Globalization's Challenge: Four More Voices Join the Discussion

Balancing Detached Inquiry with Pressure for Action

Lawrence S. Root

Globalization and labor present particular intellectual challenges for universities in that unlike other areas of academic interest, universities are participants rather than simply observers. Larger universities receive royalties from companies that sell sweatshirts and hats emblazoned with their names or symbols. Smaller schools

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The workshop began with the premise that in order to understand why the massacres occurred, the larger historical context—the tensions between the Armenians and the Turks, the ways in which the Turks constructed the Armenians as subversive and dangerous elements, the defeats and threats of the world war—had to be explored. Ronald Suny opened the proceedings with a review of the Armenian and Western historical writing on the massacres and deportations of 1915, followed by a parallel paper by Fatma Müge Göçek on the Turkish historiography. Suny proposed that the standard accounts left little room for understanding the complexity of the events. Existing histories attempt to explain the massacres by reference to religion or nationalism without fully considering that the Young Turks were secular modernizers dedicated to preserving an empire. Until now, much of Armenian historiography blamed the Turks, gave little active role to the Armenians and linked all of Ottoman history into a story that led inexorably to genocide. The official Turkish view, promoted by the state and its supporters claimed, "There was no genocide, and the Armenians are to blame."

Suny proposed that not all repressions of Armenians by Turks were part of a single teleological process that led inevitably to genocide, that Ottoman governments had a variety of policies and ambitions vis-à-vis the Armenians and that their attitudes toward Armenians radicalized as World War I broke out. By the time the Young Turks went to war with Russia in late 1914, there was nothing that the Ottoman Armenians could do to prevent the leaders of the empire from carrying their evolving plans to eliminate one of their subject peoples.

Göçek proposed a new periodization of the historiography on the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915, from the investigative Ottoman to the defensive Republican and critical Post-nationalist periods. The late Ottoman narrative on 1915, recognizing that massive killing had taken place, was transformed in the Turkish Republican period into a defensive one under the impact of escalating nationalism. The Republican scholars did not aim to understand what actually happened; rather, they hoped to prove the Turkish thesis that focused on protecting the interests of the state. As a consequence, they selectively employed historical material and conflated deaths and massacres of the populace at different points in time to conclude that just as many Turks as Armenians had died. They thus dismissed the events of 1915 as an act of Turkish self-defense. Göçek showed that the official Turkish nationalist narrative put primary blame for the events on the imperialist Western powers.
Parents who previously worked at home now commute to the central site. The program has reduced that element of child labor, but it may have worsened poverty for the families affected and increased the involvement of those children in the underground economy and sex trade.

Advocates often use emblematic messages that appear to embody fundamental, but competing, truths about globalization and labor. Those who indict international companies for their labor practices may encapsulate their arguments in statements such as: "It is clearly exploitation to pay a worker 10 cents for sewing a sweatshirt that sells for $35."

On the other side of the debate is the kind of message from those who believe these manufacturing jobs represent valued opportunities and a crucial economic step forward for poor countries: "So-called 'sweatshops' are a rung on the ladder of economic development and long lines of job applicants are testimony that they are the best jobs available."

Both of these statements have power. Their role in the debate on globalization and labor, however, depends on one's particular theoretical orientation as well as a set of empirical assertions. From the perspective of free-market economics, external efforts to improve jobs that are already better than the average in a producing country are misplaced. Economists traditionally see non-market efforts to improve pay as protectionist and, at best, counterproductive in terms of future economic development. While this theoretical orientation addresses the overall operation of competitive markets, it offers little guidance on issues of equity and the distribution of economic resources. Theories of justice and traditions of both domestic and international law argue against leaving wage determination solely to market forces and hold that companies have a responsibility for ethical behavior and for the impact of their policies on employees, communities and the environment.

Empirical questions present a third area of intellectual challenge. There is no clear agreement on fundamental questions, such as whether trade liberalization increases or decreases the standard of living in producing countries. The answer depends on the specific examples selected, definitions, and the time period studied, as well as on the extent to which any change can be explained by other factors. Even straightforward questions, such as the wage level in factories, may be elusive. Official wage rates may not be the same as
when "the normal rules of human interaction are suspended and the practice of violence is honored and rewarded." Race thinking was central to the genocides of our own time, said Weitz, and when it is taken up by revolutionary transformative regimes with powerful visions of the future, the potential for intentional, state-initiated mass killing is enhanced. War, revolution and racism created a culture of killing that marked the last century as horrifically different from its predecessors.

