The Political Geography of the Local Security Apparatus

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Abstract

Many autocrats govern sub-national areas through appointed regional executives who have significant control over their individual jurisdictions. Autocrats employ one of two strategies to govern these sub-national jurisdictions, each achieved through management of regional executives: 1) co-optation, where autocrats improve local governance by appointing \textit{locally embedded} regional executives – executives who are from the local population and enjoy long tenures – or 2) coercion, where autocrats ensure that regional executives put down local regime threats by minimizing local embeddedness – appointing non-native executives and shuffling them frequently. We argue that the prevailing regional strategy depends on the jurisdiction’s \textit{ex ante} level of regime support. We test the theory with original data from Kenya and the Republic of Congo, encompassing 250 regional executives across three autocrats. Our findings highlight the similar ways in which autocrats manage their security apparatuses to limit varied popular threats.

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1 Introduction

The chief threats to the world’s autocrats have long emanated from the conspiracies of regime insiders (Svolik 2012). In post-Cold War Africa, this has changed. By pressing autocratic leaders to hold multi-party elections, Western creditors have rendered coups less attractive, and hence diminished their frequency (Goemans & Marinov 2014). Autocrats are now more likely to lose power following mass protests or electoral defeat. At the same time, by withholding aid following gross human rights violations (Nielsen 2013), Western creditors have made large-scale repression against the population costly (Carnegie & Marinov Forthcoming.).

How do autocrats prevent popular threats when highly-visible repression is costly? To answer this question, we turn to the question of sub-national governance: autocrats can preempt the need for highly visible and costly repression by governing areas through co-optation or less violent – and less visible – low-intensity coercion that prevents local popular threats from metastasizing in the first place (Levitsky & Way 2010, Slater & Fenner 2011). We thus examine those within the state who are actually in charge of the management of the country. We focus specifically on regional executives, those high-ranking officers within the security apparatus tasked with governing their respective sub-national jurisdictions. Regional executives have coercive capacity to stop

1Svolik (2012) finds that 60% of autocrats from 1945 - 2008 lost power through coups d’etat.
2In the Appendix we graph how Africa’s autocrats have lost power by year since 1960; since 1990, the majority leave office due to popular threats (mass protests or losing an election) or institutional constraints. Also see Posner & Young (2007).
3Low-intensity coercion includes coercive tactics that are hard to observe – and thus allow the autocrat to avoid international reprimand. Some examples include surveillance, administrative roadblocks that target regime opponents, and small-scale harassment/intimidation of opposition supporters.
4These officers go by many names, including local security officers, provincial governors, area prefects, or district commissioners.
local, popular regime threats in non-violent ways, but they also craft local policy and lead development projects that have the potential to co-opt area residents. Precisely because of their utility, regional executives exist in many of the world’s hybrid and closed authoritarian regimes, including across sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., Young & Turner 1985, Schatzberg 1988, Hassan Forthcoming), the Middle East (e.g., Barkley 1994, Blaydes 2011, Sassoon 2011), and Europe (e.g., Ziblatt 2009, Reuter & Robinson 2010, Taylor 2011).

Whether tasked with local co-optation or coercion, a regional executive’s ability to discharge these two critical responsibilities is a function of her local embeddedness in her appointed jurisdiction. Local embeddedness renders co-optation more efficient: more familiar with local issues and stakeholders, locally embedded regional executives craft policy that better responds to local needs. But ensconced in local social networks and invested in the jurisdiction’s economic fortunes, locally embedded regional executives are less willing to coerce the population: to obstruct dissidents and, at the limit, to suppress protests. In short, local embeddedness is critical for co-optation but a liability for coercion. Our theory is agnostic about the source of local embeddedness. Embeddedness may be identity-based – ethnic, religious, or otherwise – or may grow deeper as regional executives spend more time in a jurisdiction.

We argue that autocrats choose a governance strategy for a region – either co-optation or coercion – according to the region’s ex ante support for the regime. In regions of core support, autocrats employ co-optation by fostering local embeddedness; they appoint in-group regional executives and grant them relatively long tenures. Outside core support regions, where support is less assured, autocrats employ coercion. They appoint regional executives who are drawn from afar and shuffle them frequently. By preventing shared bonds between regional executives and the local population, autocrats aim to ensure the loyalty of regional executives during moments of coercion.

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These forms of low-intensity coercion are not the gross human rights violations that Western nations see and reprimand. Instead, they are more in line with the actions of “smart authoritarianism” (Frantz & Morgenbesser 2016).
We examine the theory’s observable implications with data from Kenya under Daniel arap Moi (1978 - 2002) and Mwai Kibaki (2002 - 2013), and the Republic of Congo under Denis Sassou Nguesso (1979 - 1992, 1997 - ). Together, these three presidents appointed more than 250 regional executives across some 75 jurisdictions. Regional executives in Congo and Kenya serve similar roles, as they do in many autocracies: they craft local policy and are charged with suppressing regional threats.

Yet these countries’ political environments differ in two key respects that increase the analytic leverage of our empirics. First, Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki confronted different threats to their survival. Since Sassou Nguesso can guarantee electoral victory with fraud, the chief threat to his survival emanates from the streets: protests, rebellions, strikes. By contrast, during our sample period, Moi and Kibaki held meaningful but flawed elections; Moi presided over a classic competitive authoritarian regime and Kibaki, a significantly more open electoral regime. As a result, the salient threats to both emanated from the ballot box. These three leaders thus not only span the extent of popular threats that African presidents encounter. But, to the extent that we consider Kibaki’s presidency democratic, our results speak to the breadth of regime types that exist in the sub-continent. (Classification of Kibaki’s presidency as competitive authoritarian versus

As we discuss below, Kibaki’s presidency was considerably more open than Moi’s such that many classify his reign as democratic (Howard & Roessler 2006). Overall, our analysis is not affected by the classification of each regime. We simply assume that each president intended to use regional executives to maintain political power. Further, there is evidence to suggest that Kibaki’s first term was not completely open, including his government’s involvement in “tilting” the 2007 election (see Mueller 2008, Gibson & Long 2009), the reliance on state officials to carry out some of the incumbent-instigated 2007/2008 post-election violence, coupled with his aversion to instituting formal executive constraints during the 2005 constitutional referendum. Indeed, Freedom House has ranked Kenya as only “partially free” since 2002.
Second, politics in Congo and Kenya are animated by different identity cleavages. In Congo the chief cleavage is regional; in Kenya it is ethnic. Moreover, Moi and Kibaki were of different ethnicities and had different ethnic coalitions. Despite these differences, our results for each president are consistent with our theoretical expectations. By examining the theory in such different contexts, we gain confidence in its external validity: its ability to illuminate regional governance in the presence of different regime threats and identity cleavages.

