What political lessons do victims of mass violence and genocide learn and pass on to their children? We explore two pathways through which personal experiences of genocide may shape the political attitudes of survivors and their descendants. First, these experiences could engender empathy toward other victims of violence, making survivors of repression (and their descendants) more supportive of oppressed out-groups. Second, exposure to this type of mass violence could heighten levels of fear, making these individuals less supportive of other victimized groups, if they believe they pose a potential threat. We examine these two divergent effects in the context of the Jewish experience of the Holocaust, and the attendant abstract principle of ‘never again.’ We conduct a survey experiment of out-group political attitudes among American Jews, including survivors, descendants, and those with no family connection to the Holocaust. We find that survivors and descendants are far more likely to support accepting Syrian refugees than individuals without a direct family connection to the Holocaust. Yet, compared to other respondents, survivors and descendants are also less likely to change their attitudes on refugees after being primed to feel empathy or threat toward them. These findings suggest that exposure to mass violence and genocide increases empathy toward other victimized groups, and this effect likely endures across generations.
In the 20th Century, government violence and repression claimed the lives of tens of millions of people, by either directly killing them or by placing them in situations where they were likely to starve, fall ill and die (Rummel, 1994; Wheatcroft, 1996).\textsuperscript{1} In its most extreme form, genocide, repression seeks to “destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”\textsuperscript{2} Since the end of World War II, social scientists have documented over 40 cases of genocide and at least 100 non-genocidal forms of large-scale intentional killings of civilians (Anderton, 2016).

The effects of these actions reverberate far beyond the immediate deaths they cause. Extreme forms of violence, like forced deportation (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017), torture (Wang, 2017), and genocide (Paluck and Green, 2009) can shape the political attitudes of survivors and their descendants, both toward the perpetrators of violence and their political successors. Exposure to this type of violence likely also impacts long-term attitudes toward other victimized groups. One possibility is that violent victimization engenders empathy toward other victims, making survivors, descendants and other community members more supportive of out-groups experiencing repression or political violence (Dinas and Fouka, 2018). Yet exposure to such violence may also heighten perceptions of threat to the in-group, thereby making survivors potentially less supportive of other oppressed groups, particularly if they believe these groups represent a potential danger (Canetti et al., 2018).

We explore these potentially competing lessons of political violence by asking three

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1} We define repression as the use of “physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions” (Davenport, 2007).

\textsuperscript{2} https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx}
interrelated questions. First, does exposure to state violence and repression lead individuals to be more empathetic or more threatened by other groups experiencing similar violence? Second, what mechanisms account for variation in lessons learned from exposure to this violence? Third, is it possible to activate these competing lessons by reminding individuals of either empathetic or threatening considerations?

To answer these questions, we examine the political lessons of one particularly horrific instance of political violence by the state: the Holocaust. Between 1932 and 1945, Nazi Germany murdered over six million Jews across Europe, in what became the largest genocide in modern history. We focus on the Holocaust due to its scale, historical significance, continuing relevance to political debates today, and the conflicting lessons it imparted on its victims. A famous political expression that originated from this experience is “never again.” This saying has multiple meanings for the Jewish community. Klar, Schori-Eyal and Klar (2013, p. 126) highlight at least four distinct interpretations: “(1) never be a passive victim; (2) never forsake your brothers; (3) never be a passive bystander; and (4) never be a perpetrator.”

The first two interpretations are in-group focused, emphasizing defense against outside threats. The second pair are out-group focused, stressing the importance of protecting other victims. These divergent interpretations – “never again will we allow others to be victimized” or “never again will we be victimized” – convey different political lessons for the choice between helping others and saving oneself. An in-group focused interpretation of “never again” calls upon Jews to defend themselves, and never again “go like lambs to the slaughter” (Levy and Sznaider, 2004). For example, many see Israel’s robust defense

3 Their work focuses on Israeli society; however, we contend that these competing interpretations likely extend to diaspora Jewry as well.
force as the fulfillment of a promise by Jews to defend themselves against those who would harm them (Klar, Schori-Eyal and Klar, 2013). An out-group focused interpretation instead sees “never again” as a call to arms to prevent violence and injustice wherever they occur. The Jewish campaign against genocide in Darfur is a prime example of the humanitarian uses to which this expression has been put.

One area where these competing lessons may come into conflict is that of refugees, particularly if some in-group members believe those refugees represent a potential security threat. An inclusive out-group focused interpretation of “never again” should make accepting refugees a moral imperative. An exclusionary interpretation, however, should lead individuals to view refugees cautiously, with an eye toward protecting the security of the in-group. Refugees from the Syrian Civil War (2011-) are a particularly salient out-group on which to gauge the relative power of empathy versus threat considerations among American Jews. Syrian refugees are simultaneously victims of violence, and members of a group (Arabs) that many Jews see as hostile, anti-Semitic or anti-Israel.

We examine the relative force of these competing imperatives toward Syrian refugees using an original survey of U.S. Jews – including Holocaust survivors, their descendants, and Jews with no family connection to the Holocaust – and a sample of non-Jewish Americans, assessing both baseline support for Syrian refugees among these communities, and how political attitudes change in response to empathetic or threatening primes.

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4 See, for example, the 2017 speech by IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, in which he emphasizes the IDF’s role in protecting the Jewish people: http://www.jpost.com/Blogs/Israel-Behind-the-Headlines/The-Jewish-people-will-never-again-stand-defenceless-508038

5 See, for example, the genocide alert issued by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 2008: https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20081209-sudan-alert-poster.pdf

6 See, for example, https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/No-one-is-vetting-Syrian-refugees-for-signs-of-antisemitism-480565
Our evidence suggests that personal, family and even group-level exposure to the Holocaust tends to increase empathy toward other victimized groups. However, more direct experiences lead individuals to hold more stable political attitudes that are less receptive to further persuasion. Holocaust survivors and their descendants are, overall, more likely to support accepting Syrian refugees than communities without a direct family connection to the Holocaust. Yet, while other groups’ attitudes change after being primed to view Syrian refugees empathetically or as a threat, survivors’ and descendants’ attitudes remain relatively stable. We further find, perhaps surprisingly, that empathy reminders are more effective at increasing support for refugees than threat reminders are at decreasing it.

