The Urban Geography of Protest Recruitment:
Spatial Origins of Anti-Iraq War Protesters in Four Urban Centers

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Abstract: We examine three factors relating to the relationship between urban geography and the recruitment of protesters: demography, partisanship, and presence of movement organizations in an urban area. We consider how these factors affect how many protesters are recruited from an area. We test geographically-informed hypotheses with data from a longitudinal study of anti-Iraq War protest in the 2000s. From 2005 to 2010, we surveyed people who attended selected antiwar rallies and asked them to provide their zip code. For each zip code, we know how many protesters in our sample live there and the zip code’s demographic characteristics, partisanship, and number of nonprofit peace organizations. Our model estimates provide support for the hypotheses that demography and partisanship affect recruitment. The data do not support the hypothesis that the density of movement organizations contributes to mobilization. The implications for social movement research is that theories that try to identify the effects of location on recruitment and movement behavior should take into account self-selection of similar people into neighborhoods and consider a baseline model that focuses on demography and partisanship.
Introduction

In the early 21st century, the peace movement waged a protracted struggle against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Gillan, Pickerill, and Webster 2008; Heaney and Rojas 2014, 2015; Leitz 2014; Meyer and Corrigal-Brown 2005; Tarrow 2015; Walgrave and Rucht 2010; Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008). At its height, the antiwar movement drew thousands, even millions, of people to its events. We conducted field work in the movement and surveyed thousands of participants during this crest of early 21st century antiwar protest. Among our observations, we noticed an intimate relationship between protest and place. Washington, D.C. is the simplest example. As the center of American political power, the capital city is an ideal stage for protest. It is where policy makers and political elites live. It is also accessible to media that can bring a movement’s message to a global audience. Naturally, the peace movement focused much of its energy on Washington, D.C.

Washington, D.C. is not a homogeneous resource that movements can exploit. Like all urban centers, D.C. is a complex social system of neighborhoods, transit systems, and commercial centers. Some sections of the capital act as focal points for activists, such as the National Mall or the Capitol, which are ideal places for political assemblies. In contrast, other areas of the city seem to be bereft of social movement activity. The areas just beyond the National Mall are rarely the site of protest. This unevenness became very clear to us as we walked with protesters as they moved around the city. In March 2005, the first author followed one march as it moved from Malcolm X Park to the National Mall. It was very clear that some neighborhoods were places where activists commonly met and helped each other, while other neighborhoods lacked signs of political mobilization, such as flyers, posters, or banners encouraging the peace movement. Later, during other field work, both authors observed that
some neighborhoods were very tolerant of movement actions. The Adams Morgan area, where advertising for various movements was ubiquitous, was a place where one could often find anti-Bush political theater on the street. Along these lines, Figure 1 depicts student protesters marching through the streets of Washington, D.C.

[Figure 1 about here]

We are not the first scholars to observe that some places appear to be “incubators” or “hotbeds” for movements. Indeed, a substantial literature documents the important role that cities and neighborhoods have in making mobilization possible (e.g., Gould 1995; Polletta 1999; Miller 2000). We contribute to the literature on social movements and urban space through a more systematic understanding of how the complexity of cities contributes to movement mobilization. These previous studies of urban space and movements rely on case studies (e.g., Miller 2000) or, in a few cases, quantitative analyses of the association between neighborhoods and protest participation in historical settings, such as the Paris Communes of 1848 and 1871 (Gould 1995). In general, these studies do not use large quantitative data sets to establish the relationship between place and mobilization in multiple urban centers.

In this article, we briefly review three major theories for why an urban space would be a “hotbed” or “incubator” for social protest: demographic characteristics, partisanship, and social movement organization density. Then, we test hypotheses with data on 7605 protestors that we surveyed from 2005 to 2010. We estimate a statistical model of how many protestors in our sample come from zip codes in four major metropolitan areas: Washington, D.C., New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. In all four cases, we find that demography and partisanship matter, but not social movement organization density. Our conclusion discusses the implication of our study for future research on protest and place.
Motivation: Movements are Clustered in Space

Numerous studies have shown that activists tend to recruit those who live in the same neighborhood, or even the same building, including analyses of the Whiskey Rebellion (Gould 1996), the Paris Commune of 1871 (Gould 1995), the Selma protest in the Civil Rights movement (Garrow 1978), the 1989 Tiananmen Protest movement (Zhao 2001), and 1980s anti-nuclear mobilization in Boston (Miller 2000). These studies show that the concentration of people facilitates recruitment. Urban geography is important because entry points for movements can be clustered together. For example, colleges possess a high density of movement groups. They often have campus chapters of national organizations and send recruiters to campuses. Thus, colleges tend to anchor movement activities in their vicinity.

