THE TURKISH STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN
VOLUME 19   FALL 1995   NUMBER 2

DOUGLAS A. HOWARD From the Editor .......................................................... 1

ARTICLES

SÜHA ÖÇÜZELMEN, Unset Saats, Upset Sihhat: A Fatherless Approach to...
The Clock-Setting Institute ......................................................... 3

JASON THOMPSON, "Of the 'Osma' nlees, or Turks": An Unpublished...
Chapter from Edward William Lane's Manners and Customs of the...
Modern Egyptians ................................................................. 19

OYA PANCAROĞLU, Architecture, Landscape, and Patronage in Bursa:...
The Making of an Ottoman Capital City ..................................... 40

REVIEW ARTICLE

JOHN M. VANDER LIPPE, Approaches to the Changing Complexities of...
Turkey .............................................................. .......................... 56

BOOK REVIEWS

Haili Inalcik, ed., with Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History...
of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914, by CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY ....... 64

Virginia H. Aksan, An Ottoman Statesman in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi...
Efendi, 1700–1783, by LINDA T. DARLING ....................................... 68

Avigdor Levy, ed., The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, by JANE HATHAWAY ...
71

Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State...
Centralization, by FATMA MÜÇE GÖÇEK and ESRA ÖZYÜREK ............ 75

Frank Tachau, ed., Political Parties of the Middle East and North Africa...
by BRAD GLASSER ................................................................. 79

Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts...
and the Decline of Sovereignty, by MICHAEL M. GUNTER ............... 80

Thierry Zarcone and Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, eds., Les Iraniens d’Istanbul...
by PALMIRA BRUMMETS ............................................................ 81

Jenny B. White, Money Makes Us Relatives: Women’s Labor in Urban Turkey...
by EMZNE ÖNARAN INCİBİLOĞLU ...................................................... 83

Paul Stirling, ed., Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages...
by EMELIE A. OLSON ................................................................. 87

Yıldırım Erdener, The Song Contests of Turkish Minstrels: Improvised Poetry...
Sung to Traditional Music, by WALTER G. ANDREWS ...................... 91

Kemal Silay, Nedim and the Poetics of the Ottoman Court: Medieval...
Inheritance and the Need For Charge, by MEHDI KAZIMOV ............... 95

OFFICERS FOR 1994–95

President: Daniel Goffman, Dept. of History, Ball State University, Muncie, IN 47306-0480, e-mail: dfgoffman@bsuvc2.bsu.edu

Immediate Past President: Sarah Atig, 1154 Van Hise Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706-2347, office, (608) 263-8774, Fax: (608) 263-4852, e-mail: sgatig@facstaff.wisc.edu

Secretary: Virginia H. Aksan, Dept. of History, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4K5, 1025-91-910 22-1517 office, (905) 577-8993 home, Fax: (416) 577-4400, e-mail: vakson@mcmu.ca

Treasurer: Erika Gilson, Dept. of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 110 Jones Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1008, (609) 258-1141 office, (609) 258-2686 home, Fax: (609) 258-1242, e-mail: egilson@princeton.edu

Executive Board Members: Emel Olson, Witterton College; Donald Quataert, Binghamton University; Shadab, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; John M. Vanderlippe, Vassar College

Cover: Tugra of Sultan Mustafa IV (1807–1808)

