RACIAL SYMPATHY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

CHAPTER 4:
THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL SYMPATHY IN AMERICAN POLITICS

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Abstract: This project examines the understudied, but prevalent, phenomenon of white racial sympathy for blacks in American politics. Reversing course from a long tradition of studying racial antipathy, I argue that racial sympathy shapes public opinion among a surprisingly large share of white Americans. In this chapter of my dissertation, I find that racial sympathy is consistently and significantly associated with support for public policies perceived to benefit African Americans, even while accounting for measures of principles and prejudice. Furthermore, I undertake a variety of analyses to distinguish racial sympathy from existing measures of attitudes and find that the relationship between sympathy and policy opinion endures in the presence of multiple plausible alternative hypotheses. The analysis in this chapter complements Chapter 3, in which I introduce and validate an original measure of racial sympathy and demonstrate that the concept is distinct from a broader social sympathy. Chapter 4 also lays the groundwork for Chapter 5, in which I use a series of experiments to explore the activation of racial sympathy in politics. Though I situate the study in contemporary American politics, the dissertation also discusses the relevance of racial sympathy to other periods in American political history such as the Abolitionist movement and the 1960s. Overall, the project is a companion to the rich literature in political science on racial prejudice. It contributes to our understanding of the multifaceted role that race plays in American politics and public opinion.
Chapter 4: The Influence of Racial Sympathy in American Politics

Introduction

In the preceding chapters, I argue that political scientists’ preoccupation with racial animus has led them to overlook a distinct and consequential force in American politics: racial sympathy. Conceptually and empirically separate from prejudice, or more specifically, from the absence of prejudice, I also suggest that racial sympathy requires its own dedicated measurement. In Chapter 3, I discuss the creation of an original measure of racial sympathy and conduct a series of related validation analyses. Through these analyses, I find that the racial sympathy index demonstrates high internal consistency, is correlated with relevant attitudes, and is not associated with support for policies that benefit other socially marginalized groups, such as women or gays and lesbians.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the influence of racial sympathy on American public opinion, specifically as it relates to racialized public policies. The preceding chapter provides the tools to measure racial sympathy; this chapter employs these tools to evaluate the ways in which racial sympathy shapes white public opinion. I do this by conducting a series of analyses exploring the association between racial sympathy and support for racialized policies, that is, those policies that implicitly or explicitly reference race, using the 2013 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). I then replicate these results with three nationally representative surveys, all of which include a related measure of racial sympathy. Across these diverse, independent samples and measures a consistent pattern becomes clear: racial sympathy influences racialized public policies across time and survey. That it does so even while considering the effects of other related theoretical concepts, like prejudice, egalitarianism, implicit attitudes, and rejection of negative stereotypes suggests that racial sympathy is a unique and powerful dimension of opinion
in American politics.

I begin the chapter by developing theoretical expectations about the relationship between racial sympathy and opinion. Here I define racial sympathy and explain why I expect it to influence a wide range of white political preferences. Additionally, I attempt to differentiate racial sympathy from prejudice by arguing that racial sympathy’s focus on black suffering makes it substantively separate from prejudice, a theme explored throughout the chapter. This theorizing leads to several expectations for the analysis, which I attend to next. I then provide an overview of the formation and properties of the racial sympathy index, my original measure of the concept, and describe the primary source of data for the chapter, the CCES. This background information lays the foundation for the heart of the chapter, which employs national survey data to examine the relationship between racial sympathy and public opinion.

The preceding chapter distinguished racial sympathy as a racial attitude; this chapter reveals the nature and influence of this new racial attitude on political opinion. The dissertation’s next, and final empirical, chapter, uses multiple experiments to explore the activation of racial sympathy. In total, the empirical analyses are intended to examine the properties, boundaries and consequences of this understudied but important racial attitude.

Theory and Expectations

As I argue in Chapter 3, racial sympathy can affect white opinion and behavior in many domains. In principle, racial sympathy can impact the ways in which sympathetic whites choose people to befriend, movies to watch, or charities to sponsor. In American politics, I argue that racial sympathy can influence white support for public policies perceived to benefit blacks. Similarly racial sympathy can also influence white opposition for public policies perceived to hurt
blacks. Although there are many reasons why a white person might support a racialized policy – perhaps it is championed by his party, or corresponds with her preferences for government intervention, or aligns with his values – I suggest that, for some whites, feeling sympathy for African Americans provides an additional and significant boost on top of the many forces we already know to shape public opinion.

Furthermore, racial sympathy is an attitude that is related to but distinct from racial animus. Like animus, sympathy is fundamentally rooted in group-based assessments. Group-directed attitudes, whether positive or negative, are valuable in politics because they provide an efficient means to sort through a complicated information environment to reach an opinion (Converse 1964; Nelson and Kinder 1996). In this regard, sympathy and prejudice sprout from a similar source.

However, sympathy parts ways with prejudice in its focus on black suffering and the corresponding sorrow it evokes. Unlike prejudice, sympathy is not primarily concerned with deservingness, nor does it take up the “faulty and inflexible generalizations” that Allport (1954) observed as characteristics of prejudice. Racial sympathy is, first and foremost, an attitude that acknowledges and regrets black misfortune. Certainly it is possible that the presence or absence of prejudice combines with sympathy in special ways – a white individual could hold prejudice and sympathy simultaneously, for example – but this would not diminish sympathy’s primary feature as a racial attitude rooted in remorse.

Therefore, although racial sympathy functions like other known racial attitudes, it is substantively distinct. And because racial sympathy uniquely reflects sorrow over black misfortune,
it illuminates dimensions of racial attitudes that animus cannot. To be more specific, when political scientists examine the associations between measures of prejudice and political outcomes, they often infer that high racial prejudice leads some whites to oppose policies like affirmative action or black politicians like Barack Obama (though see Sniderman & Carmines 1999 and Feldman & Huddy 2005). When it comes to understanding outcomes generated by the low end of these measures however, the interpretation is less straightforward. It is certainly possible that a white person who scores low on measures of racial animus feels great sorrow over blacks’ conditions and is passionately committed to alleviating their suffering. However, it is also possible that this white person is apathetic, failing to register any reaction – positive or negative – when he thinks about black Americans (see Forman & Lewis 2006 for a discussion of white racial apathy). Scoring on the low end of a measure of racial animus does not distinguish between these two possibilities; it simply registers the absence of the attitude. Otherwise put, scoring low on measures of animus cannot be equated with sympathy for blacks. Therefore although sympathy, like prejudice, has the potential to shape white public opinion, it does so for distinct reasons.