Finally, our results shed light on the pathways through which these political lessons persist across generations. We show that the Holocaust’s effect cannot be fully explained by pre-exposure demographic differences, or post-exposure factors like educational attainment, income or partisan politics. Family socialization, however, appears to play a significant role. Empathetic attitudes are most prevalent where survivors regularly discussed their experiences with family, friends and children. In households where these conversations happened less frequently, such attitudes were more subdued.

These findings contribute to the literatures on violence and its long-term consequences (Balcells, 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017), intergroup tolerance and prejudice (Dinas and Fouka, 2018), the role of threat and empathy in political attitudes (Sirin, Villalobos and Valentino, 2016), and public opinion on immigration and refugees (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Our study builds on this research by offering the first analysis of how countervailing empathy and threat considerations inform the political attitudes
of previously victimized groups. We also conduct the literature’s largest-ever survey of out-group attitudes among Holocaust survivors and their families – an increasingly difficult-to-reach population that carries the living memory of one of history’s most horrific events.

1 The Long-Term Effects of Exposure to Violence

Recent empirical research in political science, sociology and economics has shown that violence can have a profound and lasting impact on the preferences, attitudes and actions of victimized individuals and communities. Several studies find that exposure to violence stimulates collective action (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009), social cohesion (Bauer et al., 2016; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii, 2014), political participation (Blattman, 2009), and leads victims to reject the perpetrator’s political identity (Balcells, 2012; Fouka and Voth, 2016; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). However, most of the observed positive social effects, with some exceptions (Dinas and Fouka, 2018), have been limited to members of the same community (in-group), rather than members of potentially threatening out-groups. Regarding out-groups, many studies have painted a more pessimistic picture, where exposure to violence decreases social trust (Grosjean, 2014; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011), while increasing apathy (Wood, 2006), exclusionary attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009), and political support for hawkish and nationalist parties (Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014a; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017).

While such results suggest increased threat and decreased empathy toward similarly victimized out-groups, direct evidence of such an effect remains scant. This gap is unfor-
tunate, because attitudes toward out-groups can shape public policy on a range of issues, from immigration and refugee policy (for a review, see Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014), to humanitarian assistance and intervention (see Milner and Tingley, 2013). These attitudes can also be surprisingly durable and self-reinforcing. Voigtländer and Voth (2012), for instance, find anti-Jewish pogroms during the Middle Ages to be a strong predictor of violence against Jews in the twentieth century. Likewise, Acharya, Blackwell and Sen (2016b) find that contemporary racial political attitudes in the American South trace their origins to the local prevalence of slavery 150 years ago. But why? What are the mechanisms underlying citizens’ positive or negative political attitudes toward social out-groups and how does exposure to violence affect them?

1.1 The Role of Threat

Past research has advanced several competing explanations for negative out-group attitudes, including labor market competition (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), cultural differences (Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004), political partisanship (Knoll, Redlawsk and Sanborn, 2011), and the frequency of intergroup contacts (Hopkins, 2010). Underlying each of these explanations is a perception of threat toward the out-group.

Individuals perceive an event, person, or group as threatening when they appraise a danger or risk of damage as greater than their potential ability or resources to cope (Tomaka et al., 1997). Such perceptions can be pivotal in shaping political attitudes toward out-groups (Riek, Mania and Gaertner, 2006), and immigrants in particular (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008). Individuals may perceive immigrants or refugees as pos-

\textsuperscript{7} In contrast, an event or person is perceived as a ‘challenge’ when the individual feels they have the necessary resources or ability to address the situation (Tomaka et al., 1997).
ing threats on multiple fronts, including economic well-being (Quillian, 1995; Esses et al., 2001), security (Canetti-Nisim, Ariely and Halperin, 2008; Hetherington and Suhay, 2011) and culture (Newman, Hartman and Taber, 2012). Groups that represent multiple types of perceived threats are particularly likely to face opposition (Stephan and Finlay, 1999a).

The trauma of exposure to political violence potentially compounds the salience of threat perceptions in out-groups attitudes, making individuals hyper-sensitive to future risk (Canetti et al., 2013). Biologically, prolonged or repeated stress can increase levels of the stress hormone cortisol, leading exposed individuals to have greater difficulty distinguishing non-threats from threats (Crawford, 2014). Trauma also has important social and psychological components, as survivors develop and communicate historical memory and narrative over time (Bar-Tal, 2001; Zembylas, 2007).

These biological and social responses can have important downstream effects on political attitudes. For instance, Rwandan genocide survivors with exposure to multiple trauma events are generally less open to reconciliation, and more skeptical of nonviolence and interdependence with other groups (Pham, Weinstein and Longman, 2004). In Northern Ireland, exposure to violence is similarly correlated with increased support for paramilitary groups (Hayes and McAllister, 2001) and decreased support for conciliation (Canetti et al., 2017). Around the world, groups and individuals exposed to terrorism tend to hold more militaristic political attitudes (Bonnano and Jost, 2006; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014b; Hirsch-Hoefler et al., 2016). Even mere reminders of one’s mortality can increase perceptions of out-group threat (Burke, Martens and Faucher, 2010).
1.2 The Potential of Empathy

However compelling, threat is not the only psychological response to violence and trauma. Empathy is another. A separate line of inquiry has explored conditions under which hostile or xenophobic attitudes might abate, focusing primarily on the ameliorating role of empathy. Empathy has cognitive and emotional components (Davis, 2018; Sirin, Villalobos and Valentino, 2016), including an individual’s ability to adopt someone else’s perspective and to vicariously experience the emotions of that person (“parallel empathy”) or to feel sympathy or compassion on their behalf (“reactive empathy”) (Stephan and Finlay, 1999b). While multiple studies have shown that empathy with members of one’s in-group can lead to helping behavior (see Davis 2018 for a review) and other evolutionary benefits (De Waal, 2010), the process through which individuals extend empathy to out-group members is less clear.8 Empathic considerations are most prominent when individuals perceive closeness between themselves and others (Crawford, 2014; Stürmer et al., 2006). If increased perceptions of similarity increase empathy, then decreased perceptions of similarity should hinder it.

