The current analyses of the formation and reproduction of the category of the “other” based on gender and race theories, as well as studies on prejudice grounded in critical theory, provide significant theoretical insights into the study of the Armenian relocations and deaths in 1915. To demonstrate this, the present essay first undertakes a sociological reading of Turkish historiography on the Armenian relocations and massacres of 1915. It then reviews Turkish historiography on the topic both chronologically and by contextualizing the existing literature in the tension between past and contemporary political circumstances. I argue that the narratives of the Armenian massacres can be analyzed within three categories: the Ottoman investigative narrative, the Republican defensive narrative, and the postnationalist critical narrative. The article concludes by suggesting a new periodization of Turkish history to encourage Turkish recognition of the Armenian tragedy that occurred in the Ottoman Empire in 1915.

Gender theory derives from the main premise that the personal is political and, therefore, has to be included in the study of the political that predominates the public sphere. Failure to do so undermines gender analysis because women’s experiences in particular are often related to the personal sphere, beyond the purview of scholarly analysis, and the public sphere in turn becomes dominated by research that privileges men’s experiences. These
unequal power relations, which affect the knowledge constructed in the public sphere to the detriment of women, can be eradicated only by tracing their roots through analysis of the private sphere. Only then will gender cease to be “the other” in scholarly analysis.

Yet such a move necessitates a reexamination of the scholars who create and reproduce knowledge in the scientific community. These scholars need to be aware, and critical, of how and why they formulate their research questions, and how these formulations, in turn, affect their results. Dorothy Smith, in her seminal work on the subject, states that unequal power relations in the construction of public knowledge are also hidden in the “standpoint” of scholars, who often employ scientific objectivity to distance themselves from their subject matter and use the pronoun “we” to obfuscate the privileges their public position entails. It is further conjectured that these embedded privileges and power relations are revealed only when scholars explicitly discuss their own standpoints, disclosing the assumptions they make about their scholarship and their interpretations of subject matter.1

Smith’s theoretical perspective, together with that of Patricia Hill Collins, is based on the critical approach to knowledge developed by the Frankfurt School. This school gained prominence after World War II, with the explicit intent to understand the Holocaust. The early works of scholars of this school, such as Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, discussed the formation of the authoritarian personality that obeyed Nazi orders to destroy Jews en masse. How was it possible, they asked, to get humans to obey orders for human destruction in the twentieth century, an age of scientific and human progress, in the heartlands of Europe, which claimed to spearhead the enlightened Western civilization? It is in seeking an answer to this question that they identified a dark side of science and the modern state, namely, that science and the state have power, authority, and legitimacy in the contemporary world. They contended that racist theories that relegated the Jews to a subhuman category were not adequately questioned and criticized because of the assumed objectivity and value-neutrality of science—the implications embedded in these racist theories were thus overlooked and legitimated in the name of science. The modern state was likewise presumed to have acted for the progress of all its citizens and in turn employed science in doing so—in this instance as well, the interests of the nation-state, or, specifically, the ideological agendas of the political leaders, were not adequately problematized.2

After the Frankfurt School revealed the value-ladenness of scientific knowledge, and the employment of science to legitimate particular human
interests to the detriment of humanity, it proposed instead a vigilant “critical” approach that questioned all knowledge presented as “scientific facts.” Works by scholars such as Jürgen Habermas further developed this approach as they revealed the human interests hidden in the construction of public knowledge; they argued in turn that a truly democratic society where everyone participated on equal terms could be possible only if the privileged position some assumed over others, through their access to knowledge legitimated by science, could be overcome.\(^3\)

Smith and Collins employed the critical approach to reveal and surmount the effect of unequal gender and race relations in shaping contemporary social-scientific discussions of women’s position in society. They did so in order to legitimize women’s own standpoint, which was often banished to the private sphere and marginalized as being personal, subjective, and therefore unscientific. Smith and Collins argued that a gender-neutral analysis of society could be undertaken only if the personal and the subjective standpoints of women were introduced into social-scientific research, so as to bear as much weight in the subsequent explanation of human action as existing public knowledge legitimated by scientific practice. This epistemological intervention led them to reveal their own standpoint as scholars and demonstrate how it had shaped their analyses, and it is in this context that their insights are used here.\(^4\)

I reveal my particular standpoint as a scholar in approaching the study of the tragedy that befell the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Likewise, the discussion of Turkish historiography presented below brings in vantage points of the scholars who work on this topic. As is evident to all of them, what happened to the Armenians toward the end of the Ottoman Empire is highly politicized. Even the way my colleague Ronald Grigor Suny and I initially apportioned the review of the literature on the topic into “Armenian” and “Turkish” historiographies itself shows a divide; this seemingly simple heuristic divide privileges some sources and knowledge over others.\(^5\) Notably, linguistic barriers prevented each of us from using, in my case, Armenian, and in his, Turkish, sources. Even though we both had access to works in the current scientific lingua franca, I consciously restricted myself to those works in English that reflected the Turkish discourse, and this strategy, by definition, precluded almost, if not all, the works by Armenian scholars.

The Armenian tragedy is a subject I knowingly avoided for a long time, in both my academic career and personal life, because of its highly politicized nature. The limitations of the official Turkish view are painfully obvi-
ous in the many unofficial social sanctions in contemporary Turkish society that prevent Turkish-Armenian citizens and other minorities from participating in society on equal terms with Turkish Muslims. Likewise, the limitations of the dominant Armenian view of the Armenian diaspora have been manifest at panels of the Middle Eastern Studies Association over the past twenty years; many scholars there either stated openly or seemed to imply that there was an inherently violent, destructive streak in all Turks, regardless of time and space, that had caused the tragedies at the beginning of the twentieth century and, by implication, would bring about their occurrence even today unless constant and vigilant guard was kept.