Since much of the literature that references sympathy equates it with low-end prejudice, distinguishing racial sympathy from prejudice is an important starting point (Tesler & Sears 2010, Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2011). However, in addition to differentiating these two attitudes, it is also important to study sympathy in its own right. Therefore, although this chapter considers sympathy as it relates to prejudice, my primary concern is to carefully investigate the relationship between sympathy and public opinion. To do so, I probe the consistency and durability of this association by examining a wide range of alternative hypotheses. Before I begin the analysis, I will provide some background on my expectations for the chapter.
Theoretical Expectations

First, as the preceding section suggests, I expect to observe a significant association between racial sympathy and public opinion because racial sympathy is an attitude about a group and group attitudes, especially racial group attitudes, powerfully shape American public opinion (e.g. see Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944). Furthermore, since racial sympathy is a substantively unique source of opinion, I expect to find that the significant association between sympathy and policy opinion endures in the presence of plausible alternative hypotheses, including principles and racial resentment.

The first series of analyses explores the influence of sympathy on racial policy preference using the 2013 CCES. The second series of analyses expands the scope of the inquiry by examining the relationship between racial sympathy and public opinion across sample and time. To do so, I investigate the association between racial sympathy and policy opinion across three independent nationally representative samples. The 2012 and 2008 American National Election Study (ANES) and the 1994 General Social Survey (GSS) all include a related measure of racial sympathy as well as a rich assortment of relevant independent variables. Here I expect to find that racial sympathy shapes opinion in a manner distinct not only from racial resentment, but also from other forms of racial attitudes, such as negative stereotypes and implicit racial attitudes, as well as non-racial principles, such as egalitarianism.

In all, the analyses in this chapter provide an overview of racial sympathy's powerful influence on public opinion. Acknowledging this unique racial attitude enriches our understanding of American politics in two important ways. First, it helps us to comprehend the
forces that guide some whites to “pro-black” (Craemer 2008) political behavior, such as supporting the first black president or participating in the “Black Lives Matter” movement. More importantly, by considering racial sympathy, scholars gain insight into the diverse ways in which attitudes about race shape public opinion in the United States.

Data

The 2013 CCES is the primary source of data for this chapter. However, as I will discuss shortly, I replicate many of the CCES results on the ANES and GSS using a related measure of sympathy. To start, the CCES is national stratified sample administered annually on the Internet by YouGov/Polimetrix. The 2013 CCES was fielded in November 2013. One half of the questionnaire consisted of “Common Content” which included 60 questions covering a wide range of political attitudes and the other half comprised of “Team Content” in which individual researchers submitted their own questions to be asked on a subset of 1,000 individuals. The racial sympathy index, which I will describe shortly, was submitted through “Team Content” and was distributed to 1,000 respondents, 751 of whom identified as white. In addition, our “Team Content” module included multiple questions related to racialized policies, adding to the many relevant questions in these domains already contained in the survey’s Common Content.

To approximate national representativeness, the CCES uses a two-stage selection and weighting scheme based off of Census estimates and propensity-score weighting. Studies have found that the CCES sample performs similarly to the ANES on important variables, such as vote choice (Ansolabehere & Rivers 2013; Vavreck & Rivers 2008). For example, Ansolabehere and Rivers (2013) compare the demographic composition of Obama and McCain supporters across the 2008 CCES, 2008 ANES, and exit polls, and find the distribution of the vote to be “remarkably
similar to the exit polls for both the ANES and the CCES” (320).

Likewise, the composition of the 2013 CCES sample mirrors nationally representative samples such as the 2008 and 2012 ANES, as Table 1 in the Appendix displays. In this respect, the 2013 CCES overcomes some notable disadvantages of opt-in web surveys, which typically produce overeducated samples, for example (see Couper & Miller 2008 and Malhotra & Krosnick 2007 for a discussion). The next section of this chapter, in which I attempt to replicate the CCES results, provides further discussion of the CCES sample. For now, the initial distributions suggest that the 2013 CCES provides a sufficient venue for examining the relationship between racial sympathy and opinion. It also hosts my original measure of racial sympathy, which, I argue, is uniquely suited for calibrating this distinct attitude.

**Measurement**

The primary measure used in this chapter is an original four-item racial sympathy index, consisting of four fictional vignettes, each of which depicts a black individual (or a group of blacks) suffering. After reading each vignette, subjects are asked to rate how much sympathy they feel toward the sufferer. These ratings are then used to form the index. By reacting directly to specific scenarios, the vignettes allow subjects to “easily identify the broader set of issues to which this particular one apparently belongs... (using) their general attitude toward the broader set of issues to determine their attitude toward this particular one” (Schwarz 1994 135). For this reason, the NRC

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3 The CCES sample reports a higher percentage of partisan independents than the other surveys (approximately 20%). Though this is interesting from a survey design perspective, I do not think this presents a problem for my argument. First, my theorizing about racial sympathy does not assume that the concept maps neatly onto partisanship. Furthermore, as later parts of this document will demonstrate, I replicate my results using three nationally representative samples, which feature a more accurate representation of the partisan landscape.
Panel on Methods for Assessing Discrimination encourages the use of vignettes to study racial attitudes (Blank et al. 2004). Few scholars, however, have pursued this approach.

As the preceding chapter discusses, to create the vignettes, I carried out a series of participant observation sessions. Specifically, I conducted passive participant observation, which is when the researcher observes subjects, in this case during a series of community discussions on race, to gain insight into the research population (see Schwartz & Schwartz 1955). Throughout 2013, I embedded myself in multiple events associated with the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts Theme Semester on “Understanding Race,” and listened to how community members – particularly white community members – expressed their racial attitudes. These events, which ranged from semi-structured discussions following a museum exhibit to casual dialogue after a racially themed play, often drew white people who I suspected to be racially sympathetic, so I attended to listen to how these individuals expressed themselves. I paid close attention to the words they used and the salient images that they referenced.

This exploratory research revealed that many whites articulated sympathy by discussing episodic instances of discrimination experienced by African Americans in everyday life. Rarely did they reference abstract notions of inequality or concerns about historical injustice. The racial sympathy index is designed to reflect this framework by asking for respondents’ reactions to tangible scenarios. I initially created approximately twenty vignettes depicting black suffering and pre-tested them through a series of cognitive interviews on white convenience samples. The vignettes that were ultimately selected for the 4-item index were chosen because they were successful during the pre-tests, which is to say they produced meaningful variation and were easy for subjects to understand, and cumulatively presented a range of scenarios and black sufferers.
In this respect, the racial sympathy index mirrors the measure used in “Sympathetic Identification with the Underdog,” a 1963 paper by Schuman and Harding. In this article, the authors find that sympathetic identification with socially marginalized groups is associated with support for those African Americans who challenged Jim Crow segregation, such as the black students who participated in the Woolworth’s Lunch Counter sit-in. Both the racial sympathy index and Schuman and Harding’s measure provide concrete examples of discriminatory acts, intentional or unintentional, encountered by a member of an outgroup.\(^4\)

At the conclusion of their article, Schuman and Harding argue that their measures convey a substantively unique racial attitude, writing:

“These results suggest that sympathetic identification cannot be thought of as simply equivalent to what is usually measured under the term “prejudice.” The two types of measures are clearly related, but not so much so as to consider one a close substitute for the other. Identification with the underdog appears to be a distinctive dimension, worth studying, if at all, in its own right” (238).

