Feminist Struggles in a Changing China

WANG Zheng

Introduction

Embedded in political, social, economic, and cultural transformations, gender has been a highly salient site of contention since the Chinese elite started to search for a modern China in the late nineteenth century. Having risen to become the world’s second largest economy in the twenty-first century, China nonetheless witnesses growing conservative social and political forces that have importunately attempted to reinstall and consolidate gender and class hierarchies in the context of global capitalism. This chapter examines roughly three cohorts of Chinese feminists as a way to illustrate shifting settings and constant contentions over gender equality: state feminists of the socialist period, post-socialist NGO feminists around the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW), and young feminist activists ascending onto the public stage in recent years. Each cohort has adopted distinct strategies for their diverse agendas, conditioned by their particular historical contexts and social and political parameters.

But continuities remain. While the first generation of socialist period feminists has long left the historical stage, some of its legacies have persisted, especially in terms of its institution-building in the form of an official mass organization—the All-China Women’s Federation. The relationship between feminism and the state remains central to feminist struggles in China even when state socialism has long evolved into state
capitalism, and a rapid privatization of the economy has produced 250 million citizens who do not work in the state sector (Xing 2015). And just as Chinese feminism’s inception was inseparable from a global context a century ago, today it is as deeply embedded in processes of globalization as ever. Contemporary China is in a time of “compressed temporalities,” in the sense that various contentious discourses over the past century have neither reached closure nor faded out, but rather have often been reenacted and remobilized simultaneously against a drastically changed historical setting. This chapter traces both continuities and changes in Chinese feminist struggles while critically examining constraints and possibilities for further development.

A Brief Overview of Chinese Feminism in the Early Twentieth Century

Feminism was one of the many ideologies that educated Chinese have embraced in their pursuit of modernity and rejection of an ancient dynastic system underpinned by a hierarchical sex-gender system that held chastity as the supreme value of women in the interest of patrilineal kinship. Just as the imagination of a modern China has never been singular, feminism has also been understood in diverse ways that, nevertheless, express a shared concern with gendered social arrangements. At the turn of the twentieth century, anarchist, socialist, liberal, evolutionary, eugenic, and nationalist positions shaped various feminist articulations. In their proposals for changing gender hierarchy, rooted in ancient Chinese philosophy and gender norms based on Confucian ideals of gender differentiation and segregation, feminists expressed different imaginings of a better future: a more humane society that centered on social justice and equality, a modern society that allowed individuals to break away from the constraints of Confucian social norms embedded in kinship relations as well as the control of an imperial polity, and a stronger nation that turned China from being the prey of imperialist powers into a sovereign state. Regardless of their diverse political positions, reformers, revolutionaries, professionals, and educated women and men from elite social backgrounds who embraced various versions of feminism agreed on the necessity of changing gender practices in transforming their ancient civilization, which had fallen into deep crisis in a time of imperialist and colonialist expansion. The confluence of diverse and often contradictory ideas and practices
rapidly made a neologism a key phrase in twentieth-century China: “equality between men and women” (nannü pingdeng, a Chinese rendition of the English phrase “sexual equality” that had been circulating globally since the late nineteenth century). Signifying a conscious rejection of the foundation of Confucian social order prescribing differentiation between men and women, “equality between men and women” became a badge of modernity that social groups and political parties adopted to assert a progressive identity.

After the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, educated women from elite families who had joined the revolution against the Qing government launched a women’s suffrage movement to demand equal political rights in the new Republic polity. Suppressed by a dictatorial president in 1913, the suffragists turned to women’s education and careers to lay a social foundation for women’s political rights. Radical male intellectuals launched a New Culture movement in 1915 to challenge the dominant Confucianism, which provided renewed critical feminist thrust. Gender hierarchy, gender differentiation, gender segregation, sexual double standards that demanded chastity of women while legitimizing polygamy, and cultural practices ritualized in the service of maintaining a deeply entrenched hierarchical society that was fundamentally based on the dominance of men over women, were highlighted as quintessential symbols of the backwardness of Confucian culture, defined as “feudalist.” “Feminism” was enthusiastically embraced as a powerful weapon to combat the “feudalism” that had dominated China for millennia.

The small circle of cultural radicals, which included the future founders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), rapidly expanded its social and intellectual influence after May 4th, 1919, when college and secondary school students spearheaded a nationwide patriotic movement. Incensed by the treaty signed by world powers at the Versailles Conference, which transferred all of Germany’s rights in Shandong Province to Japan after World War I, the May Fourth Movement, with its vehemently anti-imperialist female and male students as major constituents, became a powerful vehicle that carried the New Culture’s advocacy of anti-feudalism, including the promotion of feminism, into mainstream urban society. Equal educational and employment opportunities for women, and their freedom to socialize with men, ending centuries of gender segregation, were seen as the foundation for women’s liberation. Pursuing equality in all spheres of life and achieving an
independent personhood became the hallmarks of the May Fourth women’s feminist subjectivities. Many May Fourth feminists—by definition educated women and men—later played important roles in China’s political, social, and cultural transformations (Wang 1999). From two cohorts, older New Culturalists and younger student participants in the May Fourth Movement, emerged a small group of men and women, disillusioned with the Western liberal but imperialist powers, who in 1921 formed the CCP—modeled after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—and openly endorsed “equality between men and women” in its platform (Gilmartin 1995).

Even though many high-profile May Fourth feminists joined the CCP, the term “feminism” began to lose favor within the party when CCP feminists came into contact with Western socialists and communists and adopted their view that “feminism” was “bourgeois”—a discursive practice that had originated out of the rivalries between radical suffragists and socialist women in the early twentieth century (Boxer 2007). Nonetheless, CCP feminists kept alive the May Fourth feminist agendas of women’s liberation, simply replacing the discredited Chinese translation of “feminism” nüquan with “women’s rights” funü quánli and maintaining the pressure on the party to promote those rights. They mobilized women for the revolution with yet another new term: “women-work” (Davin 1976).