Rodrigue also engaged comparisons with the Jewish Holocaust, beginning with an elaboration of the particularities of the Ottoman social system and its breakdown in the nineteenth century. Defined by religious difference, Muslim and non-Muslim were always unequal in the fixed hierarchy of the Ottoman world, with Muslim as the governing element and Islam the governing religion. But the coming of Western influence and pressure, the new alternative vision of nationalism and the modernizing and centralizing practices of the Ottoman state disturbed profoundly the established relations between religious communities. Western domination, both internationally and in domestic economic life, led many Muslims to perceive non-Muslims as collaborators of the foreigners, whose ultimate aim was the destruction of the empire. In the view of the Ottoman rulers, the Armenians, who had been inferior, now appeared to be acting superior, an alien element bent on forming an independent state of their own. While Turkish nationalism inspired the Young Turks, they were primarily out to save their empire, not to build a nation-state. According to Rodrigue, "By 1915 a particularly fatal combination of resentment, humiliation and revengeful sentiment animated the ruling elite," which had suffered losses in the Balkans, defeat at the hands of the Russians at Sarikamis and faced an Allied landing at Gallipoli.

Fikret Adanir made the essential point that the military disasters of the Balkan War of 1912-1913, in which the Ottomans lost almost all of "European Turkey," were a major turning point in the history of Ottoman policies toward minorities. The defeat led to the establishment of the one-party dictatorship in January 1913, the essential abandonment of the pluralistic Ottomanist project and its replacement "by an aggressive nationalism that aspired to a new mobilization along Turkish-Islamic lines." A heightened panic about losing Anatolia gripped the Young Turks. At the same time, the Armenian political leaders turned from working with the Young Turks to appeals, once again, to the Great Powers as a way to solve the Armenian Question. The attempts by the Young Turks to
marketplace’s hegemony and the wealth it could bring all societies. The scholarly discussions around globalization and its consequences are much more cautious, however. Many scholars have noted the way globalization generates, transmits and sustains power inequalities across societies. Others note the difficulty of identifying and eliminating globalization’s deleterious impact of because of the complexities involved in the endeavor.

The University of Michigan is uniquely situated to meet this intellectual challenge, however, because of three factors: its traditional strength in the social sciences, its unique combination of area studies centers, and its burgeoning research institutes on social issues such as those surrounding gender, race and the natural environment. The strong social science tradition makes possible the rigorous critique of the proposed scenarios for globalization. Michigan’s many area centers present, in turn, the opportunity to test these scenarios in a multiplicity of contexts throughout the world.

What makes the combination analytically very rigorous is the third factor that was not there before, but has now been added: the establishment of research institutes on specific social issues. These institutes are crucial in developing the new necessary condition in conducting research: the necessity of scholars to maintain a critical engagement with their location in a particular society. Let me provide an example of this condition since it is relatively new: these research institutes provide scholars with the opportunity to analyze globalization through the lens of gender or race or the environment. Such an analysis quickly reveals in turn the deep connection between power, knowledge and human interests that often shapes not only the scholar’s research project but his or her interpretations as well.

The extraordinary research capacity provided by these three factors only works in combination. The intellectual challenge of globalization can only be met through inter-disciplinary, inter-area and inter-issue collaboration. While this collaboration has been on the University’s agenda for some time, actualizing it has been more challenging. The most significant obstacle has been the institutional the University’s structure, which continues to collect and distribute both material and human resources according to disciplinary divides. Even though research institutes have flourished alongside these disciplines, problems surrounding resource sharing often force scholars to retreat to the safe confines of their own disciplines; the disciplinary divides and the turf control that naturally follows then
the Turkish nation and being a Turkish citizen coexisted. Atatürk's Turkey had a civic idea of citizenship: "The People of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards Turkish citizenship." But at the same time it conceived of the "Turkish Nation" as a cultural and linguistic community, and, as Çağaptay emphasized, even in the secular Kemalist republic Islam was part of the definition of the nation. "Turkish nationalism nurtured an aversion towards the Christians." Under pressure from the state, the non-Muslim communities renounced the rights granted them in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Their political situation deteriorated significantly during the 1920s. Their religious institutions were threatened, and many of the thousands of Armenians left in Anatolia began to emigrate. Armenian nationalists abroad organized resistance to Turkish policies, even playing a significant role in the Kurdish rebellion of 1930, and this deepened the existing Turkish suspicion of Armenians. Even Armenians who had converted to Islam were suspect. In Çağaptay’s words, "Religion created an ethnic boundary between the Armenians and the Turks," and the Kemalist continuity of millet attitudes rendered Turkey’s Armenian citizens an alien nation within the polity.

