Chapter 1: Responsiveness and Responsibility

Responsibility is not a choice but a burden. That is the basic intuition that we will put forward in this book. Why would parties embrace a policy that is not preferred by a majority of voters and surrender the electoral chances of their candidates? Electorally unsuccessful but responsible parties, it is said, cultivate brand names today by promising policies that voters may prefer in the future. Patiently, it would seem, they stay the course and wait for voters to come around, hoping their policy proposals will be finally recognized on Election Day. While it may be true that voters are chronically uninformed, upholding predictable but losing positions is for us a nonsensical proposition for office seeking parties.\(^1\) Instead, parties should constantly update their policy menu to accommodate changes in the preferences of voters.

Parties that hope to consistently win elections could always do better by promising to deliver whichever policy a majority of voters want. Indeed, whenever possible, parties should benefit from reactive and immediate policy responsiveness instead of predictable responsibility. They should build a reputation for unabridged competence in delivering any type of good and advancing preferred policies, rather than a reputation for selecting from a restricted menu of options. Indeed, parties should develop a reputation for delivering goods and policies “on demand,” allocating

\(^1\) This was the type of political behavior that puzzled George Tsebelis (1990) when he inquired “Why do labor party activists commit political suicide?” To solve this puzzle, Tsebelis argued, we need to recognize that labor party activists were playing on a secondary arena, a \textit{nested arena}, were disciplining the party today to ensure their preferred policies tomorrow was more important than a quick decisive victory. Kitschelt (1994) also blames activists for the ideological stickiness of social democratic parties in Western Europe, although is overcoming such stickiness is what brings those parties to victory even in Parliamentary systems, and thus moves the policy agenda in the direction preferred by ideological activists.
personalized benefits to voters with the most intense preferences, constantly adjusting the type of products available in their portfolio.

In this book we challenge the notion that responsible parties maintain consistent policy positions to facilitate identification by voters. Instead, we posit, parties develop a reputation for responsibility because deviating from the policy choices they have made in the past will diminish their expected vote in the current election. Furthermore, they could only pay a price if voters are actually listening. Therefore, rather than maintaining policy consistency to minimize information costs, we argue, responsible parties do so because moving away from their prior policy offers carries a cost. In this book, we seek to measure that cost.2

There are parties, however, that pay little or no cost for constantly switching policy positions. The Peronist Justicialista Party or the Mexican Party of the Institutional Revolution (PRI), for example, change policy directions as soon as new preferences are revealed by voters. They neither pay significant electoral costs nor are they saddled with defections by party activists.3 These parties, which closely track public opinion, not only survive but thrive by switching policy whenever necessary.4 While voters may have more difficulty in identifying the ideological positions

2 Even ambiguity seems better than policy consistency. In an experiment, Tomz and Van Houweling (2009) show that ambiguity generates electoral pay-offs, especially for those identified with the party of the
candidate and for undecided voters, showing the policy clarity is not necessarily a vote maximizing strategy.

3 Following Erickson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002), we consider that political parties are responsive to changes in the publics’ mood when they “follow” the preferences of voters rather than “lead” them. This is not
without controversy, as there is a significant literature that argues in favor of an elite driven theory of public
opinion (Zaller and Feldman 1992). An elite driven theory of voter preferences, however, is not consistent
with the theory of responsiveness proposed in this book, as elites by definition cannot be responsive to the
preferences they themselves induce among the public.

4 Sanchez Cuenca (2008) provides a measure of such a cost when he shows the electoral decline of the
Spanish Socials Party (PSOE) as a result of policy shifting. Vote losses were heavily concentrated among
of responsive parties that routinely change their policy offerings; voters may recognize the parties’ competence to implement whichever policy is deemed desirable at the time of the Election.

The capacity to radically change policy positions without paying a significant cost is frowned upon in policy and academic circles, considered as a clear signal of a poorly institutionalized party or the failure to develop a sound programmatic agenda. That is neither our view nor our concern. Political parties within and across countries differ in the degree to which they stick to their prior policies; they differ in the extent to which they allocate programmatic and non-programmatic resources to benefit their core constituencies; and differ in traits such as competence and organizational capacity. Our research seeks to explain the decision to behave in a responsive or responsible way, by analyzing the linkages between parties and voters and assessing the impact of these different traits on voters’ electoral decision.

Parties develop programmatic and non-programmatic linkages to voters, advertising reputations for policy, targeted distribution, and competence. Responsive parties that change their policy offering to accommodate policy motivated voters have the freedom to see an opportunity and to take advantage of it. Therefore, the theoretically interesting question is: why do some parties fail to take advantage of the same opportunities?

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5 In this book we consider ideological proximity, spatial proximity, or programmatic affinity as conceptually identical. We define programmatic preferences as those that describe ideological positions in a left-right continuum while we use the term non-programmatic preferences to describe non-ideological determinants of the vote such as competence or valence.
The Argument

The fact that parties may pay a cost for changing their policy proposals is not a new proposition in the discipline. Policy stickiness, it has been argued, may result from the candidates’ dependence on normatively oriented activists and party leaders that have the authority to nominate them (Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2006; Schonfield and Sened 2006); party members that are crucial to promote electoral participation (Abramowitz and Saunder 2008; Abramowitz 2011); and/or from nested primaries in national elections (Tsebelis 1990). Each of these alternative theories delivers supporting evidence and is also confronted with counter examples. As there are always parties that conform to predictions and parties that deviate from expectations (and pay electoral costs), existing party systems provide us with an array of examples and alternative configurations that do not seem to fit a single model.

The theory proposed in this book seeks to bring these different explanations of party characterizations under a unified framework. This framework will allow us to explain the behavior of parties along programmatic and non-programmatic dimensions, which shape to different degrees the probability that each voter changes her choice at the ballot box. Building on recent advances in spatial models of voting (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2000), we will show that parties’ programmatic electoral behavior falls in a continuous ranging from responsive to responsible. The position of political parties in this continuous—the degree of responsiveness or responsibility—is intimately connected to non-programmatic party traits such as reputation for competence, capacity to deliver selective incentives, and organizational structure. Provided that parties are constrained by their competence reputation, their access to resources, and their organizational capacity on their capacity to shift voters’ electoral allegiances, they will be bounded to be ideologically responsible or will take the opportunity of being responsive to shifts in policy preferences.
If party leaders calculate that deviating from their current policy proposal would bring fewer votes than those expected to be won at the new policy location because voters will desert them, they should benefit from signaling policy commitment and developing a reputation for policy consistency. By contrast, parties’ ideological responsiveness should increase when endowed with a comparative advantage in perceived competence, organizational capacity, and access to non-programmatic resources, which are not associated to the ideological proposals of the party. For parties with a relative advantage on non-programmatic dimensions, which is uncorrelated to their ideological position, unfettered responsiveness should be a dominant strategy. Responsible parties, consequently, result from the inability to freely override party tradition to promise policies that in any given election would be preferred by the median voters. This inability can result either due to the lack of non-programmatic resources or the strong correlation between such resources and the ideological position of the party in the minds of voters.

Our understanding of party-voter linkages builds on an empirical understanding of voters’ preference structure, which generates incentives for politicians and it is shaped by contextual conditions and historical legacies as discussed in chapter 3. Given voters’ preferences, the non-programmatic determinants of the vote affect the extent to which parties can freely change their prior policy offerings. Paradoxically, as the saliency of ideology declines for voters’ choice (and other dimensions become more relevant for such decision), the freedom of political parties to move in the policy space increases.

Contributions to the study of advanced democracies have emphasized this paradox and serve as building blocks for our study. Two contributions are crucial for our framework. First, Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) provide a unified theory of centripetal moderation and centrifugal extremism, describing how valence that is perceived to correlate with ideology drives parties into more extreme policy positions. Seeking to measure the cost of deviating from responsibility, Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow (2006) show that when niche parties in Western Europe deviate from
their original policy proposals to cater to the preferences of a larger number of voters they tend to lose votes rather than win them. As they argue, gains from policies that move the party to the location of a larger mass of voters fail to offset defections among prior party voters. Thus, the correlation between programmatic and non-programmatic terms in the voter utility function is crucial in understanding politicians’ incentives for policy responsiveness.

Second, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) analyze the impact of non-programmatic components on the vote and show that valence asymmetries across parties result in different capacity for policy differentiation. This crucial insight helps us understand the uneven capacity of political parties to move in the ideological space seeking to attract the median voter. Our research program builds on these contributions in order to describe why parties sometimes chose to develop consistent policy reputations while at other times they pursue policy differentiation and populist responsiveness, and how these strategies can be tailored to diverse groups of voters.

As mentioned, a crucial difference between the two models of voting with programmatic and non-programmatic traits that inform our research is the correlation between the programmatic and the non-programmatic dimensions defining the voters’ choice. Whereas Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) allow both dimensions to be uncorrelated, Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2004) assume their association. This difference is essential in generating diverse incentives for political parties seeking to maximize their vote and we, therefore, do not assume their correlation but investigate it empirically for each case.

By allowing the correlation between programmatic and non-programmatic terms in the voter utility function to vary, we are able to distinguish two possible scenarios: (i) when non-

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6 Schofield (2003) also shows that political parties with weak valence images will tend to shift their positions away from those of high-valence parties, because if low-valence parties match the policy offerings of high-valence parties, the low-valence parties will then suffer electoral catastrophe because voters will choose parties strictly on the basis of valence considerations.
programmatic terms (such as valence measures) do not correlate with ideology or, (ii) when non-programmatic terms do correlate with ideology. In the first scenario parties with a non-programmatic advantage will be able to change their policy offerings toward the location of the pivotal voter as described by Ansolabehere and Snyder. In the second scenario, changing policy positions will yield electoral costs for political parties, thereby holding them on their tracks and increasing the benefits of ideological responsibility as described by Adams, Merrill and Grofman (2005). The crucial difference between both scenarios, thus, is the correlation between the programmatic and the non-programmatic dimensions considered by voters in making up their minds.

A second element shaping parties’ incentives for policy responsiveness is the variation in the endowment of non-programmatic resources When programmatic and non-programmatic dimensions are uncorrelated for voters, parties with non-programmatic advantages —e.g. higher competence, more resources, larger networks— can be more responsive to pivotal voters moving into the policy space towards them and forcing disadvantaged parties into more extreme policy positions as discussed by Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000. If both dimensions are uncorrelated, political parties with a non-programmatic advantage can use those resources to attract voters for which this non-programmatic dimension is more salient while moving in the policy space to entice pivotal voters who care more about the ideological position of the party. As other parties do not enjoy this advantage, they are likely to be pushed to occupy more extreme position.

From herein, we use the term anchoring to describe the situation when a party chooses to advertise consistent policies over several elections because gains from policy switches would be more than offset by expected losses on non-programmatic grounds. That is, when the correlation between programmatic and non-programmatic terms in the voter utility function anchors parties in the policy space. Conversely, we use the term crowding out to describe the scenario where an advantaged party colonizes the pivotal voter and pushes other parties into more extreme policy
positions. In the rest of the book, we show that both crowding out and anchoring strategies can be explained by how voters weight and connect programmatic and non-programmatic incentives offered by parties. To illuminate how that connection works, we first turn in the next section to the role of programmatic and non-programmatic incentives on the vote.

2-Voter Preferences with Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Incentives

Anthony Downs and Donald Stokes provide two distinct rationales to decide which parties and candidates voters should select on Election Day. Anthony Downs (Downs 1957) focuses on responsibility as a mechanism used by party members to store and rely on information on the policies that will be implemented once elected to office. Given that voters are unwilling or unable to invest time and energy to figure out the nitty-gritty details of policy implementation — or their consequences —, they rely on information shortcuts to make informed voting decisions. As policies benefit a restricted number of voters, parties develop reputations that allow potential beneficiaries (and their opponents) to select among candidates that will implement policies that are consistent with their preferences. Consequently, the theory states, parties cultivate party labels that signal policy content and reputations that signal policy resolve (Downs 1957), allowing voters to make informed decisions with minimum investment costs. Sticky party labels therefore allow voters to minimize information cost and relate electoral choices with expected policy outcomes.

