Critical Dialogue


— Michael T. Heaney, University of Michigan
— Fabio Rojas, Indiana University

Daniel Schlozman’s When Movements Anchor Parties stands out from other work on the interaction between political parties and social movements as the most historically sweeping book on this topic. It covers more than 150 years of American history, including movements for labor, the end to slavery, populism, Christian conservatism, and against the Vietnam War. Schlozman intricately weaves an account of groups and movements coevolving with parties as they struggle to maintain their organizations, advance their interests, and reconstitute the nature of party politics. This study deepens what is known about how party coalitions are shaped by the efforts of groups and the entrepreneurs that lead them, making it mandatory reading for any serious scholar of American politics or history.

The principal question of When Movements Anchor Parties is under what conditions are parties and movements in the United States able to sustain mutually beneficial alliances? Schlozman provides a compelling answer. He argues that party-movement alliances are sustained when there are organized groups that are able to anchor the relationship. These “anchoring groups” are usually led by strategic brokers who have a “hybrid” quality; they operate simultaneously inside and outside the formal party apparatus. Their goals are both to help their group advance its interests and to augment the party’s electoral success. These brokers need not be the same actors over time. Entrepreneurs may come and go, but alliances are sustained if new leaders arise from movements to take their place. In order to become an anchoring group, party elites must agree to work with the group’s leaders in promoting the group’s policy priorities (which Schlozman refers to as “ideological patronage”). Elites do so only when they see this cooperation as a winning path toward continuing electoral majorities. When groups provide these resources, parties are willing to grant them a veto over important decisions (such as the selection of a vice presidential nominee), thus establishing the give-and-take of the alliance. Alliances with parties are one of the best ways for movements to achieve major changes in policy, but alliances also leave movements vulnerable to cooption and exploitation.

The alliances between the Democratic Party and the labor movement, as well as the Republican Party and the Christian Right, illustrate Schlozman’s argument. The labor-Democratic alliance had its origins in the rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) during the New Deal. It was buoyed by the National Industrial Recovery Act, which greatly facilitated the ability of unions to organize and bargain collectively. Yet it was not until the post-World War II period when campaign contributions through its Political Action Committee (PAC) enabled the CIO to play a significant power-broker role within the party. Skillful brokers, such as Walter Reuther of the United Auto Workers (UAW), encouraged Democrats and labor leaders alike to find common cause on issues such as union pensions. Despite the decline in the unionized workforce from roughly a third to a tenth of all workers, a succession of labor leaders maintained their bargain with the party. The alliance has shifted in its orientation in recent years, focusing now more on guarding against attacks from the right wing, rather than advancing new policy initiatives.

The alliance between the Republican Party and the Christian Right was led by brokers who were motivated to achieve policy changes on specific issues. Leaders such as Richard Viguierie and Paul Weyrich were not initially interested in a broad alliance within the party, but in working on single-issue coalitions, such as for tax exemptions for Christian schools. However, movement leaders eventually found their success—and a foothold in the party—by reframing a series of issues to forge a coherent new conservative worldview. They sowed race, taxes, and abortion together with a common thread that helped to give Republicans a new narrative. Brokers for the New Right came and went—notably Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and Ralph Reed—but were always replaced. The robustness of this alliance owes to motivated and engaged grassroots constituents who are inclined to combine religion and party politics.
Alliances are not always sustainable. A critical strength of Schlozman’s argument is that he devotes considerable attention to cases where alliances failed. The abolition movement to end slavery, for example, was instrumental in founding the Republican Party, but it lacked a strong group basis to persist into the latter years of the nineteenth century. Similarly, populism and the Vietnam antiwar movement scored early successes, but were unable to accomplish the same transitions of leadership as was the case for labor and the Christian Right. These instances make clear that continuation of a party-movement alliance depends on whether party elites anticipate that they will be able to lean on the movement for future electoral victories. Antiwar movements are especially hindered on this score since the wars they oppose eventually deescalate or end, making it challenging to sustain mobilization around longer-term issues, such as ending the military-industrial complex.