The authors claim that sympathetic identification is a “central motivating force in humanitarian movements” (241) suggesting that the concept has broad application beyond the context of segregation. Indeed, while many years have passed since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 overturned Jim Crow segregation laws, I expect that white sympathy for African Americans still maintains its influence in present day American politics.

The racial sympathy index ranges from 0 to 1 with a score of 0 indicating that, spanning diverse scenarios, the subject feels no sorrow for black suffering. A score of 1 indicates that the

\(^4\) Schuman and Harding’s vignettes presented acts of discrimination or prejudice that were common in 1964. For example, in one vignette, the authors write: “A colored man born in New England goes South for the first time and sees in a Mississippi bus station two waiting rooms, one for colored and one for whites. How do you think he would be likely to react to this?” (231). Following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, discrimination in public accommodations, like the bus station described in this vignette, was outlawed. I updated the vignettes to appear relevant to contemporary readers.
subject consistently feels “a great deal of sympathy” for the black subject across four vignettes. The distribution of the index is presented in Figure 1 of the Appendix. The vignettes, which also appear in the Appendix, are set in a variety of everyday settings: a home, a salon, a street and a neighborhood and they intentionally vary the characteristics of the black sufferer: male, female, group, individual. As the preceding chapter discusses, the index displays properties of high internal consistency (0.74), which suggests that although respondents distinguish among the scenarios, learning about black suffering elicits a coherent response among white respondents.

Racial Sympathy and Public Opinion

Opinion on public policy has many sources. Previous research has demonstrated that education (Kam & Palmer 2008, Sears et al 1997), age (Henry & Sears 2009, Schuman & Bobo 1988), gender (Hutchings et al. 2004), region (Valentino & Sears 2005), church attendance (Feldman & Steenbergen 2001), income (Gilens 1999), and partisanship (Carmines & Stimson 1989) can all influence public opinion to varying degrees. Furthermore, and most relevant for my purposes, a broad and contested literature suggests that racial prejudice may also affect opinion on policy areas related to race (Sears et al. 1980, McConahay 1982, Kinder & Mendelberg 1995, Kinder & Sanders 1996, Alvarez & Brehm 1997, Bobo & Kluegal 1997, Sears et al. 1997, Virtanen & Huddy 1998, Gilens 1999, Federico & Sidanius 2002, Soss et al. 2003). My intention here is to evaluate whether racial sympathy is a similarly important, but also substantively unique, source of opinion in these policy areas. To do so, I conduct a series of ordinary least squares regressions that examine the association between racial sympathy and policy opinion. Since sorrow over black suffering can lead some whites to support policies that alleviate this suffering, I expect to observe a strong association between the racial sympathy index and support for racialized
policies.

To start, I examine white support for “government aid to blacks,” a broad policy area that has appeared on the ANES since the 1970s. The question asks respondents to place themselves on a 7-point scale that ranges from “Blacks Should Help Themselves” to “Government Should Help Blacks.” Previous research on this question has found that racial animus, across different forms, leads some whites to oppose government aid to African Americans (Hutchings 2009, Kinder & Sanders 1996, Piston 2014, Sears & Henry 2003). This analysis reexamines the relationship between racial attitudes and support, featuring racial sympathy as the measure of racial attitudes.

[Table 1 about here]

As the first column of Table 1, labeled “Model 1,” displays, partisanship, education, and gender are all factors that make a white person more or less likely to embrace government aid to blacks, a result that is expected, given previous research. What is perhaps unexpected, however, is that in addition to these factors, racial sympathy is also an influential source of white opinion in this policy area. The coefficient has a substantively meaningful magnitude, representing over one-third of the scale.5

One might reasonably observe, however, that Model 1 does not account for principles. Since “government aid to blacks” is fundamentally and unambiguously a policy about government spending, it is possible that support for this policy area more accurately rests in principles about the size of government than it does attitudes about African Americans specifically. Indeed, some scholars have argued that opinions on racial policies are more a function of preference for government intervention than they are an assessment of blacks (see Sniderman & Carmines 1999). By this logic, whites who favor a smaller government would oppose any redistributive policy,

5 All variables are coded are from 0-1 and all analyses in this chapter consider self-identified white respondents only.
regardless of the beneficiary, simply because it expands the size of the state. Model 2 considers this possibility by including a variable measuring principles of limited government, represented by a three-item index with a score of 1 corresponding with a strong preference for smaller government.

As the analysis indicates, principles of limited government are significantly associated with opinion in this policy area. The results in the second column of Table 1 suggest that those individuals who are less inclined to support an active government are also less likely to endorse government aid to blacks. However, even while taking the influence of this important principle into account, I find that sympathy targeted toward African Americans matters. Indeed, including preference for limited government in the model only slightly erodes the effect of sympathy.  

Thus far the analyses reveal that racial sympathy is significantly associated with opinion on government aid to blacks and that it is not reducible to preferences for limited government or partisanship, among other factors. In some respects, these results correspond with previous research, which has demonstrated the powerful influence of racial attitudes on opinion in this domain. Yet there is one crucial difference: the majority of previous work has considered the consequences of *prejudice*. Is the association between sympathy and opinion distinct from the association between prejudice and opinion? If the answer to this question is no, this suggests that a single measure of prejudice can capture the full range of racial attitudes that lead whites to support or oppose government aid to blacks. If that is the case, then there is no reason to consider sympathy in its own right.

Indeed, scholars of racial resentment, a measure that represents “a blend of anti-black affect and the kind of traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic”

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6 These results are robust to a specification that uses self-reported ideology in place of limited government.
(Kinder & Sears 1981 416), have argued that their concept measures both animus and sympathy toward blacks. While the majority of their scholarship has focused on those whites who are high in racial resentment, these scholars have also suggested that whites who score low on the index are “generally sympathetic toward blacks,” (Kinder & Sanders 1996, 106; Tesler & Sears 2010, 19) and their research provides some grounds for the interpretation that the concept of racial resentment is intended to refer to not only negative attitudes but positive attitudes as well. For example, two books by racial resentment scholars, written independently (Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2011; Tesler & Sears 2010), argue that racially sympathetic attitudes led some whites to vote for Obama. These scholars find that in both the 2008 Democratic presidential primary and in the general election, those on the low end of the racial resentment scale were especially likely to support the country’s first black president. Moreover, the association between scoring on the low end of the scale and support for the Democratic candidate in the general election was higher in 2008 than in other recent presidential elections. Primarily on the basis of these findings, both books conclude that some whites favored Obama due to his race.