This paper makes several contributions. First, it advances our understanding of autocratic durability in post-Cold War Africa. Scholars of durability have pointed to the role of a strong ruling party (Geddes 1999, Nathan 2003, Svolik 2012, Meng 2016) or other nominally democratic institutions (Gandhi 2008, Malesky & Schuler 2010) to ensure survival. We return attention to the organ that implements coercion within autocracies – the internal security apparatus. Though this institution is critical to regime survival, it remains among the least understood components of authoritarian regimes, likely because data collection has proven so difficult. This paper begins to fill this gap by providing, to our knowledge, the first micro-level dataset on internal security apparatuses across multiple autocracies. In using this data, we find that autocrats manage their internal security apparatuses according to social and predictable principles: by exploiting identity-based cleavages between local citizens and the appointees who govern and police them. Autocrats thus not only stave off potential unrest through the organizational structure of these agencies (Greitens 2016) but by ascertaining where those threats are most likely to arise (Hassan Forthcoming).

Second, scholars often regard the “elite shuffle” – the tendency for autocrats to frequently shuffle their appointees to limit incentives for malfeasance (Debs 2007, Landry 2008, Blaydes 2011, Egorov & Sonin 2011, Reuter & Robinson 2012, Woldense 2016) – as a critical principle of personnel management in autocracies. Our results underscore this. But our results also make

Much of the seminal work on the internal security apparatus in autocracies does not employ micro-level officer data. See, for instance, Enloe (1973), Decalo (1990), and Sassoon (2011).
clear that the elite shuffle exhibits dramatic variation: in this case, across space, according to a region’s prevailing political geography. Moreover, we find that the elite shuffle is used to optimize over multiple goals. Not only is it a management technique to ensure agent loyalty, but it serves a governance purpose to maintain peripheral control. Further, by extending the analysis to the Kibaki administration in Kenya, we glimpse how informal institutions from the authoritarian era can continue under more open regimes. This finding implies that sub-Saharan Africa’s recent democratic backsliding may in part due to institutional memory: institutions from the authoritarian era have been slow to reform, possibly preempts lapses of democratic progression.

Finally, this paper advances our understanding of politics in divided societies. There is considerable evidence that African leaders channel public goods to their native regions and co-ethnics (Franck & Rainer 2012, Burgess et. al 2015, Hodler & Raschky 2014), which increases the living standards of their in-group (Kramon & Posner 2016) and political grievances among out-groups (Bates 1983, Padrò i Miquel 2007). This paper suggests that an autocrat’s favored regions may enjoy higher living standards not only because they receive more public goods, but also because they are governed more effectively. In regions outside an autocrat’s core support, public policy is subordinated to the imperative of regime survival. These regions may receive fewer public goods, but they are also simply governed less effectively. Over time this may foster a particularly intractable equilibrium: regions outside the autocrat’s core support are governed poorly, which exacerbates popular frustration, renders mass protests even more likely, and perpetuates identity-based cleavages.
2 A Theory of Regional Governance in Autocracies

2.1 Local Embeddedness

A regional executive’s ability to discharge the twin responsibilities of co-optation and coercion is a function of her local embeddedness: her affinity for the local population and her knowledge of the jurisdiction. In some cases, local embeddedness is innate. Regional executives who are from the region’s local in-group are, by definition, locally embedded. These officers speak the same language, practice the same customs, and have overlapping social networks. But local embeddedness can also be learned. The very act of governing fosters personal attachments between a regional executive and the local population. By living in the region she governs, crafting policy on behalf of local citizens, and arbitrating disputes among local stakeholders, a regional executive builds social and professional bonds across the community.

Local embeddedness, however it is achieved, enables regional executives to craft and implement more effective local policies. Local administrators who are embedded in their jurisdiction have social incentives to provide more local public goods (Tsai 2007), just as local officers with longer tenures increase the success rate of development initiatives because they possess a deeper knowledge of local needs (Eaton & Kostka Forthcoming, Pepinsky et al. 2016) and are more efficient at implementation (Woldense 2016). Moreover, areas with native regional executives may see increased public goods provision because in-group members have recourse to social sanctioning mechanisms (Miguel & Gugerty 2005, Habyarimana et al. 2007), have aligned preferences (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999, Lieberman & McClendon 2012), and because in-group members can better sanction others (Baldassarri & Grossman 2011). For all these reasons, locally embedded regional executives are able to craft policies that improve their constituents’ living standards, thus rendering the government more popular among the region’s citizens and mass protests less likely[8]

[8] Much literature on China’s recent anti-corruption campaign argues that, while locally embedded regional executives craft more effective local policy and better contribute to economic growth,
Notwithstanding these benefits, locally embedded regional executives create risks for autocrats.\footnote{The pitfalls of local embeddedness exist across all state organs where officers are appointed to work among the population they serve. For examples of the negative aspects of local embeddedness within democratic bureaucracies, see Kaufman (1960) and Lipsky (1980).} Since regional executives oversee the local coercive apparatus, they must be willing to suppress local threats against the regimes: depending on regime type and consequently the specific risks that the autocrat faces, they must disband opposition political rallies, engage in (subtle) electoral fraud, or coerce protesters. But locally embedded regional executives are at risk of shirking and not discharging the coercion they are charged with (Debs 2007, Blaydes 2011) in part because they do not psychologically see area residents as “others” or outsider (Davenport et al. 2011, Saha 2014).\footnote{For more on the social psychology of in-group and out-group dynamics, see Tajfel (1974) and Leidner & Castano (2012).} Instead, autocrats purposefully decrease local embeddedness of officers to reduce the likelihood that the officer will cooperate with local opposition leaders (Blaydes 2014) or use existing networks to create a rival fiefdom to challenge the autocrat (Migdal 1988). Outsiders also appear to be more effective at breaking up local power brokers (Taylor 2011), and more generally willing to privilege the regime’s interests over those of local citizens (Barkey 1994, Debs 2007).\footnote{Lyall (2010) suggests that in-group security officials provide higher quality intelligence during civil wars, and thus advance the interests of the state. However, the “sweeping” officers that Lyall (2010) examines are fundamentally different than regional executives. Namely, regional executives are much higher in the chain of command. Instead, regional executives are those who...} Local embeddedness can increase corruption as corruption requires state officers to know and trust those offering compensation (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Abbink 2005). To the extent that corruption obtains, it does not obviate the fundamental tradeoff between coercion and co-optation. Rather, it serves as a comparative static: as local embeddedness increases the extent of corruption among regional executives, all else equal, the benefits of local embeddedness to the autocrat decline.
More broadly, autocrats are less willing to privilege competence – whether innate or learned – over political stability and officer loyalty to the regime (Reuter & Robinson 2012, Egorov & Sonin 2011).