Policy consistency, it was argued, is reinforced by the limited attention span of voters, who need to invest time and energy to update their views of parties. Consequently, even when parties decide to implement policies that deviate from their prior positions, voters are slow to notice policy changes. Policy switches, therefore, are acknowledged by voters if and when they address particularly salient policy issues. That is, on issues that voters are likely to observe, understand, and that weight enough to require an update in prior beliefs.
Contra Downs, researchers have proposed that political parties also signal a reputation delivering non-programmatic benefits, such as for policy competence, in their search for electoral support. The fact that parties propose policies that communicate distributive preferences and policies that advertise competence was the key contribution of Donald Stokes in his now classic 1963 article *Models of Party Competition* (Stokes 1963). In this article, Stokes criticizes supporters of the Downsian model for failing to recognize that parties often publicize their stances on issues that communicate overall competence (e.g. issue-valence) and are key to the voters electoral decision making.

As argued by Stokes, in addition to position-issues (e.g. *policies that divide the electorate*) voters are swayed by valence-issues “that merely invoked the linking of parties with some conditions that is positively or negatively valued by the electorate” (Stokes 1963: 373). Stokes describes position-issues and valence-issues as distinct types of signals, distinguishing policies that benefit particulars individuals or groups (i.e. taxes) from policies that are valued by all voters (i.e. lowering corruption).

In defining voters’ electoral choices, current probabilistic models of vote take into joint consideration both programmatic and non-programmatic sources of individual preferences. The assumption is that voters may derive a higher utility from a party elected to office because of particular benefits to her or his group category (position-issues) or because of the higher capacity to implement policies preferred by everyone (valence-issues). Consequently, if parties care about winning elections and have information on these different sources of vote choice, they should jointly decide which policies to offer given how voters perceive their strength in the non-programmatic dimensions. Thus, programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote jointly shape the politicians’ incentives to move in the policy space —responsiveness— or to cultivate consistent policy labels—responsibility.
Since first proposed by Donald Stokes, position-issues and valence issues have come to describe two distinct sources of utility to be *additively* entered in the electoral behavior of voters. The non-spatial determinants of the voter’s choice have been widely incorporated in existing theories, leading to dramatic changes in our understanding of spatial models of voting. As ideological proximity is no longer measured and estimated in isolation of these other determinants of the vote, empirical observations of party positions and theoretical models of party equilibrium have begun to converge (Adams 2012). That is, empirical observations that describe the programmatic offerings of parties are increasingly being explained by theoretical models that take into account what portfolio of programmatic and non-programmatic goods voters will prefer as well as what programmatic policy offerings should make parties better off (i.e. will allow them to win more votes).

Comparative interest in non-programmatic determinants of the vote has broadened with the third wave of democratization, with scholars considering a range of important alternatives such as economic competence, party organization, party identification, electoral rules, targeted distribution, and ethnic ties, to name some of the most commonly cited. Recognition of the importance of non-programmatic determinants of the vote has also resulted in reassessments in regards to the expected policy offerings of parties. With the recognition that voters judge parties on a variety of programmatic and non-programmatic dimensions, more researchers are now studying to what degree non-programmatic traits affect the menu of policies that parties may offer.  

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7 A number of theories now include programmatic and non-programmatic terms, such as economic competence (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hellwig and Samuels 2008), issue-valence (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2000; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005), party attachment (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Miller and Stokes 1963), activists-valence (Schofield and Sened 2006), electoral rules (Adams et al. 2006; Calvo and Hellwig 2011), ethnic identification (Chandra 2004), and targeted distribution (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996; Stokes 2005), Stokes et al (2013).
While the choice of non-programmatic traits varies, the mechanisms that explain the decision to advertise consistent policies or to move in the policy space are the same. In the next section we will describe how programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote interact with each other. Then, we will discuss which non-programmatic terms are most important for our comparative analyses.

3. A Model of Voting with Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Offers

Most probabilistic models of voting today consider as their point of departure a utility function where a voter \(i\) expresses a spatial preferences for programmatic policies that “separates voters” (e.g. Left-Right) and non-spatial preferences that describes the utility that voters derive from non-programmatic traits. We will describe the basic Downs-Stokes utility function in probabilistic models of voting as:

\[
U(V_{ik}) = -\alpha_i (x_i - L_k)^2 + \beta_i T_{ik} \tag{Eq. 1.1}
\]

Where \(x_i\) describes the self-reported location of a voter in the left-right scale; \(L_k\) describes the reported policy proposal \(L\) of party \(k\); \((x_i - L_k)^2\) describes the distance between the location of voter and the proposal of party \(k\); the term \(-\alpha_i\) describes the disutility for a policy offering that is further removed from the voter’s preferred location; and \(\beta_i T_{ik}\) describes utility \(\beta_i\) of the non-spatial term \(T_{ik}\) (which can vary for each one of the non-programmatic terms if there are more than one).

Most models consider the disutility \(-\alpha\) to be fixed for all voters. As a party \(k\) offers a policy that is further removed from voter \(i\), the utility of voting for that party declines a \(-\alpha\) amount. This decline in utility is generally the same for all voters, indicating that all voters care about ideological proximity to the same degree. A key insight of our framework, however, results from the recognition that different groups of voters derive different utilities from the delivery of programmatic benefits, which will result in parties being more responsive (or more responsible)
given the relative weight that voters attach to parties’ programmatic and non-programmatic offerings. Already here we emphasize this characteristic of our theory, allowing each voter in Equation (1.1) to attach different weight to ideology –e.g. indexing $-\alpha_i$ by voter.

The fact that different voters care to a different degree about their proximity to ideological offerings has substantive implications. It generates incentives for political parties and candidates to cater their ideological position to cultivate the voters who are most sensitive to their spatial location.$^8$ For example, a low income voter in Chile may give less weight to ideology than a wealthier one; Argentine voters may care less about tax policy than their Chilean counterpart; voters of the *Justicialista Party* in Argentina may value ideological proximity less than voters of the center-left party *Argentinos por una Republica de Igualas (ARI)*, to name a few examples.$^9$

Equation (1.1) also recognizes that voters differ in the importance or weight they attach to non-spatial determinants of the vote, $\beta_i$. For example, wealthy voters in Chile may attach little value to targeted distribution such as food or cash when making vote decisions. Poor voters in Argentina may care a great deal about competence compared to wealthy voters. The fact that voters care to a different degree about ideological proximity and non-spatial determinants of the vote such as targeted distribution or competence, explains also that parties gain benefits from allocating

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$^8$ In this specification there is not a substantive difference between the variables $X \equiv \{x, L, T\}$ and parameters $\theta \equiv \{\alpha, \beta\}$. While we observe variables and we do not observe parameters, both variables and parameters have distributions and jointly determine political behavior (Gelman 1995, 2004).

$^9$ Ideological distance has been show to affect voting behavior in our cases. Colomer and Escatel (2005) and Zeichmeister and Corral (2012) show that Latin American voters can consistently locate themselves and political parties in the left-right ideological dimension while Luna and Zeichmeister (2005) show a positive correlation between legislators and mass mean ideological positions in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, and Colombia.
different types of targeted goods among distinct groups of voters (Dixit and Londregan 1996), Cox and McCubbins (1986), Stokes (2005).

The term $T_{ik}$ describes the voters’ assessments of non-programmatic traits, such as competence, targeted distribution, and network capacity. Political parties have different degrees of difficulty to change the allocation of these non-programmatic terms among voters. For example, targeted goods can be swapped from one voter to another, but reputations for competence generally depend on prior performance assessments, which are not likely to change rapidly. Assessments of prior performance in office or perceptions of corruption, consequently, provide less control to party leaders than the allocation of goods or the mobilization of party networks, which are less “liquid” than ideological position change in the party platform.

**Table 1.1:** Description and Interpretation of Terms in the Downs-Stokes model of Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$x_i$</td>
<td>Ideal Ideological location of Voter $i$ on a Left-Right dimension (Taxes, social rights, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$L_k$</td>
<td>Ideal Policy Offer by Party $k$ on a Left-Right dimension (Taxes, social rights, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$D_{ik} = (x_i - L_k)^2$</td>
<td>Distance from the preferred policy of voter $i$ to the policy offer of party $k$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\alpha_i$</td>
<td>Importance or weight that voter $i$ attaches to spatial proximity. We index the weight $-\alpha_i$ by voter $i$, allowing heterogeneity among voters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_{ik}$</td>
<td>Non-spatial quantity of commodity $T$ delivered to voter $i$ (Valence, targeted distribution, descriptive representation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_i$</td>
<td>Importance or weight that voter $i$ attaches to non-spatial benefits (can vary per type of benefit).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1 summarizes the terms of the voter's utility function in Equation (1.1). Given a specific collection of programmatic and non-programmatic offerings by political parties and the weight that voters attach to each of them, is that the latter can make decisions on Election Day. We
now discuss how voters calculate the utility they derive for the different parties and how parties select a policy profile.

**Voters**

From the point of view of voters, each party reveals a menu of programmatic policies to be implemented if elected to office and is endowed with non-programmatic traits, which voters consider in making their electoral choices. Given voter heterogeneity, each voter attaches different importance or weight to these programmatic and non-programmatic party offers and selects the party or candidate that provides the highest utility for her. The probability that a voter will select each party is drawn from a multinomial distribution with probability:

\[
\Pr (V_{ik}) = \frac{e^{U(V_{ik})}}{\sum_{j=1}^{k} e^{U(V_{ik})}} \quad \forall \ i, j
\]

(Eq. 1.2)

Equation (1.2) describes the probability that individual \( i \) will cast a vote for party \( k_1 \) out of the universe of parties, \( k_1, ..., k_j \). In equation 1.2, the utility that voters derive from the bundle of programmatic and non-programmatic offerings of a party is tied to the probability of voting for that party. Readers will likely recognize formula 1.2 as a multinomial (conditional) Logit approximation to the probability of voting for parties \( k_1, ..., k_j \).

**Parties**

For electorally motivated candidates and parties, knowledge of the preferences of voters should induce changes in the policies they advertise. That is, given that parties gather information in regards to how much voters care about non-programmatic traits; parties should advertise policy...
positions that will yield the most votes. Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) provide an algorithm to estimate the location at which a party maximizes its expected vote share in multiparty elections, allowing researchers to explore whether different traits drive parties into more moderate or into more extreme policy locations. For example, if voters perceive that a leftist party $I_1$ has a higher competence for implementing policy than a second leftist Party $I_2$, the party with the lowest valence will be crowded out by the party with the highest valence. That is, $I_2$ will seek to be sufficiently close to at least a subgroup of voters so that its candidates may offset the perceived disadvantage in non-programmatic grounds.

In our characterization, political parties behave responsibly when experiencing costs if deviating from past policy proposals so that, over the course of several elections, their optimal policy offering is bounded to a narrow region on the policy space. Conversely, political parties are responsive when experiencing low costs from deviating from past policy proposals so that, over the course of several elections, their optimal strategy is to move to new policy locations in response to changes in the voters’ demands. Hence, our definition of responsiveness and responsibility results from the politicians’ desire to maximize votes and is bounded to the programmatic aspect of party-voter linkages.

**Responsiveness, Performance, and Selection**

It may be argued that parties and candidates may also be responsive to voters when deciding the allocation of non-programmatic benefits, as they could distribute public sector jobs to a particular group of voters or invest in pork in a particular district. However, the concept of responsiveness we are referring to refers to policy positions, which have spatial properties (and

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10 This assumption will be relaxed on chapter 6 as we discuss the role of political networks in providing information to parties and generating asymmetries in the capacity of parties to gather knowledge about voters.
therefore allow for the measure of ideological distance)—equivalent to Stokes’ ‘position issues.’ Parties cannot be responsive or responsible to voters in a competence dimension, as they cannot chose a competence position that would yield the most votes, although some parties “perform” better than others in terms of their competence reputation among voters. Positive reputations are an asset and negative reputations a liability, which parties should seriously consider when deciding what types of policies they should offer to voters, but they do not have spatial properties, thus restricting parties reaction to attempts at promoting the salience of areas in which they enjoy a reputational advantage.