Yet as I have conceptualized it, racial sympathy is not the absence of prejudice or resentment, but instead, a distinct and politically powerful dimension of racial attitudes. To further examine the relationship between sympathy, resentment and opinion, I conduct an additional analysis displayed in the far right column of Table 1, labeled “Model 3.” In this model, I allow for the possibility that low animus drives some whites to embrace government aid to blacks. And indeed, the analysis confirms that resentment is powerful, presenting the largest coefficient among many influential regressors. Since previous research has demonstrated that racial resentment is significantly associated with opinion in this policy area, this strong effect is expected
(see Kinder & Sanders 1996, 117).

But does prejudice, as measured here by racial resentment, capture the full extent of racial attitudes that shape public opinion in this domain? Based on the racial sympathy coefficient, displayed across the first row of Table 1, it appears that the answer to this question is no. Even with the inclusion of racial resentment, racial sympathy continues to be significantly associated with opinion about government aid to blacks. Although the effect of racial sympathy is diminished, its consistent association with policy opinion suggests that the racial sympathy index is capturing unique dimensions of racial attitudes that low animus cannot.

It is worth noting that the racial resentment coefficient is larger in magnitude than sympathy’s. Why might this be the case? Some scholars have argued that racial resentment, as a measure of animus, is a politicized concept, containing non-racial elements (e.g., see Huddy & Feldman 2009). In contrast, the racial sympathy index’s questions probe subjects’ sympathetic reactions to scenarios seemingly distant from political life. For this reason, racial sympathy has a low correlation with political values and principles and therefore may not be as influential, relative to racial resentment, on policy opinion variables. That said, racial sympathy matters beyond resentment’s impressive contribution. Furthermore, subsequent analyses demonstrate that this result is robust to other conceptualizations of animus, like negative stereotypes.

Based on the results in Table 1, it seems clear that racial sympathy is significant associated with support for government aid to blacks. But is it limited to this policy area? Fortunately, the CCES provides questions related to five other racialized policies, including: support for subsidies

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For example, on the CCES, the correlation between racial sympathy and the limited government index is -0.29. The correlation between racial resentment and the limited government index is 0.55. I find similar results examining the correlations between sympathy and limited government when I examine the white face-to-face respondents in the 2012 ANES.
for black businesses, scholarships to qualified black students, funding for schools in black neighborhoods, affirmative action, as well as welfare. Table 2 replicates the analyses in Model 3, Table 1 across these diverse policy areas. And as the table demonstrates, in four out of five cases, I find that racial sympathy provides a unique and significant contribution to explaining policy support in these domains. With the exception of affirmative action, which I will discuss shortly, racial sympathy is strongly and consistently associated with support for racialized public policy.

Among the policy areas, I observe a significant association between racial sympathy and policy for both policies that serve blacks broadly, such as the government aid to blacks item displayed in Table 1, as well as on policy items that serve specific segments of the black population, like subsidies for businesses that locate in black neighborhoods. Overall, when I consolidate all the policies from Table 1 and Table 2 into a single “racialized public policy index,” as displayed in the far right column of Table 2, I find that racial sympathy broadly influences policies that are perceived to affect African Americans. The coefficient is statistically significant (p < 0.01) and the magnitude of the effect is large, approximately one-eighth of the scale. In general, it seems that if a policy references blacks explicitly or implicitly, white opinion toward the policy will be associated with racial sympathy.

[Table 2 about here]

These analyses provide evidence of the robust association between racial sympathy and racialized public policies. And when we consider the results displayed in Table 2 in concert with the analyses presented in Chapter 3, which demonstrated that racial sympathy does not predict support for policies that benefit other socially marginalized groups such as women or gays and lesbians, we have mounting evidence that racial sympathy is an influential racial attitude with

\[\text{Work by Gilens (1999) has found that welfare is implicitly associated with race for many white Americans.}\]
consequences for American politics. The discriminant validity analyses in the preceding chapter suggest that racial sympathy is not reducible to a general social sympathy. Furthermore, the analyses of this chapter demonstrate that racial sympathy’s influence is not attributable to its alignment with partisanship or a preference for active government. Nor is racial sympathy’s influence absorbed by animus. Instead, white sorrow over black suffering provides its own meaningful contribution to American opinions on racialized public policies.

The Prevalence and Power of Racial Sympathy

The preceding analyses demonstrate that racial sympathy is a unique racial attitude with significant consequences for American public opinion. The association between racial sympathy and support for racialized public policies is consistent, substantively meaningful, and robust to varying model specifications.

Still, lingering questions remain. First, the preceding analyses use the CCES, which is an opt-in survey. Organizers of the CCES have acknowledged that they cannot classify the sample as strictly nationally representative (Ansolabehere & Rivers 2013), and others have criticized opt-in surveys more generally, arguing that respondents who self-select into the sample are systematically distinct (see Malhotra & Krosnick 2007). The distributions listed in Table 1 of the Appendix suggest that the white sample in the 2013 CCES shares important characteristics of the white samples collected in other reputable academic surveys. However, it is important to examine whether these results are unique to the subpopulation of adults who elect to take Internet surveys in the first place.
Second, despite my efforts to demonstrate construct validity, it is possible that the racial sympathy index does not capture racial sympathy, but instead, an unobserved factor that is correlated with racialized policy opinion. For this reason, it is useful to explore other measures of sympathy and to attempt to replicate the results generated by the racial sympathy index. Finally, although I examined the robustness of the relationship between sympathy and policy opinion with the CCES data, my analyses were limited to the variables included in that survey. It is therefore still possible that other political principles or manifestations of animus are responsible for the patterns observed in the first part of the chapter.

To address these concerns, I conduct a series of analyses using three independent sources of data: the 2012 and 2008 American National Election Study and the 1994 General Social Survey. These surveys have many attractive features. First, they are all nationally representative samples, thus alleviating concerns that the relationship between racial sympathy and policy opinion is somehow unique to opt-in respondents. These studies do not, of course, include the racial sympathy index. They do, however, include a question related to racial sympathy that asks respondents: “How often do you have sympathy for blacks?” In shorthand, I refer to this as the “ANES question.” The ANES question appears on all three surveys and, for my purposes, I expect it to capture the extent to which a respondent regularly feels sorrow when he or she thinks about African Americans, and thus, is closely related to my own conceptualization of racial sympathy. Studies on Internet convenience samples suggest that the ANES question is adequately correlated with the racial sympathy index, and therefore serves as a suitable approximation of racial sympathy.9

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9 I have included both the ANES measure and my racial sympathy index in multiple Mechanical Turk pilot studies. The average correlation between these measures, across multiple studies, is 0.62. For the first pilot study, fielded in
Using the ANES question, the analysis in this section attempts to answer two questions: first, are the patterns observed with the CCES data reproduced when we use other specifications of racial sympathy and other samples? Second, are the results robust to alternative measures of animus or nonracial explanations? As I will demonstrate, the answer to both of these questions is yes: across surveys and specifications, the relationship between racial sympathy and policy opinion endures. Building on the results presented in Tables 1 and 2, the analysis in this section demonstrates the consistent and significant influence of racial sympathy on public opinion.