To summarize, the forces that render locally embedded regional executives dangerous for the autocrat are precisely those that improve their ability to effectively co-opt a jurisdiction. We now turn to hypothesizing where an autocrat privileges each strategy.

## 2.2 Hypotheses for Empirical Testing

We argue that autocrats manage these officers cautiously in light of the conflicting benefits and downfalls of locally embedded officers. Autocrats choose regional governance strategies – co-optation or coercion – according to a region’s \textit{ex ante} expected likelihood of fomenting action against the regime.

In core support regions, popular threats are unlikely to emerge. To stay in power, autocrats need the support of a sufficiently large coalition among the broader population. Autocrats maintain the support of this group by sharing state resources with them while largely blocking those outside this group from these resources. In countries with politically-salient identity cleavages (e.g., clan, ethnicity, region, religion), leaders look to their in-group to comprise their core supporters. Symbolic linkages between the autocrat and the group create an environment of material in-group favoritism, which in turn re-emphasizes this bond as this group expects higher levels of state resources in the future from the autocrat than a potential replacement (Bates 1983, Posner 2005, Padrò i Miquel 2007). Moreover, in countries with political salient identity cleavages, groups tend to cluster geographically. This allows leaders to target – or purposefully withhold – state resources based on the identity of the region’s inhabitants.

Thus in core support regions, autocrats can afford to pursue a regional management strategy that officers who local-level intelligence gatherers report to (indeed, regional executives purposefully employ locally embedded intelligence gatherers).
generates regime stability by cultivating even more local goodwill. Autocrats co-opt these areas by fostering local embeddedness between the jurisdiction’s regional executive and the population. To foster this local embeddedness, autocrats appoint regional executives who are drawn from the local population and grant them relatively long tenures in office.

\[ H_1 \text{ (Co-optation): In core support regions, autocrats appoint regional executives from the local population and grant them longer tenures.} \]

Outside core support regions, autocrats privilege coercion over co-optation. Popular threats are possible in these areas because its inhabitants are not receiving state spoils. As a result, autocrats manipulate regional executives’ local embeddedness such that officers’ loyalty during moments of crisis is squarely with the regime as opposed to the local population. Autocrats do so by appointing non-native regional executives and shuffling them frequently. These regional executives are less likely to create alliances with local citizens, be bought off by local opposition leaders, or emerge as the leaders of nascent protest movements because they do not have innate bonds with the population and their tenures in office are too brief to form them.

\[ H_2 \text{ (Coercion): Outside core support regions, autocrats appoint regional executives from outside the local population and shuffle them frequently.} \]

### 2.3 Generality

This theory is flexible in two ways. First, we are agnostic about how autocrats define their core areas of support. In sub-Saharan Africa, areas of core support are generally defined by ethnic or regional cleavages. Elsewhere, a leader’s core support areas may be defined by religion (Cammett & Issar 2010, Bellin 2012), caste (Min 2015), clan (Sassoon 2011), or political faction. Put simply, different countries acquire different politically salient cleavages due to different historical legacies and political institutions (Posner 2005). This theory requires only that autocrats can identify core supporters and the jurisdictions in which they live.
Second, we are agnostic about the local threats that autocrats confront. In closed authoritarian regimes, where opposition parties are outlawed or elections are so flawed that they are not competitive, citizens often seek political change through collective action (Bratton & van de Walle 1992, Tilly 2004) or armed insurgency (Wood 2001). As a result, autocrats in charge of these regimes are chiefly concerned with mass uprisings and armed rebellions. By contrast, in competitive authoritarian regimes, multi-party elections are flawed but competitive and seen as the only legitimate means to power (Levitsky & Way 2010). Accordingly, although popular protests remain possible (Robertson 2010), autocrats here are chiefly concerned with “winning” re-election.

3 Regional Executives in Two African Countries

To examine the hypotheses outlined above, we collected data on all regional executives in the Republic of Congo between 1997 and 2012, and in Kenya between 1992 and 2007. These countries vary in two key ways: their salient political cleavage and the chief threats their autocrats confront. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 elucidate these differences and provide context for the empirical analysis in Section 4. These differences gives us confidence in the external validity of our findings.

3.1 The Republic of Congo

Sassou Nguesso has ruled Congo for all but five years since 1979. He first seized power in a 1979 coup, ruled as a single party dictator during the 1980s, and lost power in 1992 as global food prices rose and Soviet support evaporated. He returned to power following the 1997 civil war, a brutal conflict centered around himself and Pascal Lissouba, a native of Congo’s southern regions and its only democratically elected president. Sassou Nguesso has since accumulated one of Africa’s 12Moreover, popular collective action is destabilizing to the regime even when it fails to bring about regime change. Collective action signals widespread unrest as well as regime weakness (in that the regime allowed the collective action to occur) and may inspire collective action in the future.
worst human rights records (Yengo 2006).

3.1.1 Political Geography: Cleavage Between North and South

Congo’s politics are animated by a cleavage between north and south, a legacy of its first years of independence\textsuperscript{13} In 1967 a clique of military officers, all of northern extraction and from a variety of ethnic groups, deposed President Alphonse Massamba-Débat, a southerner. The officers dubbed themselves the \textit{Comité militaire du parti} (CMP) – the military wing of the Congolese Workers Party (PCT) – and governed as a junta, with Captain Marien Ngouabi designated president. Ngouabi populated the government according to the preferences of his CMP comrades. This began the longstanding political dominance of Congo’s northern regions, despite constituting only 30% of the country’s population. In turn, the PCT – the only legal political party until 1990 – became a symbol of northern dominance. Save for Lissouba’s tenure between 1992 and 1997, Congo’s presidents since 1967 have been drawn exclusively from the CMP’s original membership (and thus from the north)\textsuperscript{14}

The 1997 civil war, fought along regional lines, hardened the cleavage between north and south: northerners supported Sassou Nguesso, southerners supported Lissouba. Both groups recognized that their political and economic fortunes depended on their favored politician claiming power. The war was devastating, and had enduring political ramifications. The war cost the country 1% of its citizens and displaced an additional 35%. After claiming victory, Sassou Nguesso authorized his soldiers – again, all of northern extraction – to pillage areas inhabited by southerners both as

\textsuperscript{13}The regions of Plateaux, Cuvette, Cuvette-Ouest, Likouala, and Sangha constitute Congo’s north. The regions of Pool, Lékoumou, Bouenza, Niari, and Kouilou constitute the south. Brazzaville sits at the intersection between north and south.

