Uneven accountability in the wake of political violence: Evidence from Kenya’s ashes and archives

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Abstract
The government faces a principal–agent problem with lower-level state officers. Officers are often expected to use the state coercive capacity endowed to them to politically benefit the government. But officers can shirk from the government’s demands. An officer’s actions during bouts of large-scale and highly visible electoral violence reveal the officer’s type, thereby providing the government with the information necessary to solve its principal–agent problem for the future. The government holds officers who used their authority to perpetuate incumbent-instigated violence accountable through positive rewards, while holding officers who used their authority to perpetuate opposition-instigated violence accountable through negative sanctions. We find evidence in support of the theory using micro-level archival data on 2,500 local officer appointments and fine-grained satellite data on the locations of violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 election. The Kenyan government was more likely to fire officials whose jurisdictions saw opposition-instigated violence that targeted government supporters. But we find the opposite result where violence was instigated by incumbent supporters: there, officers were less likely to be fired if violence occurred in their jurisdiction. Our results indicate that leaders can manipulate accountability processes after political violence to further politicize the state.

Keywords
Africa, bureaucracy, coercive apparatus, electoral violence, ethnic politics, state violence

Introduction
Sanctioning local-level state and coercive officers becomes a priority after large bouts of electoral violence. Centrally appointed mayors, local police chiefs, and village executives are often at the forefront of electoral violence because of their knowledge of the local community alongside their state-endowed coercive power. In turn, domestic audiences and the international community alike demand that the government bring local state officers who perpetuated violence to justice. These dual imperatives are especially salient in unconsolidated democracies which disproportionately see electoral violence (Straus & Taylor, 2012; Hafner-Burton, Hyde & Jablonski, 2014) and are beholden to pressure from international tribunals increasingly focus on prosecuting the ‘big fish’ (O’Brien, 2012).

1 These officers are at the forefront of political violence more broadly (e.g. Davenport, 2005; Deng & O’Brien, 2013; Garcia, 2014; Sullivan, 2015).

2 Local state officers who perpetuated political violence are unlikely to face international sanctioning because international tribunals increasingly focus on prosecuting the ‘big fish’ (O’Brien, 2012).
international organizations (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Moss, Geland & van de Walle, 2006).

Yet the government may have its own incentives that affect the accountability process for local state officers that are separate from those of domestic and international audiences. The government faces a principal–agent problem with local state and coercive officers: after officers are granted coercive capacity, they are expected to follow the government’s directives. But these officers can shirk, at times (mis)using that power, perhaps even to the political detriment of the government. The majority of officers’ actions are routine and difficult to measure, thereby exacerbating the principal–agent problem by making monitoring effectively impossible.

Bouts of highly visible election violence, however, temporarily solve this monitoring problem for local state officers. The occurrence and direction of violence in the officer’s jurisdiction reveal her actions and signal her underlying loyalty to the government. Officers willing to engage in violence – on behalf of the incumbent government or the opposition – are clearly willing to misuse their authority for more routine, difficult-to-measure actions that politically benefit the incumbent or the opposition in the future. The government, therefore, holds officers accountable for their actions unevenly by negatively sanctioning officers who perpetuated violence against the government while rewarding officers who perpetrated violence that was in support of the government’s political interests.

In this way, the government creates a more loyal security apparatus for the future. The officers in place after uneven accountability will use their authority to subtly prop up the government and, at the limit, perpetuate election violence against the opposition and its supporters in the future.

We evaluate the theory using micro-level data on Kenya’s 2007–08 post-election violence. We focus on Rift Valley province where a reported 1,000 people were killed and 500,000 displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The violence in the province provides a unique opportunity to rigorously examine the theory because there were two waves of violence in geographically distinct areas. In the government’s area of core support, the government’s co-ethnic Kikuyus attacked opposition supporters. But in opposition strongholds, opposition supporters attacked Kikuyus.

We examine the sanctioning of 2,500 state-appointed, bureaucratic ‘chiefs’, the state officers most directly responsible for maintaining law and order at the local level. We recognize that data on state personnel involved in political violence is subject to the ‘victor’s justice’ – the same elites who maintain these records may have also ordered officers to commit the violence (Balcells & Sullivan, 2018). We overcome this data constraint by relying on administrative records that are seemingly unrelated to the violence to deduce which individuals involved in political violence were held accountable. In doing so, we broaden the range of potential uses for archival data highlighted in this special issue. Systematic, administrative data from government archives – which often do not suffer from the political biases described in Balcells & Sullivan (2018) – can be used to document otherwise opaque processes. We merge the archival bureaucratic data with a NASA satellite database on daily fire activity, as arson was the main form of violence during the post-election violence.

We find strong support for our theory of uneven accountability. Bureaucratic chiefs whose jurisdictions saw violence against the government’s co-ethnic Kikuyus were more likely to be fired from their positions than other chiefs within the same district whose jurisdiction did not see violence. But we find the exact opposite result in areas hit by violence that favored the government: chiefs whose jurisdictions saw Kikuyu-instigated violence against opposition supporters were far less likely to be fired in comparison to other chiefs within the same district whose jurisdiction did not see violence. Our results indicate that the government only viewed officers who misused their authority in service of the opposition, as opposed to all officers who fomented violence, as disloyal agents that had to be dismissed. The end result is that the government has been able to craft a more loyal security apparatus that can be trusted to use its authority for the political benefit of the incumbent government in the future.

