The Postcolonial Blind Spot:  
Chinese Dance in the Era of Third Worldism, 1949–1965

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Introduction

In February 1959, China’s Wudao (Dance) magazine published a two-page spread introducing a new dance from the United States. Its headline reads, “Putrid Crazy Person Dance: Western Civilization as Seen through Hula Hoop Dancing” (“Fuchou,” 1959). The spread chronicles a brief history of the hula hoop, offering a picture of US culture that corresponds with Cold War–era Maoist stereotypes of the capitalist world: a commercial venture by two US businessmen launches a hula hoop craze, media coverage spreads the craze to other capitalist countries (France, England, Japan) and even to former socialist allies like Yugoslavia, women hula hoop publicly in bathing suits, drunken street parties last until early morning, hospitals report illnesses from excessive dancing. Finally, a poem points out the underlying cause, that culture is now “at base a commodity” (ibid.: 31). A racialized car-
toon captures the picture in a single, memorable image: a long-nosed man with bushy hair and a mustache dances the hula hoop; his body is contorted with hips out to one side and arms waving in the air. The caption reads, “The American Way of Life” (ibid.: 31).

While there is nothing strictly ahistorical about this account, few US dance historians would be happy to see the hula hoop held up as a representation of mid-twentieth-century US dance culture. After all, this was a time when the ballets and modern dances of George Balanchine, Jerome Robbins, Alvin Ailey, José Limón, Martha Graham, and others were being sent around the world for cultural diplomacy funded by the US State Department, billed as exemplars of “American” artistic achievement (Croft 2015).

The choice to feature hula hoop, rather than ballet or modern dance, is especially significant, given the context of the publication: Wudao was China’s top academic journal of dance research, whose articles at the time dealt with topics such as choreographic theory, dance criticism, and conservatory dance training. Reports on foreign dancers and companies were common in the publication, which covered groups from more than twenty-three foreign countries from its inception in 1958 to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Yet, this spread is the only major account of US dance in this or any other national-level People’s Republic of China (PRC) dance publication during the Mao era (1949–76). The decadent hula hooper is thus the lone image standing in for an era of US dance typically regarded as pivotal in twentieth-century dance history (Reynolds and McCormick 2003). Such a selective reading appears astonishing and problematic, explainable only by the “straitjacket” of Mao-era ideology and a Cold War vision that blinded Chinese scholars from historical realities.

What is often forgotten in such a reflection is that Cold War stereotypes are more than a one-sided affair. Similarly narrow views also plague Western representations of Chinese culture, with equally problematic and ideologically motivated results. Consider what remains the most common image of Mao-era dance in English-language scholarship: the Chinese revolutionary ballerina dressed in military uniform, rifle in hand, poised in an arabesque atop pointe shoes (fig. 1). Like the hula hooper, this image is not ahistorical: revolutionary ballets were extremely popular during the final decade of the Mao era, and they remain a potent symbol of that period
for many today. However, similar to the hula hooper, to treat revolutionary ballet as the only important dance creation of Mao-era China is to give a skewed impression of PRC dance history. It is thus troubling that whereas Chinese-language accounts of US dance history have long moved beyond the hula hooper narrative, English-language scholarship on PRC dance history continues to center primarily on revolutionary ballet when discussing the Mao era. This approach not only misrepresents the broad spectrum of Mao-era dance developments, it also signals some persistent Cold War ideas framing Anglophone PRC studies.

Contrary to widespread perceptions, revolutionary ballet was not the dominant form of new dance creation in Mao-era China. The first work created in this form, *The Red Detachment of Women*, premiered only in 1964—fifteen years after the founding of the PRC—and it was considered a significant departure from established Chinese socialist dance practices at the time. During the 1950s and early 1960s, PRC dance creation had been domi-
nated by choreography in the new genre known as “Chinese dance” (Zhongguo wudao), whose repertoires are widely documented in extant dance films from the period.¹ Until the late 1960s, ballet choreography had only been performed by a small minority of dancers in China and was concentrated largely in a few schools and ensembles in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Clark 2008). Meanwhile, as early as January 1957, there were already more than sixty professional music and dance ensembles across the country, most performing Chinese dance repertoires (“Quanguo,” 1957). Even the Beijing Dance School (Beijing Wudao Xuexiao), the only institution in China to stage full-length ballets prior to 1960, trained far more students in Chinese dance than it did in ballet from the time it was founded in 1954 until its reorganization in 1964 (Beijing 1993; Wilcox 2019). Thus, when Red Detachment appeared in 1964, choreographers and critics not only struggled to justify its existence as correct socialist dance practice but even had difficulty finding effective terminology to describe it (Huang 1964; Wang 1964; Li C. 1965). Major changes to PRC performing arts policy enacted after 1966 led Red Detachment and several other revolutionary ballets to gain widespread dissemination both domestically and abroad, especially after their film versions were released in the early and mid-1970s. While these works did ultimately saturate the popular sphere, leaving an indelible mark on the memories of average citizens, the volume of new choreography produced in this style never rivaled that of the earlier Mao-era Chinese dance repertoires. Moreover, its period of popularity covered only the final decade of the Mao era (1966–76), while Chinese dance had been dominant for longer (1949–65).

Anglophone scholars’ commitment to the representative status of revolutionary ballet in the face of historical evidence that suggests otherwise belies lingering Cold War prejudices. Among the most obvious of these are tendencies to treat Maoist culture as monolithic and unchanging and to regard developments of the Cultural Revolution as representative of the entire Mao era. The myth that revolutionary ballet is the sole product of Mao-era dance creation helps sustain a Cold War vision of Maoist culture as both oppressive to artistic creativity and hostile to indigenous cultural traditions. It also fuels the idea that Maoist culture was derivative of Soviet forms and isolated from cultural exchange beyond the socialist sphere. Taking a new
view of PRC dance history, like moving away from the hula hooper image of US dance, requires breaking down some of these accepted notions about Mao-era culture. It calls for looking into the blind spots generated by Cold War storytelling, to see what was previously rendered invisible within them. Pre–Cultural Revolution PRC dance history is one such shadowy zone.

