Online Appendix for Expertise, Networks, and Interpersonal Influence in Congress

A Dichotomization of Cosponsorship

The key effect of interest is an interaction between the connection variable (a dichotomous measure of the level of cosponsorship) and the expertise variable (a late committee assignment). My decision to dichotomize the cosponsorship count comports with the set of best practices for analyzing multiplicative interactions offered by Hainmueller et al. (2018). They focus on two concerns. First, the interaction effect may not be linear. Second, there may be not be full support for the data, and consequently some inferences may be predicated on extrapolation rather than observed data.

Using a binary variable with a copartisanship-dependent threshold of cosponsorship as the measure of connection is a simple form of binning. The estimated dichotomized effect averages the effect over all levels of cosponsorship greater than or equal to the threshold minus the effect averaged over all levels of cosponsorship less than threshold. This dichotomization-based averaging is more useful and more credible than imposing a strong linearity assumption. Moreover, this binning ensures that the estimated coefficient reflects a comparison between high-cosponsorship pairs and low-cosponsorship pairs. In a regression with a count variable instead of the dichotomized measure, the coefficient would be heavily influenced by the far more numerous low-cosponsorship pairs, and might capture the local relationship between cosponsorship and agreement within the low-cosponsorship pairs rather than the desired comparison between high- and low-cosponsorship pairs.

Whenever a count variable is dichotomized, there is always a legitimate concern that the choice of threshold influences the substantive results. Fortunately, the core results that I present throughout this analysis hold for a variety of thresholds: 8 for copartisans and 4 for opposite-party pairs as well as 12 for copartisans and 6 for opposite-party pairs. Moreover, the results from these dichotomized analyses are related to one another in a predictable fashion. A more stringent threshold leads to a larger but less precisely estimated effect.

The issue of full support is an empirical question that can be assessed from the data. This is straightforward because both the treatment and the moderator are both binary. There are 53,547 pairs where there is no expertise and no connection, 67,742 pairs where there is expertise but no connection, 1,645 pairs where there is a connection but not expertise, and 2,196 pairs where there is both a connection

Table 1: Effect of Connection, Expertise, and Copartisanship on Change in Agreement

	8-4		12-6	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Expertise	0.0044	0.0092	0.0048	0.0097
	(0.0049)	(0.0053)	(0.0049)	(0.0053)
Connected	−0.0085	−0.0167	−0.0159	−0.0200
	(0.0077)	(0.0087)	(0.0106)	(0.0116)
Expertise × Connected	0.0192*		0.0350*	
	(0.0088)		(0.0126)	
Expertise × Connected × Copartisans		0.0115		0.0244*
		(0.0086)		(0.0111)
Expertise × Connected × Not Copartisans		0.0346*		0.0465*
		(0.0154)		(0.0213)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0114*	−0.0158*	−0.0114*	−0.0163
	(0.0055)	(0.0059)	(0.0055)	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0047	0.0096	0.0002	0.0120
	(0.0096)	(0.0109)	(0.0128)	(0.0159)
N		125130		

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table presents the same analysis as Table 2 with different thresholds for who is connected in the network.

and expertise.[1] The smallest of these cells is large enough to support statistical inference, even considering the non-independence of observations due to the dyadic structure of the data set.

In addition to the several dichotomizations that produce the same results, repeating the analysis on the raw count of cosponsorships nearly preserves the results, with the cosponsorship variable truncated at 15 to address the rightward skew of cosponsorship counts. Table 2 repeats the main analysis with the raw count of cosponsorships rather than a dichotomized network connection variable. In the baseline model, the cosponsorship expertise interaction is statistically significant at the 5% level. Breaking it out by copartisanship, it is statistically significant at the 5% level for opposite-party pairs and very nearly statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 2 ($p < 0.105$) for copartisan pairs. Of course, it may be desirable to take a transformation of the cosponsorship variable to account for decreasing marginal returns to cosponsorship, but I do not pursue this analysis further because I have already offered such a transformation with the dichotomizations above

[1]The asymmetry across treatment bins post-matching because some pairs were used in multiple matches. To account for the fact that the error terms for both of these observations are necessarily the same, these recurrences is encoded as weights.