Managed by a Women Department or a Women-Work Committee in various periods, women-work was a major platform for CCP feminists engaged in pursuing gendered social justice and equality, especially for lower-class women, as well as an important branch of the CCP specialized in mobilizing women’s participation in the Communist Revolution. In urban areas, the underground CCP feminists targeted women factory workers as the major constituents of women-work; in the CCP military bases in rural areas, peasant women were the target for feminist organization and mobilization. Running literacy classes and raising both class and gender consciousness were part of the women-work among factory workers; addressing abuse of women in patriarchal families, opposing arranged marriage, and promoting freedom to divorce were issues adopted by CCP feminists in rural base areas, though the latter item was dropped after the CCP moved to the northern base areas in late 1930s. The CCP could not afford to antagonize male peasants, who were their major recruitment targets in a time of war. So the focus of women-work shifted to enhancing women’s eco-
onomic status in rural families by encouraging them to participate in gainful, productive work.

The inner logic of the two-pronged agenda of women-work was that in order for the CCP to succeed in attracting women to the Communist Revolution, which promised women’s thorough emancipation down the road, the party had to address women’s particular and immediate needs and interests. In practice, the two dimensions of women-work presented an inherent source of tension that required tremendous wisdom for the CCP feminists to juggle skillfully, as male leaders at all levels tended to treat institutionalized women-work as an auxiliary instrument to fulfill various tasks of the party. After all, the wars against Japanese invaders and the Nationalist Party provided them with an excuse not to prioritize women’s gender-specific interests, but instead to demand women’s contribution to the Revolution.

**Socialist State Feminist Transformative Practices**

China in 1949 was an agrarian society with about 90 percent of its total population of 540 million residing in rural areas, 90 percent of women illiterate (Zhongguo renquan nianjian 2007:580), and an economy devastated by decades of war. Economic recovery with women’s participation and increasing women’s literacy were high on the CCP’s agenda for a socialist modernity. The victory of the CCP in 1949 enabled feminists in the party to wield socialist state power to materialize their feminist dreams. Only 530,000 of the CCP’s 1949 membership of 4.49 million were women, but many of these CCP women rose to official positions in administrations ranging from the central government to urban street offices and rural townships, depending on their party seniority and level of education. Although we do not claim that each CCP woman was a conscious feminist, the numbers and power of Chinese socialist state feminists in the early People’s Republic of China were arguably unprecedented in feminist histories of the world. This was a consequence of a feminist-informed Communist Revolution in the world’s most populous nation that attracted female constituents with equality between men and women as an integral goal of the revolution. Upon the founding of the PRC, many CCP feminists in their official capacities vigorously initiated and promoted transformative programs to cash the party’s promissory note of women’s thorough liberation in a socialist country. This belies the general assumption in much of the scholarship
in English that these women were passive followers of a male-dominated party.

The first National Women’s Congress, organized by senior CCP feminists Deng Yingchao and Cai Chang in March 1949, resolved to set up a national women’s organization, All-China Democratic Women’s Federation (ACDWF was changed to All-China Women’s Federation in 1957, hence ACWF), an umbrella organization that horizontally united all pro-CCP women’s organizations, and an official institution that vertically reached down to the rural villages and urban neighborhoods nationwide. This vast organizational reach enabled socialist state feminists to effectively carry out many transformative actions nationwide. The very first law adopted by the socialist state, the 1950 Marriage Law, drafted by a feminist committee led by Deng Yingchao, was a centerpiece in the socialist feminist mission of transforming Chinese “feudalist” culture. The law enforced dismantling of traditional marriage practices such as arranged marriage and underage marriage, and granted women freedom to divorce and to remarry, establishing new gender norms of equality between men and women with state power. Women’s literacy, equal employment and equal pay, political participation, reproductive health, and new public facilities to reduce working women’s burden of childcare and housework were also areas of remarkable feminist achievement in the early PRC. Their efforts to involve and engage rural and urban lower-class women, particularly in all the transformative programs aiming to eliminate class and gender hierarchies, expanded urban elite-based concepts and practices of “women’s rights” from the first half of the twentieth century. That said, the socialist state paradoxically widened the gap between the rural and urban by setting up a two-tier household registration system that offered urban residents more privileges and material goods in order to speed up industrialization.

Socialist feminists’ comprehensive vision of Chinese women’s liberation crucially hinged on transformation of subjectivities. Senior feminists were acutely aware that without undoing the patriarchal culture that saturated the psyche of the people and the CCP members, efforts to achieve women’s equality in all spheres of life would encounter severe obstacles and resistance. Cultural production was thus also an important realm in socialist feminist transformation, a heritage from the May Fourth New Culture Movement when progressive intellectuals (a cohort that included many men) produced a massive amount of litera-
Feminist Struggles in a Changing China

ture and drama to condemn a “feudalist” patriarchal tradition embodied in Confucianism. The Chinese term “feudalism” in socialist film (a state-owned industry led by female and male feminist leaders), novels, and operas decidedly represented the “Other” of socialist new China. It actually became a gender-inflected key word encompassing everything we today call sexism, masculinism, patriarchy, male chauvinism, and/or misogyny. Even illiterate women in rural areas could deploy the term effortlessly to accuse men of chauvinism (Hinton 1984). “Equality between men and women” and “women’s liberation,” popularized via state-owned media, especially the ACWF’s magazine *Women of China* and socialist films accessible even to rural communities, became household slogans intimately connecting gender equality with the authority of the new socialist state. A socialist feminist gender discourse rapidly rose to the mainstream discourse in the early PRC.

Chinese socialist state feminists in the early PRC were an integral part of the international women’s movement of the socialist camp that was represented by the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF). On December 10, 1949, only two months after the founding of the PRC, the All-Asian Women’s Congress, attended by 197 representatives from 23 countries, was organized by the ACDWF in its new role as a member of the WIDF (Haan 2010). Hosting an international conference on women when only about 10 socialist countries had established diplomatic relationships with the PRC indicated the CCP leadership’s full support for this initiative, as well as the state feminists’ high capacity for global networking. The event certainly expressed state feminists’ conscious efforts to merge the women’s movement in the PRC with socialist women’s movements globally. With the Chair of the ACDWF, Cai Chang, serving as the Deputy Chair of the WIDF, Chinese socialist state feminists also played a leading role in the international women’s movement until the 1960s, when the CCP split with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The CCP feminists’ firm identification with the party both empowered and constrained them because of the contradictory political environment. Ideologically, the party’s platform endorsed a feminist pursuit of “equality between men and women” that was written into the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Institutionally, however, male Communists assumed leading administrative positions. Many male officials did not eschew male chauvinism during the Communist Revolution even though they vowed to strive for an egalitarian society.
Women of China in the early 1950s exposed many sexist behaviors of male officials, including blocking women from entering gainful employment (Wang 2016:Chapter 3). Feminists in the Women’s Federation system found their proposals for women’s benefits often pushed aside by male officials. Even the institutionalization of a women’s mass organization did not resolve the problem of gender hierarchy in the party. The ACWF\(^2\), after all, was organized as a party-led mass organization that was responsible for advocacy rather than as an executive branch of the government, although everyone in the WF system was also on the government payroll.