China, Cold War History, and Postcolonial Critique

To render not just visible, but also comprehensible, the history of pre–Cultural Revolution PRC dance, it is helpful to consider the postcolonial dimensions of Chinese socialism during the era of national cultural construction in the 1950s and early 1960s. While postcolonial frameworks have been largely eschewed in Anglophone PRC studies, some scholars have argued for their relevance. Claire Conceison, for example, writes, “I maintain that China is postcolonial but in a rather complex and unorthodox sense of the term” (2004: 14). She goes on to explain that China can be described as postcolonial because of the historical encroachment of European, US, and Japanese colonial projects onto its territory, as well as the continued importance of these experiences in shaping modern Chinese identity. She writes, “These colonial traumas loom large in the Chinese collective memory, and as with other nations demanding and recovering from withdrawal of foreign colonial powers in the latter half of the twentieth century, China’s new nationalism is drawn largely from this experience and from the continued threat of foreign (particularly American) economic and cultural imperialism” (ibid.). Here, postcoloniality is relevant not only in accounting for China’s historical status as a “semi-colony” but also for understanding contemporary relationships to the foreign and ways of conceiving of self and other, especially in the post-Mao era. China’s self-perception during the late twentieth century, Conceison argues, was intimately tied to an East-West binarism (in which the United States often stood in for “the West”) that cannot be understood outside the context of modern colonial history. To understand constructions of national identity in contemporary PRC media and art, therefore, a postcolonial framework could be both useful and necessary.

Here, I build on Conceison’s argument by suggesting the value of postcolonial critique to reconceptualize PRC cultural history and move beyond
Cold War narratives about the Mao era. Focusing on Chinese dance in the period from 1949 to 1965, I ask how the Third World movement—defined as a convergence of decolonization, anti-imperialism, and the nonalignment program—shaped formations of Maoist culture prior to the Cultural Revolution. Recent scholarship by Alexander Cook and others has demonstrated the tremendous impact of Maoist cultural and political practices on revolutionary movements across the globe during the 1960s and 1970s (2010, 2014). I propose a longer view of this history, in which Maoist culture can be linked to third world concerns prior to what Cook calls “the age of the spiritual atom bomb” begun in 1964 (2014: i). Following Robert Young, I define the postcolonial as a historical field of connectivity that emerged when transnational processes of decolonization intersected with global leftism, creating a new arena of political movements, international exchange, and circulation of ideas and cultural forms based on a shared commitment to challenging the hegemony of Western European and US universalism: “since anti-colonial revolutions were themselves increasingly in touch with each other in different ways during the course of the twentieth century, a political and theoretical convergence took place that laid the basis for the field of ‘the postcolonial’” (Young 2001: 10). When understood in this way, postcolonialism is a strategic choice to find connections between otherwise disparate historical conditions. It can inform studies of Mao-era culture without suggesting that conditions in China before 1949 were identical to those in other places more typically postcolonial. It is the act of forging such connections, proposed initially by leaders of the Third World movement, that provide the inspiration and basis for postcolonial critique (ibid.: 16–57).

Postcolonial critique offers a useful counterpoint to Cold War knowledge production about Mao-era China because historically the two are intimately intertwined. When the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as new expansionist powers during the first half of the twentieth century, their leaders waged Cold War politics in part through contrasting positions on postcolonial thought: while Soviet leaders encouraged postcolonial critique and used it to fold the United States and global capitalism into a larger idea of Western imperialism against which to articulate anticolonial leftism, US leaders discouraged postcolonial critique and distanced twentieth-century US expansionism from other histories of colonial exploitation (Duara 2004;
The civil rights movement, global anticolonial politics, and the Cold War came together in these political shifts, with US leaders attempting to suppress communism by undermining social justice activism grounded in claims about race-based discrimination and the economic, political, and cultural structures of colonialism (Von Eschen 1997). Postcolonial discourse was thus central to Cold War politics during this period, and it laid the foundation not just for US and Soviet superpower competition but also for historical connections forged laterally among anti-imperialist coalitions, which included Maoist China (Frazier 2015).

A postcolonial blind spot in Anglophone scholarship on Maoist China—the ability to see the PRC as socialist or communist but not postcolonial—was part of a Cold War politics of representation developed largely in the United States during this period. As Christina Klein (2003) demonstrates, US representations of Asia from 1945 to 1961 emphasized differences in the then current political systems while suppressing postcolonial critique that could implicate US presence in Asia within a longer history of Western imperialism. In the post–World War II era, Klein argues, “the expansion of US power . . . coincided—and existed in tension with—the revolutionary process of decolonization” (ibid.: 5). In this context, Klein argues, a practice of Cold War Orientalism emerged in which “[US] middlebrow intellectuals repudiated imperialism as an acceptable model for East-West relations” (ibid.: 13). By promoting a vision of Asia firmly divided along lines of “communist” and “free,” US intellectuals and popular writers advanced a purportedly neutral idea of “global integration” to undercut socialist and postcolonial arguments that denounced US Cold War politics as a form of neoimperialism (ibid.: 19–60). Yet, Maoist China offered a particularly strong example for the merging of socialist and anticolonial movements. As Young writes, “The success of the communists in China in 1949 had a similar kind of effect in colonial countries that the Bolshevik revolution had had in Europe . . . national liberation and socialist revolution had been brought together” (2001: 81). The view of the Chinese revolution as a postcolonial struggle was especially incompatible with this aspect of US Cold War ideology, and it remained long outside the acceptable possibilities for Anglophone representations of Maoist culture.

Anglophone scholars have paid limited attention to PRC cultural engage-
ments related to the Bandung Conference and the nonalignment movement, two important activities that connected Maoist China with the third world during the 1950s and early 1960s. Held in 1955, the stated goal of the Bandung Conference was to foster cooperation and communication among the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa, through a postcolonial stance grounded in anti-imperialism that challenged the geopolitics of the Cold War (Prashad 2007; Lee 2010). With China, India, and Indonesia as “key players” (Duara 2004: 3), Bandung and the nonaligned movement marked a high point of intra-Asian connectivity, as well as “the first public statement of the creation of an independent transcontinental political consciousness in Africa and Asia” (Young 2001: 191). While it is sometimes dismissed because of its ultimate failure to fulfill its political and economic vision, the nonaligned movement nevertheless had important consequences in its time. It foregrounded antiracism and anti-imperialism as central issues on which to launch a critique of growing US capitalist hegemony, and it also marked the beginning of an effort, led in part by China, to create a new global alliance that challenged both Cold War powers, including the Soviet Union. The emergence of third world identity as a positive political stance became the key expression of these commitments, and this was also an important touchstone of Maoist cultural politics during this era. In this sense, as Young argues, Bandung brought about a decisive shift in the nature of the postcolonial, from a historical field of interconnectivity to a political and ideological position (ibid.).