\textsuperscript{14}For more on the CMP period, the founding of the Congolese Workers Party, and Ngouabi’s reign, see Bazenguissa-Ganga (1997).
compensation and to punish southerners for their opposition.\footnote{For more on the civil war and the violence afterwards, see Yengo (2006) and Clark (2007).}

Sassou Nguesso’s policies since have continued to exacerbate the regional cleavage. With oil revenue accounting for some 95% of GDP, citizens’ economic fortunes largely depend on securing political appointments. Sassou Nguesso reserves these positions for northerners, who account for 80% of ministerial positions. Although the government refuses to release data on utility provision (e.g., electricity and running water\footnote{Many citizens believe this withholding is for political reasons: the government wishes to conceal wide variation in provision according to political support for the regime.}) – and thus making it difficult to control for local development in our empirical analysis – available evidence suggests that northern regions receive far more public goods than southern regions.\footnote{Each of the country’s 10 administrative regions is given an identical operating budget, regardless of population. Since the country’s five southern regions are home to more than 80% of the population, regional governments in the north receive far higher operating budgets on a per capita basis.}

The only exception to northern dominance is the Kouilou region, birthplace of First Lady Antoinette Sassou Nguesso and home to Congo’s oil industry.\footnote{Adida et al. (2016) find that leaders in ethnically divided democracies marry across ethnic lines as a way to credibly signal their willingness to share state resources with their spouse’s ethnic group and build their winning coalition. We suggest that these dynamics apply to authoritarian regimes and to ones with different politically salient identity cleavages.}

3.1.2 Local Governance: Regional Prefects

Executive authority in each of Congo’s 10 regions is vested in a prefect, appointed by Sassou Nguesso “on proposition of the Interior Minister.” Sassou Nguesso draws regional prefects disproportionately, but not completely, from the north (see Figure 1).\footnote{In looking at Figure 1, some may worry that there is a mechanical effect of non-native postings to out-group areas because there simply aren’t enough regional executives from outside the auto-}
Prefects are tasked with coercing those local residents within their region who threaten the regime. Raymond Zéphyrin Mboulou, Interior Minister since 2008, described the prefect’s role this way, “[t]he state must be seen as the agent of public power . . . . The prefect is the agent of the executive branch of government in the region. You, Mr. Prefect, are thus the guarantor of state sovereignty, of its authority, and of the preservation of peace.”20 Accordingly, the prefect is given broad powers. She commands the region’s military and police forces, coordinates electoral fraud, and disbands protests. Although the constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, regional prefects routinely deny permits for opposition political rallies.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Congolese prefects are also in charge of their regions’ development. The constitution grants regional councils formal authority to allocate funds provided by Brazzaville. However these locally-elected regional councils, as one council vice-president put it, are “almost completely powerless.”21 Since regional prefects enjoy veto power over any action passed by the regional council, they largely dictate regional policies, economic and otherwise. Moreover, regional councils have no recourse to an appeals process. Still, prefects rarely veto the resolutions of regional councils. Given the prefect’s broad powers and personal relationship with Sassou Nguesso, regional council members are reticent to offend her. And given the magnitude of electoral fraud, regional councils are anyway comprised overwhelmingly of PCT loyalists.

crat’s core to wholly govern their own. This is also a concern in some northern Congolese regions of Sassou Nguesso’s core such as Sangha which was not “home” to any of the Congolese regional executives during these years. In the Appendix we conduct a randomization inference to show that, given the pool of officers, their postings were not random but instead consistent with the theory we propose here.

21 Interview with Anonymous, location withheld for security reasons, 11 July 2013.
The chief popular threat to Sassou Nguesso’s survival is increasingly the possibility of mass protests by frustrated southerners, as the unrest that accompanied his constitutional referendum in October 2015 made clear. Accordingly, prefects appointed to Congo’s southern regions must be prepared to coerce their constituents. To ensure this, Sassou Nguesso routinely forces prefects to govern regions where they have no existing ties, the better to ensure their loyalty is unrivaled. This, one regional leader conceded, is “part of Sassou Nguesso’s strategic framework.”

A candidate in the 2012 parliamentary elections from Niari region elaborated:

> If [Sassou Nguesso] names a prefect from Niari [to govern Niari], [the prefect] can’t implement Sassou Nguesso’s politics. He can’t steal or intimidate. [Local citizens] know his parents and his family, and they’ll kill his family. A delegation would come to see him, and they would say: “These policies are no good, and we won’t accept it. Do you want to destroy your own [region] for Sassou Nguesso?”

A former aide to the Bouenza regional council president said:

> The regime knows how unpopular it is. If they appoint a prefect from Bouenza, he’ll be loathe to cheat, to oppress his own population. But with prefects from other regions, their loyalties are undivided.

One high ranking member of the Niari regional council reported something similar:

> [The government appoints non-native prefects] to control the population . . . they are always from the north, or at least from elsewhere. The regime fears having the region governed by one of its own. The regime has to control them, and if there are uprisings the prefects must be willing to suppress them. . . . A native son would know the reality, even the psychological realities. And he would be less likely to waste things, to be corrupted, and to corrupt. He would have the best interest of the region at heart.

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22 Interview with Anonymous, Mouyondzi, Congo, 30 April 2012.
23 Interview with Anonymous, Dolisie, Congo, 8 July 2013.
24 Interview with Anonymous, Nkayi, Congo, 10 July 2013.
25 Interview with Anonymous, Dolisie, Congo, 11 July 2013.
3.2 Kenya

Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin, took office in 1978, following the death of Kenya’s first president and imposed a *de jure* one-party regime under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) soon afterwards. Moi would later survive the Third Wave of Democracy – unlike Sassou Nguesso – but he was forced to legalize multi-party elections in 1992 to do so. Elections were far from free and fair (Throup & Hornsby 1998, Levitsky & Way 2010). Still, they forced Moi to simultaneously thwart the opposition and “win” re-election. Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, defeated Moi’s successor and won the 2002 election.

Elections were the largest threat to each president’s political power. Neither president managed to win a majority of the votes during their re-election bids suggesting widespread domestic content and the viability of a united political opposition in unseating each incumbent (Arriola 2012). Instead, each president has maintained power after winning a “flawed” re-election in part through the country’s regional executives.

3.2.1 Political Geography: Ethnic Cleavages

Congo’s chief political cleavage is regional; in Kenya, it is ethnic (Elischer 2013, Horowitz 2016). Moi and Kibaki consistently allocated more state spending to their co-ethnic areas (e.g., Bates 1989, Morjaria 2011, Jablonski 2014, Burgess et al. 2015, Kramon & Posner 2016). In turn, a president’s co-ethnics constitute his core constituency. Since 1992, incumbent presidents have received more than 90% of votes cast in co-ethnic areas.

