Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

YURI ZHUKOV

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC

ABSTRACT In an effort to better understand the benefits and limitations of an authoritarian approach to counter-insurgency, this article examines the relationship between regime type and military effectiveness in the often neglected case of Soviet counter-insurgency operations in Western Ukraine. This study finds that the advantages authoritarian governments enjoy in designing, planning and implementing counter-insurgency campaigns – related to a lack of restraints and constraints – can all too easily become reversed through the excesses they permit.

The relationship between regime type and military effectiveness has been the focus of much recent scholarly work. A common hypothesis among those who have examined the small-war dimension of this broader research question has been that democracy exerts restraining and constraining effects on counter-insurgency campaigns, which limit the options available to the counter-insurgent. Democratic regimes are accountable to their publics, who may be averse to escalating levels of violence, may harbour moral objections to repressive measures and often exhibit a low tolerance for casualties. This view – or at least its general premise – is shared by many policy practitioners and is reflected in the 2006 US Army Field Manual on counter-insurgency.

Meanwhile, conventional wisdom holds that authoritarian regimes are considerably less constricted than democratic regimes in resorting to coercive measures. Bard O’Neill has argued that such regimes are inherently more effective at certain types of counter-insurgency, ‘given the pervasiveness of secret police and intelligence agencies, controlled
judicial processes and a willingness to employ indiscriminate force'.

In his seminal text on low-intensity conflict, Frank Kitson underscored the relative ease with which domestic intelligence operations could be maintained in an authoritarian system, noting that ‘under an authoritarian regime freedom of the individual is not particularly relevant’. Roger Trinquier further noted that insurgents can be easily identified in an ideologically homogenous totalitarian regime.

Some recent studies have begun to look at the authoritarian model of counter-insurgency (COIN) with more scrutiny. Daniel Byman has recently highlighted some of the challenges facing regimes perceived as illegitimate or repressive, including a restricted flow and compartmentalisation of information and an unwillingness of the population to volunteer critical intelligence. Although their studies have not focused on regime type specifically, Eliot Cohen, John Nagl and Nigel Aylwin-Foster, among others, have also underscored the importance of restraint in the conduct of counter-insurgency campaigns.

The growing body of scholarly literature on this subject – along with the ongoing public debate on internal COIN efforts conducted by various US allies and partners – has highlighted the need to better understand the benefits and limitations of the authoritarian model of counter-insurgency. The purpose of this study is to identify some of the characteristics of the authoritarian approach by examining a relatively neglected and analytically interesting case, and to draw some general observations about the effect of authoritarian political organisation on the planning and execution of counter-insurgency operations. Recognising the limitations of a single-case study in drawing general conclusions about the relative merits and weaknesses of democratic and authoritarian approaches to COIN, this study also identifies several areas for further research.

The Soviet campaign against the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), in 1944–59 offers a fitting case for examining the authoritarian model. While history offers numerous more recent examples of internal counter-insurgency efforts by authoritarian governments, the UPA case lends itself well to analysis in part because the archival record for this period is relatively complete, offering unique insights into both the Soviet and UPA approaches to the conflict. Additionally, the UPA case is interesting to study due to the fact that its lessons are somewhat ambiguous. Although the Soviets were ultimately successful in suppressing the insurgency, the effectiveness of the manner by which they achieved this outcome remains an open question. This contradiction compels the analyst to direct his attention to the process rather than outcome of the COIN campaign and examine the extent to
which the domestic political organisation of the counter-insurgent was an enabling or limiting factor in the shaping of this process.

In identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the authoritarian model of COIN, this study supports the hypothesis that the internal characteristics of an authoritarian state offer greater freedom of action to the counter-insurgent. The Soviet experience confirms the view that authoritarian regimes can employ, among other things, relatively extensive population control measures and invasive intelligence collection methods, can readily obtain information superiority and are under relatively little pressure to use minimum force.

However, the OUN-UPA experience also demonstrates that although the Soviet government was able to design, plan and implement counter-insurgency campaigns under less limiting restraints and constraints than would have been the case in a democratic regime, this freedom of action encouraged excesses that often threatened to undermine the overall counter-insurgency effort. In particular, this case study finds that authoritarian regimes can experience an over-reliance on coercive instruments of national power, difficulties in identifying the enemy’s exploitable factors and a lack of channels for corrective feedback.

This paper is organised into three sections. The first seeks to analyse the Ukrainian insurgency as it existed at the time of the movement of the German-Soviet front line to the west in the summer and autumn of 1944 when large-scale Soviet counter-insurgency efforts began. Rather than to chronologically recount the history of the movement, this section examines the nature, strategy and organisation of the OUN-UPA, the physical and human environment in which it operated and the domestic and external support it received.

The second section examines the authoritarian model of counter-insurgency as exemplified in the Soviet COIN campaign against the UPA, identifies its successes and failures and analyses the extent to which these can be attributed to the domestic political organisation of the Soviet Union.

The third section is an attempt to identify the restraints and constraints that were largely absent from the Soviet authoritarian model, thus demonstrating where and how an authoritarian approach to counter-insurgency proved effective, and where it proved deficient.

The Ukrainian Insurgency

To better appraise the design and implementation of Soviet counter-insurgency strategy in 1944–59, it is helpful to view the Ukrainian case from the standpoint of counter-insurgency analysis. This section makes the observations that the OUN-UPA was a secessionist insurgency, employing a strategy of protracted popular war while exploiting the
difficult geographical and socio-economic landscape of western Ukraine. Importantly, the OUN-UPA was highly reliant on six methods of gaining popular support, which would later become the focal points of the counter-insurgency campaign: charismatic leadership, esoteric and exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency and coercion.¹¹

**Goals, Strategy and Organisation**

In 1929 several Ukrainian nationalist organisations active in Polish-administered western Ukraine founded the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), with the stated goal of restoring an independent Ukrainian state on all territories populated by ethnic Ukrainian peoples.¹² The OUN and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), formed in 1942, could be best described as a *secessionist* insurgency, in that the group rejected the political community of which it was formally a part – whether the Second Polish Republic, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine or the Soviet Union – and sought to withdraw and form an independent political community.¹³ The strategy by which the organisation hoped to achieve these aims was one of *protracted popular war*. Particularly after 1941, the OUN¹⁴ focused its efforts on developing a large mass base while undermining the legitimacy and will of the occupying government authorities and supporting elements, and employing a combination of military, informational and political instruments of power.¹⁵

The OUN-UPA’s command and control structure was highly sophisticated and very centralised. Its guiding principle was to maintain unity of effort while allowing for a maximum geographical dispersal of forces.¹⁶ This was achieved through a dual administrative (OUN) and operational (UPA) chain of command, with Stepan Bandera, the supreme leader or *provid* sitting at the top. The administrative chain of command included the OUN shadow government apparatus operating in areas under UPA control and was organised vertically among increasingly smaller territorial administrative units and horizontally between six main departments at each level: military (serving as force provider to the UPA), security service, supply, political, mobilisation and the Ukrainian Red Cross.¹⁷

There was much overlap between the administrative and operational chains of command and many parallel posts in OUN and UPA were typically occupied by the same officials. The organisational methods for the military arm were borrowed largely from the Soviet, Polish and German armed forces and adapted to local needs. The UPA was led by a supreme commander – concurrently the OUN leader-in-area – and a general staff, consisting of operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel,
training and political education departments. Vertically the UPA was divided into four regional commands and progressively smaller territorial oblasts and districts, and tactical units, the largest of which was equivalent to a battalion in a regular army and the smallest equivalent to a squad. These units trained based on a modified version of the Red Army infantry field manual.