Similarly, parties do not become responsive to voter $i$ and unresponsive to voter $j$ when they strip the former of a public sector job and give it to the latter. There are no median patronage voters, unless we consider a median voter in programmatic terms when deciding to allocate non-programmatic resources such as a public sector jobs. Indeed, we consider that parties “select” which voters render the highest electoral return when receiving discrete non-programmatic resources. That is, we consider that parties are responsive or responsible to voters on programmatic grounds whereas they can select to allocate resources to distinct groups of voters. Yet, we do not consider that voter to the left of patronage will always vote for Party $I$ and voters to the right of patronage will always vote for party $R$.\footnote{Electoral support, thereby, can be conditional on policy position or selective incentive distribution or reputation over competence or any other dimension that weights on voters’ choice at the ballot box.}

As it will be described in Chapter 2, parties maximize votes by changing or maintaining policy offerings on programmatic dimensions, conditional on the voters’ prior assessments and selecting or deselecting clients for targeted distribution. Given the stickiness of competence reputations in the short term, the two sets of decisions to be carried out by parties are, consequently, which policies should candidates advertise and how to allocate non-programmatic benefits? Each strategic choice cannot be defined without reference to the other.
Equilibrium Models of Voting

Equations (1.1) and (1.2) describe the utility that voters derive from selecting parties that offer distinct policies, are endowed with non-spatial reputations, and allocate non-programmatic benefits. Armed with knowledge about the preferences of voters, parties that hope to maximize their vote will offer a menu of policies and allocate non-programmatic resources.

As mentioned above, there have been significant advances in the estimation of equilibrium models of voting, which allows us to more fully explore the implications of our theory. Under fairly general conditions, researchers have shown that changes in the value of non-spatial determinants of the vote will drive parties and candidates to more centrist or more extreme policy locations (Lin, Enelow, and Dorussen 1999; Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005; Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2000). Following that literature, two very different results can be shown to optimize party votes from Equations 1.1 and 1.2, depending on whether the programmatic and non-programmatic dimensions are i) correlated with each other or not and ii) whether parties are endowed with different quantities of a non-programmatic reputation or a commodity $T_{ik}$ as graphically depicted in table 1.2:

1) In the upper left cell in table 1.2 no party enjoys a comparative advantage in non-programmatic terms and perceptions of non-programmatic endowments are uncorrelated with ideology. This situation generates incentives for a Downsian convergence, as all political parties fall towards the position of the median voter. In multiparty elections perfect symmetry with no correlation will yield no equilibrium result.

2) The upper right cell resembles the scenario described by Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005). Lacking non-programmatic comparative advantages, parties will take more extreme and less movable policy positions if and when programmatic and non-
programmatic determinants of the vote are correlated with each other. Centrifugal and less responsive policy positions result from a party $k$ not having an advantage over other parties ($T_{ik} = T_{i-k}$) among a subset of voters that are located in a narrow region of the policy space if and only if both programmatic and non-programmatic terms are correlated with each other\(^{12}\), so that $cov(T_{ik}, x_{[a-b]}) > 0$. A positive correlation between programmatic and non-programmatic terms erodes the parties’ ability to deviate from prior policy offerings, generating the ideological anchoring characteristic of responsible parties. Hence, Adams, Merrill, and Grofman (2005) provide a blueprint to understand—and estimate—programmatic responsibility, by focusing on the strong linkages between the programmatic and non-programmatic components of the vote, which explain a party’s inability to freely move in the policy space, and thus its decision to cultivate a responsible brand.

3) The lower left cell of table 1.2 approximates the theoretical result from Equation 1.1 following the scenario described by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), when a party $k$ having an advantage over other parties $T_{ik} \neq T_{i-k}$ and when programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote are not correlated with each other, $cov(T_{ik}, x_{[a-b]}) = 0$. In this case, the party with the non-programmatic comparative advantage will dominate taking on the position that yields the most votes (e.g. the median voter if voters are normally distributed) whereas the party or parties that have a comparative disadvantage are pushed into more extreme policy positions seeking to attract other voters (crowding out). Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000),

\(^{12}\) Adams, Merrill, and Grofman’s (2005) select a variable that is highly correlated with ideological proximity as a proxy for valence. Consequently, observed changes in the policy space are consistently biased towards a responsible party model. In our research we discuss how the choice of non-spatial trait affects the capacity of parties to freely move in the space or to stay closely tied to the same policy region.
thereby, provide a crucial insight to understand ideological responsiveness as a result of inter-party asymmetries in non-programmatic terms such as competence or targeted distribution, which allow parties to move more freely in the policy space.

4) Finally, in the lower right cell, voters perceive that a party has a non-programmatic comparative advantage among a subset of voters that are located in a narrow region of the ideological space; thus, advantaged parties move in the direction of the pivotal voter but not to the position of the pivotal voter given the correlation with ideological position of its non-programmatic advantage. Meanwhile, disadvantaged parties move away from the advantaged party within narrower areas of the policy space. We define the outcome that falls between pure anchoring and pure crowding out as conditional responsiveness.

Table 1.2: Responsiveness, Responsibility, and the delivery of Programmatic and non-Programmatic benefits

| Asymmetry in the Endowment of non-programmatic traits | Covariance between Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Terms | Independence between Spatial and Non-Spatial determinants of the vote, \( \text{cov}(T_{ik}, x_{|a-b|}) = 0 \) | Covariance between Spatial and Non-Spatial determinants of the vote, \( \text{cov}(T_{ik}, x_{|a-b|}) > 0 \) |
|---|---|---|
| Voters attach similar scores to the non-programmatic term \( T_{ik} = T_{i-ik} \) | Downsian Convergence Neither Responsive nor Responsible Parties | Responsible Parties (anchoring) |
| Voters attach dissimilar scores to the non-programmatic term \( T_{ik} \neq T_{i-ik} \) | Responsive Parties (crowding out) | Conditional Responsibility |

Table 1.2 presents the basic intuition just described. We expect parties to be less movable when the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote covary with each other, so that non-programmatic traits such as the competence of parties is valued differently by voters on
the left, center, or right of the political spectrum. In this book, we use data from our cases to provide
evidence that competence, targeted distribution, and partisan networks are asymmetrically
distributed among voters and covary with ideology to very different extents in Argentina and Chile.
We will also show how voters evaluate each party’s capacity to provide non-programmatic
resources and the impact of asymmetries on parties’ incentives to move in the policy space.
Consequently, we will show how these different non-programmatic determinants of the vote induce
distinct anchoring and crowding out effects in Argentina and Chile.

4. Non-Programmatic Terms in the Voter Utility Function

The non-programmatic terms in the voter utility function vary depending on the patterns of
electoral behavior in each political context. We present here the three non-programmatic
determinants of vote choice that we use to analyze the political dynamics of Argentina and Chile (i)
competence as a valence term, which describes the parties and candidates ability to effectively
implement policy; (ii) targeted distribution, which describes the parties’ ability to capture public
resources and allocate handouts, public sector jobs, or pork to groups of voters; and (iii) partisan
networks, which describes the parties’ ability to collect and deliver information through direct
personal linkages between party members and voters. While the impact of these dimensions on
voting behavior in our countries has been shown, others categories (e.g. ethnicity, party
identification) affect electoral behavior in other contexts and their impact on policy responsiveness
could also be assessed.

We consider that parties differ from each other across and within countries in their ability to
project competence for governing, in their capacity to collect resources, and in their ability to
collect and deliver information. Thus, each of these different non-programmatic determinants of
the vote induces ideological responsiveness or responsibility; constraining or enhancing the
capacity of parties to move in the policy space depending on a) voters’ perception linking ideology
with each of them and b) on parties’ endowments of non-programmatic benefits. In turn, there are behavioral, institutional, and historical reasons that explain why voters sometimes develop perceptions of non-programmatic benefits that are inextricably linked or disengaged from programmatic offerings by parties as well as the different endowments that parties’ have of non-programmatic resources.

**Economic Competence**

Let us first describe the effect of competence signals, which more often correlate with programmatic positions by parties than other non-programmatic terms—and over which political parties have less control. The competence of political parties to solve commonly agreed problems that are considered important to the electorate has been recognized as a critical determinant of the vote (Sanders, Clarke, Seward and Whiteley 2011). These non-programmatic evaluations allow voters to distinguish policy offerings on grounds that are different from their ideological standings. For example, while there may be widespread consensus that corruption wastes collective resources and should be eliminated, in the eyes of the voters not all parties are deemed equally capable of implementing anti-corruption measures. From the recognition that parties differ in perceived competence to carry out mandates, a broad literature sprung analyzing information effects (Blais, Martin, and Nadeau 1998; Granberg and Brent 1980; Zaller and Feldman 1992) and issue dominance across parties (Vavreck 2009; Petrocik 1996).

Inter-party differences in competence may result from distinct bureaucratic experiences, human capital, choice of policy instruments, institutional trajectories, previous policy implementation experiences, etc. Let us for now state that voters are capable of distinguishing information that reveals ideological preferences from information that captures the relative competence of parties. Voters use both sources of information to select parties, taking into
consideration position-issues that benefit their group as well as valence-issues that capture how effectively policies may be implemented by parties.

An extensive literature has identified retrospective economic performance assessments as an indicator of competence and one of the most important determinants of vote choice. This literature on economic voting inquires on the conditions under which parties are not only likely to abide by an electoral mandate but, as importantly, to do so competently and administer the economy to ensure overall welfare. Positive reputations for dealing with the economy are an asset while negative reputations are a liability (Alcañiz and Hellwig 2011; Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995).

According to these theories, voters can draw competence signals from economic outcomes, by parsing out the expected distributive consequences of policies and the relative competence of politicians in economic outcomes. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) provide the most widely cited model of how economic shocks are processed by voters, distinguishing ideological content and competence signals from objective economic data. Duch and Stephenson (2008) provide a general framework that moves beyond Alesina and Rosenthal, showing cross-national differences in competence signals when evaluating incumbents. Samuels and Hellwig (2008) provide evidence of the degree to which economic shocks change the vote for the incumbent, with different institutions filtering signals that explain the attribution of responsibility to incumbents. A central tenant of these theories is that parsing out the distributive effect of policies and the effect of competence is difficult, with voters using information on positive growth both to validate prior beliefs about the benefits of policies as well as to assess the competence of politicians.¹³

¹³ To assess voters' perception of political parties' competence of both incumbents and challengers, we follow Sanders, Clarke, Steward and Whiteley (2011) who propose to use measures of voters' perception instead of relying on prior performance. This strategy allows measures of competence for both incumbents and challengers.
In these models, while ideology and competence are distinct dimensions of the voters’ choices, oftentimes the same information is used to update the voters’ beliefs generating an association between both dimensions. Voters in the United States, for example, perceive that Democrats have an advantage in ensuring economic growth, the result of partisan messages that for many years have described how spending and progressive taxation results in superior growth. An extensive literature on issue-ownership has shown that Republicans have an advantage when advancing tough security policies (Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006; Petrocik 1996). That is, voters often perceive that some parties have developed expertise in issue areas or for implementing particular types of policies. If both parties propose similar hawkish policies in security matters, voters are likely to give lower implementation marks to Democrats. If both parties propose growth promoting policies, voters are likely to give lower competence marks to Republicans. Given that reputations for competence in dealing with security or growth change slowly over time, parties that trespass issues owned by other parties may fail to gain the support of the voters they seek to recruit (Vavreck 2009). Consequently, issue trespassing is rare and issue realignment uncommon (Karol 2009).

Furthermore, when parties advertise their policy goals they do not claim that such policies will satisfy the interests and preferences of their particular constituency but, rather, that these policies will improve the life of voters as a whole. Policies that separate voters into winners and losers are routinely presented by parties as superior in general. A reduction on taxes that benefits the wealthy is presented by Republicans as a way to boost employment that will benefit the poor. An expansion of unemployment benefits is described by Democrats as a way to maintain overall growth, to the benefit of businesses that will see their profits go up. Ideology and policy competence, consequently, are oftentimes inextricably linked in the communication strategies of parties as well in the mind of voters.
Consistent with our argument, when competence signals closely relate to policy offerings, parties pay a higher cost for deviating from past offerings. When programmatic and competence signals are successful linked in particular issue areas, parties will be programmatically anchored to prior policy offerings, limiting responsiveness and increasing responsibility.

But, what if ideology fails to inform on competence? As these two dimensions unravel, we will show, parties are capable of pursuing high yield programs whenever exogenous shocks change the preferences of voters. Exogenous shocks and the changing mood among voters will result in quick policy adjustment among candidates and parties. As ideology and competence divorce from each other, policy switches increase generating policy volatility. As the connection between policy and competence erodes, voters support parties that build a reputation for competence, irrespective of their policy choices.