Our first question about the book is whether it makes sense to assume that all alliances necessarily follow analogous organizational forms. Schlozman introduces evidence that both the labor movement and the Christian Right relied heavily on entrepreneurial brokers to mediate between voters and elites. Yet it seems to be a strong assumption that all relevant alliances must be brokered in the same way. For example, he notes (pp. 40–41) that the civil rights movement relied more heavily on black churches to broker relations with the Democratic Party than on the type of brokers used in his two principal cases, thus justifying its omission from the analysis. We would argue that differences in the organizational processes of facilitating party-movement brokerage may offer explanations for why some alliances yield greater benefits for the movement and others produce greater benefits for the party. Consequently, it strikes us as helpful to retain these relationships in the category of “alliance.”

Second, we wonder about the implications of asymmetries between the Democratic and Republican parties. The Democrats have historically built coalitions that revolve around multiple, contending groups, while the Republicans tend to forge coalitions that are ideological in nature. Republican coalitions have typically been more hierarchical, while Democratic coalitions tend to be more co-equal in their membership. We would expect, then, for the Republicans to have a smaller number of anchoring groups and for those groups to play a relatively more prominent role in the party than other groups. In contrast, the Democrats are composed of a larger number of anchoring groups, each of which has a smaller relative role in the coalition. Might these groups combine to anchor the Democrats in a way that differs from the Republicans?

Third, we are curious as to how the changing nature of media affects the ability of groups to anchor parties. Is it possible that the kind of elite-voter brokerage emphasized through Schlozman’s narrative is no longer possible in an era when candidates and voters are able to react quickly to one another through emerging electronic formats?

We look forward to Professor Schlozman’s responses to our questions, as well as to his review of our own work.

Response to Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas’ review of When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American History
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— Daniel Schlozman, Johns Hopkins University

I appreciate the opportunity to engage with Fabio Rojas and Michael Heaney, especially given their careful and generous reading. Our books’ appearances within months of each other offer a happy chance for us, and readers, to watch remarkably similar intellectual questions get rather different treatments. We can only hope that, when sharp-eyed graduate students attempt a synthesis, both Party in the Street and When Movements Anchor Parties do not get ripped to shreds in the process.

A month after I submitted page proofs, Freddie Gray died in the back of a police van in Baltimore. For the third time since the Civil War—the previous two were in 1877, during the Great Railroad Strike, and in 1968, following the death of Martin Luther King, Jr.—the National Guard patrolled the city; I spent five nights under curfew. And the week before I write these words, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States. The events of 2015 and 2016 signal, as Heaney and Rojas suggest, and I discuss briefly (p. 243, 250), the future in this line of research. Disparate elements combine inside decidedly asymmetric parties (a theme taken up also by Matthew Grossmann and David J. Hopkins in their new book, Asymmetric Politics). And brokerage between parties and movements has fractured such that we may not see again a single figure playing the role of John L. Lewis or Paul Weyrich. There is much to unpack. As Trump’s victory suggests, against all the regnant powers inside the GOP, the story is not simply that the Democrats have more factions and claimants. Nor, as labor’s universalistic claims indicate, is it simply a story about groups and ideology. We have much to explain.

Yet we must also take the long view. To the queries about organization and media, let me answer inside a common framework. In recent decades, studies of social movements have celebrated diverse forms and repertoires, fretted over the dangers of hierarchy, and emphasized communication and framing as critical determinants of movement success. When Movements Anchor Parties largely emerges from a different and older tradition, emphasizing the macro environment more than the micro process. To would-be movements, it counsels relentless organizing more than messaging, and offers a healthy skepticism about internal democracy. Behind all these decisions lies a concern about power. Movements want power inside the party system. They puzzle and fight over how to get it. Analyses that foreground forms and tactics without paying attention to the
possibilities and limits in the polity at large risk putting the cart before the horse. Although analyses of social movements should continue, as they have done in the last generation, to open up black boxes inside complex processes, the “how” questions must not crowd out the “what difference does it make” questions. In studying the part, we cannot fail to reckon with the whole—because “whatever the issues and whomsoever the players, when major social movements confront parties, the stakes will remain high” (p. 13).