The theory of free spaces suggests that some areas become safe havens for movements (Polletta 1999). These are places where people can freely express themselves and otherwise organize without fear of repercussion, such as a room in a larger structure, a home or business, or sometimes an entire neighborhood. This analysis suggests that some areas are incubators, or focal points, for movement mobilization.

The Spatial Demography of Protest

The first factor that we consider is demography. The major theories of movement recruitment suggest that people vary greatly in their receptiveness to social movements because of their gender, race, education, and employment status (Corrigal-Brown 2012; McVeigh and Smith 1999). Thus, urban spaces with people who are receptive to a movement should be a place where it is easier to recruit activists. The existing research on movement participation suggests that social status is an important factor in movement participation. For example, it is often noted that education and income correlate with movement participation (Corrigal-Brown 2012;
DiGrazia 2014). This literature argues that those with more education and income have more access to sources of information and more time than can be allocated to political participation of all types, not just protest participation. Thus, one would expect education, income, and employment to correlate with protest participation.

Another argument is that race and gender affect the tendency to participate in movements. Large-scale studies of political participation have often found that women are less likely to protest (Cable 1992; Lee 1997; McAdam 1992), even if they do play important leadership roles in movements (Viterna 2005). Some empirical studies on race and protest participation, especially those in the 1970s and 1980s, found that African Americans were more likely to self-report protest participation (McVeigh and Smith 1999). Other studies note that African Americans are less likely to participate in protest, especially if it relates to policy issues aside from civil rights and racial equality. Thus, the evidence is mixed (Corrigal-Borwn 2012: 23).

These varied literatures on protest participation suggest that the spatial distribution of protesters reflects multiple demographic factors. A specific area, whether it is a neighborhood or an entire metropolitan area, is more likely to produce activists if they have a demographic profile that is associated with protest participation. Areas with younger, wealthier, employed, and more educated populations should yield more protest participants. Areas with more African Americans and women are more likely to produce protesters.

**Where Partisans Live**

Many scholars have observed that movements and parties are intimately connected (Greenstone 1969; Heaney and Rojas 2007, 2011, 2015; Kitschelt 1993; McAdam and Kloos 2014; Schlozman 2015; Schwartz 2006). Many movements have closely allied parties. Ties
between labor parties and labor movements are one example (Goldstone 2003). Ties between
green parties and environmental movements are another example (Mayer and Ely 1998). The
American case is complex because the two major parties are vast coalitions of interest groups,
movements, and unaffiliated individual voters (Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller 2008). Still,
numerous scholars have noted that the Democratic and Republican parties have an enduring and
nuanced relationship with American social movements (Schlozman 2015). The Republican Party
itself was born in the days of abolitionism and reflected the anti-slavery movements of the era.
Later in the 19th century, the Democratic Party absorbed labor and farmer's movements. In the
20th century, the Democratic Party attracted the lion's share of civil rights activists. The
Republicans attracted Christian conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s (Williams 2010).

The overlap of party and movements suggests that there is a geographic component of
movement mobilization that reflects the residential patterns of partisans. Places that have
unusually high concentrations of partisans should produce a relatively large number of
movement participants. An important finding in political geography is that there are regions
where there are disproportionately more members of one party than another (e.g., Katzenelson
1981). For example, in American politics, rural areas tend to vote for Republicans while urban
voters favor Democrats. Similarly, there are often enclaves within larger areas that have contrary
political orientations. For example, many cities have neighborhoods or suburbs that tend to vote
for Republicans. These observations result in an important hypothesis about movement
recruitment. When a party and a movement have aligned identities and interests, one should
expect that places with high concentrations of partisans have a high concentration of movement
participants.
In presenting this hypothesis, we emphasize that it is not always the case that movement and party goals align. There is not always a correlation between the presence of partisans and the mobilization of activists because many forces affect how partisan-activists see themselves. In this article, we examine the electoral victories of the party. Movements that focus on grievances often reflect an inability to address an issue through conventional politics. This tendency has means that movements may be at their strongest when their allied party is out of political power (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni 1995). Without control of the executive or legislative branches of government, many in the party may resort to movement activism. Similarly, movement leaders may find it easier to recruit at times when their sympathetic party is out of power. In addition to more strategic considerations, it may also be the case that having the opposite party in power magnifies the grievance and increases mobilization. Conversely, having the sympathetic party in power may lead many partisan activists to take a more favorable view of current policy and, thus, result in decreased mobilization.

