Posing questions and providing answers on difficult passages of the Old and New Testaments was quite popular among Jewish and Christian writers. This method, however, was not invented to discuss the Bible and the Gospels. Questions and responses on difficult topics or texts in fact had a long tradition in the Graeco-Roman world, both in the teaching practice as well as in more learned exegesis.¹ In particular, since the first centuries of the classical period, the Homeric text, with its inconsistencies and ethical issues, raised problems to many readers, who tried to solve them in different ways. The first treatise on the topic we know of was put together by Aristotle in his *Homic Prolemes*² but questions and solutions (zetemata and lyseis) on Homer remained popular through the Hellenistic and Imperial periods.³ In the Christian world, eratopokriseis (as this genre is called by Biblical scholars and scholars of early Christianity) became even more widespread. While Philo of Alexandria used this method to comment on the Bible, this practice became particularly popular with the Christians, among whom were Eusebius, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, and Au-

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I would like to thank Lewis Ayres, who first suggested that I should read Eusebius’ *Gospel Questions* and then gave useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. A special thanks goes to Matt Crawford, who exchanged many emails with me, shared bibliography, and gave very useful suggestions for improving this paper.
Recent discussions especially center on the status of this type of literature, whether this is a ‘real’ genre and which works belong to it. I will focus here on Eusebius’ Questions and Answers on the Gospels, which is the most ancient text of this type among Christian writers that has reached us. The work is not extant in its original form, but is transmitted in excerpts in various languages; the main version is a Greek epitome, which is divided into two parts, Questions to Stephanus and Questions to Marinus. There are also fragments in Latin, Syriac, Coptic, and Arabic. Without discussing the genre in relation to Eusebius and without offering an in-depth study of Eusebius’ Questions, I will


7 For a detailed philological commentary of the epitome, with list of parallel passages, see C. Zamagni, L’extrait des Questions et Réponses sur les Évangiles d’Eusèbe de Césarée: un Com-mentaire (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016). Zamagni has also curated the most recent critical edition of the epitome, which I will follow in this article; see C. Zamagni, Eusèbe de Césarée, Questions évangéliques. Introduction, texte critique, traduction et notes, SC 523 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2008). For a text with all the fragments (beyond the Greek epitome) and English translations, see Eusebius, Gospel Problems and Solutions = Quaestiones ad Stephanum et Marinum (CPG
here look at this text from a ‘comparative’ point of view—as a classicist who has worked on Alexandrian scholarship. In fact, while it is generally acknowledged that Eusebius takes his method and approach from classical predecessors, to my knowledge there is no study that tries to compare Eusebius’ *modus operandi* to that of the Hellenistic philologists. In what follows, then, I will look at the exegetical strategies employed by Eusebius (ca. 260/4 – 337/40 CE) and compare them to those employed by Aristarchus of Samothrace, the most famous Alexandrian grammarian (ca. 216 – 144 BCE), in discussing Homer. The striking similarities as well as a few telling differences in how these two scholars approach ‘problems’ in two *auctoritates* (Homer and the Gospels) will at least shed some light in the continuity (and development) of exegetical practices between the classical and Christian worlds.

1 In Aristarchus’ Path

I will here limit my analysis to the Greek epitome of the *Gospel Questions*. The longer, sixteen *Questions to Stephanus* discuss problems at the beginning of the Gospels, especially concerning the genealogies of Jesus; the *Questions to Marinus*, on the other hand, are only four and focus on the ending of the Gospels, especially the resurrection. In many of these questions Eusebius employs strategies which recall those used by Aristarchus in commenting on Homer. I will survey them here, dividing them according to the method adopted to ‘solve’ each question.

1.1 Clarifying an Author from the Author Himself: Linguistic Analysis Backed up by Textual References to Other Passages

The most obvious way to solve a textual problem is to reinterpret the passage at issue and show that if the text is correctly understood, there is in fact no problem

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3470), ed. R. Pearse, trans. D. J. D. Miller (Greek, Latin), A. C. McCollum (Syriac, Arabic), C. Downer (Coptic) and others (Ipswich, UK: Chieftain, 2010).

at all. This often entails a different, non-standard interpretation of a word or phrase in the problematic passage. Such a procedure often occurs in the Aristarchean scholia. For example, scholars found it problematic when Homer introduces Pandarus as the one, ‘to whom Apollo himself gave the bow (τόξον... ἔδωκεν)’ (Il. 2.827) because at Il. 4.105–111 Homer claims that an artisan built Pandarus’ bow, which could not then be a gift from the god. Aristarchus solves the apparent contradiction by suggesting that τόξον in Il. 2.827 does not mean the object, but is to be understood in an abstract way as ‘the art of archery’, which Pandarus learnt from Apollo (Sch. Il. 2.827a: ὅτι οὖ τὸ τόξον λέγει, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοξικὴν ἐμπειρίαν).\(^9\) In addition, the Aristarchean scholia often back up specific linguistic interpretations by a reference to other Homeric passages where the same expression is used and has the meaning which Aristarchus also wants to apply to the debated passage. This is what is generally understood to be the Aristarchean principle of ‘clarifying Homer from Homer’. While in his fragments we never find this principle formulated in this way,\(^10\) it certainly describes Aristarchus’ approach to Homer very well, in his constant effort to seek answers within the text itself\(^11\)—starting with linguistic problems, which are solved by looking at other similar usages in the Homeric poems. An example of this practice occurs in Iliad 1, when Apollo shoots arrows against the Greek camp to spread the plague and Homer says that first he attacked οὐρήσας...καὶ κύνας (Il. 1.50). While κύνας are obviously ‘dogs’, the ancients were in doubt about the meaning of οὐρήσας. Aristotle discussed the question and suggested that οὐρήσας were ‘sentinels’ (Poet. 1461a9–11). According to Aristarchus, however, the word meant ‘mules’. He found the proof in a later book of the Iliad, at

\(^9\) In Homer τόξον can indeed sometimes indicate ‘bow’ in a more abstract sense, for example in Il. 2.718: τόξον ἐδιώκει, ‘skilled with the bow’ (of Philoctetes), in the sense of ‘skilled in archery’. Yet in Il. 2.718 the primary meaning is still present, which is not the case in Il. 2.827 according to Aristarchus’ ‘solution’. Furthermore, in Sch. Il. 2.827a Aristarchus does not recall any parallel use of τόξον in a more abstract sense in Homer—of course, this could also be due to a loss in the original note, but we enter the realm of speculation. In fact, the same interpretation for a very similar line (τόξον, ὅ τοι πόρε Φοίβος Ἀπόλλων, said by Ajax to Teucer) is given in Sch. Il. 15.441a (ὅτι τόξον λέγει οὖ τὸ σκεῦος τὸ πολεμικόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τοξικὴν τέχνην).


Il. 23.111, where Agamemnon sends ύφρης...καὶ ἄνέρας to the mountains to fetch the wood for Patroclus’ funeral pyre. Since ‘men’ (ἀνέρες) are opposed to ύφρης, it is clear that the latter are animals, especially those who carry loads and which are called ἡμίονοι, ‘mules’, at Il. 11.121. The specific reference in Sch. Il. 23.111a to the problem in Il. 1.50 (ὅτι σαφῶς ύφρης οἱ ἡμίονοι, πρὸς τὸ ‘ούρης μὲν πρῶτον ἐπάχυετο’ (Il. 1.50)) shows that indeed Aristarchus is here applying the principle of clarifying Homer from Homer to solve the zetema of Il. 1.50.

Eusebius, too, delves into linguistic analysis to solve problems in the Gospels. In particular, QESSt 15 gives a good example of linguistic analysis backed up by a reference to another work within the same ‘author’, just like Aristarchus does. The question concerns the meaning that we must attribute to the archangel Gabriel’s announcement to Mary that the son who would be born from her would sit ‘on the throne of David’ (Luke 1.32). Eusebius starts by saying that the phrase ‘to sit on a throne’ has three meanings: it can have a literal sense, indicating that someone is sitting on the throne, made of ivory and wood; it can be used to mean ‘to have power’ (i.e., in metaphorical sense, even if Eusebius does not use this expression); and—Eusebius goes on (at QESSt 15.1.8–12)—‘to these two mentioned meanings a third one could be added, according to which the throne promised by God to David could be called ‘his’: it is not [the throne] on which he sat, but [the one] which the divine scriptures mean in the prophecies to him’. Eusebius then quotes Psalm 88 and explains that the promises of a throne to David in that Psalm ‘were not about the kingship on the sensible world (οὐ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τῆς αἰώνιτῆς), nor about a throne conceived

12 In fact, in a similar way, ύφρης and κύνας at Il. 1.50 are opposed to αὐτοῖς at Il. 1.51—the ‘men’, whom Apollo shot after the animals (Il. 1.50–52): ύφρης μὲν πρῶτον ἐπάχυετο καὶ κύνας ἄργους,/ αὐτὸς ἔπειτα αὐτοῖς βέλος ἐχεπευκές ἐφείς / βάλλει(e) [he first attacked the mules and the swift dogs, but then, shooting a sharp arrow against the men themselves (αὐτοῖς), he hit them]. As a consequence, ύφρης are animals like κύνας; Sch. Il. 1.50a (οὐρής) ὅτι σαφὴς ὁ ἄργος τινς ‘οὐρής’ τοῦ φύλακας ἀντιδιάστέλλει γὰρ διὰ τοῦ αὐτοῖς (Il. 1.51) οὐρής; because some [take] ύφρης to mean ‘the sentinels’, not correctly; for [Homer] opposes them [to the men] through αὐτοῖς (Il. 1.51).

13 While for Aristarchus the author is only Homer, when discussing problems in the Bible or in the Gospels, by ‘author’ we must assume the entire sacred corpus of OT and NT.

14 With ‘prophecies’ I follow the suggestion ψευδοπόνων of D. J. D. Miller, “The Greek Abridged Selection (Εκλογέ in Epitome) from Vatican manuscript Palatinus Graecus 220,” in Eusebius, Gospel Problems and Solutions = Quæstiones ad Stephanum et Marinum (CPG 3470). ed. R. Pearse, trans. D. J. D. Miller (Greek, Latin), A. C. McCollum (Syriac, Arabic), C. Downer (Coptic) and others (Ipswich, UK: Chieftain, 2010), 1–129, at 83 n. 57 (rather than ψευδοπόνων in Zamagni, Eusèbe de Césarée, Questions évangéliques, which hardly makes sense).
in a more physical sense. For they were about some eternal throne (QEst 15.3.43–46). Eusebius then concludes (QEst 15.4) that the throne promised by Gabriel to Mary is the same throne that God swore to give David in Psalm 88.

