

STRATEGIC BLUNDER: CONFOUNDING ROGUE STATES AND TERRORIST NETWORKS

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Abstract

By confounding terrorist networks and rogue states in a mission "to rid the world of evil," the U.S. is making a grave strategic blunder that: (1) creates the very alliances against it that it most fears, (2) lets discretionary wars of choice against hostile states profoundly interfere with the war of necessity against transnational terrorist networks, (3) makes nuclear proliferation and the menace of nuclear war a self-fulfilling prophecy, (4) relies overly on massive "top-down" force and fails to concentrate on effective countermeasures against terrorist "swarms," (5) transforms the war on terror into an unsustainable ideological mission that wastes national treasure and lives and undermines faith in the political system, (6) substitutes a false and delusional "Domino Theory of Democracy vs. Terrorism" for an effective geopolitical strategy (much as happened with the "Domino Theory of Communism vs. Democracy" that inspired the Vietnam War), (7) pursues a maladaptive strategy of isolation from Arab, Muslim and allied support. In the last year, this sacrifice of strategy on the altar of ideology has strengthened Al-Qaeda's hand and increased incidence of suicide attack. America cannot risk taking its eye off the real prize.

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America's Mission Impossible. "I believe that God has planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom," declared President Bush in his 2004 State of the Union address, "So America is pursuing a forward strategy of freedom in the greater Middle East. America is a nation with a mission." Yet a key "lesson" of the Vietnam War, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told Harvard's Kennedy School in 1995, was to err in thinking "we're on a mission. We weren't then and we aren't today. And we shouldn't act unilaterally militarily under any circumstances. We don't have the God-given right to shape every nation to our own image."¹

Ever since the Enlightenment, the major movements of the modern world – all the big "isms" of recent history - have been on a mission to invent "humanity" by saving it and making it their own. Modernity is the industrial legacy of monotheism, secularized and scientifically applied. Before monotheism and modernity no society ever considered that all people are, or should be, of a kind.² To many in our society, the 20th-century demise of colonialism, anarchism, fascism and communism left history's playing field wide open to what Lincoln nobly besought as "the last great hope of mankind," America's ideal of democratic liberalism (though Lincoln, like Jefferson, foresaw that the U.S. would "meanly lose" this hope if advanced by the sword).³

But the catastrophic wars and revolutions of the modern era teach us that the more uncompromising the design for historical engineering and the more self-assured the designer, the harder both will fall. The President, in his preamble to *The National Security Strategy of the U.S.*, seems to reach a contrary conclusion – that these great struggles demonstrate "a single sustainable model of national success... right and true for every person, in every society." Even after 9/11, there is scant recognition

that the unforeseen events of history perpetually transform or destroy the best laid plans, which makes it folly and hazardous to believe in the destiny of globalization or a rational outcome to history.

Shortly after George W. Bush took office, his national security team began mulling over use of ground forces to depose Saddam Hussein and transform the Middle East. “Go find me away to do this,” former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill⁴ and others⁵ report President Bush saying. Their discussions refurbished ideas first outlined in a “Defense Planning Guidance” memorandum drafted by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992 towards the end of the first Bush Administration. The plan was to jettison the winning Cold-War strategy of “containment” – based on credible threat to retaliate with massive force against aggression – in favor of a preemptive policy to perpetuate U.S. global supremacy by “detering potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.”⁶

A decade later, “preemption” fused with the “war on terror” into the core of a new security doctrine. 9/11 had paved the way.⁷

The *National Security Strategy* frames America’s new global mission in words President Bush first used at Washington’s National Cathedral three days after 9/11: “our responsibility to history is... to rid the world of evil.”⁸ As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld explained, the “nexus” of evil included terrorist networks and rogue states like Iraq that were seeking weapons of mass destruction.⁹ With Operation Iraqi Freedom set to go, the President reminded the nation that: “September 11th changed the strategic thinking... It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September the 11th should say to the American people that we’re now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organization could be deployed here at home.”¹⁰

Exorcising the world’s evil – or even all forms of terrorism - is as much an impossible mission as forever ending injustice (or earthquakes). More serious, this confounding of terrorist networks with rogue states in a global war on evil is a grave strategic blunder.¹¹ In a recent report published by the U.S. Army War College, Jeffrey Record, Professor of Strategic Studies, notes: “Of particular concern has been the conflation of al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq as a single, undifferentiated terrorist threat. This was a strategic error of the first order because it ignored critical differences between the two in character, threat level and susceptibility to U.S. deterrence and military action.”¹² Consider:

By confounding different terrorist organizations and hostile states for the sake of ideological simplicity that readily translates into short-term political gain, the U.S. risks creating the very alliances against it that it most fears in the long term. There is no monolithic threat from evil. Although the Jihadist network presents a distinct global peril, other terrorist networks and hostile states pose very different problems that are often unconnected with one another or with U.S. national security. Their fights may have fundamentally local or regional causes and ramifications. The suicide quads of Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers or Turkey’s PKK have no apparent quarrel with the U.S.¹³ They also have no significant ties with one another or with the Jihadist network, much less with European terrorists of the Spanish ETA, Italian Red Brigades or renegade factions of the IRA. North Korea has few relations with major terrorist networks, or with other so-called rogue states. CIA interrogations of top Al-Qaeda leaders in U.S. custody reveal that Bin Laden had ruled out any cooperation with Saddam Hussein.¹⁴ Documents seized during Saddam’s capture warn *Ba’ath* loyalists not to cooperate with Jihadists.¹⁵ Try as the U.S. might to put Saddam and Bin Laden in the same bed, they refuse to couple.

This confound has already led to a diversionary war of choice in Iraq that has profoundly interfered with successfully pursuing a war of necessity against Al-Qaeda and its associates. To-date, no direct ties have been traced linking Saddam to Bin Laden, and not a single functional WMD has been found.¹⁶ Nevertheless, despite numerous revelations by U.S. intelligence and military that belie Administration

claims, the White House intones in its year-end report, “*Fact Sheet: 2003*,” that the invasion of Iraq produced “clear evidence of Saddam’s illegal weapons program” and re-confirmed his “ties to terrorist organizations.”¹⁷

The President’s own Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concluded that the White House was so anxious “to grab onto something affirmative” about Saddam’s attempts to acquire weapon-grade uranium that it ignored repeated warnings from the intelligence community about how dubious the evidence was.¹⁸ According to Sir Richard Dearlove, chief of British intelligence (M16), Prime Minister Tony Blair’s assertion in September 2002 that Iraq could deploy WMD as a strategic threat to the UK and the world “within 45 minutes of a decision” was a “misinterpretation” of intelligence that merely suggested Iraq could employ mustard gas in battlefield artillery shells (essentially a World War I capability).¹⁹ Brian Jones, who was responsible for intelligence on WMD for Britain’s Defence Intelligence Staff until January 2003, concurs that the Prime Minister gave people “a false expectation” that Saddam had such weapons.²⁰ In late November 2003, veteran CIA analyst Stuart Cohen, who was in charge of putting together the 2002 intelligence estimate, posted something of a disclaimer in an article on the agency’s website: “Any reader would have had to read only as far as the second paragraph of the Key Judgments to know that as we said: ‘We lacked specific information of Iraq’s WMD program’.”²¹ “I don’t think they existed,” said U.S. chief weapons inspector David Kay in January 2004 after his team spent many months and more than half a billion dollars searching for evidence of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons.²²

Al-Qaeda attacked the U.S., killing thousands of civilians, drastically disrupting the nation’s security in matters of transportation and public gatherings, and causing hundred of billions of dollars in commercial losses.²³ Al-Qaeda also credibly threatens to attack the U.S. with non-conventional weapons. Iraq never attacked the U.S., never threatened attack, and did not use or brandish non-conventional weapons against the U.S. even after being invaded.