**Local Movement Organizations**

Social movement organizations are the third factor we examine in this article. A consistent theme in social movement research is that organizations often act as gateways for movement participation (Munson 2008; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Zald and Ash 1966). A series of studies over the last forty years found a consistent correlation between contact with a movement organization and attending movement meetings, protests, and helping out with other movement activities. For example, this finding applies to student activists (Snow, Zurcher, and Ekland-Olson 1980; Munson 2010), pro-life activists (Munson 2008), and anti-authoritarian protest (Zhao 2001). Being a member of an organization or receiving a contact from a movement organization often precedes deeper involvement with a movement.
The importance of movement organizations speaks to a central element of social movement scholarship – the "social movement sector," the people and organizations who provide the resources and infrastructure for protest (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tarrow 2011). The main finding is that there is a field, or sector, of organizations that stage protest and contact the state on behalf of movements. One important function of the movement sector is to maintain relationships with activists and help them coordinate political actions (Munson 2008). Furthermore, multiple studies have found that movement organizations often educate activists and therefore deepen their commitment to a movement and its goals by staging workshops, providing written materials, and creating places where more casual movement participants can meet other committed activists (McAdam and Paulsen 1992; Munson 2008; Polletta 1999).

The relationship between the social movement sector and organizational contacts suggests a hypothesis about geography and protest. If movement organizations are crucial to mobilization, then one would expect that movement organization density would correlate with recruitment. That is, the number of movement in organizations in a region should increase the likelihood that individuals have a contact with a movement. Thus, there should be an association between organizational density in an area and the number of people from that area who participate in a movement.

**Hypotheses**

Studies of social movements, social status, demography, and the physical concentration of partisans and movement organizations suggests that there are multiple connections between geography and movement participation. We summarize these ideas with the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Areas with larger populations have more participants in a social movement.

Hypothesis 2: Areas with more people who are available for protest, such as those with higher income, jobs, and education, have more participants in a social movement.

Hypothesis 3: Areas with more women and African Americans have more participants in social movements whose goals overlap with their gendered/racial identities.

Hypothesis 4: Areas with more partisans have more participants in a social movement whose goals overlap with their partisan identities.

Hypothesis 5: Areas with more movement organizations have more participants in a social movement.

These hypotheses address some factors that influence movement participation – population, availability, socio-economic status, partisanship, and organizational density.

The Antiwar Movement after 9/11

We test these ideas with data from the American antiwar movement of the post-9/11 era. This section briefly describes the growth and decline of that movement. Soon after the disaster of 9/11, the George W. Bush Administration made it clear that it would retaliate against the Taliban, the Islamic-religious government of Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that masterminded and launched the terrorist attacks. Just days after 9/11, antiwar groups emerged to oppose the Bush administration's terrorism policies. Though small, these groups formed the core of what would later become an international antiwar movement (Meyer and Corrigal-Brown 2005; Heaney and Rojas 2007; Tarrow 2015).

As 2001 and 2002 progressed, it became clear that the War on Terror would be expanded. Not only would the United States wage war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan, it would launch an invasion of Iraq, which was then ruled by Sadam Hussein's Baathist regime. As
the Bush administration revealed its intent to invade Iraq, new antiwar organizations were created and began to mobilize. By the time of the Iraq invasion in 2003, antiwar organizations were able to coordinate an international series of protests on the theme of “The World Says No to War”. These protests attracted millions of demonstrators in major cities across the globe.

