A Characterization of Equilibria in the Groves Ledyard Mechanism

Scott E. Page∗
Troy Tassier†

July 22, 2011

Abstract

In this paper, we characterize all interior and boundary equilibria of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism for a large class of economies and determine their stability properties. We show that the mechanism admits three types of equilibria: a symmetric, efficient stable interior equilibrium, a large set of asymmetric, efficient, unstable, interior equilibria, and a large set of asymmetric, inefficient, stable boundary equilibria. We further show that asymmetric equilibria fail to exist for large values of the punishment parameter or if the message space is bounded sufficiently. The boundary equilibria previously had not been located nor had the instability of the asymmetric equilibria been known. Interestingly, the stability of the symmetric equilibrium rests on two dynamics that individually produce instability.

∗Departments of Political Science and Economics and Centers for the Study of Complex Systems and Policy Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106
†Please send correspondence to: Troy Tassier, Department of Economics, E-528 Dealy, Fordham University, Bronx, NY 10458. telephone: (718) 817-4793. e-mail: tassier@fordham.edu
1 Introduction

Designing mechanisms that overcome the free rider problem and result in the efficient allocation of public goods has long been seen as the canonical problem in mechanism design. In a seminal paper, Groves and Ledyard offered a solution to the free rider problem (Groves and Ledyard 1976). In their mechanism, constructed incentives that induce people to truthfully reveal their preferences such that no resources need be disposed of and the outcomes are Pareto efficient. In the language of mechanism design, they succeeded in constructing an incentive compatible, balanced, efficient mechanism. They were right to call it a solution to the free rider problem.

The Groves Ledyard mechanism punishes agents that deviate from the average contribution levels. At the same time, it rewards agents if they deviate from this average by less than others do. Though Groves and Ledyard showed that all interior equilibria of this mechanism provide efficient levels of the public good, they did not consider the possibility of boundary equilibria. Here, we show that for a large class of preferences boundary equilibria exist that are both inefficient and stable.¹

We further show that these boundary equilibria, together with the symmetric equilibrium and the asymmetric interior equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (1983) (hereafter BST) are the only equilibria produced by the mechanism. Previously, BST showed that an interior asymmetric equilibrium exists for each subset of agents containing more than one-half of the agents. In the BST equilibria some agents over-contribute and some agents under-contribute relative to their true preferences. With $N$ agents and a single public good, the mechanism implements approximately $\frac{N!}{2}$ equilibria so that even modest numbers of agents result in billions of equilibria.

We extend BST’s results in three ways. First, we find closed form solutions for the equilibria. Previously, BST proved that such equilibria exist but they did not solve for them explicitly. Second, we demonstrate that these equilibria are unstable. Finally, we show that for high values of the punishment parameter or a bounded message space, the BST equilibria can fail to exist. This is also true of the boundary equilibria. When punishment is severe, the agents have a strong incentive to conform to the messages of other agents and thus eliminate all of the asymmetric equilibria. And, by constraining messages, we can force agents to remain in the basin of attraction for the symmetric

¹Of course, that class does not include quasi-linear preferences. It is well known that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism has a unique equilibria under quasi-linear preferences.
equilibrium.

One interpretation of our findings is that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism does not solve the free rider problem because it implements stable, inefficient equilibria. A counter argument is that if the message space is unbounded, then the boundary equilibria do not exist. We show that not including the boundary creates what Jackson (1992) characterizes as unbounded strategies. We show that the Groves Ledyard mechanism creates a variant of the “name the largest integer game” that leads to an arms race in the space of messages but not to an interior equilibrium. Therefore, removing the boundary on the space of messages may get rid of the equilibria but it does not get rid of the incentive problems within the mechanism. Without a boundary, best responses would lead some agents to send higher and higher messages and other agents to send lower and lower messages and no equilibrium would be attained.

A substantial portion of this paper is dedicated to investigating the stability of the three types of equilibria. If the boundary equilibria were unstable, they would not be of much practical concern. Unfortunately, they are stable. Stability can only be defined relative to a specific dynamic. When we say that an equilibrium is stable or unstable, we mean in the traditional sense that relies on linear stability analysis assuming best response behavior. This approach is standard practice in economics where dynamics assume individual level learning rules like best response functions (Van Huyck, Cook, Battalio 1994). Linear stability analysis assumes a mild form of linear best responses on the part of the players. An equilibrium that is stable according to linear stability analysis need not be attained by a given learning rule or by human or artificial agents.

We are not the first to consider the stability of the equilibria. In an early paper, Muench and Walker (1983) show that best response dynamics need not converge. Experimental results with the mechanism (Chen and Tang 1998) are more nuanced. Convergence to the equilibrium often proves difficult and depends on the size of the punishment parameter. Experiments with artificial agents show that the overshooting anticipated by Muench and Walker (1983) can be controlled (Arifovic and Ledyard 2004) provided that the agents moderate their responses. These papers consider quasi-linear preferences and so therefore do not consider the boundary equilibria.

The experimental, mathematical, and computational literatures demonstrate that linear stability analysis only tells part of the story. Mathematical stability and attaining or learning to play equilibria are different concepts. Equilibria can be stable but have vanishingly small basins
of attraction (Golman and Page 2010). To that end, we have a companion paper in which we constructed an agent based model of the Groves Ledyard mechanism (Page and Tassier 2004).\footnote{That paper, which was written at the same time as this one, includes solutions for the the boundary and BST equilibria for a specific functional form so that the results of the agent based model can be compared against the mathematics. It contains none of the general proofs that appear in this paper. It is an agent based implementation of the results of this paper. It shows that the boundary equilibria are likely to be attained under standard learning dynamics.} Relying on a specific utility function of the more general BST form, we found that artificial agents never located the BST equilibria and only found the symmetric equilibrium in special cases where we tuned the learning rates and initial conditions with great care. These findings echo Arifovic and Ledyard (2004).

The remainder of this paper is organized in five sections. In Section 2 we describe the Groves Ledyard mechanism and solve for the symmetric equilibrium and the asymmetric BST equilibria in closed form (Claim 2.) To our knowledge, a closed form solution for the BST equilibrium has never been derived or presented before. Finding the closed form solution of the BST equilibria is necessary for us to solve for the boundary equilibria that we consider later in the paper. We then prove that the BST equilibria fail to exist if the punishment parameter in the Groves Ledyard mechanism is above a threshold (Claim 3.) This is a new result that is not elsewhere in the literature. In Section 3 we prove that the Grove Ledyard and the BST equilibria are the only interior equilibria for the mechanism and offer two proofs of efficiency for these equilibria (Claims 4, 5, and 6 and Corollary 1.) In Section 4, we formally describe the boundary equilibria and show that they are stable. Combining the results of Section 3 and Section 4, we have characterized all of the equilibria of the Groves Ledyard mechanism in closed form. In Section 5 we address the stability of the aforementioned interior equilibria using linear stability analysis. We prove that the Groves Ledyard equilibrium is stable and that the BST equilibria are all unstable. In the final section, we discuss how a budget constraint can also remove the BST equilibria and the boundary equilibria as do a large punishment parameter.