The U.S. has expended many times more manpower and money dealing with Iraq than with Al-Qaeda and its home-grown regional allies. And while many top Al-Qaeda leaders are now in custody, the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies finds that the Iraq war has increased recruitment to Al-Qaeda and has “perversely impelled an already decentralized and evasive transnational terrorist network to become more ‘virtual’ and protean and, therefore, harder to identify and neutralize.”²⁴ War and occupation have also diverted resources that might have thwarted Al-Qaeda and the Taliban from healing and regrouping in Pakistan and Afghanistan²⁵ (which, according to the IIS, remains second only to the Congo as the deadliest place on earth for armed conflict).

Increased nuclear proliferation and menace of nuclear war may be a self-fulfilling prophecy that accompanies attempts to implement a coercive strategy of preemption. Although transnational and sub-national terrorist networks cannot likely be deterred or defeated through traditional means of international isolation or military action, all so-called rogue states continue to be successfully contained through conventional deterrence. Terrorist networks cannot be defeated unless they are destroyed; hostile states can be defeated without being destroyed.²⁶ This is because states, unlike terrorist networks, have a geographically circumscribed infrastructure that can be readily targeted and disabled by overwhelming application of military technology and force.²⁷

After the Soviet Union’s collapse, there was never any hint that Iraq, Iran, North Korea or any other nation remotely imagined mounting a first strike against the U.S. The reason is obvious: the U.S. has the proven power and will to annihilate any state that supported a conventional or non-conventional attack against the homeland. In fact, there is substantial indication that recent attempts by North Korea²⁸ and Iran²⁹ to step up their nuclear programs follow directly from fear of the U.S. preemptively acting against them – a fear stoked by the invasion of Iraq, a fellow charter member of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil.”³⁰ According to Jack Pritchard, who handled North Korea issues on the National Security Council of

the Clinton and Bush administrations: “They [North Koreans] watched the development in Iraq. They said for time they were concerned about the U.S. preemptive strike policy. They didn’t want to be next.... So they needed to come out and say you really can’t attack us. We have this deterrent capability.”³¹

Even key “partners in the war on terror” may be hedging bets. Following U.S. media and congressional denunciations of Saudi Arabia as an untrustworthy ally because most of the 9/11 attackers were Saudi, that country began considering acquisition of nuclear weapons as a deterrent.³² There is also now substantial evidence that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was passing nuclear weapons technology to Iran and Lybia (another official “rogue state”).³³ As Pakistan’s former top army commander, Mizra Aslem Beg, tells it, he and others have looked favorably upon efforts by Muslim countries to obtain nuclear weapons because of “discrimination and duplicity” on the part of the U.S. and “the Jewish lobby” that “gives heartburn to the Muslim world.”³⁴ Transfers by Pakistani officials of nuclear technology to North Korea (at least through 2002) further indicate that America’s “partner” in the region was doing precisely what Iraq was supposed to be doing that called for war.³⁵

The U.S. does not have the means to unilaterally prevent states intent on devoting significant resources to acquire nuclear weapons from getting them. Rather than ridicule or reject international arms controls and inspections for Iran or other countries, the U.S. should support these cooperative efforts to limit nuclear proliferation – the only efforts that have ever worked. The U.S. failed to prevent development of nuclear weapons in Russia, China, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Yet, a combination of U.S. deterrence and mutual deterrence by these other nations effectively restrains any one of them from using nuclear weapons against any other.

The U.S. is failing to concentrate on effective countermeasures against Jihadi networks – there already are effective deterrence measures against rogue states. Jihadis appear to obey a devotional logic immune to compromise or games of classical deterrence. The payoff is that a few smart and patient men, with little more than bare hands, can defy an atomic power, kill thousands, terrify millions and cause hundreds of billions of dollars in losses (more than 100 billion in New York City alone). Just as with international and civil wars tracked over the last two centuries,³⁶ political scientist Robert Axelrod shows that most casualties and cascading effects of terrorist acts are caused by a few, increasingly clustered and massive operations planned over months and years. This striking trend (a straight line on a log-log scale), indicates that we must be most vigilant in preparing for large-scale, unanticipated actions with potentially massive political, economic and social effects.

God has ordered us to build nuclear weapons,” proclaimed Fazlur Rahman Khalil of Harkat ul-Mujahideen on the CBS News show *60 Minutes II*.³⁷ A subsequent suicide attack on India’s Parliament by Jaish-e-Muhammed, a Pakistani offshoot of the Al-Qaeda affiliate that Khalil heads, probably brought nuclear war closer than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.³⁸ Imagine what these people could do with the non-conventional weapons they actively seek - not from the Evil Axis but from Pakistan, our “partner in the war on terror” and a far more proven haven for nuclear roguery. The Pakistan government’s immediate pardoning of Khan for his nuclear shenanigans and its prior release of dozens of Harkat and Jaish operatives (who had been rounded up in a post-9/11 staging of solidarity with the U.S.)³⁹ indicate that such a “partnership in the war on terror” is more a matter of convenience than of the conviction.

One priority should focus on how best “netwar”⁴⁰ may be waged against increasingly high-tech, networked terrorist groups that are seeking WMDs from multiple criminal and other non-state sources in order to pursue what physicist Richard Garwin terms “megaterror.”⁴¹ This will surely involve some sort of “fourth-generation warfare” (4GW) currently being explored in the Pentagon’s “Net Assessment” division (1GW = soldiers pummeling one another as in the Napoleonic wars and U.S. Civil War; 2GW = massive artillery pummeling soldiers as in WWI; 3GW = mobile attack of the kind pioneered by the

Germans with Blitzkrieg using tanks and planes to pierce and outflank larger but more cumbersome forces; 4GW = small, rapid, mobile forces on land, in water, in the air, and in cyberspace that can "swarm").⁴² Disabling and defending against relatively diffuse, horizontal social networks of control and command may require very different risk assessments and tactics than those used to combat the vertical social hierarchies that direct national armies. Carnegie Mellon's Kathleen Carley has used multi-agent network analysis to monitor and model changes in Al-Qaeda, such as those following break up of the cell responsible for the suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania.⁴³ She found that eliminating leaders who are central actors (having the most ties to other cell members and to other cells) can produce more adaptive responses in the overall network "healing" process than elimination of less central actors. This indicates that targeted assassinations – a favorite Israeli tactic – can be counterproductive, regardless of any civilian reaction.

A key weakness in increasingly virtual networks like Al-Qaeda is lessening of direct ties between family, friends and fighters, which makes trust in such networks harder to sustain and easier to sunder. But the U.S. has yet to take advantage of this emerging weakness in our foe. America remains (like Pakistan and other "partners") too self-interested and hidebound by its own hard power to secure the trust and cooperation needed for the long slog. Traditional top-heavy and one-sided approaches - such as "strategic" bombardment, sanctions, invasion, occupation and other massive forms of coercion – will not eliminate tactically innovative and elusive terrorist swarms. Moreover, intelligence estimates and recommendations, which continue to be based primarily on models generalizing from past occurrences and frequency of events, actually make us less secure by underestimating the importance of large but rare attacks that are far and away the most damaging.⁴⁴ Reliance on past events also blinds us to enemy innovation (the "Maginot Effect"). As financier George Soros has so profitably sensed in regard to historic changes generally, the more people to the ripples, the less they are prepared for the tidal wave.⁴⁵ This is also how we should face the apocalyptic warfare that Al-Qaeda and company intends.

