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Dear Readers,

On behalf of the Editorial Board, it is our pleasure to share with you this volume of Crossroads: The University of Michigan Undergraduate Journal of Anthropology. The articles in this volume represent the outstanding anthropological research and writing currently being accomplished at the undergraduate level at the University of Michigan and many other institutions across the country. We are proud that this journal represents the diversity of theoretical and methodological approaches at use in anthropology today.

Five authors contributed to this volume their scholarship on a range of topics related to the ways identity and independence are configured by State power. In the first essay, “In the Shadow of Terror: Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State,” author Sarah Toubman explores the complex lineage of Basque nationalism, and its peoples’ struggle for political, economical and ideological autonomy. Co-Editor-in-Chief Madeline Topor next considers how nationalistic practices in Poland have shaped and biased the archaeological discipline there, and the historical narratives it produces in her article “Nationalism and Archaeology in Poland.” In “Resistance in the Philippines During WWII,” Joseph Bogart draws upon his own grandparents’ testimonies to navigate the multifarious motivations of Filipino stakeholders with differing economic and political allegiances. Author Hero Robles then probes our understanding of human trafficking by detangling the socioeconomic and political factors that compel agentive Filipino men to sell their kidneys in commercial organ markets. To close this edition of Crossroads, author Hannah French’s article “Shadows Under the Bunk: Rebellions, Riots, and Racial Imaginary in the Carceral State,” discusses the mass incarceration of marginalized peoples, whose “riotous” efforts to reassert their humanity in the eyes of an exploitative white State—and an often apathetic public—should be reconceived as rebellious action toward life, liberty, and happiness in a new era of civil rights.

We would like to thank each and every member of the Editorial Board, as well as our authors, for the time and effort they have dedicated to the success of this publication. The process would not have been nearly as rewarding without their thoughtful revisions and brilliant ideas. In addition, this issue would not have been possible without the help of the faculty in the Department of Anthropology.

Sincerely,

Kristin Cimmerer and Madeline Topor, Editors-in-Chief, Crossroads
This paper traces the varied and complex experiences of Basque peoples which led to the formation of the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna separatist group in the latter half of the twentieth century. Though Basque nationalism largely crystalized in response to the Franco dictatorship, the roots of the ETA far precede the Spanish Civil War. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna was part of a long-standing tradition of shaping Basque identity in contrast and in conjunction to Spanish state hegemony on the Iberian Peninsula. The ETA saw their violent nationalism as a reflection and continuation of Spain’s policies of oppression against the Basque region. The region also gave rise to numerous other expressions of Basque identity which did not result in violent separatism, and this paper argues that nationalism in the Basque Country is not a single, static phenomenon, but rather that Basque peoples try on, use, and cast off various forms of nationalism as best suit their purposes.

The region currently known as the Basque Country has been subject to a larger Spanish political authority dating back as early as the fifteenth century. The Spanish state was founded and has since persisted on a premise of assumed nationhood which in theory subsumed any micro-regional allegiances. Basque identity has consequently been shaped in contrast to and in spite of Spanish governance. In order to examine the contemporary relationship between violence, Basque identity, and the Spanish state, it is thus necessary to understand the history of conflict between the Basque region and Spain. The formation of violent activist groups such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country during the second half of the twentieth century follows a long-standing tradition of shaping regional politics in the shadow of Spanish state sovereignty. The activities of the ETA, which have been generally described as terrorism, were not an illogical aberration nor a direct reaction to the brutality of the Spanish Civil War. Shifts in the expression of Basque identity over time reveal that nationalism is not a single, static ideology. Rather, peoples such as the Basques try on, use, and cast off various ethnic ties as best
suit their purposes, even expressing multiple, conflicting national identities at once—a phenomenon which might be described as “nested nationalism.”

Ability to speak the Basque language has historically been a marker of Basque identity due to the region’s location on the border between Northern Spain and Southeastern France. Because Basque is unrelated to any other known language, linguistics have provided Basques with a strong form of resistance against assimilation into a broader Spanish identity. However, the Basque-speaking administrative region known as Navarra has traditionally been more open to the possibility of integration into a Peninsular polity. During the Middle Ages, Navarra had the status of an independent kingdom alongside Castile-León, Aragón-Catalonia, and Portugal (Payne 1975, 1). On the basis of shared Catholic faith, the four regions were loosely allied against French and Muslim invaders. This was by no means a unified state and there was frequent strife between the kingdoms.

Navarra once covered almost all of Basque-speaking Iberia, though it was not strictly speaking an ethnic Basque state. By the year 1200, the entire western half of Navarra had been conquered by Castile-León (Payne 1975, 17). This is the region currently known as Basque Country, made up of the regions Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alaza. The eastern half of Basque-speaking Spain is still called Navarra, but is not considered part of the modern-day Basque Country. From 1200 until the formalization of the Spanish state, Navarra remained independent. In the sixteenth century, the marriage of monarchs Isabella and Ferdinand merged the crowns of Castilla-León and Aragón-Catalonia into the Kingdom of Spain. They conquered Navarra soon after, meaning that all Basque-speaking regions of Iberia south of the Pyrenees Mountains were officially under Spanish control (Payne 1975, 15). Even at this early date, the negotiability of Basque identity is visible. While the people of Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Alaza became subject to Castilian political authority, Navarrese Basques responded to the shifting political power on the Iberian Peninsula by adopting an independent regional identity.

The violence with which Castile-León and the emerging Kingdom of Spain conquered Basque-speaking Iberia would remain an essential feature of the Spanish state. For example, “between 1799 and 1806 the Spanish government issued a series of drastic new tax and draft
levies in Navarra and the Basque provinces” (Payne 1975, 35). These Spanish policies singled out Basques financially and called on Basque men specifically to enter into the national military and commit violence for the Spanish state. Basques responded with a series of protests, which were ignored and repressed by the Spanish government (Payne 1975, 35). Spain transitioned to a constitutional monarchy in the year 1812, but Basque peoples remained a target of Spanish authority. Political thinker Max Weber has proposed that “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1919). This is certainly accurate in the Spanish case. The Spanish Crown was notorious for its attempts to monopolize power throughout its overseas empire, and its treatment of Peninsular micronations differed little.

Seemingly sudden breaks in the expression of Basque identity can then, according to Weber’s theory, be explained by changing Basque perceptions of “legitimacy.” The protests of Basques against Spanish policies during the late monarchy questioned the legitimacy of the Spanish state’s monopolization of physical force in the Basque Country. The violent actions of twentieth century groups such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna can be conceptualized as an attempt to legitimize the Basque Country as an independent state through the use of physical force. Ceasefires signed by Basque separatist movements and the official dissolution of ETA in the twenty-first century are not necessarily a recognition of Spanish authority as legitimate, but perhaps a subversion of its monopoly on power. Under its current status as an “autonomous community,” the Basque Country is, according to Spanish law, self-governing but not fully independent. By nominally allowing the Basque Region to be subsumed by a larger Spain, Basque people, through the framework of an autonomous community, retain a separate government, parliament, and police force. While the people of the Basque Country do not entirely monopolize power over their own territory, they complicate the idea that the Spanish state successfully and legitimately exercises perfect control over what it claims to be the larger state.

The power of Spanish political institutions continued to fluctuate well into the nineteenth century. After the establishment of the constitutional monarchy in 1812, Spain saw a
series of minor civil wars. Known as the Carlist Wars, these outbreaks of political tension mostly centered around rights to govern over the Spanish nation-state. Absolute monarchy was restored in 1823, and formally lasted until 1868 (Payne 1975, 38 and 53). Spain then returned to constitutional monarchy for approximately five years (Payne 1975, 53). From 1873 to 1874, the First Spanish Republic came to power, but was quickly ousted by the Bourbon Monarchy, which assumed total control over the Spanish government until 1923. Throughout this upheaval, the various Spanish governments granted and rescinded the right of Basque regions to autonomous self-governance—known as fuerismo. Though fuerismo was sometimes restricted, it largely existed until 1834, when it was revoked (Payne 1975, 44). Fuerismo was restored in 1839, until it was again overturned in 1877 (Payne 1975, 48 and 55). For Basques, the Carlist Wars were not and could not be an opportunity to seize full control of the land they claimed because the terms of debate between the warring factions centered around control of the Spanish state. Instead, this period of conflict concerned Basques in that the ruling faction had the power to grant them more or less independence.

Basques continued to vie for the right to self-determination into the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Many scholars and Basques themselves trace the birth modern separatist movement back to this period. Sabino de Arana y Goiri—who lived from 1865 to 1903—is typically seen as the founder of this movement (Payne 1975, 65). Arana y Goiri established the Basque Nationalist Party in 1895, and his vision of independence included all Basque-speaking territories, both north and south of the Pyrenees (Ben-Ami 1991, 496). Embedded in the Basque Nationalist Party’s politics was a strong Catholic religion. Basque-speaking Spain has a tradition of observant Catholicism, and this was deployed in the nationalist struggle. Arana y Goiri often described the independence movement in language relating to Christ, and followers of Basque Nationalist Party even described him as a martyr for the cause (Ben-Ami 1991, 497). Arana y Goiri’s Basque nationalism was also intensely regional. Born in Bilbao, his activism was influenced by his identity as a Vizcaya native. The push for independence coalesced earlier and more intensely in Vizcaya than any other Basque constituency.
This regionalization of the Basque Country was mainly due to discrepancies in the rate of technological industrialization. Like many indigenous movements, the Basques have taken on a history—real or imagined—in which they are bound to land through idealized agrarian labor. According to Arana y Goiri:

> the region's rapid industrialization [was a] disintegrating influence” on Basque identity (Ben-Ami 1991, 497). Without such technological incursions, the regions of Guipúzcoa and Alaza did not yet face the same challenge to historic Basque identity. Arana y Goiri also couched this perceived incursion in ethnic terms. He portrayed the immigration of Spanish-speakers to Vizcaya for industrial jobs as an “invasion of 'foreigners' . . . degenerate, immoral, godless” (Ben-Ami 1991, 496-497).

For Arana y Goiri and his followers, fears of Spanish state violence against Basques were transferred onto the Spanish people. By threatening the traditions of self-rule and agriculture, the industrialization of Vizcaya served as a metaphor for the intrusion of Spanish authority into Basque identity. The formation of the Basque Nationalist Party at the end of nineteenth century also showcases the continued incohesion of Basque identity, due to the dominance of Vizcaya in the grassroots effort for independence.

The expressions of Basque nationalism, which emerged during the period after the formation of the Basque Nationalist Party but before the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, continued to be multilayered and contradictory. During World War I, Spain remained neutral and profited off of industrial goods sold to both sides. As Spain’s manufacturing powerhouse, Vizcaya was already producing 80 percent of Spanish steel at the commencement of the war (Payne 1975, 93). The wealthy Basque industrial tycoons who emerged during this period provide a powerful example of nested nationalism. To increase their profit margins, Basque businessmen expanded production throughout northern Spain and engaged in trade across the country, and even internationally. At the same time, they followed in a long tradition of Basque protest against Spanish financial policies by opposing a new tax on manufacturing proposed by finance minister Santiago Alba in 1916 (Payne 1975, 94). Depending on when it suited their financial ambitions, these merchants shifted their Basque identity on and off, and adopted a broadly Spanish identity.
Shifts in the Spanish political structures later in the twentieth century led again to careful negotiation of national identities by Basques. In 1923, Bourbon King, Alfonso XIII, effectively allowed dictator, Miguel Primo de Rivera to seize control of Spain. Under Primo de Rivera, technologies such as telephones and railways were installed across the country, and Spain flourished financially until the 1929 Great Depression (Ben-Ami 1991, 499). It was under these conditions that the Basque Nationalist Party gained significant support across the Basque Country, especially in Guipúzcoa (Ben-Ami 1991, 501). José Antonio de Aguirre, who at the time led the Party, feared that the dictatorship would further repress Basque home rule and erase Basque identity. Aguirre thus formed an alliance with the liberal Republicans seeking to overthrow the dictator. The Republicans were openly hostile to the Catholicism-infused nationalist politics that many Basques adopted, but the Party leader still felt this to be the Basque Country’s best option for movement towards autonomy (Ben-Ami 1991, 500). Aguirre made a calculated decision to produce an ideal outcome within a set of limits. Like the Basque businessmen during World War I, he did not turn to insurgency nor an ideology of complete separatism, but negotiated Basque identity in an attempt to improve future conditions. In 1931, the Republicans took power and proceeded to give both the Basque Country and Catalonia autonomous status. However, open elections in 1933 resulted in center-right parties winning a majority; the Second Spanish Republic lasted just three more years.

Scholars of the Basque Country such as Begoña Aretxaga and Alfonso Pérez-Agote have examined the ways in which the Spanish Civil War contributed to the explosion of violent Basque nationalism in the twentieth century. While the military clash of Nationalist and Republican ideologies in 1936 to 1939 provided a ripe breeding ground for the crystallization of the Basque independence movement, this time period by no means marked the beginning of separatist sentiments. As previously evidenced, Basques were negotiating their identity and resisting Spanish state hegemony as early as the Middle Ages. More so than in the Carlist Wars, the Spanish Civil War provided Basques an opportunity to rethink existing land claims on the Iberian Peninsula. The earlier terms of debate demanding a monarchy—whether absolute or constitutional—control the Spanish state were largely dispensed with. By the Weberian
In the Shadow of Terror: Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State

definition, the Civil War was an instance where monopoly over physical force in Spain was lost, and different human communities vied to reestablish it. During the Spanish Civil War, “legitimacy” was in flux. Though this was the perfect storm of conditions for the resurgence of a strong Basque nationalism, it alone could not have produced the movement.

Basques quickly found that although the old terms of debate were overturned, the ones which replaced them were scarcely different. The right to govern over the Spanish nation-state was still the pressing issue. Instead of competing monarchies, the choice was between a Spanish republic or a Spanish dictatorship. Like Spain more broadly, the Basque Country was splintered by the Civil War. While Basques from Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya tended to side with the Republicans, those from Alaza and Navarra typically favored the Nationalists (Ben-Ami 1991, 501). Basques from regions with disparate histories saw different risks and benefits associated with supporting each side, and acted accordingly.