One of the most outspoken and courageous Turkish historians of the events of 1915, Taner Akçam, showed how Ottoman archival documents directly contradict the official Turkish state narrative. He argued that the Young Turks implemented a general resettlement plan for ethnic and religious minorities in Anatolia between 1913 and 1918 and that a decision to cleanse Anatolia of non-Muslim elements was made at the beginning of 1914. These plans applied, not only to Armenians, but also to Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Bosnians and others, and were directed at the Turkification of Anatolia, which after the Balkan Wars was conceived as the heartland of the Turks. Armenians, however, were thought of and treated differently from other minorities. There were no qualms about killing Armenians, and Akçam stated that the documents suggest "a genocidal intention on the part of the ruling party."

Stephan H. Astourian proposed that a social, even ecological, dimension must be added to the more ideological and political explanations for genocide. During the last Ottoman half-century, millions of Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and the Balkans migrated into eastern Anatolia and Cilicia, regions inhabited by large Armenian populations, increasing pressure on the limited resource of arable land. Beginning in the 1870s, Armenians began to complain to the Ottoman Porte about land seizures and other oppressive acts
Science, Technology and Concepts of the Global World

By Paul N. Edwards, School of Information

A major intellectual challenge of globalization is to understand the far-reaching implications of scientific conceptions of global processes. Studying planetary processes involves conceiving the world as a unified and comprehensible whole; scientists have been doing this for hundreds of years. In a sense, science is responsible for the very idea of globality. Furthermore, as a system of knowledge, science has been uniquely successful at building widely shared understandings that transcend political and cultural differences.

Yet proponents have drastically exaggerated the degree to which scientific worldviews have become genuinely universal. Probably a large majority of the world’s population does not see the world through the lens of science at all. Even in the developed world, alternative knowledge systems such as chiropractic, acupuncture, astrology and yoga flourish, often side-by-side with scientific ones. And as science becomes intertwined with global politics, its ability to build shared understanding will come under increasing pressure as it collides with alternative forms of knowledge. In the political arena, science can appear to be just one interest among others, competing for resources, attention and the right to serve as ultimate arbiter of truth.

As an example of these themes, consider the problem of global climate change. How do we know that the world is getting warmer? Global warming has no correlate in direct experience. Even the most traveled, cosmopolitan citizen cannot directly perceive a global average temperature change because this change is much smaller than weather’s natural variability.

Nevertheless, the majority of people in the developed world today know what global climate change is, believe it is underway and think it will directly affect them. Recent polls show that fewer than 15 percent of Americans dismiss the threat of global warming. Europeans are even more committed to the reality of global climate change; several European governments have established firm limits on allowable greenhouse gas production. At the dawn of the third millennium, global warming is thus an established fact—one we know only through science.
Dadrian spoke on the practice of genocide denial and laid out the essential theses of the official Turkish position: that there was no intention to deport or kill Armenians; that the atrocities were beyond the control of the authorities; that the killing was regional, not general; that the numbers killed are far lower than Armenians claim, and Turks suffered as much if not more than Armenians; that the unfortunate events were the result of a civil war between Turks and Armenians; and that the events were provoked by Armenian treachery and rebellion. As in his voluminous writings, so in his oral presentation, he went on to demonstrate that each of these propositions was false and that staggering amounts of evidence have been published, most convincingly in Turkish and German sources, which show the widespread practice of deportation and massacre and the direct role of the Young Turks.

Richard G. Hovannisian (history, UCLA) reminded the workshop that while Young Turks were both the initiators and the dynamic behind the Armenian genocide, there were also officials and ordinary Turks who refused to participate even at the risk of their own lives. In a paper that discussed intervention and altruism during the massacres, he shared material from hundreds of oral histories of Armenian survivors, many of whom testified to self-sacrificial acts by Muslims. Although others exploited the vulnerability of Armenians to take economic and sexual advantage of their former neighbors, the motivations of those who helped victims ranged from sympathy and pity to the most opportunist work at economic betterment. Altruism, however, often successfully competed with economic self-interest.

A final session of the workshop turned to contemporary issues. Baskin Oran (political science, Ankara University) used the story of the Armeo-Turkish newspaper Agos to illustrate the revival of Armenian identity in today’s Turkey. Until the appearance of Agos, the Istanbul Armenian community was subjected to attacks in the Turkish media and had few avenues to express its own views to the larger Turkish public. Agos began publication, in Turkish, in 1996 and cautiously attempted to present a Turkish-Armenian position different from that of the Armenian diaspora and the Republic of Armenia. On the genocide issue, Agos editor Hrant Dink argued, "Turkish-Armenian relations should be taken out of a 1915 meters-deep well." That topic should be depoliticized and dealt with by historians.

