

Political Science 460, Section 2

Problems in World Politics: Theories of International Relations

Fall 2001

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Lecture: MW 10:00-11:30
East Hall B844

Office Hours: M 1:30-3:00 and by Appointment

The Content of the Course

This course provides an in-depth look at theories of international relations, their logic, and their application to understand individual events. The topics covered include the causes of war, negotiation, domestic politics and foreign policy, and international institutions and cooperation. Because strategic interaction is central to world politics, the student will be introduced to game theory a mathematical theory of strategic interaction and its application to international politics. The game theory models to be presented in the class require only high school algebra for their solution. A series of cases are used to illustrate the application of the theories to specific situations in world politics.

Course Requirements and Grading

The course will be graded on the basis of four problem sets, two short papers (1000 words), and a one-hour final examination. The weight of each in the final grade is as follows:

Problem Sets	40%
Short Papers	30%
Final Examination	30%

Any concerns about the grading of an assignment must be made in writing to Professor Morrow.

Administrative Guidelines

The course meets twice a week for one-and-a-half hours. Each meeting will consist of a one-hour lecture followed by a half-hour recitation session for half the class. The class will be divided in half with one half attending recitation after the lecture on Mondays and the other half on Wednesdays. The recitations provide opportunities to go over problem sets and discuss the

case readings in a smaller group and greater detail than is possible in lecture.

Students are expected to attend the lectures and their recitation. Students are also expected to submit problem sets and papers by the due dates and take the final examination at the scheduled time. Students who cannot take the final at the scheduled time for medical reasons must produce a valid medical excuse.

Required Reading

This course requires three books:

David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press

Geoffrey Blainey. 1988. *The Causes of War*, 3rd Ed. New York: Free Press

Barry O'Neill. 1999. *Honor, Symbols, and War*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

They are available for purchase in the usual places. The syllabus refers to the assigned readings by chapters using the author's name to identify each book.

Additional readings are papers or book chapters and a series of short case studies of events in world affairs. Links to the former can be found at the course website. The latter is available for purchase over the web; details will come in the first class. Those who do not wish to purchase the casebook over the web may place orders with Professor Morrow for printed books to be ordered.

The course website can be found through UM Course Tools. It contains links to readings. Solutions to the problem sets will be posted after each problem set is graded.

Outline of Lecture Topics and Required Readings

September 5: Introduction and Organizational Meeting

September 10: Strategic Approaches to World Politics
Lake and Powell, Ch. 1

September 12: Preferences
Lake and Powell, Ch. 2

September 17: Some Basic Game Theory
O'Neill, Appendix B

September 19: Some More Basic Game Theory
Lake and Powell, Ch. 3
Problem Set 1 out.

September 24: War: Basic Issues
Blainey, Ch. 1-8

September 26: War: Why Everything We Know is Wrong
Blainey, Ch. 9-12
Problem Set 1 due.

October 1: More on War

October 3: War: Breakdown of Bargaining
James Fearon. 1995. Rationalist Explanations for War. *International Organization*, 49(1995):379-414.
Problem Set 2 out.
Paper 1 out.

October 8: More on War and Bargaining

October 10: War: Signaling and Bargaining
Case 231: 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis: The United States and China at the Precipice of War?
Problem Set 2 due.

October 15: More on Signaling and War
Case 349: Diplomacy During the Persian Gulf War

October 17: Discussion of Bargaining and War
Case 345: The United States and China, 1944-46
Paper 1 due.

October 22: War: Commitment Problems
Case 453: Yugoslavia, 1991-92: Could Diplomacy Have Prevented a Tragedy?

October 24: Producing Credible Commitments: Sinking Costs and Tying Hands

October 29: Producing Credible Commitments: Honor and Face
O'Neill, Ch. 6-10

October 31: Balance of Power
Edward Vose Gulick, 1955. *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*. New York: Norton, Ch.1-3
Problem Set 3 out.

November 5: Linkage
Robert D. Tollison and Thomas D. Willett. 1979. An Economic Theory of Mutually Advantageous Issue Linkages in International Negotiations.

International Organization, 33:425-49;

Case 354: Forging Consensus: The Western Alliance and the Invasion of Kuwait

November 7: Multiple Issues and Coalitions: Spatial Models

Joseph Lepgold, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and James D. Morrow. 1996. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1985-1993. *International Interactions*, 22:41-66.

Problem Set 3 due.

November 12: Multiple Issues, Linkage, and Negotiations

Case 414: The Geneva Conference of 1954: Indochina

November 14: Domestic Institutions and International Politics

Lake and Powell, Ch. 4

November 19: Incentives for State Leaders and War Aims

Paper 2 out.

November 21: The Democratic Peace

November 26: Cooperation: Public Goods

Case 226: Turbot War: Canada, Spain and Conflict Over the North Atlantic Fishery

November 28: Cooperation: Enforcement and Institutions

Kenneth A. Oye. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy. *World Politics*, 38:1-24;

Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy. *World Politics*, 38:226-54.

Problem Set 4 out.

December 3: Cooperation: Coordination and Distribution

Stephen D. Krasner. 1991. Global Communications and National Power. *World Politics*, 43:336-66;

Case 151: Competition among Japan, the United States, and Europe over High-Definition Television

Paper 2 due.

December 5: Cooperation: Choice among Institutions

Lake and Powell, Ch. 5

Problem Set 4 due.

December 10: Review

December 12: **Final Examination, you will need to bring a bluebook.**