Physical Environment

The main area of OUN-UPA operations – western and south-western Ukraine – offered ideal terrain for insurgent activity. The Carpathian mountain range severely restricted the movement of mechanised forces and provided inaccessible base areas for UPA insurgents. The regions of Volhynia and Polisia, further north, were characterised by swamps, marshes and dense forests. German troops bypassed these areas altogether during Operation Barbarossa, allowing the UPA to take advantage of the dense foliage and establish permanent bases hidden from aerial surveillance. Moreover, the local communications – mainly narrow forest foot trails and mountain passes, a few railroad routes surrounded on both sides by trees – forced military units to move forces in long, narrow columns with exposed flanks, thus increasing vulnerability to insurgent ambushes.

Popular Support

Because a protracted popular war strategy dictated the mobilisation of a mass base, active popular support was the centre of gravity for the OUN-UPA. German intelligence sources estimated OUN-UPA’s force strength to have been between 80,000 and 100,000 men in May 1944. Those not under arms supported the OUN administrative apparatus by distributing propaganda literature, collecting taxes and providing medical and other social services. The level of passive support received by OUN-UPA is hard to quantify, although the difficulty experienced by the Germans in establishing a network of reliable informants seems to indicate that this category included a high proportion of local residents.

The OUN-UPA found its base of support in rural western Ukraine. The organisation’s effort to attract urban dwellers was complicated by the fact that the largest regional city, Lviv, was under effective German, and then Soviet, control. Moreover, several socio-economic factors made the rural population a natural source of popular support. The west and east of Ukraine had been separated by centuries of divergent historical paths and institutional legacies, resulting in a number of social cleavages that could be easily exploited. Confessional and linguistic differences defined the social and cultural landscape, with a sizeable...
minority in western Ukraine belonging to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and the centre and east belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Meanwhile, westerners spoke a dialect of the Ukrainian language heavily influenced by Polish, whereas the east shared many linguistic ties with Russia. Imperial Russian and, later, Soviet Russification policies were thus perceived as a threat to western Ukraine’s cultural heritage.

In the economic sphere, western Ukraine, unlike the east, was relatively short of arable land and had a large proportion of underemployed and unemployed peasants, providing a steady reserve of disillusioned men susceptible to extremism and manipulation, such as the promise of redistributed land. Fear of Soviet collectivisation only compounded fears already present in this region, contributing to a pattern that Ted Robert Gurr terms ‘decremental depredation’, wherein a group’s value capabilities decline relative to expectations, creating an environment ripe for political violence.

Finally, the political institutional memory in western Ukraine was steeped in the Polish, Lithuanian and Austro-Hungarian tradition, which was fundamentally different from that in the Russian-administered and, later, Soviet-administered east. Totalitarianism as a political system was particularly unappealing even to previously parochial western Ukrainians, for whom such a high level of government intrusion presented a fundamental and unwelcome change. By 1944, some of these shifts in peasant political culture and awareness had already been ignited by the brutal Nazi occupation.

Peasants constituted as much as 60 per cent of UPA’s overall personnel strength, providing the bulk of the fighting force. Accustomed to physical hardship and endurance and directly affected by the aforementioned economic, social and political grievances, peasants were the most effective and motivated element of the UPA’s enlisted ranks. In part due to its focus on the rural population and rejection of Marxism-Leninism, the OUN-UPA was less effective in attracting the industrial working class, although in 1943–44 this segment of the population – largely in response to Nazi atrocities – came to represent as much as 20–25 per cent of the UPA’s personnel, most of them from the rural lumber and food industries. The intelligentsia, including students and urban professionals, constituted 15 per cent of the UPA’s force strength. This was the most educated and capable demographic within the organisation, providing a substantial portion of the officer corps and military instructors.

Although overall external support for the OUN-UPA was limited, especially after the German defeat, operatives were able to secure significant moral and some material support from Western publics and governments. The western Ukrainian diaspora in Western Europe and
North America was instrumental in making the UPA's struggle known outside the region. This was done through a number of publishing houses in London, Toronto and New York that produced OUN literature, as well as through Ukrainian lobbyists. Overt political support was lacking, although the OUN-UPA received some material support from a number of government and non-government sources. However, this support was intermittent and generally insufficient in the light of the OUN's ambitious goals and demanding protracted popular-war strategy. The UPA's options for sanctuary in close proximity were also very limited, particularly after the Red Army occupied eastern Europe and increased cooperation with Polish and Czechoslovak border troops.

**Techniques for Gaining Support**

The capability to gain popular support was central to the OUN-UPA's strategy of protracted popular war. With varying levels of effectiveness, the OUN-UPA used all the most common insurgent means of gaining support: charismatic leadership, esoteric and exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government repression, demonstrations of potency and coercion.

- **Charismatic leadership.** The role of Stepan Bandera’s charismatic leadership, although not the decisive factor in attracting popular support, was nevertheless instrumental in maintaining unity of effort and strategic guidance. Within and outside the OUN-UPA, Bandera was a figure of almost mythical stature – as the visionary behind the ‘revolutionary’ OUN-B movement, the architect of the group’s organisational structure and author of much OUN propaganda, and in his role as supreme leader. Indeed, the OUN-UPA was commonly referred to in the USSR as Banderovtsy or ‘followers of Bandera’.

- **Esoteric and exoteric appeals.** The OUN-UPA effectively employed a combination of esoteric and exoteric appeals to attract support. In the first category, the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism was particularly effective in the context of German occupation, gaining the momentum needed to refocus this nationalist sentiment against the Soviets once the Germans were driven off Ukrainian territory in 1943–44. In the second category, the OUN-UPA appealed to specific grievances, such as Nazi abuses and forced labour, Soviet collectivisation and the promise of fair land distribution.