I approach the analysis of Turkish historiography on the Armenian deaths and population transfers of 1915 informed by my previous research on the Ottoman Empire. Because of my scholarly interest in the causes of Turkey’s contemporary problems, I began my studies in historical sociology and by examining Ottoman population transfers (sürgün) between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. Two important insights emerged from that study: first, it was impossible to claim in the contemporary context who was a real Turk, since there had been so much intermixing of populations; second, from the advent of their state and throughout its history, the Ottomans frequently and efficiently transferred populations. The Ottoman state undertook these transfers to rejuvenate (the Ottoman term is Şenlendirmek) newly conquered territories. It was in this context that the Turcoman nomads of Anatolia were transferred to the Balkans, and later villagers and artisans were moved from the Balkans and Egypt to Constantinople. This type of transfer also increased Ottoman state control over the territories from which these groups had been moved. Punitive transfers of religious groups, errant governors and their households, and non-Muslim minorities who happened to reside along Ottoman campaign routes—and, therefore, posed a threat to the security and provisioning of the Ottoman army—occurred regularly.

My subsequent work focused on the very understudied eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire to identify the structural origins of its eventual demise, tracing the nineteenth-century transformation of the Ottoman state from the eighteenth century, and narrating the Ottoman demise not through Western sources alone but also through Ottoman sources, and especially through the abundant archival material. It was the Ottoman inheritance registers that afforded a clear view of the process of Ottoman Westernization throughout the eighteenth century in general and the use of Western goods by Ottoman rulers and subjects in particular. These registers also included
the inheritance registers of Ottoman minorities, namely, dhimmis, who registered their legacies in the Islamic courts alongside those of Muslims. These records revealed that the most significant social group in adopting Western goods, ideas, and institutions was not, as I had originally hypothesized, rulers but, rather, the subjects of the empire, a social group including Ottoman minorities, which I termed the Ottoman “bourgeoisie.”

Yet why had this social group not been able to transform, Westernize, and modernize the Ottoman Empire? Unlike the western European bourgeoisie, who spearheaded such a transformation in Europe, the Ottoman bourgeoisie had been bifurcated along religious lines, a divide the empire had not been able to overcome in spite of its many, initially well-intentioned, attempts. Religious minorities, principally Ottoman Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, attained significant administrative positions, but this did not occur at all levels. While these minorities were indeed recruited into newly established Western-style educational institutions, non-Muslim graduates of these schools, who staffed most of the mid-level administrative positions throughout the empire, were not promoted at the same rate as Muslims, because they were socially disadvantaged and perceived to be untrustworthy. It was the inability of the Ottoman state to overcome the “social disadvantage” deeply embedded in the religious divide that formed the foundation stone of the empire leading, I argued, both to its demise and to the eventual tragic elimination of the non-Muslim Ottoman bourgeoisie. Even though religious minorities were indeed given political and economic privileges in the Ottoman Empire, they led separate social lives because non-Muslims could not marry into, form families with, or inherit from Muslims; they were thus unable to form the significant social networks that would have enabled them to participate fully in the Ottoman social system. The same minorities were also forbidden to bear arms (until the twentieth century) and had to pay a special poll tax (cizye) to compensate the state for the protection it offered them. Sumptuary laws required them to wear special clothes, publicly separating them from the Muslims. Even though they had access to the Islamic courts, in addition to their own communal courts, the Islamic legal system based on religious law (Seriat) did not recognize them as equal to Muslims and thereby disadvantaged them legally.

The emergent Ottoman social system was thus based on and legitimized by Islam. Minorities were permitted to participate in society in a limited fashion, according to terms set by the ruling Muslim group. For many centuries while the rest of the world was engaged in religious wars to destroy
one another, this system was an enlightened one, yet one based on a premise of social inequality that reproduced itself to ossify over time. This inequality was accepted as “natural” because there were no known alternatives until the eighteenth century. The social transformation in that century, set in motion especially by the French Revolution, radically redefined the relationship between people and society through a social contract that identified the “rights of man” spiritually in relation to God and politically in relation to a particular state.

The social impact of this transformation on the Ottoman Empire led both Muslims and minorities to reevaluate their positions within Ottoman society. Muslims focused more on the challenge of sharing the political power concentrated in the sultan and were less interested in questioning their dominant social position as Muslims within the society at large, a position they had long accepted as a natural one. They also assumed that their political aspirations did not significantly differ from those of the non-Muslims of the empire. The Ottoman minorities, who had historically accepted their location in Ottoman society for the lack of a better, politically viable option, became increasingly aware of their unequal standing and started to search for ways to alleviate this inequality. I have argued that the demise of the empire occurred because of the inability of the Ottoman state to overcome the initial religious divide that, through time, generated clear social and political separations in Ottoman society. In the process of demise, the non-Muslim bourgeoisie was dissolved mostly through direct or indirect pressure, even force of the state, while the Ottoman Muslim bourgeoisie formed under state protection at the expense, and often based on the resources, of its non-Muslim counterpart. Eventually this Ottoman Muslim bourgeoisie was transformed into the national Turkish bourgeoisie, with state support that continues until today.

Subsequent research comparing Greek, Armenian, Arab, and Turkish nationalisms during the demise of the empire clarified the reasons for the success of some nationalisms and the failure of others. In the case of Armenian nationalism, the precedent of the Greek success in 1832 sharpened the resistance of the Ottoman state to the demands of the Armenians; the Ottoman defeat in the subsequent Balkan Wars (1911–13) further radicalized this resistance. At the same time, the Ottoman elites who manned the state were also transformed, becoming dominated by “Young Turk” officers and, later, members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who were educated in Western-style schools and formed an allegiance not to the sultan but to the Ottoman state, a state increasingly defined as “Turkish.” The
emergent Turkish nationalism supported by the Ottoman state precluded the aims of Armenian nationalism in Anatolia.\(^8\)

Finally, more recent work on gender, race theory, and nationalism has continuously alerted me to the power inequalities that developed in social analysis. These inequalities do not reveal themselves with respect only to the topic under study, but traverse multiple levels that range from the standpoint of the researcher, and the construction of the research question, to the sources employed in its analysis, the assumptions made in the interpretation of findings, and the effect of contemporary concerns on this interpretation.