2 The Groves Ledyard Mechanism

We consider an economy with a single public good and a single private good. We index the agents by \( i \in \{1, \ldots, N\} \). Each agent has an initial wealth \( w_i \) and consumes a private good \( x_i \) and a public
good $y$. In the Groves-Ledyard Mechanism, each agent announces a message, $m_i$, which is $1/N$th the amount of the public good that the agent would like to have produced. The Groves-Ledyard mechanism sets $y(\vec{m}) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} m_i$. Hereafter to simplify notation, we suppress $y$ and use $m$ to denote the sum of the $m_i$'s. Agents pay a tax $C_i(\vec{m})$ which is a function of the vector of messages as follows: $C_i(\vec{m}) = \alpha_i m + \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N} (m_i - \bar{m}_i)^2 - \sigma_i \right]$ where $\bar{m}_i$ equals the average message sent by the $N-1$ agents other than $i$ and $\sigma_i = \frac{1}{N-2} \sum_{j \neq i} (m_j - \bar{m}_i)^2$. The punishment parameter, $\gamma$, plays an important role in the analysis. Increasing $\gamma$ creates an incentive for conformity. For large enough $\gamma$, all agents send the same message in equilibrium.

Utility is a function of both goods $U_i(x_i, m)$. An agent’s budget constraint requires that $x_i(\vec{m}) = w_i - C_i(\vec{m})$. An equilibrium satisfies: $U_i(x_i(\vec{m}), y(\vec{m})) \geq U(x(\hat{m}_i, m_{-i}), y(\hat{m}_i, m_{-i})) \ \forall \hat{m}_i, \forall i$.

To minimize notation, we restrict our attention to the case of agents with identical wealth levels and preferences and assume that $\alpha_i = \frac{1}{N}$ throughout. Even with identical agents the mechanism generates multiple equilibria, therefore we see no reason to make the analysis more complicated than necessary. We take care to mention when this restriction matters substantively and when it just reduces notation. Further, in some cases we show how the proofs can be extended to the case of non-identical agents.

Throughout the paper, we rely on a decomposition of $C_i(\vec{m})$ into two parts: the contribution, $m\alpha_i = \frac{m}{N}$, and the punishment, $T_i(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N} (m_i - \bar{m}_i)^2 - \sigma_i \right]$. Note that $\sigma_i$ does not depend on $m_i$, so it is out of the agent’s control. Thus, for incentive purposes, the contribution $\frac{m}{N}$ and the difference from the average are what is relevant.

### 2.1 Preferences

In the case of quasi linear preferences (Chen and Tang 1998) the Groves Ledyard Mechanism has a unique equilibrium.\footnote{Interested readers can contact the authors for a proof.} Here we consider the more general preferences considered by BST in which the Groves Ledyard (hereafter GL) mechanism has many equilibria. These utility functions allow for the amount of the public good to influence the value of the private good. As an example, the value of beach front property (a private good) depends upon the cleanliness of the ocean and the air quality (public goods). This interaction is captured by the function $A(m)$, which is assumed to be concave, continuously differentiable, strictly positive, and strictly increasing. We can thus write...
the utility of the $i$th agent as $U_i(x_i, \vec{m}) = A(m)x_i + B_i(m)$.

The budget constraint requires that $x_i = w_i - m/N - T_i(\vec{m})$. If we substitute the first of these two equations into the second we obtain:

$$U_i(x_i, y) = A(m)w_i - A(m)m/N - A(m)T_i(\vec{m}) + B_i(m)$$

The first order condition with respect to $m_i$ can be written as follows:

$$A'(m)w_i - A'(m)m/N - A'(m)T_i(\vec{m}) - A(m)/N - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^*_i - \vec{m}^*) + B'_i(m) = 0$$

Assuming strictly concave preferences (this puts restrictions on $A(m)$), there exists a unique allocation which maximizes the sum of the agents’ utility functions. Call this $(x^*, m^*)$ and let $A^* = A(m^*)$ and $B^* = B(m^*)$.

### 2.2 Solving for the BST Equilibria

We now explicitly solve for the equilibria found by BST; To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so. In the BST equilibria, a minority of the agents sends the same low message and a majority sends the same high message. Consider the case in which $k$ people deviate below by $\epsilon$ and $(N - k)$ deviating above by $\delta$. Given that a BST equilibrium is efficient, the sum of the deviations from the symmetric equilibrium add to zero; Thus $\delta = \frac{ke}{(N-k)}$.

We solve for the equilibria in three steps: First, we state the first order condition for the agents who deviate above the average and for the agents who deviate below the average separately. Second, we solve for the values contained in the Groves Ledyard tax mechanism in terms of $\epsilon$ and $\delta$. Third, we substitute these values back into the FOC and solve for $\epsilon$.

Recall the first order condition for an equilibrium written above. Since the total contribution to the public good is the same in the symmetric equilibrium and the BST equilibria, $A(m)$ does not change. The agents who belong to the minority subset of size $k$ who send the low message have a larger $T_i$ because they differ from the mean by more than the other agents. We denote the punishment paid by the low message agents with $T^l(\vec{m})$ and the punishment paid by the high message agents with $T^u(\vec{m})$. Assuming all agents have the same wealth, we can write the first order conditions for the two types of agents as:

$$A'(m)w - A'(m)m/N - A'(m)T^l(\vec{m}) - \frac{A(m)}{N} - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^l - \vec{m}^l) + B'(m) = 0$$

5
for the low message agents and

\[ A'(m)w - A'(m)m/N - A'(m)Tu(m) - \frac{A(m)}{N} - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^u - \bar{m}^u) + B'(m) = 0 \]

for the high message agents. We can then solve for the elements that make up \( T_l(\vec{m}) \) and \( T_u(\vec{m}) \) where

\[
T_l(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N} (m^l - \bar{m}^l)^2 - \sigma_l \right]
\]

and

\[
T_u(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N} (m^u - \bar{m}^u)^2 - \sigma_u \right].
\]

**Claim 1** In an efficient allocation of the public good, where \( \delta = \frac{\epsilon}{(N-k)} \), \( T_l(\vec{m}) \) and \( T_u(\vec{m}) \) are given by

\[
T_l(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)} \]

and

\[
T_u(\vec{m}) = -\frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)^2}.
\]

**Proof:** See Appendix.

The mechanism is balanced which implies that the sum of the taxes paid by the \( k \) agents sending the lower messages and the \( (N-k) \) agents sending the higher messages equals zero. We can use this insight to solve for the value of \( \epsilon \) that characterizes the BST equilibrium.

