

The Local Politics of Resource Distribution

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Abstract

This chapter discusses the various institutions by which Kenyan presidents have distributed development resources to the population over the country's first five decades after independence. Resource distribution during this period largely followed either a center-led or local-led track. Each president designed his own center-led resource distribution strategies to best distribute state resources to his co-ethnic base in light of the group's geographic location and representation in the bureaucracy. Presidents have designed local-led tracks to check the power of, and since the return of multi-party elections to bargain with, legislative elites. The resulting distribution patterns of both tracks have been driven by ethnic politics within the distributing patron's electoral constituency. The ethnic (sub-)groups that most strongly support the patron have been those that have benefited the most.

Keywords: ethnic politics, public goods provision, decentralization, executive power, democratization

The distribution of public goods is among the core functions of any state. Resource distribution has the potential to jumpstart economic development, raise living standards, and reduce income inequality, goals that many governments in the developing world are keen to realize. The widespread demand for a state's resources has thus made the politics of their distribution among the most contentious policy realms in many developing countries.

In this regard, Kenya is no different. While resources are distributed programmatically to some extent in Kenya, resource distribution is more a struggle between the country's ethnic groups about "whose turn it is to eat."¹ As in other countries with salient ethnic cleavages, the geographic concentration of ethnic groups allows politicians to distribute resources to particular ethnic groups by targeting the areas where specific groups live. Put simply, those in charge of distributing resources have used existing ethnic settlement patterns to co-opt ethnic groups that they need support from while overlooking ethnic groups associated with their political opposition. Resource distribution patterns in Kenya are both strongly influenced by, and reinforce, the logic of ethnic politics.

But the ethnicized distribution of resources in Kenya has occurred through numerous and varied channels – what explains the actual form of resource distribution institutions that have been adopted? Why have different presidents promoted different resource distribution strategies? Moreover, since independence, some resources have distributed at the local-level. Why would a president with significant executive power devolve the politically valuable task of resource distribution and allow for any local distribution at all?

I examine these questions by tracking the institutions of resource distribution in Kenya for the first five decades after independence. I divide the country's various resource distribution strategies into two tracks based on the distributing patron: a *center-led* track largely driven by each president, and a *local-led* track largely driven by Members of Parliament (MPs) within their individual constituencies. Each president changed the structure of center-led institutions based on his ethnic coalition's comparative advantages and existing position within the state bureaucracy, those within

¹This phrase was popularized by Michela Wrong's (2010) book, *It's Our Turn to Eat*.

the state tasked with implementing the president's orders. Presidents promoted different local-led institutions to check the power of or bargain with legislative elites.

For both tracks, the size of the ethnic coalition that each distributing patron needed to stay in power alongside the coalition's geographic location combined to affect the resulting patterns of resource distribution. I make this argument, first, with regards to center-led development. During the single-party era, presidents could survive simply with the support of their co-ethnics. But after the country's transition to multi-party elections in 1992, presidents needed support from a larger electoral coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Posner 2005) and began to distribute resources more widely. This chapter also shows that MPs have used their control over local resource distribution to build and maintain winning electoral coalitions within their individual constituencies. Each MP has distributed local development funds in a manner parallel to the political survival logic of center-led track under the multi-party era (albeit along a smaller scale).

This chapter makes the above arguments about center-led and local-led resource distribution in turn. I start at independence and take each track chronologically. By showing the progression of changes in the institutions that distribute resources, this chapter makes clear how the decisions made by one president institutionally affect the political survival of his successor.

Center-Led Development During the One-Party Era

Presidents Jomo Kenyatta (1963 - 1978) and Daniel arap Moi (1978 - 2002) changed the structure of the state that they inherited to better distribute central resources to their co-ethnics.

Kenya achieved independence with a devolved, *majimbo* state where the bulk of the country's resources were distributed at the provincial level. Under *majimboism*, the central government played little role in development; instead, development monies were devolved to the country's eight regional assemblies which individually lead development within their province. Each province was to hire its own administrators to administer regional programs.