3.2.2 Local Governance: District Commissioners

Kenya’s administrative districts are analogous to Congo’s regions, and its District Commissioners (DCs) to Congo’s regional prefects. By 1992 Kenya’s 47 districts had an average population of 500,000, slightly larger than Congolese regions. The number of districts – and DCs – increased to
71 by 2003, a fact that we account for in the empirical analysis. Although DCs are drawn from all of Kenya’s prominent ethnic groups, Moi and Kibaki appointed their respective co-ethnics to a disproportionate share of DC posts, as seen in Figure 1.

Kenyan DCs, like Congolese prefects, enjoy broad autonomy over local development which enables them to co-opt citizens on the regime’s behalf. Each DC presides over the “District Development Committee,” which selects the area’s development projects to implement. The quality of these projects is determined in part by a DC’s local embeddedness: DCs who better understand dynamics among rival ethnic groups can more effectively adjudicate among them. A DC who speaks local languages and is sensitive to cultural customs can better adapt national-level policies to the community she serves. Most officers attempt a “capstone” infrastructure project: perhaps a health facility or a large school extension. But major projects only succeed if the DC remains in office long enough to raise money (through “harambees”) and obtain political support from the “correct” elders. This sentiment between embeddedness in a station and local development has been around since the colonial era. Under British rule, for instance, colonial administrators

In Kenya, we empirically examine “innateness” as whether a DC is a co-ethnic of the majority of area residents as opposed to whether the DC is from the district she governs. This is because DCs are institutionally barred from serving in their “home” district precisely to reduce local embeddedness. That said, all of the ethnicities which are well-represented among DCs are among the country’s largest ethnic groups and comprise the ethnic majority in 4 - 13 districts. We include a breakdown of majority ethnicity by district in the Appendix.

This DDC was the main source of centralized district funds for the majority of the study period. In 2003, Kibaki implemented a Constituency Development Fund (CDF) that also allocated resources by legislative constituency (Harris 2016). However the DDC still persisted during these years and the area DC sits on the CDF allocation boards for constituencies in her district.


Ibid.
complained that:

Continuity in the form of a District Commissioner is essential if a district is to develop in any particular way ... a personal loyalty tends to develop between the African and the [officer], but it does take some time to do so. If changes are made too quickly, suspicion inevitably grows and nothing is achieved.

At the same time, and as in Congo, Kenyan DCs are granted significant coercive capacity to maintain law and order in their districts. They command all district police officers, chair the district security committee, and maintain a wide informant network. Since Moi and Kibaki were concerned more with the opposition’s electoral performance than mass protests, Kenyan DCs employed coercion differently than Congolese regional prefects, instead using their coercive authority to advance the president’s electoral interests. Under Moi, DCs routinely incarcerated the regime’s political opponents, prevented opposition candidates from organizing rallies, disbanded rallies underway, refused to sign nomination papers for opposition candidates, and harassed opposition supporters.

Further, because they administered elections, DCs at times engaged in blatant electoral fraud. DCs continued some of these same election-tilting practices, but to a lesser degree, under Kibaki. For instance, whereas Raila Odinga – an opposition candidate in 1997 against Moi and 2007 against Kibaki – noted that his requests to hold rallies were routinely denied under Moi, he claimed that officers under Kibaki granted permission but never on bustling “market days” – the one or two days a week that the surrounding rural area congregates in town to sell their produce.

More generally, Mueller (2008) describes a deliberate weakening of institutions outside of the executive branch throughout the entire multi-party era and the continued strength of institutions within the executive power (including DCs). Though coercion by regional executives in Kenya is

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31 Much literature has documented the political nature of DCs under Moi during the multi-party era (e.g., Throup & Hornsby 1998 and Hassan Forthcoming) as well as the one-party era (Gertzel 1970, Mueller 1984).
32 Interview with Raila Odinga, 22 May 2014, Boston, MA.
less violent than in Congo, it still played a significant role in helping each president win re-election. Whereas local embeddedness improved DCs’ ability to co-opt area residents through development, it hampered their ability to coerce. One DC conceded that, if he governed his co-ethnics, he would not employ coercion against them, but instead “I would allow [my co-ethnics] to do the [work of the] opposition. For the people not to be allowed to oppose they must send somebody who is not close to the people.”[33] Indeed, one former Interior Minister confirmed that DCs were rotated frequently to ensure that DCs remain loyal to the regime rather than local citizens.[34]

3.3 Congo and Kenya in Comparative Perspective

Before continuing to the empirics, we quickly place Congo and Kenya in comparative perspective. Our study focuses on authoritarian regimes, with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa saw many political openings after the end of the Cold War (Bratton & van de Walle 1992), with some countries democratizing, others moving towards hybrid regimes, and some simply adopting window-dressing institutions without significant democratization (Levitsky & Way 2010). Though our study focuses on Congo and Kenya because of data availability, we believe that these two countries and three regimes span the gamut of African regime types where we could plausibly expect leaders to purposefully manipulate local embeddedness for their political survival.

[Figure 6 about here.]

To show the comparative value of this study, we plot Congo and Kenya’s executive constraint score from Polity IV during our study period alongside the average for sub-Saharan Africa in Figure 6. This graph averages executive constraints for closed authoritarian, competitive authoritarian, [33]Interview with DC, Nairobi, Kenya 17 November 2011.
[34]Interview with Minister of Provincial Authority (1991 - 1996), Nairobi, Kenya, 24 February 2012.
and democratic regimes. Congo’s level of executive constraints is consistently lower than the regional average, representative of those countries that did not see significant democratic openings after the end of the Cold War. The country’s executive constraint score only increased from 1 (“unlimited authority”) to 2 (intermediate category between “unlimited authority” and “slight to moderate limitation”) during this period. Kenya’s executive constraint score is 3 (“slight to moderate limitation”) during Moi’s presidency. This is just below the regional average consistent with the country’s classification of Kenya as a competitive authoritarian regime (recall that the regional average includes some democracies with high executive constraints that pull the average up). Under Kibaki, the level of executive constraints jumps to 6 (intermediate category between “substantial limitations” and “executive parity”), representative of those countries transitioning away from autocracy.