**Claim 2** The BST equilibria are characterized by \( k \) agents sending the message \( m^* - \epsilon^{BST}(k) \) and \( (N-k) \) agents sending the message \( m^* + \frac{ke^{BST}(k)}{(N-k)} \), where \( k < \frac{N}{2} \) and where \( \epsilon^{BST}(k) = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m)}{A'(m)N(N-2k)} \).

**Proof:** See Appendix.

Note that the punishment parameter \( \gamma \) does not determine \( \epsilon \), i.e., the location of these equilibria. \( \epsilon \) is only a function of \( N, k, \) and \( A(m) \). Yet, \( \gamma \) does effect whether or not these equilibria exist as we discuss next.

### 2.3 Structure of the BST Equilibria

We now take a closer look at some characteristics of the BST equilibria. We first discuss the role of the punishment parameter \( \gamma \). Although it does not impact the location of the BST equilibria, the value of \( \gamma \) determines whether or not these equilibria exist. To show this, we decompose the utility function into two parts: the public good portion of utility (PGU) which does not depend on \( \gamma \) and the punishment portion of utility (PUNU) which does depend on \( \gamma \). These can be written as:

\[ PGU = A(m^*)(w_i - \frac{m^*}{N}) + B(m^*) \]

and
Figure 1: Utility of the high message agents when $\gamma$ is small.

Figure 2: Utility of the low message agent when $\gamma$ is small.

\[ PUNU = A(m^*) \left( -\frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N} (m_i - \bar{m}_i)^2 - \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{1}{N-2} (m_j - \bar{m}_i)^2 \right] \right) \]

Figures ?? and ?? show this decomposition of utility for the high and low agents for an example utility function with 3 agents at a BST equilibrium (2 agents are playing the high message and one is playing the low message.) Note first that both the public good portion of utility and the punishment portion of utility are at a maximum at the same message for the high agents. Thus total utility is also at a maximum at this message (the BST message.) The decomposition of utility for the low agent is much different. For her the public good portion is at a maximum but the punishment portion is at a minimum at the message that gives maximum total utility (the BST message.)

We can see this formally through the derivatives of the punishment portion of utility for the low agent. The first derivative is:

\[-A'(m^*)T^l - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m^l - \bar{m}^l).\]

And the second derivative is:

\[-A''(m^*)T^l - 2A'(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m^l - \bar{m}^l) - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}.\]

Recall that $m^l - \bar{m}^l = -\frac{\epsilon N}{N-1}$ and that $\epsilon = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m)}{N(N-2k)A'(m)}$. Substituting these into the 2nd derivative and rearranging yields:

\[-A''(m^*)T^l + \frac{\gamma A(m^*)}{N} \left[ 4 \frac{(N-2)(N-k)}{(N-2k)} - (N-1) \right].\]

Note that the public good portion of utility does not depend on $\gamma$. Thus as $\gamma$ increases the PGU remains the same. But, for the low agent, the punishment portion of utility is decreasing linearly in $\gamma$. Thus as $\gamma$ increases the total utility at the BST equilibria is decreasing for the low agents in the punishment portion of utility. Thus for sufficiently large $\gamma$, utility is minimized at the BST equilibria contribution levels, so these are no longer equilibria. This agrees with our initial
intuition. If $\gamma$ is too large, the pressure to conform is sufficiently great to wipe out the asymmetric equilibria.

We can solve for the exact value of $\gamma$ at which the BST equilibria cease to exist. Let $PGU''$ be the second derivative of the public good portion of utility. Note that this value is negative at the BST equilibria since the public good portion of utility is at a maximum. We can then state the following claim:

**Claim 3** The BST equilibria do not exist if $\gamma > \frac{\Phi''(m^*)T_i(m^*) - PGU''}{\Phi''(m^*) + B'(m^*)}$. 

**Proof:** Follows directly from above. QED.

The expression in the claim is complicated but important as it places a lower bound on $\gamma$ for the Groves Ledyard mechanism to yield a unique equilibrium. Comparative static analysis proves messy. Yet, we can say that as the utility for the public good portion becomes more concave ($PGU''$ becomes more negative), this lower bound increases. This makes intuitive sense. Sufficient curvature, is needed for the asymmetric equilibria to exist.

### 3 Characterization of Interior Equilibria

We next provide an alternative proof that any interior equilibrium must be efficient. We also show that in any interior equilibrium all agents sending a high message (respectively a low message) must send the same message. Together, these claims imply that the symmetric equilibrium together with the asymmetric equilibria found by BST comprise all of the interior equilibria of the mechanism.

To prove these and later claims, we decompose the derivative of the utility function into two parts: the public good part and the punishment part. The public good part of marginal utility (PGMU) is:

$$PGMU(\bar{m}) = A'(m)(w - \frac{m}{N}) - \frac{A(m)}{N} + B'(m).$$

The punishment part of marginal utility (PUNMU) is:

$$PUNMU(\bar{m}) = -A'(m)T_i(\bar{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m_i - \bar{m}^i)$$

We first provide an alternative and more intuitive proof that any interior equilibrium of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism is efficient.
Claim 4 All interior equilibria of the Groves Ledyard mechanism provide for an efficient level of the public good.

Proof: The amount of the public good is efficient if the sum of the PGMU’s for all of the agents equals zero. At an interior equilibrium the sum of each agent’s PGMU and PUNMU is zero; therefore, it suffices to show that the sum of the PUNMU’s equals zero at any equilibrium. We can write the sum of the PUNMU’s as follows

\[ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \left( -A'(m)T_i(\bar{m}) - \gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m_i - \bar{m}_i) \right) \]

The sum of the \((m_i - \bar{m}_i)\) terms is trivially zero. Each \(m_i\) is added once and each is subtracted \((N - 1)\) as part of an average of \((N - 1)\) messages. It therefore, suffices to show that the sum of the \(T_i(\bar{m})\)’s equal zero. Groves and Ledyard show this in their original paper. It is a condition of the mechanism being balanced. QED.

The next claim states that at any asymmetric interior equilibrium all agents sending a message higher than average send the same message.

Claim 5 Let \((m_1, m_2, \ldots m_N)\) be an interior equilibrium of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism with identical agents. If \(m_i \geq \bar{m}_i\) and \(m_j \geq \bar{m}_j\), then \(m_i = m_j\).

Proof: See Appendix.

This second claim appears to depend heavily on the identical agent assumption, but in fact it does not. Without identical agents it would not be the case that all of the agents sending the higher messages choose the exact same messages. However, it would be the case that any asymmetric equilibrium messages higher than the GL equilibrium messages would generate the same PUNMU as the messages under the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium since the amount of the public good provided would be the same in each case. Therefore, all agents sending messages above their GL equilibrium message would be obtaining the same marginal punishment for doing so. Similarly at any asymmetric interior equilibrium with identical agents all agents sending a lower than average message send the same message.

Claim 6 Let \((m_1, m_2, \ldots m_N)\) be an interior equilibrium of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism. If \(m_i \leq \bar{m}_i\) and \(m_j \leq \bar{m}_j\), then \(m_i = m_j\).