- **Terrorism.** Although terrorism was at first directed primarily against individual leaders and the local Polish population as part of a broader campaign that claimed the lives of up to 40,000 ethnic Poles, by 1945 UPA terrorism was becoming increasingly indiscriminate, as the
organisation sought to derail Soviet post-war reconstruction efforts and delay collectivisation in the region by targeting civilian infrastructure and Ukrainians and Russians suspected of collaborating with the Communist Party.33

- **Provocation of reprisals.** Fully aware of the often arbitrary and indiscriminate methods employed by the Red Army, the UPA often sought to provoke government reprisals against the local population. Indeed, numerous incidents of such reprisals were recorded, including indefinite NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) detentions of suspects, torture, executions, embezzlement and rape, all of which raised sympathy for the insurgents.34 Aware of this effect, the UPA also deliberately ‘simulated’ such reprisals by raiding villages while dressed in Red Army uniforms.35

- **Demonstrations of potency.** The UPA sought to further undermine the legitimacy of the Soviet government and attract followers by demonstrating the organisation’s political and military strength. On the political front, the OUN shadow government served this purpose by providing limited medical and other social services, mobilising the population for the struggle and printing literature.36 Militarily, although the UPA had ample freedom of manoeuvre in the west and south of the country under German occupation, after 1944 the UPA was unable to sustain continuous victories against irregular NKVD units and other Soviet forces, concentrating instead on small unit guerrilla attacks.37

- **Coercion.** In light of the above, the OUN-UPA became over-reliant on coercion to fill its ranks. Although volunteers were preferable to conscripts, OUN recruiting centres relied on forced conscription to meet quotas set by the supreme leader, often backed by the threat and use of violence against the families of those who resisted. The counter-intelligence and military police departments of the OUN Security Service (OUN-SB) also assisted in enabling conscription, as well as identifying and executing government informants and their immediate families.38

**OUN-UPA in 1944**

By the autumn of 1944 the OUN-UPA was a formidable force seeking to derail Soviet stabilisation and reconstruction efforts and prevent a transition to Moscow’s civilian control. The OUN-UPA had by this point established an impressive shadow government and its armed groupings enjoyed virtual freedom of movement over an area of 160,000 square kilometres – roughly one-quarter of Ukrainian territory and home to over 10 million people.39 In the wake of the retreating German forces in 1944, western Ukrainians greeted the Red Army cautiously and at times
with open hostility. The Soviet administrative apparatus had been completely dismantled after several years of German occupation and OUN-UPA administrative organisational efforts. The local populace associated their Soviet ‘liberators’ with the excesses of the Sovietisation campaign of 1939–41, particularly forcible collectivisation and the repression of Catholic leaders and the intelligentsia.

The Soviet Counter-insurgency

The desired strategic end state for Moscow was a stable and secure environment that would enable the full integration of western Ukraine into the Soviet Union. This goal required that a set of conditions be met: that the OUN-UPA shadow government be dismantled and individual UPA units be neutralised; that Communist Party organs be reopened across Ukraine and enjoy a monopoly on power and use of force; that the state reassert control over all economic activity, including the reintegration of local communities into collective farms.

Strategy: 1944–47

The Soviet campaign evolved through several phases, each guided by a separate strategic concept. Until March 1947, command authority over the COIN effort rested with Nikita Khrushchev, then the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (KP(b)U). The strategy during this period focused mainly on attrition, the depletion of UPA ranks and the isolation of UPA units from their sources of supply. Although the Red Army entered into sporadic engagements with UPA insurgents in early 1944, when insurgents harassed their rear services, a full-scale campaign against the OUN-UPA was launched only after the assassination of Soviet General Nikolai Vatunin on 29 February 1944. Experiencing a high loss rate against regular army units, OUN-UPA leadership promptly issued a directive to UPA forces, ordering them to avoid engaging in positional battles and to retreat into the forests to wait until the Soviet-German front line had moved further west.

Experience quickly demonstrated that regular Red Army units were ill-suited for anti-guerrilla warfare. Combing operations in forested areas were generally conducted without intelligence preparation of the battlefield and, equipped with poor information on the conditions in their operational areas, army units tended to waste resources with little discernible success. The lead in the COIN campaign was soon transferred to constabulary NKVD units, which focused their efforts on clearing select rural population centres of insurgent activity.

Upon entering a village, NKVD units would blockade the area, impose a curfew and spend several days collecting intelligence on its
residents through aggressive house-to-house searches, pogroms and interrogations. Suspected insurgents were often subject to show trials and public executions, after which their bodies were placed on public display and residents were forbidden from burying them.\textsuperscript{44} Families of individual insurgents were often held hostage as leverage, while the populations of entire villages where active support for insurgents was widespread were deported to other parts of Ukraine and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{45} The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church – often a hub for OUN administrative activity – was banned.\textsuperscript{46} Outposts and roadblocks – usually manned by regular soldiers – were established on all roads and forest trails leading to the villages, thus isolating the insurgents from provisions and critical supplies. Once the areas were secure, the NKVD would comb the outlying forest based on the intelligence it had collected.\textsuperscript{47} Some areas were simply cleared through mass logging and setting of forest fires.\textsuperscript{48} Although this approach resulted in significant losses among active UPA insurgents,\textsuperscript{49} the OUN administrative apparatus and shadow government was left largely unharmed.

\textit{Strategy: 1947–49}

Following intense criticism of his strategy by Chekist leadership in Moscow, Khrushchev was removed from his post in March 1947, and operational and administrative control of the COIN effort was transferred to the Ministries of Internal Affairs (MVD) and State Security (MGB), the successor agencies of the NKVD and People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) respectively. The strategy subsequently shifted from attrition to an effort to deny OUN-UPA its popular support. Informational and intelligence instruments of power became more heavily engaged, as the government sought to intensify its propaganda and counter-propaganda activities, while expanding its network of informants.

Security forces and local administrative authorities organised town and village meetings at which residents were shown films that discredited insurgents as traitors and Nazi collaborators, while extolling the advantages of the Soviet approach to addressing national and socio-economic problems.\textsuperscript{50} Authorities expanded population control measures by redoubling efforts to conduct censuses and issue passports to the local population.\textsuperscript{51} An effort was made to ‘Ukrainise’ the conflict through recruiting local cadres for civilian administrative positions and paramilitary ‘extermination battalions’ and self-defence forces. However, due to local fears of UPA reprisals, Moscow was forced to import Communist Party administrators from other parts of the USSR, relying on inexperienced and undereducated party loyalists with no command of the Ukrainian language and a poor understanding of the local
environment. Meanwhile, more repressive methods continued, particularly in the use of faux-UPA forces, wherein MGB agents dressed as insurgents raided villages in an effort to diminish public support for the OUN-UPA.

