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The Place of Framing: Multiple Audiences and Antiwar Protests near Fort Bragg

Michael T. Heaney · Fabio Rojas

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Abstract Social movement leaders regularly invoke geographic places—such as cities, parks, and monuments—as symbols in strategic efforts to frame social movement activity. This article examines how place affects framing processes inside a movement and counterprotester responses with an ethnography of anti-Iraq War protests in Fayetteville, North Carolina. We show how place attracts the attention of movement leaders, creates opportunities for local community members to assert their interests, suppresses some frames within the movement, and encourages opponents to co-opt the meaning of place for their own ends. The multiple meanings of place can broaden the scope of conflict and reduce a movement leader's ability unilaterally to define a movement's agenda and public image.

Keywords Place · Framing · Protest · Coalitions · Countermovements · Iraq War

Abbreviations

FPWJ	Fayetteville Peace with Justice
ISO	International Socialist Organization
IVAW	Iraq Veterans Against the War
MFSO	Military Families Speak Out
NCPJC	North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition
OVMF	organizations of veterans and military families
PFADP	People of Faith Against the Death Penalty
UFPJ	United for Peace and Justice
VFP	Veterans for Peace

M. T. Heaney (✉)
Department of Political Science, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611
e-mail: mtheaney@ufl.edu

F. Rojas
Department of Sociology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405
e-mail: frojas@indiana.edu

A small crowd gathered downtown at 9am on Saturday, March 19, 2005, in the parking lot not far from the Airborne and Special Operations Museum in Fayetteville, North Carolina. By 11 am, the crowd had swelled to about 4,000 people, many of whom carried hand-held signs with messages like "Support My Dad, Not the War" and "War Targets People of Color." The crowd began to march, led by protesters carrying a large banner stating "REAL support for the troops; BRING THEM HOME NOW." Contingents from organizations representing veterans and military families followed the lead banner. A wide range of progressive, radical, and antiwar contingents trailed behind them, along with unaffiliated people from the surrounding area and neighboring states. A small group of about 40 counterprotesters stood along the parade route, which ended in Rowan Park, holding signs with messages like "God bless our president; God bless our troops" and "Straight girls ♥ men in uniform."

The Fayetteville antiwar rally was, in many ways, like thousands of rallies held around the globe since the United States announced plans to invade Iraq (Cortright, 2004; Walgrave & Verhulst, 2004). But the location, timing, and strategy behind this rally made it stand out. March 19, 2005 was the second anniversary of the Iraq War's start and the first significant milestone for the American antiwar movement since President George W. Bush's reelection. Prominent antiwar activists saw the second anniversary as an opportunity to refocus the movement in the wake of the election. The national leaders of United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ)—the nation's broadest coalition of antiwar organizations—sought to extend the framing of the movement, in part, as an effort to "support the troops," as had been attempted by some activists opposed to the Gulf War in 1991. If the antiwar movement could capitalize on broad public support for men and women in uniform, then it could partially "harness the hegemony" of supporters of the war (especially the Bush Administration and other Republicans), who relied heavily on invocations of patriotism and public fears of terrorism to dominate the discourse about Iraq (Maney, Woehrle, & Coy, 2005; see also Gramsci, 1992). Through the tactic of rallying near Fort Bragg—one of the Army's largest military installations—and in North Carolina—one of the "red states" won by Bush in 2000 and 2004, movement leaders intended to amplify the "support the troops" frame, attract new adherents among veterans and military families, and demonstrate strength in a Republican stronghold.

The Fayetteville antiwar rally is a significant example of an effort by social movement leaders using place as a symbol in a framing strategy. The strategic use of Fort Bragg changed the politics of the rally in ways that were beyond the full control of movement leaders. Some local residents of Fayetteville claimed a privileged voice within the coalition sponsoring the rally, which suppressed the expression of alternative framings pertaining to the "right of resistance" of the Iraqi people and the historical legacy of racism in the American South. At the same time, prowar activists challenged the use of Fort Bragg by antiwar activists. Even President Bush joined the fray by traveling to Fort Bragg to give a foreign policy address on June 28, 2005 (Stevenson, 2005). The use of Fort Bragg as a symbol by antiwar movement leaders made it more readily available to other actors, thus clearing new ground for framing disputes over the Iraq War.

While much is known about place and framing separately in shaping social movements, less research illuminates how they interact with one another. One important question about the interaction between place and framing is: Under what conditions can social movement leaders use place effectively to frame political activity? We argue that places have multivalent meanings because multiple audiences of the social movement understand a place's significance differently. As a result, movement actors and their opponents are rarely able to control exclusively the meaning of a place in a framing dispute. Rather, the interaction of multiple actors determines the meaning of place for the movement and its targeted audiences. In the case of the Fayetteville antiwar rally, we examine the interaction of five groups: national

antiwar leaders, the local community, competing factions within the antiwar movement, counterprotesters espousing a prowar position, and the Bush Administration. We contend that, in 2005, an alliance among national antiwar leaders, local activists in Fayetteville, and veterans organizations collaborated successfully to project a frame of antiwar protests near Fort Bragg as supportive of the troops and military families. The use of Fayetteville as a place allowed actors outside the movement to dispute the symbolism of the place. By 2006 the original antiwar alliance had broken down such that the Fayetteville protests were less successful in projecting the "support the troops" frame.

Place and framing in social movements

The interface between framing and the place of social movement activity is examined by various scholars, most notably Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002), McAdam (1996), Miller (2000), and Sewell (2001). The theoretical objective of this article is to offer a more extensive explanation of the processes that connect place and framing. We note that the invocation of place by one set of actors expands the scope of a conflict, thus altering the political balance of forces among contending actors (Schattschneider, 1960). The ability of social movement actors to project their desired frames depends on the new balance. In this section, we highlight key ideas about framing, place, and conflict to explain how the multiple meanings of a place affect social movement framing.

Theories of movement framing and discourse

According to Goffman (1974, pp. 10–11), a "frame" establishes a "definition of a situation . . . in accordance with the principles of organization that govern events. . . and our subjective involvement in them." Frames have the potential to render "what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of a scene into something that is meaningful. . . and provide background for understanding events" (Goffman, 1974, pp. 21–22). Framing—the process of manipulating frames—is a vital tactic at the disposal of social movement leaders who seek to mobilize their constituents for collective action (Gamson, 1988, 1992). Framing strategies include "bridging" (connecting two ideologically congruent but disconnected frames), "amplification" (clarifying or emphasizing existing beliefs or values), "extension" (broadening a frame to include interests that were previously peripheral to the movement), and "transformation" (replacing old understandings and meanings with new ones; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986, pp. 467–476). Successful framing has the potential to alter the beliefs and values that individuals hold when making decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), the decisions themselves (Riker, 1986), and ultimately the outcomes of contentious politics (Mansbridge, 1986).