To start, I attempt to replicate the CCES results using the ANES question and the 2012 and 2008 ANES and the 1994 GSS. By and large, the results of this analysis, presented in Table 3, confirm the results in Table 2; racial sympathy is significantly associated with support for a range of racialized policy areas across surveys. The magnitude of the effect does vary somewhat. For example, in the CCES, I find that racial sympathy is positively, but not significantly, associated with support for affirmative action whereas in the ANES and the GSS, this relationship is both positive and significant. As I will discuss shortly, this variation may be explained, in part, by differences in question wording. The coefficients on the other available policy areas, welfare and government aid to blacks, more closely resemble the results from the CCES. Overall, Table 3 mirrors Table 2 – both of these tables reflect the significant relationship between racial sympathy and policy opinion.

[Table 3 about here]

These associations might be substantially reduced, however, when we consider other factors

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10 The 2012 ANES was administered in two modes: face-to-face and Internet and the results reported in Tables 3-5 combine subjects from both of these modes of administration. Similar patterns are observed when isolating the face-to-face respondents alone.
that could affect racialized policy opinion. Due to variable availability, the preceding analysis exclusively used racial resentment as a representation of racial animus and limited government as a representation of principles. Yet, as aforementioned, racial resentment is a controversial instrument, in part because some scholars have argued that it is confounded with conservative ideology (see Carmines et al 2011, Feldman & Huddy 2005, Sniderman & Carmines 1999). Does the association between racial sympathy and policy support remain if the measure of racial animus takes the form of implicit attitudes? Or stereotypes? Principles of limited government do not threaten the relationship between sympathy and opinion, but do other principles, like egalitarianism? This analysis takes these important questions into consideration. I start by considering the influence of other measures of animus and then move to examining the influence of non-racial explanations such as personality and principles. Broadly, I am attempting to understand whether the results displayed in Tables 2 and 3 withstand the influence of a variety of plausible alternative explanations.

Table 4a begins this inquiry by examining other measures of animus, specifically negative stereotypes. The table displays the relationship between sympathy and opinion on three policy areas that appeared in preceding tables: government aid to blacks, welfare, and affirmative action. The results are organized in columns by these three policies, with the coefficients for each survey appearing under the policy column heading. If, as previous studies have found, the perception that blacks are lazy makes it less likely for a white individual to support racialized public policies (Bobo 2000, Hutchings 2009, Sniderman and Piazza 1993), then, conversely, perhaps if blacks are perceived as hardworking, it is more likely for a white individual to support these policies. I examine the relationship between stereotype rejection and racial sympathy in two ways. First, I use
the stereotype measure in place of racial resentment and find that rejecting the stereotype is positively associated with support for the policy; however, the contribution of this variable does not overpower the influence of sympathy. Second, when the stereotype measure is included in the same model as racial resentment, as displayed in Table 4a, racial sympathy maintains a significant association with policy opinion.

[Table 4a about here]

Moving to other forms of prejudice, Table 4b considers the possibility that implicit attitudes drive opinion on racialized policies. Recent research in social psychology has examined the influence of implicit or automatic attitudes on behavior, especially in the domain of race (see Greenwald et al 2002). Based on this scholarship, it is possible that even without awareness, some whites unconsciously associate blacks with positive words and images. If this is the case, these implicit attitudes may lead them to support policies that benefit the group. On the other hand, other research on implicit attitudes in politics has found that these attitudes did not have an effect on white evaluations of Barack Obama (Kalmoe & Piston 2013). Similarly, the multivariate analyses in the second column of Table 4b suggest that implicit attitudes do not shape opinion in this domain. Racial sympathy, however, does.

[Table 4b about here]

Finally, I consider the possibility that feelings of interracial closeness lead some whites to support racialized public policies. Craemer (2008) argues that white closeness to blacks is responsible for “pro-Black” political opinions, such as support for government aid to blacks. He writes “representations of other individuals (Aron et al., 1991) or groups (Coats et al., 2000; Smith & Henry 1996) can cognitively overlap with one’s own mental self-representation...conceivably,

11 These results are not shown for space considerations but are available upon request.
some Whites could develop cognitive self-Black overlap resulting from the salience of African Americans in the history and the political discourse of the United States” (420). I consider the possibility of “interracial cross-identification” (411) by including a self-report measure in which white respondents indicate how close they feel to blacks. The results of this analysis are presented in the first column of Table 4b. As with the preceding models, the coefficient on “close to blacks” is in the expected direction, but unlike racial sympathy, it is not significant. Racial sympathy, on the other hand, is significantly associated with support for policy across all policy areas. Based on this analysis, it does not seem that whites’ feelings of closeness, at least as captured by this explicit measure, significantly shape policy opinion. Racial sympathy, on the other hand, does.

Having exhausted the racial attitude measures in these data sets, I turn next to considering the influence of other factors. To start, Feldman and others have argued that support for policies such as welfare can be explained by considering principles like egalitarianism and later, humanitarianism (Feldman 1988, Feldman & Steenbergen 2001). Indeed it is possible that some whites endorse policies such as government aid to blacks because they believe it is important to promote equal conditions for all citizens. Based on this explanation, people do not carry group-specific attitudes, like sympathy for blacks or disgust for homosexuals (Terrizzi et al 2010) or admiration of Asian Americans (Maddux et al 2008), but instead seek to uplift all groups equally. In Table 5, I use the egalitarianism index, a measure comprised of six questions to gauge the respondent’s general “commitment to equality” (Feldman 1988 424). Although the coefficient on egalitarianism is significant in both the 2012 and 2008 ANES analyses, racial sympathy remains an influential contributor to policy opinion. I replicate this finding with the GSS, which does not include the egalitarianism battery, however, there is a question that measures the subject’s
tolerance for economic inequality, which I use as proxy for egalitarianism. As with the ANES results, the GSS analyses suggest that support for these measures is rooted, at least partially, in specific feelings about blacks. Furthermore, using a convenience sample, I conducted a similar analysis in which I used the humanitarianism index in place of the egalitarianism index and found similar results.\(^{12}\)

[Table 5 about here]