In a similar spirit of opening up dialogue between Turks and
will manifest themselves in different places, and it may never be able to do so. Further, while modeling can suggest possible mitigation strategies and map their probable effects, it can neither resolve the differences among rich and poor nor produce the political will to carry out painful changes. In addition to the local, regional and national differentials in causes and human impacts, powerful political interests work to corrode shared understandings of climate change.

These processes will only become more important as the 21st century progresses. The University of Michigan's dedication to taking on "an identification with people outside of our own borders," in President Lee Bollinger's phrase (II Journal, 8.2: 4), should include a strong commitment to learn about these processes in alliance with other universities around the world. Part of this mission should include building an awareness of the widely differing perspectives on apparently "global" issues, especially outside the developed world. American undergraduates notoriously lack the abilities-such as foreign language fluency and experience with non-Western cultures-required to grasp the full force of these perspectival differences. For this reason, study-abroad programs should play a major part in the U-M's strategy for educating global citizens. The curricula of these programs should extend particularly to the study of science, technology and politics as practiced and understood beyond the U.S borders.

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Teaching "Global Product Realization" Globally

By Deba Dutta, College of Engineering

After months of preparations and multiple travels between Ann Arbor (USA), Delft (The Netherlands) and Seoul (South Korea), a new course, "Global Product Realization," was launched in September 2000 and concluded three and a half months later. This course, the first of its kind at any of the participating institutions, and probably one of only very few of its kind in the world, proved that it is possible for professors in three different countries to team-teach a group of students located in three very distant places, and
the two countries nearly reached agreement, events such as the conflict over Karabakh prevented formal relations. At first, Armenia was willing to separate the issue of genocide from the question of diplomatic relations, but with the coming to power of Robert Kocharian, Armenia stated that it would not give up genocide recognition but that it had no territorial claims on Turkey.

Summing up some of the discussion, Libaridian pointed out, "We don't know everything, and we haven't decided everything. This is a healthy attitude." The workshop demonstrated that the very word "genocide" has become a battlefield, but that it is possible to talk sensibly about what happened. Facts can be established, arguments can be made and the old stories, the "master narratives," can be changed.

While some participants were wary that by explaining the genocide, it might be "explained away," Paul Boghossian (philosophy, New York University) pointed out that a distinction must be made between causation and justification. Identifying the cause of an event is not necessarily to justify it. Since nothing can justify what happened, no one should fear that an honest investigation of the role of the Armenians in the events of 1915 could lead to a justification of the tragedy that befell them. Commenting on Bloxham's claim that there was a cumulative radicalization of Turkish policy towards the Armenians culminating in deportations and massacres, Boghossian pointed out that there is a distinction between "causes" and "triggers." A cause of an event is something without which that event would not have occurred, whereas a trigger is simply an opportunity for a cause to bring about a given event. Bloxham, he argued, had shown that wartime conditions, rather than causing the massacres of 1915, had merely provided triggers for them. Finally, to those who recoil from the use of the word "genocide" for strategic or emotional reasons, even while acknowledging the terrible events, he said that it was incumbent upon them to come up with their own terms, ones that would not distort the factual reality that have been established by the workshop—that intentional mass killing, directed against a specifically named ethno-religious people, had been ordered and executed by a government in 1915.

After three intense days of productive discussions, the workshop adjourned to a public session at which, Suny, Göçek, Michael Kennedy (sociology, II director and vice provost for international affairs, University of Michigan) and two journalists from Turkey-Cengiz Çandar and Hrant Dink-gave their impressions of the
of content, writing of case studies, grading, etc. An impressive array of international experts from the three universities gave guest lectures in the course. The students produced impressive results, learning a great deal (from the lectures and from each other) in the process. They gained experience working in an environment none of them have encountered before, but are most likely to encounter in their future professional lives.

In conjunction with the final project exhibit at the U-M on December 8, 2000, a global education forum was also organized to put the course in perspective. A panel of speakers, including consular representatives from the Dutch and Korean embassies, remarked on the importance of global awareness among students and the need for cross-cultural collaborative experiences prior to entering industry.

The College of Engineering has been proactive in establishing and enhancing opportunities for global experiences for our students. The undergraduate program in Global Engineering is a key feature that will have a broad based impact on Michigan Engineering. For graduate students, courses like Global Product Realization will enhance cultural awareness and enrich the assumption elicitation process that is critical in product innovation and development. In the information age, information is free (or at least cheap), but insights are not. And the understanding of the world around us is necessary for that insight.

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