Frames do not exist in a predefined form before the beginning of a conflict, but emerge dynamically through strategic interactions among leaders, activists, and opponents (Oliver & Johnston, 2000; Snow, 2004; Snow & Benford, 1992; Westby, 2002). During this process, activists draw widely upon the discursive repertoires available to them while forming new repertoires of collective action (Auyero, 2004; Ellingson, 1995; Fine, 1995; Steinberg, 1998, 1999; Tilly, 1978, p. 151). One possible tactic in this struggle is for weaker actors to borrow from the hegemonic discourses of stronger actors in an effort to co-opt powerful symbols, stories, and frames for their own ends. Maney *et al.* (2005) argue that peace movement organizations frequently attempt to harness the hegemony of opponents to counter threats to

civil liberties and democracy. However, not all peace movement organizations adhere to this strategy, especially those with "oppositional identities rooted in consciousness of structural inequalities," preferring instead to challenge the hegemony of opponents (Maney *et al.*, 2005, p. 375).

Adherents to a movement or a countermovement may have substantial disagreements about which frames are most appropriate and effective. Framing disputes may be fundamentally tactical in nature. Within a coalition, participants may fear that the use of a particular frame will direct attention away from their issues or concerns (Babb, 1996; Benford, 1993), overextend the movement in a way that dilutes its strength (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 206), or create backlash by the opposition (Zald & Useem, 1987; McVeigh, Myers, & Sikkink, 2004; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Participants in a countermovement may fear that a particular frame will allow the movement to convey its false messages effectively or otherwise mislead the public (Evans, 1997). Alternatively, framing disputes may be deeply substantive in nature. In the case of Maney *et al.*'s (2005) study of peace movement organizations, some of these groups prefer frames that challenge hegemony (rather than harness it), not because these frames would be more successful in mobilizing public opinion to end a war, but because their organizational identities are wholly inconsistent with hegemonic frameworks.

Places are symbols in the discursive repertoires of movements that are readily accessible during framing disputes. The influence of place on the dynamics of social movements thus matters directly to framing. In the next section, we consider the emerging literature on place and its implications for interpreting framing disputes.

Place, space, and geography in social movements

While scholars often incorporate place into their accounts of contentious politics (e.g., Garrow, 1978; Gould, 1995; Zhao, 2001), there have been recent calls to more prominently feature geography in social movement theory. Miller (2000, p. 3) argues that "[a] more geographically sensitive conceptualization of social movements is necessary if social movements are to be understood in their full complexity and variability." Though progress has been made toward this end (see especially Jacobson, 2002; Miller & Martin, 2003; Sewell, 2001), critics charge that the connection between place and contentious politics remains undertheorized (Tilly, 2003, p. 203).

Movement researchers and geographers focus on the roles that space and place play in movement activities. First, recruitment studies establish that physical proximity to movement activists increases the chance that a person will join a movement. Zhao's (2001) study of the 1989 Chinese democracy movement shows that students were more likely to join the movement if their roommate was in the movement, a process resulting in clustering of student activists in specific dormitories. Gould's (1995) research on the 1871 Paris commune reveals a similar process at work. Persons were more prone to join the revolt against the French state if their friends and neighbors did so. This propensity suggests that the neighborhood is an important unit of analysis in the study of urban conflict (Gould, 1995). Similarly, Miller's (2000) analysis of the nuclear freeze movement demonstrates that neighborhoods have powerful channeling effects. He finds that access to anti-nuclear politics in Boston was influenced by a person's residential neighborhood. Local institutions mattered, since activists were more likely to work through a university group if they lived close to MIT or Harvard or to start working with anti-defense contractor groups if they lived in a zone with many contractors. Places are not only relevant to activists, but also to state actors that seek to stymie activism. McCarthy and McPhail (2006) document how police rely on the public

forum doctrine systematically to dislocate protesters from the formal targets of the protest. This body of research helps to demarcate the conditions under which place affords (or limits) opportunities to participants in contentious politics.

In addition to serving as a context for action and a facilitator of participation, places may be manipulated symbolically by social movement leaders. Sewell (2001, pp. 64–66) observes that social movement leaders sometimes attempt to harness the symbolic value of place to influence the opinions of outside observers. For example, the 1963 March on Washington gathered in front of the Lincoln Memorial in order to connect symbolically the goals of the Civil Rights Movement with Abraham Lincoln's emancipation of the slaves. The result was to transform forever the meaning of the Washington Mall, which is now widely understood as a place where aggrieved populations can gather to register their discontent with social, economic, or political conditions (Sewell, 2001, p. 65). Similarly, McAdam (1996, p. 348) contends that when Martin Luther King, Jr. selected Birmingham as a place to march in 1963, the decision was calculated to provoke violence, attract media attention, and increase public awareness of racial injustice. Thus, place helped to frame the civil rights movement as a struggle of peaceful activists against an unjust social system in the South. A limitation of the symbolism-of-place accounts presented by Sewell (2001) and McAdam (1996) is that they focus on the work of one actor in establishing the meaning of a place. While we do not dispute that there may be moments in history when one leader exerts unilateral influence, we think it is more generally true that the invocation of place sparks a mobilization of myriad actors who seek to lay claim to the proper interpretation of place.

Multivalent meanings and the scope of conflict

Like most symbols, places have multivalent meanings—they mean different things to different people (Klatch, 1988). A place may hold one meaning for local residents, another for minority groups, and still another for national politicians. These meanings are constructed over time through the histories that different groups share with the events they participate in at that place (Nepstad, 2004). If differences in meaning correlate with variations in geographic scale, then invocation of place as a symbol will mobilize different types of audiences at the local, regional, or national levels; which scales are most relevant is part of a socially constructed process (Brenner, 2004; Miller, 2000).

Place has the potential to broaden the conflict because invoking the symbolism of place draws new audiences to a conflict. An expanded scope of conflict is of great significance because, as Schattschneider (1960, p. 2, emphasis in original) argues, "the outcome of every conflict is determined by the *extent* to which the audience becomes involved in it." Activists generally call upon place as a symbol because they believe that the expanded scope is to their advantage. However, the intervention of new participants in the conflict disrupts the balance of forces and changes the nature of the conflict (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 2–5). Once the scope of conflict adjusts, new forces may then have the upper hand (Kollman, 1998). We highlight that the existence or absence of alliances among participants at different geographic scales may prove decisive in this discursive struggle.

Consistent with these arguments, we make three claims about the conditions under which social movement leaders use place effectively when framing political activity:

1. *Instability of the scope of conflict* makes it exceptionally difficult for any one set of actors to control exclusively the meaning of a place in a framing dispute. As Schattschneider (1960, p. 5) explains, the balance of forces in a conflict is not stable until everyone has

become involved in it. The multivalent meanings of place are established through the dynamic interaction of multiple audiences. Activists are mindful of these interactions and, thus, attempt to craft their claims in ways that appeal to multiple audiences, both proximate and distant.