As each level of the Women’s Federation subordinates to the party committee of the same administrative level, WF women officials often encountered party officials who showed little interest in equality between men and women or women-work. Party Chairman Mao Zedong was apparently well aware of this situation. On November 12, 1952, in a meeting the ACWF leaders had requested, he instructed them on dealing with different levels of party committees with these colorful words: *yi song* (first, submit proposals to the party committee); *er cui* (second, push the party committee to respond); *san maniang* (if the first two methods did not work, third, just curse and swear) (Luo and Duan 2000: 126).\(^3\) Apparently, though never an intentional policy, neglecting women’s interests was a common practice within the party that continued into the socialist period; and significantly, the chairman’s support stopped at the level of advice without offering any structural rearrangement of power relations. Actually, quite a few WF officials who followed Mao’s advice were labeled as “rightists” for their candid criticism of their party leaders in the Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957. The subordination of the gender-based mass organization to the male-dominated party led to subsequent institutional marginalization of WF in the state structure of the PRC, which in turn conditioned the routine experiences of feminists in the CCP that women-work was of lesser value, except for those moments when some item on the party’s central agenda required that women be mobilized.

Historically, some CCP male leaders used the label of “narrow bourgeois feminism” as a political stick to beat down those outspoken feminists who insisted on the priority of women’s interests or raised a critical voice against male chauvinism in the CCP. In this historical context, state feminists in the WF system routinely operated in a *politics of concealment* in their endeavors to promote feminist agendas. Since singularly
and openly raising a demand on behalf of women would have a slim chance of eliciting the support of male authorities, WF officials learned to insert feminist items into the party’s agenda in order to gain legitimacy and resources for actions with a clear gender dimension. One example was when the Shanghai Women’s Federation organized a large-scale women’s rally against American imperialism in 1951 at the request of the municipal party committee. Utilizing the support from the municipal and district governments on this legitimate party “central task,” WF officials swiftly expanded the WF’s institutional development in Shanghai neighborhoods by setting up grassroots women’s organizations (Wang 2016: Chapter 1). Articulating their strong support of the party’s central tasks, state feminists often embedded a “hidden transcript” that intended to advance women’s diverse interests. In other words, camouflaging a feminist agenda with dominant party language was a major principle in the politics of concealment. The concealing and self-effacing maneuver appealed to the authority of the party and glossed over their own struggles behind the scenes.

Receding into the shadows, socialist state feminists were unknown to either the public in China or scholars outside China. Women’s dramatic advancements in education, employment, and political participation in the socialist period were noticed by many observers outside China, but without any knowledge of state feminists’ endeavors these observers generally attributed all the accomplishments to a patriarchal party-state that supposedly showed sporadic benevolence to women. A dominant conceptualization of a monolithic socialist state in the field of China studies has disabled scholarly imaginations of possible feminist visions and contentions inside the socialist state.

Socialist state feminists’ efforts to eliminate both gender and class hierarchies and transform a patriarchal culture were halted in 1964, when a Maoist class struggle against revisionism and capitalism rapidly ascended to become a dominant agenda of the CCP. The ACWF stopped functioning in the heat of the Cultural Revolution, when all government branches were paralyzed. While the effects of state feminists’ social and cultural transformations in the first fifteen years of the PRC persisted, and institutional mechanisms they developed for gender equality in education and employment continued, their feminist agenda of further transforming gender relations was suppressed by a Maoist class struggle beginning in 1964. While working-class young women had more opportunities to be promoted to leadership positions
in the Cultural Revolution because of Mao’s wife Jiang Qing’s prominent position in the power center, a New Culture agenda highlighting anti-patriarchy in cultural production was condemned by Jiang Qing and other radicals as an expression of revisionism. Suppressing a conscious agenda of feminist cultural transformation by state feminists in and outside the ACWF, Maoist radicals did serious harm to the feminist revolutionary cause. When the ACWF revived its function in 1978, the political landscape had already changed so drastically that the surviving first cohort of state feminists found their previous accomplishments for gender equality under severe attack.

A major erasure of socialist state feminists arose in the production of historical knowledge of socialism since the late 1970s, when the CCP began to depart from the socialist course after Mao’s death in 1976. In Chinese intellectuals’ concerted critique of the CCP’s crimes under Mao Zedong’s dictatorship, descriptions of the socialist period were mainly limited to condemnations of its ills, and Mao became synonymous with socialism. The antisocialist discourse was both grossly reductive and openly masculinist. In post-socialist intellectuals’ efforts to dismantle both the CCP’s authoritarian rule and socialist egalitarian values and practices, socialist state feminist gender ideology and practices that promoted equality between men and women were characterized as the Maoist state’s imposition of gender sameness, a crime of the CCP that distorted women’s natural femininity and masculinized them.

In an article published in the prestigious Chinese academic journal *Sociological Studies*, Zheng Yefu argued that contemporary China was falling far behind developed countries in terms of the level of a knowledge economy, as well as the levels of social and material wealth. At the same time, he pointed out Chinese women’s liberation surpassed all countries in the world in terms of women’s equal employment and equal pay. Deploiring what he viewed as a cause-and-effect situation, Zheng offered a critique that condensed key elements in the backlash against socialist women’s liberation:

The immediate consequence of a government enforced women’s liberation “outpacing” socio-economic development is dysfunctional family relations . . . We have failed to explore a new gender division of labor in family life because, through supporting the weak and suppressing the strong, a strong administrative power has interfered and destroyed the normal division of
labor between the strong and the weak in family. It has even made the weak mistakenly think they are not weak, and made the strong lose confidence in themselves. Ultimately, it has deprived Chinese society of “real men.” . . . A women’s liberation promoted by politics has also made China lose its women. (Zheng Yefu 1994:110; bold in the original)

Restoring gender differentiation was promoted by the urban elite’s conflicting proposals: embracing a Western capitalist modernity symbolized by sexualized and commodified women in advertisements, or reviving a Confucian tradition by retrieving so-called “Oriental female traditional virtues,” which women could express by being self-sacrificing, virtuous mothers and good wives. Rearranging gender practices by promoting a discourse of femininity has become a prominent theme in elite proposals to undo socialist modernity since the early 1980s. The preferred Chinese rendition of “feminism” as nüxing zhuyi (feminine-ism) since the early 1990s partly reflects the hegemonic power of this discourse of femininity.