This government structure greatly disadvantaged the co-ethnic Kikuyus of President Kenyatta

for two reasons. First, *majimboism* mechanically limited the amount of resources that Kenyatta could divert to Kikuyu areas. Kikuyus are a majority only in their home Central province. The Kikuyu also comprise a sizable 20% minority in Rift Valley. Moreover, many Kikuyu were hoping to migrate to other less-densely populated provinces after the removal of colonial-era restrictions on movement. But with regional assemblies distributing the country's devolved resources, the Kikuyu were guaranteed the resources devolved to Central province. While the regional assembly of Rift Valley (or other provinces) could theoretically distribute resources to areas with pockets of Kikuyus within the province, the prevailing rhetoric of the time suggested that the province's pastoralist majority would use their numeric strength to box Kikuyus out of these resources (Anderson 2005).

Second, *majimboism* limited the amount of resources that bureaucrats working within a province could divert to Kikuyu areas. Allocation decisions within each province were made by elected representatives in the regional assembly. However provincial bureaucrats had the potential to affect day-to-day allocation decisions (e.g., choosing the specific recipients of a development project, processing applications for benefits). Moreover, though the Kikuyu were arguably the country's most educated ethnic group at independence – They comprised as much as 25% of the trained African officers in the colonial administration – many non-Kikuyu groups expressed fear to their elites that Kikuyu bureaucrats would privilege their own co-ethnics when administering resource distribution programs. Politicians outside of Central thus promised their (non-Kikuyu) constituents that Kikuyus would be shut out of their regional administration (Anderson 2005). Cushy administrative jobs would instead be distributed as patronage to politicians' bases.

Kenyatta quickly dismantled *majimboism* and instead used his executive power to create a centralized, unitary state by 1964 with the central government overseeing the largest development programs. Each national ministry funneled resources to the grassroots for the creation of new development projects and the maintenance of existing ones. Indeed, the country's most well-funded service ministries (education, health, roads, water) together comprised 33% of the central govern-

ment's budget from 1963 - 2011 (Burgess et al. 2015). Allocation decisions were made in Nairobi with little input from the grassroots. Instead, each ministry allocated a set pot of money to each province or district (each of the country's eight provinces contained up to a dozen districts) for development projects within the ministry's sector. Allocations within each province and district were largely handled by the "bureaucratic-executive state" (Branch & Cheeseman 2006). Kenyatta's hand-picked Provincial and District Commissioners (PCs and DCs) of the Provincial Administration (PA) served as his hands on the ground and oversaw implementation. Top PA officials were exceedingly loyal to Kenyatta (Gertzel 1970, Leonard 1991). Kenyatta was therefore assured that allocations – from the ministerial-level to the country's individual provinces and districts – were made in his political favor.

To summarize, central allocations in this manner made sense for Kenyatta for the same two reasons which had limited resources to Kikuyus under *majimboism*. First, central ministries could divert their budget anywhere across the country, without regard to minimum spending thresholds outside Central Province. Second, Kenyatta was able to staff the state largely with Kikuyu bureaucrats (Horowitz 2017). By 1969, at the very beginning of Kenyatta's consolidation of power, almost 40% of permanent secretaries were Kikuyu (Hornsby 2011), as were half of the country's PCs and DCs, as well as the vast majority of parastatal bosses.

For the same reasons that center-led development led by Nairobi benefited Kenyatta and his co-ethnics, they hindered the country's second president, Daniel arap Moi (1978 - 2002), from distributing resources to his own co-ethnic base. The centralization of distribution decisions to the ministries and the large number of Kikuyu bureaucrats institutionally ensured a Kikuyu bias in center-led resource allocation even after Kenyatta's death. To be sure, Moi did begin to circumvent this bias through the replacement of Kikuyu bureaucrats and senior government elites in Nairobi (e.g., by 1990, roughly two-thirds of permanent secretaries were Kalenjin (Lynch 2011)). But this strategy proved gradual as there was a significant dearth of educated pastoralists. Instead, Moi, like Kenyatta before him, sought to institutionally change center-led resource distribution to best

advantage his base.