Researchers in social psychology have explored numerous methods for “training” individuals to feel empathy toward out-group members. These have included conflict resolution workshops that aim to foster mutual understanding (Rouhana and Kelman, 1994), or exposing individuals to stories of discrimination suffered by out-group members (Finlay and Stephan, 2000), multicultural education programs (Colca et al., 1982), and intergroup dialogue (Gurin et al., 1999). All of these treatments have, to varying

8 Note that, in this sense, empathy is not purely altruistic (Batson, 1997). This type of in-group empathy may instead reflect a re-assessment of one’s self-interest as that of the group (Cialdini et al., 1997).
degrees, relied on perspective-taking to reduce prejudice against otherwise stigmatized out-groups (Bilewicz, 2009; Broockman and Kalla, 2016; Galinsky and Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, Sechrist and Paolucci, 2003). Given this body of work then, we should expect reminders of empathetic considerations to increase support for vulnerable out-groups, and reminders of threat to decrease it.

But how does empathy arise on its own, without structured intervention programs? Recent research in political science suggests that intergroup empathy is most likely to arise when an out-group experiences treatment one sees as unfair and that resonates with an in-group’s own historical treatment. Because imagining oneself in someone else’s position is easier if one has already been in that position before, or knows someone who has, previous similar experience is an important situational antecedent to feeling empathy for others (Eklund, Andersson-Straaberg and Hansen, 2009). Dinas and Fouka (2018), for example, find that Greeks with a family history of forced migration are more likely to express sympathy for Syrian refugees. Likewise, Sirin, Villalobos and Valentino (2016) show that empathy felt by African Americans based on their group’s past experience can boost support for Hispanics, even when the two groups are in direct economic competition. Similar patterns hold for individuals without a family connection, but who reside in communities with a high concentration of migrants, suggesting that the lessons of repression may extend beyond its direct victims.

Empathy may change attitudes and behavior through several pathways. It may reduce perceptions of intergroup dissimilarity and, with it, feelings of threat from the out-group. Empathy may also change behavior through emotional pathways, generating outrage at a perceived injustice or concern for the welfare of others (Stephan and Finlay, 1999b). Ei-
ther pathway holds the potential of increasing intergroup cooperation – an often-elusive component of post-conflict reconciliation (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2008). Despite ample evidence that threat perceptions drive hostile intergroup attitudes, empathy is emerging as a crucial basis for fostering positive ones, representing an “antidote to individual and institutionalized fear in world politics” (Crawford, 2014, p. 538).

The Holocaust offers a hard test for the ameliorative role of empathy in intergroup relations. As an episode of mass killing on an unprecedented, industrial scale, the Holocaust has few analogies in modern history. Because genocides are extremely rare events, each with a highly specific population of potential targets, Holocaust survivors and their descendants may see others’ experiences of repression as qualitatively incomparable to their own (Margalit and Motzkin, 1996). For this reason, a survey of Holocaust survivors and their descendants can allow us to test the limits of perspective-taking as a mechanism for intergroup empathy and support.

2 Degrees of Exposure

We contend that past exposure to mass political violence can have one of two effects on attitudes toward other vulnerable out-groups: it can increase empathy or increase threat. But how do these attitudes take hold? Exposure to this type of repression can occur at the personal-, family- or group-level, and these different degrees of exposure

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9 Indeed, there is a powerful strain of thought among Holocaust historians regarding the perils of ‘immoral equivalence’ between the Holocaust and other historical or current forms of political violence. These scholars contend that many of these equivalencies may, in fact, be a first step toward Holocaust denial. See e.g. Lipstadt (2012).

10 These two responses are not mutually exclusive, but they are competing. A group that triggers threat in addition to empathy is likely to engender less support than a group that only triggers empathy and vice versa.

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imply different mechanisms of attitude formation, transmission and persistence.

In the first category are individuals who personally experienced violence, and remained alive (i.e. survivors). People respond to traumatic events in different ways. Several studies have found that personal experiences of violence can shape individual political behavior, driving victims of government repression in El Salvador to support rebel groups (Wood, 2003), victims of rebel violence in Uganda to participate in elections (Blattman, 2009), or driving Israeli combat veterans to support hawkish parties (Grossman, Manekin and Miodownik, 2015). The durability of these individual political effects remains an open question. Numerous psychological studies have linked exposure to violence – particularly early in life – with life-long behavioral changes, including increased risk of depression, post-traumatic stress and social withdrawal (Galovski and Lyons, 2004; Kuch and Cox, 1992; Pfefferbaum, 1997). The prevalence of these adverse effects depends in part on the availability of social support networks and opportunities to discuss, make sense of, and educate others about one’s experiences (Tsai et al., 2012). It remains unclear whether such discussions are more likely to amplify or dampen empathetic and threat-based out-group attitudes among survivors.

The second category comprises individuals with family-level exposure to violence (i.e. descendants of survivors). These individuals learn the lessons of repression not by reflecting on their personal experiences, but through various channels of interpersonal transmission (Rogoff et al., 2003). The household is among the most important contexts in which political discussions occur (Zuckerman, 2005). These “dinner table” interactions can foster a convergence in political behaviors and preferences among spouses, parents and children (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2012),
even facilitating the intergenerational transmission of trauma (Yehuda et al., 2000). According to the family-level socialization mechanism, descendants are likely to hold views broadly similar to those of survivors, particularly in households where survivors openly talk about their experiences. If empathy (threat) toward out-group members is the dominant response among survivors, then survivors’ kin will likely draw the same conclusion. An alternative view is that generational distance from the actual violence attenuates these political effects, making it harder for descendants to draw consistent lessons from family members’ experiences.

In the third category are individuals with group- or community-level exposure to repression, but no direct family ties to survivors (i.e. members of the same ethno-linguistic, religious, economic or other social group). To the extent that they adopt empathetic or threat-based attitudes, individuals in this category do so not through personal reflection or family socialization, but through the emergence (or rejection) of collective memories about past events. When repression is a group-level trauma – targeting victims for their membership in a group rather than individual attributes and actions (e.g. genocide, ethnic cleansing) – individuals within the targeted group may adopt similar attitudes to descendants and survivors, regardless of family connection (Stein, 1976; Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017). The contemporaneous salience of political violence varies across these non-exposed individuals – a co-villager may feel a closer proximity to the event than a diaspora member living thousands of miles away. Over time, however, perceptions of collective victimization tend to coalesce into more general narratives about how to make sense of the constructed memory of the past, particularly as regards blame attribution, prevention and retribution (Sapiro, 2004). This collective memory, in turn,
can drive collective identity and color perceptions of new political events among group members (Eyerman, 2001; Shamir and Arian, 1999). If these narratives fail to take hold, we may expect the absence of personal or family exposure to soften attitudes toward out-groups – resulting in either less empathy or less sensitivity to threats.