With the victory of the Nationalists in 1939, General Francisco Franco arguably tightened Spanish hegemony in the Basque Country to its highest levels yet. Franco’s dictatorship lasted until 1975. During his lengthy rule, Franco used his control over the military and police forces to enforce his vision of civic and cultural unity throughout Spain. In line with Weber’s interpretation of a state, the dictator exercised a monopoly on physical force within the given territory—and did so in a particularly brutal way. Under Franco, the use of Basque or any regional language other than Castilian Spanish was banned (Ben-Ami 1991, 501). No alternative Spanish political groups—let alone regional independence movements—were permitted by the one-party state. Groups such as the Basque Nationalist Party were forced underground (Ben-Ami 1991, 501). Opponents of the regime, especially political dissidents, were typically executed or imprisoned in camps. Estimates of those killed by Francoists from the start of the war until the end of the regime range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands (Katz 2018). However, even under this repressive dictatorship, Basques did not form a collective resistance. Navarra received tax breaks under Franco for its cooperation with the Nationalist cause during the Civil War (Ben-Ami 1991, 501). Due to their long history of cooperation with the Spanish state, Navarrese Basques were presented with and seized the opportunity to improve their
conditions under the dictatorship. In order to survive to the best of their ability, the Navarrese displayed nested nationalism. Instead allying themselves with the larger Basque Country, the people of Navarra maintained a regional identity which would still allow them to support Francoist Spain.

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna officially formed at the University of Bilbao in 1959, while Spain was still under the Franco dictatorship. Translated at “Basque Homeland and Liberty,” the ETA was a splinter group of the Basque Nationalist Party (Ben-Ami 1991, 503). In the 1960s and 1970s, the ETA operated from the French side of the border, and committed numerous bombings and assassinations, most notably that of Francoist politician Carrero Blanco in 1973 (Ben-Ami 1991, 503). But the violence of ETA reached its peak in the year 1980, during which the group killed about 100 people—five years after the death of Franco (Minder 2018). The ETA was not merely anti-Franco, but anti-Spanish. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna sought full independent statehood for the Basque Country. Though the group began as conservative and religious, its leadership adopted a Marxist, revolutionary platform (Ben-Ami 1991 503-04). The ETA was thus predisposed against Spanish state hegemony in all its forms, whether it was the Franco dictatorship or the democracy which replaced it.

Neither the Civil War nor Franco’s rise to power directly caused the ETA’s violence. Rather, hundreds of years of the Spanish state targeting Basques intensified into continually more repressive violence over the course of Franco’s nearly forty years in power. Furthermore, this repression did not end under Franco. In the late 1970s, the democratic government provided backing for right-wing police forces which murdered both ETA members and Basques who were sympathetic to the independence cause (Ben-Ami 1991, 513). Nonetheless, Basque nationalists did not all buy into the ETA bottom line. In 1979, moderate leaders—many of them members of the Basque Nationalist Party—signed an agreement with Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez to grant the Basque Country autonomous status (Ben-Ami 1991, 512). This statue gave the Spanish Basque Country “control over local administration, police, social services, education, internal commercial regulations, taxes, and courts” (Ben-Ami 1991, 512). Men like the then-leader of the Party, Xavier Arzallus, saw in the new Spanish state an opportunity to
obtain greater independence for Basque-speaking peoples. Though many of the signees continued to see even the democratic Spanish state as an inherent threat to Basque autonomy, they negotiated their Basque identity regardless in order to achieve greater self-governance.

The democratic Spanish government failed to include Navarra and the French Basque Country in the 1979 autonomy statute, and for the ETA this was a breaking point. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna leadership felt the agreement still left the Basque Country subservient to the Spanish state, and autonomy for all of Basque-speaking Europe was a point on which they refused to negotiate (Ben-Ami 1991, 512). The ETA saw all Spanish governments as fraudulent, and refused to accept Suárez’s terms of debate. The group continued to use violence to delegitimize the presence of Spanish authority and physical force in the Basque Country. Over the course of 59 years, approximately 800 people died from ETA attacks (Ormazabal 2019). The violence reached its height in the 1980s, when civilians, Spanish policemen, and politicians were killed (Minder 2018). At the end of the 1980s, the Spanish government signed a series of ceasefires with the ETA in an attempt to stop the attacks (Minder, 2018). Instead, these measures led to factionalization within ETA. Splinter groups—such as ETA political-military and ETA military—accepted offers of amnesty from the Spanish government or continued their violence to varying degrees.

ETA attacks noticeably decreased, but by no means ended, during the 1990s and early 2000s. In 1995, an act of violence in Guipúzcoa showed how identity in the Basque Country was changing yet again. On December 10th, twenty-three year old Mikel Otegi “took a hunting gun hanging on the wall of his farmhouse, came outside and shot two ertzainas (Basque policemen). He then called the Ertzaintza (Basque police) and surrendered himself” (Aretxaga 2005, 177). Otegi was eventually cleared of charges based on the claim that he feared for his life and acted in self-defense (Aretxaga 2005, 187). According to the logic of the ETA, throughout history, it had been Spanish authorities who were the perpetrators of violence, and Basques the victims, which necessitated a reversal in the second half of the twentieth century. However, the 1979 autonomy statute had authorized an independent police force for the Basque Country. According to Weber, Basques had then, to some degree, formed an independent state. While the Basque Country had
not strictly achieved a monopoly on physical force, Basques could perhaps for the first time successfully use legitimate violence within their own territory. State authorities—albeit Spanish ones—have constantly provoked terror in Basque citizens. The familiar specter of approaching policemen, regardless of their ethnic identity, likely called up deep-seated fear of authority for Otegi. In this context, his behavior has a clear logic.

Since the early 2000s, the violence committed by ETA has continuously dwindled, and the group’s leadership has made several efforts to formally end acts of violence on its end. ETA signed ceasefires in 2006, 2010, and 2011. In 2017, the group made efforts to disarm (Minder 2018). On May 2nd, 2018, ETA released a statement announcing its formal dissolution. “ETA wishes to end a cycle of conflict between the Basque Country and the Spanish and French states; the cycle of the use of political violence,” reads part of the letter (Ormazabal 2018). In many ways, Basque identity is shaped by a belief in the endless perpetuation of Spanish violence against Basque people. Members of the ETA took efforts to reverse this perceived cycle in the second half of the twentieth century through their own violence. Other Basque peoples throughout history have either partially adopted this identity or developed an alternative Basque identity altogether. Basque historian Shlomo Ben-Ami proposed in 1991 that “essentially, the Basque country was and continues to be a pluralistic society where a variety of political options vie for hegemony; nationalism had never been the sole and exclusive master of the situation” (Ben-Ami 1991, 495). This remains true as of 2018. The different Basque-speaking peoples of Europe hold distinct nationalist identities. Even one individual who identifies as Basque may experience conflicting ethnic ties.

Basque peoples have expressed nested nationalism—the phenomenon in which individuals or communities try on, use, and cast off various ethnic ties as best suit their purposes—since the rise of Spanish state hegemony on the Iberian Peninsula. In the sixteenth century, Navarrese Basques formed their own regional identity separate from other Basque-speaking areas. Sabino de Arana y Goiri, founder of the Basque nationalist movement, heavily incorporated Catholicism, anti-industrialism, and regional allegiance to Vizcaya into his late-nineteenth century rhetoric. During the First World War, wealthy Basque industrial tycoons
promoted trade between the Basque Country and the larger Spanish state, while simultaneously adhering to a tradition of Basque protest against Spanish financial policies. Further regional splintering in the Basque Country resulted in Basque communities fighting on both sides of the Spanish Civil War, and some siding with the Franco regime in its wake. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna formed as part of this longer tradition of shaping Basque identity in contrast and in conjunction to the Spanish state. The ETA was therefore only one interpretation of Basque nationalism amongst many, and several other expressions of Basque identity persisted even after the group’s disintegration.

This phenomenon of nested ethnic identities is crucial in examining both cases where micronational insurgency or terrorism do and do not occur. The premise of assumed nationhood on which the Spanish state stands has led to instances of micro-regional fracturing beyond the Basque Country. The Spanish micronation of Catalonia declared itself independent in 2017 based on a sense of separate linguistic, ethnic, and geographic identity similar to that of the Basque Country. However, Catalonia never produced violent activist groups to the same degree as the Basque Country. Micronationalism, in the Basque case and more broadly, can be experienced even when it is not outwardly violent. More often than not, micronationalism functions within the framework of an autonomous region without resulting in widespread separatist movements.

Sarah Toubman is a senior at the University of Michigan majoring in Creative Writing and Literature, with minors in sociocultural anthropology and history. Her research interests include European nationalism, the intersection of technology and politics, and the history of armed conflict. She hopes to conduct further studies in these fields after returning from a year teaching English in Argentina.
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Nationalism and Archaeology in Poland

Identity and Independence in the Shadow of the State

by Madeline Topor

This essay analyzes the relationship between archaeological practice and nationalism in Poland. By looking at how the discipline was affected by this political movement historically, one can better understand how nationalistic biases affect archaeology in the modern day. More can be understood about archaeology in Poland today by examining how objects can be used to alter historical narratives and perceptions of the past. Ignoring the growing influence of nationalism today will negatively impact how history is interpreted and presented to the public.

Archaeology provides a way to learn about the past through the study of artifacts, but perceptions of the past can be manipulated through these objects to serve a political agenda. A pattern of altering historical narratives through archaeological evidence emerged during the Romantic period in Poland and continued throughout the following centuries with the rise of nationalism. To show that ethnic Poles had the ability to govern their own nation-state, the archaeological remains of other groups were disregarded to further support Polish sovereignty. Nationalists traced the lineage of a single ethnic group and utilized this as compelling evidence to establish an independent nation-state in the territory where they had proof of their culture's development over time. While many believe that the influence of nationalism is in Poland’s past, ignoring the prevalence of this movement in the modern political climate will lead to negative consequences in the future when knowledge is controlled to shape public perceptions of history. The political situation within nation-states such as Poland determines how cultural heritage can be manipulated to legitimate political sovereignty. Nationalistic biases have led to the misinterpretation of material culture within archaeology in an effort to validate the independence of an ethnic group.

The rise of nationalism in Poland today is largely a result of the complicated history of foreign intervention and revolt beginning in the late 18th century. The partitions of Poland by the Russian, Prussian, and Austro-Hungarian empires in 1772, 1793, and 1795 divided up the...
Nationalism and Archaeology in Poland

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth among the three powers. This complete erasure of the state incited a series of failed revolts that persisted for the following decades, culminating in the January Uprising of 1863-64, which was the last major revolution against the occupying forces during the Romantic period. Poland was partitioned for 123 years until the end of World War I when it was finally restored. However, this independence was short-lived, as the Soviet Union developed a new communist government in Poland following World War II. The modern nation-state of Poland did not arise until the fall of the Soviet Union decades later. This pattern of land partitioning, war, foreign intervention, and revolt has cemented nationalistic policy into Poland’s history, and its influence continues into the present day.

Before the influence of Polish nationalism in the archaeological record can be analyzed, it is necessary to define precisely what is meant by nationalism and how it is understood in archaeological terms. Nationalism prioritizes state interests over all other affairs, and the field of archaeology is no exception. Although nationalism is a broad term used to acknowledge a political ideology in the field, varying subcategories are used to differentiate between the objectives focused on by political entities. Civic and ethnic nationalism are distinct, as they are utilized for different goals depending on the ideology of the state. Civic, or inclusive, nationalism defines a state’s population on the basis of citizenship, while ethnic, or exclusive, nationalism defines a population based on ethnic origin. Newly established nations often rely on ethnic nationalism to create a common cultural history to validate their newly acquired territory and to enforce their newfound political sovereignty. In the eyes of the state, a long, prosperous history backed by material evidence reinforces the notion that the majority culture is able to effectively govern the new nation. This sense of cultural pride develops within the population when they perceive themselves as having a common language and culture whose origin can be traced back through time; there is frequently a “golden age” within the chronology that the new nation attempts to emulate (Shnirel’Man 2013, 13). Accordingly, archaeology’s ability to provide tangible evidence of a cultural presence and a connection to an ancestral lineage makes it a desirable field for state control (Shnirel’Man 2013, 14). It is easier to unify a group, such as ethnic Poles (referred to in this essay as people claiming Polish ancestry), when all of its
members believe that they can trace their ancestry back to a certain time and place, allowing them to perceive a sense of common nationality in the modern state.

It is easier to establish credibility and validity for the long history of a cultural group when tangible artifacts and archaeological sites can be used as markers of a people’s heritage. Therefore, archaeologists are used to help form identities that align with state interests, which tend to be nationalistic in Eastern Europe, especially in the case of Poland and its struggle for independence. Material traces of this ancestral activity within the territory of the state are used to legitimize the political entity and create a sense of national pride for past cultural achievements within a population. Demonstrating ancestral achievement is particularly prevalent in nations like Poland which have experienced historical trauma in the form of land partitioning, revolts, war, rule by foreign nations, and the loss and reinstatement of statehood. While cultural achievements are celebrated, “defeat, the idea of heroism and sacrifice, [and] of readiness to give one’s life for the freedom of one’s people” are equally, if not more important (Shnirel’Man 2013, 14). In this way, the Romantic themes of sacrifice and revolution popularized in the first half of the 19th century are no longer restricted to literary and cultural practices; instead, they can now be demonstrated in conjunction with archaeological material to promote the struggle for national liberation. Archaeological finds are frequently used to define a state’s territory and can become national symbols for asserting rights to independence. This use of artifacts for what historian Victor A. Shnirel’Man calls “ideological propaganda” demonstrates how nationalistic beliefs can transform images of the past into key symbols of a culture (Shnirel’Man 2013, 15). As a result, there is a complicated relationship between the archaeological record and the state that is heavily influenced by nationalism and varying political interests.

The development and very definition of a nation-state is inextricably linked to cultural heritage and archaeological material, allowing the state to influence archaeology and create negative extremist biases. A nation-state is a population sharing history, language or traditions organized under one political system, and the modern nation-states in Eastern Europe were generally established based on populations of ethnic groups that seemed to share a common
heritage (Diachenko 2016, 4). The search for this “direct evolutionary descent between modern
nations and the populations of the distant past,” including “mythical peoples,” leads the state to
accept and even prefer pseudoscientific narratives, which tend to be based on the archaeological
evidence with a falsified or exaggerated account detailing the history behind it (Diachenko 2016,
6). State authorities then use these narratives for national politics and the education of the
public. In this way, they control the available knowledge and determine how it is perceived by
the public. Archaeological sites and artifacts possessing symbolic meanings of cultural heritage
are manipulated in politics to further increase nationalistic sentiment, creating biases within the
discipline that strictly adhere to the goals of the state. These goals are often connected to local
archaeology, which deals with restoring genealogy and tends to be more emotionally charged,
enabling this subfield to align closely with nationalistic aims since it is based on ethnic
nationalism. An even more precise term, nationalist archaeology, has been developed to better
explain this phenomenon. States, especially those that have recently formed, create political
goals that utilize archaeological research for nation-building and the formation of national
identity (Shnirel’Man 2013, 24). This emphasis on state development results from a country’s
(in this case Poland’s) need to prove itself as capable of independently developing and managing
the new state form of government.