Signs of the “Bandung moment” abound in the PRC historical record for those willing to look for them. A review of major periodicals in China between 1955 and 1965 shows that anti-imperialism and Asia-Africa unity are major themes in China’s public discourse during this period. Wenyi bao (Literary and Arts Gazette) published regular reports on Asia-Africa writers’ meetings between 1955 and 1965, in addition to introductions to literary works by Asian and African authors and articles promoting anti-imperialism. Between 1960 and 1962 alone, the publication’s regular advertisements for foreign literature in translation include writings from India, Jordan, Lebanon, Senegal, Ceylon, Iran, United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia. Renmin huabao (China Pictorial) likewise ran photographs of anti-imperialist rallies and meetings between Chinese and third world leaders.
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the Duxiu PRC periodical database, a title search for the words *imperialism* (diguozhuyi) and *Asia-Africa* (Ya-Fei) for 1955–64 shows over eight hundred and four hundred hits respectively, while the same search for *class struggle* (jieji douzheng) yields just over six hundred. A study of Chinese textbooks from 1949–66 corroborates these findings, noting anticolonialism and anti-imperialism to be two of the most consistent themes in the PRC official worldview as disseminated through educational materials during this period (Yu M. 2013). This data suggests that postcolonial concerns were at the forefront of PRC public discourse and cultural activity before the mid-1960s.

Despite ample historical evidence that suggests connections between Mao-era China and the postcolonial world, Anglophone scholarship has generally avoided applying the term *postcolonial* to Maoist China. Since the 1990s, the “colonial modernity” thesis has been successful in breaking down the Cold War resistance to postcolonial analysis for the late Qing and Republican eras (Barlow 1997; Jones 2001). However, when postcolonial approaches are applied to periods after 1949, they tend to be limited within circumscribed boundaries, such as the post-Mao era, minorities within China, or cases with different trajectories from the PRC proper, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan. Given this situation, one might pose the following question: if pre-1949 China is now regularly conceived of as “colonial modernity,” why is post-1949 China not postcolonial? Certainly, postcolonial critique has proven limiting in its treatment of a variety of issues, such as political economy, the “fourth world,” and marginalized minority populations within the nation-state (Dirlik 2000; Shohat 1992). Moreover, with China increasingly integrated into and even leading new forms of global capitalist integration, historical arguments about anti-imperialism seem both too closely linked to Chinese Communist Party rhetoric and too out of sync with the economic policies of today’s China to be popular among scholars and intellectuals either in or outside the PRC. Nevertheless, without attention to the postcolonial dimensions of Chinese socialism before the mid-1960s, important aspects of Maoist culture will remain obscured. In other words, while the phenomenon Tani Barlow (1993) once called “colonialism” has been largely ameliorated, a similar phenomenon of “postcolonialism” persists.
Rethinking Maoist Dance: Alternatives to Wu Qinghua

Inquiring into the postcolonial dimensions of Chinese socialism is productive in part because it offers opportunities to reconsider what we thought we knew about Mao-era culture. In the case of dance, this means discovering Maoist dance characters who look and move differently than iconic revolutionary ballet heroines such as Wu Qinghua, the female lead in *Red Detachment* whose images tend to dominate existing portrayals of Mao-era dance. Wu’s choreography consists primarily of balletic movement vocabularies: long straight leg lines; balance poses performed *en pointe*; erect and elevated torso carriage; and steps, turns, and leaps adopted from classical European ballet repertoires. While isolated movements adapted from indigenous performance are sprinkled throughout her dancing, overall it inherits little from local performance traditions, such as Chinese opera and regional folk dances (*Hongse* 1971). Combined with her costumes, props, and hairstyles, Wu’s dancing image seems to bear little relation to the national and ethnic dance forms that sprang up across the postcolonial world in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast to Wu Qinghua, the dancing images generated in these forms—Indian *bharata natyam*, Mexican *ballet folklórico*, and Balinese dance, for example—explicitly cited traditional imagery and movement as part of their construction of new anticolonial national culture. Looking only at the revolutionary ballets, China seems to have no counterpart to this trend.

Before *Red Detachment*, however, the Chinese dance repertoires of the pre-1964 era were filled with Maoist heroines whose choreographic images do echo aesthetic concerns of dance developments in the postcolonial world. Three such characters were Third Sacred Mother in the 1957 Chinese dance drama *Magic Lotus Lantern*, Zhou Xiuying in the 1959 Chinese dance drama *Dagger Society*, and Ke Ying in the 1959 dance drama *Five Red Clouds*. As with the revolutionary ballets, extant film recordings offer abundant resources for choreographic and visual analysis of these productions (*Bao liandeng* 1959; *Wu duo hongyun* 1960; *Xiaodao hui* 1961). Thus, they provide some of the best examples for delving into and interpreting Mao-era dance history. The characters of Third Sacred Mother, Zhou Xiuying, and Ke Ying present dance images very different from Wu Qinghua. This
is because, like most other full-length narrative dance productions created in China prior to 1964, *Magic Lotus Lantern, Dagger Society, and Five Red Clouds* were works of “Chinese dance drama” (*minzu wuju*), not ballet (Zhai 1996; Yu P. 2004). Thus, rather than using ballet as their primary movement vocabulary, they employed the newly created movement repertoires of Chinese dance, which took inspiration from indigenous performance sources such as Chinese opera, regional Han and ethnic minority folk dances, and martial arts. According to the accepted principles of Chinese dance drama creation at the time, it was thought that a character’s movement vocabulary should vary according to her background. Thus, the temple-dwelling immortal Third Sacred Mother performs a fusion of elements from Buddhist art and Chinese opera; the Shanghai Han peasant heroine Zhou Xiuying embodies a mix of regional Han Chinese folk dance, opera movement, and martial arts; and the Hainan Li peasant heroine Ke Ying presents choreography loosely inspired by southern minority dances. While these dances do not aim to faithfully reproduce traditional performance techniques in their original form, they produce a modern aesthetic that self-consciously locates itself within longer histories of indigenous expressive codes and aesthetic standards (Wilcox 2018). From this perspective, they have much in common with postcolonial cultural projects concerned with the strategic appropriation and transformation of traditional culture for the purposes of modern nation building.

