The Strategic Shuffle: Ethnic Geography, the Internal Security Apparatus, and Elections in Kenya ⬢ ⬢

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Abstract: *For autocrats facing elections, officers in the internal security apparatus play a crucial role by engaging in coercion on behalf of the incumbent. Yet reliance on these officers introduces a principal-agent problem: Officers can shirk from the autocrat's demands. To solve this problem, autocrats strategically post officers to different areas based on an area's importance to the election and the expected loyalty of an individual officer, which is a function of the officer's expected benefits from the president winning reelection. Using a data set of 8,000 local security appointments within Kenya in the 1990s, one of the first of its kind for any autocracy, I find that the president's coethnic officers were sent to, and the opposition's coethnic officers were kept away from, swing areas. This article demonstrates how state institutions from a country's previous authoritarian regime can persist despite the introduction of multi-party elections and thus prevent full democratization.*

Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WPKTKJ.

How do autocrats win elections? Competitive authoritarian or hybrid regimes are now the plurality regime type in the developing world (Levitsky and Way 2010). They have remained resilient, counter to initial expectations anticipating full democratic transitions during the third wave of democratization. The persistence of these regimes has ignited a research agenda to understand not only the strategic advantages of elections to autocrats (e.g., Blaydes 2011; Magaloni 2006), but also the tool kit autocrats use to ensure their political survival.

One such tool is coercion by regional executives or local state administrators, those officers in branches of the internal security apparatus (ISA) that simultaneously have administrative duties and coercive capacity within set geographical areas. Such branches of the ISA exist in many of the world's hybrid regimes, where they often coerce on behalf of the autocrat in the run-up to elections (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014).[1] These branches of the ISA are a remnant of their country's closed authoritarian era when they did much of the "dirty work" that kept their leader in power. Now facing elections, autocrats demand that these officers use their authority to engage in subtle acts of coercion that tilt the electoral playing field (e.g., procedural disqualification of opposition candidates, and low-scale harassment of opposition supporters) without attracting significant international attention.[2] Yet reliance on these officers introduces a fundamental principal-agent problem; monitoring is difficult, and officers can refuse to comply with the autocrat's demands for coercion.

[1]I use the term *autocrat* to refer to leaders facing reelection campaigns but who tilt the playing field in their favor. Others have labeled these leaders "electoral authoritarians" (e.g., Schedler 2002).

[2]For instance, see Schedler (2002) and Levitsky and Way (2010).

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One solution to this principal-agent problem is to strategically post officers to different areas based on two factors. First, an autocrat weighs the importance of an area to the election; she does not need complete support across the country, but instead, only enough to win under the country's electoral rules. Second, she estimates the expected benefits to an officer from her reelection, and thus the incentives an officer has to comply with her orders to coerce to deliver support. Weighing these factors allows an autocrat to optimize officer management, or "shuffling," and ensure that those officers who are the most likely to coerce on the autocrat's behalf are stationed to those areas of the country where the autocrat most needs to win votes.

While the type of political cleavage that is most relevant differs across countries—from clan membership to religious sect—in this article, I focus specifically on countries with salient ethnic cleavages. Instrumental theories of ethnicity maintain that the geographic concentration of ethnic groups allows leaders to target ethnic groups by targeting the areas they inhabit (Bates 1983; Posner 2005). An autocrat determines an area's importance to the election based on the country's ethnic group settlement patterns and each group's expected voting behavior, what I call her *ethnic geography*. She can only count on strong support from her *aligned* areas—those inhabited by her coethnics. At the same time, *misaligned* areas, inhabited by the opposition's coethnics, will vote against her absent large amounts of highly costly and visible coercion. But when her aligned areas are not enough to create a minimum-winning coalition, an autocrat needs to win in *unaligned* areas, those inhabited by ethnic groups unaffiliated with major candidates, to remain in power.

In a parallel manner, presidents in neopatrimonial regimes are expected to favor ethnically aligned officers in career advancement and compensation. Consequently, aligned officers within the ISA expect to benefit from the leader's reelection, whereas misaligned officers expect to benefit if the opposition (i.e., their coethnic) wins. Aligned officers are the most willing to comply with orders to coerce on behalf of the leader, whereas misaligned officers have the highest incentive to shirk. Thus, the autocrat posts aligned officers to unaligned areas, especially unaligned areas with low levels of existing support for the autocrat, where coercion will have the largest relative impact on her reelection. Misaligned officers will instead be posted away from unaligned areas to minimize the risks they pose.

I show this with a data set of 8,000 local-level appointments within the regional executive branch of Kenya's ISA for the decade following the country's return to multiparty rule in 1992. To my knowledge, this is the first officer-level data set for an ISA within an African country, and one of the largest for any authoritarian regime.[3] I find that President Daniel arap Moi's coethnic (aligned) Kalenjin officers were posted to "unaligned provinces," those provinces inhabited by unaligned groups, and specifically areas within unaligned provinces with relatively lower vote share for President Moi in the previous election. But the exact opposite pattern holds for misaligned Kikuyu officers, coethnics of President Moi's main challengers: Kikuyu officers were posted away from unaligned provinces, or only to areas within these provinces with higher vote share for President Moi in the previous election where they could do little damage to his reelection chances. I present observational evidence that a high presence of aligned Kalenjin officers in the run-up to the 1997 election is associated with an increase in Moi's vote share, and a high presence of misaligned Kikuyu officers is associated with a decrease in his vote share.