**THE HIDDEN SOCIAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE USE OF TERMINOLOGY**

Informed once again by critical theory, postmodern theory in general and specifically postcolonial theory identify how a particular body of knowledge, in their cases particular social, often written, texts, contain embedded power relations. In analyzing such texts, scholars who employ these frameworks engage in a critical reading with the intent to identify the hidden assumptions of unequal power relations. Gayatri Spivak and Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, and others have applied these insights in analyzing British colonial documents in India, thus forming the school of “subaltern studies,” named after the work of Antonio Gramsci. Their works engage the research question of why India has not been able to overcome British hegemony, even after the elimination of colonial rule and the establishment of an Indian nation-state. The roots of domination, they argue, extend deep into language and meaning structures that have been implanted in Indian society. In order to overcome the existing epistemological hegemony, they suggest scholarly analyses of both the past and the present in terms of these roots.\(^9\)

When the terminology employed in the debates on the Armenian tragedies is analyzed within this framework, the conflict over the meanings embedded in the debates becomes clear. My work addresses “Turkish” historiography on the subject. Take, for example, the use of the terms *genocide* and *massacre*. If I had approached the subject matter from the viewpoint of the official Turkish thesis, I would have needed to indicate that I objected to the acceptance of the genocidal nature of the massacres by employing the term *genocide* in quotations, or by using the term *population transfers*. By doing so, I would have thus clearly signaled my political stand on the
topic. I think this example not only demonstrates how the choice of particular terms announces a scholar’s standpoint, but it also indicates how highly this subfield is politicized.

What does this political divide between “Turkish” and “Armenian” historiography comprise? From the perspective of my focus on Turkish historiography, the more appropriate question to ask is who speaks for “the Turks,” who defines what comprised “the Armenian experience” in the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and who controls its interpretation. Most often, these questions immediately evoke the predominant Republican narrative, one promoted and sustained by the modern Turkish nation-state and its various institutions. This narrative considers the Turkish state and Turkish society to be one and the same—a consideration many Armenian scholars also accept without question—and thereby assumes that it speaks on behalf of all Turks. The researchers who work within this narrative are a special group, often including current or former state officials who consider themselves loyal citizens of the Turkish nation-state and who, as true citizens, justify, document, and prove the official state interpretation of events concerning the Ottoman Armenians before, during, and since 1915.

As I indicated above, the main assumption behind their stand is that the official view of the state is one and the same with that of the nation. Therefore, their scholarship does not evaluate historical documentation in an attempt to question what happened, but instead focuses on proving, through historical documents, that what the official state narrative claims happened is indeed what happened. Their use of historical material is selective and skewed, since it favors and highlights only those sources that are in agreement with the official interpretation while overlooking and thus silencing those that are not. While a graduate student, I received a letter from one Turkish ministry inviting me to undertake research in the Ottoman archives “to challenge the Armenian claims and prove instead the Turkish thesis.” I of course threw away the letter, because it did not fall within the ethical framework of what I define as “scientific” scholarship, that is, the formulation of a research question, rather than a predetermined answer, before engaging in archival work, and the interpretation of findings not in accordance with a predetermined framework but, rather, within the most extensive theoretical and empirical context possible.

Scholarship in Turkey and at Turkish state universities is supposed to operate according to these same scientific principles, that is, scholarly independence in the formulation, analysis, and discussion of research on social
topics. Yet the fact that most scholars in state universities are by definition state employees often leads to sanctions against them by the state if their views and interpretations contradict those of the official state narrative on the topic. In some cases scholars have even been dismissed from their posts. This situation makes scholarly analysis of social topics extremely difficult in Turkey. There are many scholars at Turkish universities who, as a consequence of their own research, disagree with the official narrative regarding what happened to the Armenians and ridicule the official state view in private, yet they are unable to express these views in public. This situation clearly demonstrates the strength of the Turkish nation-state, which is able to coax all its citizens into supporting tacitly an imagined interpretation of the Armenian issue; nationalism enforced by the state prevails on citizens not to challenge publicly the state contention as to what happened. Those few who disagree, often outside of the state-university system, run the risk of being called traitors to the nation and have to bear both insinuations about their mixed blood and tainted character, and implications that they are in the pay of one foreign country or another. Their arguments are therefore often dismissed, not on the grounds of scholarship but of character.

To counter these destructive boundaries of Turkish nationalism, which preclude scholarly analysis, it is imperative to focus on and help further to develop the alternate narrative burgeoning outside the boundaries controlled by the Turkish nation-state. It is no accident that most of the representatives of the alternate narrative are faculty members either at one of the new private universities in Turkey, which are to a certain degree beyond state control, or at universities outside Turkey. It is to be hoped that this alternate narrative will, in time, challenge and bring down the walls erected by the official state narrative. In the meantime, it is a necessary, but not sufficient, undertaking to promote the emergence of true scholarship on the Armenian issue.

True scholarship on the events of 1915 will emerge only when separate historiographies no longer exist, when scholars shed their identities as members of a particular nation-state, who unquestioningly support the master state narrative, and instead conduct research first and foremost as scholars. This does not mean, of course, that scholars by definition engage in objective, value-free research. Yet, they can move closer to this ideal, if, as race and gender theories recommend, they articulate their personal standpoints on the issue. These theories also stress that there can be meaningful change only when scholars with a painful personal connection to the issue are joined by others unconnected to it, whose work can therefore not be delegitimized
as easily by political powers. An entirely new approach to the topic becomes possible when scholars who approach the issue as a matter of human principle join those who specialize in the topic because of their life experiences.

Let me now describe the rather unconventional approach I take, in accordance with the parameters outlined above. Here, Turkish historiography on the Armenian tragedy does not comprise only those who explicitly claim ownership of the “Turkish” position, that is, those who expound the official thesis of the Turkish Republic. Instead, it includes a multiplicity of works that pertain to the period before the emergence of the Turkish Republic, as well as other “unofficial” studies that concern the periods during and after the emergence of the same republic. The historiography therefore divides into pre-Republican (cum Ottoman), Republican, and postnationalist phases. Even though the works discussed often relate directly to the Armenian deaths in 1915, they also include others that touch on the subject only indirectly. Some of the works describing the pre-Republican period were actually published by the Republic in defense of its thesis; some in the postnationalist period contain literary work. I would argue that even though these works do not specifically focus on the events of 1915, they nevertheless provide significant clues about how and why the official narrative on 1915 emerged. In the analysis of all these works, I methodologically approach the standard Turkish texts and archival sources on the Armenian genocide within a critical framework. This is done in order to discover new meanings through not only what is said but also what is not; I introduce new texts to comment on either what is said or what should have been said instead. Such critical reading amplifies the silences, assumptions, and particular interpretations contained in the master narrative; it also opens up new space for the other, Ottoman and postnationalist, narratives.