Moi inaugurated a new central-led resource distribution program, District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD, or simply, “District Focus”) in 1982 that decentralized central resources away from Nairobi. DFRD promised to “bring development closer to the people” by allocating each of the country’s (then) 40 districts a lump sum of money to enact development programs within its boundaries. I list total district allocations since 1992 in Table 1. Spending decisions within each district were finalized by each district’s internal District Development Committee (DDC). The DDC was chaired by the presidentially-appointed DC and also included all district MPs and other local stakeholders. Each central ministry would then create its nationwide budgets according to the demands of each of the country’s districts. Moreover, Moi mandated that each ministry list and justify the specific projects that the ministry spent resources on. This accounting trick made (Kikuyu) central government bureaucrats more accountable for their spending decisions; because bureaucrats’ decisions were now recorded and reviewable, lay bureaucrats had to justify their decisions to their largely Kalenjin superiors.

District Focus benefited Moi’s ethnic base by leveraging their geographic spread across districts. Moi’s co-ethnic Kalenjin comprised a majority in 6 of the country’s 40 districts even though they only comprised 14% of the population. Rift Valley’s other pastoralists – the rest of his base – were a majority in 4 districts despite comprising only 3% of the country’s population. To put these numbers into comparison, Kikuyus – the plurality ethnic group at 21% of the population – comprised the majority in 7 districts. And no other ethnic group comprised a majority in as many districts.²

DFRD also benefited his base more so than Kenyatta’s centralized distribution precisely because it downplayed the role of central government bureaucrat. As with Kenyatta, resource distribution to Moi’s co-ethnics was facilitated by the loyalties of those actually implementing center-led de-

²The Kamba, Luo and Luhya are around the same size numerically as the Kalenjin, but they comprised a majority in 2, 3, and 3 districts each.

velopment at the district-level, DCs. Moi ensured this loyalty through active management. Within his first five years, Moi rotated out 75% of Kenyatta's appointees and replaced them with new appointees. He cultivated neopatrimonial relationships with these officers by allowing them to use their authority for personal enrichment in expectation that they carry out his political orders. Moreover, Moi increased the number of Kalenjin DCs. The percentage of Kalenjin DCs rose from circa 10% at the start of his presidency to 25% by 1992. By decentralizing resource distribution to individual districts, Moi ensured that many of his co-ethnics would receive a disproportionate share of central government resources regardless of the bureaucratic inclinations of lay bureaucrats in Nairobi.

Center-Led Development After the Return to Multi-Party Elections

Kenya transitioned from a single-party regime to holding multi-party elections in 1992, amid the global Third Wave of Democratization after the end of the Cold War. Moi contested for re-election in 1992 and 1997, winning both times. I leverage the country's change in the "rules of the game" and examine its effects on resource distribution. The change in regime type altered the necessary size of a president's support base, and fundamentally, the logic by which each president has sought to consolidate political support once in office. Presidents were forced to distribute central government resources to more widely.

Under one-party rule each president simply carried support from their own co-ethnic bases. To stay in power after 1992, however, successful presidential candidates had to win the plurality of support from the country. Because no ethnic group comprises a minimum-winning coalition on their own, presidents have sought to build multi-ethnic coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Posner 2005). In building a winning multi-ethnic coalition, presidents could expect little support from "misaligned" ethnic groups, those groups who had a viable presidential candidate of their own. These groups expected to receive more state resources should their co-ethnic win, so they were expected to vote against Moi at high rates. Instead, presidents have sought votes from "un-

aligned”, or swing, ethnic groups who did not have a viable presidential candidate.