This article makes several contributions. First, I show that autocrats can optimize their coercive apparatus when they do not equally trust all officers. This result helps account for the coexistence of an ISA that is not fully "packed" with the autocrat's in-group officers, yet all the while, still uses its state authority to coercion regime opponents and keep the autocrat in office. Indeed, contrary to prevailing wisdom, this article shows that autocrats need not fully pack their ISA to ensure the coercion that keeps them in power. Instead, this article's use of highly localized officer data brings to light the importance of spatial variation in local-level regime support and individual-level officer incentives.

Further, this study connects to literature on the politicization of the public sector. Though research has indicated that autocrats must forgo competence for loyalty (Egorov and Sonin 2011), I recognize that autocrats can optimize across both dimensions by taking into account the importance of a station to meeting regime goals (Landry 2008; Iyer and Mani 2012). Patterns of state administration then become endogenous to a leader's perception of territorial variation in political threats. While this idea has been studied by scholars of state structure (Boone 2003), I extend the logic to the study of the state's most coercive institutions, allowing us to account for the high prevalence of targeted, localized coercion.

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[3]Though the ISA is often crucial in sustaining authoritarian regimes, systematic analysis at the local level has been noticeably missing from existing work because of a lack of microlevel data (e.g., Decalo 1990; Sassoon 2011; Taylor 2011).

Existing Literature

Packing the ISA

Conventional wisdom on the ISA within closed authoritarian regimes is that autocrats "pack" the ISA with officers who are perceived to have aligned incentives.[4] Who an autocrat relies on depends on a country's salient political cleavages. For instance, autocrats who come to power through violent struggle rely on those who fought with them (e.g., Carter and Hassan 2016; Weitzer 1990); leaders in the Middle East prefer to pack their officer corps with family or sect members (Bellin 2012; Sassoon 2011); and within ethnicized or fragmented countries, autocrats purposefully draw on their own ethnic group (Decalo 1990). Ingroup willingness to engage in coercion on behalf of the regime is instrumental: Ingroup officers expect to benefit more from the status quo than if the opposition won power, as a new leader will favor her own ingroup. Ingroup officers value this favoritism, as higher positions gain them both organizational prestige (Wilson 1989) and greater opportunities to extract rents from the population (Taylor 2011). Further, this link is reinforcing; favoritism makes explicit ingroup officers' link to the regime, tying their fates with the leader, as they would be let go (or worse) if the leader loses power (Bellin 2012).

Packing, however, is but one strategy for how autocrats can manage their ISA to ensure compliance. Indeed, much scholarship on the regional executive arm of the security apparatus within autocracies has documented the ethnic heterogeneity of these officers (e.g., Barkey 1994; Young and Turner 1985). This indicates the need for theory on the conditions under which autocrats coerce using a packed versus a heterogeneous ISA, as well as theory on how autocrats manage an ISA when not all officers have aligned incentives.

Ethnic Geography

Before delving into the theory that addresses these needs, I review literature on other topics that discuss how leaders rely on spatial variation in support to govern different subnational areas. Specifically, scholarship has documented how presidents vary usage of available tools subnationally in an attempt to win votes within *electorally valuable areas*, or areas that most affect the election outcome. Within countries with salient ethnic cleavages, geographic targeting is especially relevant, as ethnic groups are both geographically concentrated and tend to vote as

a bloc, precisely because politicians can easily target local public goods or policies to an area, and consequently, a group (Bates 1983; Posner 2005) This coincidence of ethnicity and space allows a leader to map her *ethnic geography*—the political alignment of the country's ethnic groups toward her and their geographic location.[5] Much existing research across sub-Saharan Africa has relied on the geographic concentration of groups to explain patterns of political behavior (e.g., Ichino and Nathan 2013; Posner 2005), and others have found that leaders rely on ethnic geography to distribute goods (e.g., Bates 1983; Burgess et al. 2015), determine taxation strategies (Kasara 2007), or decentralize power (Baldwin 2014). Scholarship on other regions of the world has found similar patterns concerning other salient identity cleavages, including sect and caste (e.g., Cammett and Issar 2010; Min 2015).

A Theory of Strategic Postings

I first examine the conditions under which an autocrat will rely on coercion through the ISA to win reelection before developing a theory for how autocrats can optimize the management of the ISA at a local level to win reelection.[6] Building on the logic of ethnic geography, I classify an incumbent's coethnics and other ethnic groups that have allied with her as *aligned*. These groups—and the parts of the country they inhabit—will vote for the incumbent, as they expect to benefit from the incumbent staying in power. *Misaligned* ethnic groups are coethnics of the opposition candidate, as well as other ethnic groups that have lined up behind the opposition.

When the autocrat cannot rely solely on the support of aligned groups to win reelection, she needs to either co-opt or coerce votes from unaligned voters.[7] Autocrats facing reelection often have a "menu of manipulation" from which they can choose tactics to ensure their victory, using both acts of co-optation and coercion simultaneously (Schedler 2002). Autocrats facing reelection rely on strategies as varied as vote buying to increase turnout in aligned areas (Magaloni 2006) and pre-election

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[4]See, for instance, Decalo (1990), Slater (2003), Sassoon (2011), and Bellin (2012).

[5]This definition builds off that in Kasara (2007) and Baldwin (2014).

[6]See Greitens (2016) on why autocrats choose specific ISA configurations.

[7]An autocrat will require greater amounts of coercion to win votes from misaligned than unaligned voters, as misaligned voters have higher expected utility from winning. In countries where distributive politics depends on ascribed identity features, voters expect the most from their ingroup members (Posner 2005). Thus, aligned and misaligned voters expect the most return from the election of the incumbent and opposition, respectively.

coercion against misaligned voters (Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014).