**Strategy: Post-1949**

By 1949 the OUN-UPA’s capabilities had been greatly diminished, as evidenced by a high incidence of desertion and suicide among insurgents, a palpable decline in their morale and discipline and even internal revolts against UPA commanders in the field. Nevertheless, COIN planners were frustrated by what they perceived as slow progress and a lack of quantifiable measures of success, and reverted back to a strategy of attrition. Four MGB divisions were deployed to the Carpathians to ‘conclusively liquidate’ OUN-UPA holdouts, inadvertently raising the visibility of the COIN campaign, gaining the attention of the *New York Times* and other Western media outlets and creating an impression that the Soviets were unable to cope with the insurgency.

The MVD and MGB again relied heavily on coercive tactics such as public executions and retributions against families, while plain-clothes MVD forces, disguised as loggers and local workers, intensified patrols of forest areas. Meanwhile, intelligence gradually became the central component of the campaign as the authorities were able to greatly expand their network of informants on the local level, recruiting numerous UPA defectors and captured insurgents who could effectively infiltrate the OUN-UPA apparatus. These improved intelligence assets resulted in heavy losses among UPA leadership, most notably its supreme commander Roman Shukhevych, who was killed in an MVD ambush in March 1950. In July the same year, a directive from the OUN supreme leadership ordered a general demobilisation of UPA units and their integration into the underground civilian network of the OUN.

Barring the occasional terrorist attack and reprisal against Soviet collaborators, in the 1950s the OUN became increasingly an organisation-in-exile, focusing on propaganda efforts and lobbying moral support from the West. In October 1959, OUN supreme leader Stepan Bandera was assassinated by a KGB agent in Munich, Germany, bringing a symbolic end to an already impotent OUN-UPA insurgency.

**Deconstructing the Soviet Campaign**

The OUN-UPA case demonstrates that an authoritarian regime such as the Soviet Union was able to plan and execute COIN campaigns under far fewer restraints (‘must dos’) and constraints (‘cannot dos’) than might have been the case in a more open and democratic political
system, permitting a reliance on coercion as the centrepiece of a COIN strategy. For example, the Soviet government was hardly reluctant to resort to the massive use or demonstration of force where a civilian population was known to reside. It was able to employ mass repression, deportation of the civilian population, coercive interrogation methods and overly intrusive counter-intelligence activities while remaining seemingly invulnerable to levels of domestic and international support for its campaign.

While the absence of these restraints and constraints certainly expanded Moscow’s options as to how it chose to implement its instruments of power, this greater latitude did not always translate into advantage at the strategic level. Rather, it caused the authorities to overlook non-coercive – informational, economic and administrative – instruments of power, and to rely on conventional measures of effectiveness that focused on body counts rather than trends in public attitudes. The fixation on attrition resulted in a COIN approach better suited for a campaign against an insurgency with a military-focus strategy, rather than a strategy of protracted popular war, in which popular support, rather than individual units or cadres, is the strategic centre of gravity.57

The following analysis explores how this lack of restraints and constraints was reflected in the Soviet ability to identify OUN-UPA centres of gravity, and in Moscow’s use of the various instruments of power at its disposal in targeting them.

**Insurgent Centres of Gravity**

More so than in conventional war, centres of gravity (CoGs) for insurgencies are difficult to identify and attack directly. Because the OUN-UPA had an organisational structure based on a strategy of *protracted popular war*, its strategic CoG was popular support.58 This fact placed targeting the hub of the UPA’s power somewhat outside the comfort zone of the Soviet Union, which preferred to target individual UPA units and leaders, as reflected in its fixation on a COIN strategy of attrition.

**Leadership.** The Soviet Union proved effective at the intelligence and information operations (IO) elements of targeting the OUN-UPA leadership, through expanding its surveillance of the population, establishing networks of informants and asserting control over the flow of information to discredit the leadership and foment rivalries. Further, demonstrating relatively little concern for collateral damage and popular sympathies towards the leadership, Moscow acted decisively in
conducting assassinations and isolating enemy forces from their command and control (C2) systems.

Despite these advantages, however, the aggressive and often indiscriminate Soviet effort to root out OUN leadership overlooked the fact that cadres are less important than popular support in sustaining a protracted popular war strategy.\(^{59}\) The resilience of an insurgency after the loss of a centralising headquarters depends in part on the extent of its popular support, the absence of underlying political divisions in the organisation and the ability to plan, coordinate and integrate individual operations independently of higher HQ. Having met most of these conditions, the OUN was able to survive despite the fact that its leadership had been mostly killed or driven into exile by 1949.

Esoteric appeals. As the imperial regime against which OUN’s ideology was aimed, the Soviet Union found it difficult to effectively counter Ukrainian nationalism with a rival ideology of its own.\(^{60}\) Although Marxism-Leninism figured heavily in the IO line of operation, it ultimately proved inadequate among a population with a different institutional memory and set of values and expectations than its counterpart in eastern Ukraine. Some pan-Slavism was used in Soviet propaganda, while other propaganda efforts sought to associate nationalism with the legacy of German Nazism. ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) efforts were also focused on locating insurgent printing presses responsible for the production of nationalist propaganda. However, the effort to undermine esoteric appeals was undermined by a lack of trained linguists and area specialists in the Soviet security services.

The Soviet experience seems to support the argument that authoritarian governments have an advantage in counter-propaganda, since they are less vulnerable to domestic and international backlash in response to the closing of independent printing presses and can thus more easily achieve informational superiority. Although credibility, legitimacy and sensitivity to local attitudes are all important in waging an effective battle of ideas, the ability to focus ISR and IO efforts on simply silencing insurgent propaganda activities – a strength of authoritarian systems – may have proved more decisive in the Soviet case.

Exoteric appeals. Because the OUN-UPA was unable to address specific socio-economic grievances of the western Ukrainian population, its use of exoteric appeals to gain support was a critical vulnerability (CV) to be exploited by the Soviet administrative and economic apparatus. In an economically underdeveloped region such as western Ukraine,
development of essential services and economic diversification had the potential of addressing many underlying social grievances.

Although Soviet central planners were able to rapidly mobilise economic resources, they were not always able to manage these resources in a meaningful and effective way. A doctrinaire fixation on collectivisation persisted unfettered by widespread public opposition, while extreme population control measures such as forcible relocation were implemented without significant economic incentives in the new area of settlement. Indeed, the UPA case suggests that insensitivity to local needs and the resultant inability to correctly identify and adjust development priorities can ultimately outweigh the benefits of central economic planning and even exacerbate popular grievances.

