

Voting after Displacement

Barriers to Political Participation in Colombia

Deanna Kolberg

Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

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Development

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Outline

- 1 Motivation
 - Why is political participation important for development?
 - Why should we expect low turnout among displaced populations?
- 2 Results
 - Large Variation in Participation
 - The Way People Leave Affects Participation



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Political Participation Affects Development Goals

Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies

Full participation incentivizes public investment in development



Figure: "We, the displaced of Naya, want peace and the removal of violent groups"; "No more forced displacement. Respect the territory of indigenous people and farmers."

Displacement Changes the Electorate

When political actors gain from displacement. . .




Figure: Referendum "Do you support the final agreement for the termination of the conflict and the construction of a stable and durable peace?"

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Costs and Benefits of Voting: $V=PB-C$

$V=PB-C$ (Riker & Ordeshook 1968)

- **Pivotality**: the degree to which your vote changes the outcome of an election
- **Benefit**: Your perceived benefit to voting
- **Cost**: Your perceived cost of voting

To increase participation, $pB > C$



Costs to Voting

- Introduction of local level elections revealed polling-station data on U.P. support
- Paramilitaries used election data to target displacement (Steele, 2017)
- 25% of Colombians do not believe the ballot is secret (ELCA)
- Polling-station size affects secrecy (Larreguy, Marshall, & Querubín,



Figure: *"I am a survivor of the genocide against the U.P."*

Benefits to Voting

- Unlikely to return to home-community for vote
- Clientelistic Parties
 - Vote-buying
 - Voter-buying
 - Relational clientelism
- Interest Organizations (Holland & Palmer-Rubin, 2015)



Figure: "If I had known I could have traded (my vote) for a ministry position or ambassadorship, I wouldn't have eaten the sandwich so quickly"

Outline


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Voting Changes after Displacement

Source: Encuesta de Hogares Desplazados (Ibáñez, 2005)


Displaced Voting Behavior - Local Elections



Geographic Variation in Turnout Rates

Source: Encuesta de Hogares Desplazados (Ibáñez, 2005)

Local Election Voting Patterns by Department



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Typology of Departure

Source: Steele, 2018


In the face of **collectively** targeted violence, three options:

- 1 Protection: Leave contested area for protection in faction stronghold
- 2 Anonymity: Leave contested area for anonymity in cities or far from home
- 3 Cluster: Leave contested area with others and seek shelter in a group




Protection

Protection-Seekers Voting Behavior




Anonymity

Anonymity-Seekers Voting Behavior



Cluster

Community-Movers Voting Behavior



Summary

- Internally Displaced Persons face high **costs** to participation and low immediate **benefits**
- The **way in which IDP's depart** likely influences their participation rate.
- Researchers need **more data** to be collected on this topic.

Current Projects:

- Lowering Costs: Electoral Institutional Design and Preserving IDP Anonymity
- Increasing Benefits: Interest Group Organization and the Mobilization of IDP's

Email: dkolberg@umich.edu



For Further Reading I

-  **Abbey Steele.**
Democracy and Displacement in Colombia's Civil War.
Cornell University Press, 2018.
-  **Alisha Holland, Brian Palmer-Rubin.**
Beyond the Machine: Clientelist Brokers and Interest
Organizations in Latin America
Comparative Political Studies, 48(9):1186–1223, 2015.
-  **Ana María Ibáñez**
Encuesta de Hogares Desplazados
Universidad de Los Andes, 2005.



ATT for Protection-seeking Results

Estimate... -0.0095785

SE..... 0.02986

T-stat..... -0.32078

p.val..... 0.74838

Original number of observations..... 1924

Original number of treated observations..... 522

Matched number of observations..... 522


Matched number of observations (unweighted). 522



ATT for Protection-seeking

Propensity Score Density

Density of Estimated Propensity Score



ATT for Anonymity-seeking Results

Estimate... -0.073022

SE..... 0.031513

T-stat..... -2.3172

p.val..... 0.020494

Original number of observations..... 1895

Original number of treated observations..... 493

Matched number of observations..... 493


Matched number of observations (unweighted). 493



ATT for Anonymity-seeking

Propensity Score Density

Density of Estimated Propensity Score



ATT for Community-keepers

Results

Estimate... 0.096463

SE..... 0.034498

T-stat..... 2.7962

p.val..... 0.0051703

Original number of observations..... 1713

Original number of treated observation..... 311

Matched number of observations..... 311

Matched number of observations (unweighted). 311



ATT for Community-keepers

Propensity Score Density

Density of Estimated Propensity Score