Combating terrorist swarms probably requires our own military's ability to operate in swarms of small and rapid mobile units, informed by culturally astute street intelligence and connected by wireless networks to powerful radar and satellite images. This sort of "network-centric" warfare is in the planning at the new Pentagon Office of Force Transformation. But hunting down, catching and destroying terrorist networks also requires a new strategic form of "spider webbing" powered by multilateral, interfaith alliances of transnational, national and local groups. Bonded by mutual trust, purpose and dedication, these multi-channel associations (true "coalitions of the willing" not bought or commandeered) could have the broad collective intelligence and resourcefulness needed to keep ahead of the game.

The strategic goal of combating terrorism, hostile nations and evil everywhere in the world is not materially feasible, and attempts to sustain this hopeless endeavor will only waste national treasure and lives, and undermine faith in the political system. "Evil" in almost any sense of the word, including that applied to terrorists and tyrants, has always been with the world and always will be.

In a relative sense, evil and good are asymmetrical aspects of the human condition (like infirmity and health, or death and life) so that the possibilities for harming people will always more numerous and easier to realize than the possibilities for helping them.⁴⁶ For individuals as for nations, it is a constant and interminable struggle to make life better.

In an absolute sense, as long as different groups of human beings believe that their different gods and missions are each absolutely right and good, Evil Others will be spawned and thrive. Attempts to impose moral absolutes necessarily breed Evil Others among people who refuse those absolutes.

Even if we could do away with exclusive moral absolutes, as long as people believe themselves to be oppressed by others who are materially much stronger they will resort to "irregular" forms of combat

against oppression, including guerilla warfare and terrorism.⁴⁷ This does not mean that people should refrain from extending their way of life by peaceful means to increase the pool of cooperators and common wealth, or should not bear the necessary costs of defeating belligerent states and destroying terrorist organizations. It does mean not seeking out and making more enemies than are already around.

Labeling others “evil” (except for true psychopaths like Hitler) is often a ploy demagogues use to justify ignoring the motives of others and to avoid having their own motives or methods questioned. Let us be clear about who many of us are fighting and why. President Bush told Congress that the 9/11 attackers and their supporters “hate our freedoms.”⁴⁸ But poll after poll show Arab and Muslim opinion strongly favoring America’s forms of elected government, personal liberty, educational opportunity and economic choice,⁴⁹ despite support for Al-Qaeda’s actions.⁵⁰ These people are not so much jealous of America as hostile to a perceived jumble of *realpolitik* and messianic mission that allows preemptive action against those who oppose U.S. interference in the world. A Defense Department Science Board reported (in response to a suicide attack against U.S. military housing at Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia): “Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States.”⁵¹

U.S. armies are becoming bogged down and overextended because they are called upon to perform contrary functions for which they are not well-trained: nation-building, policing, and anti-guerilla warfare.⁵² Without a major recruitment drive or renewal of a national draft, the U.S. cannot increase or even maintain current troop levels in Iraq to combat a drawn-out insurgency and defend construction of a new civil order (and no guerilla insurgency in history that survived an initial onslaught of overwhelming force ever ended quickly).⁵³ Unless it withdraws significant forces from Iraq, the U.S. lacks sufficient manpower to wage protracted war in another major theater (North Korea, Iran or anywhere else), much less to insure that terrorism is stopped around the world.

Moreover, spending hundreds of billions of dollars on a dubious nation-building project as the national deficit soars into the trillions and domestic programs are squeezed to reduce the debt constitutes a recipe for economic crisis and social conflict.⁵⁴ It is also possible that other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, will refuse to continue financing the U.S. debt, which could lead to economic chaos or war.

The “Domino Theory of Democracy versus Terrorism” that inspires the remaking of Iraq as a light unto Middle East nations is an ideological delusion proffered as historically-driven truth; it is comparable to the equally deluded “Domino Theory of Communism versus Democracy” that helped inspire the Vietnam War. The belief is that Saddam’s removal will enable the U.S. to install a liberal democracy and economy in Iraq, and majorities of people in the region’s other countries will then readily come on board. In this manner, “freedom” will naturally take hold throughout the Middle East and so do away with the conditions that nurture terrorism. And in any event, declared the President last November, “we will stand with these oppressed peoples until the day of their freedom finally arrives.”⁵⁵

President Bush has painted the choice in simplistic terms, proclaiming that: “The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will become an exporter of violence that takes more lives in America and in other free nations.”⁵⁶

Leaving aside that there is no prior tradition of parliamentary negotiation or elected power transfer in Iraq or most of the Middle East on which to build (as there was for the rebuilding of Germany and Japan after World War II), or any overriding sense of national identity and purpose to trump or mediate conflicting ethnic claims (as there was in the long and intermittent development of all modern democracies), there is no more reason to believe in the natural spread of democracy over all peoples and nations than there was at the end of World War I (when the U.S., Western Europe and the League of Nations originally proposed a similar scenario for Iraq, the Middle East and the rest of the world).⁵⁷

Surveys by the Pew Research Center and others show that the peoples of the Middle East do yearn for democratic choice. But there is no evidence that they will defend different interests beyond those of their own ethnic group or religion. The current international system of nation states, fixed in the UN charter, was established by Europeans (and derivatives) with firm national identities. The problem in the Middle East is setting up national governments with democratic institutions that override confessional loyalties. There is no indication that U.S. overseers in Iraq have a clue about how to do this.

Democratic freedoms are not natural or inevitable parts of the human condition.⁵⁸ They are not universal, timeless or absolute (even freedom of thought and expression has public limits that are continually being recalibrated through political negotiation). Democracy grows painstakingly through the dedication of an increasingly educated citizenry steeped in a sense of national unity and committed to the defense of differences of interest and opinion. At best, a democratic transformation of the Middle East will take many years, perhaps generations. It may never come about; or if it does, it can still fail (as in France and Mexico in the 1800s, Germany and Spain in the 1930s, or Iran and Guatemala in the 1950s).

The Administration denies a need for the kind of open-ended commitment required to even try to see democratization through, either because U.S. leaders are not really serious about it or because they know that the American people are not prepared to sustain it. When Secretary Rumsfeld warned in a recently leaked memo that it might be a “long, hard slog,”⁵⁹ the message was hastily spun away and buried. The risk is that U.S. popular support for democratizing the Middle East will collapse when a fuller picture of the timeframe and costs emerge through the whirling fog of spin and propaganda. A loss of faith in the political system and the military that defends it may ensue. This is what happened with the Vietnam War.