Reinterpreting difficult words or phrases in order to make their sense acceptable in a context is a very obvious way to solve perceived contradictions or other textual obscurities. Yet both Aristarchus and Eusebius also back up their analysis with other passages within the same ‘text’ (Homer / OT and NT); in this way, by applying the principle of clarifying an author from the author himself, they ‘prove’ that their not-so-straightforward interpretations are indeed possible as they respect the author’s usage.¹⁵

1.2 Clarifying an Author from the Author Himself: Content-related Parallels in the Same Author

Recalling other passages in Homer to explain a line is one of the most common strategies in Aristarchus and it goes beyond linguistic analysis. For example, it can also be used to analyze two different episodes in the poem and show that they work in the same way, as happens with one of the most famous zetemata in antiquity, concerning Achilles’ shield. During the combat between Achilles and Aeneas, Homer says that the latter’s spear reaches the golden plate of Achilles’ shield (Il. 20.267–268), having pierced the two plates, one of bronze and the other of tin, while the other three remain undamaged (Il. 20.269–272).¹⁶ This description implies that the shield has the golden layer underneath, hidden by those of bronze and tin—which sounded very odd. Aristarchus gives two solutions (Sch. Il. 20.269–72a). The first is the athetesis of Il. 269–72, so that Aeneas’ spear is described only as hitting the (first) golden layer.¹⁷ However, Aristarchus also proposes another interpretation in order not to be accused of at loss of a better solution and simply get rid of the problematic lines (Sch.

¹⁵ Linguistic analysis is used in QEst 3.1 and QEst 12.2.

¹⁶ Il. 20.267–272: οὐδὲ τότ’ Αἴνειαο δαίδρονος δἐρμῖον ἐγχος / ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γάρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῦ / ἀλλὰ δύο μὲν ἠλάσας διὰ πτόχας, αἱ δ’ ἁρ’ ἐπὶ τρεῖς / ἔπι, ἐπὶ πέντε πτόχας ἠλάσας κυλλοδιῶν, / τὰς δύο χαλκείας, δύο δ’ ἐνδοθεὶ κασατέροιο, / τὴν δὲ μίαν χρυσῆν, τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο μελανόν ἐγχος [Nor did the mighty spear of wise-hearted Aeneas then break through the shield, because the gold stopped it, the gift of the god. He drove it through two folds, but there were still three, since the crooked-foot god had laid five layers, two of bronze, and two of tin, and one of gold, in which the spear of ash was stayed].

¹⁷ As the text now sounds: ‘Nor did the mighty spear of wise-hearted Aeneas then break through the shield, because the gold stopped it, the gift of the god’.
Il. 20.269–72a: ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῇ λύσεως ἡπορηκέναι καὶ διὰ τούτο ἡβετηκέναι, φησίν ὅτι...
He thus suggests understanding the passage in the sense that the first external layer of gold has stopped the force of the spear, but also that the shield has been pierced until the third layer (of tin). To prove his interpretation he recalls the wounding of Menelaus in Book 4, where the metal guard around his waist (μίτρη), although pierced, protects Menelaus from a major wound (Il. 4.138). In fact, Aristarchus recalls the zetema of Achilles’ shield when discussing this episode in Book 4 (Sch. Il. 4.138a: ἡ διπλῆ πρὸς τὸ ζητουμένον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως ὀσπίδος) exactly because the wounding of Menelaus explains it.

Eusebius, too, refers to similar examples in the Bible to ‘solve’ issues in the Gospels. For example, the first question to Stephanus concerns the fact that the evangelists trace Joseph’s descent, not Mary’s, as they say that Jesus was son of David (who is connected to Joseph). The problem arose because Jesus in fact was not the son of Joseph; so, if the evangelists wanted to trace his descent, they should have focused on Mary’s family, not Joseph’s. At QEST 1.8 Eusebius maintains that it was necessary to present Joseph as the father of Jesus and so keep a secret of Mary’s divine conception because Jesus was believed to be a mortal, and so a father was ‘expected’. In fact, even if Jesus accomplished miracles, this was not enough to make onlookers think that he was of divine birth—the same, in fact, happened with Moses, Elijah, and Elisha and the other prophets, who did accomplish miracles but were mortals. ‘Therefore—Eusebius concludes at QEST 1.8.141–143 out of these biblical parallels—the fact that he performed miraculous acts did not contribute to make people believe that Jesus was not born from a man’. Along the same way, in QEST 2 Eusebius solves the supposed contradiction between the genealogies in Matthew and Luke by recalling similar, different ways to trace genealogies in other books of the Bible (Ruth works like Matthew, the first book of Kingdoms (= 1 Samuel) like Luke, Chronicles has examples both similar to Matthew and to Luke).

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18 See Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 288–89.
20 In the following of the same chapter Eusebius also quotes passages from Matthew and Luke to show the necessity for Jesus to have a father. On this question, see also § 1.4
21 QEST 12 also proceeds by referring to parallels passages in the OT and in Matthew. QEST 8 solves a problem (why does Matthew 1.6 mention Uriah’s wife in the genealogy?) by using the Psalms. Another example of this procedure is discussed in the following footnote.
1.3 Solution Justified with the Intention of the Author (or of the Character)

A variation of clarifying the author from the author himself is to ‘save’ a passage by focusing on the specific intention of the author. By closely scrutinizing the context, the exegete can thus show that as much as the specific details may seem odd, unfitting or contradictory, they are in fact required by the specific goal the author had in mind. *QES* 12 and 13 discuss Matthew’s goal in solving two similar problems concerning the distinction between generations and successions. *QES* 12 asks why Matthew (1.17) speaks of fourteen generations between David and the Babylonian captivity when 1 *Chron.* 3.10–16 lists seventeen kings from David to Jeconiah (who was dethroned by Nebuchadnezzar II). For Eusebius the answer is straightforward: ‘he [i.e., Matthew] did not care for succession in his histories, but in his genealogy he includes only as many people as they were necessary to him to complete fourteen generations’ (*QES* 12.3.48–51). *QES* 13, on the other hand, asks why Matthew first lists twelve names in the genealogies from Jeconiah to Joseph (1.12–16) but then he says that ‘from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations’ (1.17). For Eusebius, this is ‘for the same reason: for, as I said, he wanted to record generations, not successions’ (*QES* 13.1.4–5)—indeed, there can be more generations than successions in a time span since some individuals can live long; hence ‘in this case fourteen generations would be completed in twelve successions’ (*QES* 13.1.12–14).²²

While the Aristarchean scholia to the *Iliad* do not really mention Homer’s intentions, a similar solution occurs when Aristarchus focuses on the intention of the characters. While characters ‘speak’ and ‘think’ through the author’s mind (so their ‘intentions’ are in fact the author’s), looking at ‘intentions’ implies close reading and close scrutiny of the context—which is another way of ‘clarifying an author from the author himself’. One problem discussed by Aristarchus concerns *Il.* 14.84, when Odysseus addresses Agamemnon as ‘you wretch (οὐλόμενε)’, which sounded disrespectful. While some scholars adopted the solution discussed at § 1.1 and thus gave an ‘unusual’ interpretation of the epithet, considering it to mean ‘mighty’ (*Sch. Il.* 14.84a: τινὲς ἀποδεδώκασιν οὐλόμενε δεινὲ) to ‘save’ Agamemnon’s honor, Aristarchus claims that in that specific context

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²² *QES* 13.2–3 gives another solution: the two different numbers can be harmonized by assuming that in 1.17 Matthew also includes Jesus in the generations and also counted two Joachim/Jeconiah (on this double name, see below § 2.3), bringing the number to fourteen compared to the twelve successions in 1.12–16. To ‘prove’ his solution, Eusebius refers to the Book of Kings, which shows that indeed there were two Joachim/Jeconiah (*QES* 13.3).
Odysseus’ intention is indeed that of reproaching Agamemnon. Hence a strong, even offensive address is in order and in fact in line with Odysseus’ intentions. Despite the slight differences in the problem treated, Eusebius and Aristarchus show that the specific, contextual circumstances as well the intention of the author or of a character are paramount to approach correctly a text.²³

1.4 Plausibility (εἰκός), Opportunity (καιρός), and Inappropriateness (ἀπρέπεια)

In their effort to find solutions to textual problems both Aristarchus and Eusebius share the unflinching belief that their texts of reference are blameless and proceed according to probability and appropriateness, both in terms of respecting the ‘right moment’ and in avoiding details that sound (morally or logically) unfitting. These assumptions of course are necessary for an exegete who deals with a ‘sacred’ text, such as Homer was for the Greeks and the Gospels were for the Christians.²⁴ For this reason, Aristarchus often rejects lines (i.e., athetes them) because they miss what is required in the specific narrative moment (καιρός) or they lack believability or logical plausibility (εἰκός)—and Homer would have never committed such mistakes.²⁵ Aristarchus also invokes these principles to defend lines from other scholar’s doubts, by stating that a passage is in fact believable, or logical, or fit for the specific situation. One example concerns Ἰλ. 10.447 when Diomedes, upon meeting the Trojan Dolon, addresses him by name: ‘Do not, Dolon (Δόλων), put in your mind any thought to escape’. This line caused difficulties to some exegetes who found it odd that the Greek hero knows Dolon’s name, as they never met before. So they suggested reading δολῶν, the participle of δολόω, ‘to deceive’: ‘Do not put in your mind any

²³ In fact, Eusebius too uses the principle of a character’s intention in QES7 7.1, discussed at § 1.7.

²⁴ Needless to say, the ‘sacredness’ of Homer is different from the ‘sacredness’ of the Bible and the Gospels; here I am mostly using the adjective ‘sacred’ as a synonym of ‘authoritative’. Yet, while the Greeks never had a ‘real’ sacred text as the Jews and the Christians had with the OT and NT respectively, it is also true that Homer, just like the Bible and the Gospels, was considered a foundational text, at the basis of Greek education and culture. In addition, as Herodotus famously states (2.53.2), Homer, together with Hesiod, was considered the founder of Greek religion. Cf. also Heinrici, “Aporienliteratur,” 843–44.

thought of escape, trying to deceive (δολῶν) [me]. Aristarchus, however, defends the text: there is nothing wrong with it, as it is plausible (εἰκός) that the Greeks knew certain enemies’ names after ten years of war around Troy (Sch. Il. 10.447a).