The rise of Romanticism in the early 19th century and its basis in nationalistic sentiment
influenced the development of archaeology as a field used to support the formation of a common
cultural heritage. The Romantic movement emphasized emotion over reason, individuality, and
revolution. Polish historian Andrzej Walicki describes Romantic nationalism in Poland as
promoting the idea of a national goal which encompasses the spirit of self-sacrifice as a national
virtue (Walicki 1982). Romantic nationalism makes “peoples” the primary focus in the field; this
focus on particular ethnic groups historically living in a territory was used to fight for and justify
the right to statehood (Shnirel’Man 2013, 17). This pattern is again witnessed with the rise of
communism in Eastern Europe in the 20th century, when countries like Poland were trying to
free themselves from foreign intervention in state affairs. Along with the widespread theme of
sacrifice and martyrdom prevalent in the Romantic era, antiquarianism became part of the
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The study of the ancient past, along with its customs and relics, closely tied antiquarians to the field of archaeology. Increased interest in antiquarianism and artifacts developed around the same time as the Romantic movement as a way to strengthen a narrative of national identity. The sudden disappearance of the country as a result of the partitions fostered a “sudden interest in the past of the Polish nation, including the local antiquities” (Rączkowski 1996, 192). Therefore, the shared goal to eventually establish Polish independence links the movements of Romanticism and antiquarianism through both of their efforts to create cultural unity and develop a national mythology.

A popular view was spreading that a nation that understands its past and preserves its cultural practices can endure without statehood. The Positivist movement in Poland advocated for this idea, believing that “organic work,” or labor in place of uprisings, would build the foundations of a Polish society. While the Romantic literary sources are vital for perpetuating mythic retellings of historical events to advocate for revolution, particularly Adam Mickiewicz’s *Konrad Wallenrod* and *Books of the Polish Nation and the Polish Pilgrimage*, archaeological material is critical when it comes to providing the physical evidence that is needed to form a chronology for an ethnic group; however, the analysis of this evidence is heavily biased by nationalistic goals and is primarily used to establish statehood. This is because the whole premise of antiquarianism is based on the collection of antiques rather than objective research. Archaeology was greatly influenced by the Romantic movement and, subsequently, the rise of antiquarianism in the 19th century that allowed nationalists to alter the discipline to pursue their own goals of national independence.

The legitimization of political sovereignty through archaeology is best exemplified by the Polish national struggle to claim Slavic descent. In particular, the partitions of Poland sparked development in the study of Slavs and the collection of national mementos. The sudden loss of statehood could contribute to the loss of Polish cultural identity, so while the nation had no physical borders, Poles attempted to maintain the state culturally. Archaeology provides a viable solution for the search for past ancestors. Therefore, the Slavs’ historical importance to Polish heritage was enthusiastically recognized to a great extent. However, these claims were not
critically evaluated. During this time, it was common practice to believe that all artifacts, features, and sites that were found in areas where Slavs were thought to have lived were Slavic relics. Chronology was not considered, making the process of developing false histories for the sake of a unifying national mythology considerably easier. The blatant rejection of objective and thorough analyses again supports the idea that during the era of the partitions, archaeology was valued because it could fulfill political goals. Other explanations for recovered archaeological material were ignored because the “relics” were necessary in the “process of creating Polish national identity and of establishing the right to possess territory” (Rączkowski 1996, 193). Also, some believed that a more convincing case could be made for the liberation of Poland if the Polish people could lay claim to a pre-existing culture from which they could prove descent. This allowed the political situation within the lost nation-state to control the manipulation of cultural heritage and to demand territory that was supposedly held by the ancestors of the Polish people. Besides focusing strictly on the material remains of the Slavs, archaeologists often concentrated on indicating differences between Slavs and Germanic peoples. This occurred for two main reasons: to emphasize the common relationship between Slavs, and to support anti-Germanic attitudes. Again, these ideas stemmed from the Romantic period and stressed the unity of Slavic nations, calling for a common fight for freedom and independence. The shared heritage of languages, tradition, customs and social organization is used as a foundation for the unification of a culture that is unsure of how to define itself without a political presence (Rączkowski 1996, 197). This concept became influential because it helped to establish what it meant to be “Polish” when people could no longer rely on the nation-state as a source of heritage. The past of the Slavs was appealing precisely because it was so unclear: nationalists could construct a mythology based around fragmentary evidence that would serve their political goal of finally achieving an independent state.

This was the primary goal of archaeology during this time, but a great deal of artifact interpretation resulted from the desire to contradict German views. While there was an ongoing rivalry between Polish and German archaeologists to identify “nicer” or “more valuable” artifacts as belonging to either group, archaeological discoveries and analyses were conducted largely to
contradict German views on ethnic questions. This generally occurred through stereotypes and material culture because “material culture with symbolic meaning is... an integral part of power relations, as symbols of ethnic identity appear [to be] aimed at group mobilization” (Curta 2011, 538). The interpretations of archaeologists were frequently influenced by national and independence movements, which perpetuated stereotypes that idealized one group while criticizing the other. It was a widely-held belief that the Germanic people were “aggressive plunderers striving after the domination of the world,” while the Slavs were “hard-working, ‘cherishing peace and housework,’ helpful and hospitable.” These popular stereotypes were invoked by nationalists to criticize the German oppression and promote the liberation efforts, creating negative views of the Germans that would persuade more Poles to fight for freedom (Rączkowski 1996, 198). In this way, Poles used the material culture and ongoing archaeological debate within Eastern Europe to seek independence. In addition, archaeology was used to mobilize those claiming Polish heritage and descent from the Slavs against the common Germanic enemy who was responsible for the partition of land and foreign rule.

These trends can still be observed in Poland long after the end of the Romantic period, with the visible resurgence in nationalism in the field of archaeology. After the new borders were established following World War I in 1918, the political goals of the new nation changed, as were its archaeological practices. There was a new focus on changing the borders to favor Poland and prevent the intrusion of German culture (Rączkowski 1996, 202). As seen before, archaeologists played a prominent role in supporting these goals, as their research often served to discredit German arguments. After the war, Polish archaeologists could work in entirely Polish scientific institutions, contributing to a sense of national pride while also further isolating research and scientific study to the goals of the state. Shortly after, the arguments of the previous century were resumed, taking on a more emotional and nationalistic character, highlighting how controversial these debates over cultural heritage still were (Rączkowski 1996, 203). It is interesting to consider the fact that these same arguments over nationalism should come to the forefront again, especially since the independent nation-state of Poland has finally been achieved.
However, even though Poland was an established political entity, there was a need to prove that the state had historical rights to regained territories (particularly after World War II). Along with this, some tried to convince Poles that the new territory was final, since it was the result of “historic justice” (Rączkowski 1996, 209). Archaeologists continued to serve the needs of the government because they believed that they were assisting society and proving their patriotism. While independence had been achieved, nationalist attitudes prevailed to show that Poland should remain independent. The archaeological record was used to support this through the search for evidence of Polish settlement and the development of culture in various areas of the state. While these areas of research were eventually suppressed under communist rule, this ongoing trend can still be observed in the 21st century, proving just how deeply nationalism affects archaeology in Poland.

As the archaeological record is used to support ideas of ethnic homogeneity within a region, minority groups coexisting with the majority ethnicity often experience the most detrimental effects of nationalistic ideology. In varying political situations, archaeological data is treated differently depending on its subject, either portraying the “dominant” group in a positive light or criticizing minorities. For example, before there was a push in the 20th century to discredit German ideas on ethnicity, Polish archaeologists would interpret any artifact coming from around the territory as evidence of Slavic occupation. This was no longer the case after the world wars, when only the “more valuable” artifacts were deemed Slavic, while “lesser” ones were representative of Germanic inferiority (Curta 2011, 538). This issue manifests itself in field methodology when archaeologists influenced by nationalistic political views “uncover material evidence important for the nation as quickly as possible” (Shnirel’Man 2013, 23). The national perspective often has a very different concept of what is “significant,” and this gives certain artifacts or features preference in research. This leads to further issues of bias in the field because small finds reflective of everyday life are disregarded for objects that have supposed “national significance,” ignoring the significance of the lives of average groups of people.

Along with limited studies of archaeological material directed towards daily life, the heritage of minorities within the proclaimed territory of the majority ethnicity are frequently
ignored or disparaged. This occurs primarily during excavations when material from layers that are thought to be “uninteresting” is not recorded properly, if it is acknowledged at all (Shnirel’Man 2013, 23). This shows how nationalistic motives in archaeology prevent recognition of a multitude of ethnic groups and the wide availability and diversity of the artifacts associated with them. The intentional loss of material evidence representing various other cultures also serves to establish the “superiority” of the nationalist group because they can then claim that other groups failed to independently develop their own cultural achievements.

The establishment and destruction of monuments, and the process of determining their significance, was another factor that shaped Polish national identity. The physical destruction of a monument representing some aspect of a group’s heritage serves to erase any memory of the “enemy,” while also removing evidence of diversity within a given territory (Shnirel’Man 2013, 26). While it is possible to sustain the traditions of an ethnic group through cultural practices even if there is no nation-state, it is much more difficult to retain those practices when the physical cultural representations of a group’s heritage are gone. The complete destruction of Warsaw after World War II best represents how a majority group chooses to recognize monuments and other ethnic groups. Polish resistance fighters argued that Warsaw’s architecture represented the Polish nation and needed to be rebuilt. As the city was being rebuilt after the war, many of Warsaw’s citizens chose to reconstruct the city according to how it looked before the war. This conscious decision to recreate the city the way it had been before the war became a statement memorializing the elements of Polish culture that had been established years prior. While the Poles, being the majority ethnic group within the new nation-state, elected to design the city to reflect their past cultural achievements, their view on the physical remains of minority groups living within the borders vastly differed. For example, the Jewish quarter in Warsaw was not rebuilt, representing the recurring issue of determining what is historically and culturally significant (Shnirel’Man 2013, 26). While nationalism was driving politics in this period before the war, low levels of Jewish civic engagement following the war also contributed to this decision not to rebuild. From the dominant nationalistic viewpoint, the heritage of groups that could not be ancestrally traced to Poles or even Slavs was not relevant for
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fulfilling the goals of the state. Although often portrayed negatively during the intense period of nationalist influence, minorities are indeed represented in the archaeological record, revealing how their material culture was overlooked or misinterpreted to serve the dominant group.

This recurring fear of other ethnic groups undermining the political legitimacy of Poland is part of the complex historical relationship between nationalism and archaeology that remains an issue in the field to this day. After many of the newly formed states in Eastern Europe tried to validate themselves through appeals to the distant past in the post-war era, the subsequent communist rule suppressed these attempts in nations like Poland. While many scholars such as Rączkowski have argued that archaeology stopped being a part of the process of creating national identity in the 1970s because of communism, the growth of right-wing nationalism in Poland today is reflective of the pattern that emerged during the Romantic period and the wars of the 20th century. The drive by nationalists in the 21st century to maintain a nation of ethnic Poles free from foreign influence shares direct ties with the goals of previous nationalist movements. Therefore, even though it may seem as though archaeology had become a more objective discipline that recognizes the value of all archaeological research, the political situation within Poland is reminiscent of previous eras that used this field to serve their own nationalistic goals.

Even today there is a general fear of Western interpretations, explanations, and fieldwork being conducted within the boundaries of the nation. There is also a tendency to focus on regional studies within Poland and a bias towards nationalistic narratives in archaeology (Diachenko 2016, 9). This shows nationalism’s long-standing effects on the discipline that grow in prominence as nationalist views in Poland remain unchecked. This is partly reinforced by a lack of access to English publications in parts of Eastern Europe (the language most archaeological research is published in) and, in some areas, more restricted access to recent literature (Diachenko 2016, 8). This makes it easier for nationalist influences to isolate archaeologists to the study of only their own presumed heritage. In addition, the academic sector has less control over the field because private commercial firms dominate the archaeological contract market (Marciniak 2011, 179-194). Political leaders in Poland today can
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use and manipulate the archaeological material to influence the cultural politics of the nation-state to fulfill their aims. Again, if this trend in archaeology continues, there will be future issues in education when falsified histories are treated as fact, causing the next generation to hold the same prejudices that develop with extreme nationalism. Outside of education, archaeology will lose credibility as a discipline when the popularization of false narratives among the public causes the field to be seen as biased. These are potential risks that will create a negative impact on the future of modern Poland if the legacy of past events continues to perpetuate nationalism in the archaeological record.

While nationalism within the field of archaeology in modern Poland is not viewed as a developing problem, the pattern of negative effects resulting from this extremism have been seen multiple times throughout Polish history. In an attempt to validate the competency of ethnic Poles in governing their own nation-state, an ongoing failure to recognize the material culture of other groups has prevailed. This has led to debates over the significance of monuments and identity of minority groups living alongside Poles. A vast change in the way the archaeological record is interpreted is necessary in Poland’s future if these nationalistic biases are to be avoided. Archaeology is valuable for gaining insight into the past, but this value is greatly diminished when the field is used to develop one-sided historical narratives that determine the public’s perceptions of history to enforce nationalist viewpoints.

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References


This essay examines the rise of guerrilla militant groups in the Philippines that fought against Japanese occupation during WWII. Socioeconomic and political conditions in rural villages, as well as the natural environment of Luzon, the largest island in the Philippines, influenced the motives and strategies of guerrilla groups. While many militant factions aligned with US forces to regain Filipino control over their communities, the Hukbalahaps in central Luzon had motivations that arose decades earlier out of economic unrest. Furthermore, conflict within the barrios arose out of the struggle between Japanese-supporting elites and other guerrilla-supporting village members. To explore the experiences of guerrilla fighters and barrio members, this essay draws upon firsthand accounts from my grandparents’ childhoods, as well as several books that document the dynamics of the Filipino resistance during Japanese occupation. This work aims to highlight the fact that insurgencies do not exist inside a vacuum. Instead, rebel actors require the support of local civilians in order to survive.

Introduction

The Japanese began bombing the Philippine islands on December 8, 1941, less than 24 hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. At this point, the Philippines were an American colony and military stronghold, one strategically close to the Japanese opposition. Key battles were won by the Japanese, forcing the US military and their commander General Douglas MacArthur to retreat to Australia. This initiated the four-year occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese. The occupation was marked with Filipino guerrilla resistance, some of which was part of the US military efforts. This essay will focus on Luzon, the largest of the Philippines’ more than seven thousand islands. My grandparents, who lived on the northern coast of Luzon during the occupation, provided invaluable first-hand accounts about what the resistance looked like in the barrio, or neighborhood. Everyone in the barrio community, whether fighters or civilians, played a role in either helping the guerrilla resistance or aiding the Japanese. Furthermore, differing socioeconomic conditions in northern and central Luzon led to unique motivations.
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among militant factions. In this way, a close study of rural Filipino villages in WWII provides an interesting example of how the existing social structures, political landscape and surrounding environment influenced the wartime dynamic both in the barrio and among guerrilla groups.