Within this longer tradition of Chinese performance culture, the dancing image of Third Sacred Mother in *Magic Lotus Lantern* clearly builds on early twentieth-century articulations of the “virtuous female” (*qingyi*), “immortal” (*shenxian*), and “flower gown” (*huashan*) roles in Chinese opera (Goldstein 2007). Her dance is composed of soft, breathy movements with swaying curves, twisting actions, and coordinated eye, hand, and torso patterns that explicitly borrow from the movement repertoires of opera actors (*Bao liandeng* 1959). Instead of rifles, Third Sacred Mother’s stage properties include long silk scarves and a pair of double swords, standard for female characters on the early twentieth-century opera stage. In a bejeweled costume, billowy gown, and headdress, she circles the stage framing herself in arcs and figure eights of flowing pastel fabric (fig. 2). Whereas the balletic aesthetics of Wu Qinghua’s choreography demand angular leg lines, pointed
feet, and spinal verticality, the Chinese operatic aesthetics of Third Sacred Mother’s choreography demand accentuated soft leg lines, flexed footwork, and spinal compression and fluidity. The two characters’ distinct dance techniques accord with divergent traditions of embodied aesthetic culture.

In *Dagger Society*, Zhou Xiuying’s primary movement vocabularies draw heavily on the “martial female” (*wudan*) role type in Chinese opera, mixed with martial arts movement and dance techniques adapted from regional folk traditions in and around Shanghai, the fictional setting of the dance drama’s narrative. Like Third Sacred Mother, Zhou employs stage properties commonly found in Chinese opera, including double swords, batons, spears, bows, and sabers. During the production’s many battle scenes, her adept twirling and swinging of these implements, usually in coordination with the movements of other characters, draws clearly on *bazi*, or acrobatic fight techniques, that make up a core part of training in Chinese opera. Zhou’s signature stances all employ standard body wrapping arm positions, twisting footwork and corkscrew body alignments, and “orchid finger” hand
gestures required of feminine-coded Chinese opera comportment (fig. 3; *Xiaodao hui* 1961).

Ke Ying, an ethnic minority Maoist heroine, performs a significantly different movement vocabulary from those of Third Sacred Mother and Zhou Xiuying. Her signature movements include a set of lilting, syncopated steps punctuated by a kick to one side using the calf and foot, followed by a slow turn executed with the upper body on a diagonal and the arms crossed partially over the chest (*Wu duo hongyun* 1960). Inspiration for this choreography reportedly came from field research on Li and Miao folk dances in the Five Finger Mountain area of Hainan, where the story is set (Zhang T. 1985). A folk arts festival was held in Hainan the year *Five Red Clouds* was created, and some of the local groups who participated in this festi-
val also contributed to its choreography (ibid.: 80–86). The mixing of two established modern national folk dance vocabularies to compose Ke Ying’s movement style—Li and Miao—conveys Ke Ying’s identity as an ethnic Li, as well as the prevalence of Miao communities in the region where the story is set. Since Red Detachment of Women is also set in Hainan, a ballet version of Li-style folk dance also appears in that work. However, the style is used only in select group sequences intended as divertissements, not as the primary movement language of the narrative scenes, as it is in Five Red Clouds.

The citation of indigenous movement traditions in these three pre-1964 Chinese dance drama productions evinces an engagement with dance form as a site of postcolonial cultural politics. Lu Jing (1918–), Wudao’s founding chief editor and a key participant in national-level dance activities during the early PRC, addressed this issue in an article published in 1958, in Wudao’s inaugural issue. Lu wrote,

Through thousands of years of effort by our ancestors, the dance art of our nationality has created its own distinctive style that expresses the people’s psychology and customs and therefore is familiar and acclimated to and loved by them. . . . Therefore, it is necessary that we develop the dance art of new China on the foundation of inheriting national tradition. China’s dance art must appear on the world stage through a national style that is specific to China. Only then can it become a unique lustrous pearl in the treasure house of world dance art. (1958: 7–8)

Here, Lu defines “national style” as a crucial link between the past and the future: on the one hand, it inherits local traditions, emphasizing continuity; on the other, it imagines a future world in which China has developed its own national dance art, which becomes recognized and valued on the world stage. This link between the past and the future through the idea of a national dance style is central to the postcolonial cultural strategy embodied in Mao-era Chinese dance repertoires. By asserting that access to global dance culture is aided, rather than inhibited, by a commitment to developing national dance traditions, Lu challenges the colonial concept that non-European cultural traditions present a barrier to modernization and globalization. Instead, he joins a broader postcolonial effort that views
respect for diverse local cultural inheritances as a basis for equal exchange among modern independent nations.

During the pre–Cultural Revolution Mao era, both Han and minority dances were considered essential components of Chinese dance, which was constructed as a cultural expression not just of Han culture but of China as a modern multiethnic nation-state (Wilcox forthcoming). The political transition from an empire to a nation-state that took place in China during the early twentieth century brought about a new conception of Chinese identity, in which national minorities were considered part of the multicultural construct of Zhonghua minzu, or greater Chinese nationality (Tuohy 1991; Leibold 2007). This conception of multicultural national identity became central to Chinese Communist Party doctrine and was institutionalized through policies developed during the early 1950s (Mullaney 2011). Because the construction of Chinese multiculturalism through nationalities policy took place simultaneously with the construction of China’s early Mao-era dance repertoire, this repertoire embodied many of the ideals of early Chinese multiculturalism, which were often too radical to be fully realized in social practice (Blum 2001; Wilcox 2016).