2. *Invocation of symbols visibly associated with a place* enhances the effectiveness of actors in using place to project a frame. Different symbols resonate more or less with varied audiences, so which symbols are projected in conjunction with a place influences the how the place's significance is viewed by observers. Activists are especially attentive to how media are likely (or unlikely) to represent their symbolic gestures (Koopmans, 2004; Koopmas & Olzak, 2004).
3. *Mobilized participants in the local community* occupy a privileged place in establishing the meaning of a place in a framing dispute. Members of the local community may claim privileges in establishing the meaning of a place vis-à-vis the outsiders who have temporarily invaded their space.[1] Even if they do not genuinely speak for a cross-section of the local community, outside audiences tend to give greater credence (within limits) to mobilized local participants in a conflict (Naples, 2002). This condition highlights the dual relationship between place and framing: framing may employ place to its own ends, but place may enable or constrain framing in response. The relevance of the local community partially explains why "a framing that may be highly effective in one place may be completely ineffective in other places" (Miller, 2000, p. 23).

In the ethnography that follows, we examine the use of Fayetteville by prominent antiwar leaders as a place to project the "support the troops" frame in 2005 and 2006. First, we explain why Fayetteville was selected by national and local leaders as the site of major protest, mindful of the multiple meanings of the place and the diverse audiences attentive to their activities. Their goal was to broaden the scope of conflict in a way that would effectively extend the frame of the antiwar movement as supportive of the troops. Second, we discuss the participation of active duty soldiers, veterans, and military families as symbols appropriately representative of Fayetteville as a place. Third, we highlight the privilege of activists from the local community in the coalition supporting the Fayetteville rally vis-à-vis other antiwar activists. Fourth, we note the challenge to the antiwar movement's symbolic use of Fayetteville by prowar counterprotesters. Fifth, we report on the breakdown of the strategy to use Fayetteville to project the "support the troops" frame during 2006. At the same time, we call attention to the effect of mobilizations in Fayetteville on the increased institutionalization of the North Carolina peace movement.

Ethnographic fieldwork

As part of a larger research project, we attended numerous large-scale antiwar protest events in the Midwest, Northeast, and Washington, DC during the 2002–2006 period. As the second anniversary of the Iraq War approached, we received e-mails from activist listservers, noticed postings on antiwar Web pages, and had conversations with informants leading us to conclude that the rally in Fayetteville on March 19, 2005, merited special attention. Our perception was that the antiwar movement had slipped into a period of confusion after John Kerry's

[1] The collective identity formation process, which establishes who is or is not a "member" of the community in question and what constitutes a "locality," also may prove to be a contested aspect of the place-based framing dispute (Miller, 2000, p. 20; see also Martin & Miller, 2003, p. 148).

loss in the 2004 Presidential election. Prominent leaders expressed a desire to use the second anniversary to reframe the movement, thus providing an opportunity for us to gain on-the-ground insight into the strategic behavior and tactics of a movement self-consciously at a turning point. We were especially interested in the decision by UFPJ[2] to direct resources and attention to a military town in North Carolina, since doing so was a considerable departure from its regular tactic of staging massive rallies in large cities.

Our fieldwork involved four visits to North Carolina over a one-year period. The first visit was on the weekend of March 18–20, 2005. In addition to attending the rally on Saturday, March 19, we networked informally with leaders of the event in a public hospitality space, attended the affiliated hip-hop concert on Friday, March 18, and participated in the cosponsored conferences on March 20. The second visit on the weekend of April 1–3, 2005 was to attend an informal retreat sponsored by the leaders of the North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition (NCPJC). In conjunction with the retreat, which was intended to assess the success of the March 18–20 weekend, we attended the annual banquet of Black Workers for Justice on April 2. The third visit was on June 28 and 29, 2005, in conjunction with President Bush's visit to Fort Bragg for the purpose of a nationally televised address on the Iraq War. The fourth visit was the weekend of March 17–19, 2006, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the war. In addition to these four visits, we shadowed the North Carolina contingent at the nationwide antiwar gathering in Washington, DC during September 24–26, 2005.

During our visits, we produced written and audio field notes and took photographs. We conducted in-depth interviews with fifteen leaders (including two counterprotest leaders), fifty-two short interviews with rank-and-file activists, Fayetteville residents, and counter-protesters, and disseminated a brief survey which was completed by 108 participants at the March 19, 2005 rally and 145 participants at the March 18, 2006 rally. We reviewed a videotape of the 2005 weekend produced by Atlanta Indymedia, as well as media accounts of the events. While this article draws primarily upon our observations and interviews during our five field visits, we used the additional sources of information to check our recollections of events.

Harnessing the symbolism of Fayetteville

The multivalent meanings of Fayetteville resonate with audiences that are supportive of and opposed to the Iraq War. As the home of Fort Bragg, as well as a historical center of peace activism and racial oppression, Fayetteville simultaneously represents war, patriotism, peace, and southern racism in the eyes of diverse audiences. This section considers how these meanings led national and local antiwar activists to converge on Fayetteville as the site of a major antiwar rally in 2005.

Fayetteville has been home to Fort Bragg since the middle of World War I, when it was established as a permanent location for year-round artillery practice by the army (Office of the Command Historian, 2005). Since that time, the fort has become a center for airborne and special forces, and a source of economic, political, and psychological dependence for the city's population of 121,015 people (49% white, 42% black, 9% other or multi-racial; U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).

Along with a tradition of service and pride, an oppositional consciousness has evolved in Fayetteville as social activists have attempted to harness hegemony by co-opting the

[2] A list of abbreviations is provided at the beginning of the article.

symbolism of Fort Bragg for their own ends. During the Vietnam War era, organizations like GI's United Against the War in Indochina and Concerned Officers Against the War sponsored contentious marches down Hay Street and into Rowan Park (Lutz, 2001, pp. 140–141). In the midst of conflicts with the town's population, the local Quaker House, which provided information, encouragement, and support to conscientious objectors, was burned to the ground in a suspicious fire on May 20, 1970 (Lutz, 2001, p. 165).

Although the 1980s and 1990s were quiet times for the peace movement in Fayetteville, citizens maintained an activist community. In late 2000, activists from the reincarnated Quaker House established a chapter of People of Faith Against the Death Penalty (PFADP). On September 4, 2001, PFADP successfully prompted the city council to pass a resolution in favor of a North Carolina death penalty moratorium. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, PFADP sought ways to remain active on issues tied to the "culture of violence," leading them to found an organization called Fayetteville Peace with Justice (FPWJ) in November 2001.

When declaration of a "War on Terror" shifted the nation's attention toward foreign affairs, FPWJ joined the emerging statewide antiwar network. FPWJ leaders participated in a November 2002 rally in the state capital of Raleigh that drew many of North Carolina's key activists. Having participated in the Raleigh event and built relationships broadly across North Carolina, FPWJ members proposed a statewide event in Fayetteville on the Iraq War's first anniversary. Army veteran Lou Plummer, a member of FPWJ, put out a call to action in February 2004 that resulted in a rally on March 20, 2004 that drew about 1,100 people to Fayetteville. This was the largest peace rally in the city since the Vietnam War. By highlighting the involvement in the rally by military veterans, their families, and the families of those on active duty, FPWJ established that Fort Bragg could be used counter-hegemonically as a symbol by the antiwar movement, even in the post-911 era.