Eusebius, too, adopts the same criteria to defend the Gospels. We have already encountered QEST 1, where he explains why the evangelists do not trace Mary’s descent, but Joseph’s—which is properly false, since Joseph is not related to Jesus in any way. Eusebius suggests two solutions. The first is carried out with a logical argumentation: Eusebius argues that it is possible to understand by reason (QEST 1.3.42–43: “Εστι δὲ καὶ λογισμῷ λαβεῖν) that his contemporaries, seeing Jesus living as an ordinary person among them, would have had problems in accepting that he was born without a father from an unmarried girl; hence it was convenient (λυστελές ἦν) to depict Jesus as a descendant of Joseph’s family—also because otherwise Mary would have incurred punishment according to Moses’ law (QEST 1.3–4.42–51). On the other hand—Eusebius continues at QEST 1.8—it was even more difficult to believe in the divine birth of Jesus;26 so Eusebius concludes:

QEST 1.9.167–171: Οὐκοῦν ἀποδέδεικται ὅτι γρησίμως κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καρποῦ, ἢ μὲν ἐξ ἀγίου πνεύματος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ γένεσις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπεσιωπᾶτο, ὁ δὲ Ἰωσήφ ἐν χώρᾳ πατρὸς παρελαμβάνετο· εἰκότως οὖν ὁ πατήρ τοῦ παιδὸς ἐγενεαλογεῖτο.

Therefore it has been demonstrated that it was useful in that occasion that the generation of Jesus through the Holy Spirit was kept hidden to the public and that Joseph was taken to be his father. Thus, plausibly, the father of the son was listed in the genealogy.

Eusebius claims that this detail was ‘useful in that [specific] occasion’ (γρησίμως κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καρποῦ) and, like Aristarchus, concludes that it is thus plausible (εἰκότως) for the evangelist to list Josephus in the genealogy of Jesus. He then continues:

QEST 1.10.197–208: Τοῖς γούν καθ’ ἡμᾶς τοῖς παραδεξαμένοις καὶ τήν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρωπον αὐτὸν φύσιν ἐπεγνωκόσιν, εἰκότως τὰ τε λοιπὰ καὶ τὰ τῆς γενέσεως πιστὰ εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται· πλὴν ἄλλ’ οἱ θαυμάσιοι εὐαγγελισταὶ ἀναγκαίως τότε παρὰ Ἰουδαῖοι τὸν Ἰωσήφ ἐγενεαλογούν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον τὸν παρὰ πάσι βοῶμεν τοῦ Ἰησοῦ πατέρα· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο παρελθόντες μητρὸθεν αὐτὸν ἐγενεαλογοῦσιν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ ἀπεπέλεξεν εἶναι τούτῳ, καὶ τῆς τῶν θείων γραφῶν εὐθείας ἀλλότριως, ὅτι μηθεὶς τὸ πρότερον ἐκ γυναικὸς γενεαλογηθεῖσιν ἱστορεῖται, ἐδοξέων δὲ ἀπόκρυφος τις εἶναι καὶ διουγενῆς ὁ γενεαλογούμενος· τοῦτο δὲ, ὡς ἐφην, οὐ μικρὰς ἃν δυσφημίας ὁμοῦ καὶ κατηγορίας·

Our contemporary fellows, who have heard these [facts] and who have accepted his superhuman nature, plausibly accept the rest, including the facts concerning the birth, as trust-

26 This point has been discussed above, at §1.2.
worthy. However, among Jewish people, the excellent evangelists by necessity listed Joseph in the genealogy, since he was universally proclaimed to be the father of Jesus. For if they have avoided this and listed instead his genealogy from his mother's side, this would have been inappropriate and extraneous to the simplicity of the holy scriptures, because no one is recorded in the past to have had his genealogy listed from the women's side; moreover, the subject of the genealogy would have appeared to be someone without a father and of low birth. As I said, this could be the origin of no little slender and blame.

At the end, the reason behind the evangelists' choice is to avoid inappropriateness (ἀπρέπεια). This criterion of ἀπρεπές is very common among Alexandrian critics and it has been much discussed by modern scholars. On the one hand, it can certainly indicate lines perceived as 'unfitting' in terms of morality. On the other, it indicates more generally details or facts unfitting within the situation and the characters to which they are attributed.27 In the latter case, then, the idea of πρέπον, 'appropriateness', is closely connected to that of respecting the καυρός, the 'right moment', as in the following example in which these two criteria are combined to support an athetesis:

Sch. Il. 24.130–2a οὐ’ εὐνής; ἀγαθὸν δὲ (γυναικὶ—κραταίῃ): ἀδετοῦνται στίχοι τρεῖς, ὅτι ἀπρεπές μητέρα ὑψὸς λέγειν ἄγαθὸν ἄστι γυναικῇ μίαγεσθαι (cf. Il. 130 – 1). Ἐτι δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων ἀσυμφορώτατον ἔστι καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς εἰς πόλεμον ἔξοδοί· χρεία γὰρ εὐτυχίας καὶ πνεύματος, καὶ τὸ λέγειν ὅτι οἱ θάνατος σοι ἐγγὺς ἐστίν', ἀκαυρόν. δεικνύει δὲ τὶς τῶν αὐτῶν, οἰηθείς ἀποκρέμασθαι (τὸ) ὑδαί τι σῶτον (Il. 24.129). πλῆρες δὲ ἔστι, ‘σήν ἔδεα καρδίην, οὐδε τὸ τυχόν σῶτον μεμνημένος’.

‘Nor [taking heed] of bed? It is good [even to have sexual intercourse] with a woman—[death and] a strong [fate are close to you]’: three lines are athetized because it is inappropriate for a mother to say to her son: ‘it is good to have intercourse with a woman’ (cf. Il. 130 – 131). And it is the most unsuitable of all and in particular for those going to war, for [in this situation] there is necessity of vigor and spirit. And to say ‘death is close to you’ is out of place. Someone wrote these [lines] thinking that ‘not [taking heed] of food’ (Il. 24.129) was incomplete, but it is complete: ‘you will devour your heart, not remembering any food at all’.

Thetis' advice to Achilles, distraught by the sorrow for Patroclus, is considered suspicious by Aristarchus for several reasons: it is inappropriate (ἀπρεπές) for a mother to suggest to her son to have sex and out of place (ἀκαυρόν) to remind

him of his approaching death. Aristarchus’ condemnation of a comment as ‘out of place’ echoes, and in fact is the polar opposite of, Eusebius’ appeal to what is ‘useful in that occasion’ (χρησίμως κατ’ ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ). The two concepts (inappropriateness and lack of opportunity) are exactly those on which Eusebius builds up his defense of the genealogy of David for Jesus. Aristarchus uses them to reject a passage while Eusebius uses them to solve a problem—their goals are different but the strategies are the same.²⁸

1.5 Invoking ‘Ancient Usages’ Within a Self-consistent (Fictional or Historical) World

Another possibility to clarify an obscure passage is to recall the ancient usages of the people described in the ‘sacred’ text. This principle is also closely connected to, and in fact derives from, the assumption that the authors of ‘sacred’ texts are flawless and never contradict themselves; hence they must describe a self-consistent society within their entire production. Of course, the supposed ‘ancient usages’ should belong to the world beyond and outside the text itself; in fact, Christian authors often appeal to Josephus or even contemporary Jews to explain an unusual or ‘ancient’ practice or tradition.²⁹ This is not the case, however, with Aristarchus, when he speaks of the custom of the Homeric society. This difference might be simply due to the fact that unlike the Christians, who did have records about Jewish traditions outside the Bible, Aristarchus did not have any other source on the Homeric society except the Homeric poems themselves. Therefore, to find out ‘ancient Homeric usages’ he could only refer to other lines in Homer where the same usages occurred. For example, Aristarchus concludes that it is typical of Homeric society to carry a staff when speaking in public, as this is what happens both in the Iliad (Sch. Il. 10.321a; Sch. Il. 23.568a), in the city at peace depicted on Achilles’ shield (Sch. Il. 18.505a), and in the Odyssey (Sch. Od. 2.37b: ὅτι δὲ ἐκατέρας τῆς ποιήσεως ὀμηρικῶν ὁν τὸ ἔθος τετήρηται). As is clear, this is another application of the idea of clarifying an author from the author himself. Interestingly, in the Gospel Questions Eusebius follows Aristarchus’ method, as he simply invokes ancient usages without recalling any external evidence, as some of his Christian colleagues do. For example, QES t 4.2

²⁸ The principle of εἰκός/εἰκότως occurs also at QES t 9.2, QES t 10.1, QES t 11.1; QES t 16.2. The principle of καιρός is invoked at QES t 10.2.  
²⁹ For example, in the Letter to Africanus (§§ 11–12 De Lange) Origen says to have consulted some Hebrews concerning traditions alluded to in the story of Susanna; see R. E. Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 56–57, 71–72.
(derived from Iulius Africanus) Eusebius explains the problem of the different genealogies in the Gospels by recalling Israel’s ancient usages. Israel had both ‘natural’ descent (i.e., succession by legitimate birth) and legal descent (i.e., succession from a different father: when someone dies without children and his brother marries the wife of the deceased, the first child born from this marriage is considered the legal heir of the deceased) and this usage can thus explain the genealogical discrepancies in the evangelists: for example, Matthew normally gives the natural descent, Luke legal descent. Eusebius here does not go beyond his ‘sacred text’ to prove these ancient usages with some external testimony.³⁰ Aristarchus, too, explains difficult lines by referring to the ancient usages, i.e. those of the Homeric society. For example, in the archery contest in Book 23, ancient readers found it odd that Meriones, one contestant, takes the bow from Teucer, the other contestant, as soon the latter has shot (*Il.* 23.870–871). While some scholars tried to fix the text by suggesting emendations (see Didymus in *Sch. Il.* 23.870–1a¹), Aristarchus keeps the text and simply says that as much as this sounds odd, it is indeed correct: the ancient custom in archery contests was to have one bow only shared by all contenders in order not to favor any contender who might have had a different and better bow (*Sch. Il.* 23.870–1a¹);³¹ still, no external source is quoted to prove this point about the heroic society. In solving textual issues by simply invoking ‘ancient usages’ without any reference to external evidence, Aristarchus and Eusebius seem thus to have once again made the principle of clarifying an author from the author himself the leading criterion of their exegesis. They might have thought that being a rational, almost ‘scientific’, method in itself, it did not require additional external support.