A final category includes individuals with no exposure to repression, at any level. This category is important to consider, as it can help us establish a baseline of support for out-groups, in the absence of any personal-, family- or group-level experiences that might tap empathy or threat considerations. Due to a lack of direct or indirect exposure, we may expect these individuals to be more indifferent to vulnerable out-groups, compared to individuals in the first three categories. If, however, the process of collective memory formation is either ineffectual or extends to broader swaths of society than the originally targeted group (e.g. see Novick (2000)’s discussion of Holocaust memories among non-Jewish Americans) then we should expect individuals in this category to have attitudes similar to those with group-level exposure.

3 Research Design

We examine our theory with a survey experiment, conducted from Summer 2017 to Winter 2018. We survey individuals from four populations living in the United States: Holocaust survivors (personal exposure), children and grandchildren of survivors (family exposure), Jews with no direct family connection to the Holocaust (group exposure), and non-Jewish Americans (no exposure). In the survey, respondents first answer a battery of questions on potential moderating variables. We then randomly expose respondents to
a control or manipulation condition (empathy, threat), and ask about their support for vulnerable out-groups (Syrian refugees).

### 3.1 Theoretical Predictions

In this study, we test five pre-registered hypotheses:

1. **Empathy Hypothesis**: All else equal, Holocaust survivors and their descendants will be *more* supportive of other vulnerable out-groups than non-survivor populations (both Jewish and not).

2. **Threat Hypothesis**: All else equal, Holocaust survivors and their descendants will be *less* supportive of other vulnerable out-groups than non-survivor populations (both Jewish and not).

3. **Direct Trauma Hypothesis**: Holocaust survivors will be *less* supportive of other vulnerable out-groups than non-survivor populations (both Jewish and not), but their descendants will be *more* supportive than both survivors and non-Jews, because they did not directly experience *trauma*.

4. **Group Exposure Hypothesis**: All Jews, irrespective of familial exposure to the Holocaust respond similarly to out-groups (as compared to non-Jews), because Jewish *group identity* could lead all Jews to feel the trauma of the Holocaust.\(^\text{11}\)

5. **The Priming Hypothesis**: Reminders of empathy or threat can shift attitudes toward vulnerable out-groups, such that:

\(^{11}\)In other words, Jews with no familial connection to the Holocaust feel as if they have also been repressed, because of their group identity. As such, the relevant non-repressed groups may be non-Jewish Americans, rather than Jewish Americans with no direct family ties to the Holocaust.
(a) Empathy primes increase support for vulnerable out-groups.

(b) Threat primes decrease support for vulnerable out-groups.

The effectiveness of these primes may vary by exposure. Because survivors and descendants have more direct experience with repression – and have had more opportunities to share and make sense of these experiences – their views on this issue may be more established and, as a result, less manipulable through priming.¹²

3.2 Sample

Due to the difficulty of recruiting respondents from a small population, especially given the advanced age and dwindling number of Holocaust survivors, we draw our sample from a combination of subject pools, each with a distinct sampling procedure.

Personal Exposure.

Holocaust survivors are the most difficult survey respondents to reach. In the most ideal scenario, we would recruit a large, representative sample; however, this is not possible for several reasons. The first is, of course, the advanced age of the survivor population. Many Holocaust survivors have already passed away or are suffering from health ailments that preclude their participation in research. Our sample is thus confounded by variables that may have impacted survivor lifespan, including wealth or age at the time of World War II. Second, outside the United States there are no systematic, centralized

¹² In other words, those who hold “shallow” attitudes – having less extensively engaged with the question before receiving the prime – should be more susceptible to priming effects than those with more established views. For an overview of the connection between attitude strength and rigidity, see Krosnick and Abelson (1992).
databases of Holocaust survivors on which to draw. We therefore limit our sample to Holocaust survivors residing in the United States, who may have distinct views than those who chose to emigrate to Israel or other countries.\textsuperscript{13}

We recruit the bulk of our sample of survivors in collaboration with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington D.C. The USHMM maintains a database of over 208,000 Holocaust survivors, including approximately 2,000 with email addresses, who can be reached through a third party contact service. The original purpose of the USHMM database and service is to help survivors and their descendants locate potentially lost family and friends. The standard procedure for contacting individuals in this database is for an interested party to write a message to an individual. Then, the museum reviews the message and, if it deems it appropriate, forwards the message along to the survivor. This process is in place in order to protect survivors’ privacy and allow them to choose if and when they would like to respond to an inquiry. No prior academic study, to our knowledge, has used the USHMM service to reach survivors en masse.

Through multiple discussions with the museum, we were able to secure their consent to send an invitation to participate in a research study to their database of survivors with email addresses on file. USHMM circulated our survey on Wednesday, October 18th. As of Friday, October 20th, we had an open rate of 41.5\% and a click rate through to the survey of 12.4\%.\textsuperscript{14} In addition to the USHMM, we contacted every regional Holocaust

\textsuperscript{13}In another ongoing study, we explore the extent to which the patterns found in the United States differ among survivor and descendant populations in Israel, shedding light on whether empathic considerations become less prominent in a society with an active, ongoing conflict.

\textsuperscript{14}The industry average for political email surveys is a 22.2\% open and 2.2\% click rate (See: https://mailchimp.com/resources/research/email-marketing-benchmarks/), so these metrics are relatively good by polling standards.
museum in the United States (we located 17). Of these, six – in Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio – agreed to send the survey to their listservs of survivors. The regional museums sent our recruitment letter to their communities throughout the summer of 2017, beginning on July 16th.

In sum, our sample is restricted to survivors in a USHMM or regional Holocaust museum database, who had an email address and chose to respond to our email inquiry. As such, this is not a random or representative sample of survivors. While the intrinsic importance of this hard-to-reach population does not negate these limitations, we believe that the unique nature of this subject pool and the unprecedented size of our sample are sufficiently compelling to justify further analysis. In addition, it is unlikely that the nature of the bias is systematically related to out-group attitudes. In other words, respondents may be more likely to be politically active than non-respondents, but not necessarily more liberal or conservative in their political attitudes. Of those who answered the “party ID” question, our Jewish sample (non-exposed Jews, descendants, survivors) contains 64% Democrats, 25% Republicans, and 11% Independents. The partisan distribution of American Jews is approximately 70% Democrat, 22% Republican and 8% Independent, according to a recent PEW survey.