There are other reasons that it is difficult to take seriously official U.S. concerns with democratic choice in other nations, and particularly with democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. The history of U.S. pretensions to champion defense of the “free world” from “terrorism” is not reassuring. According to recently declassified documents released by the National Security Archives in February 2003, before the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. openly supported Saddam Hussein’s regime, and helped to train and supply his army. President Reagan even sent personal envoy Donald Rumsfeld twice to Baghdad to assure the Iraqi dictator that he should not be concerned with any U.S. public condemnation of Iraq using chemical weapons against Iran or Iraq’s own Kurds (in fact, the U.S. doubled aid to Saddam’s regime during 1983-1988, after learning of the gassings and while they were still going on).⁶⁰ During the same years that U.S. ally Saddam Hussein was gassing foes, Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress topped the official U.S. list of “terrorist groups.”⁶¹ (In 1986, Dick Cheney led the Reagan Administration’s successful effort to maintain a veto of a U.S. congressional resolution to recognize the ANC and free the organization’s then-imprisoned leader. “The ANC was then viewed as a terrorist organization,” said Cheney on *ABC* television’s “*This Week*” in July 2000.)⁶²

For U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, even if present knowledge about “the absence of a stockpile [of WMD] changes the political calculus” and casts doubts on last year’s case for war, the choice to go to war in Iraq was “still the right thing to do” because: “Saddam and his regime clearly had the intent – they never lost it – an intent that manifested itself years ago when they actually used such horrible weapons against their enemies in Iran and against their own people.” To most of the world, this reappraisal of history and the reasons for war seem hypocritical and fraudulent. David Kay’s hedge that the U.S. was misled along with “other governments” into believing Iraq possessed large stockpiles of WMD also fails to persuade, notes former National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, because it was the U.S. that convinced these “other governments” that Saddam had WMD in the first place.⁶³ As a result of such spinning and evasion, U.S. credibility around the world is at a historical low.

In the lead-up to last year's war, the overwhelming emphasis was on disarmament, deterrence and ties to terrorism. There was talk in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union speech about everyone's God-given right to liberty,⁶⁴ but talk of liberty for Iraq became a constant refrain only after claims about weapons and ties to terrorists proved shallow (polls from the Iraq Center for Research and Strategic Studies show few Iraqis believing the U.S. came to build democracy).⁶⁵ In any event, it is a near-formality (with no information value) that whenever the U.S. resorts to force it claims to be doing so in defense of liberty, freedom and democracy – even when helping to overthrow or subvert established democracies, as with several Latin American countries in the recent past.

U.S. posturing before and after the Iraq war has also displayed remarkable contempt for European democracy. In every European country polled, the great majority of the population opposed U.S. war plans. The fact that only the governments of France and Germany actually responded in keeping with the majority will of their people – and of virtually all the peoples of Europe – was derided by the U.S. administration⁶⁶ and media as the “Axis of Weasel,”⁶⁷ conniving cowards and appeasers of the “old Europe”⁶⁸ who were vainly trying to suppress democratic aspirations in new Europe (mostly formerly communist-controlled countries whose populations opposed the war but whose leaders, according to the *Washington Times*, “aimed to please the U.S.” in order to enjoy the benefits of NATO membership).⁶⁹ France - which sponsored America's own War of Independence, became the world's second oldest democracy, and alone among the major European nations never fought a war with the U.S. - was berated by U.S. media and boycotted by Congress. In contrast, Pakistan – which is ruled by a military junta and continues to harbor more terrorists committed to the destruction of the U.S. than any other country in the world – is wooed with words of thanks and “partnership” and hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. aid.

If we take an evolutionary perspective on history, which frames success and failure in terms of the growth or decline of traits over populations (and, eventually, in terms of the growth or decline of populations themselves), then current U.S. antiterrorism strategy does not seem adaptive. U.S. procedures to combat terror are often predictable and reactive. Even the “new” security strategy of preemption is preponderantly about maintaining U.S. preponderance (the global status quo) using traditional military means and other Great Power tactics. By contrast, terrorist stratagems are increasingly innovative and proactive.

Moreover, support for the U.S. declines in the world as support for terrorism increases. A White House panel reported in October 2003 that world hostility towards the U.S. “has reached shocking levels” and is growing.⁷⁰ In a June 2003 survey, the Pew Research Center found that only 7 % of Saudis had a positive view of the U.S., and less than 20% of Pakistanis and Turks.⁷¹ 99% of Lebanese, 98% of Palestinians and 83% of Indonesians held unfavorable opinions of the U.S., while majorities in these countries also expressed confidence in Osama Bin Laden to “do the right thing regarding world affairs.” Similar shifts in opinion are occurring among America's closest allies. An October 2003 poll engaged by the European Union saw America ranked with North Korea as the greatest threat to world peace after Israel.⁷² A June 2003 poll by the German Marshall Fund found that the majority of Europeans overall do not support force as a means of imposing international justice (compared with 84% of Americans who do support use of force), and no longer want the USA to maintain a strong global presence (compared to 64% in 2002 who favored a strong U.S. global role).⁷³ Margaret Tutwiler, the State Department official in charge of diplomacy, lamented in January 2004 that: “it will take many years of hard, focused to work” to restore America's credibility, even among traditional allies.⁷⁴ America may be the world's “indispensable nation,” as Madeleine Albright first avowed - later adding, “but I never said alone.”⁷⁵

In early September 2003, President Bush declared: “The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime.”⁷⁶ In fact, the Iraq war did not hurt Al-Qaeda or remove an ally.⁷⁷ On the contrary, the war

arguably helped Al-Qaeda by eliminating Saddam, Bin Laden's avowed enemy. Iraq did not offer Al-Qaeda WMD, nor did Al-Qaeda seek Iraqi WMD. There are two simple reasons for this: Iraq lost possession of the requisite WMD after the 1991 Gulf War, and the mutual repulsion between Bin Laden and Saddam was too much for even a temporary alliance against the U.S. under the ancient Arab code, "the enemy of my enemy is my friend."

The "liberation" of Iraq has diverted massive resources that surely could have helped to destroy Al-Qaeda and lessen the strategic threat from global terrorism. Last year witnessed nearly 100 suicide attacks – the most economically devastating, socially disruptive and politically destabilizing form of terrorism – more than any year in contemporary history.⁷⁸ A third of those attacks occurred in Iraq, more than anywhere else on earth. One clear consequence of Operation Iraqi Freedom is that the scourge of suicide terrorism that Al-Qaeda brought to world attention now plagues that country for the first time since the 13th century, when the radical Islamic sect of Assassins terrorized the Middle East (it took the Mongols to stop them). The big game in the global war on terror is the hydra-headed Al-Qaeda; it stalks patiently as the U.S. precipitously turns elsewhere. America – in trust with old and independent friends - must keep its eye on the prize or it will mealy lose the century's first great gamble.

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² J. Gray, *Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern* (The New Press, New York, 2003).

³ In Jefferson’s words: “That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition.” [T. Jefferson to I. McPherson, 13 Aug. 1813, in *The Founder’s Constitution*, vol. 3, art. 1. sec. 8, clause 8, doc. 12 (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987), http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html.]

⁴ Documented in R. Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2004).

⁵ According to *ABC News*, another official present at the NSC meetings in early 2001 confirmed that: “The president told his Pentagon officials to explore the military options, including the use of ground forces. That went beyond the Clinton Administration’s halfhearted attempts to overthrow Hussein without force.” Cited in “O’Neill’s charges against Bush confirmed,” *Washington Times*, 14 Jan. 2004, <http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040114-o91438-4377r.htm>.