The CCP’s turn to privatization and marketization was accompanied by a dismantling of socialist institutional mechanisms that safeguarded gender and class equalities for those working in the public sector, such as equal education, equal employment, equal pay, and state-funded health care and childcare; the state’s departure from a socialist egalitarian distribution system was also crucially legitimized by propagating a neo-liberalist ideology that harped on social Darwinism, a discursive maneuver that many male intellectuals eagerly adopted. The slogan “Getting rich is glorious” was promoted by the party’s media, and the poor were blamed for being incapable. The much-abused concept of a Maoist “class” became a convenient excuse for the CCP to abandon class as an analytical category in its embrace of global capitalism.

The profound social, economic, and ideological ruptures that were concealed by one major continuity—that is, the continuous authoritarian political system that sustained the CCP’s rule—coincided with the retirement of the first generation of state feminists. Having barely returned to their posts after the ACWF’s ten-year hiatus during the Cultural Revolution, the top feminist leaders used the limited time before their retirement to promote compilations of source materials and histories of the Chinese women’s movement in diverse locations nationwide, manifesting their will to pass down the heritage of a socialist feminist
history. They also started to organize national conferences on research on women, in an attempt to address the myriad problems women confronted in the era of marketization by insisting on a “Marxist theory of women’s liberation.” This theory’s fundamental thesis is that women’s liberation is based on their participation in social production. Propagating this Marxist theory of women’s liberation was the WF feminists’ important discursive struggle to resist tremendous masculinist pressures in and outside the government to push women back to the kitchen as a solution to the increasing unemployment in marketization. These initiatives recruited and relied on scholars who were showing interest in women’s issues, and quickly stimulated a high tide of research on women nationwide beginning in the early 1980s. Discrimination in women’s employment and education in a market economy and protection of women’s legal rights in marriage and at work were among the hot topics for scholars who aimed to affect public policies with their research. In this period, Chinese scholars heavily relied on the WF’s funding and organizational network as well as institutional legitimacy to get involved in research on women; however, feminist scholars from the West tend to ignore the crucial role state feminists played in this research boom, instead focusing on leading women scholars’ activities in their effort to identify an “autonomous” feminist movement vis-à-vis the supposedly party-controlled women’s movement. Literary scholar Li Xiaojiang has been credited as a pioneer of research on women in the 1980s, while much of the work state feminists in the ACWF have done since the late 1970s to initiate and support research on women has gone unnoticed.

In their old age and declining health, many members of the first generation of state feminists vigorously engaged in writing and publishing memoirs and autobiographies. These moves expressed their conscious resistance to the discursive erasure of Chinese socialist feminist struggles. However, when the CCP led by Deng Xiaoping had already made decisive moves to merge with global capitalism, which was characterized in the media as a new vision of Chinese modernity, socialist state feminists’ claims of their accomplishments in socialist revolution could have little purchase, sounding outdated. Few cared about what these feminists remembered of a time that was condemned as a dark age dominated by Mao’s dictatorship in the rising hegemonic discourse of anti-socialism. Thus, this cohort of socialist state feminists as well as their endeavors failed to enter the constructed public
memory, or historical knowledge, of a socialist past in the age of capitalist globalization.

The Fourth World Conference on Women and Feminist NGOs

The state accelerated privatization and marketization in the 1980s while opening China to transnational corporations. Urban women workers bore the brunt of this “economic reform,” as they became the first to be fired and last to be hired. The labor laws of the socialist period still existed, which required enterprises to pay for reproductive costs including paid maternity leave and daycare. Seeking to maximize profits in a changed economic system, even state-owned sectors began to lay off women disproportionately as well as close down publicly funded daycares and canteens in the name of “optimizing” management and improving “efficiency.” The one-child policy initiated in 1979 placed rural women in a deep predicament, as the simultaneous de-collectivization in rural areas installed a household responsibility system, which increased patrilineal peasant families’ demands for male labor and male heirs. Female infanticide and forced abortion increased rapidly, resulting in a seriously skewed sex ratio at birth: 117.8 boys born for every 100 girls in 2011.

In the context of a severe backlash against socialist women’s liberation in male-dominated public discourse and the state’s dismantling of socialist egalitarian institutional mechanisms in a state-controlled market economy, the beneficiaries of socialist gender equality policies rose to form a significant feminist force. A cohort of urban, educated women who were positioned in academic institutions in the 1980s began to participate in research on women in collaboration with the same cohort in the Women’s Federations in large cities with the intention to influence public policies. When the Chinese government decided to host the Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) in the aftermath of the state suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations, this cohort of feminists swiftly seized the opportunity to push the political boundaries that curtailed spontaneously organized activities after 1989. Many of these women founded feminist NGOs with resources from international donors as well as legitimacy granted by the NGO Forum that was held in tandem with the FWCW and attended by about forty thousand feminists from all over the world. The ACWF’s presence
in NGO activities preparing for the FWCW was challenged by global feminist communities due to its ambiguous status as a mass organization on the government’s payroll, subordinate to the CCP. A new term, “GONGO”—government organized non-governmental organization—legitimized its participation in the NGO Forum, an ironic moment that made NGO a desirable status even in the eyes of a worried Chinese government. In any case, the monopoly of the ACWF in leading a Chinese women’s liberation movement was deconstructed by the rise of feminist NGOs, though the two kinds of organizations worked more in collaboration than in competition in the decade following the FWCW. Two articles published in 2010 presented detailed examinations of the rise of Chinese feminist NGOs in the context of China’s hosting of the FWCW (Zhang and Hsiung 2010; Wang and Zhang 2010). This section will highlight a few key features in this cohort of feminist activism from the hindsight of a changed political milieu in 2015.