This article makes several contributions. Alongside other work that has looked at the electoral benefits of electoral violence to incumbents (Wilkinson, 2004; Kasara, 2016; Klaus, 2017), we showcase the benefits of electoral violence in helping the incumbent alleviate the principal–agent problem that arises when relying on state officers to perpetuate violence. Much extant research argues that leaders overcome this problem through ex ante institutional design (Quinlivan, 1999; Greitens, 2016). Instead, we demonstrate how a ‘stress test’ can ex post enable the incumbent to reduce future principal–agent problems and contribute to the literature on the ways in which leaders actively manage state officials (Hassan, 2017).

We suggest that the creation of a more loyal security apparatus has implications that extend far beyond
periods of electoral violence. Local state officers who engaged in electoral violence on behalf of the government clearly have the will to coerce area residents using less violent (and less monitorable) tactics in the future. Tactics of ‘low-intensity coercion’, however, are not only more prevalent than punctuated, infrequent acts of electoral violence, but are more crucial in stopping opposition candidates from becoming viable before election day in the first place (Levitsky & Way, 2010).^3^ Though the center cannot monitor the routine actions that they expect officers to engage in to undergird their political tenure, the officers in place after bouts of violence have proved themselves willing to comply with politicized government directives.

This article also speaks to the literature on accountability processes after violence. Recent research focuses on the ways in which official mechanisms for accountability such as courts or transitional justice regimes can become politicized and ultimately undermine the pursuit of justice (Brown & Sriram, 2012; Mueller, 2014; Loyle & Davenport, 2016; Lake, 2017). We show that the accountability process can be manipulated outside of the judicial realm as well, in less visible but crucial domains such as the bureaucratic management of state personnel.

**Accountability in the wake of political violence**

Local state officers are endowed with state coercive capacity (e.g. control over the local police, authority to punish those who threaten public order) because they are formally responsible for maintaining law and order in their respective jurisdictions. Some examples of these officers include centrally appointed mayors, local police chiefs, and village executives. We note two important stylized facts about these officers. First, these officers are often recruited from the local population precisely because they are locally embedded and know it well. The government needs knowledgeable bureaucrats to carry out the functions of the state at the local level. Second, the vast majority of the actions that local state officers engage in are routine – such as arresting local criminals and approving relevant permits – and, therefore, fundamentally difficult to quantify and monitor.

Local state officers are likely to use their authority in a politicized manner, as opposed to an impartial, rational-legal manner, when they have a neopatrimonial relationship with political elites (Högblund, 2009). A top government elite can promise officers who misuse their authority on the elite’s behalf – for instance, by arresting opposition supporters as opposed to simply arresting criminals – valuable resources such as the retention of their coveted position, a promotion, or a raise. Officers can create these neopatrimonial relationships with opposition elites as well. Opposition elites often have sources of private funding (Arriola, 2012) that can be leveraged to promise officers money, land, or favors in return for their compliance. Further, elites in the opposition can pledge to retain or promote the officer should the opposition come to power, a consideration that the officer weighs heavily during periods of intense political contestation.^[5]^

The government therefore faces a principal–agent problem with regards to local state officers. The government may implicitly expect officers to use their authority for its political gain, or even explicitly demand this misuse of authority. But officers can instead shirk and use that authority to benefit the opposition. The principal–agent problem is exacerbated for countries in which politically salient identity cleavages cluster regionally. In these cases, the government cannot ‘pack’ the ranks of local state officers with the government’s in-group officers or known loyalists. And since applicants have a strong incentive to claim that they are willing to use their authority on behalf of the government so as to get hired, the resulting pooling equilibrium makes it difficult for the government to pre-emptively determine officer type. Moreover, monitoring is difficult because the day-to-day actions that local state officers are expected to carry out on behalf of the government are fundamentally difficult to observe and, thus, sanction on once the officer takes office.

The government expects officers to react differently to the breakout of electoral violence, depending on the direction of violence in the officer’s jurisdiction. Electoral violence is political violence that is shaped by the

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^3^ Slater & Fenner (2011) make a similar point for authoritarian regimes.

^5^ For literature on packing the security apparatus, see Decalo, 1990; Sassoon, 2011; Bellin, 2012.
dynamics of, or seeks to influence, the electoral process.\(^7\) Electoral violence can be *incumbent-instigated*, enacted by government supporters and targeting the opposition’s supporters, or *opposition-instigated* where those supporting the opposition target incumbent supporters (Straus & Taylor, 2012). The government demands that officers prevent opposition-instigated violence. Doing so maintains law and order but, more importantly, prevents the opposition from inflicting harm against government supporters and destabilizing the government. But the government prefers that officers perpetuate incumbent-instigated violence. The officers in place after the violence ends. The government will positively reward officers whose jurisdictions saw violence that favored the post-violence government. If the opposition party takes power after the violence, thus becoming the new incumbent, government secure re-election or help government supporters benefit materially (Wilkinson, 2004; Kasara, 2016; Klaus, 2017).