Table 2: Results with Cosponsorhip as a Count Variable

	Model 1	Model 2
Expertise	0.0051	0.0041
	(0.0050)	(0.0051)
Cosponsorship Count	−0.0018	−0.0028*
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
Expertise × Cosponsorship Count	0.0016*	
	(0.0006)	
Expertise × Cosponsorship Count × Copartisans		0.0010
		(0.0006)
Expertise × Cosponsorship Count × Not Copartisans		0.0037*
		(0.0017)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0129*	−0.0108
	(0.0057)	(0.0059)
Cosponsorship Count × Copartisans	−0.0007	0.0021*
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
N	125130	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: The analysis in this table uses the same data set (i.e. the same set of matched pairs) as Table 2, but does not dichotomize on the cosponsorship variable.

B Interference Between Units

No interference, that is, that the treatment assignment of any one unit does not influence the potential outcome of any other unit, is a standard assumption in causal inference and is implicit in my difference-in-differences design. However, because of the dyadic structure of my data set, interference between units poses a potential threat to this research design. Suppose there is a non-zero cue-taking effect. Then legislators who are connected to the cue-giver change their votes on some bills as a consequence of cue-taking. However, these legislators may also appear in control pairs. This raises the possibility that the presence of cue-taking also affects the agreement rate in the control pairs. This threat is not particularly damaging in my study. Only 5.0% of control pairs include a legislator who is connected to the legislator in the treated pair. Regressing the number of cue-takers in each control pair on the change in agreement rate for the control pair (with the same covariates included in the main model), I find that the presence of cue-takers in the control pairs decreases the agreement rate in the controls by 0.04%. This effect is orders of magnitude smaller than the treatment effects I find in the analysis in the main paper, so even if there is interference between units, its influence over the results is negligible.

C Tables with All Non-Fixed Effects Covariates

The tables presented in the main results omitted some theoretically uninteresting control variables for brevity. They are reported in the tables below.

D Sensitivity to Alternative Sources of Cues

In the main analysis, the use of a first-differences for the outcome controls for sources of cues who are present before and after the cue-giver's assignment to the committee, but this still leaves the possibility that alternative sources of cues who joined their committees at the same time influence the agreement rate between the cue-giver and the cue-taker. This raises the possibility that the estimate of the cue-taking effect is confounded by these alternative sources of cues. If the estimated effect of the cue-giver is β, the true influence of the cue-giver can be estimated as $\frac{\beta}{1+\#\text{ Alt Sources}[Pr(Agree_{i,\text{alt}})-Pr(Disagree_{i,\text{alt}})]}$. The difference in probabilities accounts for the fact that the alternative sources' votes sometimes point in the same direction (exaggerating the influence of i's cues) and sometimes in the opposite (understating the influence of i's cues).

The number of alternative sources of cues can be estimated according to the following formula:

$$\#\text{ Same Committee} + \#\text{ Other Committees} \times (\#\text{ of Referrals} - 1)$$

where the number of same committee refers to the number of legislators to whom j is connected that also join the committee during t and "# Other Committees" is similarly defined. t is 0.88 in the House and 1.15 in the Senate. The average agreement rate in the House is 69% and in the Senate is 67%, and these can be used to calculate the difference between the probability of agreeing and the probability of disagreeing. Accounting for this source of confounding leaves a true effect 75% as large in the House and 72% as large in the Senate. The substantive conclusions of the paper are therefore robust to this potential confounder.

However, there are other more difficult to analyze factors that could lead the estimate to understate the true effect of cue-taking. Chief among them are (1) that committee joiners are junior, less-established members of the committee who have had less time to hone their expertise, and (2) that cues probably have decreasing marginal returns and the estimated effect is a marginal effect. I do not pursue these further because my purpose is not to precisely estimate the total effect of cue-taking, but rather to show that it is considerable and robust across contexts. The present analysis achieves this purpose without wrangling with these complications.