The Turkish Studies Association wishes to thank Calvin College for its generous financial assistance in the publication of the Turkish Studies Association Bulletin.
were obliged to accommodate the anti-reformist tendencies of entrenched local notables in a relatively out-of-the-way province. The remaining selections in Part 4 discuss Jewish participation in Ottoman and Turkish nationalist movements during the Ottoman Empire's waning years. Hasan Kayalı reconstructs Jewish activities in Ottoman parliaments, Sükrü Hanioğlu Jewish membership in the Young Turk movement. Both find that Jews tended to cast their lot with the empire's Muslim population to a much greater extent than the Christian population, particularly Greeks, and that Jewish politicians tended to concern themselves with general Ottoman, as opposed to specific communal, issues. Iber Oratlyı pleads for a more cautious assessment of Ottoman attitudes toward Zionism, agreeing with Kayalı and Hanioğlu that the Ottoman authorities appear neutral, or even sympathetic, toward Zionism in contrast to separatist nationalisms. He asserts, furthermore, that Ottoman Zionists had a cultural, rather than a political, agenda and that one cannot make a blanket characterization of Ottoman officials' position on Zionist immigration to Palestine. There is obvious tension between the conclusions of these three Turkologists and those expressed in Jacob Landau's summation of Jewish-Jewish relations in the late Ottoman Empire. Landau emphasizes Ottoman suspicion of Jewish, as well as Christian, nationalist tendencies and denies that Jews partook to any significant degree of Ottoman politics or Turkish culture. The divergence may be explained in part by the fact that Landau had no recourse to Turkish sources.

The "Culture" section represents a complete departure from the Braude and Lewis volume and illustrates how far the study of Ottoman Jewry has come and how far it has yet to go. Vivian Mann, Esther Juhasz, and Pamela Dorn-Sezgin seek to rectify persistent failures to recognize Ottoman influences on Jewish ceremonial art, material culture, and music, respectively. All use their disciplinary expertise to demonstrate the reciprocity that characterized the artistic life of the Ottoman Empire's Jewish and Muslim populations. In a fascinating anthropological investigation of Istanbul's Balat quarter, Marie-Christine Bornes-Varol clarifies and corrects the received wisdom on the neighborhood's backwater and squalor. Vedim Gürsel offers an edifying, if somewhat impressionistic, survey of Jewish characters in late Ottoman and republican Turkish literature, linking the depiction of Jews to the course of Turkish history and Turkey's reaction to the creation of Israel. Only Ilhan Bşoğoz's piece on the relation of the "Waqaq Tree" setpiece of the Karagöz shadow play to the biblical story of Esther seems a bit facile. While commenting on visual similarities, Bşoğoz fails to ask why the Waqaq and the ale of Hamar's execution are conflated in Ottoman popular memory, or why the Karagöz set pieces show a multi-headed dragon at the foot of the Waqaq Tree, devouring the hanging bodies. Noticeably absent in this section are any studies on Jewish artistic life in the Arab provinces.

The volume ends with three articles on sources that are really more expositions of particular sources than historiographical essays. Marc Angel describes the intra-communal frictions that can be gleaned from the rabbinical responsa of aforesaid Ottoman cities. Sephardic dominance is notable in all the cities he examines, from Salonica to Safed. Amron Cohen pleads for more thorough exploitation of the Ottoman archives. His advocacy of the śeriat court records points up the fact that

BOOK REVIEWS

only one study in this collection relies on these records, despite the fact that sicill studies have proliferated in the larger Ottoman field in recent years. Using sicill herself, Fatma Müge Göçek introduces the 1770 inheritance register (terekü) of the chief rabbi of Galata as an example of a little-used source for Ottoman Jewish social history. The sort of details of clothing and housing that this document provides would have been useful to Juhász and Bornes-Varol.

The Jews of the Ottoman Empire is a uniquely valuable comprehensive assemblage of research on Ottoman Jewry since the Braude and Lewis volume, even though the field has seen new developments since the Brandeis conference was held. Criticisms can always be made of such an eclectic collection. An obvious quibble is that Sephardic Jews dominate the volume to the virtual exclusion of Romaniots and Musta'rab. More troubling is the persistent gap between Ottomanists and scholars of Jewish history, and between Turkologists and Arabists. Still, the fact that scholars from all these specialties were included in the conference and the resulting volume bodes well for the future.