Proof: This proof follows directly from the previous claim.
Using these insights it is possible to construct a simpler direct proof for the efficiency of all interior equilibria in the case of identical agents.

Corollary 1 All interior equilibria of the Groves Ledyard mechanism provide for an efficient level of the public good when agents are identical.

Proof: Suppose that we have an equilibrium where the amount of the public good is not equal to $m^*$. It follows that the marginal utility of the public good part of the first order condition cannot equal zero, $PGMU(m^*) \neq 0$. From the previous claims we know that for any interior equilibrium, there must be a set of agents sending a low message and a set of agents sending a high message. The punishment portion of the first order condition for each set of agents plus the public good portion must equal zero. From our characterization of the asymmetric equilibria we know that for the agents who send the low messages the punishment portion of the first order condition is given by:

$$-A'(m)\frac{\gamma}{2}\epsilon^2 \cdot \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)} - \frac{A(m)\gamma k N(N-1)}{N(N-1)}$$

and for the agents who send the high message the punishment portion of the first order condition is given by:

$$A'(m)\frac{\gamma}{2}\epsilon^2 \cdot \frac{N(2k-N)k}{(N-2)(N-k)^2} + \frac{A(m)\gamma k N(N-1)}{N(N-1)(N-k)}$$

These two values have opposite sign. The first is less than 0 since $k < N/2$ and $A'(m)$ is positive. For the second value the left hand term is negative since $2k - N < 0$ but the right hand term is positive. Thus we need to show that:

$$\frac{A(m)\gamma k N(N-1)}{N(N-1)(N-k)} > A'(m)\frac{\gamma}{2}\epsilon^2 \cdot \frac{N(2k-N)k}{(N-2)(N-k)^2}$$

Recall that $\epsilon = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m)}{A'(m)N(N-2k)}$. If we cancel terms and substitute for $\epsilon$ we find this equation reduces to: $\frac{(2k-N)}{(N-2k)} < 1$ which is true since $k < N/2$. Since they must be equal, this can only occur if they equal zero, which implies that $PGMU(m^*) = 0$. QED.

Taken together these results imply that the only interior equilibria of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism are the symmetric equilibrium and the BST equilibria. Corollary 1 restates the Groves
Ledyard result that all interior equilibria of the mechanism are efficient. Claims 5 and 6 show that any interior asymmetric equilibria of the mechanism must have the form described by BST. Thus, the BST equilibria comprise the only set of asymmetric interior equilibria.

4 Boundary Phenomena and Equilibria

We now characterize the boundary equilibria of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism. We do this by placing a lower bound on the set of possible messages. Without such a lower bound on messages, there are no other equilibria because the incentive structure creates an unbounded mechanism (Jackson 1992). To see this, suppose that as in the BST equilibria, there are two groups of agents, some sending an identical high message and some sending an identical low message with more of the agents sending the high message. If the high message is above the BST equilibrium value and the amount of the public good is efficient, then the agents sending the high message have an incentive to increase their messages because in doing so they receive a subsidy from the punishment payments. This creates an incentive for the agents sending the lower message to make their messages even lower, which in turn causes the high message agents to raise their messages further. No equilibrium will ever be attained as the agents race toward positive and negative infinity.

If we bound the space of messages, then we get equilibria at the boundary as it stops the infinite sequence. Here, we consider the case where messages are restricted to the interval \([-D, \infty)\). This prevents infinite negative amounts of the public good. With this construction it is possible that agents sending higher messages can send infinite positive messages, but as we will show, it is not optimal to do so. For small \(\gamma\) such equilibria always exist provided \(D\) is large enough. However, for larger \(\gamma\) or for small \(D\) these equilibria and the BST equilibria do not exist.

With this structure we can no longer assume that the amount of the public good provided is efficient, but from our previous results, we can assume that \(k\) agents, where \(k < \frac{N}{2}\), send the message \(-D\), and the other \(N - k\) agents send messages \(m^+\) that are positive. Let \(m\) denote the amount of the public good provided so that \(m\) satisfies \(-kD + (N - k)m^+ = m\) or \(m^+ = \frac{m + kD}{(N - k)}\). Following the method used to solve for the BST equilibria above, we first calculate the difference between the low message \(-D\) and the average of the others, \(\bar{m}_D\). A straightforward calculation gives that \(\bar{m}_D = \frac{m + D}{(N - 1)}\). It follows that \((-D - \bar{m}_D) = -\frac{m + ND}{(N - 1)}\).
For the agents who send higher than average messages the corresponding values are \( \bar{m}^+ = \frac{(N-k-1)m-kD}{N-k(N-1)} \) and \( m^+ - \bar{m}^+ = \frac{km+NkD}{N-k(N-1)} \).

We next calculate the \( \sigma^D \) term within \( T^D \). For the agents at the lower boundary
\[
\sigma^D = \frac{1}{N-2} \left[ (k-1) \left( \frac{m+ND}{N-1} \right)^2 + (N-k) \left( \frac{ky+NkD}{N-k} \right)^2 \right]
\]
which reduces to
\[
\sigma^D = \frac{1}{N-2} \frac{(m+ND)^2(N(k-1)+k)}{(N-1)^2(N-k)}.
\]

For the agents choosing the high message the \( \sigma^+ \) term within \( T^+ \) is:
\[
\sigma^+ = \frac{1}{N-2} \left[ k \left( \frac{m+ND}{N-1} \right)^2 + (N-k-1) \left( \frac{ky+NkD}{N-k} \right)^2 \right]
\]
which reduces to
\[
\sigma^+ = \frac{1}{N-2} \frac{(m+ND)^2k(N(N-k)-k)}{(N-1)^2(N-k)^2}.
\]

We can then calculate the punishment for both types of agents. For the agents who send the message at the lower boundary it equals
\[
T^D(\bar{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left( \frac{(m+ND)^2[(N-1)^2(N-2k)+2(N-1)]}{N(N-2)(N-k)(N-1)^2} \right). \tag{12}
\]
Notice that this amount is negative. Therefore, the punishment serves as a subsidy from those sending the low message to those sending the high message. Given that the total amount of the public good is not necessarily efficient, we have that
\[
A'(m)(w - m/N) - \frac{A(m)}{N} + B'(m) = X.
\]

Therefore, the first order conditions for the agents who send the message at the lower boundary is
\[
FOC^D = -\frac{A'(m)}{N} - A'(m)T^D(\bar{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m^D - \bar{m}^D) + X = 0.
\]

This can be written as
\[
FOC^D = -\frac{A'(m)}{N} - A'(m)T^D(\bar{m}) + A(m)\gamma \frac{(m+ND)}{N} + X = 0.
\]