As such, Moi changed his center-led resource distribution strategy in the run-up to his re-elections to benefit unaligned ethnic groups in an attempt to win their electoral support. Moi did this by creating new administrative districts within the basic institutional structure of District Focus. From 1992 - 2002, the number of administrative districts rose from 41 - 71 with the vast majority created or announced before the 1997 election.³ District creation under Moi is displayed graphically in Figure 1. Under District Focus, local ethnic minorities within a district were liable to be left out of district allocations as the local ethnic majority could simply vote to channel district resources to areas inhabited by their own co-ethnics. District creation was thus a viable political strategy to distribute central government resources to an unaligned ethnic group when that group was a numeric minority within a parent district (Hassan 2016); by creating a new district for a local ethnic minority, the group was now assured a steady stream of central-government resources. In return for a new district, recipient groups were expected to vote for Moi in the upcoming election.

Senior officials within Moi’s government explicitly claimed that the creation of new units followed the above outlined electoral logic. For instance, take the example of Tharaka-Nithi district which was carved out of Meru District in 1992, just months before Moi’s first re-election. Tharaka-Nithi is home to the Tharaka ethnic group as well as the Nithi, a sub-ethnic group of the Meru that is closely related to the Tharaka. Archival documents indicate that the groups were “fed up” of being administered in Meru district because they were numeric minorities (Hassan 2016). In discussing the creation of new administrative units in the area, the PC of the province wrote “the residents themselves of the area are KANU supporters, and if we could divide [their existing units], this will be quite an asset to us politically . . . another additional asset to the ruling party.”⁴ The Permanent Secretary overseeing unit creation during these years himself remembers the three-

³Furthermore, the number of *lower-level* administrative units also increased as well. However, and in-line with the argument of this chapter, lower-level units were created as a way to bargain with legislative elites. See Hassan & Sheely (Forthcoming).

⁴As seen in Hassan (2016).




Figure 1: This map displays the new districts created from 1992 - 2002. Original district boundaries are in black. New districts are shaded in red.

day “opening-ceremony” of Tharaka-Nithi district when himself, Moi, and other political elites stressed the regime’s expectation of electoral support in return for the new district.⁵

Moi’s successor, Mwai Kibaki (2002 - 2013) engaged in the same district creation patterns that Moi had during the 1990s despite promises not to. Moi stepped down in 2002. His chosen successor, Jomo Kenyatta’s son Uhuru, lost the 2002 election to Mwai Kibaki and the National Rainbow Coalition – Kenya (NARC) coalition. During the campaign, Kibaki vowed to put an end to politicized district creation. In fact, one of his most trusted cabinet members filed a suit months before the 2002 election against Moi’s government contesting the constitutionality of the districts Moi had created. Instead, NARC’s campaign manifesto outlined Kibaki’s plans

⁵Interviews with former Permanent Secretary of PA, June - July 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.

to decentralize resource distribution to lower tiers of the state. But Kibaki fell into the same district creation patterns that Moi had during the 1990s, increasing the number of districts to circa 150 (from 71) in his first term and almost 300 by the end of his second. The scope of district creation under Kibaki is so massive that I have yet to see an administrative map with all 300 district boundaries delineated. Similar to the 1990s, Kibaki created new districts for ethnic groups that he sought to win over given *his* electoral coalition. Of the nearly 80 districts he created before 2007, only five went to his Kikuyu co-ethnics and only three went to those in areas dominated by the opposition candidate's Luo co-ethnics. The vast majority went to unaligned ethnic groups, especially local ethnic minorities, in an attempt to win their votes (Hassan 2016).

Effects of Center-Led Development

Above I traced how each of Kenya's first three presidents changed center-led development institutions. But did changes in those institutions actually affect resource distribution patterns across the country? Research on the actual distribution of funds through center-led institutions suggests that they did, and that they channeled resources towards his co-ethnic (and later electoral) base.