Though not the focus of this article, there are certain conditions that make coercion more likely. Autocrats facing reelection will opt for some level of coercion when coercion is relatively cheaper or is expected to be more successful than co-optation. Strategies that attempt to co-opt voters often prove prohibitively expensive or risky. For instance, vote buying begets a commitment problem that can only be overcome with a strong party that has a large network of locally ingrained brokers (Stokes et al. 2013), something that many African party systems lack (Riedl 2014). Relatedly, autocrats who have a highly institutionalized body capable of engaging in coercion may find it easier (and cheaper) to rely on this body to coerce rather than investing to create a strong party with deep patronage networks. Other times, autocrats find it cheaper to suppress swing voters than to provide them with (costly) goods (Robinson and Torvik 2009).

Autocrats often turn to regional executives to coerce to ensure their electoral victory, as these officers are best equipped to suppress support for the opposition through acts of "low-intensity coercion" (e.g., procedural disqualification of opposition candidates, low-scale harassment of opposition supporters) that avoid large-scale detection. I also note that these officers are ill equipped at increasing the autocrat's vote share through co-optation. This is because officers are largely unfamiliar with the communities in which they are posted, and thus unable to develop clientelistic ties with local residents. Regimes rotate officers across stations so that no officer becomes unwilling to coerce against a community she is embedded in, as well as to limit the ability of the officer to create a local following that the officer can later use to challenge the autocrat (Barkey 1994; Carter and Hassan 2016; Debs 2007; Young and Turner 1985). This constant rotation means that officers cannot credibly engage in sustained patronage relationships with area residents because they are not around long enough to have iterated exchanges with voters.

An autocrat, however, faces a principal-agent problem in ensuring compliance with her orders to coerce. Officers can refuse to help the autocrat, shirking from her demands, or even use their power to clandestinely suppress incumbent support and aid the opposition. This problem is accentuated because officers are primarily tasked with acts of low-intensity coercion that are difficult to monitor. How does a leader distinguish those officers who are willing to engage in coercion on her behalf from those who are not? A leader will use ethnicity as a proxy for whether an officer can be expected to comply. Parallel to the definition of *ethnic geography*, I define *aligned*, *misaligned*, and *unaligned* officers based on an officer's expected utility from the outcome of the election. I focus the theory on aligned and misaligned officers, as these officers have the largest incentive to comply with, or shirk from, the autocrat's orders.

One strategy to ensure compliance is to pack the ISA with coethnic officers, as existing literature suggests. Yet a complete packing of the ISA with the autocrat's coethnics is often not possible, or even desirable. First, leaders often dole out state positions, including jobs in the ISA, as a way to build coalitions with other ethnic communities. When the ruling coalition contains multiple groups—a common tactic used to solidify intraelite support in ethnically fragmented countries (Arriola 2009)—these other elites demand valuable public sector positions, such as those in the ISA, as a source of patronage for their own group members. Separately, a blatant disregard for executive constraints through the overrepresentation of the autocrat's ingroup members within the ISA can trigger regime-destabilizing outcomes such as destabilizing protests by civil society, checks by other branches of government, or an increased likelihood of coups from disgruntled sections of the ISA (Harkness 2014; Roessler 2011). As a result, autocrats must often—or strategically choose to—deploy an ISA containing a mix of ingroup and outgroup officers. Because not all officers are in the autocrat's ingroup, autocrats only have a limited number of loyal officers who can be expected to comply with orders to coerce.

When packing the ISA is not feasible or preferred, a second strategy to bypass the principal-agent problem is to selectively post officers in a manner that takes into account an officer's incentives to engage in coercion on behalf of the leader and the importance of coercion in different areas across the country. With a fixed number of aligned officers to distribute across stations, the autocrat will post aligned officers where coercive actions promise to have the largest impact on the election.

A country's specific electoral institutions will determine where these more electorally valuable areas are, and thus the empirical observations of this theory will vary based on context. In countries with electoral college–type systems where no candidate's own ethnic group is large enough to form a minimum-winning coalition (such as in Kenya, described below), an autocrat needs to win unaligned (or swing) regions (i.e., electoral units inhabited by ethnic groups that have not lined up behind either candidate) that will push her above the winning threshold.

Hypothesis 1 for the following empirical analysis, then, is that aligned officers will be sent to the unaligned regions that push the autocrat above the winning threshold, whereas misaligned officers will be kept away from

these vital regions. To the extent that an autocrat expects variation in support within unaligned regions, coercion is best targeted to local areas of relatively low expected support. Enclaves of weak incumbent support *within* unaligned regions are where an autocrat sees the most fertile ground to increase her vote share through low-intensity coercion. Accordingly, Hypothesis 2 for the following empirical analysis is that aligned officers are especially sent to areas of weak incumbent support within the unaligned regions that the autocrat needs to win, whereas misaligned officers are especially kept away from these areas.[8]

Hypothesis 3 concerns timing and is applicable across contexts. Low-intensity coercion is most effective in the long run-up to the election; constant vigilance to constrain the opposition's appeal in a given area—and strengthen the leader's—makes it more costly for opponents to contest in the area during campaign season or can deter opposition candidates from contesting at all in the first place. That being said, low-intensity coercion will be most prominent in the immediate run-up to an election and on election day itself. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is that though we should expect strategic postings in the long run-up to the election, strategic postings will be more pronounced in the immediate run-up to the election.