Apart from dance form, content was also an important site for the negotiation and expression of postcolonial cultural politics in pre–Cultural Revolution Mao-era Chinese dance repertoires. One way that a postcolonial sensibility was expressed through the content of these works was in their use of indigenous literature. The story on which *Magic Lotus Lantern* is based, *Splitting the Mountain to Save Mother* (*Pi shan jiu mu*), is a popular Chinese folk legend usually dated to the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368) that has a considerable tradition of adaptation in Chinese opera forms of various regions. The story incorporates religious symbols and moral concepts related to Daoist, Buddhist, and Confucian sources, as well as frequently reoccurring themes in Chinese classic and popular literature, such as filial piety, star-crossed lovers, master-disciple relationship, self-cultivation through martial arts, supernatural powers, and travel between the human and immortal worlds. In its use of popular literature, *Magic Lotus Lantern* followed a broader pattern that was common in Chinese dance drama creation of the time.3

Another way that a postcolonial sensibility is expressed thematically in these
Chinese dance repertoires is through their treatment of anti-imperialism. The textual introduction to the film version of *Dagger Society* sets the scene for the story as follows:

After the 1840 Opium Wars, imperialism increased its invasive and extractive impacts upon China. In order to overturn the double oppression of imperialism and the feudal court, the Chinese people carried out a long-term struggle of armed revolt. In 1851, the Taiping rebellion took place in Guangxi, and responses came from many places. In August of 1853, the anti-imperialist, antifeudal Dagger Society revolt took place in Shanghai. This film describes the story of the heroes of this revolt. (*Xiaodao hui* 1961)

As portrayed in the film, the antagonistic force in the story is the collusion between an American imperialist, Yan Matai, and a Qing official, Wu Jianzhang. Yan, performed by a Chinese actor in whiteface, is the primary villain of the story and is shown brutalizing Chinese people, including members of the eponymous Dagger Society. It is only when the heroine Zhou Xiuying kills Yan that the battle ends and the story achieves resolution. Yan plays multiple roles in the story, from a wealthy capitalist who oversees British East India Company opium imports, to a priest who mediates local negotiations in favor of his friends, and a military general who gives orders to fire canons on the Dagger Society headquarters. In this sense, Yan’s character serves as postcolonial commentary on the multifaceted nature of imperialist oppression.

In *Five Red Clouds*, postcolonial politics are expressed in a slightly more oblique manner through the work’s thematic treatment of ethnic violence. As with *Dagger Society*, the antagonism presented in the work has a dual quality here with both class and ethnicity playing a role (Zhang T. 1985). The villains in this work are a group of Guomindang soldiers who oppress local Li people, by politically intimidating them, forcing them to carry out manual labor for the soldiers, and terrorizing them by murdering members of the Li community and burning their dwellings. In one scene reminiscent of colonial slavery, a group of Li men and women are taken forcibly from their homes, chained together by ankle shackles, and made to carry out hard labor through the night without rest, under the supervision of armed guards.
(Wu duo hongyun 1960). When a Li man and then Ke Ying try to resist and plead with the officers, they are locked inside a metal cage on which a sign hangs that reads “Exhibition object: Li,” with the word Li written with three added strokes giving it the dehumanizing radical “dog.” This specific assemblage of images—forced labor at gunpoint, ankle shackles and chains, human exhibition using a cage, and the animal classifier—generates a critical reflection on the postcolonial notion that class and ethnicity are intersecting modes of social oppression. At the end of the production, when the Li take up arms and overthrow the Guomindang soldiers, they perform the embodiment of a revolutionary subjectivity that can be read as a metaphor for anticolonial revolution (fig. 4).

*Dagger Society* and *Five Red Clouds* were not alone in their foreground-
ing of imperialism and ethnic oppression as key themes; many new dance
dramas of the early Mao era presented similar issues. The idea of the United
States as a new imperialist aggressor loomed large in these productions.
*Peace Dove*, for example, a dance drama premiered in 1950, depicted the
United States as an “imperialist warmonger” whose fight for world domina-
tion through capitalism and the atomic bomb was being challenged by “the
struggles of the people of Asia” (Wu and Xia 1950). Several other dance dra-
mas and large-scale music and dance works with themes of anti-US struggle
and inter-Asian solidarity appeared during the Korean and Vietnam Wars,
the best documented of which were *Mother Calls* (*Muqin zai zhaohuan*, 1951),
*Luo Shengjiao* (1952), *Fires of Fury in the Coconut Grove* (*Yelin nuhuo*, 1965),
and *Remain in Combat Readiness* (*Yan zhen yi dai*, 1965). Racial violence
within the United States was the central theme of the dance drama *Fires
of Fury Are Burning* (*Nuhuo zai ranshao*, 1964), a small-scale dance drama
created by China’s top People’s Liberation Army performance company that
conveyed a pro-civil rights theme.

The dance begins with the brutality of a young black boy by a white
police officer, which is followed by an anti-police rally and then a victorious
battle against the Ku Klux Klan, in front of a set of the US capitol building
and a flaming cross (*Xuri dong sheng*, 1964). In all of these works, themes
of anticolonial revolution, national liberation, and race-based social justice
are mobilized by Chinese choreographers and dancers, as part of officially
sponsored activities carried out under the rubric of Maoist culture.

**China in the World: Dancing Maoist Third Worldism**

As discussed above, China’s participation in third world anti-imperialist pol-
itics during the mid-to-late 1960s and early 1970s is relatively well known.
Alexander Cook (2014) argues that the period from 1964 to 1971 marked
the height of this engagement, a time when China, now in possession of the
atom bomb, saw itself as the leader of a new group of countries that would
ally together to oppose the Cold War system characterized by US and Soviet
hegemony. In dance, this new orientation is reflected in the emergence of
large-scale Chinese music and dance productions that deal with anticolonial
revolutions and African-Asian-Latin American tricontinentalism. A 1965
dance drama *The Congo River Is Roaring* (*Gangguohe zai nuhou*), for example, commemorated the Congolese independence movement, and the 1965 large-scale song-and-dance productions *Ode to Wind and Thunder* (*Feng lei song*) and *We Walk on the Great Road* (*Women zou zai dalu shang*) celebrated anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Additional large-scale open-air performances were reported in 1965 issues of *Wudao* with captions such as “US imperialism get out of Dominica!” and “The entire world’s common enemy US imperialism must lose!” Global concerns clearly had a place on the Maoist dance stage by the mid-1960s, reflecting transnational political and cultural engagement that aligned China with the postcolonial world.