4 Coercion and Co-optation

4.1 Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics

To examine the theory, we collected analogous data from Congo and Kenya. For Congo, we recorded every regional prefect since Sassou Nguesso’s 1997 return, as well as a range of demographic information for each. We collected this information from key informant interviews, the “Official Journal”, in which the government publishes many of its appointments, as well as the archives of Brazzaville’s three leading newspapers. The result is a region-year dataset, which counts 32 individual prefects across 10 regions. We then created a series of variables based on the theory above. The variable Non-Native Prefect\(_{rt}\) assumes value 1 if region \(r\)’s prefect in year \(t\) was drawn from elsewhere. The variable Tenure Length\(_{rt}\) measures the number of years that region \(r\)’s prefect in year \(t\) had remained in that office. To measure Sassou Nguesso’s regional popularity, we exploit Congo’s regional cleavage. The variable Hostile Region\(_r\) assumes value 1 if region \(r\)
fought against Sassou Nguesso during the 1997 war.

For Kenya, we recorded every DC between 1992 and 2007, as well as demographic information for each. We collect this information from the records of the Interior Ministry. This yielded a district-year dataset, which counts 220 individual DCs across. The ethnicity of each officer is coded from their name using three methods described in the Appendix.

We then created the same three variables that we did for Congo. Non-Co-Ethnic DC$_{rt}$ assumes value 1 if district $r$’s DC in year $t$ was not drawn from district $r$’s majority ethnic group. This process was not as straightforward as for the Congo data given the increase in the country’s administrative districts. We use written and visual depictions of district boundaries and their creation date, alongside sub-district census data to re-estimate district majorities. We explain this process in depth in the Appendix. The variable Tenure Length$_{rt}$ measures the number of years that district $r$’s DC in year $t$ had remained in office. To capture the autocrat’s support in district $r$, we leverage Kenya’s ethnic cleavage. The variable President’s Non-Co-Ethnic District$_{rt}$ assumes value 1 if the majority of district $r$’s residents in year $t$ were not co-ethnics of the president. Specifically, this variable assumes value 0 if the majority of district residents were Kalenjin under Moi, or Kikuyu under Kibaki, and value 1 otherwise. We provide a map of each president’s core areas in Figure 4.

In 2008 the number of districts expanded from 71 to 290. To our knowledge, there is no official map or written delineation of those 290 districts. As a result, we conclude our analysis in 2007. We also re-run these models after considering whether the district contained a substantial minority of each president’s co-ethnics in the Appendix.

Each president has also received substantial support from other ethnic groups. However given Kenya’s weak parties and party system, a feature common in many African countries with meaningful elections (LeBas 2011, Riedl 2014), ethnic alliances are not stable across time. Presidents thus recognize that non-co-ethnic supporters from the last election might “renege” and support the opposition. Only a president’s co-ethnics are guaranteed to support him. For this reason, we do not consider measures of electoral support as the appropriate indicator for regime support.
Descriptive statics for the outcome variables of interest – Non-Native Prefect\(_{rt}\) and Tenure Length\(_{jr}\) for Congo, President’s Non-Co-Ethnic District\(_{rt}\) and Tenure Length\(_{jr}\) for Kenya – appear in Figure 3. Consistent with the theory, the left panel suggests that Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki routinely appointed non-native regional executives to regions outside their core support. Likewise, the right panel indicates that regional executives appointed to non-core support regions experienced shorter tenures than their counterparts in core support regions. The difference between core support regions and non-core support regions is particularly stark in Sassou Nguesso’s Congo. In Section 6 we offer tentative explanations for why.

### 4.2 The Politics of Regional Executive Appointment

We begin by examining the politics of appointment: whether autocrats govern regions outside of their core support with regional executives who are not from the local in-group population. Specifically, we employ a series of logit models to estimate the probability that autocrat D appoints to region \(r\) a non-native executive in year \(t\). The baseline estimating equations for Congo and Kenya, respectively, are:

\[
\text{logit} \left[ \Pr (\text{Non-Native Prefect}_{rt} = 1) \right] = \alpha + \beta (\text{Hostile Region}_r) + \gamma X_{rt} + \epsilon \\
\text{logit} \left[ \Pr (\text{Non-Co-Ethnic DC}_{rt} = 1) \right] = \alpha + \beta (\text{President’s Non-Co-Ethnic District}_{rt}) + \gamma W_{rt} + \epsilon
\]

where \(X_{rt}\) and \(W_{rt}\) give vectors of region-year controls. For Kenya, standard errors are clustered at the district-level. For Congo, since there are only 10 regions, we do not cluster standard errors.\(^{38}\)

\(^{38}\)Doing so would increase the probability of over-rejecting the null hypothesis (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller 2008).
We estimate two specifications for each autocrat: one that includes a lagged dependent variable, as observations in sequential time periods may be correlated, and one that does not.

Although the control variables in vectors $X_{rt}$ and $W_{rt}$ are theoretically similar, Congo and Kenya have distinct political institutions and histories so we operationalize control variables differently. The vectors $X_{rt}$ and $W_{rt}$ include an indicator variable that records whether region $r$’s executive in year $t$ was identified as a “personal loyalist” of the president. This accommodates the possibility that autocrats may be willing to govern hostile regions with a native executive if they are certain about the executive’s loyalty. In Congo, the chief marker of personal loyalty is whether executive $j$ occupied a senior role in the 1997 civil war effort alongside Sassou Nguesso. For Moi, we control for the number of years since DC $j$ was appointed a DC; since Moi appointed all DCs during the sample period – he had been in power for 15 years by 1992 – a DC’s length of service is an appropriate measure of loyalty to the regime. Because of Kibaki’s shorter tenure, we instead include an indicator variable that assumes value 1 if DC $j$ was first appointed by Kibaki. In all models, we control for traditional administrative factors by including region $r$’s geographic size and total population (both logged). Descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Table 1.

In the Appendix, we re-run the models after controlling for local development (the results are substantively identical).

Table 1 [about here.]

The results appear in Table 2 and indicate that all three autocrats were more likely to appoint non-native executives to regions outside their core support. The bottom panel reports the predicted probability that region $r$ was governed by a non-native executive outside the regime’s core support.

39 For population in Congo, we use the 2007 census, the only since Sassou Nguesso returned to power in 1997. Omitting this variable does not substantively alter the results (not shown). For Kenya, we use census data from 1989 and redetermine population based on changing boundaries. This process is detailed in the Appendix.
regions and within core support regions. Sassou Nguesso governs non-core support regions – those that fought against him during the 1997 civil war – almost exclusively with non-natives. Indeed, it is exceedingly uncommon for Sassou Nguesso to permit a native son to govern a non-core support region. By contrast, Sassou Nguesso governs core support regions overwhelmingly with native executives: with probability 0.6 in a given year $t$. In Kenya, the results are similar, though less stark. Under Moi, his co-ethnic Kalenjin districts were 18 percentage points more likely to be governed by a co-ethnic than non-Kalenjin districts. Under Kibaki, his co-ethnic Kikuyu districts were 35.6 percentage points more likely to be governed by a co-ethnic than non-Kikuyu districts.