Next, I consider the influence of personality on support for racialized public policies. In the earliest studies of prejudice, scholars conceptualized prejudice as a dimension of personality (Adorno et al. 1954). Years later, personality scholars, such as Ekehammar (2004) and Mondak (2010), argue that altruistic and pro-social behavior may have roots in personality. Specifically, these scholars suggest that openness to new experiences and agreeableness, two independent dimensions of personality, may be especially important precursors to altruistic behavior (McCrae & Costa 2003). To the extent that supporting a policy that benefits another racial group can be considered a form of altruistic behavior, we can examine whether an individual’s personality makes him more likely to embrace pro-black policies using the 2012 ANES, which included the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI). TIPI is a ten-item index designed to represent five dimensions of personality: openness to new experiences, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Each item consists of two descriptors, related to the dimensions of personality, using the common stem, “I see myself as:” (Gosling et al. 2003). In Table 6, I include

---

\(^{12}\) In a 2001 paper, Feldman and Steenbergen argue that humanitarianism, defined as “a sense of obligation to help those in need” can explain support for a wide variety of social welfare policies (658). Using a Mechanical Turk convenience sample, I replicated Model 3 in Table 1, and found that going from the lowest to highest levels of racial sympathy was associated with a 0.17 increase in support for government aid to blacks (\(p < 0.01\)). When Feldman and Steenbergen’s humanitarian index was added to this model, the coefficient on racial sympathy reduced slightly to 0.16, but was still significant (\(p < 0.01\)). This analysis was conducted in January 2015 using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. N=283 whites. Further information is available upon request.
variables for openness and agreeableness (which is often conceptualized as soft-hearted, good
natured and cooperative – see John & Srivastava 1999) to examine whether the association
between racial sympathy and policy opinion is consumed by individuals’ dispositions, components
of which may be genetically heritable (Bergeman 1993).

For the most part, I find that personality traits, at least as represented by openness and
agreeableness, are not especially influential determinants of policy opinion in these domains.
Generally, their influence is dwarfed by racial sympathy’s. Therefore, while researchers have found
significant positive relationships between agreeableness and pro-social behavior, such as
volunteering (see Graziano & Eisenberg 1997 and Smith & Nelson 1975), and separately, between
openness to new experiences and liberalism (Carney et al 2008), these forces are not especially
influential when it comes to supporting policies that serve African Americans. Racial sympathy is.

Finally, I examine the influence of contact on support for racialized policies. It is possible
that some whites endorse racialized policies because they have close relationships with African
Americans. Specifically, “by bringing whites into personal contact with blacks, erroneous images of
blacks can be corrected and hostile dispositions softened” (Jackman & Crane 1986 460). Early
scholars of public opinion suggested that interracial contact – but of a very specific variety – could
reduce the effects of prejudice (Allport 1954), paving the way for intergroup social and political
cooperation. To examine this possibility, the analyses in Table 7 incorporate a measure of contact
into the model, by including a question from the GSS in which respondents indicate whether a
black person has come to their house for dinner in the course of the last year. This is, admittedly, a
crude measure as dinner invitations are not necessarily representations of equal status, common
goals, cooperation, and mutual support of authority, as anyone who has entertained his or her in-laws will concede. However, Jackman and Crane (1986) use similar measures to gauge interracial interpersonal contact (see p. 464-5) and it is plausible that having dinner qualifies as personal interaction, one of the criteria of the contact hypothesis. In Table 7, I consider the possibility that support for racialized public policies is rooted in fond feelings cultivated through interpersonal contact.

[Table 7 about here]

As the analysis demonstrates, however, racial sympathy is significantly associated with policy opinion even when taking interracial contact into account. The results in Table 7 suggest that the relationship between racial sympathy and support for policies such as government aid to blacks is independent of whites’ interracial friendships. Otherwise put, although some whites may announce: “some of my best friends are black” perhaps to signal “I am personally unbiased and fair in my assessments of blacks” (Jackman and Crane 1986 462), this sentiment does not seem to be as politically important as declaring, in contrast, “I feel sympathy for black Americans.”

In general, I observe the largest and most consistent effect for racial sympathy on those policies that explicitly name blacks as beneficiaries, thus facilitating tight interstitial linkage between the policy area and beneficiary (Converse 1964, Nelson & Kinder 1996). The association between racial sympathy and support for the government aid to blacks, a policy area that explicitly references African Americans is uniformly significant, regardless of model specification. Similarly, the results in this section reveal a consistent and significant relationship between racial sympathy and affirmative action in hiring. This result stands in contrast to the null result between racial sympathy and affirmative action observed in Table 2. Here it is possible that the type of affirmative
action might matter. The CCES affirmative action question asks subjects to report their opinion for programs that “give preference to racial minorities” in employment and college admissions. The ANES affirmative action question differs in that it refers to blacks specifically rather than all “racial minorities,” thus more easily encouraging a linkage between black suffering and political support. Additionally, the relationship between welfare and racial sympathy is somewhat inconsistent, perhaps because welfare is only implicitly racialized and citizens might not necessarily connect the policy to the relevant group (see Converse 1964 p. 236-7).

Despite these aberrations, a strong and consistent pattern emerges: racial sympathy matters. The relationship between racial sympathy and policy opinion weathers the influence of multiple alternative explanations. And it survives across time points, samples, and measures. This analysis demonstrates that the influence of race on opinion is manifold and nuanced; white attitudes about blacks are more diverse than previously acknowledged. And while my results do not deny the effect or prevalence of racial animus, they do draw our attention to the multiple ways in which attitudes about race shape American politics.

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to examine the relationship between racial sympathy and policy opinion. Through a series of analyses using different samples, models, and measures, I find that racial sympathy is strongly associated with opinion on a host of implicitly and explicitly racialized policy areas. Furthermore, these results are robust to multiple alternative hypotheses, addressing the influence of principles, stereotypes, personality and contact. Despite the contributions of these factors, racial sympathy consistently and significantly influences policy opinion. Crucially, racial sympathy’s contribution is distinct from and additional to the
contribution of animus, suggesting that sympathy represents a unique dimension of racial attitudes.

As the CCES and ANES results demonstrate, racial sympathy is significantly associated with policy opinion in the age of Obama. However, as the GSS results also demonstrate, sympathy is also significantly associated with opinion over twenty years ago, during a time period characterized by the Republican Revolution. While I cannot analyze the influence of sympathy prior to the 1990s, the results do provide us with a sense of racial sympathy’s staying power. Scholars have found that prejudice remains a politically consequential force, even after the election of the country’s first black president (Hutchings 2009, Kinder & Dale-Riddle 2011, Tesler 2012); the results from the 1994 GSS suggest that the effect of sympathy was not especially heightened during or after Obama’s election. Rather, racial sympathy, like prejudice, seems to be perpetually important in American politics.