Several leading antiwar activists described the national antiwar movement as "demoralized" in the aftermath of the President Bush's 2004 reelection. However, FPWJ activists sensed that they had only begun to tap into the symbolism of Fort Bragg, so they quickly began to organize a repeat performance of the rally in Fayetteville. With a successful precedent and an already established network of activists, efforts were undertaken to produce an event with a broader reach and visibility. Consistent with our first claim, this strategy expanded the scope of conflict around Fort Bragg. FPWJ renewed its invitation for others to join with military families and veterans, thus seeking to harness the symbolic legitimacy of these individuals' past and present military involvement when holding a protest near Fort Bragg (consistent with our second claim).

On November 20, 2004, the first of several planning meetings was held in Fayetteville in preparation for the second-anniversary event. Consistent with our third claim, members of FPWJ invoked the fact that the initial invitation came from Fayetteville to augment their authority throughout the planning process. Although the coalition behind the rally would eventually span beyond North Carolina, notions of appropriateness by activists in the local community occupied a privileged place in the discussions and weighed heavily in the choices of tactics.

While local community activists called attention to the potential resonance of a larger event in Fayetteville, it was principally national antiwar movement leaders in UFPJ who seized the opportunity to use a rally near Fort Bragg as part of a larger framing strategy. For them, staging a widely visible rally in Fayetteville was one tactic to attract the attention of the media and to transform the way other attentive audiences viewed the antiwar movement. At the same time, national antiwar leaders could not simply have chosen any town with a fort to stage a successful rally. The participation of local community members in the planning

process gave activists legitimacy that enabled institutional access to meetings halls, parks, and streets that would not have been as easily available otherwise (certainly not without extensive legal assistance).

North Carolina activists began to reach out for broad support once the decision to hold the rally was finalized. Bryan Proffitt of Hip Hop Against Racist War, a North Carolina resident on the UFPJ national steering committee, authored a proposal for UFPJ to support a weekend-long event (March 18–20) as an expansion of the single-day event the previous year. In addition to a rally in Rowan Park on Saturday, March 19, the proposal called for a hip-hop concert on Friday, a Southern Organizers Conference on Sunday, and financial and logistical support from UFPJ's national office. This support would enable the coalition of activists in North Carolina—now identifying itself as the North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition (NCPJC)—to increase its resources and institutionalize its efforts. The actual events of the weekend followed Proffitt's original proposal almost to the letter, with the only exception being the absence of a celebrity speaker, such as filmmaker Michael Moore or Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney.

Proponents of the Fayetteville rally tapped the multivalent meanings of Fayetteville in making their appeals for support. For example, activists at the local and national levels stressed that rallying in Fayetteville demonstrated a symbolic commitment to organizing in the South. Proffitt's proposal emphasized the strategic importance of the South to the antiwar movement:

> Many national organizations pay lip-service to their understanding of the South's significance, but few commit the resources necessary to help Southern organizers do our work. This has to change, and UFPJ has an opportunity to be at the center of a process of building a Southern network, and a Southern movement, to replace war and occupation with justice and self-determination (Proffitt, 2004, p. 1).

Proffitt's proposal went on to detail the ways in which place ought to be a critical element in UFPJ's strategy; Fayetteville's symbolic value was not only due to its proximity to Fort Bragg, but also due to its location in the heart of a de-unionized land of immigrant labor, rural evangelical Republicanism, and the unmistakable legacies of racism and the decimation of native peoples (Proffitt, 2004). This sentiment was echoed by UFPJ's national representative, Hany Khalil, when he spoke to the First National Convention of Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW) on March 20, 2005:

> United for Peace and Justice decided to support this rally... because we know that organizing in the South is the key for the peace movement; for the future of the progressive movement in this country. And we know that building with veterans and military families is essential to those tasks as well. And I think that the work that people have done over the past few months has helped to show all those people out there who said that there was such a thing as blue states and red states, and that wrote off the South, that that was completely wrong.

Staging a major rally in Fayetteville was both symbolic of, and a vital opportunity for, expanding the reach of antiwar and progressive movements in the South.

Antiwar activists recognized that the successful use of Fayetteville as a place depended not only on the choice of the city itself, but also on the invocation of appropriate symbols associated with the place (consistent with our second claim). Key activists recognized that the symbolic importance of organizing in Fayetteville was tied to who delivered the message for the antiwar movement. They were mindful that the place of the rally could attract a different kind of adherent to the movement, thus augmenting the authority of the "support

the troops" frame (see also Druckman, 2001). By choosing tactics that emphasized the role of organizations of military families and veterans, organizers believed that they could begin to shape public opinion. As NCPJC staff member Andrew Pearson explained:

> There was a very clear recognition that, at least for the public and the media, what we were doing would be irrelevant if it didn't have a stronger ethos in who was delivering the message. And who better to express antiwar sentiment and actually resonate with people at this point in the antiwar movement than people who were experiencing it directly? ... We learned on February 15, 2003 [the date of the "Global Day of Action"] that no matter how many millions of everyday people you get in the streets, the administration can still do what they want, but that when you get people from the inside, Pentagon officials, CIA people, GIs, vets, military families, people who are really integral to making the war happen resist, then there is a real power and a real chance to stop or prevent those kinds of conflicts and occupations.

UFPJ supported the rally by supplying $5,000 of seed money, sharing its mailing lists, offering logistical support, and giving prominent attention to Fayetteville on its web page. UFPJ did not give the same level of attention on its web page to other rallies. For example, UFPJ sponsored a bus from New York (the location of its organizational headquarters) to Fayetteville, rather than directly support a large rally in Central Park organized by Troops Out Now! UFPJ's tactic of highlighting one place—Fayetteville—for national attention was coupled with efforts to deemphasize numerically larger events held in other locales. These tactics helped to legitimize Fayetteville's rally as the "national" protest event on March 19 and directed the attention of the antiwar movement to it.

With UFPJ's leadership, the scope of attention to the Fayetteville rally broadened to audiences that had not been involved in the conceptualization or planning of the rally. Other antiwar organizations quickly recognized the significance of the Fayetteville protest. For example, the principal organizations responsible for sponsoring antiwar events in Washington, DC over the past several years (the DC Antiwar Network, Code Pink, and International ANSWER) cancelled their planned protests in Washington in order to send buses to Fayetteville. (Notably, each of these organizations is known for challenging—rather than harnessing—hegemony.) As a result, the Washington, DC area did not host a major protest event the weekend of March 19. Instead, small prayer vigils were held by Quaker organizations near the Capitol building and in Clarendon, Virginia.[3] The national mobilization effort made Fayetteville one of a few cities to host a larger protest on the war's second anniversary than on the first.