Terrorism. As the UPA came to rely increasingly on terrorism as a coercive means for gaining support and discouraging collaboration with Soviet authorities, use of this tactic became a critical vulnerability due to the decline in sympathy it caused among the population. Able to employ stringent population control measures with relatively little concern for political backlash and preservation of individual freedoms, the Soviet Union was well-positioned to effectively prevent terrorist attacks. The Soviets conducted patrols aimed at discovering insurgent bunkers, intensified perimeter defence of key infrastructure and population centres, applied some administrative measures such as the hardening of civilian infrastructure, conducted censuses, distributed ID cards and publicised terrorist atrocities. However, the Soviet experience also demonstrated that these same enabling factors may just as easily cause a government to overreact through the kinds of reprisals that terrorist incidents are intended to provoke, while overly restrictive population control can create a strong desire for a return to normalcy.

Provocation of government reprisals. Soviet excesses demonstrated that a lack of restraints regarding the use of indiscriminate force and harsh interrogation methods can bolster the ability of insurgents to exploit government reprisals. Because the Soviet Union was not under a great deal of pressure to avoid or – at a minimum – promptly investigate and denounce such incidents, it was not very effective at creating a greater sense of accountability and restraint among its ranks. Instead, the USSR conducted an IO campaign that sought to publicise the insurgents’ own reprisals against civilians, thus denying the enemy the moral high ground. While effective at shaping public attitudes outside western Ukraine, such propaganda did little to change local perceptions of the COIN effort.
Demonstrations of potency. The UPA’s inability to sustain military victories against Soviet forces was a critical vulnerability, which the Soviets exploited directly through combat operations backed by reliable intelligence, and indirectly by cutting UPA units off from their sources of supply. However, because insurgencies like the UPA typically seek to avoid the kind of positional warfare that the Soviets and most regular armies would prefer to engage in, the inability to conduct effective small unit operations was a critical Soviet weakness. The Soviet experience was not unlike that of many authoritarian regimes, in which initiative at lower levels is often intentionally inhibited to prevent coup attempts, to offset poor officer quality, or both. In the Soviet case, this tendency served to undermine the flexibility and adaptability needed for successfully fighting a small and evasive enemy.61

Coercion. To counter UPA coercion as a tool of recruitment and intimidation, the Soviet Union conducted combat operations to frustrate insurgent conscription, limited access to population centres, publicised insurgent reprisals and focused ISR efforts on identifying possible insurgents. In doing so, however, the Soviets also came to rely on their own coercive methods, which often aggravated the population’s sense of insecurity. While many informants, or stukachy, willingly cooperated with authorities, countless others were seduced or intimidated into providing both accurate and false information. Inevitably, the extent of the Soviet informant network also compelled OUN-SB counter-intelligence units to redouble their efforts to punish collaborators and deter others.62

Instruments of Power

The Soviet Union committed significant and diverse resources to its fight against OUN-UPA insurgents. Security forces included regular Red Army units, the irregular forces of the NKVD and NKGB, Soviet partisans, local law enforcement and irregular ‘extermination battalions’ consisting of pro-Soviet western Ukrainians and reformed UPA deserters. Other components of the COIN campaign involved NKVD and NKGB intelligence and SMERSH (‘death to spies’) military counter-intelligence, as well as informational, administrative and economic instruments of national power.63

Security forces. The Soviet experience in Ukraine was characterised by a disproportionate reliance on the military instrument of power, to include both regular and irregular units. While the strategy and tactics employed by the UPA at times necessitated a massive mobilisation of
military resources, the relative lack of restraints and constraints facing
the Soviet Union encouraged an overly heavy-handed and indiscriminate
approach. These excesses prevented the local population from sensing a
return to normalcy, thus overshadowing non-military activities such as
administrative capacity-building and economic development that would
otherwise have reinforced the legitimacy of the government.64

A prime example of this effect was the use of faux-UPA units by the
MGB, the predecessor of the KGB. MGB forces, dressed as UPA
insurgents, conducted raids on villages and subjected ‘suspected Soviet
collaborators’ to torture, rape and executions, in an effort to diminish
public support for the OUN-UPA. However, due to a number of
distinguishing cultural and linguistic traits, these units were often
immediately recognised as Soviet agents, while in other instances these
operations created a sense that Soviet forces were unable to effectively
protect the population from UPA reprisals.65 In 1949 a top secret
memorandum from the Military Prosecutor for Ukraine described such
tactics as ‘blatantly provocative and imprudent … not only [do the
tactics] not make the efforts against banditry any easier, but, quite the
opposite, [they] complicate them, undermining the authority of Soviet
law and unquestionably harming socialist development in western
regions of Ukraine’.66

As a totalitarian political system, the USSR was largely immune to the
kind of political and ideological discord that can become a critical
vulnerability for COIN efforts in democratic regimes, resulting in
paralysis, haphazard behaviour and failure to share critical intelli-
gence.67 However, the UPA case demonstrated that lack of political
debate is by itself insufficient in guaranteeing unity of effort. Rather,
unity of effort also requires adequate training, discipline and the ability
to link tasks on the tactical level to strategic and operational objectives.
The Soviet experience demonstrated that no level of centralisation can
certainty that this connection will be made at lower levels.

The Soviet case is a reminder that a poorly trained force can easily
become frustrated in the face of an asymmetric threat for which they are
doctrinally unprepared, just as the Red Army, trained for large-scale
conventional operations, tended to revert to the kind of large-scale
violence that was much more within its comfort zone.68 The Soviets
learned quickly that, until the development of regular army cadres better
trained for low-intensity warfare, irregular forces should be employed
whenever possible in patrols and in the pursuit and destruction of
insurgent units, while regular units should be reserved for occasional
large-unit operations.

Discipline, however, proved a critical vulnerability for regular and
irregular units alike. Despite the efforts of feared Soviet political officers
in instilling better discipline, multiple recorded incidents of drunken,
lewd and criminal behaviour characterised the Soviet COIN campaign in western Ukraine, predictably resulting in a drop in public support among even the most Soviet-friendly elements of the local population. Soviet failure in this area shakes the assumption that authoritarian regimes are inherently well-positioned to raise disciplined troops.

Although a lack of well-educated servicemen in the Soviet Army and NKVD was in part a result of mass Second World War mobilisation, this fact similarly reinforced the insurgents’ stereotype of Soviet forces as having little appreciation for local customs. According to official figures, of 1,327 NKVD employees in the Rivne Oblast in north-western Ukraine, only ten had completed post-secondary education and the vast majority had never previously lived or served in Ukraine. The Soviets had tried to offset this challenge by recruiting Ukrainian speakers from central and eastern Ukraine as linguists, while similarly targeting sympathetic western Ukrainians as possible recruits.