All told, we collected 205 survivor surveys. Of these, 147 reached the treatment or control questions, and 126 answered our central dependent variable. While this size provides sufficient power to uncover only a moderate-to-large size effect, we know of no

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15 These lists were much smaller than USHMM’s, and varied in size from 10 to 100. Many of the museums who did not send out our survey simply did not have a listserv upon which to draw.

16 The exact date depended on how quickly the museum replied and how long it took them to review the request.

17 http://www.pewforum.org/2013/10/01/chapter-6-social-and-political-views/
other quantitative study of Holocaust survivors’ political attitudes with a comparably large sample and, so, can shed light on a difficult-to-observe phenomenon: the political legacies of exposure to genocide on its survivors.18

Family and Group Exposure.

To sample descendants of survivors and Jewish respondents with no family connection to the Holocaust, we used TurkPrime Panels, running a survey November 24th-December 5th 2017.19 Using this survey firm, we collected a sample of 800 American Jews. Of these, 168 respondents had some direct family tie to the Holocaust (e.g. child or grandchild of a Holocaust survivor).20

In addition to TurkPrime, we advertised this survey on various listservs and groups within the “2G & 3G” community (second and third generation survivors), including the Generations of the Shoah International and the Children of the Holocaust Association. Through these efforts, we recruited an additional 86 descendants of survivors, who completed the survey between October and November 2017. In all, our sample includes 324 descendants and 692 non-exposed Jews.21

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18 See power analysis in Appendix A.
19 TurkPrime Panels are different from Mechanical Turk, in that they draw from hundreds of different online panels, with a combined subject pool of over 10 million participants. This enables researchers to survey harder-to-reach populations (like American Jews) and achieve a more representative sample. It also ameliorates the primary disadvantages of Mechanical Turk: a small, overused participant pool familiar with psychological manipulations.
20 While there may be some social desirability bias in this self-report measure (e.g. respondents may over-report their relatives as survivors, due to the broad nature of the term), this should be relatively rare. Moreover, our follow-up questions asking about forced transport to ghettos, concentration camps and related matters help filter out individuals who report being survivors but, say, left Europe just prior to Nazis’ rise to power.
21 278 descendants and 644 non-exposed Jews reached our central dependent variable. Our sample of descendants does contain some relatives recruited through snowball sampling procedures (e.g. referred by another relative who participated), but this is a small minority of respondents.
No Exposure.

To sample our fourth category of respondents, we used TurkPrime to collect questionnaires from 558 non-Jewish Americans.\footnote{512 non-Jewish respondents reached our central dependent variable.} To keep this sample as comparable as possible to the Jewish population, we restricted the sample to Caucasian Americans. This helps reduce the possibility that large portions of this group have personally experienced other forms of state violence and repression that they are drawing from when formulating their attitudes (such as forced segregation, slavery, etc.). Data collection occurred on January 9-10, 2018.

3.3 Measurement

The general flow of the survey is as follows. Subjects with ties to the Holocaust (survivors or descendants), first respond to several questions about their (or their family’s) pre-war, wartime, and post-war experiences. All subjects then proceed to one of three treatment conditions. Subjects without familial exposure to the Holocaust begin with the manipulation. After exposure to treatment, all subjects answer questions about political attitudes. If the respondent is Jewish, they answer additional questions about their involvement in the Jewish community and Holocaust education and remembrance activities. Non-survivors (descendants, non-exposed Jews, and non-Jews) also answer several questions about their parents’ backgrounds. The survey concludes with a battery of basic demographic questions (e.g. age, gender, education, income). Appendix B provides a complete list of questions, and the complete text of each treatment condition.
Experimental Treatments.

Our experimental treatments are two types of primes: empathy and threat. The empathy prime reminds subjects of the ill-fated Saint Louis ocean-liner, which carried German Jewish refugees fleeing the Nazis, and which the United States turned away. Most of its passengers subsequently died in the Holocaust. After this prime, the survey tells subjects that “advocates of admitting more Syrian refugees cite the imperative to never again turn a blind eye to such slaughter.” In contrast, the threat prime reminds subjects that Hitler stoked anti-Semitic views in Germany, and that these attitudes led to anti-Jewish pogroms and, eventually, the Holocaust. The survey then states that “advocates of restricting the entrance of Syrian refugees cite the imperative to never again go like lambs to the slaughter.” The control condition does not mention either anecdote or invoke the ‘never again’ terminology and simply tells subjects that advocates of admitting Syrian refugees worry they may die if not admitted, while advocates of restriction worry that extremists or terrorists may hide among the refugees.

Out-Group Attitudes.

Our central dependent variable is support for Syrian refugees. After reading the prompt in their assigned treatment condition, subjects respond to the question “Do you think the number of Syrian refugees admitted to the United States should be increased or decreased?” We record their responses on a 7-point Likert scale. We also asked respondents about their support for other policy measures relevant to out-group attitudes, including a travel ban on Muslims entering the U.S., the proposed U.S.-Mexican border wall, whether the U.S. has a responsibility to protect civilian casualties of war, and
whether the U.S. should support Israel or the Palestinians in Middle East peace talks. As we show in Appendix C, our results are substantively consistent across these measures, though the effect size is attenuated.

4 Analysis

Our statistical analysis includes observational and experimental components. In the first, we test hypotheses 1-4 by exploring differences in attitudes across the four sub-samples of respondents with personal, family, group or no exposure to genocide (survivors, descendants, non-exposed Jews, non-Jews). In the second part, we test hypothesis 5 by examining the impact of our experimental treatment – threat and empathy primes – on out-group attitudes in each community.

4.1 Differential Exposure to Genocide

We begin by briefly reviewing descriptive statistics on out-group attitudes among survey respondents. Figure 1 reports mean levels of support for Syrian refugees among respondents assigned to the control condition. This support is highest among those with personal and family exposure to the Holocaust, and lowest for those with no exposure. The average non-Jewish American in our sample favored a “slight decrease” in the number of refugees admitted to the United States, with a mean value of 3.35. Non-exposed Jews, on average, favored keeping the number of refugees the same, with a mean of 4.18. Descendant and survivors, however, were more likely to favor a ‘slight increase’ in admitted refugees, with means of 4.76 and 4.85.
If we dichotomize this variable, with 1 representing support for at least a ‘slight increase’ in Syrian refugees (5 or higher), the difference becomes more stark. Just 25.5 percent of non-Jews favor a ‘slight’ to ‘great’ increase in admitted refugees. The statistics for non-exposed Jews, descendants and survivors are, respectively, 43.5, 48.7 and 61.4.