The broad contours of the theory are applicable to hybrid regimes without salient ethnic cleavages. Ethnicity can stand for other ascriptive characteristics that are salient in society. In countries where these cleavages are not salient, autocrats can instead surmise willingness to coerce through acquired markers of loyalty, such as previous military involvement (Weitzer 1990) or party membership (Reuter and Robertson 2012), or past performance on observable targets, such as incumbent vote share in the officer's station in the previous election (Blaydes 2011) or economic performance (Landry 2008). Even in countries where ethnicity is not politically salient, an autocrat can still mitigate variation in the expected compliance of officers by strategically posting those who can be most expected to comply to the areas where she needs that compliance the most.

The Provincial Administration and Kenyan Elections

I examine the above theory in Kenya during the first decade after the return to multiparty politics in 1992. Kenyan elections since then have been competitive, but far from free and fair. Kenyan politics follows a strong

ethnic logic, whereby viable presidential candidates tend to win areas inhabited by aligned groups at rates of more than 90%.[9] Areas inhabited by groups without a viable coethnic in the race or who have not lined up behind a candidate tend to split their vote. Kenya has over 40 ethnic groups, and no one group comprises a national majority. A leader cannot rely solely on strong turnout from her community, but must vie for votes from unaligned groups. I focus on this historical period, first, because of data availability reasons. It is difficult to obtain microlevel data on an ISA, one of the most closely guarded institutions within any authoritarian regime, but especially so for current regimes. Second, as I discuss below, existing scholarship on Kenya's transition to multiparty elections has established that the ISA played a large role in keeping the incumbent in power, yet little is known about *how* the regime managed this institution.

There is variation in the ethnicity of the viable candidates in the 1992 and 1997 elections. President Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin who came to power in 1978, contested in both those elections after transitioning the country away from one-party rule under the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The Kalenjin comprised 11% of the population and were the country's fourth largest ethnic group.[10] Moi's viable challengers came from the Kikuyu community, the country's largest ethnic group, comprising 21% of the population; in 1992, Moi contested against Kenneth Matiba (FORD-A: Forum for the Restoration of Democracy - Asili) and Mwai Kibaki (DP: Democratic Party), and in 1997, Moi's only viable challenger was Mwai Kibaki (DP). Moi announced in 1998 that he would abide by the country's term limits and not contest for reelection in 2002. Elischer (2013) classifies all three parties as ethnic: KANU displayed a clear bias in favor of the Kalenjin, and DP and FORD-A were associated with the Kikuyu.

Kenya's electoral rules at the time stipulated that a successful presidential candidate had to win a plurality of the votes nationwide and at least 25% of the vote in five of the country's eight provinces. This 25% rule was considered to be a larger hurdle than the plurality rule for all presidential candidates throughout the 1990s given the concentration of the country's largest ethnic groups in single provinces.[11] Indeed, no ethnic group comprised 25% of the population in more than two provinces.

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[8]See the supporting information (SI) for an application of the theory to other electoral rules.

[9]See Horowitz (n.d.) for the role of ethnicity in Kenyan multiparty elections.

[10]All population and ethnicity figures are from the 1989 census.

[11]Interview with Permanent Secretary of Provincial Administration (1991–96), Nairobi, Kenya, July 1, 2012. Interview with 1997 candidate Raila Odinga, Boston, MA, May 22, 2014.

The largest branch of Kenya's ISA during this period was the Provincial Administration (PA), the country's executive bureaucracy in charge of internal security and law and order. PA officers were the state's administrative representatives in their respective jurisdictions. Among their numerous duties include overseeing voter registration, approving public gatherings, and commanding the area's police officers. District officers (DOs) were the lowest rung of trained administrators in the PA, and they comprised the bulk of the trained officer corps (around 80% from 1993 to 2002).[12] One or more DOs were posted to each of the country's administrative "divisions," equivalent to a small U.S. county, where they had executive authority.[13] Postings were determined by the Permanent Secretary in consultation with Moi. PA officers not only earned a steady government salary, but more lucratively, also enriched themselves by using their authority to accrue rents (Hassan 2015).

Precisely because of the lucrative nature of these positions, KANU elites from all ethnic communities demanded that their coethnics be well represented in the officer corps, with positions serving as patronage to their own coethnics. Figure 1 plots the percentage of DOs in the run-up to the 1992 and 1997 elections for the country's five most well-represented ethnic groups in the PA, as well as the percentage of each group in the general population and their cabinet representation. This figure shows that Moi did pack the PA to some extent with his coethnic Kalenjins, but that they were never the majority of officers. Other groups were well represented in the PA, with their numbers mirroring those of their cabinet representation. This is consistent with the idea that Moi co-opted other ethnic groups he needed in his coalition by doling out public sector positions to them. This means that though Moi did overrepresent his coethnics in the PA, he still only had a minority of aligned Kalenjin officers. Moreover, though Moi reduced the representation of Kikuyu DOs after 1992—in line with their steep drop in the cabinet—they still composed a large portion of the PA's officer corp.

Despite multi-party electoral competition, Kenya remained far from democratic during these years, similar to, other transitioning countries of the third wave. Throughout Moi's final 10 years in office, Kenya is best described as a hybrid regime (Levitsky and Way 2010) where President Moi was able to "tilt" elections in his favor because

FIGURE 1 Percentage of DOs of the Most Well-Represented Ethnic Groups in the PA, 1992 and 1997

Note: The dashed black line gives each ethnic group's percentage in the general population. The solid gray line gives each ethnic group's percentage in the cabinet for the previous legislative session.

he maintained firm executive control over many aspects of the state (Throup & Hornsby 1998). Moi's extent of executive control—was on par with that of other African countries during these years.[14]

Much scholarship has revealed that President Moi utilized the PA to engage in low-intensity coercion to hinder the opposition in the run-up to both his 1992 and 1997 reelections.[15] PA officers' mandate to ensure order was stretched to justify shutting down opposition meetings if they "incited" the local population. PA officers were in charge of scheduling and overseeing campaign events, and they would use their discretion to deny opposition candidates licenses for community meetings or shut down their rallies. Activists for Kibaki, the main opposition contender in 1997, recall how DOs would block rally entrances with stones.[16] Other candidates saw their

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[12]I include a chart of PA officers and their corresponding administrative unit in the SI.