Force protection was an important challenge in the enclosed and tough terrain of western Ukraine, which was well-suited for insurgent ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. In such a physical environment, force protection assets such as heavy armour compromised the mobility needed for the entrapment, dissection, pursuit and destruction of light UPA units, while the requirements for combat escort of rear services convoys and protection of long and tenuous lines of communication (LOCs) threatened to result in a large, static defence force. The terrain was a factor that not even the Soviets’ best efforts to clear forested areas through mass logging could overcome.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. As a totalitarian regime that maintained its political power and regulated social activity in large part through the use of mass surveillance and networks of informants, the Soviet Union had the institutional capacity and freedom of action to create an exceptionally invasive system for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection. However, the reliance on HUMINT and harsh interrogations also presented a critical vulnerability.

Due to a number of factors, including terrain and the UPA’s tendency to mix with the civilian population, options for aerial and electronic reconnaissance and surveillance were limited, thus making HUMINT collection efforts essential. Meanwhile, the counter-intelligence activities of OUN-SB were squarely focused on reprisals against informants and their families, thus placing the lives of local agents in constant danger. Aimed at diminishing this fear and increasing the amount of information volunteered by locals, offers of amnesty were extended to defectors and captured insurgents. However, the Soviet tendency to renege on offers of amnesty and to subject insurgent
defectors to punitive measures resulted in a tendency among potential defectors to commit suicide or otherwise resist capture by authorities. Indeed, the proportion of insurgents voluntarily surrendering to Soviet authorities (as opposed to those killed in action or captured) declined from 32 per cent to 16 per cent between 1945 and 1946. Because of the unlikelihood of their being exposed by independent media outlets, Soviet leaders were under little pressure to keep their promises of amnesty credible.

Due to a lack of restraints and constraints, many Soviet intelligence collection efforts were characterised by detentions for indefinite periods of time without formal charge, torture, mass disappearances and other abuses. Although such methods undoubtedly produced some good intelligence, they were also a critical vulnerability for friendly forces, since information obtained while the subject is under extreme duress can often be unreliable and because such methods provided invaluable ammunition for insurgent propaganda. Soviet use of such methods was in part a result of systemic weaknesses; political pressure to produce quick results encouraged inadequate vetting procedures for new agents, inviting infiltrators and mole-hunts, while preferred Soviet measures of effectiveness – numbers of kills and detentions – were easily inflated through unnecessary detentions or even outright fabrication. Moreover, due to a reliance on excessive techniques, Soviet authorities were less inclined to encourage avenues for anonymous tips, which can be crucial in an environment in which informants – voluntary or involuntary – become natural targets for reprisals.

Informational. Because it was able to easily attain information superiority through direct control of media outlets, the Soviet government had an inherent advantage in information operations (IO). However, this advantage was partially offset by insularity from negative feedback and an inability to identify proper audiences and the best means of reaching them. Mostly invulnerable to unfavourable press coverage and without channels for corrective feedback, the Soviet Union had no incentive to provide timely and articulate official responses to negative reports. This effectively lent the IO campaign a sense of detachment from local attitudes, while not encouraging better discipline among the security forces.

In a rural region such as western Ukraine, where illiteracy rates were high and Soviet government media sources were seen by some as illegitimate, word of mouth was an effective means of delivering many messages. This required a certain degree of local credibility and influence among those verbally transmitting the message, which was not always possible. The USSR placed a premium on centralised control of
messages and only rarely would grant significant initiative to local agents. As a result, the messages were not always locally relevant, while the messengers themselves – whether local administrators, security forces or members of the community – were often perceived as simply restating Moscow’s talking points.

Administrative. In the administrative line of operation, Soviet objectives focused on restoring and developing essential services such as water, electricity, education, transportation, medicine and sanitation, thus integrating the restive region into the USSR. Because a key insurgent aim was to frustrate post-war reconstruction efforts, protection of civilian infrastructure from sabotage was a key challenge in western Ukraine, requiring the organisation of perimeter defence of critical infrastructure, LOCs and population centres.78

While security justifiably proved to be a prerequisite for administrative capacity-building, the Soviets sometimes inadvertently approached this integrated effort as a trade-off. Due to its relative reliance on combat and intelligence lines of operation, Moscow would often overlook the importance of essential services or the effect of a coercion-centric approach on perceptions towards this line of operation. In effect, otherwise successful Soviet efforts to industrialise western Ukraine and eradicate illiteracy were overshadowed by NKVD excesses and abuses.79

Economic. In an economically depressed region such as western Ukraine, a lack of development and legitimate employment opportunities created a fertile environment for insurgent propaganda and recruitment efforts. Because it had a monopoly on economic activity and job creation, the Soviet government was well-positioned to stimulate local economic development. Moscow was unable to fully capitalise on this advantage, however, due to a lack of security on the ground and a lack of imagination among central planners.

In an atmosphere of OUN-UPA reprisals against Soviet collaborators, the physical security of workers was a critical requirement for economic development. To diminish the effect of OUN-UPA coercion and reprisals, the Soviet government increased patrols of population centres, while controlling access to the villages through roadblocks and perimeter defence.

Once a certain degree of security had been established, western Ukraine still presented challenges for economic development, including the diversification of economic activity and job creation away from a traditionally agrarian economy, the introduction of manufacturing, services and industry, and training and education programmes aimed at
giving the locals the skills needed to succeed in more diverse urban economic centres and other regions of the USSR. This, in turn, would have reduced the need for forced relocation of mass segments of the population. However, the Soviet system placed extensive restrictions on civilian movement and relocation, through the institution of *propisky* (place of residence registrations) and other tools.

Soviet efforts to prioritise collectivisation in 1939 and 1944–45 only served to reinforce UPA propaganda, as forcible collectivisation was among the key grievances exploited by insurgents. These efforts were implemented without regard for the fact that western Ukraine was only recently incorporated into the Soviet Union, and were met with a great deal of resistance. The ideological blinders that convinced the Soviets that collectivisation was an integral part of their strategic end state were reinforced by the lack of a forum for the local population to express their grievances and concerns.

**Putting It All Together**

An analysis of the Soviet campaign against the OUN-UPA allows one to make several observations on the advantages and disadvantages of the authoritarian model of counter-insurgency. In planning and executing counter-insurgency campaigns, authoritarian regimes operate under relatively few restraints and constraints, resulting in great leverage and a tightly controlled operating environment. Because they perceive themselves as being less vulnerable to domestic and international public opinion, authoritarian regimes can operate with great freedom of action in areas where a civilian population is known to reside, and are under relatively little pressure to use minimum force to accomplish the mission.

Authoritarian systems can impose highly effective population control measures, placing extensive restrictions on civilian movement in the operational area. Such regimes are likely to possess the institutional capacity and freedom of action to create a broad and invasive system for surveillance and human intelligence collection, and can readily employ aggressive interrogation methods.