First, the introduction of a key feminist concept, gender, proved to be enabling and empowering. Gender as a feminist concept was introduced to China by Chinese feminists in diaspora in the process of preparing the FWCW to critically engage with both post-socialist discourse of femininity naturalizing gender hierarchy and a limited Marxist theory of women’s liberation unable to explain gendered power relations in all modes of productivity. For this cohort of feminists, who were deeply shaped by the socialist gender discourse of “equality between men and women,” feminist gender theory provided a powerful critical lens through which to see weaknesses in a state-endorsed and instrumental gender discourse. Li Huiying, a leading feminist scholar/activist of the Central Party School, articulated the significance of feminist gender theory for her in these words:

I think it was a very sad situation in women’s pursuit of rights since China’s liberation, because women’s pursuit of rights has been turned into a means to the end. But now in the concept of gender, the highlighted “rights” is about human autonomy and agency. People should know what rights they have and then should struggle for those rights (UM Global Feminisms Project: Interview of Li 2004).  

The attraction of “gender,” rendered in Chinese as shehui xingbie (social sex), in Li’s emphasis, lies in an empowering notion that women should and can control their own destiny without subjecting themselves
to the demands of a patriarchal state. The concept of “rights” here is deployed to demand citizens’ rights against an authoritarian state. For this cohort of urban-educated women, “liberation” had been defined for them by the socialist state. In the 1990s, gender theory that emphasized women’s agency and explicated gendered power relations and structures illuminated the limitations and constraints of that liberation. It brought about a sort of consciousness-raising for these urban feminists who began to see the potential of exercising citizen’s rights to demand gender equality beyond statist definitions. The expression of citizen’s agency, which had been amply demonstrated since the 1980s and brutally suppressed in 1989, now found a vehicle in a timely and legitimate notion of NGOs backed by the FWCW.

Second, the decade after the FWCW witnessed Chinese feminists’ innovations in widely circulating the Platform for Action, the Beijing Declaration, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (which the Chinese government signed in 1980) to hold the government accountable, and translating global feminist concepts to local practices. They initiated programs to address a wide range of issues, such as domestic violence, gender and development, feminist curricular transformation in higher education, legal aid for women, rural women’s political participation, sex-ratio imbalances, vocational training for rural women and unemployed urban women, and cultural productions that challenged sexist sexual norms, such as staging a Chinese version of *The Vagina Monologues*. Among all kinds of feminist activities, a creative form of gender training was widely adopted. Utilizing the UN agenda of mainstreaming gender as the basis for legitimate feminist actions, Chinese feminists promoted gender training as an important mechanism of social and cultural transformation. Various feminist NGOs conducted gender-training workshops as an integral part of their feminist projects, on themes such as anti-domestic violence, gender and development, and women’s psychological counseling hotlines, to enhance all the participants’ gender sensitivity. The workshops were also offered to various levels of government officials whose responsibilities related to women’s interests. In the context of a rising neo-liberalist discourse in China since the 1980s, and when the state had collaborated with the intellectual elite to make a Marxist concept of class a taboo subject in the process of China’s turning into a global sweatshop, promulgating the concept of gender equality as a mandate from the UN was also a feminist strategy to uphold social
justice as a legitimate goal to pursue, and to hold the state accountable for its verbal commitment to equality between men and women.

The third feature most saliently demonstrates the specificity of Chinese feminism: the collaborative relationship between the Women’s Federations at different levels and feminist NGOs in diverse locations. Instead of drawing a distinct divide between the two kinds of organizations, feminists from both WF and NGOs often participated in the same projects initiated by NGOs. And in some cases, feminists in the WF even organized NGOs when they felt constrained and limited by the official women’s organization (UM Global Feminisms Project: Interviews of Wang 2003 and Gao 2005). Feminist NGO organizers and feminists in the WF were mostly in the same cohort, shaped by the same socialist ideology and practices of women’s liberation. Moreover, feminists who organized NGOs in most cases were respectable academics in universities and academies of social sciences, all run by the government. The two groups thus were not only from the same cohort but also the same urban elite class who enjoyed social prestige and resources due to their positions in the state system. Fundamentally, the collaborative relationship was conditioned on the ACWF’s switch from their target constituency, women of lower classes—the masses—in the socialist period to an orientation toward urban professionals in the context of class-realignment and social reconfiguration mandated by the state as it merged with global capitalism. Urban professionals’ expertise was eagerly sought after in the rising discourse of a scientific modernity in post-socialist China. NGO feminists’ scholarly titles allowed them to present themselves as experts to state officials, including the WF system. NGO feminist organizers who were consciously maintaining an independent position in terms of initiating and managing feminist projects nevertheless needed the vast institutional reach of the Women's Federations at six administrative levels as well as the official status WF offered to effectively promote feminist issues and influence policy making.

The unique collaboration allowed effective feminist intervention in state processes, or to use a less sensitive term, “implementation of gender mainstreaming,” in the context of increasing state monitoring of NGO activism. Many issues identified and advocated by feminist NGOs have been incorporated by different levels and regions of the government, and have even entered legislation. Chinese feminists had no leverage to stem the state’s merge with global capitalism, which has resulted in officials’ massive profiteering from their power to dispose
public assets and regulate the labor of the lower classes, and thus has increased gender gaps as well as class polarization. However, feminists have forged ahead with diverse programs ranging from legislating domestic violence and promoting rural women’s participation in village management, to transformation of patrilocal marriage systems and land distribution policies to raise rural women’s status in villages and change patriarchal cultural norms of son preference. The ACWF also promoted the Reproductive Security Fund at the municipal government level to mitigate the severe impacts on urban women workers of eliminating socialist benefits for women’s reproductive work that had previously been guaranteed by state-owned enterprises. The momentous success of this collaboration between feminists in and outside the official system is China’s first anti-domestic violence law, passed on December 27, 2015, after two decades of persistent feminist struggles following the FWCW.

Feminist actions and accomplishments have been quite impressive, but they were mostly known only within Chinese feminist circles. The goal of affecting policy-making and intervening in government agenda-setting in the context of the Chinese political system requires the strategy that socialist state feminists had long adopted: maneuvers behind the scenes, utilizing personal networks and institutional resources. Friends, colleagues, relatives, and classmates positioned in powerful posts can all be accessed for a particular project in a society whose operation heavily relies on the lubricant of personal ties. This cohort of feminist leaders of either NGOs or WFs, in this sense, also has acted as lobbyists who absolutely have no intention to publicize their crucial maneuvers. Keeping a low profile is in the best interest of the cause they fight for.