For instance, Barkan & Chege (1989) find a large shift in expenditure for roads and rural health towards Kalenjin and pastoralist areas after Moi took office. Burgess et al. (2015) dig into this finding by examining the growth of Kenya's road network after independence. Major road construction is handled by the Ministry of Public Works, the service ministry which accounted for the largest government expenditure in the post-independence period. They find that districts that shared the ethnicity of the president received twice as much expenditure on roads and boasted four times the length of paved roads. Kramon & Posner (2016) examine literacy and primary school completion rates under Kenyatta and Moi. They find a similar co-ethnic presidential "bump" when looking at trends in primary education. Having a co-ethnic president during one's primary school years increased years in primary school from 4.6 to 6.1 under Kenyatta and 4.2 to 6.7 under Moi. They also trace the downstream effects of increased primary education. They estimate that

having a co-ethnic president during primary school years leads to a ten percentage point increase in the probability of formal sector employment.

After the transition to multi-party elections in 1992, empirical evidence finds that centrally distributed resources successfully targeted each president's electoral coalition. Morjaria (2011) examines the conversion of forested land managed by the Ministry of Environment into farming land allocated by the Ministry of Lands and Settlement after 1992. He finds evidence of higher rates of deforestation, indicative of an increase in land allocations from existing forest lands, in politically loyal areas. Burgess, Jedwab, Miguel & Morjaria (2015) find that president's continued favoring their co-ethnic base in non-election years after 1992, but spread road construction to other groups in the immediate run-up to an election. Jablonski (2014) examines the distribution of external development aid in the multi-party era. He finds that presidents have preferred their co-ethnics when it came to determining the location of aid sites.⁶

Local-Led Development During the One-Party Era

At the same time that each of Kenya's first three presidents distributed resources through the central government, they also promoted different local-led development programs. Whereas center-led development was meant to increase resources to each president's respective minimum-winning coalition, local-led development served as a check, and later as a bargaining chip, with local-level elites.

In the run-up to independence, the country's leaders and colonial administrators crafted the Local Government Bill of 1962. Each "Local Authority" was given the right to impose local taxes, and was expected to use the money to provide local services within the realms of primary education,

⁶Jablonski (2014) also provides us with the exception that proves the rule: aid programs disproportionately favored Luo areas from 2008 - 2013. After the 2008 post-election violence, Odinga (a Luo) was appointed as Prime Minister and his party members placed in charge of the ministries that distributed the majority of foreign development aid, Land, Roads, Public Works, and Local Government.

health care, local road maintenance, and land administration. In addition, the central government remitted a portion of the Graduated Personal Tax to the local authorities. Local authorities began to lose power by the late 1960s after the Kenyatta government shifted responsibility for primary education, health, and minor roads to the ministries. The stated reason for this loss of power was the local authorities' lack of capacity. In 1967, the Ministry of Local Government wrote that "in some of the more backward county councils, it is not possible to obtain the services of suitable staff ... this situation is likely to continue for some time."⁷ The Ministry also complained about a lack of housing and office accommodation for the councils.⁸

While local authorities did lack capacity, Kenyatta's government was not willing to invest the resources to build up their abilities because they challenged his executive power. The very existence of local authorities meant that power centers outside of Nairobi could challenge Kenyatta's political supremacy. These authorities were indeed conceived of as the local counterpart of regions under *majimboism*. Locally-elected representatives in the local authorities together with elected representatives in the regional legislatures were expected to check the center. After the regions were dissolved, many local authorities in opposition areas attempted to cultivate political spaces for the opposition.

The central government's dissolution of Kisumu County Council, the council in the heart of the homeland of the Luo, serves to emphasize the politicized nature of decentralization. The Luo standard-bearer in the 1960s was Oginga Odinga. He helped found KANU and served in Kenyatta's cabinet at independence. But by March 1966, he broke with Kenyatta and created the Kenya People's Union (KPU). 28 other MPs switched party affiliation from KANU to KPU with him. In response, Kenyatta called the snap "Little General Election" in June 1966 and used a myriad of administrative tactics to hinder KPU candidates from successfully defending their

⁷Letter from Ministry of Local Government to Office of the President, 14 October 1967, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Kenya, Folio KA/1/78.