### 1.6 Different Timing

Another strategy to ‘save’ a set of texts that seem to offer contradictory accounts of the same episode is to say that these in fact do not concern the same episode...
but rather different events happening at different times. While at first sight this can sound as a most extreme application of the idea of a ‘sacred’ text’s flawlessness, both Eusebius and Aristarchus apply this strategy quite skillfully, so that their ‘solutions’ sound credible. QEMar 4 discusses the question of the different accounts in the four evangelists regarding what happens at the tomb: ‘How is it that in Matthew Mary of Magdala, with the other Mary, has seen one angel outside the tomb, sitting on the stone of the tomb, and according to John Mary of Magdala sees two angels, sitting inside the tomb, but according to Luke two men appeared to the women and according to Mark a young man sitting to the right of the tomb was seen by them, that is, Mary of Magdala, Jacob’s Mary, and Salome?’ The first solution proposed by Eusebius is that indeed these are different episodes; first, there is the incident in Matthew, then the one in John, and they concern the appearance of angels; the stories told by Luke and Mark, on the other hand, concern human beings and are different episodes completely. So Eusebius concludes:

QEMar 4.2.30 – 35: “Εστιν οὖν εἶπεν οὗτως, ὅτι θεσσάρων ὄντων τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν, ἰσαρθή-μοι τούτως καὶ αἰ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἄναγραφέασαι φαίνονται ὅππασαί· οἷ τε καὶροι τέσσαρες, καὶ οἱ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καθὼς ὄφθεντες ἰδιαζόντες· ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ αἱ θεώμεναι τῶν γυναικῶν διάφοροι, καὶ οἱ παρὰ τῶν ὀφθεντων λόγοι λεγόμενοι πρὸς αὐτὰς παραλλάττοντες.

Thus we can say that the evangelists are four and so are the visions which appear to have been written by them; the occasions are four, and those who were seen in each occasion are different. Similarly, also the women who had the visions are different and the words spoken to them by those who were seen are dissimilar.

Indeed the episodes have so many discrepancies that the solution holds.32 Aristarchus uses the same idea for a rather more mundane episode in Homer. He argues against the Chorizontes, a group of scholars who maintained that the Iliad and the Odyssey were by different authors and, to prove their point, they pointed out to several inconsistencies between them:33

32 A similar explanation (different timing in John and Matthew) occurs in QEMar 3.3. In QESl 16 Eusebius solves the possible contradiction between Matthew and Luke (according to Matthew, Jesus was taken from Bethlehem to Egypt, but Luke says that he was taken to Jerusalem, and then to Nazareth) with the same principle: they recount different events happened at different times. As Matthew Crawford pointed out to me, a similar strategy is employed by Eusebius also in HE 3.24.8 – 13, where he argues the Gospels are not discordant if one recognizes that they have different chronologies, with the three synoptic ones recording only one year of Jesus’ life, after the arrest of John the Baptist, and the gospel of John recording the time before John’s arrest.

33 On Aristarchus and the Chorizontes, see Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 623 – 51.
The episode of the *Odyssey* in question is the account by Demodocus in *Od*. 8.266–366 of the love affair between Ares and Aphrodite: in that occasion Aphrodite is married to the lame Hephaestus. In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, when Ares is wounded by Athena in the battle of the gods, Aphrodite saves him (*Il*. 21.416–422). From this episode, the Chorizontes (fr. 8 Kohl) say that the poet of the *Iliad* knows that Aphrodite lives with Ares, while in disagreement [with this view] the poet of the *Odyssey* [knows that she lives] with Hephaestus. It is necessary to state that the times of the relationship are not the same.

Aristarchus solves the issue by stating that Aphrodite may have been married to (or lived with) both Hephaestus and Ares, but at different times. In particular, Aphrodite first lived with Hephaestus and then, after the affair with Ares and the harsh punishment of Hephaestus, she broke her marriage and started a new liaison with Ares. Demodocus’ song, therefore, refers to the past, while during the war of Troy and Odysseus’ wanderings Aphrodite is married to Ares.⁴ Even if in this case the two episodes are much hazier in terms of details, Aristarchus’ solution is indeed credible because the two narratives can be logically envisaged as successive and closely linked. So even if this strategy seems at first less convincing than other, more text-based solutions, the cases in which both Aristarchus and Eusebius apply it are plausible enough.

### 1.7 Etymology and Allegory

In *QES* 7 Eusebius has to explain why Matthew mentions Tamar, a less than honorable woman. Since Tamar is a prostitute the problem of ‘propriety’ is lurking. The first solution (*QES* 7.1–2) is to refer to *Genesis* where it is stated that when Tamar acted as prostitute, she was setting a trap to Judah to have a son from him, as she was childless (*Gen*. 38:11–27). Having a child was very important ‘at that time’ (explanation on the basis of ancient customs) and moreover she had a noble purpose: to have a child from the family Abraham and Isaac, who

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were Judah's ancestors (explanation on the basis of the character's intentions). On the contrary, Judah had deceived Tamar and was unable to control himself because, when his wife died, he took up a prostitute (i.e., Tamar in disguise)—while Tamar did wait for Judah's wife to die before carrying on her plans (QEst 7.2). So at the end Tamar turns out to be wise and chaste, compared to Judah. So far, Eusebius has followed the Aristarchean principles outlined above, especially those of logical appropriateness and opportunity, backed up by references within the same author (Genesis). Yet at this point Eusebius speaks of 'riddles' (αἰνίγματα) that were not passed in silence by the evangelist (QEst 7.3.78–79: ὃν ἐνεκα ἡγούμαι μὴ παρασεσσωπήσατι τὰ παρὰ τῷ θαυμασίῳ εὐαγγελιστῆ τὰ ἐν τούτοις αἰνίγματα). He then embarks in a rather complex allegorical interpretation, supporting it both with etymology and references to other passages in Genesis and Eph. 2.14–16. Etymology and allegory were often employed simultaneously by Greek exegetes, especially the Stoics, who famously reinterpreted Homeric divine epithets to make them square with their view of the cosmos. Aristarchus, too, used etymological analysis. On the other hand, while rejecting allegoresis (i.e., allegorical interpretation) because it went beyond the author's intentions (as the Stoics, for example, applied it), he actually accepted the trope called 'allegory' (Sch. II. 8.195a and 13.359a). The latter for the ancients was the use of images and figurative language by the poet himself, and so was a legitimate way of reading a text because it was 'internal' to it. In this sense, by recalling

35 On the importance of 'riddles' (αἰνίγματα) for allegorical readings in classical antiquity, see P. T. Struck, Birth of the Symbol. Ancient Readers at the Limits of Their Texts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), who has aptly coined the phrase 'poetics of the enigma/of the riddle' (39 and 71).


37 See Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 340–76.

38 Even if the ancient term for ‘allegory’ is ὑπόνοια and Plut. De aud. poet. 19e-f says that ἀλληγορία is a modern term (ταίς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις), the term ἀλληγορία is in fact used by Tryphon’s De Tropis (see next footnote) and in these Aristonicus scholia (καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλληγορία in Sch. II. 8.195a and ἡ διπλῆ, ὅτι παραλληγορεῖ in Sch. II. 13.359a)—and Tryphon and Aristonicus are dated between the first century BCE and the early first century CE.

39 Cf. Tryph. ii, Trop. § 1 West: ἀλληγορία ἐστὶ φράσις ἔτερον μὲν τι (κυρίως) δηλούσα, ἔτερου δὲ ἐννοιαν παρετῶσα [allegory is an expression which literally indicates one thing but suggests the idea of another]. Eustathius best describes Aristarchus’ attitude in this regard, commenting the episode of Apollo shooting dogs, mules, and men in Iliad 1 (Eust. 40.25–34, ad II. 146): 'The story without making too much of this says in a fairly concrete way that Apollo touches the quiv-
other references in the OT and NT to prove his etymological/allegorical analysis, Eusebius follows the same principle: allegory here is not external. In other words, Eusebius is not diving into allegoresis, a forced reading of a text beyond the intention of the original author; rather, he presents his etymological allegory as required by the text itself because the same imagery occurs elsewhere in the ‘sacred text’. This procedure is thus closer to the allegory-trope accepted by Aristarchus; still, this is certainly the solution that sounds the least Aristarchean among those presented in the Gospel Questions. As also noted by Perrone,⁴⁰ this is the only instance of allegorical interpretation in a work that seems in fact to purposely avoid allegory, while using other (Aristarchean) ways to solve problems in the text.⁴¹

2 Beyond Aristarchus?

In the solutions surveyed above Eusebius seems to follow Aristarchus mainly with regard to the principle of ‘clarifying an author from the author himself’, variously applied, and the assumption that a sacred text follows by default principles of ‘appropriateness’, ‘logical opportunity’ and ‘plausibility’/’believability’. Yet in some other solutions, especially contained in the Questions to Marinus, Eu-

er, handles the bow, shoots an arrow and strikes, and that those who have been struck fall and many pyres burn for them. And this is what also Aristarchus accepts, as the ancients say. For, as has already been said, he did not want to interpret allegorically anything of what is to be found in Homer, for example, to reduce Zeus to sky, sun, air, or mind; or [to reduce] Athena to wisdom, earth, or aether, or Hera to air or monarchy, or Ares to courage or war, or Hephaestus to fire, and the other [gods] to other [abstract ideas]. But he understood everything according to what has been already shown and said beforehand in the story. And even though allegory is a poetic trope, he [only] considered rhetorical allegory, that is: the rhetorical figure called ‘allegory’ about which we will discuss below. On Aristarchus’ use of allegory see A. Cucchiarelli, “‘Allegoria retorica’ e filologia alessandrina.” SIFC 15 (1997): 210 – 30; Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 138–42.


⁴¹ As Matthew Crawford has rightly pointed out to me, it is probably also significant that Eusebius doesn’t simply give an ‘allegorical’ reading but first gives a more Aristarchean explanation (in QES 7.1–2) and then goes on to allegory (in QES 7.3), perhaps recognizing that the two strategies had differing persuasive values. On Eusebius’ limited use of allegory and his ‘literal exegesis’, see M. J. Hollerich, Eusebius of Caesarea’s Commentary on Isaiah. Christian Exegesis in the Age of Constantine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 67–102; M. J. Hollerich, “Eusebius,” in The New Cambridge History of the Bible, Volume 1: From the Beginnings to 600, ed. J. C. Paget and J. Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 629–52, at 639–40 (on this specific question on Tamar) and at 649.
sebius adopts other, more specific Aristarchean strategies and seems in fact even to go beyond Aristarchus in applying philological standards with rigor.

2.1 Athetesis, Manuscript Evidence, Punctuation

The first question to Marinus concerns an apparent contradiction between Matthew and Mark, since the former says that the Savior’s resurrection took place ‘late on Sabbaths’ (ὄψε Σαββάτων), but in Mark it was ‘early in the morning on the first day of the Sabbaths’ (πρωī τῇ μιᾷ τῶν Σαββάτων).

For Eusebius, there are two possible solutions (QEMar 1.1.4: τούτου διττή Ἰν εἰη ᾧ λύσις).

