points of GDP growth yearly (as it does across much of the globe) then human rights are again being usurped for the private gain of others. According to the authors, “corruption is about different forms of discrimination, and human rights are about one’s right to remain free of discrimination” (p. 68).

This is a book of great and lasting value to scholars and theorists. It also exhaustively examines the concepts of patrimonialism, patronage, clientelism, and state capture, and how each relates to and is equated with, contributes to, or depends on corrupt practices.

A special chapter, originally published in this journal, focuses on “the Chinese exception” to discover why a corrupt, undemocratic country of immense size has been able to deliver higher living standards and lasting social benefits to its people despite the kinds of weak or questionable governance forms that militate against such progress in theory and, empirically, in the rest of the world. Rothstein and Varraich decide that Chinese “cadre” management is a key part of the answer. Instead of participatory governance, Chinese communism has substituted indoctrination (a word the authors do not use) and instilled a high order to conformity (and a belief in the importance of that conformity) among the cadre of bureaucrats who help run the country for the party and the party’s leaders. Their explanation is ingenious, but still unsatisfying. Clearly systematic acculturation from above has led over the decades since Mao and Deng’s time to a country that progresses despite embedded levels of corruption.

The authors say almost nothing about Xi Jinping’s efforts to erase corruption among cadres, imprisoning hundreds of senior party and military figures along the way. Has this purge helped to maintain China’s economic growth and the lessening of poverty? Or was it Deng’s opening of the economic engine that is responsible for China’s exceptionality? Future researchers will have to tell us what Xi’s reforms have wrought.

The last chapter of this book, on governance, hews largely to the capacity-model notion of governance that is widely accepted, but contested by a few authors—often in this journal. The authors choose to say nothing about conceptions of governance that are performance based, easily measurable and quantifiable, and—linking up with the title and thrust of their book’s message—provide a convenient methodological way to account for the drag of corruption on governance within any country or political jurisdiction. This approach could help to provide answers to the nature and extent of the Chinese exception.

The effect of leadership on corruption, and the extent to which responsible political leadership deters or even substantially reduces corruption—as in China, Rwanda, Singapore, Mauritius, Botswana, and potentially elsewhere—is never mentioned or evaluated. Nor are such other anticorruption measures as punishment, institutional fixes, removing discretion and shifting citizen-bureaucratic interactions to the Internet, enforced declarations of assets (and tax returns), and the employment of various kinds of modern technology.

These criticisms aside, Rothstein and Varraich have written an essential book for specialists and others who care and think about corruption.

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DICTATORS AND THEIR SECRET POLICE: COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS AND STATE VIOLENCE

Sheena Chestnut Greitens


How autocratic leaders stay in power is the question at the heart of much recent political science research. Scholars have identified formal institutions ranging from elections, ruling parties, and
legislatures as important tools that can be used to co-opt elite rivals. But much of this work has overlooked the coercive institutions at the heart of all autocracies, and has consequently neglected to theorize about autocratic reliance on repression. Sheena Greitens begins to fill this gap with her new book, *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*.

Greitens’s argument is simple, yet elegant. She begins from the premise that all autocrats must insulate themselves from various potential threats: coup d’états, popular revolts, and external attacks. Upon coming to power, autocrats build coercive institutions that vary on two important dimensions which ultimately impact their ability to hedge against these various potential threats: their degree of fragmentation and social exclusivity. A coercive apparatus is fragmented if there are multiple organizations within it, each with overlapping missions and, crucially, no clear coordinating authority over them. Exclusivity denotes the degree to which the coercive apparatus does not reflect the social, ethnic, regional, or religious makeup of the country, but is instead drawn from a smaller subset of society.

Autocrats, Greitens argues, are aware of the organizational trade-offs of fragmentation and exclusivity and adopt an institutional design for their coercive apparatus that best fits their “dominant perceived threat” when they first come to power. Autocrats wary of elite threats may try to “coup proof” themselves by designing a coercive apparatus that is internally fragmented and socially exclusive. This organizational design inhibits the coordination between security organs necessary to facilitate a coup and ensures each organ’s investment in the status quo. But coup-proofed institutions are organizationally constrained from adeptly staying off internal popular threats and external attacks. Alternatively, autocrats wary of popular or external threats may design their coercive apparatus to be unitary and socially inclusive. This organizational design allows for better coordination and intelligence-gathering capacity between and within security organizations to prevent popular or external threats, but also allows for better coordination to launch a coup.