⁸Letter from Ministry of Local Government to Office of the President, 1 November 1967, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Kenya, Folio KA/1/78.

seats (Mueller 1984). As a result, the KPU only successfully defended their nine seats in Central Nyanza, the home of Odinga's co-ethnic Luos. The following year, the Ministry of Local Government sent a notice to Kisumu County Council indicating that they were going to dismiss all locally-elected councilors and dissolve the local authority for two years. Instead, a local commission – run by senior government staff and staunch Kenyatta loyalists – would carry out the affairs of the council.⁹ The reason for this dissolution, the ministry claimed, is that the council had failed to meet its financial commitments. The singling out of Kisumu County Council however is unique. To begin, many Kenyan local authorities at this time succumbed to that charge. What's more, those claims *did not* apply to Kisumu: Kisumu County Council was running a surplus in 1967.¹⁰ Kisumu County Council was eventually dissolved. The local authority system as originally conceived was weakened significantly soon afterwards. By the early 1970s, Kenyatta's administrators were supervising the few remaining functions that the local authorities were in charge of.

Kenyatta, and later Moi, instead carried out local-led development through *harambee*. Meaning “let's all pull together” in Swahili, *harambee* involved individual community members pooling their resources and building a local public good – say a school, health clinic or borehole – from which all in the community would benefit. *Harambee* projects were conceptualized as “bottom-up” rather than “top-down” development whereby local communities would determine what they needed most. To be sure, *harambee* projects had existed in an informal capacity since the colonial era. But *harambee* became the main locally-driven development strategy of the one-party era after the publishing of “Sessional Paper Number 10 on African Socialism.” I graph *harambee* contributions in Figure 1. Mbithi & Rasmusson (1977) estimate that *harambee* contributions under Kenyatta comprised more than 11% of all national development expenditure from 1967 - 1973.¹¹

⁹Letter from Ministry of Local Government to County Clerk of Kisumu County Council, 7 September 1967, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Kenya, Folio KA/1/78.

¹⁰Memorandum to Cabinet and MPs from Chairperson of Kisumu County Council, 1967, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Kenya, Folio KA/1/78.

¹¹The amount of *harambee* spending is understated for two reasons. First, after a project's initial construction, Keny-

Though inspired by notions of community solidarity, *harambee* self-help projects were largely influenced by local and national-level elites. Kenyatta and Moi attempted to institutionalize *harambee* by tying MPs' local support to their *harambee* contributions. Each *harambee* drive tended to have a project sponsor that would provide the bulk of the financial resources. These patrons were often the area MP in their attempt to maintain local support. According to Widner (1992, 62), Kenyatta "took every opportunity to encourage voters to judge politicians on their material contributions to their constituencies. 'There is no place for leaders who hope to build a nation of slogans' [Kenyatta] preached. 'If you elect somebody who spends all his time in Nairobi doing nothing, what good is that?'" Kenyatta and Moi used these local expectations of MP contributions to restrain MPs from disobeying them. As *harambee* as a development strategy was institutionalized, it proved exceedingly expensive for MPs. Precisely because MPs were expected to contribute (generously) to local development projects, they had to turn to the president for additional discretionary funds. Kenyatta, and especially Moi, withheld resources from MPs who were unwilling to fall in line (Cheeseman 2002).

In this way, *harabee* was a strategy that allowed Kenyatta and Moi to stifle internal party opposition. Both presidents promised free political discussion and open debate within KANU. And as such, some MPs tried to use their position to discuss problems with the president's policies. But in speaking out against the president these legislators challenged each president's executive authority. *Harambee* became a way to check these legislators and ensure control inside the party.

Local-Led Development After the Return to Multi-Party Elections

Harambee continued in an informal manner after the country's return to multi-party elections, but local-led development spending shifted explicitly to local-level leaders.