Even when economic competence is more likely to correlate to ideology than other non-programmatic dimensions, there is significant variation within and across party systems. Our research provides evidence that voters’ ideological position is not correlated with their views about the economic competence of the Argentine Peronist or Radical parties. That is, voters’ perceptions of economic competence about the Peronists and the Radicals in 2007 did not correlate with the ideological location of voters although the mean evaluation about economic management was higher for the Peronists than for the Radicals, providing evidence of an asymmetry in this dimension. However, Argentine smaller political parties, such as the conservative PRO or the leftist ARI, displayed higher association between competence and ideological identification. In Chile, we find a higher symmetry in competence assessments by voters about the main Chilean political parties, which in most cases correlates strongly with ideology. By comparing voters and parties in both countries, our framework will help to explain how competence assessments induce higher responsiveness for the Peronists and Radicals in Argentina and stronger anchoring for the ARI and PRO. By contrast, in Chile all parties are more subject to the yoke of responsibility because
competence claims and ideological shortcuts become inextricably linked with each other.\textsuperscript{14} As a result, Chilean parties are more likely to maintain prior ideological positions, unwilling to pay the electoral costs of policy choices that deviate from past programmatic stances.

Just as perceptions of economic competence may be closely related to ideology and induce anchoring —as in Chile—or asymmetrically distributed among parties and induce crowding out—as in Argentina; other non-programmatic terms in the utility function of voters will also keep parties tied to their prior programmatic offerings or facilitate ideological change.\textsuperscript{15} In addition to economic competence, we also analyze the effect of targeted distribution and partisan networks in the behavior of parties.

\textit{The Distribution of Targeted Benefits}

The literature on new democracies has triggered a renewed interest on the electoral consequences of targeted distribution. The emerging literature on this area departs from prior anthropological and sociological traditions that underscore clientelism as an alternative form of party organization (Stokes 2007). Instead, since the seminal contributions of Cox and McCubbins (Cox and McCubbins 1986) and Dixit and Londregan (1996), a larger number of researchers have conceptualized targeted benefits as a distinct non-programmatic component in the portfolio of benefits delivered by most parties establishing connections with the literature on distributive

\textsuperscript{14} In Chile, the simple correlation between ideological distance and evaluations of economic competence ranges from a high of 0.4 for the Socialist Party to a low of 0.2 for the Christian Democrats. By contrast, in Argentina, the correlation is 0.09 for the Peronist and 0.06 for the Radicals, but 0.16 for the leftist ARI and the conservative PRO.

\textsuperscript{15} Perceived competence to deal with other issues such as corruption or crime can also be perceived by voters as connected or detached from ideological considerations. In chapter 4, we will describe different competence dimensions that distinguish parties in Chile and Argentina.
politics. In particular, the focus has been on assessing the optimal strategy to maximize votes conditional on ideological distance (e.g. Stokes 2005, Lindbeck and Weibull 1987). Fewer efforts, however, have been directed at understanding how targeted distribution affects policy responsiveness and responsibility.  

Rather than characterizing parties as either programmatic or clientelistic, we consider that all parties offer a policy bundle and deliver at least some targeted benefits to voters, whom consider jointly these party offers when deciding whether to support different candidates (Stokes 2005). As it is the case for all non-programmatic components in our probabilistic vote model, we consider that the effects of targeted distribution on policy responsiveness vary by party depending on the correlation of distributive expectations and ideology as well as the party endowment of selective incentives to distribute.

When distributive expectations correlate with ideology, we expect anchoring pressures that will prevent parties from freely moving in the policy space. However, the literature on clientelism tends to expect a low correlation between the distribution of selective incentives and the ideological position of voters. Moreover, given differences in access to public resources depending on incumbency, the capacity to deliver those resources is always unequally distributed across political parties in a single country. Consequently, the asymmetries derived from differential access and capacity to deliver public resources will be reflected in the distribution of selective incentives. Hence, if distributive expectations are not correlated with ideology, the asymmetries in

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16 In analyzing the effect that targeted distribution has on responsiveness and responsibility, we take head on existing debates on client selection in chapter 6. We measure whether parties benefit more extensively from targeting core voters or swing voters by comparing targeting strategies to maximize the vote in Argentina and Chile.

the capacity to deliver targeted goods should generate incentives for better endowed political parties to *crowd out* their rivals. That is, we expect that parties that have a comparative advantage in the access and delivery of targeted resources will be able to move their policy offering towards the median ideological voter while *crowding out* parties with fewer resources to more extreme locations.

There is considerable debate in the literature regarding the proper definition of targeted distribution. In what follows, and throughout this book, we will consider a narrow definition of targeted distribution as the *discretionary allocation of a stream of resources to a restricted number of clients selected through party sanctioned recruitment channels.*

Let us explain in greater detail: first, per our definition, we define targeted distribution as a stream of resources that voters receive or expect to receive in-between elections. While there have been extensive discussions about the possibility that voters will receive a targeted benefit from one party and then vote for a different one, our conceptualization is quite different from the “pay-as-you-go” type of approach to the delivery of targeted resources. We do not consider that parties buy an election by delivering a payoff sum before or after the election to a restricted menu of voters. Instead, we contend, parties offer a schedule of payments that is contingent on controlling office. Different parties will offer different transfer schedules to voters, who consider both the value of the offer and the probability $\pi$ that parties will win and make good on their payment schedule.¹⁸ We recognize that moral hazard raises monitoring and screening problems in targeted distribution, which have concentrated a great deal of attention in recent research (e.g. Stokes et al 2013). These

¹⁸ Notice that after the election parties can always stop payment to voters and forfeit on the expected delivery of targeted goods. Such decision would lower the value of targeted returns in the next election, as voters would update and reduce the probability $\pi$ of future allocations of benefits. In our model, without winning office there are no payments and without payments the utility of targeted distribution in future elections declines.
issues are discussed at length in Chapter 6, presenting our case against monitoring models and in favor of screening ones.

Secondly, our definition explicitly distinguished targeted from non-targeted distribution by the fact that parties can select (or activate) clients through recruitment channels, putting a party face to the delivery of benefits (Calvo and Murillo 2012). Different from redistribution by policy, there are no individuals to the “right” or to the “left” of the beneficiaries. Targeted distribution works as an on-and-off switch that activates allocations of resources to particular individuals. For any given individual, a schedule for the allocation of targeted goods by Party $k$ raises the utility of voting for that party. Furthermore, different targeted goods yield different returns, contingent on the weight that voters attach to each benefit in the portfolio of politicians.\(^1\)

Our definition also emphasizes another critical distinction between targeted distribution and programmatic distribution, which is how recipients become eligible to access benefits (Calvo and Murillo 2013). In the former case, activists screen high yield from low yield voters and mediate in the access to goods. In the latter case, categories of beneficiaries are defined by policy and access is independent from partisan channels of selection and distribution. Consequently, what distinguishes non-programmatic targeted distribution from programmatic distribution is how voters access these benefits.

Consider for example the allocation of unemployment subsidies through the workfare program *Jefes y Jefas* in Argentina and the workfare program *Chile Solidario*, in Chile. In Argentina, immediately after economic crisis of the 2001, the administration of President Eduardo Duhalde instituted a workfare program to deliver 150 pesos a month to unemployed adults. Registration was delegated to local party brokers and payments often delivered through partisan channels. Both

\(^{19}\) Some scholars have argued that the delivery of targeted benefits to a sub-group of voters may drive away from that party those voters that feel excluded (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). Our model accommodates such “disincentives,” which will behave much in the same way that positive incentives do.
the registration of beneficiaries and the allocation of resources rested in the hands of party members or party allies, endowed with the authority to allocated benefits to large but still restricted groups of voters.\textsuperscript{20} In the case of Chile, a workfare program was implemented at around the same time, delivering comparable payments, but registration was conducted by public sector bureaucrats and payments deliver through public banks. In the former case, Argentina, workfare subsidies were allocated to clients selected through party sanctioned channels. In the latter case, Chile, workfare subsidies were allocated to voters defined by means-tested criteria, registration carried out by non-partisan bureaucrats, with resources delivered through non-partisan institutions (Luna and Mardones 2014).

The fact that only a subset of individuals is selected by a party also distinguishes targeted distribution from other non-programmatic determinants of the vote such as competence. Indeed, while all individuals develop competence assessments for each party in a race, there are only some individuals selected by parties to perceive targeted benefits. Different from competence assessments, targeted distribution takes the value of zero for a very large share of the voting population that receives or expects to receive no benefits. Simultaneously, the value of targeted distribution varies widely among heterogeneous groups of voters, which attach different value to public sector jobs that ensures a comparatively high income for an extended period of time or to small subsidies that complements their primary incomes. Given that targeted distribution describes the allocation of resources to a restricted menu of voters through party sanctioned channels, selecting the right type of clients is essential. Voters have different sensitivities and attach different

\textsuperscript{20} Notice that expectations can be shifted by new public policy and that competing way of distributing social policy can coexist within the same country. For instance, in 2009, the same Argentine government established a temporary employment program (Argentina works) distributed through political networks with considerable discretion, and a non-discretionary universal cash transfer for parents of poor children (Universal Transfer per Children).
weight to the delivery of targeted goods and, consequently, politicians that seek to maximize votes need to select clients that will have the highest sensitivity and yield the highest return. Voter heterogeneity, we will show in this book, critically affects how parties decide which voters should be targeted and the type of benefits to be delivered. As a result, differences in the weight that voters attach to targeted benefits will affect the degree to which parties are responsive or responsible.

In our research, we analyze the effect of three different types of goods on party vote: handouts (clientelism), public sector jobs (patronage), and public works (pork). We find significant differences in the importance that voters attach to these types of goods as well as differences in the degree to which distributive expectations about them correlate with ideology. In particular, we show that distributive expectations regarding handouts and patronage are less correlated with ideology than expectations on pork, which are more closely related to policy preferences across both countries. Consequently, we show that both in Argentina and in Chile the delivery of handouts and patronage resources induces crowding out while the allocation of district level pork induces anchoring.

Because targeted distribution requires identifying clients and allocating resources, it depends critically on the ability of parties to gather information and deliver resources. Partisan networks play a fundamental role in identifying needs and delivering benefits, becoming a third and fundamental non-programmatic term in our theory.

**Partisan Networks**

The final non-programmatic component of the vote that we analyze in great detail is partisan networks. In the last few years there has been renewed interest in political networks in general and partisan networks in particular. In the particular area of representation, partisan networks have been generally described as a signal of party competence or valence, considered as a resource to mobilize or to disseminate party messages. Voters recognize differences among parties in the
policies they offer, their competence to manage the economy, their capacity to deliver targeted benefits, and capacity to collect and communicate voter preferences. Partisan networks can be used to disseminate programmatic party messages, deliver targeted benefits, mobilize campaign resources, and signal enthusiasm and resolve. A number of authors have recognized that activists provide parties with valence resources that differ from competence in governing or issue ownership. Kitschelt (1994) and Schofield and Sened (2006) explicitly note that activists improve electoral performance and induce policy stickiness. Baker, Ames, and Renno (2006) describe that information networks increase party vote while Klofstad et al. show that public disagreement in social networks structure preferences and behavior (2012). The role of networks in mobilization and distribution as well as its impact in shaping electoral support independent of voters’ policy preferences has been emphasized in the work of Levitsky (2003), Auyero (2001), Schwarzerberg (2011), Magaloni et al (2007), and Stokes et al (2013), among others.

In our research, we explicitly define party networks as a non-programmatic determinant of the vote, capable of communicating preferences and delivering resources. The capacity of parties to intersect with voters in their daily life is one of the most important functions of parties. Information networks allow voters to attach familiar faces to candidates, forge descriptive ties, re-interpret party messages, rely preferences, and access to benefits. Partisan networks also provide a training ground for party candidates, allowing them to fine tune their inter-personal skills, to develop a constituency they can showcase to fellow party members, and to build social capital for office.

Our work shows that parties differ significantly in the size and structure of partisan networks generating important asymmetries in the efficiency of partisan networks. A large network of activists is an asset, showcasing party strength to voters and multiplying the delivery of party messages. A small network is a liability, signaling voters that the party message is not credible and has little capacity to gain traction. In sum, networks provide critical resources to troubleshoot party ideas, collect voter preferences, deliver messages, and allocating benefits.
The impact of partisan networks on policy responsiveness has generated some disagreement in the literature. For some authors, partisan networks and organizations anchor parties ideologically reducing their responsiveness to median voter preferences, especially through their role in the selection of candidates (Tsebelis 1990, Kitschelt 1994, Abramowitz 2011, Fiorina, Abrams and Pope 2006). For others, partisan networks can provide connections to voters devoid of ideological content and allow parties to move in the policy space (Levitsky 2003, Stokes et al. 2013). Our work brings together these competing frameworks but empirically establishing the correlation between partisan networks and ideological distance. We show, that those contrasting views correspond to cases where activists are party ideologues or cases where party activists are pragmatists (Kitschelt 1994).