E Robustness of Polarization Analysis to Other Cutpoints

Table 4 employed a cutpoint at the 104th Congress, the point of the Gingrich Revolution, to compare cue-taking in an era of high polarization to cue-taking in an era of lower polarization. Table 9 considers the robustness of this finding to nearby thresholds. When the 103rd Congress is used as the threshold, there is a positive and statistically significant cue-taking coefficient for congresses before and after the cutpoint. For the remainder, the coefficient is only statistically significant on the side that has more data, but the point estimates remain positive and large. All point estimates are within one standard deviation of the point estimates in Table 4..

F Using DW-NOMINATE To Measure Polarization

In the main paper, the test of polarization relies on the common proposition that partisan polarization was higher in the 1990s and the 21st century than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. These analyses use time as a proxy for partisan polarization (and other simultaneous processes, such as legislators spending progressively less time in Washington). I opt to use the time proxy in the main analysis precisely because it allows me to show cue-taking has survived these other changes that have swept over Congress in recent decades, but it is also worthwhile to consider more direct measures of polarization. Table 10 uses a popular measure of polarization: the distance between the party means of the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal (2000)'s DW-NOMINATE.[2] I classify a congress as low polarization if the difference is below its median value for the relevant chamber; otherwise, I classify the congress as high polarization. The cue-taking coefficient is positively significant for both congresses with low polarization and congresses with high polarization.

References

Hainmueller, J., J. Mummolo, and Y. Xu (2018). How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? simple tools to improve empirical practice. `https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2739221`.

Poole, K. T. and H. Rosenthal (2000). *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

[2]Since the purpose of this exercise is just to illustrate consistency with my preferred measures, I do not delve into the complications of getting standard errors for DW-NOMINATE and propagating these forward into the analysis.

Table 3: Effect of Connection, Expertise, and Copartisanship on Change in Agreement

	Model 1	Model 2
Expertise	0.0047	0.0094
	(0.0049)	(0.0053)
Connected	−0.0103	−0.0183
	(0.0087)	(0.0096)
Expertise × Connected	0.0285*	
	(0.0103)	
Expertise × Connected × Copartisans		0.0136
		(0.0096)
Expertise × Connected × Not Copartisans		0.0452*
		(0.0184)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0114*	−0.0159*
	(0.0055)	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0065	0.0134
	(0.0105)	(0.0131)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0002*	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0003	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0001	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0001	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0001	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	0.0000	−0.0001*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
N	125130	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table is identical to Table 2 with additional covariates reported.

Table 4: Intercameral Differences in Cue-Taking

	Model 1
Expertise	0.0102
	(0.0053)
Connected	−0.0057
	(0.0079)
Expertise × Connected × House	0.0236*
	(0.0112)
Expertise × Connected × Senate	0.0437
	(0.0241)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0167*
	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0037
	(0.0108)
Expertise × Senate	0.0030
	(0.0160)
Connected × Senate	−0.0143
	(0.0188)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0000)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000
	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001
	(0.0000)
N	125130

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This Table is identical to Table 3 with additional covariates reported.

Table 5: The Robustness of Cue-Taking to Recent Changes in Congress

	Model 1
Expertise	0.0108
	(0.0058)
Connected	−0.0029
	(0.0098)
Expertise × Connected × Pre-104	0.0229*
	(0.0107)
Expertise × Connected × 104+	0.0344*
	(0.0149)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0166*
	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0030
	(0.0104)
Expertise × Pre-104	−0.0016
	(0.0045)
Connected × Pre-104	−0.0156
	(0.0120)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0003
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000
	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001
	(0.0000)
N	125130

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This Table is identical to Table 4 with additional covariates reported.

Table 6: Effect of Connection and Expertise Where the Cue-Giver Seldom Cosponsors the Cue-Taker's Legislation

	Model 1
Expertise	0.0100
	(0.0053)
$\text{Connected}_{i,j}$	−0.0077
	(0.0083)
$\text{Connected}_{j,i}$	−0.0113
	(0.0084)
Expertise × $\mathbf{Connected_{i,j}}$	0.0326*
	(0.0111)
Expertise × $\mathbf{Connected_{i,j}}$ × $\mathbf{Connected_{j,i}}$	−0.0264
	(0.0163)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0167*
	(0.0058)
$\text{Connected}_{i,j}$ × Copartisans	−0.0024
	(0.0108)
Expertise × $\text{Connected}_{j,i}$	0.0180
	(0.097)
$\text{Connected}_{i,j}$ × $\text{Connected}_{j,i}$	0.0000
	(0.0108)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000
	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001
	(0.0000)
N	152250

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This Table is identical to Table 5 with additional covariates reported.