Turkish historiography on the Armenians can be viewed within three historical periods, each with its own distinct narrative. The first, the Ottoman Investigative Narrative, is based on contemporaneous accounts pertaining to the Ottoman Armenians and the Armenian deaths of 1915, published either by the Turkish state or by opposing political groups. The second is the Republican Defensive Narrative, which emerges from works written with the intent to justify, document, and prove the nationalist master narrative of the Turkish state. It explicitly denies the allegation that an Armenian genocide occurred in 1915 and is often published or kept in circulation by the Turkish state. The third, the Postnationalist Critical Narrative, is found in works that are directly or indirectly critical of the nationalist master narrative but that do not, in most cases, focus specifically on the Armenian deaths.
of 1915. Their concern is much more with the silences in contemporary Turkish society pertaining to Turkish history and, related to this, Turkish society’s ethnic composition. I think that reading genocide within this framework can create a new space for a different Turkish interpretation of the Armenian deaths of 1915.

**THE OTTOMAN INVESTIGATIVE NARRATIVE ON READING GENOCIDE**

My reading of the works written during the Ottoman period on the Armenian relocations and deaths reveals two characteristics that distinguish the Ottoman investigative narrative from the others. First, since all of these works were written around the time of the events of 1915, they do not question the occurrence of the Armenian “massacres” (genocide was not a term then employed), but focus instead on asking what happened and why. Later, as the temporal distance between the events of 1915 and the scholarship increased, the events become distant memories; consequently, the narratives of both the Republican and postnationalist periods focus not on the events themselves but, rather, on the meanings these events acquired.10

Second, the Ottoman investigative narrative reveals a very strong tension between two worldviews. Some of the authors maintain a more traditional Ottoman imperial view and regard the existing structure of empire as just and the position of the Armenian subjects within it reformable; they also blame the events on both the Armenian subjects and the Muslim officials who deviated from Ottoman norms under pressure from European powers. Other authors, however, display a more “protonational” state view and perceive the existing structure of the empire as inadequate and the position of the Armenian subjects within it problematic; while they are not quite clear about what to do about these inadequacies and problems, they give priority to the preservation of the state and its Muslims over all other concerns.

The central tension in the Ottoman investigative narrative regarding the Armenian deaths and massacres in 1915 is over the attribution of responsibility for the crimes. Not only did the Ottoman state acknowledge what happened, but it also published the proceedings of the military tribunal that tried some of the perpetrators. Yet the memoirs of Ottoman officials reveal that the tendency to shrink from responsibility for the crimes against the Armenians increased with the surge of protonationalist sentiments. The tension over responsibility mounted especially after World War I, with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire; the Treaty of Sèvres, signed between the Allied pow-
ers and the empire, put forward the Armenian tragedy as a reason not only to take away Ottoman lands where there were significant minorities but also to establish the conditions for an Armenian homeland. Works on the subsequent transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish state illustrate how responsibility for the crimes gradually shifted from the perpetrators to the victims. Significant in this shift is the strong connection between the CUP, which justified the Armenian tragedy as an unfortunate consequence of its attempts to protect the Ottoman state, and the Nationalist movement, which gradually adopted this Unionist stand as its own.

This connection between Ottoman and Turkish rule has never been extensively documented and studied because Republican rhetoric has dismissed, and still dismisses, any connection to the CUP, which was responsible for losing the empire. Yet the works I analyzed in this category clearly demonstrate the strength of the connection between the Republic and the CUP in terms of transfer of wealth, ideology, and manpower. Some of the accused perpetrators of the Armenian massacres escaped to Anatolia to evade Allied attempts to bring them to justice; those perpetrators who evaded Allied investigation, as well as silent participants in the massacres, simply stayed put and threw in their fortunes with the burgeoning nationalist movement. Once the oppositional struggle in Anatolia commenced and assumed the form of an independence movement that would eventually triumph in establishing the Turkish nation-state, the former perpetrators, some of whom occupied significant positions in the nationalist struggle and became patriotic citizens of the new state, could no longer be accused, because there was no political entity left to accuse them: the Allied powers had retreated, the reigning sultan had been deposed, and the empire was now defunct.

The new nation-state and its leader, Mustafa Kemal, could not take a stand against the former perpetrators, who became comrades in the struggle, because they were needed to sustain the new nation-state. Aware that he needed to have his country recognized by the Western powers, who still took issue with what happened during the Unionist leadership, and anxious to take credit for the establishment of a nation-state that was actually built with resources provided by the CUP, Mustafa Kemal took a public stand against the Unionists, denied his Unionist credentials, liquidated those Unionists who challenged his authority, and claimed his passage to Anatolia on May 19, 1919, was the starting point of the War of Independence that eventually led to the establishment of the Turkish nation-state, with the Treaty of Lausanne.

The treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne form important landmarks in the
discussion of the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915, because the first acknowledges and the second rejects them. Accusations about the Armenian massacres encouraged the inclusion in the Treaty of Sèvres of provisions for an Armenian homeland in Anatolia. While, for Armenians, the treaty promised them a political entity, a country, they could call their own, Muslim Turks viewed it as a death sentence guaranteeing their disappearance as a political entity. Armenians in Anatolia and the diaspora struggled and cooperated with the Allied powers to attain their promised homeland, and they tried to bring to justice those who had perpetrated the massacres. The Muslims of Anatolia, who now defined themselves with the new, formerly radical identity that had not been embraced by the Ottomans, because of its exclusion and limited scope, namely, that of “a Turk,” fought against the Allied powers and the Armenians who were allied with them.

The Turkish War of Independence, fought between the Muslim Turks and the Armenians, ended with the victory of the Muslim Turks. Yet this victory was predicated on the atrocious injustices the Unionists had committed against the Armenians in Anatolia in the name of a protonational ideal. First, they had physically removed the Armenians from their homeland and eventually settled in their stead the Turkish Muslim refugees fleeing the Balkans and Russia, thereby irreversibly altering the population composition of Anatolia. Second, they decimated the Armenian population through the massacres, and traumatized and dispersed them in a manner that made it extremely difficult for Armenians to reunite as a coherent political entity. And finally, the Unionists capitalized on the property and goods left behind by dead or relocated Armenians, using these resources to help mobilize and finance an army and populace in support of the nationalist cause.