If large networks are an asset and small networks a liability, we expect that parties with a comparative advantage will be able to *crowd out* parties with limited activists’ support. Consistent with our theory, large networks that do not correlate with ideology will induce policy responsiveness while networks that correlate with ideology will induce responsibility. In analyzing the cases of Chile and Argentina, our research provides a window to the internal organization of parties, measures of the size and structure of partisan networks, and evidence of their effect in the choice of policies and in the selection of clients. We will show that partisan networks have different structures and serve different purposes in Chile and Argentina, allowing us to explain diverse incentives for policy responsiveness and responsibility across political parties in both countries.

5. **Voter Heterogeneity and Parties’ Biased Attention**

The third building block of our framework—in addition to the correlation between programmatic and non-programmatic offers, and the asymmetry in the endowment of non-programmatic resources—is that we acknowledge that voters attach different importance or
weight to the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of their vote, as described in Equation 1.1. Indeed, we allow the importance or weight that voters attach to ideological distance to be indexed by voter, noting that different individuals and groups of voters do not care equally about the different products in the portfolio of politicians. For instance, when deciding which candidate to vote for, high income voters may care deeply about tax policy; unemployed voters may be more easily swayed by the possibility of being recruited for a public sector job; voters in a slum may take notice of the ability of party brokers to provide access to clean water or food.

We also argued that differences in the value that individuals attach to the different components of the vote will drive parties to pay more or less attention to distinct groups of voters. Parties will always do electorally better if they properly match policies and resources with high yield voters that will be more likely to be swayed by different programmatic and non-programmatic benefits. If some groups and individuals are more likely to change their vote upon observing policy proposals or receiving targeted benefits, parties will improve their performance by delivering more of those benefits to high yield voters that are sensitized to each type of benefit. As a result, their attention would be biased toward those voters.

Consider for example a party L that will allocate policies and goods to two groups of voters. The first group denominated P cares intensely about the policies implemented by the party while the second group denominated C cares deeply about competence. Consequently, for the first group the probability of voting for the party is a function of \( pr(L|1) = f(1 * P_p + 0 * C_p) \) while for the second group the probability of voting for the party is a function of \( pr(L|1) = f(0 * P_c + 1 * C_c) \). In this scenario, the policy preferences of group C are of no substantive importance for the leaders of Party L and they should only attend to the preferences of \( P_p \).

Heterogeneity in the preferences of voters is explained by a number of behavioral, socio-economic, and identity related factors that distinguish social classes, ethnic groups, religious groups, regions, to name some of the most important. In fact, there is a significant literature that
acknowledges that parties emphasize different policies to different constituencies. Candidate ambiguity, it has been shown, is a vote maximizing strategy precisely because it allows voters to interpret policy offerings according to issues they care deeply about (Tomz and Van Houweling 2009).

In line with an extensive literature that identifies biases in the attention that politicians pay to voters of different socioeconomic groups in old democracies, we uncover similar sources of policy biases in Argentina and Chile. In contrast to studies pointing to the role of political participation, differential resources and collective action problems as sources of socioeconomic bias, we identify here an alternative source of bias that is generated by the distribution of voters’ policy preferences across different socioeconomic groups in the electorate. Using extensive interviews with politicians in each country, as well as data on the allocation of public resources, we measure the extent to which differences in the weight that voters attach to different types of benefits explain the allocation of policy and non-policy benefits by elites.

Just as parties pay closer attention to voters with more intense preferences for particular types of programmatic and non-programmatic items in their political portfolio, ideological responsiveness and responsibility will also be more intensely shaped by high yield voters. In this book we provide evidence that in both Chile and Argentina there are groups of voters with more intense preferences for different types of programmatic and non-programmatic goods. We will also

\[21\] Referring to the American poor, V.O. Key (1949/1964, 527) said: “the blunt truth is that politicians are under on compulsion to pay much heed to classes and groups of citizens who do not vote.” More recent work has confirmed the impact of socioeconomic status on turnout differentials in the US (Leighley 1992, Quaile-Hill and Leighley 1996) and Europe (Offe 2012). Manza (2008) and Bartells (2008) emphasize the impact of political participation and campaign financing on shaping politicians differential attention to voters of diverse socioeconomic groups. Gilens (2012), Rigby and Wright (2011), Wlezien and Soroka (2011), and Bartels (2008) analyze policy responsiveness to different income groups in the US.
show that differences in the degree to which voters care about the policy offerings of parties will
determine what policies parties will offer and which voters will be targeted. In line with our prior
argument, we assume here that the correlation between the programmatic and non-programmatic
terms in the voter utility function can vary for diverse groups of voters. Political parties can thereby
tailor their electoral strategies for each of group (e.g. targeting some types of selective incentives)
and bias their ideological responsiveness toward some group of voters (e.g. by socioeconomic
status) if the programmatic and non-programmatic terms have different levels of correlation across
different groups of voters.

In sum, voter heterogeneity—in the dimensions most relevant in each case—generates
incentives for political parties to identify high yields or more sensitive voters when deciding an
allocation of programmatic and non-programmatic benefits. As previously explained, a higher
correlation between the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote will induce
*anchoring* whereas a lower correlation along with an asymmetry in the endowment of non-
programmatic resources will induce *crowding out*. However, the relative contribution of different
groups of voters will be weighted by the attention from politicians that different groups of voters
may conceit. Consequently, biases in the importance that voters attach to the delivery of
programmatic and non-programmatic offers will affect the degree to which parties are responsive
to the ideological preferences of distinct groups of voters.

**The Road Ahead**

We have presented here our theoretical framework based on three main elements: the
differential weight that voters attach to programmatic and non-programmatic benefits offered by
parties, the correlation between both types of benefits in the minds of voters, and the asymmetries
in parties’ endowments of non-programmatic resources. We have also described here the model
used to measure the impact of these elements on voters’ electoral choice, which is fully developed
in the next chapter and used to measure their implications on responsiveness and responsibility in Argentina and Chile in subsequent chapters after presenting the impact of historical legacies and contextual variables on shaping parties’ programmatic and non-programmatic offers (and voters’ perceptions) in the two countries we study. In those empirical chapters, moreover, we also described the variation across voters of diverse socioeconomic status on the weight attached these different offers and their implications in terms of parties’ strategies.
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Chapter 5: Voting for Policies, Competence, and Selective Incentives

In Chapter 1 we introduce readers to a theory of responsiveness and responsibility with office seeking parties that deliver programmatic and non-programmatic benefits to gain the support of voters. Then, in Chapter 2, we described some of key implications of our model using synthetic data. We argue that asymmetries in non-programmatic endowments—such as higher perceived competence to manage the economy or higher network capacity—allow advantaged parties to dominate high yield positions in the ideological space and crowd out disadvantaged parties to more extreme locations. We also argued that correlated programmatic and non-programmatic preferences on the part of voters will induce responsible behavior, preventing deviations from prior programmatic offers. Then, in Chapter 4, we offered descriptive evidence of significant inter-party asymmetry in non-programmatic endowments in Argentina and more significant association between programmatic and non-programmatic traits in Chile. That descriptive information, we propose, is consistent with incentives for crowding-out in Argentina and more significant policy anchoring in Chile.

In this chapter we move to the next stage of our research program, describing the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of vote choice in Chile and Argentina. We provide evidence that ideological proximity, competence for managing the economy, the allocation of selective incentives, and network capacity, are critical determinants of vote choice in Argentina and in Chile.

Findings in this chapter show that ideological proximity is a predictor of vote choice both in Chile and in Argentina, although Chilean voters care to a larger extent about ideological proximity when deciding their vote. Results in this chapter also show significant inter-class variation in the importance that Argentine voters give to ideological proximity. Indeed, among middle class
Argentine voters, ideological proximity matters almost as much as in Chile. By contrast, lower income voters in Argentina attach little weight to ideological considerations when deciding their vote. In the case of Chile, we find very little inter-class variation in the importance that voters attach to ideology.

Findings in this chapter also show that perceptions of economic competence are a key determinant of the vote both in Chile and Argentina. This is consistent with an emerging interest in valence politics in comparative research (Clarke et al. 1992; Clark 2009; Adams 2012), which in most countries of the world tend to be as good or a better predictor of vote choices than ideological proximity (Clark 2009). ¹ Our results show that voters in Argentina and Chile care a great deal about competence when deciding their vote.

Our results also describe significant inter-class differences in the importance that different voters attach to economic competence. In Chile, better-off voters care a great deal about competence, while competence is not as important among the Chilean poor. By contrast, in Argentina low income voters care a more about competence than middle income voters.

This chapter also presents readers with evidence that both selective incentives and network capacity increase party vote in Chile and Argentina, although their importance differs by country and across socio-economic groups. As we will show, selective incentives increase party vote in both countries, although pork and patronage display larger effects than handouts. In fact, once we control for all variables, expectations about the distribution of handouts fail to achieve statistical significance, indicating that vote buying strategies based on small sums of money, food, or clothing

¹ Even in African countries, where the literature has traditionally emphasized ethnic identities and networks as the crucial non-programmatic dimension providing information for electoral choices (Posner 2003, Habyarimana et al. 2007), valence issues have been shown to have a crucial effect on the vote, certainly stronger than positional issues (Bleck and Van de Walle 2013).
have little impact on the vote. Instead, vote for a party increase significantly as expectations to receive public sector jobs and local investment on public works grow.

In earlier chapters we argued that voter heterogeneity biases policy attention towards high yield voters. After providing evidence that voters care about policy, competence, selective incentives, and network proximity; we present models that estimate separate parameters for voters of different socio-economic groups. Results show that not all voters derive the same utility from the programmatic and non-programmatic offers of parties. The fact that voters develop more intense preferences for different products in the portfolio of politicians is, we argue, the key to understand biases in policy responsiveness and segmented strategies of electoral offering.

The organization of this chapter is as follow: in the next section we describe a statistical model of vote choice in multi-party elections. We then present statistical results with a variety of different specifications, varying the type of non-programmatic incentives delivered to voters, varying the size of the districts, and allowing socio-economic heterogeneity in the importance that respondents attach to the different components of their vote.

1. **A Probabilistic Model of Voting with Programmatic and Non-Programmatic Benefits**

How do voters decide who controls public office? Both deterministic and probabilistic models of voting seek to answer this question. Prior models have considered the effect of programmatic preferences expressed by voters on a range of issues as well as the policy offers made by parties. As described by our theory, we consider a larger set of benefits to be offered by parties. Indeed, voters care—and parties promise to provide—a diverse assortment of policy and non-policy products.

Voters use the available information to select among candidates given the menu of party choices offered in their districts. In the previous chapter we described two large surveys conducted in Chile and Argentina, which measure the preferences, behavior, and social context of voters. In both countries we requested that respondents answer the following question: “If national
legislative elections where to take place next Sunday, what party would you vote for?” Responses were open ended and non-responses were followed up with a one-time insistence. This provided us with a sample of 1,584 respondents that indicated a vote choice for the top five parties in Chile and 1,696 respondents in Argentina.\(^2\) We imputed missing values for the independent variables using multivariate imputation by chain equations (MICE)\(^3\) and estimated models with five alternatives in Argentina—PJ,\(^4\) UCR, ARI, PRO, and the main provincial party (PPP)—\(^5\); and five alternatives in Chile—the Socialist Party (PS), the Christian Democrats (DC), the PPD, UDI and the RN.

To predict party vote we considered four main independent variables that report on the key traits discussed by our model (presented in chapter 1): the ideological distance between each respondent \(i\) and party \(j\); the perceived party competence to manage the economy;\(^6\) the proximity

\(^2\) We did not provide a closed menu of parties to respondents and non-responses prompted a one-time insistence. Undecided voters represented 27% and 20% of respondents in Argentina and Chile. Blank votes represented another 10% and 14% respectively. Finally, votes for smaller parties represented 3.3% of the vote in Argentina and 11% of the vote in Chile.

