noirs cherchent dans le passé de leurs parents l’espérance d’une intégration apaisée," LE MONDE, 17 October 1991.

On AU NOM DE LA MÉMOIRE and memory activism related to 17 October 1961 see Jim House, ANTICRISTIAN MEMORIES, pp. 363-65. House emphasizes the connection between the work of these groups and the government's decision to belatedly open the archives related to the demonization. By successfully forcing the government to act in this way, House argued, their efforts to encourage greater integration of socially marginalized groups, such as second-generation children of Algerian immigrants, have been largely successful.


Ibid.

Films on 17 October 1961 include: "Le Silence du fleuve" (Agnès Denis, 1991), "Drowning by Bullets" (Philip Brooks and Alan Hayling, 1992, also shown on French television's France 3 on 1 March 1993 as 17 octobre 1961: une journée portée disparue), and "Vivre au Paradis" (Boulim Guerdjou, 1999). "Octobre à
Paris," made by Jacques Panjel in 1961-62, was seized by the government and never subsequently released in France.

81. By law, the ministry of Culture has authority over archives of government documents in France, but each individual ministry and government office still retains the right to determine what documents are consigned to the archives and for how long they are to remain closed to the public. It is still possible for historians to see these documents while they are closed to the wider public, but only with special permission. The process of demanding this permission—called a dérogation—can be long and at times confusing for researchers. In practice, certain archives—among them the Archives of the Prefecture of Police in Paris—have operated with a great deal of autonomy and without much supervision from the ministry of Culture. Jospin's call for greater accessibility was an attempt to establish some standardization and transparency in this process. I should add, however, that when I requested permission to see the documents in the police archives regarding the 17 October in the spring of 2002, I found the staff to be very cooperative and the permission was granted in a matter of weeks.

82. Bernard and Garin, "Le Massacre du 17 octobre 1961".

RéFORMER LES RETRAITES EN FRANCE

Bruno Palier
CNRS, Cevipof de l'Institut des Sciences Politiques

Le système français de retraite présente de façon typique, voire caricaturale, les caractéristiques des systèmes continentaux de protection sociale, qualifiés de conservateurs et de corporatistes par Gosta Esping-Andersen. Ce système d'assurance vieillesse, financé en répartition, vise au maintien du revenu des salariés et garantit des prestations relativement généreuses aux travailleurs mais se soucie peu des plus pauvres ou de ceux (surtout celles) aux carrières discontinues et aux faibles revenus. Ce système, obligatoire, n'est pas géré directement par l'État mais par les partenaires sociaux, représentants de ceux qui cotisent et bénéficient du système. Dans la mesure où chaque catégorie professionnelle a tenu à conserver son propre régime de retraite, le système est très fragmenté.

Prestations généreuses, gestion par les partenaires sociaux et non par l'État, fragmentation corporatiste du système, toutes ces caractéristiques tendent à rendre le système particulièrement difficile à réformer, même si aussi bien l'impact du vieillissement de la population sur le financement des retraites futures que les lacunes de la couverture sociale semblent en rendre une réforme en profondeur de plus en plus nécessaire. Alors que tous les gouvernements depuis la fin des années quatre-vingt ont pensé ou tenté de réformer les retraites, seulement deux réformes sont passées, une tous les dix ans: en 1993 et en 2003, la dernière ayant fait l'objet d'une vive contestation sociale.

En 1993, la récession économique du début des années quatre-vingt-dix, comme la préparation de la monnaie unique, ont alors ouvert une fenêtre d'opportunité qui s'est vite refermée avec l'échec du plan Juppé de 1995 et le changement de majorité politique qui s'en est suivi en 1997. Entre 1997 et 2002, le gouvernement Jospin n'a fait que reporter tout projet de réforme dans la crainte des conséquences électorales d'une réforme politiquement risquée. Le gouvernement Raffarin a mis presque un an pour élaborer sa réforme et n'a pu éviter d'importantes manifestations avant d'accepter les demandes de certains des syndicats.