Greitens continues, arguing that the variation in the organizational design of coercive institutions has implications for the scope, intensity, and precision of state violence against civilians. Countries with coup-proofed coercive institutions see more intense and indiscriminate violence because they are ill-designed to collect intelligence from the broader population and have the highest institutional incentives for violence. Counterintuitively, the coercive institutions most adept at preventing popular or external threats are those that exact the lowest levels of violence against their civilian population.

Greitens explores her theory through historical case studies of the coercive institutions in three East Asian countries: Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, Ferdinand Marcos’s rule in the Philippines, and South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. Her data include private diaries of autocratic leaders, internal documents from the archives of security institutions, and U.S. intelligence reports. She also conducts interviews with former members of the security organizations in the cases she studies. With an eye toward external validity, she briefly applies the theory to Chile under Pinochet, the East German Stasi, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in a concluding chapter.

The novelty of the argument makes this book a thought-provoking read. Greitens bridges two interconnected literatures previously separated by arbitrary subfield divisions: coercive institutional design in Comparative Politics and state repression in International Relations. This is perhaps the book’s biggest contribution: If we want to understand how autocrats stay in power, it is not enough to examine the degree to which, or even why, their states use violence. We must study the organizational structure of the state institutions that carry out this violence.

Further, the impressive synthesis of primary and secondary sources combined with careful comparative analyses provide a template for how others seeking to understand opaque institutions might approach their research questions. Greitens’s book is a model for how scholars can use qualitative data in a context where quantitative data are suspect.

Nonetheless, the book faces limitations that future research can build on. First, scholars may question the process by which autocrats determine their dominant perceived threat. Greitens’s argument is
based upon the idea that autocrats have sufficient information and power to know and respond to this
dominant threat. But the threat that an autocrat finds most acute may be a function of the security
apparatus he inherits or the coercive apparatus he relied on to claim power. That is, the intelligence-
gathering capacity of the security apparatus before autocratic reform determines the information that
the autocrat receives on potential threats to his rule.

Second, it is unclear the extent to which autocrats have sufficient control over the institutional
design of their coercive apparatus so as to redesign them when coming to power. The existing security
apparatus that the autocrat inherits dictates how dangerous an organizational change is to the ruler’s
security. If a new leader decides to purge certain members from the security apparatus, for instance,
excluded officers may spark a coup or civil war. As such, a leader may opt to leave his security
apparatus intact despite his dominant perceived threat.

We believe this book is a crucial advance in the study of autocratic politics. Scholars of authoritari-
anism, political violence, and East Asia need to take the institutional configuration of the security appa-
ratus seriously in the wake of Greitens’s first book.

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GOVERNANCE NETWORKS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Erik Hans Klijn | Joop Koppenjan

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The sheer volume of literature published in the field of governance mirrors the growing interest in con-
ducting research on this ambiguous term (Rose-Ackerman, 2017). In practice, the increasing complex-
ity of everyday challenges has made governments become more dependent on social and economic
actors to achieve their goals. In this book, Erik Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan make a heated plea for
the study of governance networks and complexities (Part I), the management of complexities (Part II),
and democracy and accountability in networks (Part III).

The book’s initial hypothesis is that public administration, private and nonprofit organizations are increas-
ingly faced with complex, wicked problems—that is, “problems with a certain extent of social and technologi-
cal complexity” (p. 43)—when developing policies or delivering services in the public sector. The authors
contend that these activities unfold in networks of interdependent actors steered by deviating and sometimes
conflicting perceptions and strategies. Debating that these networks are being controlled by cognitive, strate-
gic, and institutional complexities, the authors convincingly suggest that a better means of dealing with these
complexities is through progressive forms of coordination, that is, network governance. Yet doubts remain as
to whether this would be easy to ensure the interested parties work together as a whole. The authors do not
state that it would be easy, but instead discuss how to manage the complexities in various ways.

This textbook is “written for students in public administration, public management, public plan-
ing, and policy sciences and analysis” (p. xii). The book is both theoretically and empirically rich. It
provides definitions on core concepts, teaching its readers how to handle difficult problems in govern-
ance networks. Although these definitions are furnished with examples from Europe and the United
States, the book could have been further improved if it had provided examples from countries where
governance structures are weak or dominated by corruption.

Even though one could find the presentation of definitions rather simplistic—for instance, those on
“governance as good governance” (p. 5)—I concur with the authors when they state that “although