\(^3\) While we deleted non-responses, blank, and small party votes in both countries; we replicated all analyses with a full dataset, drawing votes randomly to replace missing observations with multivariate imputation by chained equation (MICE in R 2.9). Results of alternative models are similar and available upon request.

\(^4\) The survey was structured so that voters could select their preferred Peronist faction. This included the Frente para la Victoria (FPV) of former President Kirchner, allies of Carlos Menem, Rodriguez Saa, and a generic Peronist party. Because the survey question was “undirected,” we recoded as Peronists all responses that described any of the party factions.

\(^5\) Due to the importance of provincial parties in Argentine, the fifth party choice varies per province seeking to retrieve information on the main provincial party, its partisan network and its distributive intent. We coded all provincial parties as PPP when conducting our analyses.

\(^6\) Our analyses concentrate on the effect of competence in managing the economy (rather than dealing with poverty or crime), which yields the largest effects as described in Chapter 4.
of respondents to the network of activists of each party; and the distributive expectations of perceiving handouts, a public sector job, or the public works required by their community. These variables augment the standard model of ideological proximity (Downs 1957), incorporating valence components (Stokes 1963), selective incentives (Cox and McCubbins 1986), and network capacity (Dixit and Londregan 1996).

As described in previous chapters, we measured ideological distance as the squared distance from the self-reported ideological location of each respondent to the reported location of each party, \( (x_i - L_k)^2 \). Ideological placements were measured on an eleven point scale, from 0 to 10, with low numbers describing locations on the left of the political spectrum and high numbers representing placement on the right. We expect parameter estimates of ideological distance to be negative, with larger ideological distance reducing the probability of voting for a party.

Secondly, we measure the effect of competence to manage the economy on the vote using a four point variable that ranged from “not competent at all” to “very competent.” As described in Chapter 4, there are significant inter-country and inter-class differences in the perceptions of competence in Argentina and Chile. Furthermore, as in the case of ideology, each voter reports distinct competence assessments for each of the parties, giving us a set of five competence responses per country.

Thirdly, we measure linkages between voters and each party, taking advantage of the proximity measure to the network of activists of each party that was described in the previous chapter. This distance is calculated using survey questions of the form “how many people do you

\[ \text{In Chapter 6 we expand the current analyses to revisit the effect of distribution on voting conditional on party networks to assess the conditions that shape patterns of targeting for selective incentives.} \]
know, and they know you, who are activists of party x?" Following Gelman and Hill (2007),
individual parameters reporting distances from respondents to each party network were estimated
using a negative-binomial design with individual and group specific over-dispersion parameters
(Gelman and Hill 2007; McCarty et al. 2000; McCarty, Killworth, and Rennell 2007). As described in
Gelman and Hill (2007), the over-dispersion parameters report that the respondent knows
more/less members of a group than the prevalence rate (in standard deviations). As with
ideological distance, network proximity is alternative specific for respondent i and party k. We
expect this variable to have a positive effect on vote choice, where a respondent who knows more
activists from a party will be more likely to vote for that party.

A fourth set of independent variable describes the self-reported unconditional expectation
of receiving handouts, a public sector job, or the public works from an elected member of party k.
The questions read: "In a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is very unlikely and 10 is very likely, How
likely would it be that an elected member of the (party) would provide you with (type of good). "The
1-10 ordinal index was used to measure the expected probability. The question was worded as to
solicit unconditional expectations of receiving goods, and did not imply a quid-pro-quo exchange
before, during, or after an election. The respondent was presented with this question prior to
questions on vote behavior, in a survey module that assesses party performance. Consequently,

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8 Respondents were instructed that knowing someone meant that "you know them, they know you, that you
may contact them by phone, letter, or in person and that you have had some contact during the last two
years." Further survey details in the appendix.

9 The survey instrument was also worded to prevent voters from disclosing information under that false
assumption that the interviewer could provide any link or connection to a party that was in position to
deliver goods. The question was inserted in a module assessing the expected performance of parties in office,
together with questions about the parties’ capacity to manage the economy, unemployment, being responsive
to the voter preferences, etc.
survey instruments did not prompt respondents to assume that the delivery of goods was conditional on voting for a candidate whom, once in office, would deliver the benefits. These questions are also alternative specific, inquiring on the likelihood of perceiving different goods from members of each party $k$. We expect distributive expectations to increase a party's vote.

We also include respondent specific controls measuring the relative size of the respondents’ personal network (log),\(^{10}\) as well as the gender and socio-economic income of respondents. We also control for the respondent’s level of support for targeted distribution and, in the case of Argentina, the size of locality.\(^{11}\) We have theoretical expectations about the effect of some controls, although they are of secondary importance for our theory.

*Model Specification*

We use a Conditional (Multinomial) Logit design with alternative- and respondent-specific variables. Alternative-specific variables estimate the effect of variables that vary by choice (each party $k$ in our model). For example, the ideological distance between a respondent $i$ and the PS

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\(^{10}\) The size of the personal network had a mean of 200 and 203 in Argentina and Chile respectively. Estimates of network size are similar to those measured in France and the USA (McCarty, 2000 #632; McCarty, 2007 #627).

\(^{11}\) To measure support for distribution, the survey inquires: “How adequate is it for political parties to distribute [food, money, clothing, jobs, public works].” Responses were coded on a 10 point scale, from completely inadequate to completely adequate to control for the potential negative impact of distribution among non-beneficiaries (Weitz-Shapiro 2012). In Argentina, district size was measure using the log of the voting age population in the voters’ district following a large literature on the impact of district size on both the vote and the allocation of targeted transfers in Argentina (Gibson and Calvo 2001, Calvo and Murillo 2005, Calvo and Escolar 2005). In Chile we did not use a variable measuring district size, given that district sizes for the lower house are roughly equal by design in two-member districts.
enters into the utility function of voting for the Socialists but not in the utility function of voting for other parties such as the UDI or the RN. That is, each voter reports different ideological distances from her or his preferred position $x_i$ to the location of each of the parties, $S_{ki}$. Consequently, the ideological distance variable differs by party and voter, $(x_i - L_{ki})^2$, and the conditional logit model estimates a single parameter to assess the effect of distance on all vote choices.

Respondent-specific variables, on the other hand, take the same value across alternatives. For example, wealthy voters do not change their income category because they decide to vote for a different party. A wealthy voter remains wealthy independently of whether she or he votes for the PS, the DC, or the UDI. However, wealthy voters exhibit a different propensity of voting for the Peronists, the Radicals, the PRO, etc. Consequently, the same wealth score for voter $i$ yields a different expected linear effect—different vote probabilities—of voting for a party. The respondent-specific variable in the multinomial choice model, consequently, estimate separate parameters for $k - 1$ parties.

The alternative-specific choice (e.g. ideological distance) is often refer in the literature as a conditional logit model. Meanwhile, the respondent-specific choice (e.g. wealthy voter) is often referred to as a multinomial logit model. Our specification includes both alternative specific variables that vary by choice (such as ideological distance or competence) and respondent specific variables with traits that remain constant by voter (such as gender or wealth). To avoid confusion, consequently, we describe the statistical estimate as a multinomial (conditional) logit model:

$$U(V_{ik}) = -\alpha(x_i - L_{ik})^2 + \beta_1 Competence_{ik} + \cdots + \delta_{1k} Gender_i + \cdots$$  \hspace{1cm} (Eq. 5.1)

$$Pr(V_{ikj}) = \frac{e^{u(V_{ikj})}}{\sum_{j=1}^{l} e^{u(V_{ikj})}} \forall i, j$$  \hspace{1cm} (Eq. 5.2)
As readers will note, in equation 5.1 the alternative specific variable “Competence” is indexed by respondent \( i \) and alternative \( k \), describing respondents that provide assessments of competence for each of the parties. Similarly, the ideological distance \( (x_i - L_{ik})^2 \) also varies by respondent \( x_i \) and party position \( L_k \). For these two variables, a single parameter \( \beta_1 \) or \( -\alpha \) summarizes the full effect of competence or ideological distance on party choice. By contrast, the variable Gender is indexed by respondent, \( i \), given that gender does not vary by choice. Instead, a different parameter \( \delta_{1k} \) is estimated for each choice, \( k - 1 \), with one party as a baseline. In all analyses of this book, we kept the PS (Chile) and the Peronist PJ (Argentina) as the baseline category.

Model Results

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present model estimates for Chile and Argentina. The first six variables in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are alternative specific, describing the effect of key parameters of interest—ideology, competence, network, and three different types of selective incentives—on party vote. As described above, alternative specific variables indicate that voters report on a trait that differs by type of choice (Party), therefore there is a single parameter estimate that captures the effect of a trait such as ideological distance. For example, a left-wing voter located at 1 could place the ARI candidate at the center-left position of 4 and the UCR candidate at the center, 5. Consequently, this voter would report an ideological distance variable that takes the value of \((1 - 4)^2 = 9\) units for the ARI and \((1 - 5)^2 = 16\) units for the UCR. Given model results, this would yield a \(-0.019 \times 9 = -0.171\) decline in the log-odds ratio of voting for the ARI compared to a party that is located at her or his preferred position. By contrast, ideological distance would lead to a decline of \(-0.019 \times 16 = -0.304\) of voting for the UCR compared to a party located at his or her preferred position of 1. We provide actual probability estimates in Figures 5.1 and 5.2, but coefficient estimates for the alternative specific variables can be readily compared as log-odd ratios across countries.
Both in Argentina and in Chile results conform to the theory, showing that the determinants of the vote are similar across countries. Results show that ideology matters for both Argentine and Chilean voters, although the linear effect of ideological proximity on vote choice is significantly larger among Chilean voters. Indeed, the linear predictor is twice as large and, as important, given that assessments of party positions are much more precisely defined in Chile than in Argentina, model results reinforce the view of Chile as a more intensely programmatic party system.

Assessments of competence to manage the economy also have a very large and significant effect on party vote. In the last models of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 we see that the linear estimate of competence on the log-odds ratio of party vote is almost identical across countries (1.002 in Chile compared to 1.009 in Argentina). While the effect of Competence seems much larger than that of ideology, the range of ideological distance is [0,100], while that of competence is [1,4]. Consequently, the maximum effect of ideology and competence on the vote is very similar in Chile. However, the maximum effect of economic competence on the vote is almost twice as large as ideology among Argentine voters.