While these patterns are broadly supportive of the empathy hypothesis, some caution is warranted in drawing conclusions. The estimates in Figure 1 are subgroup means, conditional only on assignment to the control condition, and do not account for any potential confounding factors. It is possible, for instance, that individuals in the non-Jewish subgroup are less supportive of refugees due to differences in political partisanship, education, income, age, or pre-WWII family history. To account for these and other potential
barriers to inference, we conduct several more rigorous statistical tests.

**Evidence from linear models**

To examine how personal, family and group exposure to genocide might impact out-group attitudes, we first consider a simple linear model, in which we regress support for Syrian refugees on the subgroup to which a respondent belongs: survivor, descendant, non-exposed Jew or non-Jew. This model also accounts for several individual-level covariates, like age, gender, education, income, party identification, location, and the pre-WWII residence and profession of the individual or their parents/grandparents.

Figure 2a reports coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from our model, with white, non-Jewish Americans as the reference category. These results confirm that survivors and their descendants are significantly more supportive of Syrian refugees than other subgroups. When asked about their support for Syrian refugees, an average Holocaust survivor’s response was 2.6 points higher than that of an average non-Jewish

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23 We restrict analysis to those in the control condition.

24 Formally, our baseline specification is

\[
\text{Attitudes}_i = \theta \cdot \text{Exposure}_i + \beta_1 \text{x}_i^{(\text{pre})} + \beta_2 \text{x}_i^{(\text{post})} + \text{Region}_i^{(\text{pre})} + \text{Region}_i^{(\text{post})} + \epsilon_i
\]

where Attitudes\(_i\) are the expressed out-group attitudes of respondent \(i\), Exposure\(_i\) is \(i\)'s exposure to the Holocaust (personal, family, group, none), \(\text{x}_i^{(\text{pre})}\) is a vector of pre-WWII covariates, \(\text{x}_i^{(\text{post})}\) are post-WWII covariates, Region\(_i^{(\text{pre})}\) and Region\(_i^{(\text{post})}\) are fixed effects for pre- and post-WWII locations of family residence (in Europe and U.S., respectively), and \(\epsilon_i\) is an i.i.d. error term. Because education, income, party ID and current location are technically “post-treatment” (e.g post-WWII), we repeated the analysis without \(\text{x}_i^{(\text{post})}\) and Region\(_i^{(\text{post})}\), yielding the same substantive results for the exposure coefficient. For survivors, we used their family’s pre-war place of residence and father’s pre-war profession. For descendants, we used their survivor relative’s pre-war residence and profession (father first, then mother, then grandparent). For non-exposed Jews and non-Jews, we use the pre-war residence of their mother, if the parents were likely born before World War II. We use the pre-war profession of their father, again if the parents were likely born before World War II.
American. Descendants too were, on average, 1.8 points higher than non-Jews. The baseline attitudes of non-exposed Jews, however, are not significantly different from those of non-Jews.

How do the views of Holocaust survivors and descendants differ from those of Jews with no direct connection to the Holocaust, and from each other? Figure 2b illustrates the same results as before, with non-exposed Jews as the baseline category. This model shows that descendants and survivors are both significantly more supportive of Syrian refugees than non-exposed Jews. Figure 2c uses survivors as the baseline category, which enables us to make a direct comparison between survivors and their descendants. Although the point estimate for descendants is lower than for survivors, the 95% confidence intervals overlap, meaning that these two groups are not significantly different from each other in their support for Syrian refugees.

**Direct effect of Holocaust exposure**

One potential limitation of the above analysis is that the relationship between genocide exposure and out-group attitudes may be driven by post-WWII developments. It is possible that, after the war, survivors and their descendants may have made different educational and professional choices, or became disproportionately more likely to support Democrats or Republicans. While the results from Figure 1 hold when we consider model specifications with and without post-exposure variables, neither approach fully resolves the issue. Conditioning on post-exposure covariates can potentially induce post-treatment bias into our estimates of direct effects. Yet simply excluding these covariates might induce omitted variable bias.
To account for these possibilities, we estimate the average controlled direct effect (ACDE) of genocide exposure: the effect of personal, family or group exposure when mediating variables are held constant at a particular level. We use two estimation procedures. The first is sequential-g estimation, which transforms the dependent variable (i.e. support for refugees) by removing from it the effect of post-exposure variables and then estimates the effect of exposure on this demediated outcome (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016a). The second approach, telescopic matching, uses nonparametric matching to impute counterfactual outcomes for fixed values of each mediating variable, and then uses these imputations to help estimate the direct effect of exposure, while holding the mediating variables constant (Blackwell and Strezhnev, 2018). To facilitate pairwise comparisons across each level of exposure, we repeat both estimation procedures iteratively for every combination of sub-samples (e.g. personal vs. family, personal vs.

\[ \widetilde{\text{Attitudes}}_i = \phi \cdot \text{Exposure}_i + \alpha' \cdot x_i^{(pre)} + \text{Region}_i^{(pre)} + \nu_i \]  

where \( \widetilde{\text{Attitudes}}_i = \text{Attitudes}_i - \gamma(\text{Exposure}_i, x_i^{(post)}, \text{Region}_i^{(post)}) \) is the difference between the observed outcome and the demediation function \( \gamma(\cdot) \), which removes variation due to the causal effect of the mediator. We estimate standard errors of \( \phi \) through nonparametric bootstrap (see Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016a).

Because telescopic matching requires binary treatments and mediators, we dichotomize all covariates (e.g. above/below median education, income, etc.) and group assignments, splitting the overall sample into pairwise comparisons. Let \( E_i \) be i’s exposure category (e.g. 1 if personal, 0 if family), and \( M_i \) be the value of a mediator (e.g. 1 if Republican, 0 if Democrat). In the first stage, we match each respondent with \( M_i = 1 \) to other respondents with \( M_i = 0 \), but similar values of pre-WWII covariates \( X_i^{(pre)} \) and identical exposure status \( E_i \). After imputing potential counterfactual outcomes for matched respondents, we perform a second matching stage with respect to exposure category \( E_i \), minimizing imbalance on
group, personal vs. none, etc.).