After the invasion of Iraq, the antiwar sustained high levels of mobilization for approximately four years (Heaney and Rojas 2011). While subsequent protests did not match the size or scope of the March 2003 rounds of protest, they were substantial by any measure. Some protests in major cities, such as Washington, D.C., reached an estimated size of hundreds of thousands of people. The protests were national in scope. For the first four years after the invasion of Iraq, antiwar activists managed to stage national days of protests where large-scale protest occurred in America's largest cities.

These protests attracted substantial media attention and the war in Iraq. Not surprisingly, the war became a focal point of American politics in the early 2000s. Public disapproval of the war started to grow at that time (Heaney and Rojas 2015: 53). By 2008, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the war in Iraq, or at American involvement, to come to an end. This preference is in sharp contrast to earlier polls showing strong public support for the war in Iraq. Studies of polling data indicate that the war had become a key point for voters, allowing Democrats to regain control of Congress in the 2006 election (Jacobson 2010). Disapproval of the war, in polls, was often correlated with voting for Democrats in the 2006 election. Later, antiwar attitudes were correlated with voting for Barack Obama in the early primary states, such as Iowa and New Hampshire (ABC News 2008a, 2008b).

By 2007, there were clear signs that the antiwar movement had begun demobilizing (Heaney and Rojas 2011). Reports of crowd size reveal that fewer and fewer people were
attending antiwar protests. In 2007, the antiwar movement could rely on tens of thousands, and
sometimes hundreds of thousands, to attend their events. In 2010, the first author attended a
protest in Chicago that was attended by a few dozen people. Another protest in Washington,
D.C. in 2011 was so sparsely attended that journalists appeared to outnumber antiwar
demonstrators.

Qualitative signs also pointed to antiwar demobilization. For example, political
candidates stopped talking about the war in comparison to other issues (Heaney and Rojas 2015:
50). Major political organizations that sponsored mass protest, such as Moveon.org, switched to
other issues such as healthcare and the recession. Even dedicated antiwar organizations, such as
United for Peace and Justice, were transformed by the demobilization. In the mid-2000s, UFPJ
was able to support full-time employees, rent office space in Manhattan, and set up large events,
such as lobby days, where activists would meet with their elected leaders. By 2010, this office
space had been vacated and staff had moved on to other issues.

The decline of antiwar activism has been debated by activists, scholars, and the media.
Heaney and Rojas (2011, 2015) argue that much of the demobilization can be attributed to how
self-identified Democrats within the antiwar movement interpreted the urgency of the situation.
Surveys show that protestors were much less likely to express anti-Republican sentiment (e.g., "I
hate Bush") as Democrats gained control of Congress. This change in how antiwar protest is
framed coincides with the abrupt decline in the participation of Democrats in rallies.

Analytic Strategy and Data

The dependent variable in our analysis is the number of protesters observed from a given
zip code. The data on demonstrators is taken from a multi-year survey of antiwar protestors that
we conducted from 2005 to 2010. Each time the antiwar movement called for a national day of
protest, or organized a rally meant to draw people from across the country, we conducted a survey.

We selected the zip code as the unit of analysis to focus on the smallest geographic area that survey respondents could identify. The typical respondent may know their zip code – but not their census track – and would be unlikely to provide their personal address in an otherwise anonymous survey. There are other considerations for working at this level of analysis: (1) other forms of data are often tabulated at the zip code level; (2) there are many more zip codes than other units such as congressional districts, which means we have substantial variation in our geographical variables; (3) zip codes are known by most adults; and (3) they unambiguous boundaries that are set by the United States Postal Service.

In this article, we focus on four urban areas for a substantive and pragmatic reasons. Substantively, we chose cities that are important for antiwar politics in America. Washington, D.C. is the city that is usually the stage for national protests because it is the capital. New York, Chicago, and San Francisco all have large activist communities and hosted major protests at multiple points in time. Pragmatically, these were the four cities that staged large protests over many years that we could access. As indicated in Table 1, San Francisco yielded over 700 surveys and the others yielded thousands of surveys.