In information operations, closed political systems are well-positioned to attain information dominance and have little incentive to respond to press criticism and negative feedback.

On a broader level, authoritarian regimes are far less susceptible to political and ideological discord and gridlock than are democratic regimes, permitting consistent political decisions and common strategic guidance.

However, as demonstrated by the Soviet experience against the UPA, authoritarian regimes are likely to rely on coercion as the centrepiece of
a COIN strategy, becoming inclined to employ indiscriminate force, mass repression, relocation and invasive intelligence and counter-intelligence methods. This can cause the government to rely on attrition and misleading measures of effectiveness, while underestimating the utility of non-military instruments of power, thus delaying a sense of a return to normalcy and creating an impression that key material grievances are not being addressed.

The Soviet experience suggests that a COIN campaign designed under greater restraints and constraints could actually have resulted in better awareness and responsiveness to public expectations and demands, encouraged greater flexibility and innovation at the small unit level and promoted the identification of performance gaps at the tactical level.

In the area of operational design, while authoritarian regimes face fewer restraints and constraints in directly attacking insurgent centres of gravity, they can become easily susceptible to ideological and cognitive blinders. This observation challenges Trinquier’s general assertion that totalitarian governments are necessarily more effective at identifying enemy exploitable factors.80

Authoritarian regimes are also characterised by a relative lack of channels for corrective feedback – whether from commanders in the field or from the public. Planners risk becoming insensitive to popular attitudes and fail to take into account the effects of COIN operations on levels of popular support.

Although the intelligence potential of authoritarian governments is undoubtedly significant, information obtained through the employment of harsh techniques can be quite unreliable. Widespread use of such methods can also provide invaluable ammunition for insurgent propaganda.

Authoritarian regimes will also not necessarily be successful at information operations, as government-run media risk being perceived as illegitimate, while lack of feedback weakens the government’s ability to correctly identify audiences and messages.

As evidenced by the Soviet experience in western Ukraine, the advantages authoritarian and totalitarian governments enjoy in designing, planning and implementing counter-insurgency campaigns can all too easily become reversed through the excesses they permit. To characterise all of these advantages and disadvantages as unique to authoritarian political systems, however, would be analytically unfair.

A misreading of insurgent strategy and improper identification of enemy centres of gravity can be a problem for authoritarian and democratic regimes alike.81 Democracies can similarly misread the nature of the insurgencies they are fighting and rely on unreliable measures of effectiveness.82 A low domestic political tolerance for friendly casualties can also lead democratic governments to place a
heavy emphasis on coercive instruments of power and force protection, resulting in rapid escalation and disproportionate retaliation.\textsuperscript{83} However, one advantage of a more open political system is that planners become more sensitive to popular attitudes, and are compelled to investigate transgressions and take corrective measures.\textsuperscript{84}

Since most military organisations are path-dependent bureaucracies with parochial interests and priorities, neither regime type has a clear advantage in instituting significant changes to training and doctrine, although a democratic regime would arguably be under greater political pressure to do so.\textsuperscript{83}

Democratic governments also do not necessarily have an advantage in small unit tactics, and can often overlook their importance.\textsuperscript{86} Meanwhile, some authoritarian governments have been superb at decentralised operations, and have encouraged initiative and flexibility at lower levels.\textsuperscript{87}

Although the more extreme interrogation methods used by the USSR – such as detainee abuse, hostage-taking and execution of family members – are beyond the scope of what is normally permitted by the legislation of most democratic regimes, democracies have undoubtedly also employed questionable interrogation techniques. However, open political systems also create an environment in which concerns regarding the utility of such methods are regularly voiced and debated, and planners are significantly more constrained by what is deemed acceptable by public opinion.\textsuperscript{88}

**Directions for Future Research**

A comprehensive understanding of the relationship between regime type and the effectiveness of a counter-insurgency campaign naturally requires research and analysis that reach beyond the explanatory power of a single case study. Although the OUN-UPA case enables one to identify many of the distinguishing characteristics of the authoritarian approach, as well as some of its strengths and weaknesses, the model can be refined further with lessons from additional case studies of authoritarian campaigns against insurgencies employing a *protracted popular war* strategy, including the Russian and Soviet efforts to suppress the Basmachi Revolt in Central Asia after the First World War, the German campaign against Yugoslav guerrillas in 1941–43, Myanmar’s struggle against the Kachin Independent Army, the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan’s actions against the Balochistan Liberation Army and Saddam Hussein’s Al-Anfal campaign against the Kurds.

To identify which factors in each campaign could be directly attributed to regime type, a comparative analysis would need to be conducted against democratic counter-insurgencies, including US efforts
in the Philippines, Vietnam and Iraq; UK efforts in Northern Ireland, Burma and Malaya; and the French campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale in Algeria. In selecting additional cases of counter-insurgencies, a distinction would need to be made between domestic counter-insurgencies and foreign internal defence, as each presents a different kind of challenge and requires different mechanisms and levels of commitment. Research on the relationship between regime type and constraints in counter-insurgency could also be linked to the study of war outcomes, thus examining if and how authoritarian excesses may impact odds of counter-insurgency success.

The implications of such an analytical effort would have significant policy relevance for the United States, in helping to gauge the potential effectiveness of US allies and partners fighting insurgencies linked to al-Qaeda. Many of these countries exhibit traits similar to those of Soviet forces in western Ukraine, and some of the patterns seen in the UPA case are likely to reappear. By being better able to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the authoritarian approach to counter-insurgency, the US can adjust its expectations and refocus its assistance in a more effective manner. The preceding analysis should be read as but one part of a broader effort to enhance our understanding in this area.

NOTES

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the official position of National Defence University, the Department of Defense or the US Government.

1. Studies that have examined the relationship between regime type and military effectiveness in conventional wars include Biddle and Long, ‘Democracy and Military Effectiveness’; Biddle and Zirkle, ‘Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare’; Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes; Filson and Werner, ‘Bargaining and Fighting’; Garrzek, ‘Democracy and the Preparation for War’; Reiter and Stam, Democracies at War; Reiter and Stam, ‘Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness’. For an alternate perspective, see Desch, ‘Democracy and Victory’. A widespread view in this literature is that while authoritarian civil-military relations are an advantage for COIN, they are a disadvantage for major combat.

2. See Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars; Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships, and Counterinsurgency’.

3. ‘Combat operations must therefore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to minimize or avoid injuring innocent people. . . . Needless harming innocents can turn the populace against the COIN effort’: US Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, pp.5–12.

4. The term ‘authoritarian’ is used here to denote a regime characterized by the habitual use of coercive measures as a means to enforce strict obedience to the chief executive. This can be distinguished from the term ‘autocratic’, which implies, in part, a lack of institutional constraints on executive recruitment and decision-making, but does address directly state behaviour and propensity toward the use of coercion.