— Daniel Schlozman, Johns Hopkins University

In 2006, amid anger at the Bush administration’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, antiwar rallies reached their peak and Democrats retook both chambers of Congress. The following year, even as American troops “surged,” the antiwar movement dissipated and retreated to its radical core. At the end of the Obama presidency, American troops remain in Afghanistan and, as military advisers in the fight against ISIS, in Iraq. The antiwar movement’s partisan allies in the Democratic Party had taken the reins of power—and yet the movement had fizzled and failed.

This paradox—a moment of seeming political opportunity instead spelled the beginning of the end for the antiwar movement—motivates Party in the Street, a superb activist-eye account of protest as it ebbed and flowed. At the heart of the book lies the authors’ indefatigable shoe-leather research. From 2004 to 2010, Michael T. Heaney and Fabio Rojas, assisted by their own veritable army of field workers, collected wave after wave of surveys that asked antiwar protesters (along with 2008 Democratic convention delegates) about themselves, their organizational ties, and their motivations. Those surveys, some of the most extensive repeated cross-sectional records we have for activists in a social movement, form the core of the authors’ story.

Before 2006, with anger at George W. Bush and his policies riding high and Democrats out of power in Washington, anti-Republican sentiment motivated participation in anti-war protests. As the Democratic Party began to taste power, party loyalists stopped demonstrating. Heaney and Rojas asked their respondents—more than 2,000 of them in each of three waves—the most important reasons you came to this event” (pp. 104–5), and then coded the open-ended responses. In all three periods, most respondents’ reasons emphasized ending the war. The share motivated by opposition to the Republican Party (e.g., “to impeach Bush”), however, fell from 23 percent of respondents in 2004–2005 to 12 percent in 2007–2008 to a mere 1 percent in 2009–2010. Similarly, respondents in 2004–5 reported being contacted to attend a protest most frequently from United for Peace and Justice, a disparate umbrella group, followed by the leftist ANSWER Coalition and then MoveOn, a bona fide member of Democrats’ party network. By 2009–2010, ANSWER was by a factor of two the most common organization mentioned as recruiting protesters, and MoveOn had fallen out of the top ten (pp. 140–1).

Heaney and Rojas situate these striking findings in the context of activists’ multiple, intersectional loyalties and identities. Movements, especially those without deep bases in civil society to ground their efforts, must continually motivate their supporters. Yet in a polarized era—far more partisan, if less tumultuous, than the world of the anti-Vietnam war movement—partisan loyalty easily frames activists’ views and commitments. When Republicans held the reins of power, movement and partisan identities reinforced each other, both for individual Democrats and for groups that sought to mobilize them. After 2007, a climactic presidential election and then a rush to pass domestic legislation crowded out antiwar activism. And once Barack Obama and not George W. Bush was the man ordering troops into battle, activists’ antiwar and partisan loyalties worked at cross purposes.

This book is social science from the bottom up. Although a chapter analyzes co-sponsorship patterns for antiwar legislation in Congress, the book principally asks how and when events shaped protest activity, rather than how protest activity shaped the Democratic Party or American foreign policy. A book meant to celebrate the power of protest and steeped in the intricacies of radical politics gives protesters strangely little agency. We see how events shape the movement, but get far less sense of how the movement mattered.

For Party in the Street, the party is the party in the street. Political parties as sites of democratic struggle, rather than as sums of individual loyalties, play little role in the story. In the 1960s, the antiwar movement asked explicitly, through the McCarthy campaign, the disastrous ’68 convention, party reform, and the McGovern campaign, whether to choose voice in or exit from the party system in general, and the Democrats in particular. Decades on, how did activists understand parties and their roles? Did they view themselves as part of a constituency that a party might recognize as such? One hesitates to pine for more research in a book with so much of it, but parties’ views of the antiwar movement remain opaque here. In what ways did ordinary Democrats (the party in the electorate), precinct captains and fundraising consultants (the party as organization, writ large), and elected officials (the party in government) view the antiwar movement as threat and opportunity? How did those views change over time? In turn, what did state party platforms say about Iraq and Afghanistan, and did those planks reflect pressure from antiwar activists? Should the antiwar movement have used the primary as
a weapon against hawkish Democrats in Congress, as anti-Vietnam liberals did sporadically (when, for instance Robert Drinan defeated Philip Philbin in 1970) and as the Tea Party has done far more effectively?