[Table 1 about here]

We restrict our attention to zip codes within fifty miles of the protest site. This limitation was applied for theoretical and pragmatic reasons. Theoretically, we expect the bulk of protesters to live relatively close to a protest site. There is not a compelling reason to closely consider all zip codes in the United States. For example, there is no theoretical reason to consider Wyoming as relevant to protest in Washington, DC. Pragmatically, to include all zip codes in the United
States would create biases in model estimation, as there are over 43,000 zip codes and most of them do not yield a single protester in our sample. Such a model would have a highly zero-inflated distribution, since less than 1% of our cases would not be zero.

**Methods**

At each protest event, we hired a team of surveyors to canvas the crowd in a rough grid formation. Adapting a technique from exit polling, we randomly select an “anchor” in the crowd and then asked the fifth person in line behind that person to fill out a survey. We did not ask the initial “anchors” to complete the survey because the selection of the anchor may be nonrandom (i.e., a Latino male surveyor may nonrandomly choose other Latinos). We found that survey response rates are high and comparable to major surveys. Our overall response rate in the survey was 81%. To estimate the number of protesters from each zip code, we use our survey data. We asked each respondent to list their zip code. Approximately 93% of respondents provided a zip code. For research that validates this method, see Walgrave and Verhust (2011).

The independent variables of interest are drawn from three sources. First, we use data from the Federal Election Commission (2004) to estimate the relative partisanship of each zip code. Normally, voting data are not tabulated by zip code. However, the Missouri Census Data Center (2014) provides data that links zip codes to other political units. Specifically, they provide data indicating how each zip code overlaps with congressional districts. For each zip code, they estimate how much area overlaps with each district. For example, a zip code may overlap with congressional district #1 for 10% of its area and congressional district #2 for 90% of its area. Using that linking data set, one can estimate the partisan orientation of the zip code by taking the
weighted average of the 2004 Presidential vote count (e.g., district #1 voted for Bush 52% and district #2 voted for Bush 59%).

Second, to account for the fact that activism may be tied to partisans with more resources, and not only rank-and-file voters, we used data from the Federal Election Commission (2004) to count the number of people who made donations of $200 or more to any political action committee associated with John Kerry’s 2004 presidential election campaign. In the FEC data, we found eight political action committees whose title indicated that there were organized to collect funds for Kerry or to help the Democratic Party support Kerry’s presidential run.

Third, to measure the concentration of movement activism in a zip code, we found every organization in the 2004 Encyclopedia of Associations that were self-described as peace organizations. We identified these organizations in the following manner. We began by obtaining the Policy Agendas Project (2014) data set, which collects basic information on all registered political organizations in the Encyclopedia of Associations. The lead authors of the study, Bryan Jones and Frank Baumgartner, then created a coding for American interest groups. We focused on organizations focused on war and peace (category 16). Then, we examined all groups in this category and found 116 organizations that stated they promoted peace, opposed war, or opposed weapons such as nuclear or chemical weapons. We obtained the zip codes of 109 of these organizations, which corresponds to a missing data rate of 7%.

Our data include measurements of the demography of the zip code. We consulted the website of the US Census Bureau (2014) and obtained zip-code-level data about the zip code’s gender balance, percent of black residents, average household income, and rate of employment among adults. To compute these numbers, the Census Bureau matches census tracts with zip codes. In an overwhelming percentage of cases, census tracts have a single zip code associated
with them. When there are multiple zip codes, or there are no zip codes, the Census Bureau creates the five-digit zip-code tabulation areas (ZCTA) to approximate zip codes (US Census Bureau 2016). The differences appear minor in most analyses. Hurvitz (2008) finds that variables, such as population size or average household income are highly correlated. There are a number of zip codes that do not appear in the Census’ zip-code tabulation list but they are not relevant to this study because they tend to be corporate centers or other locations with high-volume mailing. Most residential addresses have similar zip code and zip-code tabulation labels. Zip-code tabulation areas have another limitation that are not relevant to the analysis – they may include rivers, lakes, and other topographical features in ways that are ambiguous or coded differently by the United State Postal Service (Grubesic and Matisziw 2006).

Finally, our models include distance as an important control variable. It might be hypothesized that some zip codes do not produce many protesters because they are far away. Distance imposes time and transportation costs on potential activists. To account for these costs, we added the distance in miles from the zip code of the protest location to each zip code to our model. There are multiple ways to convert zip code to zip-code distances. We chose a common method, which is to take the longitude and latitude of the center of each zip code and compute the distance using the Haversine formula, which is standard in many statistical packages (e.g., Wada 2009).