Figure 3 reports sequential g results alongside OLS estimates. The quantities represent ACDE estimates, or average differences in support for Syrian refugees across exposure categories, while holding the value of mediating variables constant. These results are substantively consistent with OLS estimates: the more direct a respondent’s exposure to the Holocaust, the greater their level of expressed empathy toward Syrian refugees. Survivors were more empathetic than descendants or non-exposed Jews by almost a full point (.88 and .86, respectively, on a 7-point Likert scale), and more empathetic than non-Jews by almost two points (1.98). Individuals with both family and group-level exposure were significantly more empathetic than individuals with no exposure (.77 and .65, respectively). While descendants were slightly more empathetic than other Jews (.11), this latter difference was not statistically significant.

A similar picture emerges in the telescopic matching results. Figure 4 reports this second set of estimates, separately for three potential mediators: party identification, education and income. Differences across exposure categories are generally of the same magnitude and direction as before, with more direct exposure increasing support for Syrian refugees. There remains strong evidence for a persistent effect of Holocaust exposure.

Our second-stage estimate of ACDE is then:

$$\hat{\tau} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i} \left( \hat{\text{Attitudes}}_{i10} - \hat{\text{Attitudes}}_{i00} \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

where \( \hat{\text{Attitudes}}_{i10} \) are \( i \)'s (imputed) attitudes under \( E_i = 1 \) and \( M_i = 0 \), and \( \hat{\text{Attitudes}}_{i00} \) is the same for \( E_i = 0, M_i = 0 \) (see Blackwell and Strezhnev, 2018).

While sequential g estimation accommodates demediation using multiple post-treatment variables, telescopic matching requires a single binary mediator for imputation of potential outcomes in the first stage.
exposure when party ID and education levels are held fixed. However, it appears that differences between Jewish respondents with no family exposure to the Holocaust and non-Jewish Americans are at least partly driven by post-WWII income. Individuals with group-level exposure are on average more empathetic (by .65 points), but this difference does not meet conventional levels of significance (standard error of .42). That said, income does not explain differences between survivors, descendants and non-exposed Jews, or between descendants and non-Jewish Americans.

Taken together, these observational analyses carry the following implications:

1. Strong support for the *Empathy Hypothesis*. Survivors and descendants are significantly more empathetic towards Syrian refugees than non-exposed subgroups.

2. No support for the *Threat Hypothesis*. Survivors and descendants appear to be, in fact, less threatened by Syrian refugees than non-exposed communities.

3. No support for the *Direct Trauma Hypothesis*. While descriptive statistics and linear models reveal no significant differences between survivors and descendants, our ACDE estimates suggest that, contrary to H3, direct experience of trauma seems to make survivors more empathetic than their descendants.

4. Mixed support for the *Group Exposure Hypothesis*. While our regressions suggest that non-exposed Jews express attitudes generally similar to those of non-Jews, descriptive statistics and ACDE estimates disagree, finding a higher average level of empathy among all Jews, irrespective of family ties to the Holocaust. However, there is some evidence that this relationship is at least partly driven by differences in income between Jews and non-Jews.
Figure 2: Support for Syrian Refugees by Subgroup. Points are OLS coefficients. Red bars are 95% confidence intervals. Covariates included in the model are: age, gender, party ID, education, income, pre-war country of residence, and pre-war profession.
Figure 3: Exposure to genocide and out-group attitudes. Values represent average differences in support for increasing admission of Syrian refugees into U.S. between groups in the rows and columns: $\theta$ coefficients for OLS (equation 1) and $\phi$ (ACDE) coefficients for sequential g (equation 2). Darker shades indicate larger differences. Diagonal lines indicate that differences are insignificant at the 90% (single line) or 95% confidence level (double line).
Figure 4: Telescopic matching estimates of average controlled direct effect of genocide exposure on out-group attitudes. Values represent average differences in support for increasing admission of Syrian refugees into U.S. between groups in the rows and columns, while holding each mediating variable constant. Darker shades indicate larger differences. Diagonal lines indicate that differences are insignificant at the 90% (single line) or 95% confidence level (double line).
4.2 **Experimental Analysis of Threat and Empathy Primes**

To test our fifth and final hypothesis, we estimate the effect of our experimental manipulations on support for Syrian refugees, and whether the effect of empathy and threat primes varies across subgroups.

**Evidence from linear models**

We begin with a basic split-sample analysis, in which we regress support for Syrians on experimental condition for each subgroup of respondents. Figure 5 summarizes the results of these models, broken down by treatment and subgroup.

Figure 5 reveals a significant, positive effect for the empathy prime. Respondents who randomly received reminders of empathetic considerations expressed higher levels of support for vulnerable out-groups than respondents in the control condition (average increase from 3.9 to 4.5 on a 7-point Likert scale). This effect is strongest among respondents with no group or family connections to the Holocaust. Non-Jews become significantly more supportive of Syrian refugees when they receive an empathy prime (from 3.3 to 4.1). They do not, however, become less supportive of refugees in the threat condition. Non-exposed Jews have the same response: an empathy prime increases support relative to control (4.3 to 4.9), while a threat prime does not reduce support.

For descendants and survivors, neither prime significantly increases or decreases sup-

---

28 Let $\kappa(E_i = k)$ be the set of respondents in exposure category $k \in \{\text{personal, family, group, none}\}$. For each respondent $j \in \kappa(k)$ in this set, our model specification is

$$
\text{Attitudes}_j = \theta \cdot T_j + \beta'_1 x_j^{(\text{pre})} + \beta'_2 x_j^{(\text{post})} + \text{Region}_j^{(\text{pre})} + \text{Region}_j^{(\text{post})} + \epsilon_j
$$

(4)

where $T_j = t$ is respondent $j$’s treatment assignment, $t \in \{\text{control, empathy, threat}\}$. Results were consistent under a restricted version of this model, which excludes post-WWII covariates.
Support for Syrian refugees. The direction of the empathy priming effect is the same for descendants as it is for non-Jews and non-exposed Jews, but its magnitude is smaller and more uncertain. Also, for descendants and survivors (particularly survivors), the threat prime slightly reduces support relative to the control (which was not the case in the other subgroups), but this reduction is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is interesting, as it demonstrates that victimized populations may, in fact, be more susceptible to threat considerations, even if their baseline support for refugees is higher than non-exposed groups. However, this reduction in support is not statistically significant.