⁶ The memo also called for preemption to “remain the predominant outside power in the region [Middle East and Southwest Asia] and preserve U.S. and Western access to the region’s oil.” Paul Wolfowitz, who is currently Deputy Secretary of Defense was Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy at the time. The initial draft from February 1992, which gave no role to the United Nations, was circulated for several weeks at senior levels in the Pentagon, until leaked by *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*. [B. Gellman, “Keeping the U.S. first,” *Washington Post*, 11 March 1992, p. A1]. Top-level Democrats and World leaders and reacted adversely to what they deemed a radical departure from Cold War doctrine of deterrence in favor of an offensive strategy to perpetuate U.S. global supremacy. As a result, the White House ordered then-Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to rewrite the draft in April 1992 so that the emphasis would shift back to containment and international cooperation. [P. Tyler, “Pentagon drops goal of blocking new superpowers,” *New York Times*, 24 May 1992, sec. 1, p. 1]. The 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* conforms more closely to the February 1992 draft.

⁷ It is possible that persons close to the Administration sincerely believed, on the basis of no factual evidence, that the 9/11 plotters could not have driven big planes and destroyed big buildings without the assistance of a big state government like Iraq. Those who initially expressed this view include Defense Policy Board chair Richard Perle (in the *Washington Post*), ex-CIA chief James Woolsey (told to *CNN*’s Wolf Blitzer) and *Weekly Standard* editor William Kristol (on NPR). [Cited in an essay by J. Loeb, posted as “Bush doesn’t understand our true enemy,” 14 July 2003, <http://pfaff.tcc.virginia.edu/home/MT/archives/000177.html>].

⁸ *National Security Strategy of the United States* (White House, Washington, DC, Sept. 2003), intro. Part III, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat.htm>.

⁹ According to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, there is a “nexus between terrorist networks, terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction.” [D. Rumsfeld, “The price of inaction can be truly catastrophic,” *Asahi Shimbun* (Japan daily), 10 Sept. 2002, www.asahi.com/english/op-ed/K2002091000520.html]. Secretary Rumsfeld also refers to rogue regimes, like Iraq under Saddam and Afghanistan under the Taliban, as “pariah states.”

¹⁰ White House release, 6 March 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030306-8.html.

¹¹ Shortly before Condoleeza Rice became National Security Adviser, she strongly affirmed that the U.S. need not be worried about rogue states, including Iraq, because “if they do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration.” [C. Rice, “Promoting the National Interest,” *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 2001, p. 61]. She also affirmed that rouge states “were living on borrowed time” because of the historically inevitable advance of democracy – a weaker argument for confidence than deterrence. At the same time, CIA director George Tenet clearly distinguished threats posed by Osama Bin Laden and “international terrorist networks” intent on “trying to stage an attack on the United States” from “ballistic missile threats” posed by “rogue states... North Korea, probably Iran and probably Iraq.” [“CIA director cites strong links among terror groups,” *CNN.com*, 2 Feb. 2002, www.cnn.com/2000/US/02/02/cia.terrorism/].

¹² J. Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, Dec. 2003), p. v; www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/bounding/bounding.pdf. Record’s analysis of the current strategic muddle is enlightening. But his “realist” recommendation for the U.S. “to settle for stability [in Iraq] in the form of a friendly autocracy of the kind with which it enjoys working relationships in Cairo, Riyadh and Islamabad” seems decidedly short-sighted. Record intimates, in line with Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz, that strategic clarity should not be subordinated to moral clarity. From this perspective, war is a means to rationally further political self-interest - not moral principles - when diplomatic and other less costly means fail.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, perhaps the most successful proponent and practitioner of geopolitical realism in contemporary U.S. history, attributes the first explicit formulation of this doctrine to France's Cardinal Richelieu, who declared that "states have no principles, only interests." [H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1995)]. Although some version of this doctrine has governed relations between great powers ever since state-level societies first emerged in the Middle East several thousand years ago, the trouble with applying the doctrine in today's world is that, globally, people have become more demanding and less compromising in seeking self-governance according to wider moral principles that often transcend narrower national interests. In this global political climate, continued U.S. support for "friendly" and "stable" autocratic regimes leads to resentment and increased likelihood of terrorism from people compelled to suffer those regimes.

¹³ This even has domestic repercussions. For example, a Federal District Court ruled that the Patriot Act's ban on providing advice and assistance to terrorists was "impermissibly vague" as a result of a suit filed by several humanitarian groups that work with Kurdish refugees in Turkey and Tamil residents in Sri Lanka. [E. Lichtbalu, "Citing free speech, judge voids part of antiterror act," *New York Times* 27 Jan. 2004, p. A21]. Although the PKK has avoided public condemnation and actions that target the U.S., the PKK and its many Kurdish supporters are fully aware of the overwhelming support of the Clinton and Bush administrations' support for the Turkish government's counterinsurgency campaign against them (which, according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, has bordered on "ethnic cleansing" in some areas).

¹⁴ J. Risen, "Captives Deny Qaeda Worked with Baghdad," *New York Times*, 9 June 2003. At the time of these interrogations, U.S. officials continued to assert that war with Iraq was justified because: "Baghdad has a long history of supporting terrorism. It has also had contacts with al-Qaeda." [George Tenet, CIA Director, before U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, *BBC NEWS*, "U.S. says Iraq linked to Al-Qaeda," 19 March 19 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1881740.stm].

¹⁵ J. Risen, "Hussein warned Iraqis to beware of outside fighters, document shows," *New York Times*, 14 Jan. 2004, p. A1.

¹⁶ In early January 2004, a 400-strong military team that had been searching for Iraq's WMD was "withdrawn after finding nothing of substance." ["US weapons team withdrawn from Iraq," *Agence France Presse* wire, 8 Jan. 2004, <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040108/1/3h4i0.html>].

¹⁷ "Fact sheet: 2003: A year of accomplishment for the American people," White House news release, 13 Dec. 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031213-4.html.

¹⁸ W. Pincus, "White House faulted on uranium claim: Intelligence warnings disregarded, President's advisory board says," *Washington Post*, 24 Dec. 2003, p. A1.

¹⁹ Cited in P. Tyler, "Leaders sought a threat. Spies get the blame," *New York Times*, 1 Feb. 2004, sec. 4, p. 3.

²⁰ "Blair raised 'false expectation' on Iraqi weapons, says expert," *Agence France Presse* wire, 10 Feb. 2004, <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040210/1/3hwhr.html>.

²¹ S. Cohen, "Iraq's WMD programs: Culling hard facts from soft myths," posted on CIA website, 28 November 2003, www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/press_release/2003/pr11282003.html.

²² Cited in MD hunter: No stockpiles in Iraq," *CNN.com*, 24 Jan. 2004, www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/01/23/sprj.nirq.kay.int/. According to Kay, the CIA and other agencies were blind to the fact that Iraq had abandoned programs to produce chemical or biological weapons after the 1991 Gulf War, and that their nuclear program lagged far behind Iran or even Libya. [J. Risen, "Ex-inspector says C.I.A. missed disarray in Iraqi arms program," *New York Times*, 26 Jan. 2004, p. A1].

²³ According to U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld: "September 11th cost more than three thousand lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, it makes \$87 billion pale by comparison." [D. Rumsfeld, "DoD - Prepared statement for the Senate Appropriations Committee" (U.S. Dept. of Defense, Washington, DC, 24 Sept. 2003), www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2003/sp20030924-secdef0462.html]; "Sept. 11 economic toll: \$1 trillion," *The Oakland Press*, 7 Sept. 2003,

www.andersoneconomicgroup.com/Publications/Press_Clips/2003/sept_dec/OaklandPress_sept11cost_090703.pdf.