Unlike the routine actions that officers engage in that are difficult to monitor, officer actions during bouts of election violence are observable. Electoral violence leaves immediate and lasting signs in an area, such as a mass exodus of victimized groups, large numbers of civilians dead, or scorched fields. Moreover, local state officers are sufficiently well known in their jurisdictions that their role in the violence is visible to area residents: even governments of low capacity states will receive information through the chain of command or local civil society about the local perpetrators of large-scale violence. In cases where a government cannot ascertain officer action completely, it can make well-informed inferences about the probability of the officer’s actions based on the dynamics of the conflict there. Violence carried out in the officer’s jurisdiction acts as a credible – albeit sometimes noisy – signal as to the likelihood of the officer’s actions.

The government will use an individual officer’s actions during electoral violence as a signal of the officer’s type. An officer either perpetuated or stopped electoral violence in her jurisdiction, and that violence was either incumbent-instigated or opposition-instigated. The government can therefore solve its principal–agent problem for the future and holding officers accountable unevenly after the violence ends. The government will negatively sanction or dismiss officers who perpetuated opposition-instigated violence. On the other hand, the government will positively reward officers whose jurisdictions saw incumbent-instigated violence. The officers in place after uneven accountability have shown their willingness to violently coerce in a manner that benefits the government. They will be likely to do so again should election violence break out in the future. But even if no other such stress test occurs during the officer’s tenure, the government is assured that the officer is willing to use her authority to engage in less violent, and less monitorable, tactics that help the government (e.g. beating local opposition supporters, preventing them from registering to vote).

This (uneven) accountability process meets a secondary goal of appeasing international and domestic audiences. Clearly, a government has strong incentives to engage in uneven accountability to solve the principal–agent problem among local state officers. But sanctioning officers based on their political beliefs during normal times can cause destabilizing backlash in electoral regimes: domestic audiences and the international community will raise red flags if the government engages in clear partisan punishment or attempts to further politicize the state. The government, however, is expected to punish perpetrators in the wake of electoral violence. Domestic audiences will punish the government at the ballot box in the next election or through political unrest if they believe that the government is not doing enough to punish local state officers who perpetuated violence. Similarly, the international community can pressure governments whose agents carried out violence (Hafner-Burton, 2008) or withhold development assistance (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Moss, Gelander & van de Walle, 2006) if they do not see the government actively punishing perpetrators. Uneven accountability therefore meets two goals: solving the principal–agent problem for the future and appeasing external audiences.

We note that the dynamics of the accountability process will depend on the government in power after the violence abates. If the incumbent retains power after the violence, we expect uneven accountability to favor officers who oversaw violence that favored the pre- and post-violence government. If the opposition party takes power after the violence, thus becoming the new incumbent, the accountability process should favor officers who oversaw violence that favored the post-violence government (and the pre-violence opposition).

**Alternative arguments**

We address two alternative arguments. First, we acknowledge that political violence can occur for reasons beyond the facilitation of the local-level officer posted there. Violence might be the result of the local officer’s incompetence. An officer might simply be unable – as

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7 Though our analysis is applicable to most forms of political violence, we focus specifically on electoral violence.
opposed to able but unwilling – to stop violence in her jurisdiction. Incompetence will not matter for areas that were hit with opposition-instigated violence. In these cases, officers either willingly instigated violence or were unable to stop violence against the incumbent’s supporters. Either way, the government will negatively sanction officers whose jurisdictions saw opposition-instigated violence. On the other hand, the government would want to punish officers who tried to stop incumbent-instigated violence but whose jurisdictions saw incumbent-instigated violence anyway. However, it is empirically difficult to disentangle these two mechanisms for areas that saw incumbent-instigated violence to observe the relative importance of each. Analyses that cannot identify between those places that saw incumbent-instigated violence due to the direct instigation of an officer versus the officer’s incompetence – such as ours – will be empirically biased towards zero.

Second, it might be the case that the government cannot observe officer action at all. The government cannot hold any individual officer accountable if it is not capable of observing or inferring officer action, as is the case in many weak states (Englehart, 2009; Cole, 2015). In these cases, we should see no discernible pattern in how the government distinguishes officers whose jurisdictions saw violence accountable from those whose jurisdictions did not see violence. 8 Though the government may symbolically sanction some officers as scapegoats, sanctioning is not based on the officer’s actions during the violence.

One extension of this second alternative, that we test for below, is that the government may purge all officers who might have opposition sympathies, regardless of individual officers’ actions. Theoretically, however, the center is unlikely to engage in a purge of all local state officers based solely on presumed loyalty. The government is highly unlikely to find officers who are government supporters in opposition strongholds, so the government’s best bet is to hire impartial officers. A purge risks dismissing impartial, rational-legal bureaucrats who uphold the law and potentially replacing them with officers who actively misuse their authority on behalf of the opposition.

Kenya and 2007–08 post-election violence

Kenyan local officers: Chiefs and assistant chiefs

Our analysis centers on Kenyan ‘chiefs’ and ‘assistant chiefs’, centrally appointed village-level state officers that serve a wholly bureaucratic function. A chief is in charge of her respective administrative ‘location’ and an assistant chief is in charge of her respective administrative ‘sublocation’. Each location comprises several sublocations such that the chief is directly ahead of the assistant chief within the chain of command. These officers ultimately report to the permanent secretary of the country’s interior ministry, among the president’s most important appointments and trusted advisers, and the president himself. Decisions about the hiring, promotion, or dismissal of chiefs and assistant chiefs are formally made by the permanent secretary with input from other government elites.