The first is the athetesis, since the pericope ‘early in the morning on the first day of the Sabbaths’ is not found in all the copies of Mark. In the best manuscripts of Mark (QEMar 1.1.7: τὰ γοῦν ἀκριβηὶ τῶν ἀντιγράφων)—in fact in most manuscripts of Mark (QEMar 1.1.12–13: ἐν τούτῳ γάρ σχεδόν ἐν ἄπασι τοῖς ἀντιγράφοις τοῦ κατὰ Μάρκου Εὐαγγελίου)—the paragraph ends without it (QEMar 1.1.14: περιγράφατο τὸ τέλος). So this temporal comment, which is contradictory with the other Gospels, is extraneous to the text of Mark. Hence Eusebius concludes (QEMar 1.1.14–16): ‘what follows in some rare copies, but not in all, may be superfluous (περιττὰ Ἰν εἰη) and especially if it contained a contradiction (ἐπερ ἔχοιεν ἀντιλογίαν) to the evidence of the other evangelists’.

Aristarchus famously used athetesis to reject passages that were in contradiction with other passages in Homer or that were syntactically or semantically superfluous (στιχοὶ περισσοί). Yet, while Eusebius invokes the same critical principles, he also explicitly says that the problematic pericope was not well attested in the manuscript tradition—in other words, his athetesis is ‘philologically’ justified. In contrast, there is no case in the Aristarchean scholia to the Iliad where Aristarchus supports an athetesis by claiming that the suspicious lines are missing in some manuscripts. Perhaps this was in fact also the case, but this piece of information got lost in the course of tradition. This possibility cannot be excluded; yet, on the basis of our sources, we can only note that his scholia

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42 Expressions such as τῇ μιᾷ τῶν Σαββάτων/Σαββάτου or ὄψε Σαββάτων are notoriously difficult to translate, as σαββάτον can mean both ‘week’ or ‘7th day of the week’ (i.e., Sabbath) both in the singular and in the plural; see BDAG, s.v. I have kept my translation as close as possible to the original Greek, using the plural ‘Sabbaths’ for Σαββάτων and Sabbath for Σαββάτου.


44 See D. Lührs, Untersuchungen zu den Athetesen Aristarchs in der Ilias und zu ihrer Behandlung im Corpus der exegetischen Scholien (Hildesheim: Olms-Weidmann, 1992), 18–148; Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 463–68.
discussing atheteseis never mention manuscript evidence when rejecting a line. As our evidence goes, therefore, all Aristarchus’ atheteseis are based on internal reasons only. On the other hand, Eusebius backs up his subjective judgment (contradiction with other passages and superfluity) with more objective data (manuscript evidence).

In addition to the athetesis, however, Eusebius also suggests another solution, more suitable to those who are resistant to athezing anything in the Gospels (QEMar 1.2.19–21: ἀλλος δὲ τις οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν τολμῶν ἀθετεῖν τῶν ὅπωςοῦν ἐν τῇ τῶν εὐσαγγελίων γραφῆ γερμένων, διπλὴν εἶναι φησὶ τῇ ἀνάγνωσιν, ώς καὶ ἐν ἑτέρωι πολλοῖς,):

QEMar 1.3.29–37: το γὰρ ἀναστὰς δὲ πρωί τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ Σαββάτου’ κατά τὸν Μάρκον, μετὰ διαστολῆς ἁναγνωσόμεθα· καὶ μετὰ τό ἀναστάς δ’, ὑποστίζομεν· καὶ τῇ διάνοιαν ἀφορίσομεν τῶν ἐξῆς ἐπιλεγομένων‘ εἶτά τὸ μὲν ἀναστάς‘ ἄν, ἐπὶ τὴν παρὰ τῷ Ματθαίῳ ὅψε Ἀχίλλεως;‘ τότε γὰρ ἐγήγερτο· τὸ δ’ ἐξῆς ἐτέρας ὁ διανοιαὶς ὑποστασικῶν, συνάψωμεν τοῖς ἐπιλεγομένοις ‘πρωί γὰρ τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ Σαββάτου ἐφάνη Μαρία τῇ Μαγδαληνῇ’.

We shall read what is in Mark: ‘having risen again early in the morning in the first day of the Sabbath’ with a pause; and we shall punctuate after ‘having risen again’; and we will separate this idea from what follows. Then ‘having risen again’ would [correspond] to Matthew’s ‘late on Sabbaths’, for this is when he resurrected. The following part, which generates a different idea, let us connect it with what follows: ‘for early in the morning in the first day of the Sabbath he appeared to Mary of Magdala’.

By reading the same text with a different punctuation (which implies a different syntactic articulation of the text), there is no contradiction between Mark and Matthew. The resurrection now takes place in both of them ‘late on Sabbaths’ but then Christ appeared to Mary Magdalene ‘early in the morning’. Solutions based on a different punctuation were common in Alexandrian scholarship and Aristarchus adopted this strategy to solve one of the most famous zetemata in the Iliad. It concerned the meaning of the proem, when Homer said that the ‘will of Zeus was brought to fulfillment’ (II. 1.5). Aristarchus (Sch. II. 1.5–6) connects this phrase with lines 6–7: ‘from when (ἐξ οὐ) first Atreus’ son, lord of men, and the noble Achilles stood apart quarreling’. In this way, then, Zeus’
will is closely linked with the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon and refers specifically to his will to honor Achilles, offended by Agamemnon, as Zeus promises to Thetis at II. 1.503 – 530. Others, however, connected the temporal clause in lines 6–7 not to line 5, but backwards to line 1: ‘The wrath sing, goddess, of Peleus’ son Achilles... from when (ἐξ οὗ) first Atreus’ son, lord of men, and the noble Achilles stood apart quarreling’. In this way, the second hemistich of line 5 (‘and thus the will of Zeus was fulfilled’) remained isolated and could then only refer to the entire war of Troy. This reading would have thus supported the later tradition that Zeus caused the Trojan War to solve the problem of overpopulation, as the Cypria recounted (Sch. D II. 1.5). Aristarchus totally rejected this interpretation as it was based on a non-Homeric mythical tradition; so he found a syntactic solution to read the proem differently.

This approach to zetemata is definitely sophisticated and presupposes a rather refined taste for syntactic fineries. While this is not surprising for Aristarchus, Eusebius too shows to be very skilled in this area. Having worked extensively as corrector and editor of the Bible, where punctuation was of course a recurrent problem, he reapplied these skills to the exegesis of the Gospels. ⁴⁷

**2.2 The Author as Exegete of Himself, Homonymy, and Scribal Mistakes**

QEMar 2 offers some interesting parallels with Alexandrian practice as well as some important points of departure from it, so it is worth discussing it in more detail. The problem concerns a supposed contradiction between Matthew and John: according to Matthew, Mary Magdalene had witnessed the resurrection ‘late on Sabbaths’ (ὀψὲ Σαββάτων) but in John she stands at the tomb in tears ‘on the first day of the Sabbath’ (τῇ μιᾷ τοῦ Σαββάτου). In this case, too, Eusebius offers two solutions. The first is linguistic:

QEMar 2.1.4–11: Οὐδὲν ἂν ἐπεριπλάνεσθαι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, εἰ τοῦ ὀψὲ Σαββάτων μὴ τὴν ἐσπέραντον ἔραν τὴν μετὰ τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ Σαββάτου λέγεσθαι ὑπολάβομεν, ὡς τινες ὑπελήφθησιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἑβδόμη καὶ ὀψὲ τῆς νυκτὸς τῆς μετὰ τὸ Σάββατον οὕτω γάρ καὶ ὀψὲ τῆς ὀρας

to fulfillment, from when first Atreus’ son, lord of men, and the noble Achilles stood apart quarreling].

Eusebius anchors his analysis to modern linguistic usage (οὖτω ... εἰώθημεν λέγειν), which is exactly what Aristarchus does in the following scholium:

Sch. II. 13.493a πίστευε' ἐκ βοτάνης; ὅτι 'ἐκ βοτάνης' ἐστὶ μετὰ τὴν βόσκησιν, ὡς λέγομεν 'ἐξ ἀρίστου παρέσωμα' ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον

'From the pasture to drink': because ‘from the pasture’ (ἐκ βοτάνης) is ‘after the pasture’ (μετὰ τὴν βόσκησιν), just as we say ‘I will be there away from lunch (ἐξ ἀρίστου)’ instead of ‘after lunch (μετὰ τὸ ἄριστον)’.

The specific question is different (Aristarchus is here focusing on the Homeric use of different prepositions compared to koine) but the method is the same. Both Aristarchus and Eusebius clarify an odd use in an author by recalling similar uses in daily contemporary language. Rather than clarifying an author from the author himself, they draw parallels with the spoken usage known to the readers, which is also a rather obvious and straightforward exegetical strategy—in fact, it is an easier way to make points clear to contemporary audiences, who might not be expert of all the linguistic usages of the text they are studying but who are certainly at ease with their own daily language. Eusebius, however, also supports his interpretation by calling attention to a linguistic usage in the Gospels and to the very text of Matthew, who has acted as exegete of himself:

QEMar 2.1.11–15: ὂθεν ὡσπερ διερμηνεύων αὐτὸς ἐαυτὸν, ὁ Ματθαῖος μετὰ τὸ ὁμφατικώς ἐπήγαγε τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ, φησι: δηλαδὴ ὥρα τῇ λοιπῇ ηδή ὑποφανοῦση, καὶ ἐπιφωσκούση εἰς τὴν Κυριακὴν ἡμέραν. ... 2.2.38–42: Ἐθελ δὲ ὅτι τὴν ἐβδομάδα Σάββατον καλεῖν, καὶ πάσας τὰς ἡμέρας οὔτως ὑπομάζειν. Λέγεται γοῦν παρὰ τοῖς εὐαγγελισταῖς τῇ μιᾷ τῶν Σαββάτων: ἐν δὲ τῇ συνθείᾳ, δευτέρᾳ Σαββάτων, καὶ τρίτῃ Σαββάτων, καὶ τετάρτῃ Σαββάτων: ... 2.2.51–56: ὡστε καὶ ἐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς κεκρατικοῦσας ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τοῦ θεοῦ συνθείᾳς, τὸν διὰ τοῦ ὁμφατικοῦ δηλούμενον καιρόν, μὴ τὴν ἐσπερινὴν ὑπάρχῃ εἰς, ἀλλὰ ταύτην, ἣν Ματθαίος αὐτὸς παρέστησαν εἰπὼν τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ εἰς μίαν Σαββάτων.