A wide variety of national, international, and independent media—including television, radio, print, and Internet publications—reported on the Fayetteville rally. For example, a basic search of newspapers using Pro-Quest identified twelve distinct articles that covered the rally, including the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, and *San Francisco Chronicle*, but not including the widespread attention paid by left-leaning independent media outlets (such as *Democracy Now!*). Some of these articles explained the event explicitly as part of a strategy of the movement to amplify the "support the troops" frame (e.g., Basu, 2005; Finer, 2005). A truly astonishing aspect of all these articles is that Fayetteville is mentioned side-by-side with New York, London, and San Francisco. The fact that a relatively small city in the middle of rural North Carolina is juxtaposed with

[3] We hired two observers to attend these events and conduct surveys of the participants. Our observers confirmed media accounts that these vigils did not resemble the massive protests that have been commonplace in Washington since George W. Bush became President.

the great cities of the world is strong evidence that movement leaders were effective in using the rally to amplify the "support the troops" frame. Some of this attention may have been due to media expectations that a conflict might erupt with a protest so close to a military base (Gitlin, 1980). Regardless of whether every observer of the protest interpreted it as supportive of the troops, the increased attention to the rally no doubt amplified the intended frame. This symbolic use of place as a central tactic in a framing strategy is analogous to its use during the civil rights movement, as detailed by McAdam (1996) and Sewell (2001).

Veterans and military families take center stage

Staging an antiwar rally near Fort Bragg required organizers to strike a delicate balance. While they wished to project the notion that the rally was supportive of the troops and military families, they were mindful that their plans might be interpreted by some observers as opposition to the troops themselves. This sensitivity stemmed from the awareness that multiple audiences are observing the activities of the movement, as we note in our first claim. Thus, the physical presence and participation of individuals representing organizations of veterans and military families (which hereafter are called OVMFs) was seen as vital to projecting a pro-troops frame. The OVMFs were perceived as being the appropriate actors to harness the hegemony of the War on Terror since it is difficult or impossible for war proponents to label them as "disloyal" or "unpatriotic," as it done more easily to members of other groups. The perceived necessity of OVMFs in the rally privileged their role vis-à-vis other constituencies within NCPJC, including (but not limited to) Quakers, peace activists, African Americans, civil libertarians, women, and socialists. The concerns and tactics of OVMFs came to dominate an event ostensibly planned to "support the troops."

The multivalent meanings of Fayetteville encouraged OVMF involvement. Fayetteville resonated with these groups not only because of the desire to project the "support the troops" frame, but because of the significance of Fort Bragg in the history of the military and of resistance to the military. Mary Barr of Gainesville, Florida, a member of Veterans for Peace (VFP) and the GI Rights Hotline, noted that Fayetteville was significant to her because of the historic role Quaker House had played as the first safe house for conscientious objectors during the Vietnam War. Today, Quaker House is one of the national headquarters for the GI Rights Hotline. Jerry McRaith of Rice Lake, Wisconsin, President of the Northwoods Chapter of VFP, told us that he came to Fayetteville in order to support other veterans' organizations, especially IVAW and Military Families Speak Out (MFSO) and to observe the reaction of local people to the protest. For McRaith, place facilitated both the expression of solidarity and the testing of movement tactics.

In conjunction with the OVMFs, the organizers of the rally used three principal tactics to amplify the extended frame. First, the parade to Rowan Park was led by the OVMFs. Second, the choice of speakers for the stage in Rowan Park was weighted toward members of the OVMFs. Third, IVAW and MFSO held their national meetings in Fayetteville on the day following the rally.

Representatives of the OVMFs marched in the front of the parade to Rowan Park, carrying banners to declare the presence of each organization.[4] A few contingents of non-OVMFs, such as the Campus Antiwar Network, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the North Carolina Council of Churches, carried banners in the parade, but

[4] The OVMFs carrying banners were IVAW, MFSO, VFP, Vietnam Veterans Against the War, and Gold Star Families for Peace.

they followed significantly behind the OVMFs. The order and visual appearance of the parade conveyed a clear hierarchy with the OVMFs at the apex. We think it is significant that this is the only protest we attended during the 2002–2006 period that unambiguously placed OVMFs at the top of a multi-organizational hierarchy. Photographs of other events did not show OVMFs leading large antiwar marches.

The appearance of veterans in the parade helped create visual images and sounds consistent with the place. Many veterans wore combat uniforms and participated in an elaborate series of "sound off" leader-response calls, consistent with the repertoire of their military training. We counted nineteen distinct calls by marching veterans. A typical call was: "We're the veterans against the war. We know what we're marching for. Two years ago we went to war. Now what are we fighting for?" Veterans' dress and chants conveyed a coherence lacked by most other groups in the parade, which leaders hoped would orient the coverage by news media. Their efforts to frame news coverage were largely successful (in this particular news cycle, at least). For example, National Public Radio broadcast the veterans' "sound off" calls in its coverage of the event (Marshall-Genzer, 2005).

On the main stage in Rowan Park, sixty percent of the scheduled speakers (24 out of 40) were either veterans or members of military families. Of the remaining sixteen speakers, four were conscientious objectors, three were family members of victims of terrorist attacks or war violence, and nine represented civic, religious, or political organizations unaffiliated with the military, such as the Muslim-American Public Affairs Council, the International Solidarity Movement, and the Coalition of Immokalee Workers. Only one speaker, Rann Bar-On of the International Solidarity Movement, did not address the plight of soldiers, veterans, military families, or innocent American civilians who have been victimized in the War on Terror or the Iraq War.[5]

While all of the OVMFs were prominent at the rally, many of the activists were fond of saying that "the Iraq veterans are the rock stars of the peace movement." One of the more widely discussed speeches was given by Michael Hoffman, a co-founder of IVAW, who was honorably discharged from the Marine Corps. After taking the stage to a standing ovation, Hoffman used his platform, in part, to call for support for better veterans' benefits:

> When we joined the military, we signed a contract. But a contract works two ways. We said we would be willing to fight and die for our government. The government said they would take care of us after we do fight, and they are welching on that promise right now. We are here in Fayetteville now to say that we will stand by the troops, that we will support them, that we will fight for the benefits that we earned, that we were promised, and you will help us fight for that.

Another speaker representing the OVMFs was Cindy Sheehan, co-founder of Gold Star Families for Peace, whose son Casey was killed in Iraq. Sheehan garnered worldwide attention a few months later in August 2005 when she camped outside of President Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, demanding to know the "noble cause" for which her son died.

The fact that IVAW and MFSO elected to hold their annual meetings in Fayetteville on March 20 solidified the rally on March 19 as an event endorsed by veterans and military families. The conferences afforded these organizations a critical opportunity to unite, support one another, and reflect on their place in the contemporary antiwar movement. In a remarkably candid speech that opened the IVAW conference, Vietnam veteran David Cline, National

[5] Bar-On was arrested later in the day for crossing the police perimeter in symbolic defiance of the wall separating the Palestinians and Israelis in Israel. He was the only person arrested at the event.