The legitimate concern about the effectiveness of their operations via the state power, however, could also become a source of self-censorship. This cohort’s conscious subversive feminist actions have made them very sensitive to the political parameters set by the state, which paradoxically place them under the influence of a state constantly monitoring NGOs. The state’s punishment of the very few feminists who dared to openly raise a dissenting voice and work on taboo issues forcefully demarcated a forbidden zone: issues related to so-called “national security,” such as labor organizing, ethnic conflicts, and violation of citizens’ rights in any form by any government branch. One prominent case is that of feminist literary scholar Ai Xiaoming of Zhongshan University,
who bravely made documentary films recording struggles of village women and men against corrupt officials, rural victims of HIV-contaminated blood in the so-called “plasma economy” promoted by provincial governments, the injustice of a court ruling in a date rape case, and so on (UM Global Feminisms Project: Interview of Ai 2005).\textsuperscript{5} Her actions, which crossed the line of an exclusive focus on less risky “women’s issues,” resulted in the discipline of the state in the form of her forced early retirement and non-renewal of her passport. The personal price is high if one dares to defy the authoritarian state, which has been increasingly corrupt and coercive in the two decades following the FWCW.

The political context, thus, has served as a critical factor in feminists’ choices of what actions to take and what strategies to adopt, and limits what may be accomplished. The constraints of the context also largely explain this cohort’s preoccupation with the feminist concept of gender. Legitimized by the UN mandate, gender has been carved out as a relatively safe zone for feminists to pursue social justice and equality without an open challenge against multiple systems of oppression in the process of a repressive state capitalism. “Gender mainstreaming” is a circumscribed feminist agenda in comparison to the vision of this cohort’s revolutionary foremothers, who pursued women’s thorough liberation via political, economic, cultural, and social structural changes. It nevertheless has quietly created new areas of feminist intervention that their foremothers did not envision or where they were unable to intervene. Last but not least, this cohort’s tremendous efforts in gender training, especially their efforts to develop women’s and gender studies curricula in higher education and to promote feminist knowledge production, have inserted a critical feminist discourse in contemporary China’s media and knowledge production, otherwise dominated by blatant sexism and neo-liberalism. Such discursive endeavors have paved the way for the rise of a younger generation of daring feminists who reject the ambiguous term nüxingzhuyi (feminine-ism) and openly embrace nüquanzhuyi (women’s right/power-ism), a Chinese rendition of feminism shunned by the mainstream society for its emphasis on women’s demand of both rights and power.

New Style of Feminist Actions of Young Feminists

In the second decade following the FWCW, the dynamics in the field of Chinese feminist struggles changed again due to drastic shifts in
China’s social and economic transformations as well as its political environment. The feminist pioneers who formed NGOs with the opportunity of the FWCW inspired other groups to follow suit in establishing issue-oriented NGOs nationwide. The rapid growth of various NGOs with massive financial support from diverse international donors alarmed the CCP, which was insecure about its rule and was confronting increasing class and ethnic conflicts domestically and the impact of “color revolution” globally. A decade after the NGO Forums hosted in China, the CCP started to tighten up its monitoring and regulation of Chinese NGOs and to restrict their international funding sources as well as to subvert and co-opt Chinese NGOs.

At the same time, a younger generation of feminists emerged on the stage of social activism, disregarding the tightening political control. Many of the students of the first cohort of feminist NGO leaders, now situated in various urban professions including universities, the media, and WF, carry on feminist struggles in new forms and styles. This cohort of feminists in their late thirties to early forties is joined by an even younger group of feminists who are recent college graduates in their twenties. One commonality across the age groups is that they have grown up in post-socialist China, when socialist institutional mechanisms such as equal employment and equal pay guaranteed along with a position in public enterprises had been largely dismantled in the process of privatization and marketization. In tandem with institutional changes, the socialist gender discourse of equality between men and women by the 1990s was already overshadowed by a discourse of gender differentiation that celebrated a “natural femininity” attained by “modern” consumption of feminine products and by resuming the traditional role of a virtuous mother and good wife, and a hegemonic masculinity embodied in the “successful” men who possess power, wealth, and women. The strong attraction of these young, educated women to feminism is not accidental in a particularly limiting and blatantly sexist political culture.

A demographic factor in combination with China’s drastic economic development has prepared the rise of these young feminists. The one-child policy since 1979 has resulted in an unprecedented number of single daughters (the lucky ones who were not aborted) who enjoyed all the resources their families from both parents’ sides could afford for their education and personal development. The coming of age of these “little princesses” coincided with China’s huge expansion of college
education, which tapped the educational market based on an expanding middle class. The college enrollment in China jumped from 2.28 million in 1978 to 29.07 million in 2008 (Xin Zhongguo liushinian ji-aoyu chengjiu zhan 2009). As a result, the number of female college students rapidly rose from about 37 percent before 1999 to 51.03 percent in 2012, and female Master’s degree holders also rose to 51.46 percent in 2012 (Zhang and Cai 2012). This college sex ratio, which indicates an opposite trend to the skewed sex ratio in the population, demonstrates female students’ superb academic performance, since each applicant has to pass national college entrance examinations to be accepted by various universities according to their test scores. The gender of applicants whose test scores rank among the top regardless of disciplines and locations has also shown a continuous change, with the male top testers declining from 66.2 percent in 1999 to 39.7 percent in 2008 (Zhang and Cai 2012). The consistent high performance of female students has led to an outcry in male-dominated media about yingsheng yangshuai—a so-called gender imbalance with a flourishing female (ying) and declining male (yang). Many universities have adopted discriminatory admission policies that set a higher score for female students to be considered, on the grounds that many enterprises would like to accept more male graduates than female graduates. Indeed, blatant gender discrimination in employment has been a well-known reality since the economic reform, and even many government branches have jumped on the bandwagon of posting only male wanted job advertisements.

A large cohort of well-educated young women from diverse social and economic backgrounds with high aspirations for themselves as well as high expectations from their families, contradictorily, has encountered excessive gender discrimination and pervasive masculinist sexual norms that openly treat women as sex objects and secondary citizens. Inspired by feminism, young women nevertheless have few social resources to make their voices heard, let alone to participate in the policy-making process as the feminists of older cohorts have been able to. As a feminist organizer of this young cohort commented on the feminist strategy of the second cohort working quietly with/in the official system to generate policy changes, “Their experience is very difficult to replicate. At the time of the FWCW they usually already had some managerial positions in the official system, and they had a circle of friends who were in the decision-making or advisory
positions. These factors have served as the lubricant between their NGO programs and the government” (Li 2015). It is a sober assessment of the relative deprivation of young urban educated women’s social, economic, and political power versus that of the cohort growing up in the socialist period.