²⁴ *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (International Institute Strategic Studies, Arundel House, London, 15 Oct. 2003). Al-Qaeda was never a centralized terrorist network, evolving as a loose collection of groups and individuals that did not even refer to itself (at least before 9/11) as "Al-Qaeda." [J. Burke, "Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror," (I.B. Taurus, London, 2003)]. Al-Qaeda ("the Base") was founded in 1987-1988 in Peshawar by Bin Laden and his spiritual mentor, Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian-Jordanian ideologue who preached global Jihad to free Muslim lands from non-Muslim control. [A. Azzam, "Al-Qa'idah al-Sulbah ("The Solid Base"), *Al-Jihad*, 41, April 1988]. Bin Laden seems to have used the term primarily to refer to an organizational database for keeping track of personnel (and provisions) recruited for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. [R. Gunaratna, *Inside Al-Qaeda*

(Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2002]. Only after the FBI began investigating the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania did U.S. officials begin referring to: “‘al Qaeda,’ a worldwide terrorist organization led by bin Laden.” [Press Release of the Indictment of Bin Laden and Atef, United States Attorney, Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4 Nov. 1998, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/98110403.htm>]. The increasing interconnection (though not unification) of regional Jihadi groups into an “Al-Qaeda network” may be, in part, the result of the U.S. over-attributing to Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda a global concentration of power and organization. This public targeting and talking up of Al-Qaeda has encouraged home-grown groups only tenuously connected with Bin Laden – if at all – to claim responsibility for attacks in Al-Qaeda’s name in order to be taken more seriously by friend and foe alike. The November 2003 suicide bombings in Istanbul may be a case in point. Turkish officials, as well as many other in the West, immediately attributed the bombings to Al-Qaeda – although the bombs were probably made and detonated by local Turkish groups claiming to *represent* Al-Qaeda’s aims.

²⁵ “Nearly two years after their defeat in Afghanistan, suspected Taliban and Qaeda forces are threatening the stability of the government of President Hamid Karzai and stalling reconstruction.” [C. Gall, “No. 2 State Dept. official visits Afghan region of new attacks,” *New York Times*, 6 Oct. 2003].

²⁶ The effectiveness of subnational and transnational groups that employ terrorism as a tactic can be limited, if the respective host nation-states in which these groups operate do not give these groups active or passive support (e.g., technical assistance or sanctuary).

²⁷ Whereas continually upgraded and expanded intelligence, police work and community networking are critical to destroying geographically diffuse terrorist networks, military analyst John Keegan shows that even the best intelligence appears to have had little impact on the final outcome of wars between modern empires or nation states. What matters is how armed forces perform, and how well one side anticipates the other side’s performance. [J. Keegan, *Intelligence in war: Knowledge of the enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda* (Knopf, New York, 2003)].

²⁸ North Korea now sees U.S. maneuvering of aircraft carriers and strategic bombers on the Korean Peninsula as part of Washington’s plan for “preemptive attacks” on North Korea – a situation “getting more serious as the days go by.” [“North Korea in armistice threat,” *CNN.com*, 18 Feb. 2003, www.cc.com/2003/WORLD/asaipcf/east/o2/17/nkorea.nuclear/].

²⁹ According to *The Guardian*: “Iran does have one deeply persuasive reason for acquiring nuclear arms: national security.... Barely a week goes by without US officials making threatening noises toward Iran, decrying its alleged support of international terrorism, encouraging internal civil insurrection, or reminding it that like Iraq, the US deems it to be a ‘rogue state’.” [“Iran’s fears are real,” *The Guardian*, 16 Sept. 2003, www.guardian.co.uk/iran/story/0,12858,1042837,00.html].

³⁰ The “Axis of Evil,” as defined by President Bush in his State of the Union Address (9 Jan. 2002), refers to “regimes that sponsor terror” but specifies only Iraq, Iran and North Korea. A good sounding but politically incoherent and unsettling notion, it is designed to conjure up the life-and-death struggle of World War II between the American-led Allies and the Axis Powers of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan. There is no formal or informal coalition between Iraq, Iran and North Korea, as there was for the original Axis alliance. Iraq and Iran have repeatedly attacked and killed one another more than they have anyone else. North Korea has almost nothing in common with either, but was thrown into the “Axis of Evil” by speechwriters David Frum and Michael Gerson because of the need for a non-Muslim, non-Middle Eastern evildoer to parry the perception that the U.S. was on an anti-Muslim crusade or simply out to control the Persian Gulf. [M. Reynolds, “‘Axis of Evil’ rhetoric said to heighten dangers: Many foreign policy observers think Bush’s phrasing, although effective on the home front, caused serious damage abroad,” *Los Angeles Times*, 21 Jan. 2003].

³¹ North Korea’s claim to have nuclear deterrence capability may be more bark than bite. After inspecting North Korea’s nuclear facilities, Siegfried Heckler, former director of the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory, also told Congress that there was little hard evidence that North Korea actually possessed a nuclear device or delivery system. [“Expert tells Congress he remains unsure of North Korea’s nuclear capabilities,” *NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, Public Broadcasting television, 21 Jan. 2004, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june04/northkorea_01-21.html]

³² E. MacAskill, I. Traynor, “Saudis consider nuclear bomb,” *Guardian*, 18 Sept. 2003, www.guardian.co.uk/Saudi/story/0,11599,10444402,00.html.

³³ “Founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program admits leaking secrets,” *Agence France Presse* wire, 3 Feb. 2004, <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040202/1/3hp43.html>. See also: “Musharraf says individuals involved in nuclear proliferation,” *Agence France Presse* wire, 25 Jan. 2004, <http://sg.news.yahoo.com/040125/1/3hhzi.html>; D. Sanger, W. Broad, “From rogue nuclear programs, web of trails leads to Pakistan,” *New York Times*, 4 Jan. 2003, p. A1.

³⁴ D. Rhode, “General denies letting secrets of A-Bomb out of Pakistan,” *New York Times*, 27 Jan. 2004, p. A6.

