While the book is important as an encapsulation of the literature, it does suffer from some weaknesses. The choice of case studies—likely to be seen as less important now than a few years ago—is a victim of history, as the book was written before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but as the volume’s greater contribution lies in its compiling of research methods and literature, this is not a fatal problem. Likewise, attempts in the conclusion to justify the field of psychological assessment with reference to “rogue states” and the “world after 9/11” are likely to read as dated over time, and appear more ad hoc than critically constructed. There are good arguments to be made for the kinds of analysis outlined in this volume, but sweeping references to the changed nature of world politics are probably not the best way to make them.

More limiting is the volume’s inward-looking nature. While once or twice in the introduction and conclusion some reference is made to broader issues in international relations theory (motives, structure vs. agency) or to serious questions about the assumption of psychological consistency, no serious attempt is made to bring in other points of view, or to situate this subfield in the larger constellation of international relations or political behavior studies. This sort of context readers will have to supply themselves, or professors for their graduate students. But for readers who want to bring themselves up to speed on the field of psychological assessment—and who can supply the context themselves—this volume will be an invaluable resource.

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The popular initiative is perhaps the most bitterly contested legacy of the Progressive Era in American politics. By providing citizens with a way to pass laws without the interference of the legislature, reformers ostensibly intended the initiative as a mechanism for popular forces to displace the wealthy economic interests that dominated state governments. Yet critics have long maintained that the practical effects of this institution have been exactly the reverse of what was intended, since the initiative enables narrow economic interests to circumvent the traditional checks and balances of the policy process.

Frederick Boehmke lends a unique perspective to the initiative debate in _The Indirect Effect of Direct Legis-lation_. While previous scholars have focused on outcomes in specific initiative campaigns, Boehmke explores how the initiative broadly influences state political systems. He argues that incentives created by the initiative option lure more citizen-dominated interest groups into state politics. The result of this influx is to expand opportunities for citizen participation generally and to shift policy agendas toward citizens’ issues. These effects have the potential to spill over to other states as successful interest groups export their organizational models and tactics, and as interstate comparisons create isomorphic pressures in neighboring states. Thus, while the direct effects of an initiative may sometimes be adverse to citizens’ interests, the indirect effects tend to raise citizens’ voices to government. This argument would have been stronger had it been more self-consciously critical of the degree to which “citizens” groups genuinely represent citizens’ interests (as opposed to serving as front organizations sponsored by other interests).

Boehmke develops his argument using a simple (but not simplistic) formal model of a game between an interest group and a legislature. From the model, he derives three direct predictions that, when combined with three modest additional assumptions, yield six empirically testable implications: (1) initiatives stimulate interest group mobilization; (2) initiatives increase representation for citizens groups more than for economic groups; (3) interest groups in initiative states are more likely to possess resources useful for initiatives than groups in noninitiative states; (4 and 5) outside lobbying tactics are more important to interest groups in initiative states than those in noninitiative states, even after accounting for differences in resources; and (6) legislatures respond to inside lobbying more readily when they are credibly threatened with an initiative. These implications are examined and supported using multiple data sets, including institutional records on state interest group populations, the history of state policy adoptions on capital punishment and Indian gaming, and survey evidence on the strategies and tactics of individual interest groups.

The weakest link in Boehmke’s argument pertains to the first implication, specifically his claim that an initiative’s existence causes the overall interest group universe in a state to expand. While Boehmke demonstrates persuasively that the interest group populations of initiative states differ from those of noninitiative states, he fails to substantiate the claim that initiatives are indeed the ultimate cause of that difference. The root of the problem lies in his assumption that the presence of the initiative in a state can be
treated as exogenous (11). However, the initiative was not randomly allocated among the states; early in its history it was adopted mostly in western states and, more recently, by Wyoming and Florida (1968), Illinois (1970), and Mississippi (1992). To the extent that a state’s choice to have the initiative (or not) was a product of stable characteristics (e.g., culture, constitution, ideology) in its political system, Boehmke’s findings may properly be a function of those characteristics, rather than the initiative, per se. Since it is unlikely that history has erased many of the initial differences between initiative and noninitiative states, Boehmke’s analysis systematically overstates the institutional importance of the initiative. This problem could have been addressed with an appropriate two-stage regression model or more thorough historical analysis. Without such analysis, however, the reader is left to suspect that the initiative and interest group behaviors may actually be driven by unidentified common causes.

My criticisms notwithstanding, Boehmke’s study contributes usefully to theories of interest group strategies and popular initiatives. Methodologically, it illustrates nicely how to combine a formal model, large-N empirical analysis, and multiple data sets when addressing a single topic. Most significantly, the book affords ample inspiration for future research. For example, the indirect effects of other institutional innovations (perhaps state-level 527 organizations) might be evaluated using a similar approach. Or, the formal model might be modified incrementally to allow for multiple, competing interest groups and/or divided chambers in the legislature. Thus, I predict that an indirect effect of The Indirect Effect of Direct Legislation will be to stimulate new insights on the relationship between institutional arrangements and interest group behavior for years to come.

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The essays in Representing God at the Statehouse describe and evaluate the activities of religiously-based interest groups in nine U.S. states. By virtue of its focus on states that encompass a variety of political and religious contexts, and by showing how the relationship of religion to politics and the tactics employed by religious groups vary from state to state, this book makes an important scholarly contribution and improves our understanding of the influence of religion in contemporary politics.

The greatest common strength of the essays contained here is that each of them carefully and systematically documents the scope and variety of religiously-based political activity occurring at the state level. Anne Marie Cammisa, for example, makes clear that in the famously “blue” state of Massachusetts, the Christian right is actively represented by the Massachusetts Family Institute, which mobilized its members in opposition to gay marriage in the state. Brian R. Calfano and his colleagues demonstrate, on the other hand, that groups on the religious left play an important part in Texas, the most crimson of the “red” states. There, the Catholic Conference lobbies the state government in opposition to the death penalty, and Texas Impact unites “mainline and liberal Protestant and Jewish organizations” under a single umbrella to advocate “‘on behalf of the poor, the disprivileged, and victims of discrimination’” (110). Even Utah—where members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints constitute approximately seventy percent of the population—exhibits considerable diversity in religiously-based political activity. There, according to David B. Magleby, the Catholic Church may be the most visible and active source of religious lobbying.

A second important contribution of this work pertains to its documentation of how religiously-based interest groups are in no way monolithic; instead, and much like other types of interest groups, they adjust their strategies and modify their tactics to best fit the political, cultural, and religious environments of the states in which they operate. Edward Larson and his colleagues, for instance, point out that Virginia’s largely uncompetitive legislative districts, relatively short legislative sessions, and term-limited governorship combine to minimize the effectiveness of religious groups’ efforts at traditional lobbying. Partly as a result, religiously-based interests have sought to influence Virginia politics by playing an active role in primary elections. California, by contrast, as Edward L. Cleary points out, has a highly professionalized legislature, which helps to explain the presence of a “well defined and relatively stable” cadre of religious lobbyists in Sacramento, most of whom possess impressive “credentials and professional experience” that they bring to bear on their lobbying efforts (211).

While this work provides a rich account of religious lobbying in the several states, it leaves several