Results

Table 2 shows the summary statistics for zip-code level data in four cities – Washington, D.C., New York, Chicago, and San Francisco. The demographic variables have expected properties. The protest count per zip code, Kerry donor, and organizational density variables merit more discussion. On the average, each zip code produces about one to three respondents.
It is also important to note that the distribution of protesters is highly skewed. The average zip code in Washington, D.C. yielded 3.81 protesters, but the Adams Morgan area by itself produced 106. The same pattern can be observed in different areas across the country. A handful of zip codes account for many protesters. This finding shows that protest mobilization disproportionately draws from a few areas within a city. Movements do not draw equally from all areas of the city. Figure 2, using data from the Washington, DC area, illustrates this basic observation. Many zip codes have little or no protest recruitment while a few yield many protesters.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 2 about here]

The descriptive statistics also show a similar pattern for the number of Kerry contributors per zip code. In Washington, DC, less than 1% of residents donated to the 2004 Kerry-Edwards campaign. However, there was one zip code where 9% of residents contributed to that candidate, showing an extreme concentration of partisans that donated money to a presidential candidate.

The organizational density summary statistics show that nonprofit peace organizations are rare. They are most dense in Washington, D.C. where 8%, or about 1 in 12, zip codes have a peace organization. But this property does not hold in the other three cities we examined. There is only a 1 in 20 chance that a zip code in New York or San Francisco is home to a peace organization, and only 1 in 100 chance that a zip code in Chicago has a peace organization. This result indicates that the peace-oriented social movement sector rarely has a physical presence in many urban centers outside the capital.

Table 3 tests our hypotheses about the role of demography, partisanship, and organizational density on the number of protesters in our sample who reside in a zip code. The
demographic variables have many of the expected effects. Zip codes with larger populations are more likely to have protesters appear in our sample. There is a small effect for the ethnic composition of the zip code, except in Washington, DC. Income and college education both have positive and significant effects on protestor count from that area, but not the proportion of employed people. These results portray an intuitive portrait of the relationship between demography and antiwar protest participation: larger, ethnically diverse, educated, and wealthy areas produce the most protesters. Our control variable for the zip code’s distance to the protest site has a small, but positive, effect of distance, which captures the fact that the zip codes yielding the most protesters are a few miles from the protest site.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 shows mixed evidence for the hypothesis that a zip code’s partisan orientation is associated with participation. In New York and San Francisco, the 2004 Kerry vote correlates with the protester count. In Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, the number of Kerry donors had a positive effect. In Chicago, neither measurement of partisanship was associated with mobilization.

The most surprising finding is that organizational density has no effect on mobilization in our data. This might be attributed to the fact that nonprofit peace organizations are relatively rare. The Baumgartner and Jones data set only produced 140 in the entire country. Many grassroots peace organizations may not go through the effort to formalize themselves as nonprofit organizations, but instead remain informally organized. However, Washington, D.C. has a relatively high concentration of organizations and there was still no effect on mobilization. Thus, among these four cities, there is no evidence that that organizational density precedes antiwar protest participation.
Discussion and Conclusion

The principal goal of this paper is to understand how differences in urban space affect protest participation. The literature on social movements suggested at least three factors that drive movement involvement: demography, partisanship, and movement organization density. The models were estimated for four urban regions and it was found, consistently, that demography and partisanship matter but not the presence of nonprofit movement organizations. Here, we discuss how the findings relate to theories of social movement mobilization.

First, our empirical results suggest that movement mobilization research examine protest participation in reference to a baseline established by demography and partisanship. For example, numerous scholars have asked how local cultures may facilitate protest participation or how the physical features of urban space contribute to mobilization (Zhao 2001; Castells 1983; Sewell 2000). This study suggests that the analysis of culture or the physical landscape accounts for these factors because a surplus of people with specific values, or physical structures conducive for mobilizing, may be due to a self-selection process, as people spatially segregate according to political or demographic factors.