Table 7: Change in Agreement Between the Cue-Taker and the Committee Member Most Similar to the Cue-Giver

	Model 1
Expertise	0.0066
	(0.0059)
Connected	−0.0285
	(0.0157)
Expertise × Connected	0.0425*
	(0.0173)
	(0.0241)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0008
	(0.0070)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0040
	(0.0164)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0005*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0003
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0003*
	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001
	(0.0001)
N	72689

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table is identical to Table 7 with additional covariates reported.

Table 8: Effect of Leaving a Committee on Change in Agreement

	Model 1
Exit	0.0127
	(0.0069)
Connected	0.0079
	(0.0085)
Exit × Connected	0.0131
	(0.0103)
Exit × Copartisans	−0.0083
	(0.0061)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0165
	(0.0115)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0002
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Exit × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0003
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)
Exit × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Exit × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Exit × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0001
	(0.0001)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0002*
	(0.0001)
N	130716

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table is identical to Table 7 with additional covariates reported.

Table 9: The Robustness of Cue-Taking to Partisan Polarization with Alternative Cutpoints

	102	103	105	106
Expertise	0.0120*	−0.0108*	0.0126*	0.0117
	(0.0058)	(0.0058)	(0.0056)	(0.0060)
Connected	−0.0096	−0.0033	0.0028	0.0034
	(0.0095)	(0.0095)	(0.0088)	(0.0094)
Expertise × Connected ×	0.0130	0.0233*	0.0315*	0.0325*
(Congress < Cutpoint)	(0.0103)	(0.0111)	(0.0118)	(0.0116)
Expertise × Connected ×	0.0412*	0.0339*	0.0288	0.0258
(Congress ≥ Cutpoint)	(0.0140)	(0.0144)	(0.0166)	(0.0174)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0165*	−0.0166*	−0.0166*	−0.0166*
	(0.0058)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0028	−0.0032	−0.0051	−0.0053
	(0.0104)	(0.0105)	(0.0109)	(0.0109)
Expertise × (Congress < Cutpoint)	−0.0037	−0.0018	−0.0046	−0.0025
	(0.0048)	(0.0046)	(0.0045)	(0.0046)
Connected × (Congress < Cutpoint)	−0.0017	−0.0154	−0.0211	−0.0201
	(0.0115)	(0.0121)	(0.0114)	(0.0113)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0003*	0.0003*	0.0003*	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0003
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001*	−0.0001*	0.0000	−0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
N				125130

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table replaces the cutpoint at the 104th Congress in Table 4 with alternative congresses.

Table 10: The Robustness of Cue-Taking to Partisan Polarization with DW-NOMINATE

	Model 1
Expertise	0.0092
	(0.0057)
Connected	−0.0185
	(0.0100)
Expertise × Connected × High Polarization	0.0344*
	(0.0149)
Expertise × Connected × Low Polarization	0.0229*
	(0.0107)
Expertise × Copartisans	−0.0166*
	(0.0058)
Connected × Copartisans	−0.0030
	(0.0107)
Expertise × (High Polarization)	0.0016
	(0.0045)
Connected × (High Polarization)	0.0156
	(0.0120)
Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0003*
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Copartisan	−0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	0.0005
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0003)
Expertise × Count of i Cosponsoring Opposite Party	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Copartisan	0.0001
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite-Party	−0.0003
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0001)
Expertise × Count of j Cosponsoring Opposite Party	−0.0000
Committee Member's Bills Before Assignment	(0.0002)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t-1$	0.0000
	(0.0000)
Number of Bills Voted on During $t+1$	−0.0001*
	(0.0000)
N	125130

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Note: This table replaces the cutpoint at the 104th Congress in Table 4 with the difference in DW-NOMINATE party means as the measure of polarization.