Maoist China’s third world cultural connections, however, began much earlier. Even before the founding of the PRC, direct movements of artists, as well as shared stylistic and cultural strategies, had fostered such connections. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), the emergence of “national form” as a theme in Chinese Communist Party cultural policy generated the initial context for early experiments in Chinese dance creation. The Yan’an “new yangge” movement can be seen as an initial step in this direction, followed by Dai Ailian’s activities in Chongqing and Liang Lun’s in Kunming (Tong 2013; Wilcox 2019). Within these, the “national forms” debates of the late 1930s and early 1940s established principles that would become foundational to early Maoist Chinese dance culture: the central role of field research in informing new artistic creation, the commitment to creating dance choreography grounded in indigenous aesthetic practice, and the idea that modernization was compatible with extending China’s cultural heritage. Recognizing these concerns as a shared theme both before and after 1949, Bonnie McDougall and Kam Louie characterize the period from 1937 to 1965 as a continuous cultural era, what they call “return to tradition” (McDougall and Louie 1997; Clark 2008: 6–8). This period can also be regarded as China’s most serious time of engagement with postcolonial cultural issues.

China’s “return to tradition” coincided with an explosion of national classical and folk dance styles across the colonial and postcolonial world. Although they were products of different local conditions and histories, these movements nevertheless came to constitute a global phenomenon,
in which China was a major participant during the early Mao era. This transnational dance field was postcolonial in the sense that it challenged the “universalist” claims of ballet and Western modern dance by asserting the significance of local, culturally specific sensibilities (Kowal 2010). One development that had a significant impact on these new forms was Soviet-style state folk dance, pioneered by Igor Moiseyev’s State Academic Ensemble of Folk Dances of the Peoples of the USSR, founded in 1937 (Shay 2002). Another was the promotion of modern South Asian classical dances such as 
*bharata natyam* and *Kathak*, launched in the late 1930s through the work of Rukmini Devi, Tanjore Balasaraswati, Madame Menaka, and others (O’Shea 2007; Chakravorty 2008). In Mexico, the year 1937 marked the first staging of *Danzas Auténticas Mexicanas*, which presented a new theatricalized form of nationalized folk dance known as *folklórico*, and in the United States it marked Katherine Dunham’s appearance on Negro Dance Evening, an important turning point in the development of African American modern dance inspired by Afro-diasporic sources (Hellier-Tinoco 2011; Foulkes 2002). Korean dance artist Choe Seung-hui (a.k.a. Choi Seunghee, 1911–69), at the time a colonial subject of the Japanese empire, launched her world tour in 1937, which would have a major impact on the development of modern Korean and Chinese dance, as discussed further below (Kleeman 2014; Wilcox forthcoming).

Before 1949, some connections were established between Chinese dance activities and international dance networks, largely through the international experiences of individuals; after 1949, they took place on a national scale. Between 1949 and 1962, delegations of dancers from the PRC attended seven international dance competitions held at the World Festivals of Youth and Students in Eastern Europe (Sheng 1959; Tian Y. 1962). The 1957 festival had special groups for Bandung countries, Africa, the Arab world, and Latin America, and the 1962 festival attracted representatives from 101 Asian, African, and Latin American nations, in addition to those from Europe and North America (Peacock 2012: 521; World Federation 2015). During this time, foreign dance companies also performed extensively in China. Between 1949 and 1959, China received sixty-five dance performance delegations from twenty-three foreign countries, an average of one every two months. Of these, thirteen came from the Soviet Union; seven from North
Korea; four each from Hungary, India, and Indonesia; three each from Bulgaria, East Germany, Japan, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia; two each from Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Poland, Romania, and Vietnam; and one each from Albania, Australia, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Cambodia, Great Britain, and Thailand (Sheng 1959: 7). Algerian, Cuban, Guinean, and Congolese groups also visited between 1960 and 1964 (Xu 1960; Tang 1961; Dai 1964; Zhang S. 1964). During these visits, troupes often stayed for several weeks, touring in multiple cities and performing scores of shows for Chinese audiences. Simultaneously, Chinese dance companies also toured abroad. Between 1949 and 1959, Chinese dance companies performed in thirty-nine foreign countries: the Soviet Union, Hungary, Korea, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Germany, Australia, India, Indonesia, Burma, Vietnam, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Austria, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Afghanistan, New Zealand, Egypt, Sudan, Abyssinia, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iran, Cambodia, Luxembourg, France, Japan, Mongolia, and Iraq (Sheng 1959: 6).

A majority of dance works performed during these exchanges, both by Chinese and foreign ensembles alike, was not ballet or Western modern dance but works in the new national dance styles. In the case of China, this meant Chinese dance. All forty works for which China won awards at the World Festivals of Youth and Students dance competitions between 1949 and 1962, for example, were Chinese dance choreographies. Of 113 photographs of Chinese tours by foreign dance companies published in Renmin huabao between 1950 and 1962, only about one quarter (twenty-eight total) are of ballet performances, while about one-third (thirty-six total) are of European or Latin American folk dance. The largest number (forty-nine total) depicts national folk or classical-style dances from East, South, and Southeast Asia. This last category included nineteen images of Southeast Asian dances, including six Burmese, four each of Indonesian and Thai, three Vietnamese, and two Cambodian. India was strongly represented, with fourteen images total, including performances in bharata natyam, Kathak, Kathakali dance drama, and Manipuri styles, as well as hybrid and folk-style works (fig. 5). This examination of early Mao-era dance exchange shows considerable activity with the postcolonial world in the 1950s and early 1960s.
An examination of foreign dance training in China during this period shows a similarly prominent role of styles and artists from the postcolonial world, especially from other parts of Asia. The first foreigner to significantly impact Chinese dance development in the PRC, apart from the Trinidad-born and Britain-trained Dai Ailian (1916–2006), was the Korean-born, Japan-trained dancer Choe Seung-hui. Choe’s company gave several high-profile shows in Beijing in December, 1949, which were attended by representatives from China’s top theater, music, and dance companies, as well as major political leaders (“Wenhua,” 1949). In 1951–52, Choe led a course