President of VFP, reacted to the strategic position occupied by the veterans' organizations by borrowing a metaphor from military combat:

> One of the things that I've learned is that when the shit gets heavy and they call you unpatriotic, they love to get a veteran out in front, because it is hard to criticize you. And I don't mind running cover for anybody; that's being a point man. But being a point man means that you're part of the crew. And you have to be listened to at the table and treated justly.

He continued by considering the balance that veterans should strike in this role:

> We can't allow ourselves to be put into a position of being window dressing for the peace movement. Now, there's two sides to this, because not only is there a danger of just being window dressing, but there's also a danger of thinking that the movement should just be in support of or behind military families and veterans. See the only way we're going to get a broad-based social movement in this country is to organize all the people that are concerned around their real issues.

Cline's further comments conveyed that OVMFs held the balance of power in the antiwar movement at the moment and the potential to exert sway over its strategies and tactics. While the OVMFs were drawn into the rally because of their symbolic consonance with Fort Bragg (consistent with our second claim), requesting their participation ultimately yielded power to these groups over the rally's agenda and staging.

The local community within the coalition

The national scope of the 2005 antiwar rally brought a diverse cadre of activists to Fayetteville. Although solidarity with the troops and OVMFs drew many of these visitors, others came with agendas pertaining to the injustices of capitalism, southern racism, homophobia, religious freedom for Muslims, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and many other issues. Some activists sought to use the rally as an opportunity to project these alternative agendas. However, consistent with our third claim, activists from the local community exerted privileges in the planning and execution of the rally that prevented alternative frames from dominating the discourse surrounding the event. Instead, an alliance among local activists, national antiwar leaders, and the OVMFs kept the event focused on supporting the troops.

The objection of key actors within FPWJ and NCPJC to airing alternative frames was more tactical than substantive in nature. In private, the many rank-and-file activists in NCPJC were more readily drawn into discussions concerning "white privilege in the South," sexism, or homophobia than they were into conversations about the Iraq War. For example, the most widely discussed stage event was the performance by the Cuntry Kings, a self-proclaimed group of "Drag Kings," that presented a skit criticizing the military's discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Debates about sexuality were a central part of activists' discursive repertoires, nurtured during their concurrent careers in other social movements. But, during NCPJC discourses, activists saw the "support the troops" frame as more appropriate and effective *in this place* than the alternatives. Even some self-identified socialists could agree that it would not be strategically productive for the rally to be framed as having been "sponsored by socialists."

Alternative framings were rejected principally because the state-level actors in NCPJC listened closely to the FWPJ members' objections these frames. In particular, the sponsorship

of conferences by the OVMFs was viewed as grounds for sensitivity. Local leaders such as Lou Plummer spoke for the OVMFs in the NCPJC meetings, declaring what types of plans would or would not be palatable in Fayetteville. For example, the authority of the local community was invoked to stymie discussion of an event that might take place closer to the gates of Fort Bragg, or on Hay Street, as occurred during the Vietnam War. Activists did not push to march through the center of town, but accepted a parade route through a quiet, residential area, in part to avoid confrontations with local people. These decisions resulted, in part, because the proximity of local activists made them essential to securing permits and negotiating with police and, in part, out of a desire not to alienate the OVMFs and pro-military residents of the local area.

The core leadership of NCPJC acquiesced to the desire of local activists to keep the rally focused on the hegemony-harnessing frame of supporting the troops. However, other elements of the NCPJC coalition resisted this decision, preferring instead to challenge hegemony. Especially salient was the question of whether NCPJC should support the "right of resistance" of the Iraqi people against the American occupation. While a defense of the "right of resistance" is common at rallies sponsored by sectarian movement organizations like International ANSWER, such claims are especially incendiary in a town where the families of injured and killed soldiers live. When representatives of the ISO on the NCPJC Steering Committee raised the prospect of affirming the "right of resistance," they were quickly rebuffed by core coalition leaders and FPWJ representatives.

The "right of resistance" was only one of several issues on which ISO representatives were criticized by others in NCPJC as drawing upon a discursive repertoire that was inappropriate within the local community. During the planning process, ISO-FPWJ disputes materialized in discussions about who would speak on the stage. During the evaluation process, credit or blame for different aspects of the weekend depended on adherence to what was appropriate in Fayetteville. At evaluation sessions, we witnessed two tense confrontations between representatives of ISO and FPWJ, one on March 20 and one on April 2. The end result was that core coalition leaders asked ISO representatives not to participate in further NCPJC meetings or events.

Despite the efforts by coalition leaders to suppress alternative framings, their tactics were not entirely successful. Numerous FPWJ activists were irate when the *Fayetteville Observer* pictured a contingent from the International Socialist Organization (ISO) on the front page, rather than a contingent of veterans (Williams, 2005). Regardless of the efforts of movement leaders, local news media exploited the symbols of the rally in the ways that seemed appropriate to them. This outcome illustrates our first claim that no one set of actors can control exclusively the meaning of a place and demonstrates the limits of what a movement can accomplish by symbolic manipulation.

Privileges of the local community advantaged proponents of the "support the troops" frame in dialogues with critics of the military present at the rally and conference. We spoke at length with Efia Nwangaza, a civil rights attorney and former member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, who served on UFPJ's national steering committee as a representative of Not in Our Name, an organization focused on resistance to the U.S. government's war on terrorism. She was also one of the facilitators of the Southern Organizers Gathering on March 20. During the interview, Nwangaza challenged the pro-troops frame of the weekend. She noted that the speakers on Saturday focused "almost exclusively on U.S. losses" and with a few exceptions "did not acknowledge the humanity of the Iraqi people."

Of the weekend, she complained that:

> There was too much deference to the military. People formerly in the military have to be accountable for their participation in the military. Why were they in the military in the first place? The United States military does not have a history of largesse. It has a history of imperialism.

Rather than extending the frame of the antiwar movement to support the troops, Nwangaza proposed a frame "transformation" in which the antiwar movement promoted justice for all peoples, regardless of race or nationality. Consistent with our second claim, Nwangaza invoked the former slave market in downtown Fayetteville as a counter-hegemonic symbol associated with the place to advance a race-based critique of the military. To Nwanagaza, Fayetteville vividly symbolized historical racism. Local activists responded by arguing that the prevailing logic of Fayetteville is that because the individuals who serve in the military put their lives on the line for the country, and because their families and community make considerable emotional and economic sacrifices when soldiers go to war, civilians who come to military communities must show special deference and respect to the military during their visits.