[13]Divisions that are the district headquarters (one administrative tier higher than a division) tend to have more than one officer stationed there. I discuss the implications of this in the SI.

[14]According to Polity IV, Kenya's Executive Constraint score from 1992 to 2002 was 3, whereas the average for Africa during these years was 3.43 and the average for African hybrid regimes was 3.76 (see the SI).

[15]Most notably, see Throup and Hornsby (1998) for descriptions of the actions that PA officers engaged in to tilt the election toward Moi. For research on how prior regimes had used the PA to stay in power see Gertzel (1970), Mueller (1984), and Branch and Cheeseman (2006).

[16]Interview with former MP, Nairobi, Kenya, July 3, 2012.

rally requests denied, or canceled day-of by area DOs.[17] And when the opposition was allowed to meet, the PA often sabotaged events; DOs were known to hold mandatory community meetings during programmed opposition rallies or disperse opposition crowds under the guise of "maintaining local security."[18]

With a change in leadership possible through elections, officers expected different payoffs depending on the ethnicity of the successful presidential candidate. The prevailing assumption among Kikuyu officers, coethnics of the viable opposition candidates during the 1990s, was that they would advance if Moi lost, as they would be favored by their own co-ethnic president within the PA.[19] This would be a welcome reprieve, claimed Kikuyu officers, as many complained that their promotions had been stalled because of their ethnicity.[20] As one former DO put it, favoritism from promotions to *per diems* depends "on how you relate to the man [in office]."[21]

Conversely, Kalenjin officers were explicitly fearful of being let go or reprimanded if Moi lost, as they expected their preferential treatment in advancements to disappear.[22] The ethnicized nature of the 1990s elections and the rhetoric used by the opposition worked to cement loyalty to Moi as an integral component of Kalenjin identity (Lynch 2011; Ndegwa 1997). This created a self-fulfilling cycle whereby Moi trusted Kalenjin officers to engage in the coercion demanded in the run-up to his reelection campaigns and strongly doubted whether non-Kalenjin officers—and Kikuyu officers especially—would comply with orders to coerce.

Data and Models

Data Overview

I construct a data set of DO postings within administrative divisions. The data come from administrative officer records located in the archives of each of the country's provincial headquarters. These records list the country's administrative units and the name of the officer stationed

[17]Interview with Raila Odinga.

[18]Interview with Raila Odinga.

[19]Interview with Kikuyu DO under Moi, Nairobi, Kenya, November 9, 2011. Interview with Kikuyu DO under Moi, Nairobi, Kenya, November 22, 2011.

[20]Interview with Kikuyu DO under Moi.

[21]Interview with former DO, Nairobi, Kenya, November 7, 2011.

[22]Interview with Kalenjin DO under Moi, Mombasa, Kenya, February 13, 2012. Interview with Kalenjin DO under Moi, Nairobi, Kenya, November 23, 2012. Interview with Raila Odinga.

TABLE 1   DO Breakdown by Province Type (1993–97)

Province Status	Ethnicity	Count	Percent by Ethnicity
Misaligned	Kalenjin	41	9.3
	Kikuyu	113	25.6
	Luhya	37	8.4
	Luo	48	10.9
	Mijikenda	30	6.8
Aligned	Kalenjin	278	19.5
	Kikuyu	145	10.2
	Luhya	127	8.9
	Luo	146	10.2
	Mijikenda	136	9.5
Unaligned	Kalenjin	362	21.4
	Kikuyu	247	14.6
	Luhya	202	12.0
	Luo	207	12.3
	Mijikenda	130	7.7

Note: In total, there are 3,558 officers. The overall breakdown is as follows: 681 Kalenjin DOs (19.1%), 505 Kikuyu (14.2%), 366 Luhya (10.3%), 401 Luo (11.3%), and 288 Mijikenda (8.1%).

there. They were collected biannually so I construct a time-series data set at the division level from 1993 to 2002, covering some 8,000 DO appointments. I code the ethnicity of each officer from their name using two methods described in the SI.

I list the breakdown of officers by ethnic group and province status from 1993 to 1997 in Table 1 to incorporate the 25% rule; three provinces—Coast, Northeastern, and Rift Valley—are classified as aligned either because the majority of residents were Kalenjin or other ethnic groups that had aligned with the Kalenjin since the pre-independence era (Anderson 2005). Further, in the previous 1992 election, Moi won the province and no other candidate met the 25% electoral threshold. Two provinces—Central and Nairobi—are classified as misaligned because they contained a high percentage of Kikuyus and Moi came in last among the viable candidates in 1992. Three provinces—Eastern, Nyanza, and Western—are classified as unaligned because at least one of the province's ethnic groups that comprised more than 25% of the population was unaligned during the 1992 election and President Moi did not come in first or last place, or more than one candidate met the 25% threshold. Given Kenya's electoral rules, these are the provinces where meeting the 25% threshold was in doubt for President Moi and where coercion had the potential to

prevent the opposition from clearing the 25% threshold as well.