Part I: Socioeconomic Conditions

The road to Natba, one of the 43 barrios which comprise the Bacarra municipality, is lined with rice patties for miles on end, jungled mountains breaking up the skyline in the far distance. These are the coastal lowlands of Ilocos Norte. My grandparents both spent their childhood in the barrios of Bacarra, the setting of which was not too different when I visited in 2014 than it was during the Japanese occupation 70 years prior. The Philippine climate can generally be described as having two seasons: very hot and very rainy. I was caught in the blazing hot summer season during my stay. Fortunately, there was an air conditioner in my grandfather’s family home to make sleeping bearable, but that was a luxury that most houses in the barrio could not afford. Daily village life is almost ritualistic. Fishermen would wake up at sunrise, around 5 AM during the summer, and head to the beach for the morning catch. During the afternoon, rice farmers would lay out the day’s harvest on the road to dry in the hot sun. The smell of the seawater half a mile from the town, the occasional moo from the carabao or crow from the rooster, the scattered ruins left over from fifteenth century Spanish colonial architecture – these familiar sounds, smells and sights jogged the memories of my grandparents, who recalled stories of their experience during the war. Understanding the geographical setting and daily life of rural Filipinos will be especially important when analyzing the reasons for uprisings like the Hukbalahap movement, as well as how guerrilla groups operated to resist the Japanese forces.

Leading up to the war, the prevailing socioeconomic system in the rural Philippines barrio followed a hacienda structure, a landowner-tenant system that emerged during Spanish colonization. Hacienderos, the rural elites, owned dozens of large farm plots, while smaller land owners controlled one or two farms and comprised the “upper middle class” (Lapham 1996, 96). Tenants, or the lower class, worked the fields and made up the majority of the barrio’s citizens.
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Tracing it back to the sixteenth century, wealthy Filipinos and Spaniards turned plots of land into rice and sugar farming estates, on which peasants would work and live (Lapham 1996, 126). By the early 1900s, this system had evolved into a paternalistic relationship between landowner and tenant. The tenant would normally be paid enough to feed himself and his family, as well as being able to keep a portion of the harvest. To prevent starvation during low-yield bouts, the landowner would frequently provide rice loans, or *rasyons*, to the tenants for no interest (Kerkvliet 1977, 7). It was a guarantee that the peasant farmers would have a minimum subsistence to survive on. In this system, landowners took on a moral responsibility for their tenants. Events were hosted in the town square to maintain unity, and the general well-being of the lower class was not overlooked.

The landowner would benefit from his tenants' loyalty in order to gain the political support needed to run for government positions. The Filipino government system in the rural areas included the mayor, who led the entire municipality, the captain, who led the barrio, and a number of local councilmen. Most of these government officials in the barrio were land-owning elites, wealthy enough to own farms, but likely not wealthy enough to have a better life in the city. Their political stature among the local communities became important factors when the Japanese occupation spread across the island.

Following the American defeat of the Spanish in 1898, the *hacienda* social structure remained relatively stable in Northern Luzon. Elsewhere, however, the growing influence of American capitalism contributed to the erosion of the relationship between the peasant and the landowner. Starting in the early 1900’s, the impact of American colonialism was felt most harshly in Central Luzon, where the farmland for cash crops was the most fruitful, and therefore the most profitable (Kerkvliet 1977, 23). *Hacenderos* began to run their farms more like a business and less like a family, a change from the traditional norms. The biggest manifestation of this trend was the elimination of the *rasyons*. Rice loans increasingly either were refused or came with exorbitantly high interest rates (Kerkvliet 1977, 17). This left most peasants at the risk of malnutrition or starvation. Compounding this problem was the fact that landowners became
increasingly aloof, often hiring middleman supervisors to watch over the field hands, making it much more difficult for the peasants to voice a complaint or a need.

In the name of efficiency, landowners also started dealing with tenants’ problems as groups rather than individually, as was done before. This consequently led to the formation of union-like organizations. The new factions were not initially violent. Most simply campaigned for rights to a larger share of the harvest, which had decreased over the previous several years (Kerkvliet 1977, 30). Strikes and protests became more common, with the rare violent attack on the landowner or his farm supervisor. Early calls for reform aimed to go back to the “good old times” when tenants were treated relatively fairly. By the end of the 1930s, groups of reformers organized themselves into the KPMP, or Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas (National Society of Peasants in the Philippines). There were other organizations, but the KPMP was the largest (Kerkvliet 1977, 31). Tensions boiled over once the landowners started to order the local police to “shoot on sight suspicious characters” during the strikes, which led KPMP members to begin arming themselves (Kerkvliet 1977, 57).

This unrest in Central Luzon had major effects on how the Japanese occupation played out in that region. The differing socioeconomic landscapes in Northern and Central Luzon set the stage for the complex interplay of characters during the war. As Filipinos organized to counter the Japanese forces, members of the KPMP eventually formed the the militant guerrilla group known as the Hukbalahaps, who often clashed with American-aligned guerilla factions in the more northern areas. Furthermore, in the barrios, one’s position in the stratified political system often dictated which side individual community members aligned with. The following two sections will delve into the formation of militant guerrilla groups, as well as the interesting dynamics that occurred inside the villages.

**Part II: Guerrillas**

According to many Filipinos, the first week of the Japanese invasion was the most difficult part of the entire occupation due to the sheer chaos. As Japanese troops moved north from Manila after the initial attack, news spread quickly to municipalities in Luzon and Ilocos.
Norte. My grandmother recalled fearful conversation among the community members when Japanese troops had reportedly reached nearby towns. This prompted many families to flee their barrios for the safer mountain regions, where it would be more difficult for the enemy troops to access. Some searched for relatives in other villages, only to find that the ones they were looking for had already evacuated (Kerkvliet 1977, 62). In the middle of the chaos, looting on the behalf of other Filipinos became commonplace as fleeing families inevitably left their possessions behind. These raids, as many had expected, were violent from the beginning. The Japanese soldiers came into the barrios firing rifles and throwing grenades. One town leader in the barrio of San Ricardo, in Central Luzon, recalled that the raiders “shot carabao and anything else that moved” (Kerkvliet 1977, 62). The frequent burning of houses compounded the disruption.

After the initial Japanese attacks, guerrilla groups quickly assembled in the forested mountains, safe from Japanese infiltration at the time. Familiarity with the extreme climate and geography gave the Filipinos a distinct home field advantage. The mountains tended to be less developed, with few roads connecting the various villages. During the four to five month long rainy season, the mountain rivers would turn into “raging torrents,” preventing the inexperienced Japanese from crossing safely (Norling 1999, 88). Thus, the rain provided safe cover for Filipino forces to travel. Once the rainy season gave way to the dry months, anyone could see across the flat rice patties for miles (Lapham 1996, 98). As a result, troop movement on both sides was largely confined to the night.

Guerrilla forces were not one unified entity, but rather were many smaller troops specific to their region. The closest form of cooperated activity was the United States of America Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), assemblies of Filipino fighters led and trained by US military captains. Some captains were white, some were Filipinos who had lived in the United States before the war. The Philippine Scouts, a large organization of American-led Filipino guerrilla groups established during the 1920s to counter previous insurrection, joined forces with the USAFFE during the war. The Scouts, having been trained as part of the US military, were considered the most capable fighters (Lapham 1996, 4). In Baccara, many young men, including
my grandfather’s eldest brother, went to the mountains to join the Scouts. These men, as my grandmother describes, were relatively young, but often had wives and families whom they left behind. Structure within the guerrilla camps was reflective of the barrio social structure. Officers were most likely the sons of landowners, and below them were the tenant farmers (Lapham 1996, 96). Many other Filipino-led guerrilla groups formed, including the well-known Hukbalahaps.

For the same reasons as many other Filipino guerrillas, namely revenge and a sense of obligation to country, KPMP chapters in Central Luzon also formed their own fighting groups. Leaders from the relatively small communist party in Central Luzon, the PKP, organized KPMP members into the Hukbalahap guerrilla force dedicated primarily to fighting the Japanese. The fact that local government officials and landowning elites largely supported the Japanese continued to fuel the anger of the KPMP (Kerkvliet 1977, 42). Characterizing the entire Hukbalahap movement as communist can be misleading. Most of the troop captains were indeed prominent members of the PKP and the Socialist party, but the peasant volunteers were not motivated by Marxist ideology (Lapham 1996, 154). Nevertheless, almost all wanted a change in the deteriorating economic system.

There were many reasons why the Filipinos tended to side with the American military rather than the Japanese. Revenge, however, was likely the most powerful motivation for many (Kerkvliet 1977, 68). Almost everyone had lost a family member or friend during the initial Japanese invasion. Some people had lost homes, too. However, more strategic reasons for American support were also important. The Americans, as stated in the Philippine Constitution, had promised to grant the Philippines independence in 1944, a transition that was interrupted by the Japanese occupation. Furthermore, the Filipinos had faith in the American military, fueled by wild stories of hi-tech bombs, walls of fire, and magnet-like weapons that sucked in Japanese soldiers (Lapham 1996, 12). Some Filipinos also told tales of how Douglas MacArthur was an omniscient genius with the ability to foil any Japanese military surprise (Lapham 1996, 12). Perhaps decades of colonial rule had fostered a paternalistic attitude among Filipinos towards the Americans, or perhaps first-hand accounts of cruelty and brutality by Japanese
soldiers during the raids turned off the Filipinos from any sense of support for their new rulers. Regardless, there was a level of faith and respect that Filipinos tended to give American soldiers that they did not afford the Japanese.

Communication, and therefore cooperation, was a struggle. Each guerrilla group tended to be separated by geographical barriers such as rivers, dense forests, or mountain ranges. Radios and radio engineers were in short supply. Lapham, a guerrilla officer himself, said the most common form of communication between groups was a system of runners who carried information between units (Lapham 1996, 74). Runners also shuttled intelligence information to Manila, where it could be transmitted to General MacArthur’s station in Australia. Interestingly, however, Lapham notes that the task of carrying information was secondary to simply giving jobs to eager volunteers (Lapham 1996, 74). In other words, the role itself was in some cases a tool for morale. Everybody wanted to feel useful.

Despite a general consensus among guerrilla groups that the Japanese forces were the enemy, considerable infighting among Filipino groups diverted a significant amount of time and resources. While many of the troops were led by American military personnel with an organized goal, the vast majority of guerrilla participants were Filipinos with varying motivations. Most volunteers fought out of hatred for the Japanese or a sense of pride for country, but others saw joining guerrilla groups as a way to plunder or settle family vendettas by attacking nearby barrios (Lapham 1996, 103). Misaligned goals within groups contributed to instability, while poor communication and differing objectives between groups led to bigger conflicts. Some officers did not tolerate certain levels of violence or torture perpetrated by those under their command, and some officers despised the cruel methods of nearby commanding officers (Lapham 1996, 106). However, the most consistent pattern of conflict was a result of the very nature of guerrilla organizations. Lapham writes that “to be successful, a guerrilla leader must become the de facto ruler of the territory” (Lapham 1996, 76). Guerrilla groups relied heavily on support and supplies from the communities in which they were based. If one guerrilla group moved into another’s territory, it was a very tangible threat to the survivability of the original
troop. Thus, the hesitance for one group to stray too far from its home base made collaboration between groups even more difficult.

The most detrimental cross-group conflicts often involved the Hukbalaps, or Huks, from Central Luzon. Widely described as a communist movement, the Huks were starkly anti-Japanese during the war. Yet unlike many guerrilla groups in the Philippines, the Huks’ motivations grew out of animosity towards the land owners over the previous few decades. Some accounts claimed that the Huks viewed the USAFFE as just as much an enemy as the Japanese, pointing to Huk propaganda that called out US forces as “seeking to make Filipinos slaves of America” (Lapham 1996, 133). Lapham recounts that the Huks were “treacherous adversaries” (Lapham 1996, 133). Frequent conflicts were most commonly attributed to the fact that the Huks were politically motivated for different reasons than the US-led military forces. Also, the Huks tended to be more aggressive in their attacks on the Japanese, which undermined American-led guerrillas’ “lie-low” strategy at some points during the occupation (Kerkvliet 1977, 94).

While the US aimed for a unified Filipino fighting force across the country, guerrilla groups were more accurately an extension of the local communities upon which they relied. Guerrilla fighters fought to protect the villages from which they came from, and in turn the supporting villagers sought to provide supplies and morale to the militants. Thus, the barrio was indispensable to the survival of any guerrilla group in that territory. The next section of this essay will discuss the various means by which local communities propped up the guerrillas, as well as the difficulties that came with covertly undermining the Japanese attempts to occupy the region.

Part III: The Barrio

Soon after winning key battles and taking control of the municipalities, the Japanese began implementing pro-Japanese governments within the local villages. As the Japanese tended to not be threats to the local elites’ positions within the community, most became tolerant of and sympathetic to the occupation. Other officials were released from Japanese
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prison on the condition that they would support and work with the new regime (Kerkvliet 1977, 63). The Japanese also gained control of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), the police force that was present in all of the municipalities. PC officers were mostly Filipinos, paid by the Japanese high command (Kerkvliet 1977, 63). Furthermore, the Japanese set up their own education programs. My grandmother told of the Japanese forcing schoolchildren to learn the Japanese language. There was strong resistance to this by the Filipinos, who took great pride in their home country. Lapham writes that many Filipinos were even sent to Japan to be educated with the intention of bringing them back to the Philippines to form “puppet republics” (Lapham 1996, 213).

What contributed to the bulk of the drama during the occupation were the loyalties of the civilians in the barrios. While most non-fighters supported the guerrillas and detested the Japanese, there were some pro-Japanese community members who provided the soldiers with intel on guerrilla troops. My grandmother estimates that 20 percent of the barrio was pro-Japanese, however this estimate may be high considering that Ilocos Norte was “notoriously rife with pro-Japanese elements at the time” (Norling 1999, 114). Most of the Japanese sympathizers were land-owning elites or government officials with the understanding that the new regime would allow them to retain their positions of power. In Natba, where my grandfather grew up, the captain of the barrio and the councilmen cooperated with the Japanese. The mayor of the entire Baccara municipality was also pro-Japanese. At one point, my grandfather’s father, also a landowner, was taken to be executed by the local government for not cooperating with the occupation. Fortunately, by one way or another he was spared. According to my grandmother, other village members gave up information to the Japanese soldiers simply out fear for their lives, an emotion that should not be forgotten given the situation.