NCPJC rejected racism, homophobia, and the right of resistance in framing disputes because of their perceived need to pacify multiple audiences simultaneously, especially OVMFs, local activists, and the local community more broadly. These frames were more visible at rallies elsewhere which were not perceived to be subject to the same constraint. Rallies held the same weekend in San Francisco, Chicago, and New York more openly stressed these relatively radical frames in advertisements, hand-held signs, and staged speeches.[6] First, the liberal-leaning local communities in each of these places are—or are perceived to be—more tolerant of counterhegemonic frames. Second, the wishes of the OVMFs were not a constraint in these places, since they were not central players in these protest coalitions. Third, none of the sponsors of these events made place a part of the framing strategy. In the case of Fayetteville, place significantly constrained the use of alternative frames. This comparison suggests that on a more general level (and consistent with our first claim), the choice of frames depends on the particular set of audiences that protest sponsors seek to reach with their frame.

Countering antiwar protesters

By invoking Fayetteville and Fort Bragg as part of their framing strategy, antiwar activists provoked the involvement of people who understood these places as symbolic of patriotism and conservative values (consistent with our first claim). For them, protesting so close to a military installation was evidence of disrespect for—rather than support of—the troops. Disputes over the "support the troops" frame were most explicit when the March 19 parade encountered about 40 counterprotesters on the left side of the road, in a section marked off by police tape. Arguments between marchers and counterprotesters frequently touched on the meaning of place. The counterprotest sponsor was Free Republic, an Internet-based conservative discussion forum created by Jim Robinson in 1996. The counterprotesters challenged the view that the protest was supported by veterans and military families. Instead, they targeted the groups present whose organizational identities were rooted in oppositional consciousnesses. One of the counterprotesters, a middle-aged white female, had a bull horn:

[6] We hired graduate students in each of these places to conduct surveys and observe the events. These reports, along with Web searches we conducted, provide the evidence for this point.

> The veterans and the men and women who have family members who were killed are being used as pawns by leftist groups.... There are no pro-America groups who are marching with Madea Benjamin. There are no pro-America groups who are marching with Brian Becker and ANSWER and the International Socialist Organization, the Workers World Party, United for Peace and Justice, the biggest leftist Marxists in the country. They all hate America. You are dancing in the blood of dead American soldiers. You give these people money and the money is sent to Iraq to blow up more American soldiers. Madea Benjamin and Code Pink are not peace-loving. They want more Americans dead. The more Americans that Code Pink sees dead, the more they celebrate.

At this point, a crowd of drumming protesters passed, chanting, "Support the troops for real. Bring them home now." The counterprotesters passed the bull horn to a middle-aged white male:

> Hey don't lie to these people.... You don't give a damn about the war. You're using the war as an excuse to push socialism. We hear you over there yelling "Money for jobs and money for education."... But what do you want? You are using the war as an excuse. You would rather we lose the war. The more American soldiers die, the more you can push your agenda. You're not interested in the life of American troops.

These arguments were typical of counterframing strategies in which political opponents seize movement claims and frames and try to alter their policy implications (Naples, 2002).

A primary goal of the counterprotesters was to communicate that the protesters were not symbolically representative of Fayetteville or Fort Bragg. First, very literally, the protesters were not "from here." They were bussed in from somewhere else; most likely, New York City.[7] Second, the protesters did not "belong here" because they did not hold the values appropriate in this place. They are socialist and anti-American. They did not really support the troops and, in fact, were likely to bring them harm. One counterprotester, a middle-aged white man, told us:

> Some of these people's mother and father helped kill some of my friends in Vietnam doing the same garbage that these people here are doing. I've got a son and a son-in-law overseas. And they're trying to kill them too.

Third, the fact that the protesters came to Fayetteville, as opposed to going somewhere else, proves that they are against the troops. A young white female recommend that, "if they're against the war, they should go to where the decisions are made in Washington, DC. Since they're here, they must be against the soldiers." Although not part of the counterprotest, Brad Trogdon, a white Fayetteville resident, shared a similar sentiment:

> I really think it was disgusting because Fayetteville is probably the largest military town in North Carolina. Fort Bragg is probably the largest military base in the country.[8] For you to have protests—now I understand that all people have their First Amendment

[7] A survey conducted by NCPJC of 806 participants sheds some light on this issue. About 63.28% of the respondents came from North Carolina and about 36.72% from out of state, including 3.6% from New York. Assuming 4000 people in attendance, that would be 2,531 "local" participants and 1,469 from out of state, including 144 New Yorkers. So while the majority of participants were North Carolinians, well over a thousand people came from someplace else, including the equivalent of three busloads of New Yorkers.

[8] In fact, the nation's largest military base is Fort Hood, which is near Killeen, Texas.

rights . . . However, I think that when you have a show like that it is so totally disrespectful to the troops who are over there fighting to give them that right. . . and more so to the families of the people still left behind over here.

President Bush seized the last word on Fort Bragg in 2005 when he came to town to give a televised address to the nation on June 28. His presence reflected the expanded scope of conflict brought about by the rally and can be viewed as an attempt to reassert hegemony over the use of the fort as a symbol in the War on Terror. North Carolina activists interpreted the President's choice of place for his speech as a reaction to their rally on March 19. Bridgette Burge—a member of the inner circle of NCJPC—wrote to us in a personal e-mail on June 28 that "President Bush is headed to Fort Bragg today for a pep-rally. We see it as a victory of our framing efforts and strategic use of place. This administration is reacting to our framing! Brilliant."[9]

We traveled to Fayetteville on the day of the President's speech. Members of FPWJ staged a small vigil of about fifty people at the Market House in the town center, with Chuck Fager of Quaker House serving as the principal organizer. Several of the participants we interviewed objected that the President's speech was "using the troops as a prop" to support his "failed policies." Interestingly, the March 19 rally can be seen in exactly the same light: the use of the troops as a prop, a symbol, with a politically loaded, specific meaning. Regardless of whether the President's speech at Fort Bragg was, in fact, scheduled to react to the Fayetteville antiwar rally, we view the dialogue among activists as an archetypal example of our first claim: A place cannot be owned or controlled by any one set of actors in contentious politics. Instead, place becomes a touchstone through which divergent audiences compete for advantage in a framing dispute.

One year later

We revisited Fayetteville one-year later for the third anniversary of the war. NCPJC organized a rally on March 18, 2006. Many of the same activists—dogged still by counterprotesters from Free Republic—worked behind the scenes as the contingent paraded from downtown into Rowan Park. Veterans groups were largely absent, yielding a much different look and sound for the march. Media accounts estimated that approximately one thousand people turned out. According to our survey, only a few marchers (8.27%) came from outside North Carolina, in contrast to the approximately 38.89% that we estimate made the journey from another state the previous year.

We noticed significantly less police surveillance in 2006 than we had in 2005, and the tension between police and organizers was markedly less palpable than it had been. Likewise, disagreements among internal participants seemed nonexistent in 2006, in contrast to how they had boiled above the surface in 2005. Members of the ISO were visibly absent from the program and all other aspects of the event. The Southern Organizers Gathering at the Rainbow Room on Sunday morning consisted of a progressively dwindling small group from Fayetteville and the surrounding local areas. The scope of conflict had obviously narrowed.