JANE HATHAWAY, OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY


Why did the main challenge to the Ottoman state come not in peasant or elite rebellions but in endemic banditry? In answering this question, Karen Barkey challenges existing formulations on state centralization in both the world historical experience and the Ottoman Empire. She first criticizes the frequent employment of the western European route to state centralization, where elite and peasant coalitions challenge the state, as a blueprint to explain all state centralizations throughout the world. Barkey then focuses on the Ottoman state experience to develop an alternate route whereby the state centralizes through incorporation and bargaining with social groups. She specifically locates such Ottoman state centralization in the seventeenth century, a period which most historians interpret as one of state decline. Barkey argues that endemic banditry, the only challenge that could structurally emerge in this period, helped consolidate state power rather than undermine it. After analyzing seventeenth-century Ottoman history in depth, she studies the three social groups that might have played a role in transforming the Ottoman state but could not, namely the Ottoman regional elites, the peasants, and the celali bandits. Barkey concludes that the failure of these social groups to challenge the Ottoman state demonstrates the strength of the state in this period and also indicates a successful process of state centralization.

The argument of the book is more detail is as follows: In the Introduction, Barkey compares the western European case of state development with the Ottoman version, exploring specifically how and why similar consolidation processes of warfare, taxation, and administrative imposition led to different outcomes. She argues that, instead of the European mode of state contestation by peasant or elite challenges, the Ottoman Empire developed an alternate route of state centralization.
through bargained incorporation. Specifically, the patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state and resulting prebendal structure combined with historical conjuncture to produce this different outcome. Chapter Two then ventures into a description of seventeenth-century Ottoman history based almost exclusively on the works of present-day historians; Barkey reinterprets these works to argue that the Ottoman state was not weakened by these crises but instead strengthened by them. In the next three chapters, her focus shifts onto the three social groups that might have challenged the Ottoman state but could not. Chapter Three analyzes the Ottoman regional elites, namely the landholding cavalry and the governors and governors-general, who failed to search for solutions outside the state because of their initial dependence on and loyalty to the sultan. Chapter Four centers on the other possible challenger to state power, the peasantry, who similarly did not succeed because of three structural barriers: the organization of production around the family unit hindered the development of horizontal ties, the frequent rotation of the landholder impeded the emergence of vertical ties, and finally, the institution of the court provided the peasantry with the alternative of making official complaints, thus causing them once more not to invest in horizontal and vertical ties. Chapter Five concentrates on those peasants, religious students, and mercenaries who chose not to complain to the state but instead engaged in banditry. Even though all could have ultimately challenged the Ottoman state, all were gradually decimated by the omnipotent state that both created the conditions leading to local militarization and, at the same time, ingeniously developed methods of bargaining and cooptation. Chapter Six analyzes the bandit-state relation in more depth, demonstrating how the state offered bandits administrative posts away from their local power bases and, upon their acceptance, usually eliminated them within a couple of years; bandits also had no possible recourse other than the one offered by the state because they lacked an ideology and common political goal and developed at best a political rhetoric. In the Conclusion, Barkey reiterates that the Ottoman route to state centralization diverged from the western European case and that seventeenth-century Ottoman history demonstrated the strength of the Ottoman state rather than its weakness.

Barkey’s analysis is impressive on two counts. First, she is able to bring the problematic issue of Ottoman state centralization into the larger theoretical debate on comparative state development. By employing a structural analysis of state transformation, she is able to expand her potential audience beyond Ottoman specialists to include all social scientists. Second, Barkey presents novel narrative, explanations, and interpretations that challenge existing interpretations of seventeenth-century Ottoman history. By doing so, she potentially prepares the ground for many debates.