Still, it is important to consider whether certain events, frames, or stimuli make it more likely for whites to express or act on racially sympathetic attitudes. This chapter supplied evidence of racial sympathy’s impressive and consistent influence, establishing the concept’s external validity. I have not yet explored the psychological mechanism that activates racial sympathy in politics. Doing so will provide evidence of sympathy’s internal validity, thus enabling us to draw stronger causal inferences about the ways in which racial sympathy influences political outcomes. In the next chapter, I discuss a series of original survey experiments that examine the circumstances that activate racial sympathy. Furthermore, Chapter 5 provides insight as to how “sympathy entrepreneurs” (Clark 1997) might be able to release the political power of racial sympathy on select causes.
The primary objective of Chapter 4 was to provide a detailed examination of the role of racial sympathy in public opinion. An additional objective, however, was to demonstrate the ways in which sympathy enriches our understanding of the complexity of racial attitudes. Racial sympathy is influential, distinct and can be included in any future study that seeks to understand the complex role of race in American politics. And while I attempted to examine a diverse range of public policies, the influence of racial sympathy on evaluations of black candidates or political behavior on behalf of African Americans remains uncharted territory. This chapter provides encouraging evidence that these are fruitful inquiries waiting to be undertaken.

Overall, the chapter builds on a vast, but ultimately narrow, group attitudes literature. Indeed, by concentrating on animus, social scientists have developed only a partial understanding of how racial attitudes affect outcomes. As Krysan (2000) observes, “sociologists are almost always more interested in those individuals... that create some social problem...we focus almost all our efforts on understanding conservative racial policy attitudes” (160). My work does not dismiss the influence of racial antipathy but rather adds an original dimension to our understanding of racial attitudes. By including racial sympathy in future studies, scholars can gain insight into the many and distinct ways in which attitudes about race influence politics in America.
Table 1: Racial Sympathy and Support for Government Aid to Blacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party (1=GOP)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (1=Female)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region (1=South)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church Attendance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Government</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.319</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2013 CCES

*** p < 0.01; **p<0.05; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. Each column presents a model, examining the relationship between racial sympathy and government aid to blacks.
### Table 2: Racial Sympathy and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Black Businesses</th>
<th>Black Schools</th>
<th>Black Scholarships</th>
<th>Aff. Action</th>
<th>Racialized Policy Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.17*</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.29***</td>
<td>-0.46***</td>
<td>-0.37***</td>
<td>-0.42***</td>
<td>-0.58***</td>
<td>-0.47***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.12**</td>
<td>-0.09*</td>
<td>-0.18***</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt.</td>
<td>-0.18***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.53***</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.77***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.062)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2013 CCES

*** p < 0.01; **p<0.05 ; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. The final column presents an index of opinion on all policies presented in Tables 1 and 2, (index alpha: 0.87). Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance.
Table 3: Racial Sympathy and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>Govt Aid to Blacks</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.12*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.17*** (0.037)</td>
<td>0.22*** (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.53*** (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.49*** (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.98*** (0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt</td>
<td>-0.08*** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.06*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.05 (0.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.74*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.69*** (0.046)</td>
<td>0.23** (0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 5,142, 2,013, 414, 5,403, 2,169, 508, 5,360, 2,109, 628

Sources: 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 2008 ANES, 1994 General Social Survey (GSS)

*** p < 0.01; **p<0.05 ; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness.

Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The top column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. Below these headings, the results for each survey are presented. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance.
Table 4a: Racial Sympathy, Racial Stereotypes and Support for Racialized Public Policies

Sources: 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 2008 ANES, 1994 General Social Survey (GSS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Govt Aid to Blacks</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.11*** (0.027)</td>
<td>0.17*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.19*** (0.059)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stereotypes</td>
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<td>-0.06 (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.46*** (0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.51*** (0.026)</td>
<td>-0.49*** (0.039)</td>
<td>-0.92*** (0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.09*** (0.030)</td>
<td>-0.04 (0.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt</td>
<td>-0.08*** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.06*** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.79*** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.71*** (0.055)</td>
<td>0.51*** (0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,988</td>
<td>409</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness.

Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. Below these headings, the results for each survey are presented. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance. The stereotypes variable represents the extent to which the respondent rates blacks as lazy relative to whites with a score of 1 = blacks are lazier than whites and 0 = whites are lazier than blacks.
Table 4b: Racial Sympathy, Closeness, Implicit Attitudes, and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close to Blacks</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implicit Attitudes</td>
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<td>0.10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
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<td>-0.47***</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.09***</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>0.71***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1,933</td>
<td>5,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 2008 ANES, 1994 General Social Survey (GSS)

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness.

Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. Below these headings, the results for each survey are presented. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance. The Implicit Attitudes Measure refers to the AMP (see Kalmoe and Piston 2013 for a discussion of this measure).
Table 5: Racial Sympathy, Egalitarianism and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
<th></th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.23***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
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<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
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<td>-0.96***</td>
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<td>-0.21***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
<td>0.60***</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,142</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>5,403</td>
<td>2,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.384</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0.320</td>
<td>0.234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2012 American National Election Study (ANES), 2008 ANES, 1994 General Social Survey (GSS)

*** p < 0.01; **p<0.05 ; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness.

Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinions. Below these headings, the results for each survey are presented. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance.
### Table 6: Racial Sympathy, Personality and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Affirmative Action in Hiring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreeableness</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Openness</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.53***</td>
<td>-0.26***</td>
<td>-0.50***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.10***</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Govt</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
<td>-0.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.72***</td>
<td>0.70***</td>
<td>0.63***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>4,943</td>
<td>5,182</td>
<td>5,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 2012 American National Election Study (ANES)

*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10. White respondents only; analyses are weighted for national representativeness. Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance.
Table 7: Racial Sympathy, Contact, and Support for Racialized Public Policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Aid to Blacks</th>
<th>Welfare</th>
<th>Affirmative Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial Sympathy</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Resentment</td>
<td>-0.95***</td>
<td>-0.34***</td>
<td>-0.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.21***</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.23***</td>
<td>0.64***</td>
<td>0.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1994 General Social Survey

*** p < 0.01; **p<0.05 ; * p < 0.10. White respondents only.
Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). All variables are coded from 0 to 1. The column headings display the dependent variables, which are questions about policy opinion. Coefficients on additional control variables included in the models here are not shown for space considerations – the following variables were also included in the models: income, age, education, gender, region (South) and church attendance.
Appendix

Table 1. Comparison of Whites in the 2013 CCES, the 2008 & 2012 ANES, and the 2012 GSS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2013 CCES</th>
<th>2012 ANES</th>
<th>2008 ANES</th>
<th>2012 GSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Male</td>
<td>49.26</td>
<td>48.46</td>
<td>44.82</td>
<td>46.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% BA+</td>
<td>29.17</td>
<td>32.94</td>
<td>29.83</td>
<td>31.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Democrat$^{14}$</td>
<td>37.76</td>
<td>37.74</td>
<td>43.61</td>
<td>41.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Republican</td>
<td>42.18</td>
<td>48.68</td>
<td>44.67</td>
<td>40.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Age</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45.54</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Distribution of Racial Sympathy

Whites only. Unweighted. Source: 2013 CCES

$^{14}$ Includes all three categories of Democrats: lean Democrat, Democrat, and Strong Democrat. This coding is replicated with the relevant categories for the percentage of Republicans.
MEASURES

1. 2013 CCES VARIABLES

2013 Independent Variable: Racial Sympathy Index
The following directions were provided at the beginning of the racial sympathy questions.