Hence, as if he wanted to be exegete of himself, after ‘late on Sabbaths’ Matthew added ‘at dawning’, that is, clearly ‘at the time when the day is already started and at dawning towards the Lord’s day’—...The custom was to call the whole week ‘Sabbath’ and all the days also in this way. Thus in the evangelists it is said ‘on the first one day
of Sabbaths'; and, in normal usage, ‘the second of Sabbaths’, and ‘the third of Sabbaths’, and ‘the fourth of Sabbaths’. …so that from actual practice and the custom that has prevailed among the churches of God, the moment expressed by ‘late on Sabbaths’ is not the evening-time, but the time which Matthew himself has presented saying ‘at dawning towards the first day of Sabbaths’.

Here Sabbath does not mean the day called ‘Sabbath’ but indicates the entire week, and this is typical of the evangelists (e.g., Mark 16.2; Luke 24.1; John 20.1, 19). In this way, Eusebius clarifies an author from the author himself. He, however, also further ‘proves’ his point by pointing out that Matthew has added an additional detail that clarifies what he means, when he says ‘at dawning’, which shows that he does not mean the night of Saturday but in fact the early morning of Sunday, just like John. Aristarchus, too, often points out that Homer is exegete of himself. For example, unlike the Neoteroi (i.e., the poets after Homer), who use the word μῆλα for all the quadrupeds, in Homer the word means only sheep and goats. This becomes clear from II. 10.485–486 (‘just as a lion rushes on flocks [μήλοιον] without their shepherd / on goats or sheep [αἴγεσιν ἢ ὀἴσοι], and leaps upon them with evil purpose’), in which Homer explains what μῆλα mean by adding the apposition ‘goats or sheep’ (Sch. II. 10.486: αἴγεσιν ἢ ὀἴσοιν: ὅτι ἐπεξηγεῖται, τίνα τά μῆλα).

The idea that an author is exegete of himself is not the same as the principle of clarifying an author from the author himself, even though, of course, the two ideas are connected. In fact, the former is a subdivision of the latter, more general principle: while normally it is the scholar’s task to find the key to explain his author in the text itself, sometimes the explanation is offered by the author himself, who acts as his own exegete offering a ready-made explanation to the scholar. It is thus interesting to note that both Aristarchus and Eusebius comply with both principles in their exegesis. In this question in particular, Eusebius com-

48 Indeed, the same self-explanation of what μῆλα are in Homer occurs in a line from the Odyssey (Od. 9.184: μῆλ’, διές τε καὶ αἴγες) quoted in Sch. II. 10.485b: ὅτι μῆλα οἱ νεώτεροι πάντα τὰ τετράποδα, ὁμηρὸς δὲ αἴγας καὶ διῖς ‘μῆλ’, διές τε καὶ αἴγες’ (Od. 9.184) [because the Neoteroi [call] μῆλα all the quadrupeds, but Homer [calls so] goats and sheep [only]; e.g., μῆλ’, διές τε καὶ αἴγες’ (Od. 9.184)]. For other examples of this approach in Aristarchus, see R. Nünlist, The Ancient Critic at Work: Terms and Concepts of Literary Criticism in Greek Scholia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 202 and 203; Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 220–21.

49 In fact, Porphyry clearly connects them in QH 1, 56.3–6 Sodano: ἀξίων δὲ ἐγώ Ὅμηρον ἔξ Ὅμηρου σαφήνειν αὐτόν ἐξηγούμενον ἐκατόν ὑπεδείκτων, ποτὲ μὲν παρακεφαλέως, ἀλλοτε δὲ ἐν ἄλλοις [considering it right to clarify Homer from Homer, I have shown that Homer interprets himself sometimes in passages which are nearby, sometimes in other [more remote] passages].
bines the two strategies, the use in the Gospels and the self-exegesis of Matthew, and concludes that there is agreement between the two Gospels (QEMar 2.3.73–74: οὖτω γὰρ ἡ συμφωνία συνδράμοι ἐν τῶν εὐαγγελικῶν φωνῶν) and that ‘in this way the same Mary of Magdala saw both what is in Matthew and what is in John (QEMar 2.4.94–96). The same idea of ‘accord’ (συμφωνία) among different passages in Homer often recurs in the scholia by Aristarchus (Sch. Il. 2.107a; 3.230a; 7.330b; 8.19), who has the same agenda: to show that Homer is self-consistent and never contradicts himself.

Eusebius then suggests another solution:

QEMar 2.6.125–129: Λυθεὶς δ’ ἄν καὶ ἄλλως τὰ προκείμενα, εἰ ἑτέρας μὲν τὰς παρὰ τῷ Μᾶτθαιῷ Μαρίας ὑπολάβοις εἶναι, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν παρὰ τῷ Ἰωάννῃ· τέσσαρας γοῦν τὰς πάσας Μαρίας παρούσας τῷ πάθει τοῦ Σωτῆρος μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων γυναικῶν εὑρίσκομεν’ ... 2.7.147–154: Τούτων οὖν τῶν τεσσάρων Μαρίων, εἰ τὰς δύο τὰς παρὰ τῷ Ματθαίῳ ἀγίᾳ Σαββάτων τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ εἰς μίαν Σαββάτων’ ἐλθούσας ἐπὶ τὸ μνημεῖον, καὶ τὸν ἀγγέλον θεασαμένας, ἑτέρας εἶναι ἐκλάβοις παρὰ τὴν ‘πρῶτη τῆς μιᾷ τῶν Σαββάτων, ἐπὶ σκοτιάς οὔσης’ ἀφικομένην μόνην κατὰ τὸν Ἰωάννην, ἀγνοοῦσαν τὸ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν, καὶ διὰ τούτου κλαίουσαν, οὐδὲν ἄν σκολιὸν ἀπαντήσει, πάσης ἀπορίας καὶ ζητήσεως ἐκποιών ἀριθμείσης·

The [problem] at hand could also be solved in a different way, if you assumed that the Marys in Matthew were different from the one in John. For we find four Marys in total among the other women present at the Saviour’s passion [i.e., Mary the mother of Jesus; her sister, Mary the wife of Clopas; Mary Magdalene; Mary the mother of James and Joseph]. ... Of these four Marys, if you were to take the two in Matthew, who came to the tomb ‘late on Sabbaths, at dawning towards the first day of Sabbaths’ and who saw the angel, as different from the one who in John came alone ‘early in the morning, on the first day of the Sabbaths, while it was still dark’ and who did not know about the resurrection (and this is why she was crying), no obscurity would surface, because every difficulty and question would have been completely removed.

According to this solution, the Marys in Matthew are different from the Mary in John, so the evangelists are describing different episodes with different characters who have however the same name—hence the confusion. Homonymy is an ‘excuse’ often invoked by Aristarchus for similar problems involving a possible contradiction within Homer. The most famous cases concern ‘resurrected heroes’, that is, those heroes that die and then appear again alive later on in the poem. This is typical of oral poetry, in which minor characters are many (and dispensable); because these are not central figures, an oral poet can sometimes forget that they had been already killed, and reuse their names while re-composing in performance—hence the ‘resurrections’. But for Aristarchus, who did not know that these slips in memory are to be accepted in oral poetry, this

50 See Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 267–72.
was a problem, as the poet was openly contradicting himself. His solution was to assume homonymy, that is, there was more than one hero with the same name. The most famous case is that of Pylaemenes, leader of the Paphlagonians (II. 2.851), killed by Menelaus at II. 5.576–579. However, in Book 13 he appears again, crying after the funeral chariot of his son Harpalion, who has just been killed by Meriones (II. 13.658–659). Like Eusebius, Aristarchus proposes two solutions:

Sch. Il. 13.658–9α ἀχνύμενον· μετὰ δὲ σφι (πατήρ κίε δάκρυα λείβων, ἑ) ποινὴ δ᾿ οὗ τις παιδὸς (ἐγίνετο τεθνῶτος); ἀδετοῦνται ἀμφότεροι, ότι πλανηθείς τις ἐκ τοῦ ὅ ῥα πατρὶ φίλῳ ἔπετο’ (II. 13.644) ἔταξαν αὐτούς, ἵνα καὶ ὁ πατήρ τὸν ὑών ὀδύρηται. οὐ λέγει δὲ ‘νῦν ἔπετο’, ἀλλ’ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος παρεγίνετο; διό καὶ πρόσκειται τὸ ἔς Τροΐην, οὐδ’ αὖτις ἀφίκετο’ (II. 13.645). εἰ δὲ μένοιν οἱ στίχοι οὕτοι, νοητέον ὀμνυμίαν εἶναι.

‘Grieving; and with them went his father, shedding tears; but there was no blood-price for his dead son’: both lines are athetized because someone misled by ‘[Harpalion,] who followed his dear father’ (II. 13.644) added them, so that the father, too, could mourn the son. But [the poet] does not say: ‘[who] then followed’, but when first he came from his country: therefore, the line ‘to Troy, but he did not come back’ (II. 13.645) is also added. But if these two lines remain, we must consider it a case of homonymy.

The first option is the athetesis. Aristarchus supports it by stating that an interpolator misunderstood the meaning of II. 13.644 (by ‘[Harpalion,] who followed his dear father’), thinking that it meant that Harpalion followed his father Pylaemenes on that very day to fight the Greeks, rather than that Harpalion simply followed his father to the war, when it first started (which is the correct meaning). As a consequence of his misunderstanding that both father and son were present in this specific episode, the interpolator added lines 658–659, so that the father, Pylaemenes, could mourn his son after he had been killed. Since this was an addition due to a misunderstanding, for Aristarchus these lines could be dispensed of. He, however, also provides an alternative lysis which avoids the athetesis: homonymy, that is, in Homer there are two Pylaemenes, one killed by Menelaus in Book 5, and the other, father of Harpalion, in Book 13.

In comparing Eusebius and Aristarchus in these cases we might say that Eusebius seems to have refined Alexandrian philological techniques. First, as we saw in the previous section, in QEMar 1.1 Eusebius supports an athetesis by stating that the pericope at issue is not well attested in the manuscripts of Mark. This is in striking contrast with Aristarchus, who in this case speaks of an interpolation but without substantiating his claim by data from the manuscript tradition—that is, that the line was for example missing in some of the copies he inspected. He simply assumes the action of some ‘interpolators’ but does not have any ex-
ternal evidence to support his claim. So, as already noted above at § 2.1, Aristarchus does not seem to be preoccupied to give ‘external’ support to his subjective judgments.