For the agents who send the high message we have
\[
FOC^+ = -\frac{A'(m)}{N} - A'(m)T^+(\bar{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m^+ - \bar{m}^+*D) = 0
\]
which equals
\[
FOC^+ = -\frac{A'(m)}{N} - A'(m)T^+(\bar{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{km+NkD}{N(N-k)} = 0.
\]
In order for a boundary equilibria to exist, three conditions must hold: First, MU for the low
message agents must be negative. This implies that the low message agents want to decrease their
message more but the boundary prevents them from doing so. Second, for low message agents the
payoff at the boundary must be higher than at any interior point. The boundary is a best response
for the low message agents. Third, the high message agents must not want to send infinite messages.
The message of the high agents must stop at some value. The second and third conditions are
trivially satisfied since for low $\gamma$ the utility function is concave and marginal utility is decreasing in
$m$. For the first condition to be satisfied it must be that
\[-\frac{A'(m)}{N} - A'(m)T^D(\tilde{m}) + A(m)\gamma \frac{m+ND}{N} < 0.\]

For sufficiently small $\gamma$ the second and third terms are smaller in absolute terms than the
first which is negative. Thus for small $\gamma$ the low agents may have negative marginal utility at
the boundary indicating that they want to further decrease their message. Combining this with
the analysis of the BST equilibria above, we see that for sufficiently large $\gamma$ only the symmetric
equilibrium exists. Thus, one can always increase the punishment parameter of the mechanism to
enforce an equal sharing of the cost of public good provision.

These boundary equilibria are stable. This can be seen by looking at the first order conditions
for the low message agents. They are negative. This means that they would like to further decrease
their message below the boundary level and if pushed away from this boundary the agents have
incentives to return to the boundary. Once there, they create incentives for the high message agents
to coordinate on their equilibrium value as well. We omit the formal proof as it is similar to the
proofs for the interior equilibria which we cover next.

5 Stability of the Interior Equilibria

We analyze the stability of the interior equilibria using linear stability analysis. Linear stability
analysis assumes that if an agent’s marginal utility is positive in $m_i$ at a point, then the agent
increases its message and if the marginal utility is negative that the agent will decrease its message
and that the magnitude of the change is proportional to the marginal utility.
\[
\frac{\delta m_i}{\delta u_i} = \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial m_i}
\]

In our analysis we again find it useful to decompose the utility into the public good component and
the punishment component of marginal utility. Recall that these equations are:
\[ PGMU(\vec{m}) = A'(m)(w - \frac{1}{N}) - \frac{A(m)}{N} + B'(m) \]
\[ PUNMU(\vec{m}) = -A'(m)T_i(\vec{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m_i - \bar{m}^i) \]

We can write the equation of motion as the sum of these two terms.
\[ \dot{m}_i = PGMU_i(\vec{m}) + PUNMU_i(\vec{m}) \]

As we shall show, peculiarities of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism make this decomposition useful in understanding the dynamics of the system. We first show that the symmetric equilibrium is stable and then show that the BST equilibria are unstable given these equations of motion.

5.1 Stability of the Symmetric Equilibrium

The decomposition of the equation of motion into a public good portion and a punishment portion highlights a remarkable property of the symmetric equilibrium. The punishment contribution to utility creates an unstable dynamic as does the public good contribution to utility, but added together, they create a stable dynamic. The dynamics created by the public good portion of utility allow for drift in the vector of messages as long as the amount of the public good provided remains efficient. The punishment portion of utility creates an incentive for the agents to send the same message, whether or not it is efficient. Therefore, the punishment portion allows drifts from efficiency.

The force toward efficiency created by the public good incentives overpowers the drift away allowed by the punishment incentives. And the force toward symmetry by the punishment incentives overpowers the drift away from symmetry allowed by the public good incentives. Thus, at the symmetric equilibrium, unstable incentives plus unstable incentives yield stable incentives.

To simplify the presentation of our results in this section we show matrices as though there are only three agents but we derive our results and use notation from the \( N \) player case, so that our analysis is general. If we compute the Jacobian for the public good contribution to utility we get the following form

\[ \frac{\partial PGU_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix} -\theta & -\theta & -\theta \\ -\theta & -\theta & -\theta \\ -\theta & -\theta & -\theta \end{vmatrix} \]
where $-\theta$ equals $A''(m)(w - \frac{1}{N}) - \frac{A'(m)}{N} + B''(m)$. The reason that every entry in the Jacobian has the same value is that the marginal effect of an increase in any agent’s message is the same for all players since the costs are split evenly. This value is negative at an efficient equilibrium. As we mentioned, considered in isolation, this is not a stable system. In the case of $N$ agents, $N-1$ of the eigenvalues are 0 and the other has value $-N\theta$. The fact that the non negative eigenvalues are not strictly positive means that the system has other equilibria in the neighborhood of this point. In fact, any set of messages that sum to the efficient amount of the public good is a steady state with respect to the public good portion of utility. If one agent increases its message by $\epsilon$ and another decreases its message by $\epsilon$ then this new set of messages is a steady state for this portion of the equations of motion.

Next we consider the Jacobian associated with the punishment portion of utility. Recall that the punishment portion of marginal utility at the symmetric equilibrium is zero. It can be shown that the Jacobian is given by

$$
\frac{\partial PUNU_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix}
-A(m)\gamma\frac{N-1}{N} & A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} & A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} \\
A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} & -A(m)\gamma\frac{N-1}{N} & A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} \\
A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} & A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N} & -A(m)\gamma\frac{N-1}{N}
\end{vmatrix}
$$

This matrix has the form

$$
\begin{vmatrix}
-(N-1)\omega & \omega & \omega \\
\omega & -(N-1)\omega & \omega \\
\omega & \omega & -(N-1)\omega
\end{vmatrix}
$$

where, $\omega = A(m)\gamma\frac{1}{N}$.

This matrix has $(N-1)$ eigenvalues equal to $-N\omega$ and one eigenvalue equal to 0. Therefore, this dynamic like the previous dynamic also is not stable. If all of the agents increase or decrease their messages by a common amount, the new messages are a steady state. Because this deviation has to be coordinated among all $N$ agents, this dynamic has only one eigenvalue equal to zero. In the previous dynamic, almost any deviation will lead to a new equilibrium, that is why almost all of the eigenvalues are zero. When we add these two matrices together, we get a matrix that
defines a stable dynamic. As mentioned above, the first dynamic forces efficiency; the second forces symmetry. The combined Jacobian at the symmetric equilibrium looks as follows:

\[
\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix}
-(N-1)\omega - \theta & \omega - \theta & \omega - \theta \\
\omega - \theta & -(N-1)\omega - \theta & \omega - \theta \\
\omega - \theta & \omega - \theta & -(N-1)\omega - \theta \\
\end{vmatrix}
\]

This matrix has \((N-1)\) eigenvalues of \(-N\theta\) and one eigenvalue of \(-N\omega\). Therefore, it is stable. The assumption of identical agents again plays only a minor role here. If we give each agent a unique \(B_i(m)\), then each row of the public good matrix gets multiplied by a unique constant, \(\beta_i > 0\). \(N-1\) of the eigenvalues are still zero and the other eigenvalue equals \(-N\sum_{i=1}^{N} \beta_i \theta\) for the public good portion of utility. This nonzero eigenvalue replaces \(-N\theta\) as an eigenvalue of the combined Jacobian and the other eigenvalues remain unchanged.