[Table 2 about here.]

4.3 The Politics of Regional Executive Tenure

Just as autocrats are more likely to govern non-core support regions with regional executives drawn from afar so too, the theory suggests, should autocrats shuffle them more quickly. In so doing, autocrats ensure that regional executives cannot develop feelings of local embeddedness with the local population, which may ultimately rival their commitment to the regime.

We employ a series of Cox proportional hazard models to examine the politics of shuffling. We estimate the probability that autocrat $D$ removes region $r$’s executive in year $t$, again as a function of region $r$’s core support status. The estimating equations for Congo and Kenya are analogous to those in (1) and (2), respectively:

$$ h(t) = \beta (\text{Hostile Region}_r) + \gamma X_{rt} + \epsilon $$

(3)

$$ h(t) = \beta (\text{President’s Non-Co-Ethnic District}_r) + \gamma W_{rt} + \epsilon $$

(4)

where $h(t)$ gives the regional executive’s hazard rate at time $t$. The vectors of control variables $X_{rt}$ and $W_{rt}$ are identical to those in equations (1) and (2), respectively, save for one difference.
We also control for whether region $r$’s executive in year $t$ was non-native. This accommodates the possibility that autocrats treat shuffling and non-native appointment as either complements or substitutes: that if regional executive $j$ is not native to region $r$, shuffling her rapidly may be less necessary, for her loyalty to the regime may already be assured.\footnote{\textsuperscript{40}} As above, we estimate two specifications for each autocrat: one that includes an autocrat-level frailty term and one that does not.

The results appear in Table 3. Again, Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki shuffled regional executives in non-core support regions at a far higher rate than those in core support regions. Figure 5 presents the associated survival plots. The $y$-axis gives the estimated proportion of all regional executives appointed in some year 0 who remain in office at some year $t$, recorded along the $x$-axis. Outside of Sassou Nguesso’s core support regions, some 65\% of regional executives will be shuffled just two years after appointment, and nearly all by year three. By contrast, in his core regions, Sassou Nguesso grants regional executives exceptionally long tenures: a full decade after appointment, some 70\% will remain in office. In Kenya, Moi and Kibaki employed the same policy, though, again, differences across regions are less pronounced. For Moi, two years after appointment, roughly 55\% of regional executives in core support regions will remain in office; in non-core support regions, only 40\%. For Kibaki, two years after appointment, nearly 60\% of regional executives in core support regions will remain in office; in non-core support regions, only 30\%.

As in Section 4.2, the coefficients for Loyalty$_{rt}$ are instructive, and consistent with the theory. For Sassou Nguesso and Kibaki, regional executives who were identified as personal loyalists were far less likely to be terminated in any year $t$. Indeed, the results suggest that when Sassou Nguesso and Kibaki appointed personal loyalists to regions outside their core support, they treated them like regional executives appointed to core support regions. In short, presumed loyalty to the autocrat enables the autocrat to govern potentially hostile areas with native sons – with the

\footnote{The results are substantively unchanged if we do not include this term (not shown).}
associated benefits for local governance – while remaining relatively confident that, if an uprising emerges, native sons will suppress it as loyalty requires.

[Table 3 and 5 about here.]

5 Robustness Checks

In this section we describe several robustness checks that are included in the Appendix.

5.1 Native Postings as Strategic

First, readers may be concerned that the non-native statistical results – presented in Section 4.2 and Table 2 – may simply be driven by the pool of potential Congolese prefects and Kenyan DCs. That is, since Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki “pack” their regional governance apparatus with in-group officers, it may be overwhelmingly likely that non-core support regions/districts are governed by executives drawn from afar. If so, our statistical results may reflect this packing rather than the autocrat’s strategic behavior. Put otherwise, if the autocrat’s in-group is well-represented within the pool of potential regional executives, then this may “mechanically” generate the non-native result in Table 2.

We first refute this concern using descriptive statistics. As we show in Figure 1, neither country’s officer corps was totally packed. Although each of the three did disproportionately draw regional executives from their in-group, other demographic groups were well represented.

Second, to further ensure that our statistical results above are not driven by packing, we employ randomization inference. For each leader, we specify a pool of potential candidates for regional executive positions: individuals who, for each autocrat, could have been selected. We then randomly select a group of counterfactual regional executives from this pool of potential candidates, and randomly assign them to executive positions in region \( i \) in year \( t \). For the randomly selected
group of counterfactual regional executives, we construct our explanatory variable of interest: Non-Native Prefect\(_{it}\) for Congo, Non-Co-Ethnic DC\(_{it}\) for Kenya. We then estimate the baseline model, given by equations (1) and (2). We perform this simulation 1,000 times for each autocrat, and then compare the resulting distribution of coefficients to the observed coefficients reported in Table 2. If the strategic behavior we observe in Congo and Kenya is actually driven by a packed governance apparatus – again, a governance apparatus that is overwhelmingly comprised of the autocrats’ co-ethnics or co-regionals – then the simulated distribution of coefficients will converge to the observed coefficients reported in the main text.

This randomization inference may be sensitive to the pool of potential candidates for regional executive positions. Accordingly, to ensure the robustness of our results, we define the pool in a variety of ways. For both countries, we initially consider the current pool of Congolese prefects or Kenyan DCs. But we recognize that selection into these elite regime positions is not random. Thus we run additional randomization inferences based on the potential pool of possible Congolese prefects or Kenyan DCs. In Congo, we examine 1) all government ministers appointed since 1997 and, 2) most expansively, all government elites (generals, senior colonels, ministers, presidential advisers, local mayors, regional executives, heads of parastatals, and appointees to the various constitutional courts and advisory bodies). In Kenya, we look at the pool of District Officers, those officers within the security apparatus who are one tier below DCs and where all DCs are drawn from.

Across these different definitions of candidate pools, we find no consistent evidence that the results above are driven by packing.

### 5.2 Tenure Length and Station Difficulty

Readers may also be concerned that our tenure results – presented in Section 4.3 and Table 3 – are driven by station difficulty rather than the autocrat’s strategic behavior. That is, Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki may shuffle regional executives in non-core support regions not be-
cause of strategic considerations, but simply because those postings are difficult, and so regional executives posted there perform poorly. We may therefore observe shorter tenure spells in jurisdictions outside the autocrat’s core support for purely bureaucratic reasons, rather than a strategic effort to diminish local embeddedness.