As for homonymy, here too Eusebius seems to employ the criterion a bit more skillfully than Aristarchus. Pylaemenes in the Iliad can hardly be a homonymy: he is always said to be from Paphlagonia and the name is not common. On the other hand, Mary is a very common name and there are actually many Marys in the Gospels, so Eusebius can carry out his ‘solution’ more persuasively. In fact, Eusebius goes a step further in addressing a possible objection to his ‘solution’: that in both Matthew and John this Mary is said to be ‘of Magdala’, which would definitely problematize the homonymy argument:

QEMar 2.8.162–171: Ei δὲ τὸ τῆς Μαγδαληνῆς προσκείμενον ἐν ἁμφοτέροις τοῖς εὐσαγγελισταῖς ὅνομα τὴν διάνοιαν ταράττει, ἀλλ’ οὐ προσῆκε τὴν θείαν συχείν γραφὴν λέξεως μίας ἢ ὀνόματος ἐνεκεν, διὸ πολλάκις συμβαίνει καὶ κατὰ γραφικόν προσκείθησαί σφάλμα: ἕ γὰρ δύο καὶ τάκτας ἀπὸ μίας πόλεως ἢ κώμης τῆς Μαγδαληνῆς ὀρθομάθη ήγητέον· ἕ ἐπὶ μίας αὐτῶν προσκείθησα τὸ τῆς Μαγδαληνῆς ἐπώνυμον, ἀπάς τοῦ γραφέως κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν σφαλέντος, ὅτι εἰ ἐκείνου τῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν πρώτω ἐπικολουθηκότως σφάλματι·

But if the name ‘of Magdala’, which is present in both evangelists, causes confusion in the sense, one should not tamper with the divine scripture because of one word or name, which often happens to be due to a scribal mistake. We must either suppose that these two women came both from the same city or village, that of Magdala; or that the appellative ‘of Magdala’ was given only to one of them and that, once a scribe made a mistake early on, the scribes after him followed this first mistake.

Eusebius here demonstrates to be a rather skillful philologist in realizing the possible objection to his argument—a self-critical attitude which is often lacking in Aristarchus’ fragments. On the other hand, here Eusebius falls in the same pitfalls that we have highlighted for Aristarchus in the Pylaemenes question: the supposition of a scribal mistake without any external proof. In fact, he himself

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51 For this problem in Aristarchus, see Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 484–90.
53 Not always, however. For example, Aristarchus is aware that his athetesis may cause problems to some scholars or readers in Sch. II. 20.269–72a (discussed at § 1.2).
54 Origen, too, assumes a scribal mistake to solve a problem in Matthew in his homily to Psalm 77; see discussion in M. M. Mitchell, “‘Problems and Solutions’ in Early Christian Biblical Inter-
realizes that this is not the best course of action and so ultimately decides that it is indeed better to consider the existence of two Marys, both from Magdala, rather than supposing a scribal mistake:

QEMar 2.9.186–190: Κάλλιον δὲ τὸ μὴ δὲ σφάλμα αἰτιάσασθαι κατὰ τοὺς τόπους, δῦν δὲ ἀληθῶς γεγονέναι τὰς Μαγδαληνὰς φάσκειν, ὡς καὶ τέτταρας ἀπεδείξαμεν τὰς Μαρίας· ὕν οὐδὲν ἀτοπον ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς Μαγδαληνῆς δύο Μαρίας ὁρμᾶσθαι λέγειν, μηδὲν τε λοιπὸν ἀπορεῖν.

But it is better not to invoke a mistake in these passages and to say that indeed there were two [women] from Magdala since we also demonstrated that there were four Marys. It would not be strange, then, to say that of these [four Marys] two Marys came from the same city of Magdala, and not to worry further.

We might not be satisfied with this double homonymy (i.e., same name and same place of origin) but it at least shows that Eusebius was well aware of the basics of philological methodology: it is not legitimate to suppose external interpolations or scribal errors if manuscript evidence does not support such an assumption.⁵⁵

2.3 Double Names

Another Aristarchean principle to solve possible inconsistencies, and in fact one that is the reverse of the homonymy principle, is to claim that a character can have two different yet related names. This helps to address cases in which different names are used for what is considered to be the same person.⁵⁶ For example, a Myrmidon called Alcimedon is first introduced at Il. 16.197; in Book 17 he appears again in the battle for Patroclus’ body with his companion Automedon (Il. 17.467, 475, 481, 500, 501). Alcimedon never again appears in the Iliad, but at Il. 19.392, 24.474, 574 we find Alcimus, another Myrmidon, who is always in company of Automedon; hence Aristarchus concludes that this is the same hero for whom Homer has used an abbreviated form of the name (Sch. Il. 19.392ᵃ ¹ ²; 24.574: ὅτι συγκέκοψε τὸν Ἀλκιμέδοντα Ἀλκιμον εἰπόν). Similarly,

⁵⁵ QEMar 3.4 also invokes homonymy (i.e., they are different Marys) to solve the following question: ‘How is it that the same Magdalene, who has touched the Savior’s feet with the other Mary ‘late on Sabbaths’ according to Matthew, is told ‘not to touch me’ ‘early in the morning on the first day of the Sabbath’ according to John?’.

⁵⁶ See Schironi, Best of the Grammarians, 272–73.
in *QESt* 10, Eusebius addresses the question of why Matthew 1.11 calls Jehoiachim ‘Jecconiah’ and solves it by stating that he had two names (διώνυμος οὗτος ἕν). Both scholars make the same point, yet here Eusebius is able to support this claim on a stronger basis than Aristarchus. The latter, in fact, had no further evidence except that the names at issue are quite similar and that this person is a Myrmidon and is always accompanied by the same companion Automedon. Eusebius, on the contrary, is able to find another passage in the OT where the name Jeconiah rather than Jehoiachim occurs: *Jer* 22.28 (*QESt* 10.3.53–55). This evidence gives additional strength on the argument, which is lacking in Aristarchus. In both Eusebius and Aristarchus the starting point is that the names at issue are quite similar, so that it is easy to assume a variation; yet Eusebius is able to find a proof for it, while Aristarchus is stuck with an ‘educated guess’ based on a logical inference.

### 3 Conclusions

This survey has shown that beyond a generic imprint of Alexandrian scholarship on Eusebius’ *Questions*, there are very specific strategies, which occur similarly or even identically in the *Questions* as well as in the Homeric commentaries of Aristarchus. Among the strategies most commonly used by Eusebius and Aristarchus we have isolated the following:

1. Linguistic analysis/reinterpretation:
   i. referring to other passages in the same text/author
   ii. referring to similar modern linguistic usages
2. Looking for explanations given by the author himself (i.e., the author is his own exegete)
3. Looking for the author’s/character’s intention
4. Etymology
5. ‘Internal’ allegory
6. Recalling ‘ancient usages’
7. Plausibility/believability (εἰκός)
8. Opportunity (καιρός)
9. Avoidance of inappropriateness (ἀπρέπεια)
10. Homonymy
11. Double names
12. Different timing
13. Choosing a different punctuation
14. Athetesis
15. Assuming scribal mistakes/interpolations
Many of these strategies (1–6) are based on the general principle of explaining an author from the author himself, which becomes the golden rule for Alexandrian-oriented philology.\(^5^7\) In addition, because both Homer and the Gospels have a ‘sacred’ status in the society of Aristarchus and Eusebius respectively, the two scholars need to assume that their authors have composed them flawlessly; hence the aesthetic principles invoking plausibility/believability (εἰκός), opportunity (καιρός), and avoidance of inappropriateness (ἀπρέπεια) (7–9)—principles which ultimately stem from an Aristotelian approach to literary texts.\(^5^8\) The assumed lack of flaws in sacred texts is also at the basis of more ad-hoc solutions invoking homonymy, double names, or different timing (10–12), even if these λυσεῖς often also require some specific textual analysis to prove that identical names are used for more than one character, or, on the contrary, that similar but not identical names refer to the same character, or that episodes which seem similar are in fact different and happening at different times. Finally, both scholars can also act upon the text by rejecting lines or invoking scribal mistakes or a different punctuation (13–15)—emendation and editorial techniques are here employed to ‘save’ the text.

Already Johnson has suggested a link between Eusebius’ method and literary criticism in the Graeco-Roman world.\(^5^9\) However, he limited his analysis mostly to Eusebius and to cursory references to the manuals of rhetoric of Theon, Aphthonios and Hermogenes as well as to the six parts of grammar as described by the first chapters of Dionysius Thrax’s \emph{Techne Grammatike}. By showing specific parallels between Eusebius’ \emph{Questions} and fragments of Aristarchus’ Homeric commentaries, the present analysis has further proven that Eusebius uses methods and strategies employed by the most famous of the Homeric commentators, Aristarchus. While the six parts of grammar later defined by Dionysius Thrax are already present in Aristarchus’ philology,\(^6^0\) the points of contact between Eusebius and Aristarchus are specifically the strategies employed to solve \emph{zetemata}. Greek scholars first developed those strategies in order to ‘save’ Homer, a fundamental text in Greek \emph{paideia}, which could however elicit accusations of internal contradictions, unsoundness, and even immorality. More specifically, Aristarchus developed some of these strategies in a very rational way, excluding for example \emph{allegoresis}. We have found some of these

\(^5^7\) This category, of course, excludes the reference to similar modern linguistic usages (1.ii), which however is a very basic form of linguistic explanation, not necessarily linked with Alexandrian or Aristarchean scholarship.

\(^5^8\) See Schironi, “Theory into Practice.”

\(^5^9\) Johnson, “Rhetorical Criticism.”

\(^6^0\) See Schironi, \emph{Best of the Grammarians}, 93–544.
very strategies in the *Gospel Questions*. Therefore, rather than taking inspiration from rhetorical schools, as suggested by Johnson, Eusebius seems to follow the Alexandrian, more specifically Aristarchean, method in discussing textual problems.⁶¹

In addition, Johnson interpreted this method as ‘a method of attack and defense, not of analysis; refutation seeks to discredit, not to understand’.⁶² On the contrary, in my view Eusebius does analyze his text, albeit to ‘save’ it, as does Aristarchus with Homer. Their object of analysis was a text that for various reasons was considered sacred—Homer for the Greeks and the Gospels for the Christians—hence they necessarily had an apologetic goal when discussing *zetemata*; yet this attitude did not entail open attacks aimed at discrediting ‘academic opponents’. In fact, I think that both Aristarchus and Eusebius were convinced that even if they had sometimes a polemical target (the detractors of Homer or Zeno-dotus for Aristarchus and especially Porphyry for Eusebius), their exegetical method was a correct and ‘scientific’ way to comment on and clarify texts that presented what, at a superficial reading, seemed problematic points.