Where to find new resources for feminist activism? What forms of actions are viable for the young feminists who have hardly any ties with those who have power in the official system? It turns out that social and economic marginality does not necessarily disempower the young educated urban feminists who have been brought up in the age of cyberspace and of new conceptual frameworks circulating globally. The young feminists have quickly identified a powerful medium for feminist engagement: the Internet. And because they are not embedded in the official system and have no circumventing considerations associated with those who have some social status, they are far less restricted in conceptualizing the possibilities of their actions. As a result, we have witnessed many innovative actions initiated by young feminists who have nothing to lose.

Most prominent among those who engage in online feminist organizing are Feminist Voice in Beijing and New Media Women’s Network in Guangzhou. Feminist Voice is an offshoot of Women’s Media Monitor Network, a feminist NGO in Beijing founded in 1999. Led by a committed feminist, Lü Ping, who quit her job in the ACWF’s newspaper to become a freelance writer to enact her vision of autonomous feminism, Feminist Voice has formed a loosely connected feminist network via its website and its electronic journal circulated via email. In particular, it has attracted young feminists who have neither prestigious social status nor available social resources, but who nevertheless possess abundant imagination and creativity. A loose coalition of young feminists all over the country named Young Feminist Activism (YFA), working closely with Feminist Voice, operates vigorously via website, email, weibo, and WeChat, with provocative topics and self-initiated actions. Because their intention is to call public attention to violations of women’s rights in all aspects of Chinese society as a way to engender feminist social and cultural transformation, they deliberately create shocking images in public spaces and then take photos of their actions to circulate online. Their strategy drastically departs from the older cohort of feminist NGO leaders, who are good at maneuvering behind the scenes and inconspicuously running gender training workshops.
indoors. Visuality becomes a crucial method for these younger feminists to enable visibility of many unseen and untold violations of women’s rights.

YFA members have staged many public performance actions that have successfully attracted public attention. They occupy men’s rooms in public to demand change in the design of public bathrooms with gender equity; they shave their heads to protest gender discrimination in college admission; they protest sexual harassment on the subway with signs saying “I can be slutty, yet you can’t harass me”; they adorn themselves in “blood”-stained white wedding gowns in public to protest domestic violence and post topless photos online collectively to inscribe anti-domestic violence slogans on their bodies; they launched a feminist cross-country walk to circulate feminist messages; and they engage in many more such innovative actions. As the Introduction to the YFA photo exhibition in New York City in the fall of 2015 states, “These young people are full of inspiration, talent and bravery at the intersectional space of art, body politics and social movement. Feminism has no doubt become the fountain of their wisdom” (YFA Photo Exhibition 2015).

The YFA’s most influential performance action took place on March 7, 2015, with the “assistance” of the police who detained five young activists preparing to post anti-sexual harassment stickers on public transportation as part of their activities to commemorate International Women’s Day. The detention of the Chinese Feminist Five at the moment when global feminists launched Beijing + 20 to evaluate feminist progress since 1995 led to a global mobilization. Feminists in many countries staged protests and over 2 million people from all over the world signed the online petitions demanding their release. Chinese feminist activism entered the global spotlight.

Domestically, the detention of the Feminist Five epitomizes the tightening political control of social movements by the state, but nevertheless has galvanized more feminist awareness and support among the young generation. After the release of the Feminist Five, not only have they resumed feminist activities while still on probation, many more young women have joined online discussions of feminist issues to promulgate and expand a feminist discourse via the Internet. The term nüquan zhuyi (women’s right/power-ism), unambiguously embraced by this cohort of feminists, is gaining increasing purchase among the young generation.
The New Media Women’s Network in Guangzhou was initiated and led by journalist Li Sipan, and sustained by a core group of young faculty members in universities in Guangzhou, many of whom had been active participants in feminist programs organized by Prof. Ai Xiaoming before her forced retirement. The location of Guangzhou is congenial to social activism, as it is adjacent to Hong Kong. Ideas and resources for civil society have long flowed from Hong Kong to Guangzhou via various channels. The New Media Women’s Network has creatively launched colorful public activities such as public lectures and art exhibitions as well as online feminist activism. One of the most prominent cases initiated by this group is the anti-sexual harassment campaign in higher education in China. The group succeeded in collecting about 260 signatures from Chinese professors and scholars transnationally on two petitions: one to the Ministry of Education demanding the implementation of anti-sexual harassment mechanisms in Chinese universities, and one to the president of Xiamen University demanding due punishment of a professor’s systematic sexual harassment of his female graduate students. All the transnational mobilization was accomplished via email and WeChat, with the active participation of the YFA as well as older feminists situated in academic institutions. The widely circulated petitions resulted in the temporary removal of the male professor from his teaching post at Xiamen University (a mild punishment unsatisfactory to feminists and his victimized students), and the Ministry of Education’s regulation to forbid sexual harassment at universities (at the moment remaining on paper without enforcement mechanisms).

A recent successful action by the New Media Women’s Network was the massive online discussion on the meaning of International Women’s Day, launched by Li Sipan as a blog post a few days before International Women’s Day in 2016. By March 8, it had received 101 million visits: hundreds and thousands of young people joined a public discussion on how to continue a feminist heritage, join global feminist struggles, and resist capitalist consumerist co-optation of a feminist event as a way to commemorate International Women’s Day. Feminism, nüquanzhuyi, has never received such massive public attention in China. The Feminist Five and many more YFAs also actively participated in the celebration and debates online and even re-circulated the anti-sexual harassment stickers which had been evidence of their “crimes” a year before. This huge success of cyber action demonstrates the existence of a rapidly expanding social force
that is eager to be informed of feminist heritages as well as to get involved in feminist actions.

As the Guangdong area has been a center of manufacture for global markets, concentrating tens of millions of migrant workers, feminists in Guangzhou have developed contacts with women workers’ organizations in recent years, turning increasing attention to the intersection of class and gender. The efforts of young, urban, educated feminists to seek coalition with a more marginalized social group, with full knowledge of the politically sensitive nature of their action, indicate their conscious challenge of political boundaries with an expanding feminist vision. In their online communications, these college-educated young feminists, fluent in English, frequently demonstrate their familiarity with current transnational feminist issues as well as feminist critiques of capitalist globalization. The critical concept of class has been consciously deployed by this cohort in their articles circulated via WeChat, analyzing migrant women workers’ marginality and their predicament, conditioned by both gender and class power relations in today’s China. It was also featured prominently in the online discussion on International Women’s Day.