This ambitiously comparative, revisionist agenda, however, also contains two major weaknesses: the comparative approach Barkey undertakes fails to adequately analyze the Ottoman state, and the historical documentation she provides falls short of supporting her claims. Even though Barkey criticizes the Western-centered approaches to state development, her own analysis of the Ottoman state cannot escape the blueprint provided by the French state. Inherent in Barkey’s analysis is a comparison that makes the Ottoman state appear “different”; for instance, we are told that European peasant rebellions and bargains they made were not like the

BOOK REVIEWS

Ottoman case (p. 194), but we never actually learn what they were like. Similarly, the Ottoman state is portrayed as deviating from this blueprint, following an “alternative” (p. 3), “divergent” route (p. 9), “lacking” peasant and elite challenges (p. 8), “different” from the European states (p. 194), “lacking” institutional forms to espouse (p. 175), unlike especially France, which “steadily and carefully moved toward a centralized administration... while the Ottoman state moved toward a similar goal by leaps and bounds, erratically” (p. 241), developing in “fits and starts instead of a linear evolution to more formal and legalistic forms” (pp. 237–38).

Assumed in such a presentation is, of course, a smooth European transformation from which the Ottoman case deviates.

Barkey is not interested in what comprises the Ottoman state but rather what makes it different from the European cases. We are not told about the formation of the Ottoman state (see p. 10, footnote 16) or, more importantly, its transformation in the seventeenth century. Barkey announces that she “cannot present the Ottoman state in all its complexity, institutions and processes of rule” (p. 28 footnote 8) but focuses instead only on those institutions and mechanisms most relevant to her argument. In doing so, she already takes her own conception of the Ottoman state as given and focuses not on its decision-making processes but instead on its subsequent policies (p. 60). Similarly, Barkey dismisses the transformations that the Ottoman state underwent in the seventeenth century, especially during the reign and later assassination of Osman II, as insignificant (pp. 220–23). By arguing for state centralization solely on the basis of policy formation, Barkey misses the crucial transformations that occurred in Ottoman state decision-making in the seventeenth century, transformations which led many to interpret the period, rightly or wrongly, as one of decline.

Barkey’s comparative approach to the Ottoman state also leads her to focus almost exclusively on social groups that were significant actors in the European context. She thus analyzes the role of officials and peasants; dismisses other groups such as artisans, merchants, and nomads; and totally overlooks the ethnic, religious, and regional differences within and among these groups. For instance, the very significant threat of heterodox religion, which is coupled with a very strong anti-state discourse in the seventeenth century is dismissed because it fizzes out “in the social disorganization of rural life” (p. 128). Also not mentioned are the frequent protests of the groups employed by the Ottoman state to work in mines and in the maintenance of infrastructure such as roads and bridges. In Barkey’s analysis, the social groups she selects come to life only through their interactions with the Ottoman state; they are presented as solitary units who rarely have interaction with each other except during times of harvest and taxation (p. 93). These social groups do not appear to live, marry, have fights, go on pilgrimages, or engage in any other meaningful activity; they also do not seem to partake in the myriad networks that other studies show to exist between the households of the landholders and the peasantry through marriage, financial transactions, and/or interactions during religious and local holidays. In all, Barkey’s comparative approach hinders her from analyzing the Ottoman state and society fully and on their own terms.

The other major weakness concerns the paucity of historical documentation presented to support the challenging arguments. Barkey waits until Chapter Three
to introduce the novel historical documentation she brings forth to support her argument; we are then told that this basically comprises some material from the 1572–1582 and 1654–1655 periods, selected because Sultan Murad IV ordered a reorganization of the provincial system between 1632 and 1634. In spite of Appendices One and Two, where Barkey describes her archival material, it is unclear what was actually available out there, how she sampled from the material, or, more significantly, what actually comprises her period. If she is focusing on the ceha revolts, which are commonly defined as occurring between 1550 and 1650, her non-random selection of a mere twelve years to make her arguments on state centralization is inadequate. Given the significance of sampling and representativeness in sociological analysis, Barkey should have first determined her time frame, presented the total amount of material available for the period, then explained why she selected what she selected from among that material. Only then would she have been justified in advancing her arguments on state centralization; her present examination of two, or at most three, sets of records mostly comprising provincial assignments from a particular region, selected as “snapshots” (p. 65), are inadequate both quantitatively and substantially in supporting her claims. The fewcourt cases Barkey introduces in her narrative from her own archival work (for instance, pp. 85, 91–92) are the only instances where the analysis becomes vibrant and convincing, but they are, unfortunately, too few and far between.