Chiefs and assistant chiefs are in charge of upholding internal security and maintaining law and order within their jurisdiction, so the appointment process strives to choose officers who are familiar with local dynamics. Chiefs and assistant chiefs are appointed in their native, ‘home’ jurisdiction, are never rotated to work outside that jurisdiction, and serve until retirement. 9 As such, these officers are always members of the local ethnic group, speak the local language, are familiar with local customs, and can tap into family and ethnic networks. The center’s need for local knowledge means that areas that are ethnically affiliated with the opposition must still be governed by a chief or assistant chief who is a co-ethnic of the opposition. 10

Chiefs and assistant chiefs have a wide range of duties relevant to our study; they control the local police, have the authority to punish area residents who they deem as disturbing law and order, and adjudicate local land disputes. 11 Indeed, they are the highest-ranking, most important bureaucrats of any state organ within an administrative location or sublocation. These positions are highly valued and, unsurprisingly, it is rare that a chief or assistant chief willingly leaves her position for another within the state (save an assistant chief who

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8 Such monitoring problems are compounded during large bouts of violence, regardless of state strength, when the ‘fog of war’ makes it difficult to observe specific actions. While the fog of war often refers to real-time decisionmaking, it can also contribute to an actor’s ability (in our case, the government’s) to collect and decipher officer action within the conflict (Davenport & Ball, 2002).

9 There is a strong informal institution that chiefs and assistant chiefs must have been born in the jurisdiction and own land there.

10 The role of chiefs and assistant chiefs in providing intelligence to the center expanded during the anti-colonial Mau Mau war (Eck, 2018) and cemented the centrality of these officers for post-independence authoritarian leaders.

11 During our period of study, there were two police forces. The Administrative Police was fused with the bureaucracy containing chiefs and assistant chiefs. The Kenya Police remained separate.
becomes the next chief of her sublocation’s respective location).

**Rift Valley, ethnicity, and land**

This article’s empirical analysis focuses on the main site of Kenya’s 2007–08 post-election violence, Rift Valley province. Electro violence there stems from historic and contentious land politics. As we describe below, the violent tactic of choice in Rift Valley was arson.

Rift Valley is a contested space. The province is considered the homeland of various pastoralist groups, namely the Kalenjin. Since the colonial period, however, Kikuyus and other ‘migrant’ ethnic groups have settled in the province. Kikuyu migration into Rift Valley continued under the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu himself. The government acquired large tracts of land from the colonial regime which it passed on to small-scale farmers. Kenyatta favored his co-ethnics in land allocations across ‘settlement schemes’ in Rift Valley without regard to historic land claims by native pastoralist groups. The Kikuyu population of Rift Valley grew from 341,000 in 1969 to more than 950,000 by 1989 (19.2% of the province’s total population) as a result of these policies. Within Rift Valley, the Kikuyu are concentrated in locations and sublocations with high numbers of settlement schemes.

The settlement of Rift Valley by the Kikuyu has therefore fueled feelings of land injustice among the Kalenjin. Kalenjin narratives of ‘stolen’ lands became tied to the presidency and the political process (Boone, 2014; Klaus, 2017). The link between presidential ethnicity and land distribution was only strengthened under the reign of the country’s second president, (Kalenjin) Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002). Moi engaged in the same land distribution tactics Kenyatta did and doled out land to his co-ethnics in land allocation policies with Rift Valley’s land again being parceled out to Kikuyus. Political elites incited ‘youths’, largely from the Kalenjin community, to launch pre-election violence centered in districts with large migrant communities (Throup & Hornsby, 1998; Klopp, 2001). Importantly, the violent tactic of choice was arson. The instigators’ goal was to evict Kikuyus and other migrant groups to claim their land (Akiwumi Report, 2002; Boone, 2011). In the end, some 1,500 people died and 300,000 were displaced (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

**2007 election and subsequent violence**

Kenya was gearing up for another contentious presidential election in 2007. Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, came to power in 2002. In 2007, he faced a re-election challenge from Raila Odinga, a Luo candidate. Odinga chose William Ruto, a Kalenjin, as his running mate to help win the Kalenjin vote. As during the 1990s, national-level politicians tapped into Kalenjin fears about land allocation to mobilize electoral support (Lynch, 2008; Mueller, 2008; Klaus, 2017). Kalenjin electoral support was thought to be enough to guarantee Odinga the presidency. And indeed, early election results gave Odinga a commanding, almost insurmountable, lead. Later electoral returns favored Kibaki, however. Kibaki was declared the winner on December 30 amid serious allegations of fraud. Violence broke out soon after the official announcement of the results. Parallel to the violence in the early 1990s, Kalenjin youth attacked members of non-indigenous groups across Rift Valley. This Kalenjin-instigated (opposition-instigated) violence was centered in Kalenjin districts as well as neighboring Trans-Nzoia and targeted the Kikuyu (Harris, 2012). However, there were also sustained retaliatory attacks by Kikuyu on the Kalenjin and the Luo in (Kikuyu-majority) Nakuru district.

As during the 1990s, the primary tactic of violence was arson. Instigators of the violence attempted to...