Second, the analysis in this paper offers an important qualification to the view that "organizations matter" for social movements (McAdam 1988; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Chadwick 2007). Certainly, organizations are crucial for modern movements because they provide resources and legitimacy for activists. At the same time, not all organizations matter in the same way to the same people. The activist group that has nonprofit status and the funds to pay for advertising may not be the type of organization that recruits locally in its area. Therefore,
studies of the social movement sector should take into account the audience of the organization and its relationship to space. There is likely a division of labor where the most prominent organizations focus on national advertising, contacting Congress and the media, and coordinating legal actions. More "grassroots" organizations, which often have little or no bureaucratic apparatus, might account for the bulk of activists recruited locally. These considerations suggest a hypothesis for future research: nonprofit organizations recruit, on the average, more protestors than local organizations (e.g., churches or neighborhood clubs), but grassroots organizations recruit more from their neighborhood or vicinity.

Third, we believe there would be value of replicating and testing our hypotheses in other urban centers. The data set on early 21st century peace activism is one of the most comprehensive surveys of a social movement to date, yet we were only able to collect data over a sufficiently long time period for four cities. It may also be the case that the demographic-partisan model of movement participation documented in our data only holds for peace activism. Movements focusing on other policy issues might exhibit different patterns of protest and space. Thus, the study should be replicated not only in multiple regions, but also for issues other than antiwar activism.

References


Figure 1. Student Antiwar Protesters March through Washington, D.C., March 19, 2010
Figure 2. Protester Density in Washington, D.C.
Table 1. Survey Description

Features of Survey

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period of Survey</th>
<th>August 2005-October 2010</th>
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<td>Surveys with Zip Codes in Four Cities</td>
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Surveys by City with Zip Codes

<table>
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<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Zip Code</th>
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<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1457</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>1229</td>
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<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>769</td>
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Sample Demographic Characteristics

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<td>White</td>
<td>77.16%</td>
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<td>Black</td>
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<td>College Degree or Higher</td>
<td>69.24%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-Identified Democrat</td>
<td>37.69%</td>
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Note: Sample demographic data only from four cities in survey and from respondents who lived within a fifty-mile radius of the protest site.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Zip Codes in Four Urban Areas

<table>
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<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S. Dev.</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
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<td>9.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td>1.57</td>
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<td>Black %</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employed %</td>
<td>69.67</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>33.10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Graduate %</td>
<td>38.66</td>
<td>19.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>84.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Vote %</td>
<td>51.91</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>78.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Donors per 1,000</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Organizations</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Protest Site</td>
<td>25.72</td>
<td>14.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Negative Binomial Model of Zip Code Characteristics and Protestor Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Washington, D.C.</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population/10,000</td>
<td>0.38 *** 0.04</td>
<td>0.23 *** 0.03</td>
<td>0.29 *** 0.03</td>
<td>0.22 *** 0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female %</td>
<td>-0.02 0.02</td>
<td>0.00 0.03</td>
<td>0.00 0.03</td>
<td>0.00 0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black %</td>
<td>0.00 0.00</td>
<td>-0.01 * 0.00</td>
<td>-0.01 ** 0.00</td>
<td>0.01 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income/10,000</td>
<td>-0.22 *** 0.04</td>
<td>-0.38 *** 0.07</td>
<td>-0.34 *** 0.06</td>
<td>-0.17 ** 0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed %</td>
<td>-0.01 0.01</td>
<td>0.05 ** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.01 0.01</td>
<td>0.01 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Degree %</td>
<td>0.03 *** 0.01</td>
<td>0.03 ** 0.01</td>
<td>0.05 *** 0.01</td>
<td>0.01 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Vote %</td>
<td>-0.01 0.00</td>
<td>0.03 *** 0.01</td>
<td>0.00 0.01</td>
<td>0.03 ** 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerry Donors/1,000</td>
<td>1.10 * 0.41</td>
<td>0.47 0.37</td>
<td>-0.90 1.41</td>
<td>2.01 ** 0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Organizations</td>
<td>0.02 0.12</td>
<td>-0.01 0.14</td>
<td>0.04 0.30</td>
<td>0.06 0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.04 *** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.01 0.01</td>
<td>-0.05 *** 0.01</td>
<td>-0.04 *** 0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.77 * 1.20</td>
<td>-3.82 2.17</td>
<td>1.22 1.79</td>
<td>-2.62 1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psudeo-R²</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>