To understand antiwar politics from the Democratic Party’s vantage point, one important factor, surely, lies in the differences, underplayed in the book, between Afghanistan and Iraq. Democratic elites from Barack Obama on down emphasized those differences; an epigraph quotes Obama’s 2002 speech opposing “dumb wars” (p. 71), but the book never really pushes the point. If committed Democrats and other relative moderates swelled rallies to end the war in Iraq, then their decision to shift away from protest looks less like partisan identity trumping movement loyalty than simply a case of a policy victory largely achieved. In those limited terms, Heaney and Rojas undersell shifts in party and policy.

Still, half a century after Vietnam, the antiwar movement, seen in the large, remains strikingly weak and the Democratic Party strikingly hawkish. Except for MoveOn, the organizations and coalitions that Heaney and Rojas describe live far from the political mainstream. The antiwar movement of the 2000s, like its predecessor in the 1960s and 1970s, has left few institutional footprints, and fewer still to bridge the gap between radical critiques and the party mainstream. Democratic foreign-policy mandarins, whatever their views about particular interventions abroad, blanch at the rejection of American power that many antiwar activists espouse.

Nor have the doves a standard-bearer at the top. Without waves of social movement activity, above all from Occupy, which preceded it, Bernie Sanders’s electoral success would have been unthinkable. Yet he never articulated on foreign policy the same kind of comprehensive critique from the left that he mounted on domestic issues. Instead, he referenced his 2002 vote against authorizing force in Iraq, and repeated old criticisms of U.S. behavior back to the days of Henry Kissinger.

Heaney and Rojas write that “Alignment between the antiwar movement and the Democratic Party promoted broader coalitions, while dealignment between the antiwar movement and the Democratic Party promoted narrower coalitions” (p. 140). This claim seems entirely correct—but also something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. And it reflects not just the fragility of antiwar identities, but the complexities of transforming the Democratic Party.

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— Michael T. Heaney, University of Michigan
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We are grateful to Professor Schlozman for his thoughtful reaction to our book. At the same time, there are a number of issues that we see differently than he does.

We disagree that the purpose of our book is “to celebrate the power of protest.” Rather than “celebrate” protest, we endeavor to explain the interactions of a party and a movement, regardless of whether those interactions proved to have positive, negative, or neutral effects on the party or policy. Indeed, we find the limited effects of the movement to be one of our most interesting findings. In Chapter 2, we document how the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States did little to change the course of policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Chapter 6, we show how the movement prompted the consideration of new legislation—as well as how that legislation was more substantive in nature in 2007 and 2008—but also that most of this legislation failed to become law. We point to the enactment of Public Law 110–28 in 2007, which codified the antiwar movement’s demand that no permanent bases be established in Iraq and that the United States should not control Iraqi oil resources, which appears to be the only policy concession won by the movement. It is true that the Vietnam antiwar movement had substantial effects on policy, but such was not the case after 9/11.

We see our argument as giving strong recognition to the agency of activists. Activists could have continued to protest war after the Democrats gained electoral success, but they chose not to do so. Donors stopped giving money to the movement. Members of Congress stopped sponsoring legislation. Few activists became candidates for Congress. All of these factors point to activists making choices. It just so happens that they exercised this agency in favor of their partisan identities, rather than their movement identities.

We are clear in Chapter 1 that we envision a multi-part party, including a party in government, party as organization, party in the electorate, and party in the street. Of course, we focus on the party in the street—since that is our contribution—but we do not deny the importance of other aspects of the party. We point to multiple ways in which other aspects of the Democratic Party addressed the war and the antiwar movement, including statements by presidential candidates (pp. 49–51), exit polls (pp. 51–55), campaign strategies, and caucuses in Congress (p. 175 and 189).

Finally, we explain that both activists and politicians blurred the differences between the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan such that, from a movement perspective, they were essentially the same conflict. When we separately analyzed activism around the two wars (pp. 122–124), we found that the identity of activists had the same effects in both cases.

In essence, we did look for the kinds of effects Professor Schlozman proposes, but the research did not support their presence.