After the Unionist victory in the subsequent War of Independence, they began to justify their actions against the Armenians as a tragic but necessary move for the preservation of the Turkish state. Contrary to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, which had promised a homeland to the Armenians and political death to the Ottomans, the Treaty of Lausanne, signed by the nationalist Turks, guaranteed the Turks a state and homeland at the expense of the homeland and state that had been promised to the Armenians by the Allied powers in the Treaty of Sèvres. The immediate interests of the Allied powers took precedence over their support of the Armenian homeland, and Armenian strength to establish a presence in Anatolia and to claim their homeland was exhausted. In contrast to the Treaty of Sèvres, the Lausanne treaty brought the Armenians political death.
Thus the treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne offered contradictory solutions for the Armenians and the Turks, and this also comes through in the subsequent narratives the two sides have formulated. The discussion of the Treaty of Sèvres psychologically unnerved the Turkish nation-state and brought back memories of the insecurity and the impending doom of destruction felt before and during the War of Independence. The Treaty of Lausanne, however, became, for Turks, one of birth, celebration, and rejoicing; it recalled the pride and glory they felt as they went to the Europe that had shamed them with its frequent political interventions leading to the ultimate shame—for the first time in their six-century-long history—occupation of the central lands of their empire, where they had long considered themselves to be the dominant people. When the Turks signed the Treaty of Lausanne as victors, they claimed for themselves the national homeland they had imagined had been theirs from the beginning of time.

Yet the Armenians had exactly the opposite experience. The contemplation of the Treaty of Sèvres kindled in the Armenians hope and joy, bringing back memories of when they had almost had a homeland of their own in the lands they had lived on from time immemorial. It took them back to a time when they had flourished financially and intellectually, had reared a new Armenian generation educated with the European ideals of freedom and liberty, and were on the brink of establishing a homeland where they aspired to create a new, advanced civilized nation-state that would have brought back their proud ancient civilization, the cradle of Christianity. The Treaty of Lausanne had the opposite effect on the Armenians, however, as it reminded them of the final destruction of the dreams of that magical homeland where they hoped to bring out the best in their culture and civilization and build for their sons and daughters the society they had so long envisioned. Yet the possibility of such a homeland was categorically denied by the Turks, who not only established a nation-state, such as the Armenians had so long yearned for, but did so in their stead, at their expense, with wealth that was confiscated from them, and with the energy sapped out of the lives of their own children, who were not able to flourish in their dreamed-of homeland, but were instead massacred as they hopelessly marched in columns not toward the rebirth of their nation but, instead, to their deaths.

Both of these narratives contain great sorrow, for they have both been constructed at the expense of those who lost their lives and saw their dreams destroyed. Many scholars have noted how Western imperialism aggravated this suffering on both sides. Yet I would argue that then, as now, the role of
another social actor—nationalism—needs to be emphasized in contextu-
alizing past and present Turkish and Armenian narratives. Nationalism
polarized the Armenians and the Turks and caused them each to challenge
the other’s existence. It was also nationalism that instilled in each the idea
of a primordial right to create a homeland filled with compatriots in pur-
suit of the same dreams, and it was nationalism that decreed that these goals
could be exclusively theirs, accomplished at the expense and exclusion of
the other.

It is morally unproductive to discuss who suffered more, because using
the degree of human suffering to establish rights only increases the tendency
to cause suffering. Yet it is worth noting in this instance that nationalism
caused considerably more physical, social, and psychological suffering to
Armenians than Turks, since the members of the CUP, who espoused an
imagined community of Turks, had the support of state mechanisms to real-
ize their goals and had no qualms about employing them fully against the
Armenians, who, ironically and tragically, were the subjects of the same state.

Let us now turn to the question of why it has been so difficult to sustain
scholarly analyses of the tragic events of 1915. The context of the transition
from the political form of an empire to that of a nation-state has caused
this difficulty, because the scholars who undertake the analysis have them-
selves been born and raised in nation-states, an experience that colors their
standpoints. If one acknowledges this epistemological limitation and
approaches the period critically, however, it is possible to identify two con-
current narratives: one was formulated by former Ottomans who contin-
ued to interpret events that took place around them within the framework
of the empire; the other was formulated by select groups, like some CUP
members, as a new exclusionary nationalist framework. Authors from the
second narrative forcefully shaped the events around them, using every avail-
able means in order to create their envisioned homeland. Their vision also
gave them a new sense of empowerment and entitlement, preyed on the
deeply felt, general resentment for non-Muslims, and enabled them to fol-
low their vision with a comparable degree of passion.

From the standpoint of the present, I think it is unfortunate that the lat-
ter, nationalist vision prevailed. While both the Armenians and the Muslims
of the Ottoman Empire had “peacefully coexisted” in an imperial system that
did not treat them equally, this inequality had been part and parcel of their
social system for so long that even those groups in the empire that periodi-
cally challenged this inequality did so within the boundaries of the imperial
framework. It was only after the Enlightenment, and the French Revolution
it helped spark, that an alternate vision of society, based on nationalism and an alternative political structure, the nation-state, was introduced. The Ottoman Empire became one of the many testing grounds around the world of both a nationalist vision and the political structure this vision attempted to create. The experiment itself created a very strong sense of empowerment and entitlement to transform everything at all costs to realize what was such a promising and liberating alternative vision and the political structure it entailed. At the time, it appeared almost natural to exclude, remove, or destroy those who did not fit the vision. The world had to fight and suffer through two global wars to appreciate fully the destructiveness embedded in this new way of thinking about the world. Ultimately, the two concurrent narratives of the supporters of empire and the advocates of nation were reconciled, and together they produced the Republican narrative.

The emergence of a Turkish “nation-state” on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire precluded the discussion of any claims about the land the Turks had now identified as their homeland; it was no accident that Mustafa Kemal said, and the Turks constantly reiterated, that there was not “a handspan of the soil of their motherland” (bir karsî vatan toprağı) to be relinquished. What Mustafa Kemal had forcefully articulated was shared by many who had no qualms about the directive, as taught to all Turkish schoolchildren: “Fight for the motherland until the last drop of your blood” (Kanımızın son damlasına kadar). People’s willingness to annihilate themselves for a vision demonstrates both the ideological strength of nationalism and its incredibly destructive power. Since the people wishing to destroy themselves have no intention of taking that chance alone, they call on their compatriots to join them in the effort and to define a common target to destroy, a clearly specified group, which differs from them according to a definition they have composed as patriots.