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12 744 of the reported 1,133 deaths (Waki Report, 2008) and 1,021 of the 1,775 fires during the post-election violence were in Rift Valley.
13 The Kalenjin make up around 11.5% of the country’s population and 46.8% of Rift Valley’s population. The other ‘indigenous’ Rift Valley groups comprise 3.6% of the country’s population and 14.2% of the Rift Valley population. All ethnicity figures are from the 1989 census, the most recent census to release subnational ethnicity information.
14 The Luhya, Luo, and Kisii comprise 9.6%, 3.9%, and 2.5% of the population, respectively.
15 Gibson & Long (2009) report the results of the only nationally representative exit poll for the 2007 election. They suggest that Odinga won 46.1% to 40.2%.
16 Existing literature has established that arson was the primary violence tactic during the violence (e.g. Waki Report, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 2008).
displace local residents of ethnic groups associated with their political opponent and subsequently claim their land (Anderson & Lochery, 2008). Perpetrators torched the farms, shops, and compounds of area residents that they knew to be from the ethnic group(s) associated with their political opponents. The victims would flee and leave the land for the instigators to claim. Much of the violence was intracommunal: local residents knew where members of other ethnic groups lived locally (Mueller, 2008). In the end, some 1,000 were killed and 500,000 were displaced (Human Rights Watch, 2008).

The role of chiefs and assistant chiefs in the violence
Both sides of the post-election violence were organized by political elites (Mueller, 2008; Boone, 2014; Klaus, 2017), but there is evidence that local chiefs and assistant chiefs played a significant role in its implementation and spread. We present secondary evidence on the role of chiefs and assistant chiefs in the violence from the Waki Report (2008), produced by the official international commission of inquiry on the 2007–08 post-election violence.

Chiefs and assistant chiefs involved in the violence used their state authority to perpetuate violence instigated by their co-ethnics. In Nakuru, the Waki Report (2008: 110) details an incident where local police officers, ‘spotted some people burning houses and managed to arrest one arsonist whom they were escorting to [the local Chief’s] camp [so that the arsonist could be jailed] [. . .] The Chief ordered the officers to release the [arson] suspects otherwise he would incite his people to attack them’. Similarly, the Waki Report (2008: 90) states that security services in Nakuru, many under the control of chiefs and assistant chiefs, ‘did not want to stop the violence or were under orders not to do so’.

In Uasin Gishu, the district that saw the worst violence, a pastor recalled that he had tried contacting the chief but,

[n]othing happened. Kikuyu young men started trying to defend themselves. There was no response. The Chief arrived with his two police officers who were both Kalenjin. The AP officers started pushing the Kikuyu men back [into the fire] as the Kalenjin men burnt houses behind them. (Waki Report, 2008: 57)

In Baringo, another Kalenjin district, one witness claimed that local chiefs had organized local community meetings ‘during which sentiments were expressed to the effect that Kikuyus would have to leave and go back to Central Province’ (Waki Report, 2008: 92).

The post-violence coalition government
The violence abated when Kibaki and Odinga signed a peace accord on 28 February 2008. The accord created a coalition government where Kibaki retained the presidency and Odinga was appointed prime minister. Their parties each received about half of all ministerial positions. The accord tried to further enshrine power-sharing by mandating dual control over each ministry. If a party chose the minister, the other party chose the assistant minister(s).

Despite these formal power-sharing arrangements, the interior ministry continued to carry out the interests of Kibaki and his allies after the violence ended. Kibaki chose the minister and permanent secretary of the interior ministry. And since the Kenyan state is particularly top-heavy, with the minister and permanent secretary of each ministry making the bulk of decisions, accountability decisions were made to favor Kibaki and his political allies. Indeed, the assistant minister of the interior ministry after 2008 was a member of Odinga’s party. Yet, he claims that he had little de facto authority over the Provincial Administration (PA): ‘they only give me scraps. I am kept off the real decisions.’ Instead, Kibaki’s inner circle made the vast majority of decisions about personnel within the PA after the violence. Kibaki remained president until 2013 when Uhuru Kenyatta, his co-ethnic and an alleged elite organizer of the Kikuyu-instigated violence, took office.

Data and models
Archival data on chief appointments
We construct a dataset of chief and assistant chiefs postings in Rift Valley. The data come from administrative officer records located in the archives of Rift Valley’s

17 Kasara (2016) argues that a secondary goal of the violence was to redistrict constituencies for future elections, and make safer Kalenjin parliamentary seats. Indeed, Harris (2012) finds that the number of registered Kikuyu voters in Kalenjin districts dropped in areas with arson activity.
18 See Rutere (2011) for the role of other state officers in the violence.
19 Although Kibaki himself was largely absent from the day-to-day affairs of the interior ministry, many of Kibaki’s closest allies were heavily involved in the management of the state and were looking forward to electing Kibaki’s (Kikuyu) successor in the next election.
20 Interview with Assistant Minister of Provincial Security, 1 February 2012, Nairobi, Kenya.
provincial headquarters from 2009 to 2012. Each province is mandated to keep all bureaucratic records for three years after their publication, after which they have permission to destroy the files. The field research for this project was carried out in 2012, when Rift Valley headquarters still had records from the immediate aftermath of the violence. The records list all of the locations and sublocations within a district (districts are one administrative tier lower than provinces), the officer stationed there, when that officer started her post, or the station’s vacancy if empty.21 We provide an anonymized sample of the officer returns in the Supplemental Information (SI) section in the Online appendix.22 We geolocate each chief’s location and assistant chief’s sublocation to its corresponding administrative unit from the 1989 and 1999 censuses so as to merge in demographic information. We are able to geolocate more than 96% of observations in our study area.23