- ³⁵ D. Rhode, “Pakistanis question official ignorance of atom transfers,” *New York Times*, 3 Feb. 2004, p. A3.
- ³⁶ L. Cederman, “From billiard balls to sandpiles,” *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, **97**, 135-150 (2003); R. Axelrod, “Apocalyptic terrorism,” presentation to seminar on International Security Affairs (based on data from Internat. Inst. for Counter-Terrorism), Univ. Michigan, 5 Sept. 2003.
- ³⁷ Fazlur Rahman Khalil interviewed on *60 Minutes II (CBS news)*, 15 Oct. 2000. Khalil’s group, Harkat ul-Mujahideen, is a member of the *World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders*, the umbrella organization formed by Osama Bin Laden in 1998.
- ³⁸ On 13 December 2001, a 5-man suicide squad attacked India’s Parliament in New Delhi. India demanded that Pakistan’s government crack down on the jihadi groups in its territory. Pakistan refused, India recalled its commissioner to Pakistan, and at least a million men were soon mobilized on both sides of the Kashmir border. Following another suicide attack at an army base near Jammu that killed 36 people, India announced that it was planning to go to war after the monsoon rains tapered off. Both countries threatened to use nuclear weapons [R. Behdi, “India ‘will go to war after the monsoon’,” *News Telegraph*, 21 May 2003, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2002/05/21/wkash21.xml]; R. McCarthy, “Dangerous game of state-sponsored terrorism that threatens nuclear conflict,” *The Guardian*, 25 May 2002]. The danger of nuclear confrontation on a “one-rung” escalation ladder, where any use of nuclear weapons entails massive use, is particularly acute for countries, like Pakistan and Israel, that have practically no territorial depth.
- ³⁹ Pakistan President Musharraf authorized release of over 100 Harkat ul-Majahideen following electoral gains by the Mutahidda Majlis-e-Amal in the 2002 elections. [“Harkat-ul Mujahideen reincarnates as Jamiat-ul Ansar,” *Pakistan-Facts.com*, 21 March 2003, www.pakistan-facts.com/article.php/20030321235452363.] Lashkar -e-Tayiba has been the most active Pakistan-based Jihadi group operating in Kashmir. Shortly before Musharraf buckled to U.S. pressure and announced a ban on several Jihadi groups, Lashkar-e-Tayiba mutated into a new organization, Jama’at ud-Dawa, under the leadership of Hafiz Muhammed Sayid. Sayid has shunned suicide bombing but has embraced suicide shooting attacks by *fedayeen* on representatives and supporters of Indian authority. [Z. Abbas, “Profile: Lashkar-e-Toiba,” *BBC News*, 26 Aug. 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3181925.stm.] Before 9/11, Musharraf lambasted U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright for including Pakistani Jihadist groups in the 1999 U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations: “General Musharraf says those whom the report identifies as terrorists are not terrorists. It is a matter of definition; we do not recognize them as terrorists.” [Editorial, *Frontier Post* (Peshawar) cited in *Patterns of Global terrorism: ‘Terrorism’s Changing Map’*, Federation of Atomic Scientists, May 2005, www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/05/www0m23.htm].
- ⁴⁰ D. Ronfeldt, J. Arquila, *Networks and netwars: The future of terror, crime, and militancy* (Rand, 2001), www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/.
- ⁴¹ R. Garwin, “The technology of megaterror,” *Technology Review* (MIT), Sept. 2002, www.technologyreview.com/articles/garwin0902.asp. Garwin sees terrorists more likely to explode a small nuclear device at ground level, rather than in the air using a missile or plane, because it is easier and more contaminating.
- ⁴² The U.S. invasion of Iraq was arguably less 4GW (and more 3GW) than the attack on Afghanistan.
- ⁴³ K. Carley, “Modeling covert networks,” Paper presented to the workshop on Culture and Personality in Models of Adversarial Decision-Making, U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific Research, 13 Nov. 2003, Arlington, VA. See also K. Carley, J. Lee, D. Krackhardt, “Destabilizing networks,” *Connections*, **24**, 31-34 (2001).
- ⁴⁴ R. Axelrod, “Risk in network information systems,” Report for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, 20 Oct. 2003, www.personal.umich.edu/~axe/risk.pdf.
- ⁴⁵ G. Soros, *Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism* (Public Affairs, New York, 2000), p 80.
- ⁴⁶ See S. Pinker, *The Blank Slate: The Modern denial of Human Nature* (Vintage, New York, 2002), pp. 10-11.
- ⁴⁷ S. Atran, “Genesis of suicide terrorism,” *Science* **299**, 1534-1539 (2003). Bruce Hoffman explains: “terrorists perceive themselves as reluctant warriors, driven by desperation – and lacking any viable alternative – to violence against a repressive state, a predatory rival ethnic or nationalist group, or an unresponsive international order.” [B. Hoffman, “Defining terrorism,” in R. Howard, R. Sawyer, *Terrorism and counterterrorism: Understanding the new security environment* (McGraw-Hill, Guilford, CT, 2003), p. 14].
- ⁴⁸ White House news release, 20 September 2001, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.
- ⁴⁹ “Views of a changing world 2003” (Survey Rep., Pew Research Center, 3 June 2003); available at <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185> www.
- ⁵⁰ “Arab Nations’ ‘Impressions of America’ Poll” (Survey Rep., Zogby International, Utica, NY, 2002); available at www.zogby.com/features/features.dbm?ID=186.

⁵¹ "DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Vol. 2: DSB Force Protection Panel Report to DSB," December 1997, www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/trans2.pdf.

⁵² U.S. Armed Forces have had limited nation-building, civil affairs (including policing) and counter-guerilla missions for a long time. What's new is the scope and frequency of the tasks involved. The military is only now going embarked on a major review on how to "transform" itself to this changing national security environment.

⁵³ By September 2003, the unexpected resistance to American occupation of Iraq had forced the Pentagon to increase the call up of U.S. Army reservists and National Guard and to extend the tour of duty for regular soldiers. ["The new Iraq: A longer tour of duty for some troops," *CNN.com*, 9 Sept. 2003, www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0309/09.loi.08.html]. Suicides among US soldiers have increased significantly from 13 to 17 per 1000. ["Army studying high suicide rate among US soldiers in Iraq," *USA Today*, 14 Oct. 2003]. Initial plans to reduce occupation forces to 30,000 by fall 2003 proved woefully misbegotten. [M. Gordon, E. Schmitt, "U.S. plans to reduce forces in Iraq, with help of allies," *New York Times* 3 May 2003]. By November, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was arguing that 130,000 would be enough to quell the insurgency, although Senator John McCain and other members of the majority party claim that even these troop levels are not nearly enough. [B. Slavin, "McCain: Force levels in Iraq inadequate," *USA Today*, 5 Nov. 2003].

⁵⁴ Even if Congress does not make recent tax cuts permanent, the deficit should reach nearly two trillion dollars within the next decade. [E. Andrews, "Budget office forecasts record deficit in '04," *New York Times*, 27 Jan. 2004].

⁵⁵ "President Bush discusses freedom in Iraq and Middle East," *White House release*, 6 Nov. 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html.

⁵⁶ White House release, 7 Sept. 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030907-1.html. For Richard Perle, national security adviser to the Pentagon and a chief architect of the political vision behind the Iraq war, democratization of Iraq and the pacification of the Middle East would proceed as follows: "We have Ahmed Chalabi, chief of the opposition Iraqi National Congress to enter Baghdad. Ending the current regime will liberate the Iraqis. We will leave both governance and oil in their hands. We will hand over power quickly – not in years, maybe not even months – to give Iraqis a chance to shape their own destiny. The whole world will see this. And I expect the Iraqis to be at least as thankful as French President Chirac was for France's liberation.... Iraqi leader Ahmed Chalabi and his people have confirmed that they want a real peace process, and that they would recognize the State of Israel." [R. Perle cited in "Blessed are the warmakers?" (a debate between Daniel Cohn-Bendit and Richard Perle), *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2003, www.foreignpolicy.com/issue_may/june_2003/debate.html]. None of Perle's prognostications have come to pass. Ahmed Chalabi is an international financier who left Iraq in 1958. In 1992 he was convicted by a Jordanian court for embezzlement and fraud (among other charges) while serving as chairman of the failed Petra Bank in Jordan. He was sentenced in absentia to 22 years' hard labor. About this time, he became a leader of the Iraqi National Congress. The INC was created at the behest of neoconservatives in the first Bush government for the purpose of fomenting Saddam's overthrow. Despite highly publicized and well-financed U.S. backing, Chalabi's return to Iraq in April 2003 garnered little popular support. Few Iraqis had ever heard of him, and few of those who had thought much of him. Although most Iraqis appeared to be gladly rid of Saddam, few threw flowers or kisses to their would-be liberators. Increasingly many are throwing stones and grenades.