The majority of the community fully supported the guerrilla resistance to the Japanese. Almost everyone had ties to some of the young men who joined the Scouts or another troop. Many barrio civilians understandably kept their loyalties close to the chest. These “fence-sitters” realized that they would be punished by someone, whether it was the Japanese or the Filipino
guerrillas, if they committed themselves to the losing side (Lapham 1996, 78). Therefore, the topic was often talked about only very carefully.

The Philippine Constabulary, the police force, had been supposedly controlled by the Japanese after the initial invasion. However, their loyalties to the occupation were weak. Many were veterans from some of the first battles against the Japanese and, despite retraining by the Japanese high command, still felt a sense of Filipino pride (Lapham 1996, 136). Most took the policing job simply because they needed to feed their families. Guerrilla commanders understood this and often held back from ambushing the PC patrols (Lapham 1996, 137). From this emerged a sense of unspoken mutual cordiality. Some guerrilla fighters even gained intel by dressing in PC uniforms and pretending to work beside the guards (Lapham 1996, 137). At other times, PC patrols would tell guerrilla groups where they could find ammunition and food.

Raids were common in the barrios during the occupation. These were the most memorable times during the war for my grandparents. Village members would often hear of the Japanese soldiers raiding nearby barrios, prompting community members to prepare for the impending violence. My grandmother’s family had dug a hideout pit in their backyard, stocked with food and camouflaged with sticks and leaves. In my grandpa’s barrio, men would spread out every hundred yards from the beach to the town, creating an alarm relay. When the signal was sounded, my grandpa, along with the other village boys, would run out into the rice patties where the Japanese would not look. In some barrios, mass evacuations occurred, but this carried the risk of death from disease or malnutrition if the people did not return for some time (Norling 1999, 137). On multiple occasions, Japanese soldiers would storm into the village and drag twenty or thirty young men out of their houses. They took the young men to the city center to publicly question and behead. The goal was to punish and remove civilians who fed and sheltered the Filipino resistance fighters, as well as instill fear into onlooking citizens (Norling 1999, 137). Meanwhile, pro-Japanese councilmen would give information as to who were the most staunch guerrilla supporters. Both the Japanese and Filipino guerrilla troops knew that controlling the support of the civilians was of utmost importance to winning the war.
Resistance in the Philippines During WWII

As my grandparents describe, after the Japanese raiders cleared out, the guerrilla fighters would come down from the mountains to resupply and root out anyone who gave up information to the Japanese soldiers. Perhaps feeling the need to match the violence of the enemy, these instances were sometimes just as cruel. Accounts from one guerrilla troop in the Abra province revealed that some infantry members used torture before killing the pro-Japanese civilians (Norling 1999, 111). My grandmother recalled guerrilla fighters pulling suspected pro-Japanese men from out of their homes, parading them through the streets, and executing them in the town square. Guerrilla captains believed it necessary to kill anyone siding with the enemy, as this was the only way to make civilians in the barrio feel safe about providing aid to the guerrillas (Norling 1999, 110).

No guerrilla group could survive without support from the local community. Even at the risk of punishment or death from the Japanese, civilians provided guerrillas with food, supplies, and moral support. As one Scouts leader Captain Ralph Praeger wrote in his memoir:

“They – men, women, and children – made heroic sacrifices to keep the resistance movement alive. Whatever credit may go to the actual guerrillas themselves can never be so great as that which belongs to the civilians who supported them, and who bore the brunt of the enemy’s anger and reprisals” (Norling 1999, xi).

The most frequent and most important role of the barrio was providing the local guerrilla group with food. While the Japanese closely monitored how the farmworkers’ daily yield was distributed, guerrillas urged them to hide away some portion of their rice harvest for patriotic reasons (Lapham 1996, 84). Civilians were often eager to help out the resistance movement. Simply on an economic level, the IOUs that American troop leaders would offer in payment were often more attractive than the cheaply printed Japanese occupation bills, of which few trusted the future value (Lapham 1996, 85). Other guerrilla groups would merely seize whatever supplies they needed.

Weapons and ammunition were another necessity for guerrilla forces. Even the US commanded USAFFE troops were short on guns, especially at the beginning of the occupation.
Many Filipino land owners already had rifles or handguns and, if they supported the guerrillas, sold their weapons to the fighters. Some municipalities would provide money every few months to the local troop for supplies and weapons (Lapham 1996, 82).

Building a network of trustworthy civilians was also essential. Guerrilla troops needed reliable safe houses to conduct meetings, as well as guides to show them the best way to reach the next town (Lapham 1996, 24). Additionally, medical care was frequently lacking in the guerrilla camps, so troop members would find dependable doctors in each barrio in the area.

Lastly, one of the most overlooked forms of support that civilians provided during those trying times was that of morale. In the barrio of Solana, “no fewer than five thousand” civilians gathered outside to wish the guerrillas good luck as they initially left towards the mountains (Norling 1999, 58). Midnight masses were also frequently held to pray for friends and family who had gone off to fight.

Morale and optimism among both the guerrilla fighters and the civilians turned out to be the key to outlasting the Japanese occupation. Among Filipinos living in the barrio, laughter was one mechanism with which to boost morale. While Filipinos were understandably afraid of the Japanese soldiers, fear was often interrupted by humor during weeks without combat activity. One Filipino guerilla officer, Arthur Furagganan, recounted that “at first they had been afraid, but soon were able to laugh at their conquerors because the latter were so unintentionally comical” (Norling 1999, 78). For example, some Filipinos thought the Japanese soldiers walked like a vaudeville comedian. A boy from the barrio might follow a walking soldier, mocking his “waddle-like” gait, causing a scene of muffled laughter (Norling 1999, 78). Other instances of humor came as a result of botched Japanese propaganda efforts. Japanese propaganda messages over the radio tended to be spoken in badly mispronounced Tagalog, which led to a considerable amount of amusement (Lapham 1996, 213). Furthermore, Japanese radio announcements tended to make claims of overwhelming Filipino support for the new Japanese occupation. In reality however, people in the communities knew from everyday conversation that this was far from accurate and soon turned to chuckling at the radio announcements.
Audacious young newsboys would sometimes yell, “Read all about it! Turn this around and you'll have the truth” (Lapham 1996, 215).

Propaganda was considered by the guerrilla leaders as one of their main mechanisms of winning over the support of the community and keeping morale high. Lapham writes, “one of my main tasks was to bolster civilian morale, so as I moved from town to town, I gave lots of speeches” (Lapham 1996, 88). Some guerrilla troops sent “truth squads” into the barrios to dispel Japanese propaganda, often portraying the American forces as extremely close to victory (Norling 1999, 133). While it is difficult to measure the overall magnitude of the guerrilla’s military effect during the occupation, the optimism of the Filipino people and their willingness to support the guerrillas under treacherous conditions certainly allowed them to survive until the Americans overtook the Japanese in 1945.

**Conclusion**

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines during World War II was a tumultuous time in Filipino history. It is difficult to grasp the true level of destruction that occurred over the four years. Around six percent of the Filipino population was killed (Norling 1999, 197). The city of Manila, previously a jewel of southeast Asia, was decimated. Every citizen in the Philippines was affected by the war one way or another. Similarly, every citizen had a role to play during the occupation, whether it was fighting, actively supporting the guerrillas, or simply trying to play their cards right when questioned about where their loyalties lay. Moreover, existing socioeconomic structures influenced who supported which side, and even served as the original reason for the Huks to take up arms. The violent chaos was paralleled by the convoluted network of characters and perspectives during the occupation, making the Philippines an interesting and important area of study.

As a case study, investigating Filipino guerrilla militant groups in relation to the local barrios can help us better understand the factors that allow insurgencies to survive. Increasingly, anthropologists and historians who study insurgency and rebellion acknowledge that active fighting groups can only succeed with the peripheral support of the community. This
support can take the form of supplying and housing rebel actors or simply staying quiet when prodded by the opposition. Analyzing this segment of Filipino history can also lend emphasis to the fact that the underlying socioeconomic and political landscapes, not just of nations, but of small villages, can determine what motivates certain groups of people and ultimately can affect how insurgencies are shaped.

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Underprivileged and vulnerable men in countries from the Global South are exploited domestically and internationally for profit through various forms of human trafficking. Anti-human trafficking advocates often include the organ trade under the umbrella of human trafficking. The organ trade involves multiple components and consists of various practices, e.g. transplant tourism, government response and law enforcement, international advertising, and individual organ brokers. Yet, the nuances of the organ trade become muddled within the universalizing framework of human trafficking. This paper explores trafficking in commercial organ markets, using the illegal kidney trade in Baseco, Manila, as a springboard for our discussion. This paper provides a brief background on the rise of the kidney market in the Philippines and argues that various socioeconomic factors facilitate the market’s continued prevalence. Extreme poverty and kidney providers’ relationships with organ brokers offer lenses through which to extrapolate kidney providers’ motivations in the commercial organ markets. This paper concludes with a discussion of the risks and consequences providers experience after giving up a kidney, and further recommends a closer examination of the anti-human trafficking responses of the Philippine government.

Introduction

Desperate for money, Neil sought out a broker in 2001 to sell one of his kidneys in the thriving underground kidney market of the Philippines. He had migrated to the slum areas of Manila in 1985 and worked primarily as a tricycle driver, but the money Neil earned from this occupation was not enough to care for his sick father. Upon hearing of the potential for monetary compensation from selling an organ, he thought he had found hope and headed straight to a public medical center in Manila where he had his kidney removed (Gatarin 2012, 24). However, Neil’s story becomes disheartening when we learn of the complications after his procedure. The broker paid for Neil’s medical examinations leading up to his operation, but
their relationship disintegrated immediately after Neil’s operation. Although Neil received the money to pay for medical care for his father, he had no chances of discussing post-operative care with the broker. Therefore, his health deteriorated, his body weakened, and he could no longer perform his job.

Neil’s story represents the many organ transplantations that arose from the Philippine government’s promotion of the country’s participation in the global health tourism industry. Medical anthropologists Elizabeth Roberts and Nancy Scheper-Hughes define medical migration in the context of medical tourism in their article, “Introduction: Medical Migrations.” Under their definition, the medical tourism industry consists of two distinct populations: “affluent Westerners taking advantage of the health care resources in poor nations or poor and medically disenfranchised persons desperately seeking life-saving treatments” (Roberts and Scheper-Hughes 2011, 2). Medical tourism frequently includes agencies—and in some cases individuals – that seek to connect a prospective patient with a service provider. These encounters are often necessary in transplant tourism, where foreign recipients suffering from failing organs travel to countries in the Global South for various transplants. However, the inclusion of live organ providers (e.g., kidney providers) and the shortage of organs have generated considerable debate amongst national authorities and the public, most notably over whether these transactions constitute human trafficking. These debates were spurred by several cases in which organs were removed from live providers, or the selling of their organs under exploitative conditions.

Human trafficking constitutes a violation of human rights and exploits those most vulnerable in society. Certainly, the global increase has influenced ethical perceptions that the industry takes advantage of impoverished individuals. For many potential organ providers in the Global South, a common method of selling an organ was the recruitment by brokers who roam slums and run-down neighborhoods. Brokers then advertise the organs of these individuals to wealthy foreigners in desperate need of organ transplants. However, in extrapolating organ providers’ motivations for becoming involved in the commercial organ markets, we must
consider socioeconomic inequalities before indiscriminately categorizing the transplant industry under the universal framework of human trafficking.

What is transplant tourism?

To begin to understand organ transplantation in the Philippines and its marginalizing effects, we must begin with an overview of the history of transplant tourism. The practice of transplant tourism emerged following the development and widespread availability of the immunosuppressant drug cyclosporine. As an immunosuppressant, this drug prevents the body from rejecting a transplanted organ (Scheper-Hughes 2000, 194). In conjunction with improved surgical experience and the increased likelihood of matching patients with organ providers from distant countries, the Philippine government formally launched the Philippine Medical Tourism Program (PMTP) on November 20 and 21, 2006. The initiative was established in partnership with the Department of Health and Department of Tourism. The PMTP was a Public-Private partnership meant to attract foreign clients by providing medical and wellness services as a tourist package. According to Philippine Quarterly journalist Kaira Alburo, a unique feature of this package was the abundance of “medical examinations and treatments, cosmetic surgery, dental services, ophthalmology procedures, traditional and alternative healthcare, and organ transplants” (Alburo 2007, 197). Just as increasing global needs for kidney transplantations were outpacing the development of donation programs from deceased individuals, the government promoted the country as a destination for live organ providers through the website Tourism-Review.com, which stated, “A kidney transplantation in Davao and Cebu is offered at $60,000 whereas the procedure could cost $140,000 in other countries” (Tourism Review 2006). Through this initiative, however, the Philippines found itself in a conundrum in which the generated economic revenue did not benefit everyone, especially the country’s most impoverished. Offering world-class service to foreigners did not necessarily mean Filipinos could afford the services themselves.
Kidneys for Sale: Socioeconomic Effects of a Nationally Endorsed Prohibition

In 2003, the former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enacted the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act, which subjected the loosely regulated organ market to anti-trafficking guidelines. The law stated:

the State shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures and development of programs that will promote human dignity, protect the people from any threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate trafficking in persons and mitigate pressures for involuntary migration and servitude of persons (R.A. 9208 2003).

However, given the promotion of the country as a hotspot for live organ providers, a disconnect seemed to exist between the government’s ambitions and the full implementation of the Act’s guidelines. Though rules and regulations were present, the Philippines saw no convictions in cases regarding the organ trade, and instead the World Health Organization categorized the Philippines as a major country destination for organ transplantation, along with China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Colombia (Reuters Staff 2007). Geographically, two of the defining features of globalization are the reinforcement of existing disparities between the Global North and Global South in accordance with newly emerging spatial expressions of inequality. This geography is explained in part by the high levels of economic marginality and vulnerability in the majority of developing countries. However, the effects of globalization can also be seen in the health care systems in these countries as they are driven heavily by the desire to attract international transplant patients who can afford their services. Amongst the countries involved in the transplant tourism sector, traveling patients tended to choose the Philippines because “Filipino kidneys [were] the cheapest in the organ market costing only US $1,500” (Gatarin 2012, 17). Thus, organ transplants have become a staple feature of the Philippines, particularly in disadvantaged regions where providing kidneys allowed for an easy way to make money and subsequently pay for medical care and/or support families.