[9] Burge's precise choice of words in this e-mail is almost certainly influenced by her exposure to an early draft of our paper. We had decided that our ethnographic fieldwork was finished by this point (although it turned out not to be), so we shared our draft with members of the inner circle of NCPJC, from whom we solicited feedback. Even though her choice of words is likely influenced by us, we nonetheless believe that the general sentiment that the President was reacting to them would have been felt by the activists.

Without UFPJ directing media attention to the rally in 2006, it escaped significant news coverage. Our Pro-Quest search identified only one article (from a Raleigh newspaper) that covered the Fayetteville rally (Stock, 2006). While news coverage alone does not establish conclusively that a movement's frames are received by intended audiences or not, it is a fair indicator of the likelihood. We think that the significant differences in coverage between the two rallies is strong evidence of the relative success of the 2005 rally in projecting its intended frame in comparison with the 2006 rally.

The relative absence of contention and excitement at the 2006 rally solidified, for us, the tremendous significance of what had happened in Fayetteville the year before. In 2005, national antiwar leaders had self-consciously turned to Fayetteville as part of a grand framing strategy. They did not use Fayetteville or Fort Bragg freely and without constraint—they faced resistance from the local community, factions within the movement, and an organized counterprotest. Nonetheless, it was the alliance among national leaders in UFPJ, local activists, and OVMFs that injected broad significance into the Fayetteville rally in 2005. Their strategy amplified one of the multivalent meanings of Fayetteville in the eyes of multiple audiences attentive to these events.

National antiwar leaders saw 2006 as a year to reframe the movement in light of the Bush Administration's bungling of emergency aid during Hurricane Katrina. Many of the veterans organizations that had been such a vital force during the 2005 Fayetteville rally instead joined the "Veterans Gulf March" from Mobile to New Orleans (March 14–19, 2006), which focused on the theme "Every bomb dropped in Iraq explodes over the Gulf Coast" (Veterans Gulf March, 2006). In this case, place was part of a "bridging" strategy that attempted to amplify the connection between the frames "social needs" and "wasteful war." In keeping with the framing strategy of national leaders, the NCPJC organizers pointed to the New Orleans rally when speaking to the press during their own rally (Stock, 2006). This switch in focus to New Orleans highlights the efforts of movement leaders to alter how place serves as a symbolic backdrop for a movement.

Although the 2005 rally near Fort Bragg was but a moment in history, it was also a moment with lasting consequences for its hosts in Fayetteville and in North Carolina. Many participants from the Fayetteville rally went to Washington on September 24, 2005, with 40 of them staying in town to lobby Congress on Monday the 26th. Lobby day coordinator Tamara Tal told us that "March 19 helped to unify us and give us focus. It inspired us to keep working together." During the lobby day in Congress, we noticed that the North Carolina contingent was among the most organized groups, with perhaps only the New York contingent maintaining a similarly high level of focus. On April 22–23, 2006, NCPJC held a statewide convention "to formalize a 3 year old network of antiwar, peace, and justice activists and organizations into a strong, democratic, statewide, powerful and accountable Coalition" (NCPJC, 2006). It formally agreed on points of unity and elected a steering committee (to supplant governance by the previous "interim" steering committee). This move expanded NCJPC's organizational capacity and allowed it to respond rapidly to events of the spring and summer of 2006, such as widespread discontent over congressional efforts to crack down on immigration.

The inner circle of NCPJC tentatively decided not to organize a fourth anniversary march near Fort Bragg in 2007. They have accepted that the symbolic power of Fort Bragg for the antiwar movement has faded, at least for the moment. Yet the ability of North Carolina activists to stage three successive rallies in Fayetteville helped to provide the impetus that made greater institutionalization of the movement possible.

Conclusion: Place and movement tactics

The meaning of place is multivalent within social movements. Places neither have inherent meanings that can be invoked freely by any participant in a discourse, nor do the inhabitants of a place have exclusive control over the significance of where they live. Rather, places become resonant symbols through negotiation and interaction among multiple audiences. Actors within coalitions and countermovements use place differently in these discourses, sometimes preferring to use place to harness the hegemony of opponents, while other times choosing to challenge the hegemony of opponents. As the scope of conflict broadens, competing audiences construct the relevant graphic geographic scale: a place alternatively becomes representative of a local population, a region, and a nation's history. In analyzing these dynamics, our ethnography contributes to scholarly understandings of place in social movements by clarifying the processes through which frames, tactics, and audiences interrelate during contentious politics.

Political actors regularly invoke geographic places as part of their framing tactics. Beyond the Fayetteville rallies, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s marches on Washington, Selma, and Birmingham, Cindy Sheehan's vigil in Crawford, the Veterans' Gulf March, and the 2004 Republican National Convention all reflect the strategic use of place. Political actors rarely find, however, that their tactics work precisely as planned. Rather, the multivalent meanings of a place interest new audiences in the conflict, widening its scope. If leaders fail to align key audiences according to the intended frame, the result may be the opposite of what was planned. The reaction of mobilized participants within the local community may be especially influential in affecting the outcomes of these framing disputes.

Our ethnography specifies that place is often a critical part of the discursive opportunity structure that allows social movement actors to shape public opinion (Snow, 2004). In doing so, we fulfill, in part, Miller's (2000, p. xv) call for "analysis of local mobilizing efforts and their interactions with broader-scale processes." We identify and explain the processes that govern these interactions: the changing scope of conflict among multiple audiences, the successful and unsuccessful invocation of visibly associated symbols, and the privileged position of local participants in the conflict. In doing so, our analysis jointly enhances theories of place and theories of framing in contentious politics.

Fayetteville alternatively stands for patriotism, militarism, resistance to militarism, the South, or racism, depending on who you ask. Especially in 2005, antiwar activists were able to channel the symbolism of place to frame the antiwar movement as mobilized in part to "support the troops." One limitation of our account is that we arrived on the scene once the frames and the key players had been well defined. As a result, we see less clearly than we would like the role of place in the initial filtering of competing frames. Further research could fruitfully explore this filtering process, perhaps focusing more on the routine—rather than contentious—stage of framing. Such investigations could prove to be an opportunity to connect more clearly discussions of identity formation, emotions, and resource mobilization with frame construction.

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Michael T. Heaney is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida. His recent publications include "Building the Chicago School" (with John Mark Hansen), *American Political Science Review,* Vol. 100, No. 4, November 2006, and "Brokering Health Policy: Coalitions, Parties, and Interest Group Influence," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law,* Vol. 31, No. 5, October 2006.

Fabio Rojas is an assistant professor of sociology at Indiana University. His forthcoming book, *From Black Power to Black Studies: How a Radical Social Movement Became an Academic Discipline* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), uses black studies' history to show how political movements generate lasting institutional change.