Proximity to the network of activists also has a large and significant effect on party vote in both Argentina and Chile, although the maximum linear effect on voting is 25% larger in Argentina. Given that the total number of activists is almost 17% larger in Argentina than in Chile (1.4% of the voting age population in Argentina compared to 1.2% in Chile), results confirm the commonly held believe that party machines are more important in Argentina because of both their size and organization as well as a result of the types of selective incentives they deliver.
Table 5.1: Determinants of the Vote in Argentina, Conditional (Multinomial) Choice Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance</td>
<td>-0.0205*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.0205*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.0184*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.0194*** (0.003)</td>
<td>Large District (UCR)</td>
<td>-0.4885*** (0.200)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence to manage the Economy</td>
<td>1.1262*** (0.066)</td>
<td>1.0926*** (0.066)</td>
<td>1.0212*** (0.067)</td>
<td>0.9899*** (0.068)</td>
<td>Large District (ARI)</td>
<td>0.8071*** (0.272)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Network of Activists</td>
<td>0.4917*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.4661*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.4362*** (0.055)</td>
<td>0.4186*** (0.056)</td>
<td>Large District (PRO)</td>
<td>0.7352*** (0.301)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handouts</td>
<td>0.0923*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.0347 (0.036)</td>
<td>-0.0452 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.0452 (0.029)</td>
<td>Large District (PPP)</td>
<td>0.5386* (0.029)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patronage</td>
<td>-0.2433*** (0.038)</td>
<td>-0.3707*** (0.042)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0355 (0.033)</td>
<td>Handouts (UCR)</td>
<td>-0.0113 (0.037)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pork</td>
<td>0.2439*** (0.052)</td>
<td>0.1975*** (0.052)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0113 (0.037)</td>
<td>Jobs (UCR)</td>
<td>-0.017 (0.046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C2(UCR)</td>
<td>0.1393 (0.467)</td>
<td>-0.0226 (0.470)</td>
<td>0.0699 (0.478)</td>
<td>-0.0405 (0.493)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>0.0143 (0.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C3(UCR)</td>
<td>-0.1519 (0.437)</td>
<td>-0.2696 (0.439)</td>
<td>-0.1683 (0.447)</td>
<td>-0.3072 (0.447)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0963*** (0.038)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D1(UCR)</td>
<td>-0.5392 (0.451)</td>
<td>-0.6306 (0.452)</td>
<td>-0.5318 (0.459)</td>
<td>-0.5712 (0.472)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0994*** (0.032)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D2(UCR)</td>
<td>-0.3212 (0.436)</td>
<td>-0.4295 (0.436)</td>
<td>-0.387 (0.445)</td>
<td>-0.5258 (0.463)</td>
<td>Proper to allocate</td>
<td>-0.1243*** (0.046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D3(UCR)</td>
<td>-0.4986 (0.614)</td>
<td>-0.512 (0.618)</td>
<td>-0.5257 (0.618)</td>
<td>-0.6735 (0.634)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0575 (0.042)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D4(UCR)</td>
<td>-0.419 (0.401)</td>
<td>-0.4432 (0.404)</td>
<td>-0.4411 (0.406)</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.408)</td>
<td>Proper to Distribute</td>
<td>-0.0527 (0.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C3(ARI)</td>
<td>-0.9822*** (0.378)</td>
<td>-0.9689*** (0.381)</td>
<td>-0.99*** (0.379)</td>
<td>-0.7766** (0.384)</td>
<td>Proper to allocate</td>
<td>-0.0034 (0.046)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D1(ARI)</td>
<td>-1.3256*** (0.401)</td>
<td>-1.3022*** (0.403)</td>
<td>-1.2295*** (0.403)</td>
<td>-1.1901*** (0.405)</td>
<td>Proper to allocate</td>
<td>-0.0158 (0.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D2(ARI)</td>
<td>-2.0045*** (0.443)</td>
<td>-2.076*** (0.444)</td>
<td>-1.9841*** (0.444)</td>
<td>-1.84** (0.451)</td>
<td>Proper to allocate</td>
<td>0.0175 (0.045)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D3(ARI)</td>
<td>-1.7546*** (0.815)</td>
<td>-1.7881*** (0.818)</td>
<td>-1.8003*** (0.816)</td>
<td>-1.5629*** (0.833)</td>
<td>Proper to allocate</td>
<td>0.0165 (0.047)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C2 (PRO)</td>
<td>-0.1937 (0.410)</td>
<td>-0.1914 (0.417)</td>
<td>-0.2546 (0.426)</td>
<td>-0.1832 (0.430)</td>
<td>Women (UCR)</td>
<td>-0.0187 (0.192)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C3 (PRO)</td>
<td>-1.4424*** (0.416)</td>
<td>-1.393*** (0.423)</td>
<td>-1.313** (0.426)</td>
<td>-1.162** (0.433)</td>
<td>Women (ARI)</td>
<td>-0.3809** (0.216)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D1 (PRO)</td>
<td>-1.820*** (0.442)</td>
<td>-1.8016*** (0.447)</td>
<td>-1.701*** (0.451)</td>
<td>-1.6909*** (0.456)</td>
<td>Women (PRO)</td>
<td>-0.454* (0.238)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D2 (PRO)</td>
<td>-1.8974*** (0.456)</td>
<td>-1.8431*** (0.459)</td>
<td>-1.8254*** (0.465)</td>
<td>-1.5976*** (0.474)</td>
<td>Women (PPP)</td>
<td>-0.1449 (0.281)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D3 (PRO)</td>
<td>-2.4068*** (1.087)</td>
<td>-2.3959*** (1.088)</td>
<td>-2.3475*** (1.081)</td>
<td>-2.0372*** (1.089)</td>
<td>Constant (UCR)</td>
<td>-2.9239*** (0.783)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C2 (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.1242*** (0.540)</td>
<td>-1.3301*** (0.547)</td>
<td>-1.2012*** (0.554)</td>
<td>-1.2276** (0.554)</td>
<td>Constant (ARI)</td>
<td>-0.971 (0.856)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE C3 (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.3452*** (0.462)</td>
<td>-1.5029*** (0.461)</td>
<td>-1.2766*** (0.466)</td>
<td>-1.2377*** (0.467)</td>
<td>Constant (PRO)</td>
<td>-0.2713 (0.932)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D1 (PPP)</td>
<td>-2.0826*** (0.524)</td>
<td>-2.2603*** (0.522)</td>
<td>-2.0679*** (0.527)</td>
<td>-2.0796*** (0.524)</td>
<td>Constant (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.8732 (1.106)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D2 (PPP)</td>
<td>-2.172*** (0.502)</td>
<td>-2.3478*** (0.499)</td>
<td>-2.2245*** (0.505)</td>
<td>-2.2083*** (0.507)</td>
<td>Constant (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.8701 (1.126)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE D3 (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.5015*** (0.694)</td>
<td>-1.6991*** (0.697)</td>
<td>-1.5436*** (0.702)</td>
<td>-1.3136** (0.715)</td>
<td>Constant (PPP)</td>
<td>-1.2599*** (1.137)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Network (UCR)</td>
<td>0.3515*** (0.121)</td>
<td>0.3319*** (0.123)</td>
<td>0.3581*** (0.123)</td>
<td>0.2762*** (0.127)</td>
<td>LogLik</td>
<td>-1203.54 (1696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Network (ARI)</td>
<td>0.1534 (0.147)</td>
<td>0.1669 (0.148)</td>
<td>0.192 (0.148)</td>
<td>0.2998* (0.153)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1183.1 (1696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Network (PRO)</td>
<td>-0.0244 (0.164)</td>
<td>0.0171 (0.167)</td>
<td>0.072 (0.170)</td>
<td>0.1534 (0.170)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1162.38 (1696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Network (PPP)</td>
<td>0.2885 (0.188)</td>
<td>0.2427 (0.189)</td>
<td>0.3241* (0.192)</td>
<td>0.3646* (0.192)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1138.9 (1696)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Conditions (multinomial) logit model with alternative specific and individual specific parameter estimates.
Table 5.2: Determinants of the Vote in Chile, Conditional (Multinomial) Choice Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
<th>Model1</th>
<th>Model2</th>
<th>Model3</th>
<th>Model4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Distance</td>
<td>-0.0381***</td>
<td>-0.0371***</td>
<td>-0.0364***</td>
<td>-0.0359***</td>
<td>-0.0073</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>-0.0028</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence to manage the Economy</td>
<td>1.0474***</td>
<td>1.0636***</td>
<td>1.0273***</td>
<td>1.0142***</td>
<td>0.0297</td>
<td>0.0283</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity to Network of Activists</td>
<td>0.3321***</td>
<td>0.3274***</td>
<td>0.3257***</td>
<td>0.3219***</td>
<td>0.0337</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0204</td>
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Note: Conditions (multinomial) logit model with alternative specific and individual specific parameter estimates.

Results also show that patronage and pork are important both in Argentina and Chile, although the maximum possible linear effect is almost a third larger in Argentina. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, an interesting finding is that once we control for the delivery of all three types of goods (handouts, patronage, and pork), results fail to find a statistically significant benefit for the delivery of handouts in either Chile or Argentina.
Analyzing the effect of the respondent specific controls is also of interest. It is worth reminding readers that the effect of respondent specific variables on party vote describes changes in the log-odds ratios of voting for a party vis-à-vis the model baseline—the Peronists in Argentina and the PS in Chile. For example, voters of the ARI and PRO in Argentina are considerably more likely to live in large districts than those of the Peronist PJ. By contrast, voters of the UCR are considerably less likely to live in large districts than those of the Peronist PJ.12

Given that the baseline party in Argentina is the Peronist PJ, estimated parameters already provide a glance of the voters’ behavior even before we provide readers with model probabilities. For example, we can observe that middle income voters in the C2 category are not statistically less likely to vote for the ARI or the PRO than for the Peronist PJ, everything else held constant.

However, among lower income voters we see a statistically significant decline in the log-odds of voting for the ARI, and the PRO when compared to the Peronist baseline. The negative effect of class on the ARI and PRO becomes larger as the respondents income declines—from C3 through E we see increasingly negative values for both the ARI and the PRO. The negative effect of class on the PRO and ARI vote is statistically significant even after we control for all other components of the vote such as ideology, competence, network capacity, or selective incentives. Indeed, the pro-Peronist vote among the poor extends beyond all other parameters in the model, confirming the continuous association of the Peronist party with lower income voters described in chapter 3.

By contrast, in Chile the effect of class on the vote is not statistically significant with the exception of the PPD vote on the PS. That is, once we control for differences in ideology, competence, selective incentives, and network proximity; there is no direct effect that is measured by the socio-economic indicators. Indeed, the pro-PS vote among the poor is explained by inter-class differences in behavioral determinants of the vote such as ideology or competence and, once

12 Indeed, since the 2001 crisis, the UCR voter has become a party that is more dependent on the vote of the smaller peripheral provinces {Leiras, 2007 #1278}{Calvo, 2005 #375}. 

13
we control for those variables, there is little else to be explained by class. Again, these findings confirm the historical patterns and more recent analysis of the Chilean vote described in chapter 3.

In the case of Argentina, we can see that larger personal networks increase the log-odds of voting for the UCR in all models and for the UCR and the ARI in the full model when compared to the Peronists—i.e. Model 4. In the case of Chile, larger personal networks increase the log-odds ratio of voting for the RN, compared to the leftist PS. Although we expect large networks to correlate with socio-economic status, we do not have any particular theoretical expectation in regards to the effect of personal network size on vote choice. Personal attitudes toward targeted distribution have no significant effect on the vote on either country, except for the ARI in Argentina. Favorable views about targeted distribution for all three types of selective incentive are negatively correlated with the probability of voting for the ARI, a party whose electoral campaign was strongly based on denouncing government officials for corruption. Finally, results show that women are less likely to vote for the ARI and the PRO in Argentina, when compared to the Peronists. In Chile, women are more likely to vote for the conservative UDI.

Given the difficulties to interpret the conditional logit estimates, Figures 5.1 and 5.2 provide readers with an intuitive description of different scenarios, with probabilities drawn from Models 4 in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. In all plots, the vertical axes describe the probability of voting for each of the parties and the horizontal axes describe the self-reported ideological placement. For example, the plot in the upper-left of Figure 5.1 describes the probability of voting for the PS, DC, PPD, UDI, or RN, with all independent variables set to their means except those of ideology and perceived competence to manage the economy. For all parties, we fixed mean perceived competence equal to five, and estimate the expected probability of voting for a party for voters located in different locations of the policy space.
Figure 5.1: Vote, Ideology, and Economic Competence in Chile

Note: Probability estimates from Table 5.2, model 4, with varying competence scores.

If the voters’ assessments of competence are on average equal to 5 for all parties, the upper-left plot in Figure 5.1 shows that voters on the left select the PS, PPD, and DC in larger numbers, while voters on the right select the UDI and RN in larger numbers. A voter located in the extreme left, a 0 in the scale, would display a 51% probability of voting for the PS, a 20% probability of voting for
the DC or for the PPD, and less than 5% probability of voting for the conservatives UDI or RN. Similarly, holding mean competence equal to five for all parties, we observe that a voter on the extreme right—a 10 in the ideological scale—would display a 37% probability of voting for the RN, a slightly lower probability of voting for the UDI (approximately 35%), and much lower probabilities of voting for the DC, PPD, and PS.

As described in Chapter 4, self-reported ideological placement and competence to manage the economy tend to be highly correlated with each other in Chile. Consequently, the upper-right plot in Figure 5.1 gives on average equal competence to all parties, but allows the voters assessments of competence to be correlated with ideological distances. When assessments of competence and ideology are correlated, predicted vote choice shows a more ideological—and polarized—party system, with well-defined parties on the left and right of the political spectrum. Indeed, voters on the extreme left (a zero in the scale) increase their probability of voting for the PS by almost 30 points, from 51% to 80%; and voters in the right increasing their probability of voting for the UDI and RN by almost 12 points each, from around 37% to almost 50%.

The lower plots in Figure 5.1 provide evidence of dramatic changes in party vote with small increases in perceived competence. The lower-left plot shows that a mean advantage of 1 unit (out of 10) in perceived competence ensures that the RN wins even among centrist voters located slightly above 5 in the ideological space. Furthermore, the advantage of the RN is particularly large among conservative voters. Indeed, as proposed by the theory, differences in perceived competence have a more dramatic effect among parties that are ideologically closer; yielding significant vote loses to the disadvantaged party, which is marked in the electoral decline of the UDI in the lower left plot and of RN and the PPD in the lower right plot.