The lack of regulation by the Departments of Health and Tourism strengthened the relationship between transplant tourism and organ selling before it caught the attention of the
Kidney Sales, Organ Brokering, and Transplant Tourism in the Philippines

Philippine government. This relationship was especially pronounced in 2007, when Osaka University Professor Yosuke Shimazono reported, “There were more foreigners (536 patients) than Filipino (510) patients who received kidney transplants in the Philippines that year” (Padilla et al. 2013, 918). Suspecting that more foreigners would maintain the industry and further exploit impoverished Filipino families, the Department of Health established a national ban on the kidney transplants to foreigners unless they were related to the donors by blood (Conde 2008). The results following the enactment of this ban were astounding. Benita Padilla et al. noted, “The annual number of foreign (mostly of Middle Eastern origin) transplant recipients fell from 531 in 2007 to two in 2011” (2013, 918). Similarly, the number of transplant operations on Filipino natives also decreased from 510 to 381. Although the Philippines’ health policies restricted kidney transplants to related recipients, a loophole behind this ban existed like other historical prohibitions of substances such as alcohol and illicit drugs. The trade continued underground. Roger Lee Mendoza of Wilmington University revealed through his study on the growing black-market trade that over ninety percent of the vendors reported their kidneys were given to an unrelated recipient (Mendoza 2010, 103). This finding was noteworthy due to the national ban on commercial organ transplantation. Unfortunately, the Philippines failed to enforce its existing laws and health policies, thereby maintaining its status as one of the largest destinations for kidney transplants globally.

Case Study: Bataan Shipping and Engineering Company

Although kidney transplants to foreigners had been banned, this did not necessarily lead to a complete eradication of the industry. For instance, National Singapore University researcher Sallie Yea has extensively documented the poverty at the Bataan Shipping and Engineering Company (Baseco) in the Tondo district of Manila, as well as the male workers involved in the transplant industry. The economic desperation that forced residents to give up their kidneys for transplant into the bodies of wealthy foreigners was alarming. Hoping to find better opportunities in the nation’s capital, people from different parts of the Philippine archipelago flocked to Manila only to discover that they could not secure a stable job nor afford
housing. Rather than returning home, however, they instead held onto their hopes and found residence within the slum areas of Baseco. Given such economic circumstances, “approximately 3,000 of Baseco’s 100,000 or so residents have sold a kidney” (Alburo 2007, 199).

For organ providers who are in financial straits, monetary compensation is often the main motivation to sell one of their kidneys. Although, before this act can be framed within the narrative of human trafficking, we must understand what kidney donation can mean in the context of Baseco’s living conditions. To briefly provide a glimpse of the working men’s economic situations, Yea found the majority of men shared similar characteristics: they had obtained minimal years of education, had dependents to support (ranging from 3 to 13), and held low-paying jobs such as construction worker, pedicab driver, and kargador (carrier of goods) (2010, 363). However, their hard-earned money was only ever enough to provide a meal or two for the day. One past provider stated, “I earn PP 250 a day and I need to support five people, including myself. One meal is PP 100 so if we want to eat three times a day the money is not enough” (Yea 2010, 363). As the heads of their households, Filipino custom also expects these men to be the breadwinners of their family. Therefore, selling their kidneys arose from the daily challenge of survival and the never-ending need for money. These problems were temporarily mitigated by the money they could easily earn from a single transaction. In this respect, poverty (despite the men holding paying jobs) is the key factor of vulnerability that propagates the transplant industry.

**The Role of Organ Brokers**

Complicating the landscape of whether organ transplantation satisfies the framework of human trafficking are a multitude of social conditions that generate differential thought processes conducive to individuals agreeing to the operation. Interviews with organ providers indicated that brokers were routinely around the area soliciting potential providers with monetary benefits and medical gratuities. They played an essential role in “connect[ing] international patients with sufficient funds to poor individuals willing to exchange kidneys for cash” (Turner 2009, 193). A part of their job was to advertise their services in developed
Kidney Sales, Organ Brokering, and Transplant Tourism in the Philippines

countries to find wealthy buyers and make a profit. Moreover, these brokers often lived in the vicinity of impoverished neighborhoods, making it substantially easier to approach potential individuals. As one past organ provider stated, “My recruiter comes from Baseco and he goes around and asks everyone if they want to sell a kidney. The recruiter keeps following and persisting until he gets enough ‘yeses’ to fill his quota” (Yea 210, 367). From this approach, the kidney being provided for a price was neither a random nor spontaneous occurrence, nor was it a situation where the individual was forced. The providers themselves, after much contemplation with the information brokers gave, often decided the well-being of their families outweighed the risks of the operations.

The role of organ brokers living in impoverished communities had an undeniably strong link to the increased prevalence of kidney transplants in Baseco. Aside from the brokers actively seeking participants, in some situations, some men personally sought out a broker or someone to help arrange for the sale of their kidney. Leo, a former worker from Baseco, for example, made the decision to sell his kidney when he was an 18-year-old student to help pay for his mother’s foreign-brand medicine. Leo had no knowledge about organ transplantations prior to his operation, but he still approached a local agent who went by the alias Baboy. Instead of attending school, Leo and Baboy headed for St. Luke’s Hospital in Quezon City, Manila, to report his blood type and sign the consent form agreeing to surrender his kidney. When asked if he was certain he wanted to go through with the process, Leo demonstrated his masculinity and responded, “Lalaki akong kausap mo (You are talking to a man)” (Ventura 2014). Leo was promised PP 100,000 for providing his kidney, an act Leo wanted to believe was out of altruism toward someone in need. Another organ provider, Jess, related that he went to the same hospital and had his kidney removed after his neighbor did the same. He also said that, “I didn’t really sell. It’s just a donation. Of course it’s just a donation” (Gatarin 2012, 28). Lack of brute force was evident in these two experiences, and the providers believed their decisions were made out of charity rather than a desire for personal gain. How kidney providers perceived themselves during and after their operations legitimized the act in their mind. Although providers qualified the operation as an act of altruism, this perspective complicated organ transplantation under
circumstances defined by the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. Moreover, altruism may not be the best grounds on which to exempt organ transplantation from the human trafficking law, especially in situations in which providers wanted to opt out before the operation but were ultimately pressured to give up their kidneys.

**Implications for the Organ Providers**

Admittedly, kidney transplants hold some risks for the living donor. In Leo’s situation, although cyclosporine was recognized as an anti-rejection drug, the hospital he went to for his kidney removal subjected him to multiple intense medical examinations to determine whether his kidney would be compatible with the recipient. As inadequate testing and screening of organs could also place recipients at increased risk of infections, Leo was further “examined for Hepatitis A and B. He had chest X-rays, ECGs, and MRIs” (Ventura 2014). The brokers usually paid for these medical procedures, and the recipients would later reimburse them. Therefore, if donors considered backing out of the donation, they often had no choice but to go through with the process as they held no means of paying back the broker. Another past kidney provider, Al, fled the hospital the night before his operation and found himself tracked by his broker. Because Al and his broker lived in the same community, their relationship as neighbors would be crippled should he back out. The broker, who had invested considerable money on Al’s medical tests, urged Al to reconsider his decision, stressing that “the patient was seriously ill and would not survive without the transplantation” (Yea 2010, 368). Al changed his mind after this confrontation. In this dynamic, the choice to not proceed with transplantation was undermined not only by the costs incurred from the medical examinations but also by the responsibility of someone else’s survival. Despite kidney transplantations being nominally voluntary, the issue of life or death elevates the situation from one solely incentivized by money. Contrary to the human trafficking framework, neither coercion nor abuse of the power dynamic between the broker and the provider ultimately convinced Leo and Al to submit to their operations, but rather through the guilt and obligation that they felt toward their recipients.
In exploring the financial aspects of kidney transplantations in the Philippines, the brokers’ presence in these transactions suggests why the industry is widely regarded as a form of human trafficking. Exploitation in this industry is characterized by the inadequate compensation that the brokers offer even when they initially attracted potential organ providers with the promise of large amounts of money. According to Hillsborough Community College Professor Athena Smith in 2012, wealthy patients pay a price ranging from US$30,000-60,000, with most of the money ending up in the brokers’ pockets and less than the promised US$3,000 going to the providers (Smith 2012, 3). Therefore, the brokers did not fulfill their part of the agreement with the providers. The organ providers became trapped in a predicament in which they could do nothing to mitigate their outcome due to the illegality of the industry. As one past provider who sold his kidney following the 2008 ban on transplantation between non-blood relatives reflected, “My kidney is already gone and it is illegal to sell a kidney so I can’t make a complaint to the police or anything” (Yea 2010, 369). The provider had no recourse to pursue the additional money that he was promised but did not receive. The lack of communication between the brokers and the kidney providers contributed to the discrepancy in the resulting payout. Because most providers did not ask for a specific price for their kidney, the brokers had the freedom to establish the value for themselves but report a lower number to the providers. For example, the asking price from a provider in the United States in 2007 was US$30,000, but the price in the Philippines was more than ten times lower in 2008 (Mendoza 2010, 103). In hindsight, this strategy allowed the Philippines to maintain its status as a destination for kidney transplantations. However, the continuation of this industry would only ever be detrimental to its most impoverished.

The discounted price earned by the Filipino kidney providers had several implications for the post-operative benefits they had hoped to attain. Certainly, the additional gratuities including medical insurance, life insurance, and post-operative care could provide a starting point for past providers to move out of Baseco, but like the disparity they encountered with the compensation for their kidneys, they discovered that such care and treatments were only empty promises from the brokers. Providers rarely received post-operative care, which included
“follow-up check-ups/testing, monitoring/documentation, treatment for complications and anti-rejection drug prescriptions),” suggesting that monetary payment marked the terminal point of the transaction (Mendoza 2010, 104). When combined with the fact that money earned from transplantations was usually allocated to expenses other than the provider’s post-operative care, the providers suffered more than benefited. Many reported that their bodies became weaker and tired more easily, which placed them at risk of losing their jobs that demanded physical labor.

Conclusion

The concept of medical tourism presents invaluable insights toward the growth of the organ trade industry in the Philippines. Although inexpensive medical care in the Philippines might be considered a tourist attraction, the socioeconomic conditions that medical tourism reified following the launch of the PMTP led to the rapid growth of a market economy that commodifies human organs. The widespread selling of kidneys resulted in a national moral quandary surrounding human trafficking. However, central to dissecting the categorization of organ sales as human trafficking is an exploration of why impoverished individuals would surrender their kidneys. Selling their kidneys allows men in Baseco to satisfy their responsibilities as breadwinners in their families. After all, several organ providers held jobs and either voluntarily donated their kidneys at a brokers’ insistence or sought a broker themselves. These providers do not fit the picture of the human trafficking victim central to the narrative circulated in many academic accounts involving abduction, coercion, and physical force. Most men were motivated to sell a kidney for the quick cash they could use to support their family, but they were not necessarily coerced into the industry. Perhaps an exploration of the effects following such experiences would situate Baseco’s kidney providers in a human trafficking framework. A more nuanced approach and stronger enforcement of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act by the Philippine government are necessary for these actions to be framed as human trafficking.
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Social organizing movements, particularly civil rights movements, have historically built upon their predecessors and exchanged ideas and language in order to build effective platforms to advocate for human rights. Today, practices of mass incarceration criminalize marginalized groups still entrenched in these movements toward justice. In doing so, the system provides a vehicle through which ideas can transfer to build a new movement for prisoners’ rights. Despite this, decades of organizing has affected little change in the prison system, and often results in violent rebellions. This paper explores the nature of these “prison riots,” and how re-contextualizing them as rebellions reveals not only the nature of the carceral state, but also the arcadian potential of prison resistance to contribute to a new era of civil rights.

Prelude.

The Special Activities Building was quieter than normal. A few women lounged on the benches outside the bathroom, where they waited to sign in with the correctional officer (CO) on duty. Rain smudged windows already grainy from fine, inlaid wires. As my workshop co-facilitator and I signed ourselves in, we exchanged the usual pleasantries with the CO: “Good morning, how are you?” “Good, thank you--yourself?” “Good.” “You have a good day now, ladies.” The two of us made our way back down the white hallway to the classroom where we’d be teaching, an open tile room with dozens of chairs, a few long tables, and two padlocked lockers where supplies were kept. On one side stood a blackboard with chalk that was sometimes there, sometimes not. We waited for the women in our workshop to receive call-out and walk from their housing units to special activities. As more time passed, the CO we’d greeted earlier began to look in at us as he patrolled up and down the hallway. Finally, at half an hour past our start time, he joined us inside the classroom. Something in his face had changed, made his jawline sharper and his eyes darker.
“Do you want me to discipline them?” he asked, something like glee running beneath his voice.

My response was measured and unfazed. “No, that’s alright,” I said. “This is a completely voluntary workshop. I’m guessing many of them were unsure about it since this is our first day, and it’s bad weather, too. I’ll be excited to see everybody who is interested next week.”

Yet I was badly shaken, and my co-facilitator knew it. When my partner and I enter the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility, everyone puts on their best behavior. What we had witnessed was a slippage. Where the special activities building normally provided a well-oiled piece of theater resembling a (if severely lacking in privacy) grade school, we had been provided with a hint at what may lay behind the mask. I understood, mentally, that COs were not as kind to prisoners as they were to me. But it was another thing to have it so blatantly placed before me, the power of it in my hands as it must be every day for the corrections staff. When I leave the facility that morning, and the barbed wire is out of sight, I am convinced of their theater once again. When I hear of riots on the news I think to myself, “my women wouldn’t do that” or “it must’ve been the unstable/angry ones. I’ve not met those types.” The truth, of course, is that I have, and that “my” women would. But there is another truth, and that is that a prison riot is not just a riot, and the theater played by myself and the corrections staff at Women’s Huron Valley may just, in fact, be a theater of our entire society.

When the Detroit Riot was reclaimed as the Detroit Rebellion, the Civil Rights and Black Power movements won a crucial victory: a rhetorical shift from crime to insurgency, from violence to resistance. Mass incarceration today has imprisoned these movements and their constituents at alarming rates, and yet no reexamination of the nature of prison “riots” has taken place. How can it be that people can come together at enormous risk to stand for their basic human rights and somehow, in the course of this act of justice, they are re-criminalized? And why doesn’t the outside world seem to notice? Assuming that many who are active politically in the US are familiar with information about mass incarceration by now, as well as basic intuition about the prison condition, how do we as a collective body find ourselves characterizing insurgents as rioters rather than rebels?¹ This paper will examine the efficacy of

¹ These questions were developed in conversation with Heather Ann Thompson, and I owe her my thanks.
two massive, coordinated insurgencies: that of the 1971 Attica Uprising and the summer 2018 nationwide hunger strike. In tracing the contexts of these events from inception to retribution, I hope to reveal the nefarious underbelly of carceral insurgency: beneath every riot is a rebellion, carefully obscured. Beneath each rebellion, a new and unseen global movement for human rights, one with potential to shift our concept of truth and justice.