To ensure this is not the case, we examine the subsequent postings of all regional executives in our dataset. In Congo, this is straightforward. All former regional executives entered retirement after stepping down. As a result, long-tenured regional executives share the same subsequent career trajectory as short-tenured regional executives, just as former executives in core support regions share the same subsequent trajectory as former executives in non-core support regions. The reason is that regional executive positions are regarded as the terminal point of a career in local or regional government, the military, or some other bureaucratic service to the regime. Appointees to other, similarly high ranking positions – such as government ministers or ambassadors – are typically drawn from a different candidate pool, in which experience in electoral politics is privileged over experience in regional government or the military.

In Kenya, we observe a similar pattern. Although former DCs are routinely appointed to new postings, we observe no statistically significant difference (p<.05) in the rate of re-posting across short- and long-tenured DCs. Likewise, we observe no difference in the rate of re-posting across DCs who governed core support and non-core support regions. Again, the identical subsequent career trajectories imply that regional executives in non-core support regions enjoy shorter tenures not because of poor performance, but from the autocrat’s strategic considerations.

### 5.3 Leveraging Kenya’s Two Regimes

To further bolster our empirics, we show that the Kenya results hold after pooling our data across Presidents Moi and Kibaki. While this work is not causal, we run a “difference-in-difference” style analysis for both the native postings and tenure strategies across the 2002 transition. We consider a district as “treated” if it is co-ethnic to the current president in office. The results are unchanged.
6 Conclusion

In this paper, we show that the personnel management decisions of autocrats are not idiosyncratic, a function of the autocrat’s whims. Rather, autocrats confront common popular challenges and resolve them in similar ways. Specifically, we find that autocrats govern sub-national regions according to their ex ante level of support. In core support regions, where popular threats are unlikely to emerge, regional executives are locally embedded; they are from the local in-group and serve long tenures in an attempt to increase development and co-opt the area. Outside core support regions, where popular threats are possible, autocrats purposefully limit the local embeddedness of regional executives; regional executives are drawn from the out-group and are shuffled quickly to ensure the officer’s loyalty to the regime.

We find evidence in support of our argument using micro-level data drawn from three presidents across two African countries. The local embeddedness of regional executives under Congo’s Sassou Nguesso and Kenya’s Daniel arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki varied predictably across in-group/out-group appointments and tenure length. By illuminating patterns of regional governance across countries with different political cleavages, institutions, and popular threats, we gain confidence in the external validity of our theory.

We find, too, that these patterns are especially pronounced in Congo. Sassou Nguesso governs hostile regions with non-native executives at a particularly high rate, and then shuffles them particularly quickly. The historical literature suggests two factors that may explain this cross-autocrat variation. First, as we discussed in Section 3, popular uprisings constitute a more profound threat to Sassou Nguesso’s survival than to either Moi’s or Kibaki’s during our sample period. Accordingly, Sassou Nguesso may have had even stronger incentives to employ coercion in Congo’s southern regions. Second, Kenya’s stronger bureaucratic institutions – constructed during the colonial period and inherited by subsequent presidents – imposed constraints on both Moi’s and Kibaki’s autonomy, and thus prevented them from appointing and terminating regional executives at will. By
contrast, Congo’s bureaucratic institutions were essentially destroyed by the 1997 civil war, and so Sassou Nguesso has confronted far weaker institutional constraints. In turn, Sassou Nguesso may have been able to employ coercion more aggressively in southern regions – and co-optation more liberally in northern regions – than either Moi or Kibaki. To be clear, these explanations for cross-autocrat variation are tentative. Still, they suggest new possibilities for cross-country research: how variation in regime threats and existing bureaucratic institutions condition regional governance in autocracies.

One implication of this paper is that coercion entails costs. In regions where autocrats are less popular *ex ante*, they employ management strategies that render them even less so over time. Regional executives who are not locally embedded pursue inferior public policies, increasing the area’s aversion towards the regime. This inferior management increases the probability of future protests and reinforces the coercion equilibrium. But autocrats are forced to accept this risk, because the *ex ante* level of hostility in the region forces them to privilege the loyalty of regional executives over local welfare. Though outside the scope of this paper, we regard the coercion strategy’s long-term effects on regional dynamics as an important topic for future research.
References


Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Regional Executives and the Areas they Govern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Congo</th>
<th></th>
<th>Kenya</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operationalization</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Operationalization</td>
<td>Count</td>
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<td>Districts</td>
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<td>District Commissioner-Years</td>
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Table 2: The Politics of Regional Executive Appointments in Congo and Kenya

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<th>Moi</th>
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<td>6.69**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.49)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>N</td>
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**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Results from logit regressions following equations (1) and (2). For variable descriptions, see Table 1.

Predicted Probability of Non-Native Regional Executives
with Loyalty and Lagged DV at 0, numerical variables at means, and 95% confidence intervals

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<td></td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.31, 0.81]</td>
<td>[0.88, 0.99]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.41, 0.82]</td>
<td>[0.90, 0.99]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: The Politics of Regional Executive Tenure in Congo and Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sassou Nguesso</th>
<th>Moi</th>
<th>Kibaki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outside Core</td>
<td>4.30**</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.11)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>-4.83**</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Native Officer</td>
<td>-2.66**</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.90)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frailty term</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, †p < 0.1. Results from Cox proportional hazard regressions following equations (3) and (4). For variable descriptions, see Table 1.
Figure 1: Regional executives appointed by Sassou Nguesso, Moi, and Kibaki, with their respective core support regions shaded. The \( y \)-axis gives the proportion of portfolio-years in the dataset – itself subsetted by autocrat – that were natives of the regions along the \( x \)-axis.
Figure 2: Polity IV executive constraints score for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (circles), Kenya (dashed line), and Congo (dash-dot line). The numbers for Congo and Kenya include only the study period.
Figure 3: Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables of interest. The left barplot displays the proportion of years in which region $r$ was governed by a non-native executive, according to core support areas and non-core support areas. The right barplot displays the average tenure of regional prefects, again according to core support and non-core support areas.
Figure 4: Maps of the main independent variable, core area. The Congo map hashes the country’s northern regions that constitute Sassou Nguesso’s core, as well as Kouilou, his wife’s core region. The Kenya maps list the country’s districts and hash in those districts where a majority of residents were a co-ethnic of the president (both Moi and Kibaki’s spouses were from their respective ethnic group).
Figure 5: Survival plots associated with the statistical results in Table 3. For each, the solid line gives the survival curve for autocrat $D$’s core support regions, while the dashed line gives the survival curve for autocrat $D$’s non-core support regions.