Table 1 offers suggestive evidence that officers of different alignments had different posting patterns across provinces. Kalenjins were slightly more likely to be posted to unaligned provinces.[23] Because many provinces contain the full range of electoral support for Moi, these summary statistics do not provide the full picture. The following empirical analysis accounts for both variation across provinces (Hypothesis 1) as well as different levels of local support within each type of province (Hypothesis 2).

Empirical Strategy

I run two specifications for each of the first two hypotheses. For the first specification, I collapse the time-series data to create a single observation for each division. I run two ordinary least squares regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage of officers within a division from 1993 to 1997 who were Kalenjin or Kikuyu. For the second specification, I use the time-series data; the unit of analysis is the division half year from 1993 to 1997, and the dependent variable is whether an officer of a specific ethnicity was posted to a division during a half year. I run two separate logit analyses with an indicator for whether the officer was Kalenjin (aligned) or Kikuyu (misaligned) as the outcome variable.[24] To test Hypothesis 3, I include an indicator variable for the election year (*1997*) for the time-series specifications, as the theory indicates that incentives for low-intensity coercion should be highest in the immediate run-up to the election. I cluster standard errors at the district level for all specifications (one administrative tier higher than divisions).[25]

I operationalize Hypothesis 1 as whether Kalenjin officers were more likely to be sent to, and Kikuyu officers kept away from, divisions in unaligned provinces. The main explanatory variable is an indicator variable for whether a division was in an unaligned province (*UnalignedProvince*). I also rerun this analysis after

substituting *UnalignedProvince* with *AlignedProvince* and *MisalignedProvince*, respectively, as another way to test this hypothesis: Kalenjin officers should be kept away from, and Kikuyu officers sent to, these other provinces. The main explanatory variable to test Hypothesis 2 is an interaction term between *UnalignedProvince* and President Moi's vote share in the local division in the 1992 election (*LaggedVoteShare*).[26] Local vote share is measured at the constituency level; constituencies follow division boundaries closely, but in some instances, parliamentary constituencies span more than one division.[27] Though focusing on *UnalignedProvince* isolates best where Moi needed to win votes under Kenya's electoral rules, I rerun these tests by looking only at division-level ethnic variation and find substantively similar results (see the SI).

I control for possible alternative explanations for officer postings. It may be the case that other senior political elites demand that officers of certain ethnicities be posted to their constituencies, so I include an indicator variable for whether the division's MP was in the cabinet (*Cabinet*). I control for the possibility that officers were posted for traditional administrative reasons by including the division's ethnolinguistic fractionalization as measured by the Herfindahl Index (*ELF*), the division's logged population (*lpop*), and the logged area (*lsqkm*). I control for the ethnic violence and countervailing incentive in Rift Valley by including an indicator variable for all divisions in the province (*RiftValleyProvince*). Further, I rerun all models after dropping observations in this province and find substantively similar results (see the SI). In the time-series specification, I control for the number of DOs working in a division in a year (*TotalOfficers*).[28]

Results

Table 2 gives the results for Hypothesis 1. The results of the models that substitute *AlignedProvince* or *MisalignedProvince* for *UnalignedProvince* are in the SI and are consistent with the theory. Taken together, the results indicate that Kalenjin officers were sent to divisions in unaligned

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[23]The relatively high number of Kalenjins in aligned provinces is driven by postings to Rift Valley, which suffered from ethnic violence with "indigenous" groups (predominantly the Kalenjin) violently evicting "migrants" (predominantly the Kikuyu, Klopp (2011)). See the SI for this countervailing incentive in Rift Valley.

[24]In the SI, I run the main models using an indicator for the broader Kalenjin ethnic group and the broader Kikuyu language group. The results are weaker, though largely robust.

[25]In the SI, I rerun the tests over the time-series data with division fixed effects to evaluate Hypothesis 3 on its own (the results are robust).

[26]In the SI, I rerun this interaction term after substituting *LaggedVoteShare* with an indicator variable for whether a division could be considered a Moi "stronghold" or "weakhold." The results are consistent with the theory.

[27]When this is the case, I assume that all divisions within the constituency shared the same vote share.

[28]I present models that control for a DO's individual-level characteristics (see the SI); the results remain robust.

TABLE 2 DO Ethnicity on Province Status

	1 Kalenjin Collapsed	2 Kalenjin Time-series	3 Kikuyu Collapsed	4 Kikuyu Time-series
UnalignedProvince	0.07*	0.84**	−0.06*	−0.40*
	(0.03)	(0.27)	(0.03)	(0.19)
LaggedVoteShare	−0.01	0.16	−0.10	−0.27
	(0.05)	(0.30)	(0.05)	(0.29)
1997		0.04		−0.29*
		(0.14)		(0.12)
ELF	0.04	0.12	−0.03	−0.30
	(0.05)	(0.32)	(0.04)	(0.29)
lpop	−0.07	−0.29	0.00	0.38
	(0.05)	(0.33)	(0.03)	(0.25)
lsqkm	−0.02	−0.32*	0.03	0.15
	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.12)
Cabinet	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.10
	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.26)
RiftValleyProvince	0.21***	1.12***	−0.12***	−1.24***
	(0.04)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.26)
TotalOfficers		0.01		−0.03
		(0.04)		(0.03)
Intercept	0.48	−0.01	0.17	−3.40*
	(0.26)	(1.72)	(0.16)	(1.36)
Number of observations	249	3,558	249	3,558

Note: Odd-numbered columns display the results of an OLS regression of officer ethnicity in a division on division characteristics using the collapsed data. Even-numbered columns display the results of a logit regression on the time-series data. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.

provinces. Kikuyu officers were kept away from divisions in unaligned provinces.