Kenya saw the rejuvenation of the local authorities system during Moi's final years in office,

atta – and Moi after him – pledged to provide the recurring development costs to maintain the facility. Second, archival records only capture official *harambee* donations.

a system which Kibaki retained until the official promulgation of the new constitution in 2013. Moi inaugurated LATF, the Local Authority Transfer Fund, in 1998. LATF transferred 5% of the national personal income tax to the country's 175 local authorities. In 2008, LATF transfers accounted for 41% of total local authority revenue (LATF Annual Report, 2007 - 2008). Figure 1 graphs collective LATF transfers from its inception until the LA system's dissolution in 2013. As with the local authorities under Kenyatta, each local authority also generated internal revenue through local taxes (e.g., water charges, land rates, county house rents, sewerage fees, game reserves, market fees).

Each local authority determined expenditures through participatory budgeting. Officially, local authorities are run by locally-elected ward representatives and some central ministry staff. Local authority leaders are expected to incorporate area residents when creating their annual Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) about how resources should be used. Each local authority is expected to use their resources – LATF disbursements and internally-generated revenue both – to establish and maintain local public goods such as public markets, local roads, local social welfare programs, and public transportation. However, in practice, many LAs spend their resources on personnel. In 2008, local authorities were spending around 40% of their resources on personnel and less than 20% on maintaining existing projects or building new ones (LATF Annual Report, 2007 - 2008).

Aside from overseeing a strengthening of the country's local authorities, President Kibaki inaugurated the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in 2003. The Constituencies Development Fund Act of 2003 allocates at least 2.5% of government revenue annually to the country's constituencies. 75% of the funds are distributed equally among the (then) 210 constituencies, with the remainder of the funds allocated based on constituency need. Funds are distributed through a CDF committee (in each constituency) which was explicitly modeled after the structure of each district's DDC; each MP is the chair of their constituency's CDF committee alongside other constituency elites who were chosen by the MP. Together, the committee (but in effect, the MP) allocates money

to create new, or maintain existing, development programs within their constituency. Between 2003 - 2007, CDF allocations averaged around \$350,000 per constituency per year (Harris & Posner 2016). By 2010, that number reached almost \$800,000, an amount substantially larger than other CDFs across sub-Saharan Africa: per constituency funds are \$318,000 in Sudan, \$21,000 in Malawi, \$14,000 in Tanzania, and \$5,200 in Uganda (Tshangana 2010).

What explains the adoption of these local-led resource distribution strategies in Kenya's multi-party era? As with DFRD, these efforts were nudged, and later applauded, by the international donor community. However, there is strong evidence that these local-led resource distribution initiatives took the specific form they did as a result of increased legislative power relative to the executive. Indeed, the adoption of all three local-led resource distribution tracks after 1992 has sought to increase MP control over distribution. First consider the empowerment of the local authorities. Allocations through the Local Authorities, though intended to be shaped solely by local residents, is strongly influenced by the area MP. Sheely (2015) finds that the LASDAP process is subject to elite capture, especially by the area MP, who can shape their Local Authorities' priorities. Rose & Omolo (2013) write that budgets were not made publicly available to area citizens until after MPs had approved the budget.

Second, consider how Kibaki launched the CDF to appease MPs. MPs under Moi's reign were constrained by the need to toe-the-line in expectation of *harambee* funds. Given the public's continued expectation of MP philanthropy during the multi-party era, MPs wanted to institutionalize a set amount of discretionary funds to offset community expectations of local-level giving. Thus Kibaki was able to assuage MPs to join NARC, not only by buying them off individually (Arriola 2012), but by promising to inaugurate the CDF. By giving MPs their own set of funds, the CDF helped mitigate imbalances in resource distribution across ethnic groups and areas of the country (Bagaka 2008).

The legislative push for the CDF continued after promulgation of the new constitution, when MPs fought to maintain the CDF. The new constitution originally intended to remove the CDF

from the hands of MPs and place the kitty in the hands of each sub-national county government (Harris 2016). In response, MPs passed a new CDF bill in 2015 that is similar to the 2003 original, granting them continued access to a pot of money for their individual constituencies.