8. Byman, ‘Going to War with the Allies You Have’, p.18.

9. This emphasis on restraint was also shared by Kitson, who wrote that counter-insurgents should generally ‘avoid the use of force as far as possible, and for as long as possible, because of
the adverse effect it is bound to have on public opinion'. Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, p.70; Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*; Cohen et al., ‘Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency’.

10. For clarification of terms, OUN will be used in referring to the solely political branch of the movement, UPA in discussing the military organisation and OUN-UPA in discussing the entire network collectively.

11. In organising this analysis, this section makes extensive use of the analytical framework provided by Bard O’Neill in his 1990 book *Insurgency and Terrorism*.

12. ‘Postanovy Velikoho Zboru’; ‘Akt vidnovlennya’


14. Henceforth, all references to OUN, unless otherwise noted, refer to Stepan Bandera’s OUN-B faction.


23. ‘OUN-UPA: Orhanizatsiya’.

24. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church recognises the authority of the Moscow Patriarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church.

25. Myasnikov, ‘Cherez Revolyutsionnyi Terror’.


28. Ibid.


32. Poltava, ‘Kto Takie’, p.44.


34. Myasnikov, ‘Cherez Revolyutsionnyi Terror’.


37. Ibid., p.44.


40. Soviet thinking on counter-insurgency was based in part on precepts laid out in 1926 by Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Tukhachevsky in an article published in *Voina i Revolyutsiya* entitled ‘Struggle against the Counterrevolutionary Uprising’. Most controversially, Tukhachevsky advocated the application of the principle of collective guilt, through evicting and detaining insurgents’ relatives and local communities and seizing and redistributing their property. Tukhachevsky, ‘Bor’ba s Kontrrevolyutsionnym Vosstaniem’, p.10; Beckett, *The Roots of Counterinsurgency*, pp.100–1.

41. Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.

42. Of 3,753 operations conducted in all seven *oblasts* of western Ukraine in July 1946, 2,813 or 75 per cent produced ‘no results whatsoever’. The vast majority of operations resulted in no contact or disarmament of the individual unit. Burds, ‘Agentura’, p.123.

43. Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.

44. Khrushchev, ‘Lyst M. Khrushcheva’.
45. 175,063 persons had been deported, mainly to Siberia and Kazakhstan, between 1944 and 1952. Of these, between 75 per cent to 84 per cent were women and children under the age of 15: ‘Dovidka NKVS URSR pro hid puhotovchoi’; ‘Dopovidna sekretarya’; Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.


47. Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.


49. Declassified Soviet figures show an impressive loss rate among insurgents: in 1944–46: 476,360 ‘bandits and others’ had been killed in action (23 per cent), detained (53 per cent) or turned themselves in (24 per cent). ‘Dovidka NKVS URSR pro borot’bu’.


52. Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.

53. ‘Dopovidna zapiska’.

54. Koval, ‘Organizatsiya Ukrainskikh Natsionalistov’, p.73


58. Ibid., p.72.


61. The negative impact of this phenomenon on military effectiveness in conventional wars has been highlighted in several studies of the Iraqi Army during Operation Iraqi Freedom. See Woods et al., ‘Iraqi Perspectives Project’ and the excerpts summarised in Woods et al., ‘Saddam’s Delusions’.

62. For a recent treatment of how the use of violence by insurgents and governments affects the supply of informants see Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*.

63. Tkachenko, *Povstancheskaya Armiya*, ch.5.


65. ‘Dopovidna zapiska’.

66. Ibid.


68. Ibid., p.141.


70. Ibid.


75. Myasnikov, ‘Cherez Revolyutsionnyi Terror’.

76. For an account of the weaknesses of the Soviet ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) effort in Ukraine, see Burds, ‘Agentura’.


81. For example, the international systemic dynamics of the Cold War led the US to overemphasise Communist involvement as a key enabler of Third World insurgencies. See Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms*; ‘Spetsdonesennyu narkoma’, pp.108, 112.

82. This is demonstrated in Vietnam, where Headway Reports published by U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) tended to emphasise misleading indicators such as enemy losses, numbers of strategic hamlets and frequency of insurgent attacks, in lieu of trends in public support for the VietCong insurgency. See Kaiser, *American Tragedy*, pp.202–8. A fixation on targeting leadership and cadres rather than winning public support is also vividly demonstrated by Israel’s March 2004 assassination of Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
US ROEs (rules of engagement) in Vietnam and Iraq have attracted much criticism. See Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, p.200; Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’.

The Department of the Navy’s recent investigation into the murders of Iraqi civilians at Haditha is but one example of how democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to charges of misconduct.

The recent creation of a Counterinsurgency Center in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the development of a new COIN Army Field Manual are both examples of such institutional change in the US.

Although the British recognised the utility of small units in discovering and fighting insurgents in Malaya, this was not the case with US forces in Vietnam. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, pp.194–5.

The German tradition of Auftragstaktik is a notable example of this decentralised approach, wherein subordinate commanders made decisions based on their understanding of the commander’s intent, even if their actions violated other guidance and orders. This resulted in shorter decision cycles and greater flexibility. See Doughty, *The Breaking Point*, pp.31–2.

As demonstrated by the ongoing debate in the US over treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.

References


Byman, Daniel. ‘Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism’, *Strategic Studies Institute*, Nov. 2005.


Dopovidna sekretarya Chernivetskoho obkому KP(b)U V. Vovka sekretarevi TsK KP(b)U L. Kaganovychu pro vyselennya simei chleniv OUN u zhovtni 1947 roku [Information from the KP(b)U Secretary of Chernivtsi oblast to Secretary of CCKP(b)U L. Kaganovych on the resettlement of OUN members’ families as of October 1947]. Top secret [declassified], 31 Oct.

Dopovidna zapiska vis'kovoho prokurora vis'k MVC Ukrains'koho okrugu pro fakty gruboho porushennya radyans'koi zakonnosti v diyal'nosti tak zvannyakh spetsgrupp MDB [Briefing note from MVD military prosecutor in Ukrainian District on flagrant violation of civil law in the activities of so-called MGB spets-groups], 4/001345, top secret [declassified], 15 Feb. 1949, In Banderovshchina, edited by A. Andreev and S. Shumov. Moscow: Eksmo, 2005, pp. 213–23.


Sluzhba bezopasnosti OUN(b) [OUN(B) Security Service], available at http://oun-upa.org.ua/articles/sb.html [accessed 16 October 2007].


Tukhachevsky, Mikhail. ‘Bor’ba s kontrrevolyutsionnym vosstaniem [Struggle against the counterrevolutionary uprising]’, *Voина и Революция*, Vol. 7/8, 1926, p. 10.