Figure 2 graphs the results from columns 2 and 4 to show the change in predicted probability that a given Kalenjin or Kikuyu DO would be posted to a division in an unaligned province, over an aligned or misaligned province.[29] A Kalenjin officer was 10 percentage points more likely to be posted to a division within an unaligned province. A Kikuyu officer was 6 percentage points more likely to be posted to a division outside an unaligned province.

Table 3 evaluates Hypothesis 2. Column 2 provides evidence that aligned Kalenjin officers were posted to divisions in unaligned provinces, and especially to divisions within unaligned provinces with low past support for President Moi. These are the divisions where DOs could do the most to help Moi's campaign. The interaction term

is not significant in column 1, but this seems to be a remnant of Kalenjin postings to Rift Valley (see the SI). We see the opposite results for misaligned Kikuyu officers (columns 3–4). Kikuyus were sent away from divisions in unaligned provinces, and when they were posted to these provinces, they were posted away from divisions with low levels of support for Moi in the previous election.

To interpret the magnitude of Hypothesis 2, Figure 3 simulates the interaction term of *LaggedVoteShare* and *UnalignedProvince* from columns 2 and 4 of Table 3. The graph plots the probability that an officer of a particular ethnicity is posted to an unaligned province over other provinces at different levels of vote share for President Moi in the previous election. On the right side of the figure, with high levels of vote share, the implicit comparison is to divisions within core provinces. The comparison is to divisions within opposition provinces on the left side of the figure. In comparing areas that have low local support for Moi, Kalenjin officers are 15% more likely to be posted to a division in unaligned province than a division

[29]Predicted probabilities are simulated following Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) with 1,000 simulations.

FIGURE 2 Posting to Unaligned Provinces

Note: This plot shows the likelihood that a Kalenjin or Kikuyu officer was posted to a division within an unaligned province as opposed to an aligned or misaligned province with 95% confidence intervals. The data come from columns 2 and 4 in Table 2.

in an opposition province. Kikuyu officers are almost 15% more likely to be posted away from an unaligned province when posted to areas with low levels of support for President Moi. At high levels of vote share, there is no difference in the probability that Kalenjin or Kikuyu officers will be posted to divisions within either unaligned or aligned/misaligned provinces. For comparison, the SI includes these models for DOs of the next three largest ethnic groups in the PA and indicates no posting patterns across or within unaligned provinces.

The negative coefficients on *1997* in columns 4 of Table 2 and column 4 of Table 3 indicate that Kikuyu officers were less likely to be posted to any division during election years. PA officers are interchangeable with officers of equivalent rank who run the country's ministries in Nairobi.[30] PA elites not only selectively managed where officers of different ethnicities were posted, but also changed which officers were stationed in the field in the first place, hiding Kikuyu officers in national ministries during election season.

While the results presented give evidence in favor of the theory of strategic postings for the run-up to the 1997 election, there is evidence that strategic postings extended past the 1997 election. In the SI, I consider the different incentives of officers in the run-up to 2002, given the new ethnicities of the candidates, and find results consistent with the theory.

Exploring the Mechanism

The above analysis shows that President Moi's aligned Kalenjin DOs were sent to, and misaligned Kikuyu DOs away from, the country's most electorally valuable areas. This section provides suggestive evidence in support of the mechanism—that aligned DOs were more willing to comply with orders to coerce, whereas misaligned DOs were not.[31]

Qualitative Evidence of the Mechanism: Varying Compliance across DOs

Qualitative data for this project are drawn from more than 100 interviews with PA officers alongside archival evidence from all available folios on the PA during these years. The evidence corroborates the theory that many Kikuyu officers used their authority to bolster the opposition. For instance, one letter from KANU elites in Eastern Province, an unaligned province, complained of their Kikuyu administrator that "we didn't get any assistance from the local DO in carrying out the KANU recruitment drive ordered by the President, but to the contrary, the officer incited [people] against KANU."[32] A Kikuyu DO serving during these years argued that he did not implement his political orders, such as rejecting permits of opposition parties or harassing their

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[30]Interview with Deputy Permanent Secretary of Internal Security, October 13, 2011, and November 13, 2011. Interview with Deputy Permanent Secretary of PA, November 21, 2011.

[31]The SI contains results from a placebo test on strategic postings of other types of officers.

[32]Letter from Isiolo Leaders to Permanent Secretary of PA, February 24, 1992. Folio BB/1/250, Kenya National Archives.

TABLE 3 DO Ethnicity on Division Characteristics

	1 Kalenjin Collapsed	2 Kalenjin Time-series	3 Kikuyu Collapsed	4 Kikuyu Time-series
UnalignedProvince	0.09	1.40***	−0.12***	−0.91***
	(0.05)	(0.37)	(0.04)	(0.24)
LaggedVoteShare	0.00	0.70	−0.15*	−0.77**
	(0.06)	(0.41)	(0.06)	(0.28)
UnalignedProvince × *LaggedVoteShare*	−0.04	−1.29*	0.17*	1.40***
	(0.10)	(0.52)	(0.07)	(0.37)
1997		0.04		−0.30**
		(0.14)		(0.12)
ELF	0.04	0.31	−0.05	−0.36
	(0.05)	(0.31)	(0.04)	(0.27)
lpop	−0.07	−0.31	0.00	0.34
	(0.05)	(0.31)	(0.03)	(0.22)
lsqkm	−0.02	−0.38**	0.04	0.21
	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.12)
Cabinet	0.02	0.23	0.00	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.26)
RiftValleyProvince	0.21***	0.98***	−0.11**	−1.08***
	(0.04)	(0.21)	(0.04)	(0.25)
TotalOfficers		0.01		−0.02
		(0.04)		(0.03)
Intercept	0.48	−0.06	0.19	−3.17**
	(0.26)	(1.63)	(0.15)	(1.20)
Number of observations	249	3,558	249	3,558