Figure 5 Uday Shankar dance company of India performs *Tilottama* in China in 1957. Source: China Foto Bank
at the Central Academy of Drama in Beijing, where she helped train the first generation of PRC Chinese dance practitioners and established methods for developing Chinese dance vocabularies derived from Chinese opera, which were often used in Chinese dance drama (Tian and Li 2005). It is well known that the Beijing Dance School (BDS) served as a primary center for Soviet ballet training in China and was also the site of China’s first ballet company, founded in late 1959. What is less well known, however, is that the school’s primary mission was to teach and develop new curricula for Chinese dance. The inaugural graduation performance by students at the school, held in 1955, included ballet, European character dance (Russian, Spanish, Hungarian, Polish, and Yugoslav), Chinese classical dance, and Chinese folk dance (Beijing 1993: 12). Magic Lotus Lantern was created as a student project of the BDS choreography course, which though led by a Soviet instructor, Viktor Ivanovich Tsaplin (1903–68), emphasized new choreography for Chinese dance drama (ibid.: 13). Chinese opera star Li Shaochun also coadvised the production along with Tsaplin. By the end of the 1950s, Asian dance was the primary focus of the school’s curriculum. Apart from the six Soviet instructors who taught at the school for staggered two- to three-year periods between 1953 and 1960, four Indonesian teachers also taught at the school on long-term contracts, staying from July 1957 to August 1959 (ibid.: 291). The shift in focus toward Asian dance is evident in the school’s 1958 graduation performance, which, apart from the oft-mentioned staging of the ballet Swan Lake, consisted almost completely of Asian dance styles, including Burmese, Cambodian, Chinese, Afghani, and Ceylonese (ibid.: 186).

The courses in Asian dance taught at the Beijing Dance School during the late 1950s laid the foundation for the creation of China’s first free-standing professional dance company specializing in foreign dance, the Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble (Dongfang Gewutuan, hereafter OSDE). Officially established on January 13, 1962, the ensemble specialized in “the study and performance of music and dance of the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America” (“Xuexi,” 1962). A product of the Bandung era, the company is said to have resulted from a conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and President Sukarno of Indonesia during the latter’s visit to Beijing in 1956. After seeing Chinese dancers perform an Indian dance, Sukarno reportedly
suggested that a dance exchange be established between China and Indonesia, which led to the presence of the Indonesian teachers at the Beijing Dance School the following year (Nan 1997). The OSDE soon became an emblem of China’s international connections throughout the postcolonial world. In December of 1960, many dancers who would eventually be founding members of OSDE accompanied Zhou Enlai on a foreign-relations trip to Burma, where they performed dance works representing fourteen Asian countries (ibid.: 3). The ensemble was a product of regular exchanges linked to Bandung diplomacy dating to 1953 (Wilcox 2017).

The inaugural gala of the OSDE, held in Beijing during the 1962 Spring Festival holiday, presents one embodiment of China’s postcolonial cultural relations through dance. Photographs from the show appeared prominently in mainstream Chinese newspapers of the time, and it was considered a major cultural event (Chen 1962; Li L. 1962). During the show, Chinese performers presented folk or classical music and dances in the following styles: Tajik, Japanese, Cambodian, Indian, Cuban, Guinean, Ethiopian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, Burmese, Nepalese, Korean, Chinese, Mexican, Cuban, Cambodian, and Vietnamese (Jin 1962; Chen 1962). The opening act was a Balinese dance known as *pendet*, described by a contemporary critic as follows:

As the dance began, a set depicting an Indonesian-style ancestral temple appeared at the center of the stage, and sitting on the stage was a “gamelan” orchestra, playing harmonious musical sounds akin to that of bells and chime stones. Under the direction of a temple officiant, six female devotees danced in a line facing the front of the stage. Fragrant incense was stuck in their hair, and their hands lifted alms bowls as they used dance to enact movements of religious ritual. By putting their palms together, performing prostrations, and subtly altering their finger positions, they expressed their hearts’ pious reverence. Later, they cast the colored flower petals from their bowls into the audience, expressing welcome and gratitude. (Jin 1962: 86; fig. 6)

After the performance, members of the ensemble posed for a photograph with Premier Zhou. The OSDE was one of the early Mao era’s most impor-
tant national performance ensembles, which both embodied and served the strengthening of China’s foreign relations with the third world (Zhang Y. 2012). Few could have anticipated that with the start of the Cultural Revolution just four years later, in 1966, not only would the dances performed by OSDE, but most Mao-era Chinese dance repertoires as well, be labeled antirevolutionary and their dancers largely banned from the stage. The rise of revolutionary ballet occurred through the suppression of these earlier Mao-era dance forms (Wilcox forthcoming).
Conclusion

The idea that revolutionary ballet was the lone product of Mao-era dance creation is a common misperception in Anglophone scholarship. The maintenance of this idea, however, relies on strategic occlusions of significant and well-documented phenomena in Chinese dance history. It requires the occlusion of an extensive body of new Chinese dance repertoires and training programs created during the pre–Cultural Revolution period, which are well documented in extant dance films and published materials from the time. Beyond the full-length narrative dance dramas already discussed, hundreds of new short-form Chinese dance choreographies also appeared during the 1950s and early 1960s, many of which established the stylistic foundations for dance forms that continue to be widely practiced in China and the Sinophone world today. Upholding the narrative about ballet also requires the occlusion of active circuits of transnational dance exchange across the postcolonial sphere in which national dance forms, rather than ballet, constituted the predominant artistic medium. The popularity of ballet during the latter part of the Mao years has often been attributed to Sino-Soviet friendship and the important role of Soviet models in the development of Mao-era dance culture (Ou 1995). However, this idea also requires the occlusion of the persistent ambivalence toward ballet expressed in the writings of Chinese dance professionals of the time, as well as the fact that Sino-Soviet friendship had already broken down before the revolutionary ballets emerged. Even within the Soviet Union, debates raged around the question of whether ballet was compatible with socialist culture (Ezrahi 2012). All of these occlusions can be said to have generated a blind spot in Anglophone studies of PRC dance history, which reflects a broader tendency to resist bringing the insights of postcolonial history to bear on the study of Maoist culture more generally.