Effects of Local-Led Development

The effects of the local-led development strategies adopted have differed depending on the relative power that MPs had under each regime type. During the one-party era, areas represented by MPs who were aligned with the president benefited. Since the return to multi-party elections, when the legislature has begun to act as a check on the executive, the amount of money that each MP officially receives is fixed, but research has pointed to distribution inequities within individual constituencies.

During the one-party era, the majority of *harambee* funds were channeled to areas with MPs who were aligned with the government. Under Kenyatta, some 40% of *harambee* funds from senior government officials went to Central Province and other areas with large Kikuyu populations (Widner 1992). But under Moi, the recipients of *harambee* funds shifted – more than one-third of funds from 1980 - 1999 went to Rift Valley (Transparency International 2001). Research has yet to determine where *harambee* resources within each constituency were channeled during these years.

After the return to multi-party politics, research suggests that distributing patrons have funneled local resources to their electoral base. Harris & Posner (2015) find that MPs are electorally strategic in where they place CDF projects; MPs favor areas with large numbers of people – and thus potential voters – but also proximity to their home villages. Harris (2016) finds that many citizens in constituencies with salient ethnic cleavages believe that MPs distribute CDF resources to her own tribe and others who voted for her.

LATF distributions also follow similar patterns. Though the introduction of LATF came with accountability mechanisms intended to improve service delivery, distributions – and importantly patronage positions within the LA – are distributed by local elites, including councillors and the

area MP. Sheely (2015) suggests that LA elites can capture the participatory budget process, steering LATF funds to their preferred projects. Though not looking at LATF distributions specifically, Hoffmann et al. (2016) find that councillors benefit their local village – where they ostensibly have the most support – as opposed to other parts of the ward.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the politics of resource distribution during Kenya's first five decades which occurred along either a central-led or local-led tract. Center-led provision helped each president consolidate political power and distribute resources to his co-ethnic base and other communities he needs support from. Unsurprisingly, center-led provision has benefited each president's favored groups. Local-led provision was designed to check the power of, and later, bargain with, local elites. Recent research has found that individual constituencies, MPs have privileged their core supporters as well as other swing groups. Indeed, resource distribution is less about efficiency or need, but moreso about the proximity of one's group to the political elite distributing the resources.

Table 1: Allocations

Year	<i>Harambee</i>	LATF	CDF	Districts
1991	84615800	–	–	107000000
1992	361898501	–	–	108000000
1993	105484653	–	–	124000000
1994	120208423	–	–	36000000
1995	142300679	–	–	34000000
1996	279513042	–	–	34000000
1997	1486248838	–	–	36000000
1998	89990702	–	–	36000000
1999	454647588	–	–	36000000
2000	–	1000000024	–	152600000
2001	–	2306900040	–	137400000
2002	–	3000000000	–	–
2003	–	3000000000	–	3876525
2004	–	3750000000	1300000000	4640978
2005	–	4000000004	5600000000	–
2006	–	5000000000	7200000000	28143348
2007	–	7500000000	9700000000	–
2008	–	8250000000	10100000000	11110240
2009	–	9250000001	10100000000	–
2010	–	10400000000	12000000000	–
2011	–	11602482611	14300000000	–
2012	–	17300000000	16989550000	–
2013	–	20601001995	–	–

This table combines allocation information for various resource distribution programs in Kenya from 1991 - 2013. The second column gives the amount of reported *Harambee* contributions in real 1999 Kenyan Shillings, as reported by Transparency International (2001). The third column gives the amount of LATF funds across all Local Authorities and are from the Ministry of Local Government. The fourth column gives the approximate amount of CDF funds distributed by year. The fifth column gives the amount of funds collectively given to the country's districts is from the annual budget. Columns 3 - 5 are in nominal Kenyan Shillings.

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