Note: Odd-numbered columns display the results of an OLS regression of officer ethnicity in a division on division characteristics using the collapsed data. Even-numbered columns display the results of a logit regression on the time-series data. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$.

supporters, because "when I implement a policy, I am supporting the government of the day and their political party—the policies that are being implemented always favor a political party. And I did not support that political party."[33] On the other hand, evidence suggests that Kalenjin DOs consistently used their coercive authority to bolster the regime. A third-party candidate in the 1997 election claimed that the strongest bureaucratic barriers to his campaign came in divisions run by Kalenjin DOs.[34] Throup and Hornsby (1998) similarly observed that "some DOs became notorious for their partisan attitudes, particularly Kalenjin DOs" (382).

[33]Interview with District Commissioner, Nairobi, Kenya, November 9, 2011.

[34]Interview with Raila Odinga.

"Effect" of Strategic Postings

I cautiously turn to investigating the effect of DO postings. These results, however, can only provide suggestive evidence—treatment (having a Kalenjin or Kikuyu DO) is susceptible to confounding, as the predictors of the treatment (whether a division is assigned a DO of a specific ethnicity) may themselves be related to Moi's 1997 vote share. Indeed, as this article has argued, Moi intentionally posted officers of different ethnicities based on a division's political characteristics. To the extent that Moi used criteria to strategically post officers that are not picked up in the model, this confounding is likely to run against my results because I argue that Moi posted aligned DOs to the divisions where he expected to perform the worst.

I create a constituency-level data set where I count the percentage of division observations within each constituency that are staffed by a Kalenjin. I create this

**FIGURE 3 Difference in Postings: Unaligned
vs. Other Provinces by Vote Share**

Note: This plot shows the likelihood that a Kalenjin or Kikuyu officer was posted to a division within an unaligned province as opposed to a non-unaligned province for varying percentages of *LaggedVoteShare* with 95% confidence intervals. The data come from columns 2 and 4 in Table 3. I simulate postings for the 12.5th–87.5th percentiles of *LaggedVoteShare*.

variable for Kikuyu officers as well. This data set has a structure similar to the collapsed data used in the main results.

The results (see the SI) suggest that increasing the percentage of DOs in a division between 1993 who 1997 who were Kalenjin from the 10th percentile to the 90th is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in Moi's 1997 vote share (95% CI: −0.2, 1.1). Replicating this analysis for Kikuyus is associated with a 1.1 percentage point decrease in Moi's 1997 vote share (95% CI: −2.2, −0.0). The associated percentage point increase in Moi's 1997 vote share if we increase the percentage of DOs who were Kalenjin from 0 to 100 is 1.0 (95% CI: −0.4, 2.3), or 2.3 for those who were Kikuyu (95% CI: −4.6, −0.0). The modesty of these predicted effects is likely a result of the confounding discussed earlier. Precisely because PA elites posted Kalenjin officers to areas of low support, the analysis likely underestimates the actual effect of each officer.

Conclusion

While we know why autocrats hold elections, much less studied is how they win them. This article argues that autocrats facing competitive elections strategically post officers within the ISA to solve a principal-agent problem.

When an autocrat cannot expect all officers to engage in coercion on her behalf in the run-up to an election, she can use variation in expected loyalty to determine where officers should be posted. Within countries with salient ethnic cleavages, ethnically aligned officers have the largest incentive to engage in coercion on behalf of the autocrat, so autocrats send them to the most electorally valuable areas. Autocrats strategically post ethnically misaligned officers away from these areas. I find support for this theory looking at officer postings within Kenya's ISA, the Provincial Administration, in the decade immediately following the return to multiparty elections.

On the whole, this study contributes to theoretic debates about the institutional foundations of autocracy. Just as scholars of hybrid regimes have elucidated how formal institutional change to electoral rules has been subverted by informal institutions, such as clientelism, I show that there exists a parallel trend within the state agencies of these regimes. State agencies within competitive authoritarian regimes have been subject to massive reforms and on the whole "look" more Weberian than their authoritarian counterparts. Yet informal practices, such as the strategic postings shown here, can systematically subvert the intended effects of formal reforms. Indeed, the use of state agencies by autocrats facing election, and the informal practices that make these state agencies effective, are among the defining features of these hybrid regimes.

A key implication is that the formal ethnic diversification of state agencies, and the introduction of formal reforms to state bureaucracies more generally, is not enough to stop these agencies from following coercive orders in hybrid regimes. Indeed, though existing work has argued that the ethnic diversification of state agencies by autocrats in authoritarian regimes more broadly can work as an attempt to court other ethnic groups, and argued that this diversification has the potential to reduce the neopatrimonial ties of bureaucrats within these state agencies, the findings in this article suggest otherwise. An autocrat does not need to completely pack a state agency, but can maximize the usefulness of compliance by managing the agency carefully, selectively posting the most loyal bureaucrats to key posts. We should thus question whether the incorporation of "outgroups" into state agencies results in true power sharing that enhances democratization.

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

• The Provincial Administration and Kenyan Elections
• Data and Models
• Exploring the Mechanism