Mass incarceration has a complex and ugly history, but its origin is generally associated with the Nixon and Clinton administrations and the War on Drugs. There is countless scholarship that reveals the thinly veiled racism innate in this “war,” through which the Civil Rights and later Black Power movements came to be fought (Provine, 2008). Prisons around the world have a long history as repressive tools used to punish dissidents and political enemies, but the narrative in the United States has somehow escaped this story. The numbers, however, are clear. The rates of incarceration for petty theft or small drug possession were and are significantly higher for Americans of color than for white Americans. Death penalties and infacility punishment are also disproportionately skewed to affect persons of color rather than white inmates. Through the mass incarceration of black folks, the corrections industry created a civil rights issue—as, moreover, civil rights activism itself became a punishable crime (The New York Book Review, 1972). In this way, the movement cycled through the walls of prison and transformed the gates into both a rite of passage and that passage into a necessary act of resistance.

Incarcerated activists experienced a rapid reduction of freedoms that continues today. Laws like three strikes (you’re—in), Truth in Sentencing and mandatory minimums stripped discretionary power from judges, made it difficult to avoid sentencing and made it more difficult to get out once incarcerated. Inside prisons, conditions deteriorated as the space became more and more crowded. Many states repealed laws like good conduct time, which reduce prison sentences in exchange for good behavior. With no incentive to keep their heads down, activists began to organize, reclaiming affiliations with civil rights groups such as the Black Panthers and

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2 Martin Sostre, incarcerated for the theft of $71, spent years in prison because he would not keep his head down.
other outside allies (Berger, 2014). It is this history that lends itself to the coordination, strategies, and language of carceral insurgency today.

Inside prisons, guards routinely exercise power in arbitrary acts of cruelty. I have heard the stories: one wrong look could be cause to “catch a ticket” [prison slang], which renders a prisoner ineligible for parole. Too many tickets, or one (perceivedly) threatening physical motion, and prisoners are put into solitary and allowed out, even for showering, only at staff discretion. Some have been left in solitary for months for protesting for human rights (PBS, 2000). Even with good time, it has been nearly impossible to avoid trouble. Facilities have no privacy, relying on an infrastructural visibility to create a fear-driven panopticon that keeps prisoners in line (Prison Legal News, 2016). Guards usually are male, even in women’s facilities, and are themselves overworked and undertrained, increasing their wariness and liberal use of punishment. Yet perhaps the most sinister feature of the carceral state is the subtle and pervasive dehumanization. Prisoners never are referred to by name, but by last name or, sometimes, by number. Health conditions are so poor that a single cold virus can take down an entire facility in the span of a few days, and inmates have severely limited access to health clinics. When they do, doctors often are callous and dismissive of prisoners’ complaints. Private contracting with food service companies such as Corizon leaves inmates constantly hungry, as they are shepherded back and forth to the chow hall only to find maggots in their food (The Atlantic, 2017). Many states allow private companies to bid for ownership of the products of inmate labor, and these companies are able to maximize profits by hiring inmates who earn less

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3 The information below is drawn largely from my own experiences with the criminal justice system, stories I have heard firsthand from incarcerated people, and corroborated by the literature and scholarship I have read on the subject, including the citations listed in this paper. See especially: Prison Legal News 2016, “Attica Prison Guards Who Viciously Beat Prisoner Avoid Jail Time But Lose Jobs.”

4 Foucault’s “panopticon” and theories of social control and discipline would propose that visibility architecture is a nonviolent, and therefore encouraged, form of social control. I would argue that prison is experienced proof that the panopticon is actually a method of fear, rather than social harmony—that shame, fear, and uncertainty are forms of violence in the minds and bodies of those who are vulnerable to them, especially if they are at risk of any form of retribution based on their non-consensual visibility, social, emotional, physical, or otherwise.

5 Both of these anecdotes have happened to me personally; on the first, I have been prevented from entering the facility multiple times due to endemic infections. On the second, I knew a woman who broke her foot, but refused to “kite” to get access to the clinic, believing that doing so would worsen her injury.
than a dollar on the hour (Legal Information Institute, 2017). This aspect of prison life bears explicit and legal parallels to slavery, or at least a form of trafficking.  

In extreme juxtaposition to this cruelty, prison is also often boring. Workshops like the one I teach are so highly prized that the wait list is two years long. With little to no access to education or entertainment, prohibitively expensive tools to communicate with family or friends, and the commodification of items as simple as clear-barreled pens with which to write letters home, prisoners have nothing to do except what they are told. Many prisoners, especially those incarcerated in their youth, read and write at a grade-school level (Begin to Read, 2018). Prison activism at its best--democratic, peaceful, organized--has historically been dismissed and ignored outright (Thompson, 2017). Activism at its worst--insurgent, violent, chaotic--is bestialized (The New York Times, 1972). In no case, however, does a prison riot or activist event occur in isolation. Insurgencies spread not only within facilities but across facilities, and the language used is a rapidly-globalizing rhetoric of resistance and power that mirrors that of citizens outside the prison system. Ideas that began in the Black Panther party integrated into a political murmur in California’s San Quentin, leading to a manifesto from Folsom in the same state, which eventually sparked the Attica uprising all the way across the country in New York (Berger, 2014). Similarly, the nationwide hunger strike began with a riot in South Carolina’s Lee Correctional (Shadowproof, 2018). The violence may be characterized as a mere manifestation of criminal identity, but it is hardly apolitical. After all, resistance to incarceration has been ongoing for hundreds of years. Prisons, which are meant to be isolated and secure, have become a hub of cross-culture and international human rights movements. It is this collective, public-facing, political nature that transforms Attica from a riot to a rebellion, a transformation Guha (1999) characterizes as from “individualistic or small-group deviance from the law...[to] collective social defiance--it bears the twin signs of a birth-mark and a becoming.” Here, dissidence and revolt become symbolic not of criminality but of insurgency and of possibility.

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6 For the persuaded reader, one should note that it’s not just a parallel. Slavery is explicitly still legal in the US if the slave is a prisoner. For further exploration of carceral slavery, see The New Jim Crow (2010) or the documentary 13th.
Through their demands, prisoners imagine an alternative, radically subversive space through which to organize and exhibit their rights by manipulating the infrastructure of the state. These have been and will be in this essay referred to as the “arcadian spaces” (Shah, 2010). Within this framework, the response of the state to the arcadian space is telling more so of the nature of the system than of the nature of the incarcerated actors within it.

**Attica.**

It is difficult to make sense of the slew of writing, news, and other accounts coming out of Attica following the rebellion in 1971. Where media and government sources have one narrative, firsthand accounts by inmates provide an entirely alternate one. I will attempt to convey both narratives as fairly as possible, but I make no secret of the fact that I find the state’s narrative full of many more illogics. However, it is not the illogics themselves but the fact of their presence that interests me, for despite these inconsistencies, the state’s narrative is still the one that is largely told today.

The seeds of the rebellion grew in the metal shop (Thompson, 2017). Workers in the 1960s could not be paid more than 23 cents an hour, which, although they did not pay rent or food, was meager for meeting inflated commissary prices for goods such as toothpaste, soap, and menstrual products, or for collect calls home. The metal workers went on strike, soon to be joined by laborers from all over the facility, even as correctional officers put entire cell blocks on lock down. Eventually, maximum wage was raised to $1 an hour. The strike ended, but the unrest did not. Although nobody seems to know exactly what scuffle prompted the eventual full-out rebellion, most sources confirm that an altercation of some kind of or another broke out between an inmate and a guard. To answer the question of why this conflict became incendiary, whereas others of similar nature might not have, we can turn in part to the opposing trends described above, of a simultaneous reduction in freedom and increase in collective, grapevine-esque activism and striking activity across the nation in response to facility cruelties. In other words, the fate of most facilities was a propensity to revolt. The rebellion was not necessarily
much larger or much more violent than other rebellions, but the particularism of Attica’s infamy lies in the response of the nation.

Since the narrative diverges at this point in history, during the chaos of scuffle-turned-riot, I will tell the stories one at a time, beginning with the state, as I suspect this story will be more familiar and thus quicker to cover.

Following the scuffle, the prisoners quickly took the COs, who were vastly outnumbered, hostage and rallied in the yard (PBS, 2000). At first, these COs were beaten and passed from hand to hand, but the prisoners eventually organized and placed the COs under guard (and protection) in a corner of the yard. They reiterated their demands as media began to arrive to cover their event. Initial negotiations went well, but during the period in which prisoners were deciding whether to surrender in exchange for facility reforms, they suddenly refused to speak with negotiators, stating that they would speak only with the governor under conditions of amnesty and asylum to a non-imperialist country. The negotiations were rejected. Since the governor did not have the power to grant amnesty, it was clear, according to analysis by the governor’s secretary, that these last two amendments were added to the negotiation in order to create a breaking point that would allow prisoners to further confront their perceived abusers (PBS, 2000). Moreover, the move was politically self-cornering; the governor could not visit the prison under siege, because to do so would set a precedent that could incite future violence with the intent of procuring such a visit. Interestingly, this analysis is framed by Douglass as an issue of travel time: if the governor went “every time prisoners rioted and took hostages,” he would spend all of his time traveling to prisons (PBS, 2000). The state thus acknowledges riots as commonplace, but dismisses them as natural rather than a trend which could be reversed.

One last offer of concession was made to the prisoners: that if they released the hostages and stood down, they would not be harmed, and the state would enact no recrimination unless a prisoner was found to have participated in a crime--which, by nature of work stoppage, rioting,
and in the most peaceful case, observing or organizing the activity, all had. Not only was the offer rejected, but prisoners marched the hostages to the catwalks atop the prison walls and began visibly threatening them. The governor immediately called in state troopers, who quickly and effectively rescued the remaining hostages. During and immediately prior to the rescue effort, the prisoners began massacring hostages, some even going so far as to castrate and brutalize them. These stories were decried by the public and held up as an example of the need for prisons and the necessity of restricting liberties within them—especially at Attica, whose black masses held the worst of the worst. The account was published in newspapers across the country; the nation’s sympathy had been misplaced and was now realigned.

Inmates such as Frank Smith tell a different story entirely (PBS, 2000). The inmates’ account is one framed by organizing, justice, and the rhetorical demands of national activist movements (Thompson, 2017). Matters came to a head in a pressure can, an environment in which prisoners had been systematically mistreated and forced to live in overcrowded conditions. COs had ignored, willfully or otherwise, the delicate ecology of the prison and arbitrarily relocated a group of gang members into the same housing unit as their rival gang, exacerbating tensions over space and power. And, to top it off, prisoners’ demands for change, negotiated democratically via a letter correspondence with commissioner Oswald, were appeased only verbally while inside the prison conditions continued to deteriorate.

Immediately following the scuffle-turned-riot, armed, off-duty COs and police began to surround the prison. Activists inside quickly organized the riot and arranged for the protection of the hostage COs. They established a negotiating corner and called in external media so that the gaze of the public could protect them and create the semblance of civility. During the negotiations, the commissioner promised to enact reforms, but prisoners who were careful to watch the nightly news on TV noted his duplicity, hearing him tell the public that the prisoners were demanding too much (Thompson, 2017). Lacking faith in the commissioner, the prisoners appealed to the governor to visit in person, both so that they could not be harmed and because

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8 Even peaceful organizing within prison is a crime. According to Perilous, one prisoner at the Ohio State Penitentiary was found guilty in August, 2018 of “engaging in or encouraging group demonstration or work stoppage” following the hunger strike.
his word would be held, they hoped, to higher standards. Ultimately, the state not only denied amnesty, but it sent troopers to invade overnight in the midst of negotiations. Awoken by the sound of the helicopters, the prisoners made a desperate move to protect themselves; they marched the hostages to the catwalks and threatened them, hoping this action would prevent the troopers’ entry.

Instead, the troopers, using bullets outlawed by the Geneva convention, opened fire across the yard and shot canisters of tear gas, killing both prisoners and hostages as many prisoners began to surrender (Thompson, 2017). When all of the prisoners had been downed, the surviving hostages were extracted and presented to the waiting media and state negotiators as heroes. The same could not be said of injured prisoners, who were denied medical care even as the troopers told stories of them castrating and slaying hostages just outside the walls. Autopsies performed on the deceased COs later revealed that the troopers’ narrative was impossible. No bodies had been slashed or mutilated at all, and in fact all of them were injured by state-issued bullets or shrapnel from gunfire (Thompson, 2017).

Nor does the prisoners’ story end here, at the same point in time as the alternative narrative outlined above. Where the state’s story is framed as a rescue mission and thus ends with the retrieval of (living) hostages, the prisoners’ story extends for weeks (PBS, 2000). The retribution enacted on prisoners was thorough and disproportionate to the violence prisoners themselves had created during the uprising. Both COs and troopers tortured the injured men of Attica for weeks, forcing them at gunpoint to run a gauntlet of armed guards over shards of broken glass while the guards beat them with batons. Many were locked in solitary for more than a month, a practice which the United Nations has called “cruel, inhuman,” and even “torture” (UN News, 2011). They were denied food, water, and medical care. In one notable case, a man was strapped to a table naked with a football under his chin. As COs methodically burned him with cigarette butts, he was told that if he let the football drop, he’d be killed (Thompson, 2017). Many prisoners who survived these weeks were permanently disabled. Yet the media had already moved on after their story of prisoner brutalization, and to them, Attica returned to
being as quiet and secretive as always. What went on behind the walls was a mystery unsolved—or more accurately, hidden—for decades to come.9

The Hunger Strike.

As we near the 50th anniversary of the Attica rebellion, prison insurgencies continue to be widespread. Although popular reports of such uprisings seem to be few and far between, the 2018 nationwide strike among prisoners managed to garner significant attention and awareness outside prison walls. Significantly, like Attica before it, the strike as a coordinated effort appeared to follow the same pattern, with three steps standing out clearly.