We have no reason to suspect any bias of omission or a political motivation in the release of the data that might affect our results.24 Chief and assistant chief records have been collected at the provincial level on behalf of the central government for decades. In recent years, archival officer returns have been made available for perusal by researchers so long as they obtain the necessary clearance. These archival records allow us to capture a ‘snapshot’ of Kenyan chiefs and assistant chiefs who were in place in the years after the violence ended. We use the records to deduce whether a chief or assistant chief was fired from her location or sublocation sometime during 2008–09 by determining if the current chief or assistant chief was hired in the post-violence period or was retained throughout. To reiterate, it is highly unlikely for officers to willingly leave their posts. Chiefs and assistant chiefs are the most important bureaucrats within their jurisdiction and would see any other government job as a demotion. Further, chiefs and assistant chiefs are institutionally mandated to be from the area they serve and cannot be rotated across stations. If an area’s chief or assistant chief started serving after 2008, this is most likely due to the previous chief or assistant chief having been fired from her post.

The richness of the systematic data we are able to extract from these files allows for a rigorous evaluation of which chiefs and assistant chiefs the Kibaki government held accountable. At the same time, we recognize the limitations of this archival data source. The vast majority of records from the pre-violence era were destroyed in accordance with official policy. Empirically, this means that we cannot link specific officers to demotions or dismissals, or measure officer promotion. Further, we are not able to measure if officers with certain characteristics – e.g. officers from a particular ethnic group – were more likely to be punished.

Geolocating electoral violence

We geolocate the post-election violence using NASA’s Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Thermal Anomalies Fire data. We use these satellite data to measure whether a given location or sublocation experienced post-election violence between 30 December 2007 and 28 February 2008. As we discuss above, arson was the violent tactic of choice in Rift Valley. Indeed, Kasara (2016) finds that 89% of the 736 police cases during the post-election violence involved arson. Moreover, arson occurred in the same jurisdictions that also experienced post-election violence of other forms (Waki Report, 2008). This suggests that the MODIS dataset likely captures the incidence of violence more broadly.25

We follow the procedures other projects have employed when using MODIS to locate political violence. First, the dataset itself is prepared to ensure that each observation is a fire as opposed to, for instance, hot gas or volcanic activity (Giglio et al., 2003). Second, we acknowledge that the satellites sense nonviolent fires. We therefore create an indicator variable for whether a fire occurred in the area over the same time in the previous

21 These records occasionally record other officer characteristics, including the officer’s sex, age, education level, and rank (e.g. Senior Chief 1 or Chief 2).
22 Unfortunately, and as we describe in the SI, the records do not all record an officer’s rank and when they were last promoted. This means that we cannot deduce if certain officers were demoted or promoted in the wake of the post-election violence.
23 We could not geolocate a satisfactorily high number of observations for two pastoralist districts – Turkana and West Pokot – so we remove them from the analysis. The removal of these districts does not affect the validity of our results as they did not experience violence against Kikuyus.
24 The records that were the most spotty were those in arid, far-flung parts of the province where state capacity is weakest. Records from Rift Valley’s farming districts – that are among the country’s most developed and where the violence took place – were the most complete.
25 In the SI, we run a placebo test on whether officers who saw a fire in their jurisdiction in the year prior were subsequently fired. The null results (SI) both indicate that chiefs’ and assistant chiefs’ firings were not related to arson activity in the pre-violence period and serve as an additional measure of validity of the MODIS data.
year (30 December 2006 to 28 February 2007) and code these jurisdictions as not experiencing arson related to the electoral violence. Figure 1 displays arson activity in Rift Valley during the 2007–08 post-election violence. Figure 2 plots the number of fires per day in Rift Valley from 30 December 2007 to 28 February 2008. As a comparison, we plot the number of fires one year prior (30 December 2006 to 28 February 2007).

The MODIS dataset has important limitations. Namely, it cannot identify the direction of violence – it cannot tell us whether a specific fire targeted ethnic groups affiliated with the opposition or the incumbent. That said, we believe that the geographic concentration of the violence alongside pre-existing settlement patterns allows us to infer the target of arson in a jurisdiction. Secondary sources and research on the post-election violence agree that government-instigated violence was concentrated in Nakuru while opposition-instigated violence was concentrated in the Upper Rift where Kalenjins were more numerous. 27

**Variables and specifications**

We run logit regressions where our dependent variable is $Fired_{ij}$, a binary indicator of whether a chief or assistant chief $i$ was fired in location or sublocation $j$ sometime during 2008–09. Only looking at locations or sublocations with officers currently in them, however, undercounts the number of administrators who were let go because there is a time lag between when a chief or assistant chief is fired and when a replacement is hired. For this reason, we also code as $Fired_{ij}$ whether a station was vacant as this indicates that the previous administrator was fired. 28