⁵⁷ S. Atran, "The surrogate colonization of Palestine," *American Ethnologist* **16**, 716-244 (1989).

⁵⁸ Preference for certain democratic freedoms and human rights constantly generate conflicts with other freedoms and rights: freedom from fear of violence versus the right to bear arms, freedom to unburden one's life from the unrecoverable costs of supporting a non-thinking agent (abortion, euthanasia) versus the right to life, and so on. These and other socially divisive conflicts are far from being democratically resolved in our own society. Even if they are eventually resolved, other conflicts will invariably arise as new challenges and opportunities brought by changing circumstances and unforeseen events ceaselessly restructure the space of human preferences and needs.

⁵⁹ D. Monitz, T. Squitieri, "Defense memo: A grim outlook," *USA Today* 22, October 2003.

⁶⁰ Although President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld touted Saddam's use of chemical weapons as a major reason the U.N. should have supported war against Iraq, documents declassified in February 2003 (available on the National Security Archive website) show that the U.S. provided Iraq with combat planning assistance in the 1980s, even after Saddam's use of chemical weapons was widely known. Then presidential-envoy Rumsfeld met twice with Saddam, delivering the message that Iraq's use of chemical weapons posed no obstacle to assistance despite U.S. public condemnation of chemical weapons use. ["U.S. documents show embrace of Saddam Hussein in early 1980s despite chemical weapons, external aggression, human rights abuses," *The National Security Archives*, 25 Feb. 2003, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/press.htm].

⁶¹ *Terrorist Group Profiles*, U.S. Dept. of Defense (Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1988). See also speeches by President Reagan reported in *Washington Post*, 23 July 1986, p. A1, 28 July 1986, p. A17.

⁶² Cited in “What did Cheney say about Mandela?” *On the Issues* 30 July 2000, www.issues2000.org/askme/Mandela.htm.

⁶³ Z. Brzezinski interviewed on “Talk of the Nation,” *National Public Radio*, 2 Feb. 2004.

⁶⁴ “State of the Union,” 28 Jan. 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html.

⁶⁵ According to *Agence France Presse*, interviews (1620, MOE 3-4%) took place September 28-October 10 in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Ramadi, Fallujah, Arbil, and Sulaymaniyah (and of course location, location, location matters in these polls). Among the key findings, 67% of Iraqis “view the US-led coalition as an occupying force, while only 46% considered them such when US troops rolled into Baghdad April 9.” Over the same timeframe, “those who viewed the US forces as liberators slumped from 43% to 15%,”

www.mehmag.org/blog/archives/000044.html. There is little indication that President Bush and his proconsul in Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, are able to accept “democracy’s paradox”- that if people choose representatives who we don’t like, or who have different values or ways of doing things, then we must accept voters’ decisions as long as this does not yield physical violence against us. In particular, there is increasing evidence evidence that “the Bush team seems unable to stomach the idea that democracy in Iraq will mean Shiites assuming power, and most likely developing close ties with Shiite-dominated Iran.” [D. Hiro, “one Iraqi, one vote?” *New York Times*, 27 Jan. 2004, p. A26].

⁶⁶ The 9/11 attack on the U.S. incited French and German media to an outpouring of compassion for the American people, and for America’s open society and individual freedoms. The day after the attack on New York and Washington, the newspaper *Le Monde*, France’s leading left-of-center daily and a frequent critic of perceived American cultural and military hegemony, published a front-page editorial entitled “*Nous sommes tous Américains maintenant*” (“We are all Americans now”). A small but deeply felt and telling symbolic act of support. In March 2003, after France vowed to block a United Nations Resolution authorizing the United States to attack Iraq, the U.S. House of Representatives officially banned mention of “French fries” and “French toast” from its cafeteria menu. A sign in the cafeteria read “Update: Now Serving in All House Buildings ‘Freedom Fries.’” A small but deeply felt and telling symbolic act of support. What a difference a war can make.

⁶⁷ “AXIS OF WEASELS: Germany and France Wimp Out on Iraq,” *New York Post*, 24 Jan. 2003. The paper originally featured a front-page image of the French and German leaders as morphed weasels. And the beat goes on: “Paris and Berlin - the Axis of Weasel - certainly aren't America's allies in any recognizable sense of the word.” [“The weasels’ just desserts,” *New York Post* editorial, 12 Dec. 2003].

⁶⁸ “Rumsfeld dismisses ‘old Europe’ defiance on Iraq,” *CBS News*, 23 Jan. 2003, <http://www.cbc.ca/stories/2003/01/23/rumsfeld030123>.

⁶⁹ N. Krlev, “NATO candidates aim to please U.S., Europe,” *Washington Times*, 13 Sept. 2002. Latvia’s current Foreign Minister, Sandra Kalniete, justified Latvia supporting the U.S. for the sake of “liberty, freedom and democracy,” but candidly remarked: “I have already stated my position back in April when the decision to send troops to Iraq was made. The public opinion, now and then, still seemed to suggest that majority of the residents have been against war in Iraq to begin with.” [Cited in *Delfi Report* (Latvian daily), 25 Nov. 2003, <http://rus.delfi.lv/news/daily/latvia/article.php?id=6871834>]. The former Foreign Minister, however, reportedly conceded that Latvia had “to ‘salute and shout, ‘Yes sir’... we have to please America no matter what the cost.” [Cited in N. Chomsky, “The Iraq war and contempt for democracy,” *ZNet Commentary*, 31 Oct. 2003, www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003-10/31chomsky.cfm].

⁷⁰ “Changing minds, winning peace: A new strategic direction for U.S. public diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim world” (Rep. Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, Comm. On Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 1 Oct. 2003); <http://www.rice.edu/projects/baker/Pubs/testimony/winningpeace/24882.pdf>.

⁷¹ Views of a changing world 2003” (Survey Rep., Pew Research Center, 3 June 2003), <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=185>.

⁷² A. Cowell, “Bush visit spurs protests against U.S. in Europe,” *New York Times*, 16 Nov. 2003, p. 15.

⁷³ R. Bernstein, “Foreign views of U.S. darken since Sept. 11,” *New York Times*, 11 Sept. 2003.

⁷⁴ C. Marquis, “U.S. image abroad will take years to repair, official says,” *New York Times* 5 Feb. 2004, p. A5.

⁷⁵ Cited in N. Krlev, “United States admired, reviled,” *Washington Times*, 9 Dec. 2002.

⁷⁶ Cited in D. Milbank, C. Deane, “Hussein link to 9/11 lingers in many minds,” *Washington Post*, 6 Sept. 2003. Even after President Bush declared on September 18, 2003 that “we have no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 attacks,” and after Saddam’s capture two months later, most Americans still believed the contrary. [P. Krugman, “Telling it right,” *New York Times*, 19 Dec. 2003].

⁷⁷ B. Hoffman, “Saddam is ours, does Al Qaeda care?” *New York Times*, 17 Dec. 2003.

⁷⁸ S. Atran, “The strategic threat from suicide terrorism,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 03-33, Dec. 2003, www.aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/openpdf.php; See table in online supporting materials, S. Atran, Letter in response to Tobeña, *Science* (2004, in press).