5.2 The Instability of the BST equilibria

We now perform the same analysis for the BST equilibria. Here, the calculations are more involved because for each subset of size \(k < N/2\) that deviates from the symmetric equilibrium we get a distinct set of dynamics. Since this creates a potentially infinite set of systems, we consider the case where \(k\) equals one in full and show that it is unstable. We then sketch a proof for why the same logic applies for any \(k\).

The Jacobian for the public goods portion considered alone is the same as for the symmetric equilibrium and takes the form

\[
\frac{\partial PGU_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix}
-\theta & -\theta & -\theta \\
-\theta & -\theta & -\theta \\
-\theta & -\theta & -\theta \\
\end{vmatrix}
\]

This is not a stable system. In the case of \(N\) agents, \(N-1\) of the eigenvalues are 0 and the other eigenvalue is \(-N\theta\). Calculating the Jacobian for the punishment portion of the dynamics at the asymmetric equilibrium is cumbersome. Recall that \(T^i(\vec{m})\) is the punishment paid by the agents who send the lower message. In this case, that is just one agent. The equation of motion for
the message sent by that agent is given in the third row. The Jacobian takes the following form:

\[
\frac{\partial P\text{UN}U_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix}
\alpha - (N - 1)\beta & \alpha + \beta & \alpha - \beta \\
\alpha + \beta & \alpha - (N - 1)\beta & \alpha - \beta \\
-(N - 1)\alpha + \beta & -(N - 1)\alpha + \beta & -(N - 1)\alpha + (N - 1)\beta
\end{vmatrix}
\]

where \(\alpha = A''(m)T'(\text{m})/(N - 1)\) and \(\beta = \gamma A(m)\) It can be shown that this matrix has one eigenvalue equal to 0, one equal to \(\beta\) and \((N - 2)\) equal to \(-N\beta\). So the punishment portion of utility also is unstable. When we combine the Jacobian for the public goods contribution to the dynamics and the punishment portion of the dynamics we get a matrix of the following form

\[
\frac{\partial U_i}{\partial m_j} = \begin{vmatrix}
\alpha - (N - 1)\beta - \theta & \alpha + \beta - \theta & \alpha - \beta - \theta \\
\alpha + \beta - \theta & \alpha - (N - 1)\beta - \theta & \alpha - \beta - \theta \\
-(N - 1)\alpha + \beta - \theta & -(N - 1)\alpha + \beta - \theta & -(N - 1)\alpha + (N - 1)\beta - \theta
\end{vmatrix}
\]

This matrix has one eigenvalue equal to \(-N\theta\), \((N - 2)\) eigenvalues equal to \(-N\beta\), and one eigenvalue equal to \(\beta\). Therefore, the system is not stable. As before, symmetry of agents does not play a large role in the dynamics. If each agent has a unique utility for the public good, a unique \(B_i\), then as in the symmetric case, only the \(-N\theta\) eigenvalue is affected and the change is only in magnitude not in sign.

This proves that the BST equilibria in which one agent sends a low message and the rest send high messages are unstable, but it does not prove the general case. Moreover, the calculation does not always provide any intuition behind why a system is stable or unstable. Though, in the symmetric case, we found that by decomposing the dynamical system into two parts, we could uncover the causes of stability.

The logic driving the instability of the BST equilibria relies on the decomposition of marginal utility into a public good contribution (PGMU) and the punishment contribution (PUNMU) to marginal utility. At \(m - \epsilon\), PUNMU equals

\[-A'(m^*)T'(\text{m}) - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N - 1}{N}(m^l - \text{m}^l).\]

This can be rewritten as
\[ \gamma [ \epsilon A(m^*) - \epsilon^2 A'(m^*) \frac{N(N-2k)}{2(N-2)(N-k)} ]. \]

Similarly, PUNMU at \( m + \frac{k\epsilon}{N-k} \) equals

\[ -A'(m^*) T^u(\bar{m}) - A(m^*) \frac{N-1}{N} (m^u - \bar{m}^u). \]

This can be rewritten as

\[ \gamma [ -\epsilon A(m^*) \frac{k}{N-k} + \epsilon^2 A'(m^*) \frac{N(N-2k)k}{2(N-2)(N-k)^2} ]. \]

Suppose for a moment that \( \epsilon = 0 \), (we are at the symmetric equilibrium, \( m^* \).) For \( \epsilon = 0 \) PUNMU at \( m - \epsilon \) and PUNMU at \( m + \frac{k\epsilon}{N-k} \) become the same equation. By assumption \( A(m^*) > 0 \) and \( A'(m^*) < 0 \); therefore, the punishment portion of the FONC for the agents sending the low message is positive for small values of \( \epsilon \). As \( \epsilon \) increases the punishment portion of FONC eventually decreases to zero and thereafter is negative. The value for which this expression equals zero is the \( \epsilon \) which gives the BST equilibria. Recall that this is denoted \( \epsilon^{BST} \). Similarly, the punishment portion of the FONC for the agents sending the higher message equals 0 at \( \epsilon = 0 \). For positive \( \epsilon \) the punishment portion of the FONC is negative. For increases in \( \epsilon \) the punishment portion of the FONC remains negative until \( \epsilon^{BST} \) and thereafter it is strictly positive.

Near the BST equilibria if the agents are not quite far enough apart (if the low agents are sending too high a message and the high agents are sending too low a message) then the agents sending the lower message will have a positive PUNMU and will increase their message. The agents sending the high message will have a negative PUNMU and decrease their message, moving them away from the BST equilibrium and toward the symmetric equilibrium.

On the other hand, if we are near the BST equilibria but the agents are too far apart (the low message agents are sending too low a message and the high message agents are sending too high a message) then the low message agents will decrease their message further. The high message agents will have positive PUNMU and will increase their messages further. The messages of the low agents move toward \(-\infty\) and the messages of the high agents move toward \(+\infty\).

This intuition can be captured in a formal claim.

**Claim 7** The BST equilibria are unstable.

**Proof:** See Appendix.
Note that the number of BST equilibria equals the number of boundary equilibria, so for each unstable interior equilibrium there exists a stable boundary equilibrium. Adding in the symmetric, stable equilibrium gives a total index of one for the system.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we have characterized all equilibria for the Groves Ledyard mechanism. The equilibria include heretofore unidentified boundary equilibria that are inefficient. We have also determined the stability of all of these equilibria. We find that the interior equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (BST) are not stable, but that the boundary equilibria are stable— as is the symmetric equilibrium discussed by Groves and Ledyard. Remarkably, the symmetric equilibrium achieves stability by combining two unstable dynamics.