The language in which the creators of the first revolutionary ballets defended their work suggests a much more complex relationship to Soviet ballet than has often previously been assumed. In a 1965 essay defending *Red Detachment*, one of the ballet’s lead choreographers, Li Chengxiang, wrote that the emergence of this production meant that Chinese choreographers were no longer following the lead of the Soviet Union, a practice
he described as “running along behind the butts of others” (gen zai ren-jia de pigu houbian pao) (1965: 16). Rather than copying others, Li argued, *Red Detachment* marked an end to China’s so-called “blind worshipping” (mangmu chongbai) of foreign ballet in its existing forms and a shift toward revolutionizing the genre to make it suitable for Chinese subjects. In a way, this argument followed positions that had long been taken by leaders in the field of Chinese dance, who tended to regard ballet as foreign, comparing it to a foreign language (Dai 1946). The major difference between Li’s position and those articulated earlier was that he now claimed that ballet-based choreography, if executed properly, could become a national dance style. Instead of considering this as proof of Maoist China’s uncritical importation of Soviet dance models, it thus makes more sense to regard the development of revolutionary ballet as part of a longer history of formal experimentation in Maoist dance that took inspiration from diverse dance styles (Wilcox forthcoming).

Examining this longer history of PRC dance creation fosters a more global understanding of Maoist culture, by reaching out beyond Cold War models that have tended to emphasize connections to the Soviet Union or the United States, rather than to other parts of the third world. In the past, inattention to the postcolonial dimensions of Maoist culture on the part of Chinese studies scholars often foreclosed comparison and dialogues about third world cultural exchange initiated by scholars in other fields. For example, in her study of performance in mid-twentieth-century Tanzania, Kelly Askew (2002) identified Tanzanian cultural policies that had considerable parallels in Mao-era China, yet the postcolonial blind spot in Anglophone PRC studies scholarship limited her ability to recognize these parallels. Based on writings by Chinese studies scholars, Askew determined that there was a stark difference between Chinese and Tanzanian cultural policies, because “Mao . . . viewed the cultural heritage of his people from a purely negative standpoint . . . [and] found [nothing] worth emulating or worth preserving” (ibid.: 158–59). Had China scholars been more attentive to cultural developments such as the history of pre-1964 Chinese dance, Askew’s conclusions might have been quite different. Similar lost opportunities can also be found in a recent study on Sino-Indonesian performance encounters of the 1950s and early 1960s (Lindsay and Liem 2012: 191–222).
A willingness to embrace postcolonial approaches and see cultural activities in Mao-era China as part of broader third world movements will not only offer new ways of understanding Maoist culture but also generate innovative possibilities for cross-cultural studies of South-South and intra-Asian exchange.

Stretching across more than three decades and comprising diverse creative fields, Maoist culture was neither monolithic nor unchanging; rather, it had diverse faces and thus requires diverse interpretive approaches. In the field of dance, the pre–Cultural Revolution Mao era witnessed a proliferation of choreographic experimentation that shared similar questions with concurrent movements taking place across the world. In their concern with adapting indigenous culture and expressing anticolonial politics through modern choreography adapted from Chinese opera and regional folk dances, practitioners of Chinese dance during the 1950s and early 1960s engaged in a form of dance research common to many postcolonial communities at this time. Beyond mere affinities, these links to third world dance practice were also actualized through the movement of dancers and dance works: the presence of Korean and Indonesian teachers in Chinese dance schools; the touring of third world ensembles in China; the founding of China’s own dance ensemble dedicated to performing dances of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; the staging of Chinese dance at the World Festivals of Youth and Students organized by the World Federation of Democratic Youth; and the widespread touring of Chinese dance ensembles to newly independent postcolonial countries around the world. These phenomena demand new ways of thinking about Maoist dance culture that not only move beyond but also help better contextualize the revolutionary ballerina as one part of a longer history of PRC dance creation. No longer a soloist, the revolutionary ballerina is one part in a series of concurrent programs and successive acts.

Notes

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1 In addition to the films discussed below, see Bai feng chao yang (Hundred Phoenixes Face the Sun; Beijing Film Studio, 1959), Caidie fenfei (Colored Butterflies Flutter About; Beijing Film Studio, 1963), Dongfeng wanli (The Endless East Wind; August First Film Studio, 1964), and Dongfang hong (East Is Red; Beijing Film Studio, 1965).

2 The term minzu was used in Mao-era professional dance discourse as a synonym for “Chinese” or “national”; it included both Han and ethnic minority dance styles.

3 Other examples include Dao xiancao (Stealing Immortal Herbs; Central Experimental Opera Theater, 1955), Liu Hai kanchai (Liu Hai Chops Firewood; Hunan Provincial Folk Song and Dance Ensemble, 1958), Shi Yi he Wang En (Shi Yi and Wang En; Tianjin People’s Art Theater, 1959), Qiang qin (Snatching the Bride; All-China Federation of Trade Unions Cultural Work Ensemble Dance Team, 1959), Bingdilian (Twin Lotus Flowers on One Stalk; China Railroad Cultural Work Ensemble, 1959), Zhenzhu cheng de xiao gushi (Little Story of Pearl City; South China Song and Dance Ensemble 1959), Shi Yi kanchai (Woodcutter Shi Yi; Tianjin People’s Art Theater, 1959), Yu meiren (Lady of the Sea; Beijing Dance School, 1959), Liang Shanbo yu Zhu Yingtai (Liang Shanbo and Zhu Yingtai; Central Opera and Dance Theater, 1959), Manluohua (The Bindweed Flower; Guizhou Provincial Song and Dance Ensemble, 1960), Niulang zhinü (Cowherd and the Weaving Girl; South China Song and Dance Ensemble, 1960), Leifeng ta (Thunder Peak Tower; Central Experimental Opera Theater, 1960), and Hou Yi (Hou Yi; Shanghai Experimental Opera Theater, 1962).

4 The Thai group that visited in 1957, for example, performed in ten cities (Li L. 1957).

5 This evaluation is based on consultation of photographic and film documentation of all but one of the works, as well as interviews with Chinese dancers who attended World Festival of Youth and Students dance competitions during this period.

6 Images of ballet performances include Czech, Mongol, Soviet, British, Bulgarian, Mexican, Japanese, Hungarian, and Cuban companies, all of which are also shown performing other dance styles.

7 The Vallathol Narayana Menon and Uday Shankar companies both toured in China between 1953 and 1957 (Wilcox 2017).
8 The Beijing Dance School’s Experimental Ballet Ensemble was founded in 1959 but remained attached to the school until late 1963, whereas the Oriental Song and Dance Ensemble was founded as a national-level touring company in early 1962.

References


“Xuexi he biaoyan Ya Fei La ge guo renmin de gewu” (“Study and Perform Song and Dance of the People of the Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America”). 1962. Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily), January 14.