A separate question concerns the interpretation of these similarities between Aristarchus and Eusebius. We can think of ‘exegetical universals’: the way commentators work on a text would follow standard and obvious methods, which are always the same independently from the texts, without any connection among different exegetical traditions. This is certainly a possibility, especially in the field of technical/philological exegesis, as carried out by both Aristarchus and Eusebius, who proceed by logical steps—and logical steps are by definition limited and quite predictable (insanity is much more inventive). However, the number of these exegetic similarities and above all the specificity of some of these strategies (such as homonymy or different timings) as well as the use of the same technical terminology (e.g., ἀθετεῖν, εἰκός, ἀπρεπές) seem to suggest a

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⁶¹ While rhetoric and grammar/philology share many common strategies and technical vocabulary, they are not the same discipline, even if the boundaries are often fuzzy to define. For example, in the discussion of tropes and *schemata*, rhetorical handbooks are different from more grammatically-oriented ones; see D. M. Schenkeveld, “Figures and Tropes: A Border-Case between Grammar and Rhetoric,” in *Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften. Geschichte, System, Praxis als Probleme des ‘Historischen Wörterbuchs der Rhetorik*, ed. G. Ueding (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1991), 149–57; Schironi, *Best of the Grammarians*, 125–26. On the other hand, my claim is limited only to Eusebius’ *Gospel Questions*. Since the ‘genre’ of *erotapokriseis* is so diverse, other texts that belong to it might have a much more ‘rhetorical’ stance; for instance, the examples discussed by Papadoyannakis, “Instruction by Question and Answer,” 94–100, have a more pedagogical/performative attitude rather than scholarly aim.

⁶² Johnson, “Rhetorical Criticism,” 37.
more direct influence of the Alexandrian method on Eusebius. If so, how did Eusebius learn about Alexandrian scholarship and their approach to *zetemata*?

No doubt, Eusebius had had a good education and was acquainted with classical culture, from philosophy to *grammatike*. So he had probably encountered the system of posing questions and answer in his own education. However, when we look at the specific and highly distinct strategies which he employs to discuss the Gospels, we need to assume his acquaintance with Alexandrian and in particular Aristarchean scholarship. Eusebius might have even read the very Aristarchus’ commentaries, if they were still available at that time. More likely, however, the link between Aristarchus and Eusebius was mediated by indirect knowledge, since we have no evidence that Aristarchus’ commentaries or similar type of technical literature became part of the school curriculum, especially in the third or fourth century CE; nor do we have evidence of a direct reading of Aristarchus by Eusebius.

The ‘genre’ of questions and answers was not initiated by Eusebius among Christian writers. We know that already in the second century CE Tatian compiled a list of *Problemata* in the Bible, but it is uncertain whether or not these ‘problems’ were also followed by their solutions. Since there is no evidence of solutions offered by Tatian and since, even though he knows their existence, the way Eusebius refers to Tatian’s *Problemata* in *HE* 5.13.8 suggests that he probably never saw the text, we need to look elsewhere. Philo of Alexandria and Origen are the other, most obvious candidates for inspiring Eusebius’ solutions. Philo of Alexandria is considered the forerunner of the genre among Jews and Christians with his *Questions on Genesis* and *Questions on Exodus*, which are

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63 We do not know until what time Aristarchus’ work could be consulted. In the second century CE, Herodian most likely knows them first-hand; around the same time, Galen tells us (PA 13) that the libraries on the Palatine possessed very old and important originals, such as the *Aristarcheia*, which we understand to be his editions or commentaries of Homer.

64 A. J. Carriker, *The Library of Eusebius of Caesarea* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 75–154, 299–303, does not list Aristarchus or any other *grammatikos* among the pagan authors which Eusebius knew first-hand.


66 Eusebius is simply passing on the report of Tatian’s *Problemata* from Rhodon, who was a disciple of Tatian and tells about his teacher’s work; see Crawford, “The *Problemata* of Tatian,” 543. As Carriker, *Library of Eusebius*, 56, notes, Tatian’s *Problemata* are absent from the catalogue of Tatian’s works which Eusebius possessed and listed in *HE* 4.29.6–7.

67 So also Perrone, “Sulla preistoria delle ‘quaestiones’ nella letteratura patristica,” 492.
quoted by Eusebius in the Historia Ecclesiatica (HE 2.18.1: Τῶν ἐν Γενέσει καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἐξαγωγῇ ζητημάτων καὶ λύσεων). Yet there are some significant differences. First, Philo does not proceed by questions, but his is a continuous commentary on Genesis and Exodus; in addition and more importantly for us, his ‘solutions’ do not really fit the Aristotelian/Alexandrian model of zetemata/lyseis, since he is almost always prone to allegorical interpretation, which is in fact the opposite of the Alexandrian ‘solutions’—and allegoresis is also almost ignored by Eusebius in his Questions. If Philo is not a good link between Alexandrian philology and Eusebius, Origen seems to offer more interesting parallels. Even if he never wrote a real collection of questions on the sacred texts, in his homilies and commentaries Origen often adopts a zetematic approach, proceeding by questions and answers. As Bernhard Neuschäfer has demonstrated, in his editorial and exegetic work on the OT and NT Origen adopts many principles and methods from the Alexandrians. In particular, Origen follows the idea of clarifying an author from the author himself when he uses passages from the Bible or the Gospels to solve problems in either one of these works. In addition, he used Alexandrian editorial principles when working on the Hexapla.


70 On Origen’s ‘questions’ and examples of his method, see Heinrici, “Aporienliteratur,” 853; Bardy, “La littérature patristique” (1932), 224–28; Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 41 and 339–42; Perrone, “Sulla preistoria delle ‘quaestiones’ nella letteratura patristica,” 500–05; Mitchell, “‘Problems and Solutions’.”

71 Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe.

72 See Neuschäfer, Origenes als Philologe, 276–85; Mitchell, “‘Problems and Solutions’,“ 45 and 49–50.

It is not difficult to find a link between the bishop of Caesarea and Origen. As is well known, in Caesarea Pamphilus organized a library/scriptorium, which probably incorporated also the library of Origen, who brought his books to Caesarea when he moved there in 232 CE.\textsuperscript{74} In his scriptorium Pamphilus trained many scribes, among them Eusebius, to copy Origen’s works, which were also collected there.\textsuperscript{75} After Pamphilus’ martyrdom in 310 CE and after becoming bishop of Caesarea in 315 CE, Eusebius himself developed the library and kept working on Origen.\textsuperscript{76} Aside from knowing Origen’s works from his activity as a copyist, Eusebius also knew Origen’s exegetical methods and used them in his own writings, as Claudio Zamagni has shown with reference to \textit{QES}t 1.\textsuperscript{77} Similarly, the other solutions in the \textit{Gospel Questions} could have been inspired by Origen’s ‘Alexandrian’ philological approach to \textit{zetemata}.\textsuperscript{78}

Whatever is the origin of Eusebius’ acquaintance with Alexandrian scholarship (either direct knowledge or filtrated through Origen’s writings), Eusebius seems to have developed a specific sensitivity for such an approach and, with time, even improved on it. Our analysis has in fact shown that while in both the \textit{Questions to Stephanus} and the \textit{Questions to Marinus} Eusebius employs Aristarchean strategies, in the latter work the Aristarchean method seems much more sophisticated, both in his use of more complex Aristarchean strategies and in their further development. This could mean that the \textit{Questions to Marinus} are successive to the \textit{Questions to Stephanus}, as already suggested by Zamagni,\textsuperscript{79} and that in the years Eusebius became more and more of an Alexandrian philologist. More importantly, in the second group of examples we have seen that Eusebius seems to improve on Aristarchus’ methodology: he shows to be more

\textsuperscript{74} See Carriker, \textit{Library of Eusebius}, 3–12.
\textsuperscript{76} On the work of Eusebius in connection with Origen, see Grafton and Williams, \textit{Christianity and the Transformation of the Book}. Cf. also Levine, \textit{Caesarea}, 125–27. On Eusebius’ library and the authors and texts he had and consulted, see Carriker, \textit{Library of Eusebius}.
\textsuperscript{77} Zamagni, “Eusebius’ Exegesis”.
\textsuperscript{78} By ‘Alexandrian philology’ I mean ‘technical’ and ‘literalist’ philology, on the model of Aristarchus. The Hellenistic Alexandrian school of philology is very different from the later Jewish and Christian school of interpretation which develops at Alexandria and which often adopts allegory, as rightly noted by Hollerich, \textit{Eusebius of Caesarea’s Commentary}, 94–102 (who opposes this later Alexandrian school to the Antiochene school of Eusebius). In fact, in his very good and clear survey, Hollerich, “Eusebius” stresses Eusebius’ text-based, history-oriented scholarship.
aware of certain possible pitfalls and above all he applies some philological methods more soundly. For example, he is aware that his homonymy solution might have some weaknesses and strengthens the argument of the double names by finding the supposed ‘second’ name attested in another sacred text (Jer.) beyond Matthew. He also improves on Aristarchus’ method in his attention to manuscript evidence, as we noted when discussing the athetesis he proposes in Mark on the basis of manuscript evidence. This is not to say that Aristarchus disregarded manuscripts when working on Homer. Of course he did look at them, especially when he first had to put together what modern scholars now consider a ‘preliminary edition’, which was his working text of Homer, in which he had eliminated lines that were not well attested in his manuscripts.\(^{80}\) However when discussing an athetesis, Aristarchus hardly considers manuscript evidence in the fragments that we have. These details might have been lost in the course of the tradition, and the same might have also happened with other comments by Aristarchus on Homer. Yet when we compare the method followed by Aristarchus in the scholia to the Iliad with Eusebius’ epitome on the Gospel Questions, the latter turns out to be not only a very good pupil of the Hellenistic Alexandrian school but also able to improve on Aristarchus’ methods while being aware of its limits.\(^{81}\) Matthew Crawford has demonstrated Eusebius’ dependence on and refinement of Alexandrian scholarship in working on the Canon Tables, in which he continues but also improves upon the work of Ammonius of Alexandria’s Diatessaron-Gospel.\(^{82}\) I would like to suggest a similar trajectory in Eusebius’ approach to zetematic literature: he took it (probably via Origen) from classical Alexandrian scholarship but also improved upon its methodology. If this analysis is correct, then in Eusebius we can detect not only how Christianity adopted Alexandrian scholarship but also that it was not mere servile adoption. Origen, Eusebius, and their colleagues were scholars of the first rank, who not only learned their lesson well but were also able to surpass their masters—Aris-

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81 A similar methodological awareness emerges in Origen when he criticizes Marcion, who is much more prone to emendation based on personal judgment; see Mitchell, “‘Problems and Solutions’, ” 48.

tarchus would have been happy of his legacy and proud of how these late pupils of his had improved on it.