Taken as a whole, our results suggest that if we put a loose boundary on the message space, the Groves-Ledyard mechanism may not generate efficient solutions to the free rider problem. Agents may locate one of the many stable boundary equilibria. If we do not put a boundary on the message space, the mechanism is unbounded and may not reach an equilibrium given standard learning rules (Jackson 1992).

We do show that by increasing the punishment parameter or putting a severe bound on messages we can make it so that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism implements a unique, stable equilibrium. Doing so resurrects the mechanism from the problem of inefficient boundary equilibria as well as from the implicit critique of Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus. Their result implied that the mechanism created a massive coordination or learning problem in which agents would have to select from among one of possibly billions of equilibria.

The fact that a large punishment parameter eradicates these problems does not mean it is an ideal solution. Increasing $\gamma$, the punishment parameter, forces all agents to give the same amount, in effect, reducing the mechanism to a tax. This tax is not imposed by the rule of law but through incentives.

A combination of larger punishment and placing a lower bound on the message space is the best hope for creating a practical mechanism. Our explicit solutions for the BST equilibria show that the agents sending the lower messages send large negative messages for a wide range of parameter
settings. If a constraint prevents agents from sending negative messages, the agents at the lower boundary will increase their messages and head back to the symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, constraints on the message space may mitigate the need to make the punishment parameter too severe (Page and Tassier 2004.)

Appendix

Proof of Claim 1: We first calculate the difference between the low message \( m_l \) and the average of the others, \( \bar{m}_l \). In the special case where \( \delta = \frac{k\epsilon}{(N-k)} \), \( (m_l - \bar{m}_l) = -\frac{\epsilon N}{(N-1)} \). For the agents who send higher than average messages the corresponding values are \( (m^u - \bar{m}^u) = \frac{\epsilon N k}{(N-1)(N-k)} \).

We next calculate the \( \sigma_l \) term within \( T_l \). For the agents with low messages

\[
\sigma_l = \frac{1}{N-2} \left[ (k-1) \frac{(\epsilon+\delta)^2 (N-k)}{(N-1)^2} + (N-k) \frac{(k-1)^2 (\epsilon+\delta)}{(N-1)^2} \right]
\]

which reduces to

\[
\sigma_l = (\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{(k-1)(N-k)}{(N-1)(N-2)} \right].
\]

For the agents with high messages a similar calculation gives

\[
\sigma^u = (\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{(k)(N-k-1)}{(N-1)(N-2)} \right].
\]

We now calculate the punishment for both types of agents as a function of \( \epsilon \) and \( \delta \). For the agents who send the low message the punishment is:

\[
T_l(\bar{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} (\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{(N-k)^2}{N(N-1)} - \frac{(k-1)(N-k)}{(N-1)(N-2)} \right]
\]

which reduces to

\[
\frac{\gamma}{2} (\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{(N-k)(N-2k)}{N(N-2)} \right].
\]

This value is positive since \((N - 2k) > 0\). In the efficient case, this amount equals

\[
T_l(\bar{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)}.
\]

A similar calculation for the taxes paid by those who send the higher messages gives
\[ T^u(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2}(\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{k^2}{N(N-1)} - \frac{k(N-k-1)}{(N-1)(N-2)} \right] \]

which reduces to

\[ \frac{\gamma}{2}(\delta + \epsilon)^2 \left[ \frac{k(2k-N)}{N(N-2)} \right] . \]

In the efficient case, this amount equals

\[ T^u(\vec{m}) = -\frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)k}{(N-2)(N-k)^2} . \]

QED.

**Proof of Claim 2:** In an efficient allocation of the public good, where \( \delta = \frac{k}{(N-k)} \), \( T^l(\vec{m}) \) and \( T^u(\vec{m}) \) are given by the following equations:

\[ T^l(\vec{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)} \]

\[ T^u(\vec{m}) = -\frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)k}{(N-2)(N-k)^2} . \]

By the first order conditions, \( m^l, m^u \), and \( m^* \) must satisfy the following two equations

\[ A'(m^*)w - A'(m^*)/N - A'(m^*)T^l - \frac{A(m^*)}{N} - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^l - \bar{m}^l) + B'(m^*) = 0 \]

\[ A'(m^*)w - A'(m^*)/N - A'(m^*)T^u - \frac{A(m^*)}{N} - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^u - \bar{m}^u) + B'(m^*) = 0 . \]

Recall that in an efficient equilibrium, we have that

\[ A'(m^*)w - A'(m^*)/N - \frac{A(m^*)}{N} + B'(m^*) = 0 . \]

Therefore, at any asymmetric efficient equilibrium it must be that

\[ -A'(m^*)T^l - A(m^*)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N} (m^l - \bar{m}^l) = 0 . \]

For the agents who send the low messages substituting for \( T^l \) yields:

\[ -A'(m)\frac{\gamma}{2} \epsilon^2 \frac{N(N-2k)}{(N-2)(N-k)} = \frac{A(m)\gamma \epsilon (N-1)}{N(N-1)} \]

which can be simplified as
\[ \epsilon^{BST}(k) = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m)}{A(m)N(N-2k)}. \]

This is the amount that the low message agents deviate below the message sent in the symmetric equilibrium. Similarly, the first order condition for the high message agents reduces to the following when we substitute \( T^u \)

\[ A'(m) \frac{\gamma}{2^k} \frac{N(2k-N)k}{(N-2)(N-k)^2} = \frac{A(m)\gamma kN(N-1)}{N(N-1)(N-k)} \]

which can be reduced to

\[ \epsilon^{BST}(k) = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m)}{A'(m)N(N-2k)}. \]

QED.

**Proof of Claim 5:** Set the public good part of marginal utility (PGMU) equal to \( X \), which may be positive, negative, or zero.

\[ A'(m)(w - \frac{m}{N}) - \frac{A(m)}{N} + B'(m) = X \]

It follows that the punishment part of marginal utility (PUNMU) equals \(-X\).

\[ -A'(m)T_i(\bar{m}) - A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m_i - \bar{m}) = -X \]

The PGMU’s are identical given that the agents have identical wealth and preferences. The PUNMU’s differ, we can write them as

\[ -A'(m)T_i(\bar{m}) = -X + A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m_i - \bar{m}) \]

for agent \( i \), and as

\[ -A'(m)T_j(\bar{m}) = -X + A(m)\gamma \frac{N-1}{N}(m_j - \bar{m}) \]

for agent \( j \).

Suppose that \( m_i > m_j \). It follows then that \( \bar{m}^j > \bar{m}^i \) and therefore that \((m_i - \bar{m}^i) > (m_j - \bar{m}^j)\).