We run three different specifications, first with no controls and then with controls for a total of six regressions. In the first specification, our independent variable is $Arson_j$, a binary indicator drawn from the MODIS data of whether location or sublocation $j$ experienced an arson during the post-election violence. In the second and third specifications, we interact $Arson_j$ with $OppositionDistrict_j$ and $Nakuru_j$, respectively. These are binary indicators of whether a location or sublocation is in an opposition district or Nakuru. Our regression equations for the main models are as follows:

\[
\text{logit}(Fired_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Arson_j + X_j
\]  

\[
\text{logit}(Fired_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Arson_j + \beta_2 OppositionDistrict_j + \beta_3 Arson_j * OppositionDistrict_j + X_j
\]  

\[
\text{logit}(Fired_{ij}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Arson_j + \beta_2 Nakuru_j + \beta_3 Arson_j * Nakuru_j + X_j
\]  

\[26\] In addition to the problems discussed below, we account for the possibility that the MODIS data may count fires that are not arsons by re-running the analysis after only including the largest fires – those at the 50th and 75th percentiles of intensity. The results are substantively similar.

\[27\] We are cognizant of the possible potential bias in all existing narratives whereby they misrepresent the nuances of the violence, arguing a narrative that falls neatly into what we would expect from episodes of ethnic conflict (Brass, 1997) or partisan conflict (Rutere, 2011). In the SI, we attempt to overcome this concern by looking at within-district variation in residence patterns and the direction of the violence.

\[28\] We also re-run the analysis after coding $Fired_{ij}$ up to 2011 (the results do not change).
$X_j$ is a vector of control variables. We control for President Kibaki’s 2007 vote share ($\text{Kibaki vote share}_j$), local economic conditions by including the number of individuals (normalized) living below the poverty line ($\text{Poverty headcount}_j$), ethno-linguistic fractionalization as measured by the Herfindahl Index ($\text{ELF}_j$), and local land grievances by including a dichotomous variable for whether Kenyatta created a settlement scheme in the observation’s larger division ($\text{Settlement scheme}_j$). We also control for traditional administrative factors by including each location or sublocation’s logged area in sq km ($\text{larea}_j$), logged 1999 population ($\text{lpopulation}_j$), and ruralness ($\text{Distance to major town}_j$).29

Results

The results are presented in Table I and provide strong and consistent evidence in support of the uneven accountability hypothesis. Chiefs and assistant chiefs in opposition districts, where the violence was instigated by opposition supporters and targeted the government’s co-ethnic Kikuyus, were more likely to be fired if there was violence in their jurisdiction. In contrast, chiefs and assistant chiefs in government-aligned Nakuru, where the violence was propagated by Kikuyus and aimed at opposition supporters, were less likely to be fired if there was violence in their jurisdiction. These results indicate that the Kibaki government selectively fired officers who oversaw electoral violence in their respective jurisdictions that went against their interests and selectively retained officers who oversaw electoral violence in their respective jurisdictions that was in favor of the government.

Refuting alternative explanations

In this section, we discuss alternative explanations to explain our results and present data to refute them. Full details and results of models presented are in the SI (in the Online appendix).

First, we consider the alternative explanation that there was an indiscriminate purge of all opposition officers after the violence. This explanation suggests an
ethnic story where officers who were ethnically misaligned with the Kikuyu government were sanctioned, regardless of their actions during the violence: although the government gained no new information about an individual officer’s type from the violence, the government opportunistically used the violence as political cover to negatively sanction all officers ethnically affiliated with the opposition, even without evidence that any given officer acted against the incumbent’s interests. We note that the president cannot purge all non-co-ethnics indefinitely from chief and assistant chief positions. These jurisdictions must be governed by a member of the majority ethnic group. Kalenjin locations and sublocations thus continued to be governed by a Kalenjin officer, even if the officer in charge during the post-election violence was fired.

30 Our empirics in Table I refute this alternative explanation. Had the Kibaki government engaged in a purge of misaligned officers, we would have seen a null coefficient on *Arson* and a positive coefficient on *Kalenjin district* in Columns 2 and 5 of Table I.

Relatedly, we examine whether the government only held Kalenjin chiefs accountable, as opposed to all chiefs that engaged in opposition-instigated violence. Since the majority of opposition-instigated violence took place in Kalenjin-majority districts, one might assume that our results for Equation 2 were driven by this explanation. To remedy this concern, we re-run Equation 2 after removing all Kalenjin districts from our sample. In this new subsample, we see opposition-instigated violence in Trans-Nzoia, a district with a Luhya majority. Equation 2 remains significant and positive in this model, indicating that our results are not the result of an ethnic battle between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, but one about revealed officer loyalty. In other words, Luhya chiefs – whose political leanings were between Kibaki and Odinga – were more likely to be fired if there was an arson in their jurisdiction.