Finally, the most prominent feature distinguishing this young cohort from the previous two cohorts of Chinese feminists examined in this piece is their open defiance of heterosexual normativity. Unlike older feminists, who generally avoid open discussion of sexuality, the young cohort displays their diverse sexuality with ease and analyzes the oppressive nature of compulsory heterosexuality with depth. Some young feminists are also active members of gay and lesbian organizations. The determined break from the grip of dominant heterosexual normativity is often inseparable from the empowerment of these courageous young women and men’s exposure to feminism, and embracing a feminist activist identity seems logical to many of them. They are not afraid of being singled out as a minority, sexually or politically, in a largely conformist society. Any individual challenge against homophobia or discrimination based on sexuality receives strong support from this young cohort of feminists.

Feminist Voice and the New Media Women’s Network are physically located in two different regions far away from each other. However, both are national or even transnational in the sense that their overlapping members are scattered all over the world (some Chinese students studying abroad are active members), unrestricted by geo-
graphic location, as both groups operate mostly via cyberspace. YFA as well as some of the older cohort of feminists can be found in actions initiated by either organization. The confluence of these young feminist’s innovative and spontaneous efforts on diverse fronts has formed a viable and dynamic feminist movement in the face of a tightening state control of social movements in China.

**Conclusion**

In 2013 at a meeting with the ACWF leading body, President Xi Jinping instructed: “Special attention should be paid to women’s unique role in propagating Chinese family virtues and setting up a good family tradition. This relates to harmony in the family and in society and to the healthy development of children. Women should consciously shoulder the responsibilities of taking care of the old and young, as well as educating children. . . .” (Xi 2013). Emphasizing traditional familial roles for women articulates both a masculinist imperative to restore China’s pre-socialist gender order and an increasing social crisis since the state has shed its responsibilities for the care of children, the old, and the sick. The privatization of reproductive labor and the recent population policy that switches from one child to two children added new fuel to the fundamentalist neo-Confucian agitation for reviving patriarchal order, making gender contentions ever more ferocious.

Chinese feminist activists are confronting grave challenges, as the male-dominated authoritarian state is turning openly conservative in its gender policy and further tightening its political control. How to deal with the state power with dwindling numbers of feminist agitators inside the official system (the first cohort has passed away, and the second cohort is mostly retired)? And as the state expands its restrictions on international donors’ support of the Chinese NGOs, how are the resource-poor young feminists going to obtain necessary material support to continue their activism? Most seriously, the Chinese authority has also accelerated its control of cyberspace. State censorship is a daily experience for Chinese netizens, when the cyber police constantly delete texts circulating online or via WeChat, or shut down websites. The very space and means of young feminist activism is under the direct surveillance of the police.

Paradoxically, Xi Jinping gave a speech at the Global Women’s Summit jointly hosted by the UN and the Chinese government in
September 2015, reiterating the Chinese state’s commitment to gender equality. Certainly a stunt by state feminists operating behind the scenes to make the event possible, the verbal commitment by the top authority maintains the discourse of gender equality as an official one, providing legitimacy for feminist activism in China. In this sense, the politics of concealment of the first cohort of socialist state feminists has continuously been visible in the maneuvers of the second cohort, though the anti-feudalism of the first cohort has been replaced by gender-mainstreaming as a legitimate feminist agenda with the backing of the UN. Such an official feminist agenda can certainly provide some space for the third cohort to maneuver as well. However, the goal of the young feminists is beyond the boundaries of officially legitimate zones. Rather, young feminists have functioned as a conscious monitoring group constantly holding the state accountable to its verbal commitment to gender equality by initiating feminist projects beyond the scope of state feminists. This function of exerting public pressure from outside the official system is extremely important in a context where the ACWF has long lost its first cohort of revolutionary feminist leaders; the second cohort of feminist officials fostered in the socialist period with a commitment to women’s liberation is mostly retired; and the organization has become part of the state bureaucracy with officials who have less commitment to gender equality than interest in career advancement. While conscious feminists still operate in the official system here and there, institutional constraints often seriously limit their capacity for feminist initiatives. With neither state power nor ties to those with official power, the young cohort of feminists nonetheless is producing a loud feminist critical voice in China’s extremely contentious discursive arenas. We have confidence that the savvy young feminists who have reached a critical mass will be able to forge ahead with even more innovations and creativity to boldly and cautiously navigate the rough seas of feminist political, social, and cultural interventions, in between the gaps and fissures of multiple conflicting discourses and power structures.

Notes

1. Cai Chang joined the CCP in 1923 and Deng Yingchao joined the CCP in 1925. Their party seniority allowed them to enjoy tremendous respect, especially since they did not pursue high political position with their party seniority. Cai married Li Fuchun in 1923, who became Vice Premier of the PRC, and Deng married Zhou Enlai in 1925,
who became the Premier of the PRC. The informal power Cai and Deng enjoyed in the
party was beyond the reach of their successors in the ACWF.

2. The acronym ACWF has two meanings: one, the national women’s organization
that has six administrative levels paralleling the state administrative structure; two, the
national headquarters of the mass organization based in Beijing. In the following, ACWF is used strictly to refer to the national headquarters while WF means the whole
system of the national women’s organization.

3. Mao’s original phrase san maniang was changed by women officials into san pipping (third, criticize) in their public talks, perhaps because of the apparent gender offensiveness of the original and class connotation. Cursing and swearing in profane language
were some times adopted by lower class women as a powerful weapon in their resis-
tance, but were forbidden for women of “respectable” families.

umich.edu/~glblfem/ch/china.html. The quotation is from the interview of Li Huiying,
Gender and Public Policy (2002), edited by Li, was the first publication on public policy
in China adopting gender as an analytical framework.

5. Of a range of documentaries made by Ai Xiaoming, Taishi Village, Stories of the
Plain, and The Heavenly Garden boldly exposed violation of citizens’ rights by cor-
rupted officials in different locations and at various levels.

6. The photo exhibition Above Ground: Forty Moments of Transformation: a pho-
tography exhibition of young feminist activism in China, was organized by YFA in New
York City, in September 2015 to parallel the UN Global Summit on Women.