This nationalist tone dominates the Republican defensive narrative I next discuss. Yet I want to draw attention to a significant historical occurrence that colored this narrative: the Armenian deaths and massacres in 1915 were followed by the Russian and Allied occupation of the central lands of the Ottoman Empire, directly and also with the help of the Greeks. During these occupations, the Armenian revolutionary committees, now joined by those polarized by the tragic turn of events against their people, sided with the occupying forces, took up arms, and in some places perpetrated atrocities against the Muslim Turkish populace that were similar to those that the Armenians had suffered. The Turkish massacres of 1917, especially those in eastern Anatolia, became central to the defense of the Republican
narrative. Hence, Turkish nationalism was further articulated as a consequence of these massacres by Armenians, as well as the massacres committed by the Greeks who occupied western Anatolia, with the support of the Allied forces, until they were forced to retreat by the nationalist forces of the Turkish Independence Movement.

The other defensive element on which the Republican narrative capitalized was provided by the ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) murders of Turkish diplomats throughout the world in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an ill-fated attempt to draw attention to the Armenian genocide. When combined with Turkish nationalist rhetoric, the murders polarized Turkish public opinion, not only against ASALA and Armenian claims but, unfairly, against all Armenians. The Turkish diplomats served as representatives of the Turkish Republic. They had no connection to the Armenian deaths of 1915 other than the fact that they were citizens of the Turkish nation-state founded on what could have been the Armenian homeland, and their murders demonstrate the harmful effect nationalism has had on the Armenians. The murders presented Republican Turkey with the opportunity to include in its narrative, again a nationalist move, a claim to avenge the deaths; thus, they strengthened the Republican resolve to resist Armenian claims and further radicalized the Turkish official stand on the issue, to a total denial of the Armenian massacres of 1915.

REPUBLICAN DEFENSIVE NARRATIVE ON READING GENOCIDE

The master Republican nationalist narrative on the Armenian deaths of 1915 traces the origins of the tragedy to the intervention of Western powers in the affairs of the empire and justifies the Armenian relocations and subsequent massacres as responses to subversive acts of the Armenian committee members. This narrative does not recognize, on one hand, the significance of the preexisting structural divide in Ottoman society among social groups, and the naturalized Muslim superiority this divide entailed, and, on the other hand, the fact that Turkish nationalism was one of many nationalisms that emerged during this period, with claims no more just than those of the others, even though it was the one that happened to triumph over them, at their expense.\textsuperscript{12}

This nonrecognition engendered by Turkish nationalism, which sought the preservation of the Turkish state at all costs, has led the Republican state to assign all moral responsibility for the Armenian deaths and massacres to
anyone but the Ottoman Turkish perpetrators. As a consequence of this non-recognition, the Armenian victims themselves, tragically and ironically, have emerged in the Republican narrative, alongside the guilty Western powers, as the main perpetrators of the crimes. Any feeble attempt to assign blame to the Turkish perpetrators is immediately dismissed in the Republican narrative with the defense that what happened was a tragic but necessary act for the preservation of the “state.”

No significant studies on the Armenian deaths and massacres appear until the two works by Esat Uras and Y. G. Çark in 1953. Their publication was accompanied by declarations of loyalty to the Turkish nation-state at every opportunity. Then, from 1953, there is a gap in the scholarship until 1976. The scholarship that has appeared since 1976 is clearly dominated by Turkish nationalism, from the start, which constantly not only demands that its authors pledge their allegiance to the Turkish nation-state as citizens but also requires them to preserve Turkish state interests in their works, even at the cost of critical scholarship. These two significant gaps in the scholarship on the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915 warrant further examination.

Why were there no works on this important social and moral issue of the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915 during the first thirty years of the Turkish Republic? This long silence regarding an event so crucial and central to the period immediately succeeding it might be due to several factors. First, it is reasonable to assume that the trauma and devastation endured by Ottoman subjects during the war afterward created a climate in which people were more eager to “forget” the immediate past than to question it. Further, the close link between the Armenian deaths and the Unionist leadership that funded and staffed the War of Independence led the leaders of the Turkish nation-state to employ a nationalist Republican rhetoric to silence discussion of the Armenian issue.

Moreover, by 1926, Mustafa Kemal had effectively eliminated the Unionist leadership he regarded as a potential threat to his rule; only those who declared and proved their personal loyalty to the person of Mustafa Kemal by taking positions against their former friends were able to survive. Some Unionists who were considered dangerous to Mustafa Kemal’s rule were executed following the 1926 trials of those who attempted to assassinate him; based on shoddy evidence, and with the help of those Unionists who had declared their personal allegiance to him, Kemal was able to eliminate all those who criticized the ruling regime in Turkey. Others chose exile in order to survive and did not feel safe returning to Turkey until after Mustafa Kemal’s
death in 1938, while those who did remain in Turkey risked their lives to do so and survived so long as they withdrew from political life and strictly maintained their silence. The fact that the young Turkish Republic underwent a series of traumatic social reforms during the era of Mustafa Kemal’s single-party rule also precluded such discussions. Finally, the subsequent promulgation of the laws of treason against the Turkish state and Kemal rendered any counterinterpretation of the official version subversive.

The same political framework dominated the rule of Mustafa Kemal’s successor and close friend, İsmet İnönü (1938–50); even though some of Kemal’s opponents were able to return to Turkey after his death, they did so while maintaining their silence and censoring their views in tacit support of the existing political rule. During this period, Turkey was also coming to terms with the trauma of World War II. Further, both the Kemal and İnönü periods were marked by strong Turkish nationalism that informally defined citizenship in terms of religion and ethnicity. Muslim-Turkish citizens, like their Muslim-Ottoman predecessors, were dominant. All other social groups were co-opted, disregarded, or silenced by methods ranging from censorship to population exchanges.

Turkey made the transition to a multiparty system in 1948. Censorship restrictions were initially eased after the sweeping electoral victory of the Democratic Party in the first elections, held in 1950, after the 1948 transition to a multiparty system. This transition may have encouraged some members of Kemal and İnönü’s Republican People’s Party (RPP), such as Uras, who retired from active politics, to find time to write. Many former Unionists, such as Rauf Orbay, began to publish their memoirs during this period. The choice taken by authors Uras and Çark to write about the Armenians may also have resulted from concerns about the increasing visibility and strength of populist and Islamic elements since the rise to power of the Democratic Party; these concerns were realized in the incidents of September 6–7, 1956, during which minorities, particularly Greeks, were attacked and killed.