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**Table I. Main results: Officer firings on local arson activity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Nakuru</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Opposition</th>
<th>Nakuru</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
<td>−0.63**</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>−0.36†</td>
<td>−0.83***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
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<td>Kalenjin district</td>
<td>−0.44*</td>
<td>−0.70**</td>
<td>−0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson * Kalenjin district</td>
<td>0.72*</td>
<td>0.89**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nakuru</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.91***</td>
<td>0.76***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson * Nakuru</td>
<td>−0.85***</td>
<td>−0.79***</td>
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<td>Kibaki lagged vote share</td>
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<td>Poverty headcount</td>
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<td>(1.02)</td>
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<td>ELF</td>
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<td>Settlement scheme</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance to major town</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interception</td>
<td>−1.38***</td>
<td>−1.13***</td>
<td>−1.45***</td>
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<td>−0.34</td>
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<td>2,277</td>
<td>2,277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < 0.1, †p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Logit regressions of the likelihood of a given chief or assistant chief getting fired by 2009 given an arson in their given location or sublocation during the post-election violence. The derivation of the variables is described in the text. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Second, we attempt to address concerns arising from the limitations of the MODIS data and its inability to tell the direction of the violence. Our results run into inference problems if there were many opposition-instigated attacks in Nakuru or incumbent-instigated attacks in opposition districts. We address this concern by looking specifically at the potential for double-sided violence in Nakuru given its history of Kalenjin-instigated violence during the 1990s. We restrict our sample to those jurisdictions in Nakuru where we are certain that violence was incumbent-instigated by leveraging the fact that violence broke out in places where the instigating group was the local majority and the victimized group was a local minority: only in these areas did the majority group feel safe enough to perpetuate violence. We re-run Equation 3 after interacting Arson * Nakuru with an indicator variable for whether the Kalenjin population of the location or sublocation was between 10% and 49%. Additionally, and as a harder test, we also interact Arson * Nakuru with an indicator variable of whether the Kalenjin population of the location or sublocation was between 10% and 49% and there was a Kikuyu majority. The results are in the SI in the Online appendix and are all consistent with the uneven accountability hypothesis.

Third, we re-run the models after controlling for sites of 1991–92 pre-election violence using data from Boone (2011). Including this variable controls for the government’s perceived likelihood of violence breaking out in an area. Further, the government can estimate the loyalty of officers who have been in their post since the early 1990s. This test is thus particularly useful to rule out the alternative explanation that the government instigated violence in particular jurisdictions within Nakuru (where all government-instigated violence occurred) because it already knew the loyalty of officers there. The results are in the SI.

Conclusion

In this article, we present an ex post solution to the principal–agent problem that a government faces when delegating coercive power to local security officers. In the wake of highly visible bouts of electoral violence, the government will use an individual officer’s actions during the violence as a signal of the officer’s type. The government holds officers accountable through positive rewards or negative sanctions depending on whether the violence in their jurisdiction was incumbent- or opposition-instigated. We find support for our theory of uneven accountability in Kenya’s Rift Valley in the aftermath of the 2007–08 post-election violence. Local bureaucratic chiefs and assistant chiefs in jurisdictions that saw opposition-instigated violence against government supporters were more likely to be fired. On the other hand, chiefs and assistant chiefs in jurisdictions where electoral violence was incumbent-instigated and against opposition supporters were less likely to be fired.

While we examine the theory only on one case, we see signs of uneven accountability in other post-violence situations. Take for instance the wake of Zimbabwe’s 2008 election violence. The Mugabe government demoted or fired police and army personnel suspected of being sympathetic to the political opposition: ‘Several policemen told HRW that officers were told to support ZANU-PF or resign, and that promotion in the police was contingent on support for ZANU-PF’ (US State Department, 2009). Likewise, consider the 2010–11 post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire where an estimated 3,000 civilians were killed and more than 150 women were raped (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The election unseated incumbent Laurent Gbargo and the opposition candidate Alassane Ouattara took office. The Ouattara government appointed a Special Investigative Cell in the Ministry of Justice, which was charged with holding perpetrators on both sides of the conflict accountable. Reports of the cell’s activities, however, indicate that the accountability process was similarly politicized: ‘though the cell was designed as an impartial judicial body […] this balance has not been achieved. More than 150 Gbagbo supporters have been accused of crimes and arrested, but few from the Ouattara side have been similarly charged and detained, leading observers to point to the cell’s politicized leadership and a strong current of “victor’s justice”’ (Davis & Vigani, 2013). Future research should examine the accountability process for these cases and others to refine the uneven accountability hypothesis we propose here.

More broadly, the Kenyan 2007–08 post-election violence, alongside other cases, gives insight into why we might see uneven accountability processes take place within unconsolidated democracies. These countries remember the previous authoritarian era when the security apparatus was crucial for helping autocrats stay in power and officers were compensated well in return. Since the beginning of multiparty elections, little time has passed and little will has been developed to create impartial, professional coercive organs. Both officers and politicians are primed to re-establish the neopatrimonial relationships that allow for the misuse of the state’s coercive authority, providing a fertile ground for the perpetuation of electoral violence by state actors.
Replication data
The dataset, codebook, and replication files for the empirical analysis in this article, along with the Online appendix, can be found at http://www.prio.org/jpr/data sets. All analyses were conducted using R.

Acknowledgments
We thank Meredith Blank, Charles Crabtree, Donghyun Choi, Christian Davenport, Charles Hornsby, Jule Krüger, Anne Meng, Susanne Mueller, Noah Nathan, Brenton Peterson, Rachel Riedl, Tyson Roberts, Christopher Sullivan, Carly Wayne, and participants at the University of Chicago’s Program on International Security Policy and the University of Michigan’s Peace and Conflict Workshop for helpful comments and feedback.

Funding
The research was partially funded by NSF DDIG #1226777, as well as internal grants from Harvard University and the University of Michigan.

References


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