By the equations above it follows that \( T_i(\bar{m}) < T_j(\bar{m}) \). However, if we solve for \( T_i(\bar{m}) \) and \( T_j(\bar{m}) \) directly we see that \( T_i(\bar{m}) > T_j(\bar{m}) \), a contradiction. Explicitly,

\[ T_i(\bar{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{N-1}{N}(m_i - \bar{m})^2 - \frac{1}{N-2} \sum_{\ell \neq i}(m_\ell - \bar{m})^2 \right] \]
\[ T_j(\bar{m}) = \frac{\gamma}{2} \left[ \frac{(N-1)}{N} (m_j - \bar{m})^2 - \frac{1}{N-2} \sum_{\ell \neq j} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^j)^2 \right] \]

Recall that \((m_i - \bar{m}^i) > (m_j - \bar{m}^j)\). It therefore suffices to show that

\[ \sum_{\ell \neq i} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^i)^2 < \sum_{\ell \neq j} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^j)^2. \]

We will rewrite the left hand side of the inequality in order to show it is less than the right.

\[ \sum_{\ell \neq i} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^i)^2 = \sum_{\ell \neq j} m_\ell^2 - 2 \sum_{\ell \neq j} m_\ell \bar{m}^i + (N - 1) \bar{m}^i - m_j^2 + 2m_i \bar{m}^i \]

Let \( \Delta = \frac{m_i - m_j}{N-1} \). The previous equation reduces to:

\[ = \sum_{\ell \neq j} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^j)^2 - 2\Delta \sum_{\ell \neq j} m_\ell + (N - 1)(\bar{m}^i - m_j^2) + (m_j^2 - m_i^2) + 2\bar{m}^i (m_i - m_j). \]

Given that \( \sum_{\ell \neq j} (m_\ell - \bar{m}^j)^2 \) appears in the expression, it suffices to show that the remaining terms are negative. We can rewrite these terms as:

\[ -2\Delta(N - 1)(\bar{m}^i - \bar{m}^j) - (N - 1)(\bar{m}^j^2 - \bar{m}^i^2) - (m_j^2 - m_i^2). \]

The first of these three terms is clearly negative. We can rewrite the last two terms as:

\[ = -2m\Delta - (m_j^2 + m_i^2)(1 - \frac{1}{N-1}) < 0. \]

QED.

**Proof of Claim 7:** Recall that

Given a BST equilibrium \( m^{eq} \) and a \( \rho > 0 \), instability requires that the neighborhood of radius \( \rho \) around \( m^{eq} \) must contain a point, \( \hat{m} \), such that beginning from \( \hat{m} \), the dynamical system will not converge to \( m^{eq} \).

We first provide an outline of the proof. Choose an arbitrary BST equilibrium where \( k \) agents send the message \( m^* - \epsilon^{BST}(k) \) and \( N - k \) agents send the message \( m^* + \delta^{BST}(k) \) such that the allocation of the public good is efficient. Call this \( m^{BST}(k) \). Given a \( \rho > 0 \) choose \( \epsilon < \epsilon^{BST}(k) \) such that if \( k \) agents send the message \( m^* - \epsilon \) and \( N - k \) agents send the message \( m^* - \frac{(N-k)\epsilon}{k} \), the messages lie in the neighborhood of radius \( \rho \) around \( m^{BST}(k) \). The agents sending the lower message are sending a message greater than the equilibrium low message and the agents sending the higher message are sending a message lower than the equilibrium high message.
It suffices to show that the agents sending the lower message will increase their message and the agents sending the higher message will decrease their message. This will move the set of messages further from the BST equilibrium. These conditions are sufficient using the following logic: If the messages at each instance of time continue to provide for an efficient amount of the public good then the same argument applies: *at each moment in time, the messages will be even further from the BST equilibrium.* Alternatively, suppose the dynamics could lead to either over or under provision of the public good at some time $t_1$. Without loss of generality assume over provision of the public good. In this case the public good portion of the FONC will become negative. This will cause the agents sending the higher message to reduce their messages by even more. The agents sending the lower messages will have less incentive to increase their messages and may even have an incentive to decrease their messages if the over provision becomes too severe. Therefore, at some time $t_2 > t_1$ one of two things must happen. Either the low and high messages will converge (in which case the system will converge to the symmetric equilibrium) or the amount of the public good will again be efficient. If the latter occurs, since the agents sending the higher messages have been decreasing their message, the new messages are further from the BST equilibrium at time $t_2$ then they were at time $t_1$.

Thus, we only need to show that the derivative of the utility function for the agents sending the lower message with respect to their message is positive and that the opposite is true of the derivative of the utility function for the agents sending the higher message. Since the amount of the pubic good is efficient, the value PGMU equals zero. It suffices then to show that PUNMU is positive at $m^* - \epsilon^{BST}(k)$ and negative at $m^* + \frac{k\epsilon^{BST}(k)}{N-k}$ and that therefore, the BST equilibria are locally unstable. We prove this as Claim 7 in the appendix.

**Claim 8** PUNMU is positive at $m^* - \epsilon^{BST}(k)$ and negative at $m^* + \frac{k\epsilon^{BST}(k)}{N-k}$.

**Proof of Claim 8:** Recall that $\epsilon^{BST}(k) = \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m^*)}{A(m^*)N(N-2k)}$. Consider the following deviation $\epsilon = (1 - \phi)\epsilon^{BST}(k)$, where $\phi > 0$ is arbitrarily small. PUNMU at $m - \epsilon$ equals

$$\gamma \left[ \epsilon A(m^*) - \epsilon^2 A'(m^*) \frac{N(N-2k)}{2(N-2)(N-k)} \right].$$

Substituting in the value for $\epsilon$ yields
$$\gamma \left[ \frac{(1-\phi)2(N-2)(N-k)A(m^*)^2}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)} - \frac{2(1-\phi)^2(N-2)(N-k)A(m^*)}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)} \right]$$

which reduces to

$$\gamma \left[ \left( (1-\phi) - (1-\phi)^2 \right) \frac{2(N-2)(N-k)A(m^*)^2}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)} \right]$$

which is strictly positive. Therefore, the agents at $m - \epsilon$ increase their message. To show that the agents at $m + \frac{k\epsilon}{N-k}$ decrease their message, we make the following similar calculation. Recall from above that PUNMU at $m + \frac{k\epsilon}{N-k}$ equals

$$\gamma \left[ -\epsilon A(m^*) \frac{k}{N-k} + \epsilon^2 A'(m^*) \frac{N(N-k)k}{2(N-2)(N-k)^2} \right].$$

It follows that PUNMU at $\epsilon$ equals

$$\gamma \left[ -\frac{2(1-\phi)k(N-2)A(m^*)^2}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)} + \frac{2(1-\phi)^2k(N-2)A(m^*)^2}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)} \right]$$

which can be simplified as

$$\gamma \left[ -(1-\phi) + (1-\phi)^2 \right] \frac{2(k(N-2)A(m^*)^2)}{A'(m^*)N(N-2k)}.$$

which is negative. QED.

References