Why was there a gap in the scholarship between 1953 and 1976? Quite likely it resulted from the 1960 purge of the Democratic Party from power by the Turkish military and the ensuing reintroduction of censorship and state control over scholarship and the knowledge it produced. Yet, this state of affairs changed once again in the 1970s as a result of the assassination of Turkish diplomats by the radical Armenian group ASALA in an attempt to draw international attention to the Armenian genocide. The defensive Republican narrative became even more radicalized during this period, draw-
ing selectively on Ottoman documents and the two early Republican works of scholarship, and it has remained the hegemonic narrative until today.\textsuperscript{16}

I have criticized this defensive Republican narrative for its inherent Turkish nationalism, which, I argue, makes critical scholarship impossible. The nationalist cloak over this narrative creates shortcomings: the use of archival material is highly selective, and nationalist scholars almost unanimously overlook other source material that contradicts the narrative, such as the investigation records of the Ottoman military tribunals and contemporaneous accounts in Ottoman newspapers documenting the deaths and massacres of 1915. These scholars also assume that pre-nineteenth-century Ottoman communal relations were peaceful and just, until the intervention of Western powers subverted the Ottoman Armenians. Yet, these communal relations naturalized Muslim dominance over the minorities, and the nationalist rhetoric reflects only the Muslim view of these relations. Even though Western powers did have a destructive effect on Ottoman communal relations, one must recognize yet again the equally, if not more destructive force, of nationalism.

The French Revolution and the social transformations it envisioned altered the expectations of all social groups in the Ottoman Empire. The frustrations of Ottoman Muslims created the social group of the Young Turks and their Muslim followers, who assumed power in 1908 and ultimately carried out the massacres of 1915. In turn, the frustrations of Ottoman minorities first generated demands for reform; when these failed, and Ottoman-Muslim aggression against them increased, minority members took up arms and revolted. While both Ottoman Muslims and minorities nurtured nationalist visions, any realization of their visions ultimately implied the decimation and destruction of the other.

Since Muslims as a group had the support of the Ottoman state and the advantage of a social structure that protected their privileged position, they eventually triumphed over the minorities. Their triumph was couched in the ideology of nationalism, which condoned all actions carried out in the name of the imagined community and the nation-state. This nationalist ideology enabled nationalists in the Ottoman state to justify the Armenian massacres on behalf of the imagined community of Turks, and it inspired them to join the Turkish independence movement to actualize the imagined community. In turn, the emergent Turkish nation-state rejected its Ottoman past and the massacres in which its leaders had been implicated. Republican scholars who engaged in research into the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915 institutionalized Turkish nationalism. As a consequence, they
could identify in their research the subversion of only two “others” of Turk-
ish nationalism, namely, the Western powers and the Ottoman minorities,
while failing to see that their own actions had been no less destructive. As
a result, they denied the massacres and argued that they themselves had been
victims. Only within the current postnationalist era has a more critical and
self-reflective reading of Turkish historiography, which places the blame
equally on all social groups, including Turks, become possible. I next focus
on how a postnationalist critical narrative of the events of 1915 has started
to emerge in contemporary Turkey.

**POSTNATIONALIST CRITICAL NARRATIVE ON READING GENOCIDE**

The most significant factors uniting the works in this category are that none
is written to defend a particular thesis and that none is supported in its pub-
lication to any extent by the Turkish state. Additionally, these works are not
colored by the nationalism that pervades the Republican narrative but instead
take a postnationalist stand. As such, they are knowledge products of the
emerging civil society in Turkey. They fall into three broad groups: those
written specifically on the Armenian issue; those penned on various other
dimensions of Turkish history but that, indirectly, illuminate and contextu-
talize the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915 within Turkish history
at large; and literary works, mostly novels by Turkish-Armenian writers,
which have recently begun to be translated into Turkish.¹⁷

The most significant dimension of the postnationalist critical narrative
emerging in Turkey is its willingness to recognize Turkish society not as an
imagined community of nationalist Turkish compatriots but, rather as a
cultural mosaic that comprises many diverse social groups, including Kurds,
Alevi, and the much-atrophied minorities—Armenians, Greeks, and Jews.
Turkish society at large is involved in an exploration of these social groups
through their literature and their historical narratives, and some societal
segments have started to engage in more critical self-reflection. Islamists have
begun to challenge the dominant, secular nationalist writing of history with
the publication of many memoirs that highlight the agency of religion in
Turkish history. Liberal Turkish intellectuals have taken on the task of crit-
ical self-reflection about what comprises and ought to comprise Turkish iden-
tity. These groups are willing to move beyond the narrow boundaries of the
nationalist cloak, which blames others for everything that happened. Some
are also ready to recognize how Turkish nationalism caused Armenians pain
and suffering. If these burgeoning groups transform themselves into a movement organized around the recognition of human rights, and if they are able to overcome the resistance of nationalist elements embedded in society and especially in the military, the Armenians deaths and massacres in 1915 may come to be widely recognized in contemporary Turkey.

**Conclusion**

Why is Turkey, like other countries, still not fully able to make the transition from a nationalist phase to a postnationalist one? In this context, Turkey faces one major obstacle, the periodization of nationalism in contemporary Turkey. It is extremely significant that current Turkish nationalist rhetoric identifies the passage of Mustafa Kemal to Anatolia on May 19, 1919, as the starting point of the nationalist struggle that culminated in the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. This periodization dismisses the significance of prior historical events and interprets the nationalist movement as a spontaneous development predicated solely on the agency of a single person, Mustafa Kemal.

The discussion and recognition of the Armenian deaths and massacres of 1915 in particular, and the demystification of nationalism as it continues to cloak contemporary Turkey in general, will be possible only if an alternate periodization is applied. The emergence of Turkish nationalism as a significant historical force needs to be traced to 1839, when the Ottoman Empire officially recognized the need to undertake political and social reforms. These “reforms” triggered the first stage of Turkish nationalism, initiated by the 1839 reform, and then continued with the subsequent 1856 and 1879 reforms, which all mark unsuccessful attempts by the Ottoman Empire to incorporate its minorities into the empire on equal terms.