In defining possible historical sources for the period, Barkey also disdains the use of new material such as folk songs, tales, myths and poetry—sources that form the foundation of a new social history, one that expands beyond the narrow clutches of state-centered discourse to give voice to those groups that have been silenced by it. Barkey introduces these sources in opposition to state documents as “popular production” (p. 179), only to dismiss them in the following four pages on the grounds that it is “hard to match the historical record with the stories, poems and mythological explanations of events that flourish in the imagination of many individuals” (p. 179). By doing so, Barkey misses the function of these sources as cultural repositories that give meaning to social action outside the realm of the state. This stand then enables her to dismiss the attempts of various bandits to challenge the Ottoman state as “political rhetoric” (pp. 220 ff.) generated by “personal greed” (p. 197). If such a bandit accepts a government post, it demonstrates for Barkey state cooption, and if he does not, he is dismissed as being “arrogant” and “lacking political motives” (p. 207). According to Barkey, such bandits ultimately have no structural significance because, in the end, they were all crushed by the state (p. 240); the collective memory they left, the myths they created thus signify nothing. Ironically, however, it was listening to these folk-tales of rebellion that helped, among others, Ottoman students in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries foster alternate visions to Ottoman state rule. Barkey’s structurally determined formulation overlooks the meaning structures embedded in Ottoman society and thereby misses the site of many challenges that developed against the Ottoman state.

In summary, even though Karen Barkey presents us with a very challenging, structurally determined argument on Ottoman state centralization, we argue here that her theoretical construction and mode of employment of historical sources contain elements that very much challenge and subvert her contentions.

Fatma Muge GEcE and Esra oZyurek, University of Michigan


Professor Frank Tachau has edited a useful and noteworthy reference work, which is the first comprehensive encyclopedia of the parties and political movements of the Middle East and North Africa. The book provides students with important introductory and background information, and specialists with accurate and detailed data. Clearly, the encyclopedia will facilitate scholarship that compares political liberalization and parliamentary experiments throughout the Middle East, and in particular in the Arab world. The main flaws of the encyclopedia are the uneven analyses of some country chapters and a superficiality in the treatment of some important parties and trends that seems to reflect a lack of readily accessible sources. But in the end, the work fills a critical gap for students and scholars of Middle Eastern politics and history.

This reference work is part of Greenwood Press’s five-volume historical guide to political parties throughout the world. Appropriately, the work is an inclusive one, seeking to provide as much information as possible on the “formation, evolution, and impact” of modern Middle Eastern parties and political movements, which account for all countries of the Middle East as defined by Tachau. (Only one chapter is devoted to the six Arabian Gulf monarchies.) Each chapter includes an introductory essay on the history and character of the party system of the respective country and then features a detailed description of its various parties, which are listed alphabetically in the indigenous language (as translated and transliterated into English). Each contributor has tried to provide information on every party. Parties about which there is little information are so noted.

The overall structure of the encyclopedia is sensible and useful. The well-researched chapters (for example, Nathan Yalanski’s on Israel) are indeed incisive overviews of political life in particular countries. Unfortunately, some important regional developments were neglected, and some contributors could have been more diligent in researching their chapters and in using non-English sources.

For example, the country sections of the single chapter on the Arabian peninsula states are particularly terse. Moreover, they are apparently based entirely on easily attainable sources and include nothing particularly detailed or innovative. Tachau’s justification for this summary treatment is that these “relatively small” countries “have not yet established fully empowered parliamentary bodies or meaningful popular elections.” This explanation is, of course, puzzling since few Middle Eastern countries have “fully empowered” parliaments and “meaningful” elections. But more importantly, one must question the brevity and superficiality of the section on Kuwait, for that country has had one of the more meaningful political liberalizations in the Arab world over the last thirty years. The chapter