First, prisoners made legitimate civil rights demands that were unmet through democratic means. Second, the eruption of pre-existing tensions began with a few and then spread through solidarity measures. Originally organized for 2019 by various inmate-run groups such as the Jailhouse Lawyers Speak and the Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, the strike’s start date was bumped up to August 21, 2018, following the violence at Lee Correctional earlier that summer in which seven inmates were killed. While the riot was (similarly to Attica) blamed on gang warfare between rival groups housed together, Lee inmates weighed in on this themselves, stating that “gangs” were not an appropriate term for the groupings which form inside prisons, which form not to organize crime but for self-preservation in a facility which itself is often dangerous (Shadowproof, 2018). I do not mean to ignore interpersonal violence that occurs between prisoners, but it would be equally wrong to equate small-group and individual hostilities with the systemic violence which has created mass insurgencies like those of the strike and of Attica in 1971. It’s also worth noting that much of the interpersonal violence that occurs is encouraged, exacerbated, or falsified by staff, who have been known to ignore fights as they break out, to house rival groups together, or to claim a prisoner threatened them in order to put that prisoner in

9 It was a near-chance discovery of Heather Ann Thompson’s (2017) to come across old files she’d been searching for for years that revealed some of this information. The boxes she procured included old prison uniforms still stained through with dried blood.
The strikers issued a national list of ten demands, which ranged from educational and voting rights to the end of prison slavery (the practice of not paying prisoners for labor) to ending racism in the carceral state. More than seventeen states participated in the strike, according to information presented by prisoners to various news outlets, family, and organizational allies, although most state corrections departments denied these claims (Perilous, n.d.).

In the Northwest Detention Center in Washington, demands that prisoners presented were met with threats of relocating the prisoner farther away from family. This prison had the highest reported number of participants; between sixty and two hundred prisoners reportedly participated. Most other reported numbers ranged in the tens, with real numbers likely much higher. Some of the more revealing cases include those in institutions in Florida and South Carolina, both of whose departments of corrections explicitly denied any strike activity, despite clearly retributive activity. In South Carolina, particularly, a 24-hour lockdown was imposed amid a rash of suicides, and here also COs forced prisoners to strip naked in the yard and circle a metal detecting pole purportedly to find hidden cell phones, if not to discover the means of conspiracy than for pure show. Inmates at Burnside, a prison in Nova Scotia, Canada, also participated in strike activities in solidarity. Through 20 days of peaceful protests, the prisoners managed to have their demands featured on the news and garner national attention and organizational support. Perhaps the relative popular success in this strike might be accounted for by the fact that among their demands were better conditions for COs, to which the corrections union responded that “we don’t necessarily disagree [with the other reform demands], but there’s operational aspects…” At this same jail, a prisoner committed suicide under the retributive conditions (Perilous, n.d.).

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10 See the origin story of the Lee riot—I have also heard numerous firsthand accounts in my work with currently and formerly incarcerated individuals.

11 One prison claimed the prisoners had been put on lockdown due to an outbreak of disease, but the symptoms and contagion pattern stated by officials was called “implausible” by health experts, who aligned the symptoms of prisoners more closely with the effects of severe sensory deprivation and abuse.
The James T. Vaughn center in Delaware is perhaps most illustrative of the nature of the campaign waged, which I will elaborate on further in the section “Stakes Revealed.” Vaughn had experienced a riot in February 2017, after which the problematic prisoners were transferred to Sussex, also in Delaware. In late July 2018, at the very beginning of early national strike efforts, the relocated prisoners went on hunger strike, and, a few weeks later during the August strike, prisoners remaining at Vaughn joined them. This movement of prisoners between facilities may have helped tremendously to create the display of national solidarity through the coordination of the hunger strike.

The third parallel with Attica was that retribution occurred simultaneously with the release of an antithetical public narrative (Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, 2018). Consistently, in every facility that experience a strike and had participants able to report out, prisoners experienced physical and property abuse, widespread lockdowns, and use of solitary confinement without evidence the prisoner participated in the strike, along with the solitary confinement of jailhouse lawyers in particular. Aaron MacDonald in Indiana managed to “expose the abuse” inside and has been placed under one year non-contact visitation, meaning he won’t be able to see his loved ones for a year (Incarcerated Workers Organizing Committee, 2018). Notably, in Nova Scotia, which carried overwhelmingly positive popular support including from the corrections union and the Department of Justice, the prison confined forty people to their cells for 23 hours a day for weeks following the strike. And in Florida, the Times Union reported that its journalists were denied information about the strike because it would pose a “threat to the security, order, or rehabilitative objectives of the correctional system, or the safety of any person” (Perilous, n.d.). It is difficult to know, until more of the strikers are released and are able to freely tell their stories, exactly what occurred at each of the prisons that participated above.

Stakes Revealed.

In both the Attica and hunger rebellions, divergent narratives appeared between the prisoners and the state. Both the violence and the veracity of the inmates is at stake in the space
between these stories, and that is no trivial matter. In questioning opposing claims, it’s important to remember the agency of the actors, what role they had in the narrative they produced, the stakes created, and the politics of belief. Even in prisoners’ demands, the language of human rights is pervasive: the Attica demand for asylum to a “non-imperialist country” is a clear cut example of the ways in which prisoners understood themselves to be colonized subjects of the state. In return, the actions of the state have fallen blatantly outside international moral code, from the bullets used during the trooper invasion of Attica to the extensive use of solitary confinement as a punishment for activism.

It is obvious that the uprisings had an effect in shaking up the system because of the sheer amount of resources and effort that went into shutting them down and dealing with the public narrative. Why would the state claim there was no strike, yet enact visible retributions on prisoners while denying journalists entry to the facility? What “rehabilitative efforts” are harmed by allowing members of the public to speak with prisoners about their demands, as was the case in Florida? The state is the actor with the highest stake in a need for secrecy, the one without the burden of proof. Thus it is easier, more necessary, and more believable for the state to make a claim than it is for a prisoner who might face severe retribution, like Aaron MacDonald, to speak up. The prisoners’ story simply makes more logical sense: for people who have tried for so long to gain access to negotiations and reform, it’s certainly a surprising move to “refuse” negotiation as the state claims in the case of Attica. Nor, if the prisoners aimed all along to create violence, does it make sense to organize in the first place, to arrange protection for hostage COs, or to call in national media for the negotiation process. To arrange all of this and then deliberately create violence could only perpetuate the negative public image of criminals, and that doesn’t seem a likely goal of the Attica uprising at all. That state misinformation and retribution is true, then, and still rebels chose to speak out, indicates the presence of something larger than themselves that they believe is worth the risk. If prisons and their uprisings are manifestations of civil rights movements, as I hope I’ve shown, then we must consider the efficacy of rebellion—and the nature of stakes—from the lens of civil rights.
Prison systems have, since their inception, created an enormous amount of value for (white) society. The War on Drugs supported dominant white hegemony and narratives of poverty and crime among communities of color. Prisons created jobs during economic downturn, jobs that became lifelines for white, blue-collar towns whose constituents were largely high school graduates. Also for these towns, prisons provided an enormous political boost, as incarcerated individuals counted in the census toward the population of their carceral town, rather than their hometown (The Atlantic, 2013). This counting practice disproportionately gives political clout to the same people who depend on mass incarceration for their livelihood. These are the stakes that manifest themselves in mass incarceration policies and also retribution for public rebellion.

The wake of Attica brought the construction of the first-ever supermax prisons in U.S. history. These prisons are designed to permanently and brutally contain our most dangerous, involving layers upon layers of security, and placing every inmate in 24/7 solitary (Rhodes, 2014). It becomes easy to dismiss instances in supermax, like prisoners throwing feces and other bodily matter, as a symptom of psychosis, which all of the “worst of the worst” are assumed to have. Yet the conditions of the prison, as Rhodes (2013) points out, make this behavior a perpetuating cycle, and one of the few options of protest and rehumanization left to the inmates. Such behavior unfortunately only reifies the American racial imaginary, in which the monsters under small children’s beds are not simply thugs but black thugs, not simply kidnappers but desperate inner city psychopaths. Historically, people of color have been the subject of added scrutiny during any moral panic, from the AIDS epidemic to the opioid crisis. Prisoners, especially, being full predominantly of persons of color, fall prey to this archetype of inmates as the vicious, strong, and uncontrollable. Thompson points out that it is often the prisoners with the least to lose who are most willing to incite action—those on death row, sentenced for life without parole, etc.—which makes these same prisoners the face of the riot (Jacobin, 2018). It is this imaginary that makes a story about prisoners “castrating” hostages publishable in The New York Times, and believably consumable to the outside public. The imaginary corroborates the story the state wishes to tell, so long as a person of color is targeted.
Frederick Douglass (1845) wrote that slavery dehumanized both the slave and the slave-owner, and following the parallel to today’s carceral state, “what happens to people in prisons happens to all of us” (Thompson, 2014). When the state told Attica’s prisoners they wouldn’t face charges or retribution unless they’d participated in a crime during the riot (and rioting itself is a crime), their actions were clearly not rehabilitative, for their statement left virtually no option except punishment. In the same vein, secretary Douglass’ statement that the governor could not visit prisoners “every time” they rioted dismissed prison unrest as something not reformable or of concern, but rather as natural and even expected of the facilities (PBS, 2000). It’s difficult to imagine that a system built to rehabilitate and yield productive citizens could have gone so horribly wrong in so many ways. Following the logic of Occam’s Razor, the simpler, but far more sinister, conclusion is that the criminal justice system isn’t broken at all; in the wake of rebellions like Attica’s, it has become more high functioning than ever, smoothly and efficiently punishing and enslaving blackness.

At risk of hypocrisy, I have written about incarcerated individuals of color without myself being either racially marginalized or incarcerated. Thus it is bold of me to claim, as I am, that this high-functioning system has been upheld, in part, by a process of body politicization, in which our very bodies become vehicles of political nature and decision: to grant rights, or not—to police, or not. Race is politically charged, and these politics become inscribed on our bodies the moment I exit prison freely, and the woman beside me, who is of color, is escorted away. These inscriptions are dangerous; they play into an ability to distance oneself from the grounded experience of a real person.

In asking why even in the most supported demonstrations, such as the Nova Scotia protests in and outside the walls, retribution was chosen over reform, the political nature of prisoner insurgency turns from a tool of coordination to a weapon. Prisoners become a concept, not real humans, mere inscriptions of the politics and civil rights movements of the time. Their experience thus becomes a symbol, rather than something lived and individual, and their rights a debate and a protest rather than something for which real suffering will take place away from passive eyes. Today, this political experience is consumed by the public in TV shows such as...
“Orange is the New Black,” “Criminal Minds,” and various police shows, and criminal justice has moved from the space of experience into politics, effectively handing control of the stakes to the state which controls the rules of the political arena. Meanwhile, inside the walls, “violence is directed at individual bodies as representations of a collective, transgressive other” (Peteet, 1994).\(^{12}\)

The interplay of politicization and racial imaginary makes for sensational news, news that people even believe they care about, yet in the divergent narrative the state’s story is always privileged over (inaccessible) prisoners’ experience. Reliance on a cooperative narrative, in which the troopers relay an objective account of a riot to the media, has damned many insurgencies, including the ones described above. The state’s stakes in secrecy work because the public falls for their narrative, the one whose language consists of barbaric imaginaries rather than human rights solidarity. From pleas ignored to pleas lied about to the lie being believed, the theatre of the carceral state has been played by all of us.

Through all of this, prisoners themselves have quite clearly taken agency over their situation. In the face of the utmost repression and invisibility, they have organized again and again, sometimes even using the state’s own weapons against it. In the section of this paper on the hunger strike, I note a case in which prisoners were threatened with relocation due to their behavior, and the case of another facility—James T. Vaughn—in which transferred prisoners engaged in striking activities in their new facility. The Attica uprising has, in fact, also been blamed on transferred prisoners (Thompson, 2017). The state has scapegoated this phenomenon as the cause of institutional violence, claiming that a select few problematic prisoners incite the others. On the contrary, if the context of the uprisings of Attica and the hunger strike show anything, it’s that the state-mandated movement between and in and out of the walls facilitates the exchange of language and ideas and, in turn, creates the national unity necessary to resist oppression in large scale. Mary Steedly (1993) aptly noted that "narrative experience is...the space where political subjects come to recognize themselves." With the

\(^{12}\) As is shown in a similar situation with Palestinian politicization, punishment of one body is symbolic of punishment of a social body.
benefit of this communication, prisoners very quickly are made aware of the abuses and noble resistances of their fellows all across the country. No longer alone behind the walls, their acts become visible in the locus of a cross-border movement, contributing to a general civil rights act. It is this solidarity that allows the insurgency. Most hopefully of all, the intergroup and interracial solidarity shown in these resistance movements could be instrumental in helping to break up the racial imaginary.

To affect real change, people must care about the change. By and large this care has been realigned through some of the processes I’ve outlined in this section. Our gaze as (white) members of society is what, in the introduction of this paper, protected me and my co-facilitator from seeing and narrating our own experiences of the repressive carceral state, and instead invoked a theatre of nicety. It is also the gaze of the public, which has been forcibly kept at a remove, which carries the potential to truly support prisoner movements. Incarceration during a time of social unrest and change has sometimes been held as a sign of prestige once the prisoner returns home, a rite of passage signifying activism and nobility. For young black men in Detroit and other areas of the country, incarceration is still a rite of passage, but no longer one of social prestige (Bergmann, 2010). Perhaps in the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement, incarceration was considered a moment of activism. But the dominant narrative produced by the state has deliberately counteracted this chance for prestige, demonizing and dehumanizing poor communities of color pre, during, and post incarceration. Vis a vis housing, employment, and surveillance policies, returning individuals are perpetually punished upon coming home, always criminals and never activists.

The arcadian space articulated by prisoners for decades has been the same, one of humanization and participation in society for the betterment of society. Perhaps if COs wore body cameras as some police forces now do. If judges had discretionary power rather than scripts of mandatory sentencing—if those judges were voted into office by an informed population. If power over prisons was taken out of the hands of those who rely on them to their

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13 I am referring specifically to the IRA of Northern Ireland and Palestinian resistance movements. In both of these cases returned prisoners were immediately given leadership positions, having survived and resisted the oppressive state. Julie Peteet 1994 and Begoña Aretxaga 1997.
own benefit. Or if, instead of isolating returning prisoners, we integrated them, so that we had more faces, and fewer shadows under the bed—or “bunk.” Would, then, prison insurgencies be reframed from historical riots to rebellions? Were that the case, we’d have many reparations to make, but in exchange we’d all regain a little more humanity, and be a little more right.

**Hannah French** graduated from the University of Michigan in 2019 with a BA in Cultural Anthropology and Creative Writing. This work is inspired by deep care for and work with the community impacted by the criminal justice system. Hannah has volunteered inside Michigan’s only women’s prison, Women’s Huron Valley, for almost two years, facilitating a theatre and creative writing workshop. She also worked as an organizer on campus for Umich Behind Bars, a student-led movement fighting for justice on campus, and produced a reentry-focused storytelling podcast, While We Were Away. In the spirit of this article, she’d like to be so bold as to claim that, like many doctors and anthropologists have begun to believe, the credo “Do No Harm” is a call to proactively, politically, and purposefully rebel against harm. In the future, she hopes to work with communities and non-profits to subvert the social determinants of health.
References