We are interested in your reactions to some things that happen in every day life. We will first describe the situation to you and then ask you a few questions.

Racial Sympathy 1A
Variable Label

Mrs. Lewis, a white woman with young children, posts advertisements for a nanny on community bulletin boards. She receives many inquiries and decides to interview all applicants over the phone. Mrs. Lewis is most impressed with a woman named Laurette, who has relevant experience, is an excellent cook, and comes enthusiastically recommended. Mrs. Lewis invites Laurette over for what she expects will be the final step of the hiring process. When Laurette arrives, Mrs. Lewis is surprised to see that Laurette is black. After Laurette's visit, which goes very well, Mrs. Lewis thanks her for her time but says that she will not be offered the job. When Laurette asks why, Mrs. Lewis says that she doesn't think that her children would feel comfortable around her. Laurette is upset about Mrs. Lewis' actions.

How much sympathy do you feel for Laurette?

Question Text

1 A great deal of sympathy
2 A lot of sympathy
3 Some sympathy
4 A little sympathy
5 I do not feel any sympathy for her

Racial Sympathy 2A
Variable Label

Tim is a white man who owns a hair salon. His business is growing rapidly and so he decides to place an advertisement to hire new stylists. In the advertisement, he writes that interested applicants should come for an interview first thing next Monday. When he arrives at the salon on Monday, he sees a line of seven or eight people waiting outside the door, all of whom appear to be black. He approaches the line and tells the applicants that he's sorry, but the positions have been filled. The applicants are upset; they feel they have been turned away because of their race.

Please indicate which statement best describes you.

How much sympathy do you feel for the applicants?

Question Text

1 A great deal of sympathy
2 A lot of sympathy
3 Some sympathy
Milford is a mid-sized city in the Northeast. The main bus depot for the city is located in the Whittier section of Milford, a primarily black neighborhood. Whittier community leaders argue that the concentration of buses produces serious health risks for residents; they point to the high asthma rates in Whittier as evidence of the bus depot's harmful effects. The Milford Department of Transportation officials, who are mostly white, state that Whittier is the best location for the depot because it is centrally located and many Whittier residents take the bus. Furthermore, it would be expensive to relocate the bus depot to a new location. Whittier community leaders are very upset by the Department's inaction.

How much sympathy do you feel for the residents of Whittier?

1. A great deal of sympathy
2. A lot of sympathy
3. Some sympathy
4. A little sympathy
5. I do not feel any sympathy for them

Racial Sympathy 4A
Variable Label

Michael is a young black man who lives in a midwestern city. One day Michael is crossing the street and jaywalks in front of cars. Some local police officers see Michael jaywalk and stop and question him. Michael argues that he was just jaywalking and is otherwise a law-abiding citizen. The police officers feel that Michael is being uncooperative and so they give him a pat down to see if he is carrying any concealed weapons. Michael is very upset by this treatment.

Please indicate which statement best describes you.

How much sympathy do you feel for Michael?

1. A great deal of sympathy
2. A lot of sympathy
3. Some sympathy
4. A little sympathy
5. I do not feel any sympathy for him

2013 CCES DEPENDENT VARIABLES

- Government Aid to Blacks: Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they
should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this? (Government should help blacks / Blacks should help themselves)

- **Support for welfare**: In your opinion, should federal spending on welfare be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
- **Policy Questions**: Here are several things that the government in Washington might do to deal with the problems of poverty and unemployment among black Americans. Please indicate whether you favor or oppose each.
  - **Black business**: Government giving business and industry special tax breaks for locating in black neighborhoods (strongly favor/strongly oppose),
  - **Black schools**: Spending more money on black schools (strongly favor/strongly oppose)
  - **Black scholarship**: Providing scholarships for black students who maintain good grades (strongly favor/strongly oppose)
- **Affirmative Action**: Affirmative action programs give preference to racial minorities in employment and college admissions in order to correct for past discrimination. Do you support or oppose affirmative action? Affirmative action (strongly support/strongly oppose).

### 2. ANES TIME SERIES VARIABLES

#### 2012 ANES Independent Variable:
- **Sympathy for Blacks**: How often have you felt sympathy for Blacks?

#### 2012 ANES Dependent Variables:
- **Affirmative Action in Hiring**: What about your opinion - are you FOR or AGAINST preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?
- **Welfare**: What about welfare programs. Should federal spending be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME?
- **Aid to Blacks**: Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?
  - Title: Government Help to Blacks. Left: GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP BLACKS. Right: BLACKS SHOULD HELP THEMSELVES
    Additional dependent variables for discriminant validity analyses are available upon request.

#### 2008 ANES Dependent Variables
- **Welfare**: What about welfare programs. Should federal spending be INCREASED, DECREASED, or kept ABOUT THE SAME?
- **Aid to Blacks**: Where would you place YOURSELF on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about this?
  - Title: Government Help to Blacks. Left: GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP BLACKS. Right: BLACKS SHOULD HELP THEMSELVES
• **Affirmative Action in Hiring:** Some people say that because of past discrimination, blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of blacks is wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't earned. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?

3. GSS VARIABLES, 1994 GSS

**1994 GSS Independent Variable:**

• **Sympathy for Blacks:** How often have you felt sympathy for Blacks?

Note for all GSS analyses: Due to variable availability, the questions differed somewhat between the ANES and GSS. For the GSS analysis, partisanship, income, age, education, gender, region, church attendance were measured using comparable questions to the ANES and CCES. The limited government index was not available, so instead I used self-reported ideology. Additionally, the full 4-item, racial resentment index was not available, so I used the two items that were included instead:

- Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statement: Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without special favors.
- Do you think that Blacks get more attention from government than they deserve? (Much more, more, about right, less, much less)

The question used to approximate egalitarian attitudes was:

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes. (Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly)

Finally, the question used to approximate interracial contact was: During the last few years, has anyone in your family brought a friend who was a [(Negro/ Black/ African-American)] home for dinner? (Yes, No, Don’t know)

**1994 GSS Dependent Variables:**

• **Government Aid to Blacks:** We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Spending on assistance to Blacks.

• **Welfare:** We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. Welfare

• **Affirmative Action:** Some people say that because of past discrimination, Blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion of Blacks is wrong because it discriminates against others. What about your opinion—are you for or against preferential hiring and promotion of Blacks?
References