The suppression of the counterrevolution by the Action Army on April 25, 1909, signals the beginning of the second, “protonationalist” stage, when military officials assumed control of the emerging political structure in the name of the state and the nation. The January 1913 coup d’état formed the high point of Turkish protonationalism, and the November 1, 1918, escape of Unionist leaders to Germany its demise. It was during this pernicious period of protonationalism that the Armenian deaths and massacres occurred.

The third stage, “official nationalism,” emerged on May 15, 1919, when many groups throughout the central lands of the empire started to mobilize the arms, military personnel, and financial capital prepared by the CUP
leadership throughout Anatolia. This third stage reached its high point not with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne or the establishment of the Turkish Republic but, rather, with the Greek-Turkish population exchange of 1923–24, the final mass movement of populations to realize the imagined Turkish Muslim community. This peak of nationalism sustained itself until 1983, although weathering repeated attempts to sever the connection between the military, which has assumed the guardianship of Turkish nationalism, and the transforming political structure. These attempts include the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party in 1924 and the foundation in 1946 of the Democratic Party. Both parties were ultimately crushed by the military. The demise of the third stage of “official nationalism” began with the establishment of political organizations within civil society, organizations that, at least initially, have withstand the state-cum-military-centered nationalism. The 1983 creation of the Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal, the 1995 emergence of the New Democracy movement, and the 2001 formation of the liberal Islamist party represent such developments.

According to this alternative periodization, Turkey is now at a turning point; as the third stage of “official nationalism” comes to an end, the first sparks of the fourth stage of “postnationalism” are in the making by a new generation that has come of age not during the foundation of the republic but, rather, in a period when the republic is being contested. This new generation will have to determine what to make of these postnationalist sparks. If the connection between the military and the political system is severed, and if the Turkish Republic is integrated into the European Union, this may mark the beginning of the fourth, postnationalist stage in Turkey. It remains to be seen how such developments might affect the official Turkish position on the Armenian deaths in 1915.

NOTES


10. Among the works that constitute this narrative are the memoirs of Kamil Said and Talat Pashas, Mehmed Asaf and Dr. Reşid, the Ottoman Military Tribunal Records of 1919–20, the collections of Ottoman documents published by the Turkish state, and the official reports on the Armenian massacres by Hüseyin Nazım Pasha and the National Congress of Turkey. Let me note there that I do not have space to review individually each of the works within this narrative. However, they include the following works: *8 Mart Sene 335 Tarihinde İrade-i Senny-i Hazret-i Padişahiye İktiran Eden Kararname ile Müteşekkil Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi Muhakemə Zabıt Ceridesi* (Turkish Military Tribunal Records, 1919–20); Anonymous [Esat Uras?], *Ermeni Komitelerinin A’mal ve Hareket-i İhtilaliyesi* [The Actions and Revolutionary Movements of the Armenian Committees], ed. Erdoğan Cengiz (1916; Ankara: Başbakanlık, 1983); Mehmed Asaf, *1909 Adana Ermeni Olayları ve Anılarım* [1909 Adana Armenian Incidents and My Memoirs] (Ankara: TTK, 1982); Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915–1920)* [Armenians in Ottoman Documents] (Ankara: BDAGM, 1994); Gül Çağali-Güven, *Kamil Paşa ve Sait Paşanın Anıları: Polemikler* [Memoirs of Kamil Pasha and Sait Pasha: The Polemics] (İstanbul: Arba, 1991); Hüseyin Nazım Paşa, *Ermeni Olayları Tarihi* [History of the Armenian Incidents], 2 vols. (Ankara: Başbakanlık, 1994);


14. Demir, Bir Şehid Anasına Tarihîn Söyledikleri.
16. Çark, Türk Devleti Hizmetinde Ermeniler; Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler.
17. Among works in this category are those by Taner Akçam and Taner Timur,
which focus specifically on the atrocities committed against the Armenians in 1915, and others such as those by Şükrü Hanioğlu, which deal with different subject matter but produce very significant insights into the events of 1915. Taner Akçam, İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu [Human Rights and the Armenian Problem] (İstanbul: İmge, 1999); Taner Timur, Türkler ve Ermeniler: 1915 ve Sonrası [Turks and Armenians: 1915 and Its Aftermath] (Ankara: İmge, 2000); and Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Hanioğlu, Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Also included in this category are works that produce worlds of meaning pertaining to the events, namely, literary works by Muslim Turks such as Ismail Arik and Armenians such as Hagop Mintzuri. Ismail Arik, Mahallelerindeki Ermeniler [Armenians in Our Neighborhood] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); and Hagop Mintzuri, Atina, Tuzun Var mı? [Athena, Do You Have Some Salt?] (İstanbul: Aras, 2000). Other works within this narrative include Akçam, İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu; Arik, Mahallelerindeki Ermeniler; Fuat Dündar, İttihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913–1918) [The Muslim Settlement Policy of the Union and Progress Party] (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001); Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution; Hanioğlu, Young Turks; Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu, İttihat–Terakki’nin Şeriflannası ve Yargılanması: Meclis-i Mebusan Zabıtları [The Interrogation and Trial of the Union and Progress Party: Proceedings of the Ottoman Assembly] (İstanbul: Temel, 1998); Mintzuri, Atina; Hüdavendigar Onur, Ermeni Portreleri: Milet-i [sic] Sadıkadan Hayk’ın Çocuklarına [Armenian Portraits: From the Loyal Community to the Children of Hayk] (İstanbul: Burak, 1999); Antan Özer, Yaşamı Beklerken [Awaiting Life] (İstanbul: Aras, 1997); Yervant Şirnakeşliyan, Balıkçı Sevdası [Passion of Fishermen] (İstanbul: Aras, 2000); Timur, Türkler ve Ermeniler; Pars Tuğlacı, Ermeni Edebiyatımdan Seçikler [Selections from Armenian Literature] (İstanbul: Cem, 1982); Türk Tarih Vakfı, 75 Yılda Tebaa’dan Yurttaş’a Doğru [From Subject to Citizen in 75 years] (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1999); and Krikor Zohrab, Hayat, Olduğu Gibi [Life, as It Is] (Ankara: Ayraç, 2000).