The effect of competence on the vote is also very large and significant in the case of Argentina, as shown in Figure 5.2. The upper-left plot describes baseline results, with a very large electoral

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13 Mean correlation was set to the mean values described in Chapter 4.
advantage for the Peronist PJ when all values are set at their means and competence fixed to the same score of 5 for all parties. This is the case given that Peronists benefit from considerable advantages in other non-programmatic endowments, such as the likely delivery of handouts, patronage, and public works as well as more extensive activist networks. The weight of competence becomes even more salient in the lower-left plot where the PJ assigned lower levels of competence, resulting in a significant decline in electoral support.

Results become more interesting once we increase mean competence for the UCR (keeping others constant), allowing the Radicals to overtake the Peronist PJ among moderate voters. More interesting, we can see that once Peronists no longer enjoy non-programmatic advantages, the more ideological traits of the smaller ARI and PRO translate into a party system with better defined programmatic traits. In the lower right plot, we increase the relative competence of the ARI and the PRO and, as in Chile, allow ideological proximity and competence to be correlated with each other. Predicted probabilities show that positive assessments of competence for the more ideological ARI and PRO alter the ideological space for all voters, with higher Peronist electoral returns on the right of the ideological space.
Figure 5.2: Vote, Ideology, and Economic Competence in Argentina

Note: Probability estimates from Table 5.2, model 4, with varying competence scores. The plot in the lower-right allows competence assessments to be correlated with self-reported ideology, as it was the case in Chile.

The online appendix to this Chapter describes changes in the probability of voting for Chilean and Argentine parties as we change other non-programmatic endowments. Estimated probabilities for other non-programmatic components of the vote behave much in the same way that as
competence does, with large vote gains for the advantaged parties and large vote loses for the disadvantaged ones. In Chile, party vote becomes more ideologically defined when non-programmatic endowments correlate with self-reported ideological preferences. In Argentina this is also the case when considering the smaller ARI and PRO.

In all, model results provide support for several of the key assumptions of our theory: firstly, in both Chile and Argentina we find that ideological proximity, competence assessments, network capacity, and selective incentives (except for handouts) are strong predictors of party choice. Secondly, we find comparable effects across countries for all four types of benefits in the portfolio of politicians, although ideological proximity is a stronger predictor of party vote in Chile while competence is a stronger predictor of party vote in Argentina. Thirdly, we show that small advantages in non-programmatic endowments result in large vote gains and that disadvantages in non-programmatic endowments result in step vote loses. These are the key findings that support the crucial incentives for party’s policy position in our model of responsiveness and responsibility.

2. Voter Heterogeneity and Class in Argentina and Chile

In the previous section we present readers with eight models of vote choice, were parties offer programmatic and non-programmatic benefits to voters. In these basic models, we estimate changes in the probability of voting for each party without considering whether voters in different socio-economic groups attach different importance or weight to the benefits provided by parties. In this section we move one step further, estimating the extent to which different groups of voters develop distinct preferences for different types of benefits in the portfolio of politicians.

As in the previous model, we consider alternative-specific and respondent-specific variables, but this time we allow model estimates to vary by class:
\[ U(V_{ik}) = -\alpha_{\text{class}}(x_i - L_k)^2 + \beta_{\text{class,1}}\text{Competence}_{ik} + \cdots + \delta_{\text{class,k}}\text{Gender}_i \]

(Eq. 5.1)

\[ \Pr(V_{ik}) = \frac{e^{u(V_{ik})}}{\sum_{j=1}^{l} e^{u(V_{ij})}} \forall i, j \]

(Eq. 5.2)

We compute this model via MCMC Bayesian estimation in WinBUGS 1.4.1 with uninformative priors. Estimation details and code are described in more detail in the Appendix 5.B at the end of this Chapter.

Tables with models coefficients can be found in the Appendix 5.C. For presentation purposes, Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 present readers with plots of the coefficients for our four key variables of interest i.e. ideology, competence, network proximity, and selective incentives. Coefficients describe linear changes in the log-odds ratios of voting for a party for each of the socio-economic income categories, with 90/10 credible confidence intervals.

The interpretation of model results for the alternative-specific parameters is straightforward, describing the importance or weight that voters within each of the different socio-economic categories attach to their ideological proximity to parties, their assessments of competence to manage the economy, the size of party networks, and the expectation of perceiving a public sector job. Model results in Argentina distinguish respondents by income categories, from the better-off middle class respondents in C1 through C3 to the lower income categories D1 through E. For Chile, results distinguish the relatively better off respondents in C1-C3 from the lower income category D. The different classifications respond to how data was collected and do not represent different groupings on our part. In both countries, the chosen cut-off divides the population approximately in halves.

Consider for example Figure 5.3 in the next pages which describe coefficient estimates for the different socio-economic categories in Chile. The upper-left plot shows that ideology is an important determinant of vote choice for all four different socio-economic categories. However,
differences are only statistically significant at the .1 level when comparing the C1 and D categories, with ideological distance leading to a larger decline in the probability of voting for a party among C1 voters—an estimate of -.55 for C1 voters compared to -.33 for D voters, although the statistical difference between the coefficient estimates is barely significant at \( p = .093 \).

The upper-right plot shows more noticeable differences in the importance that voters of different classes attach to the perceived competence to manage the economy. Among the better-off voters in C1, the linear effect is 1.49 units of change in the log-odds ratio of voting for a party per unit increase in perceived competence. By contrast, the effect for the lower income respondents in D is only .95, with the difference being statistically significant at the .01 level.
Figure 5.3: Linear Effect by Socio-Economic Income, Chile 2007

Note: Plots describe the estimated coefficients from Table 5.C.1 in the Appendix. Lines describe the [20,80] interval around the estimated coefficients.
The importance that voters attach to their relative proximity to party networks and to selective incentives also differs by social class although differences are not particularly dramatic except between C1 and D. Interestingly, network proximity fails to achieve statistical significance for the better-off voters in C1 while it matters a great deal among low income voters. Finally, distributive expectations of being allocated a public sector job increase the log-odds of voting for a party among C2 through D voters, but not among the better-off voters in C1. However, readers can readily note that the largest coefficient for patronage investment is displayed by the relatively well-off voters in C2. We will come back to this finding in Chapter 7, as we analyze patronage spending in Chile and Argentina.

In all, results show that the better off voters in C1 care a great deal about ideology and competence but they attach little value to party networks and selective incentives. By contrast, poor voters in the D category are receptive to both the programmatic and non-programmatic determinants of the vote. 14

Figure 5.4 presents the coefficient estimates for the Argentine voters, with better discrimination among the lower income D voters, which are separated in two categories. Results show that ideological proximity is a considerable weaker predictor of vote choice in Argentine, resulting in changes in the log-odds vote that are half of those observed in Chile. Results also show that class differences are smaller than in Chile and estimates are not statistically different for the relatively better-off voters in C1 and the low income voters in D1 through E.

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14 We are not considering the electoral impact of their size here, as D voters constitute 45 percent of our sample and C1 voters only 9 percent.
Figure 5.4: Linear Effect by Socio-Economic Income, Argentina 2007

Note: Plots describe the estimated coefficients from Table 5.C.2 in the Appendix. Lines describe the [20,80] interval around the estimated coefficients.
By contrast, Figure 5.4 shows not only that Argentine voters care a great deal about competence to manage the economy, but also that low income voters are particularly sensitive to differences in perceived competence. Indeed, differences in the effect of competence among C1 voters and D voters are large and statistically significant.

Results also show few socio-economic differences in the effect of network capacity on vote choice. Differences in the effect of network capacity on vote choice are small when comparing C1 through E voters in Argentina, with estimates achieving statistical significance for voters in the C2 and the D2 categories. While network capacity was statistically significant when considering the full sample, the smaller samples by socio-economic group results in less precise estimates that sometimes fail to achieve statistical significance.15 Finally, Figure 5.4 shows that expectations of selective incentives significantly affect vote choice and that the effect of allocating public sector jobs is considerable larger than in Chile for all groups although more dramatic among less well-off voters.

15 In chapter 6, we show that networks have a conditional impact on the vote by influencing the efficiency of selective incentive delivery for lower income voters in Argentina.
Figure 5.5: Maximum Linear Effect by Socio-Economic Income, Chile 2007

Note: From Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix. Maximum effect describes the maximum possible linear effect of the coefficient, multiplying the parameter estimate by the range of the independent variable. For example, the linear effect of one unit change in ideology for the relatively well-off respondents of C1 is -0.055 and the maximum in-sample range is $9^2 = 81$, resulting in a maximum effect of -4.4. Similarly, the effect of a one unit increase in perceived PS competence to manage the economy is 1.45 and the maximum range is 4, for a maximum effect of 5.81. We can see that in Chile the maximum linear effect of perceived competence is larger than the maximum linear effect of ideological distance among the C1 respondents.
Figure 5.6: Maximum Linear Effect by Socio-Economic Income, Argentina 2007

Note: From Table 5.A.2 in the Appendix. Maximum effect describes the maximum possible linear effect of the coefficient, multiplying the parameter estimate by the range of the independent variable. For example, the linear effect of one unit change in ideology for the relatively well-off respondents of C1 is -0.0335 and the maximum in-sample range is $9^2 = 81$, resulting in a maximum effect of -2.72. Similarly, the effect of a one unit increase in perceived PS competence to manage the economy is 0.93 and the maximum range is 4, for a maximum effect of 3.73. We can see that in Argentina the maximum linear effect of perceived competence is larger than the maximum linear effect of ideological distance among the C1 respondents.
To facilitate the comparison among the different types of benefits provided by parties, Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present maximum effects plot, describing the maximum linear change in the log-odds ratio from each type of programmatic and non-programmatic benefit. For example, while the decline in vote probability that results from ideological distance seem small, -.055 among C1 voters in Chile, the total range of the squared ideological distances goes from 0 through 81. By contrast, while the linear effect of competence to manage the economy seems large, the variable has the much smaller range of 1 through 4. Consequently, comparing the effect of the different programmatic and non-programmatic strategies may be difficult. In Figures 5.5 and 5.6 we present the maximum possible linear effect of each benefit, by multiplying the estimated coefficient by its possible range.

Results show that the perceived competence to manage the economy is of the outmost importance among Chilean voters, followed by ideological proximity, selective incentives, and partisan networks. Similarly, maximum effect plots show that perceived competence to manage the economy also ranks first in Argentina, followed by selective incentives, ideology, and partisan networks.

However, socio-economic differences in the maximum effect of programmatic and non-programmatic benefits are particularly noticeable in Argentina. For example, ideological distance has very limited effect on party vote among low income voters while selective incentives have very limited effect among wealthy voters. Indeed, results confirm that Argentines parties that want to maximize their vote should target different types of benefits to constituencies from different socio-economic groups. By contrast, for all voters in Chile competence and ideological distance are more important than selective incentives, even though effects are comparatively larger among the better-off voters.
Concluding Remarks

This chapter provides evidence that the electoral choices of Argentine and Chilean voters are shaped by a number of programmatic and non-programmatic offers in the portfolio of party candidates as suggested by our theoretical framework. We provide evidence that ideological proximity, competence for managing the economy, the allocation of selective incentives, and network capacity, are critical determinants of vote choice in Argentina and in Chile.

We provide evidence of inter-country and inter-class differences in the determinants of the vote. Findings in this chapter show that competence is a critical determinant of vote choice. However, we also find that well off voters in Chile and low income voters in Argentina give considerable more weight to party competence in defining their vote. Results also show that ideological distance matters in Argentina and Chile, but that Chilean voters care to a larger extent about ideological proximity when deciding their vote. By contrast, lower income voters in Argentina attach little weight to ideological considerations when deciding their vote. In the case of Chile, we find very little inter-class variation in the importance that voters attach to ideology. These differences in what different types of voters consider in making their electoral calculus generate different incentives in both countries both for ideological responsiveness to diverse categories of voters as discussed in chapter 8. Yet, before focusing on responsiveness, we will analyze how these incentives shape parties resources to target different types of selective incentives (chapter 6) and to decide a public policy, which has strong individual distributive effects, such as the allocation of public funds on public employment (chapter 7).