At baseline, respondents with personal exposure to genocide were most supportive
of refugees, followed by those with family-level exposure, group-level exposure, and no exposure. Empathy primes can significantly increase support for refugees, but only among those less directly exposed, Jewish or not. Threat primes, meanwhile, have no impact on any subgroup.

These results suggest that those more directly exposed to state repression and violence may have more established views on the treatment of vulnerable out-groups – namely, they support protecting them. However, for this reason, reminders of empathetic considerations do not significantly increase their support.\[^{29}\] If anything, threat primes may reduce this baseline support, or make their support more uncertain. This rigidity of attitudes contrasts with the relative malleability of views among non-exposed who, at baseline, are less supportive of protecting out-groups, but can be convinced to help them when reminded of empathetic considerations.

**Covariate imbalance across exposure categories**

The results above provide tentative support for the empathy hypothesis, but the inferences we can draw are limited by the nature of the explanatory variable. Because we can randomly assign respondents to treatments, but not to exposure categories, the marginal covariate distributions are likely quite dissimilar across the four subgroups. After all, Holocaust survivors differ from other respondents in many ways other than exposure to genocide: they are considerably older, were (mostly) born in Europe, and may also have a different average gender distribution, and family socioeconomic background. In addition to confounding our estimates, this covariate imbalance increases the sensitivity

\[^{29}\text{This is not necessarily a ceiling effect, as the mean support for refugees is not at the top of the scale — survivors could have expressed more support in the treatment conditions, they just did not.}\]
of results to minor changes in model specification.

To adjust for this covariate imbalance – while accounting for the multivalued nature of exposure status – we employ inverse generalized propensity score (GPS) weights. The logic of this approach is to create a re-weighted version of the dataset, in which more “dissimilar” respondents (e.g. descendants without close matches among non-exposed Jews) receive less weight, and the level of self-reported exposure is weakly unconfounded by observable pre-treatment factors (Imbens, 2000).

Figure 6 shows the results of this re-weighted analysis. As before, empathy primes have a positive effect on support for Syrian refugees overall (from 4.1 to 4.7), but respondents with no exposure account for much of this result. Among Jews with no family connection to the Holocaust (group exposure), the empathy effect remains positive (4.7 to 5.1), but is more uncertain than before. This general pattern further reinforces the possibility that individuals with more direct exposure to repression develop more rigid views and are less susceptible to manipulation.

5 INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF ATTITUDES

Why do descendants hold views similar to survivors? Why do empathy primes have less of an effect on these individuals than on those with no personal and family exposure to genocide? The above analysis has shown that genocide exposure has an enduring, po-

\[ w_i = \frac{\Pr(E_i)}{\Pr(E_i|X_i)} \]

\[ \Pr(E_{it} = k|X_i) \]

\[ \Pr(E_{it}) \]

30 GPS weights take the general form \( w_i = \frac{\Pr(E_i)}{\Pr(E_i|X_i)} \), where \( \Pr(E_{it} = k|X_i) \) is the conditional probability that respondent \( i \) has genocide exposure level \( k \in \{ \text{personal, family, group, none} \} \) given pre-WWII covariates \( X_i \). \( \Pr(E_{it}) \) is a stabilizing factor based on the marginal probability of genocide exposure (Robins, Hernan and Brumback, 2000). Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we calculate weights using Imai and Ratkovic (2014)’s covariate-balancing generalized propensity scores (CBGPS) estimator, which relies on a generalized method-of-moments framework. Second, using these weights, we re-estimate the model in Equation 4, with the full re-weighted sample and separately for each subgroup.
Figure 6: Effect of empathy and threat primes, CBPS-weighted estimates. Bars represent the average support for Syrian refugees, on a scale from 0-7, in each subgroup and condition. Lines represent 95% confidence interval.

potentially intergenerational impact on out-group attitudes, and that post-exposure factors like political partisanship, education and income cannot fully explain this relationship. We now consider family socialization as a potential mechanism behind these patterns.

According to social learning theory (Bandura, 1969), children acquire political attitudes in part by observing, emulating and identifying with the attitudes of those who surround them, particularly parents and other family members. This intergenerational transmission becomes more likely when parents see a given issue as highly salient, and have ample opportunities to make their attitudes known to their offspring (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers, 2009). Once acquired, especially early in life, individuals’ political
attitudes can become quite durable (Stoker and Jennings, 2008). Because they have more extensively engaged with the question through conversations with family members, such individuals are more likely to have developed established, rigid views toward other vulnerable out-groups, which in turn might make them less susceptible to emotional primes (Krosnick and Abelson, 1992).

To test this possibility, we asked survivors and descendants how frequently they discussed their Holocaust experiences with family, friends and children after the war.\textsuperscript{31} We then regressed support for Syrian refugees on responses to this question, using the same OLS and sequential g specifications as before. We ran these models on a combined sample of survivors and descendants, as well as each group separately.

Table 1: Family socialization and support for Syrian refugees. Sequential g estimates, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for pre- and post-treatment control variables not shown. P: personal exposure, F: family exposure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Talk to family about Holocaust</td>
<td>Seq.g 1.04 (0.48)*</td>
<td>Seq.g -1.06 (1.48)</td>
<td>Seq.g 1.07 (0.58)'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII covariates</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII covariates</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure</td>
<td>P, F</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1023.5</td>
<td>338.4</td>
<td>705.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{31} The general question wording, which varied slightly by generation, was “In the years since the war, how often did (you/your mother/father/grandparent) speak to (friends and family/your child/you) about the Holocaust and (your/her/his) experience in it?” Responses were on a 5-point scale, from “Never” to “Very often - at least once a week.”
attitudes. This relationship is particularly pronounced among descendants, and in the combined sample of descendants and survivors. Among these subgroups, an increase in the frequency of such conversations from “never” to “very often” yields a significant increase in support for refugees, equivalent to a full point on the Likert scale. Such conversations, however, have no apparent impact on the attitudes of survivors. This non-effect is not entirely surprising, since individuals with personal exposure to genocide are likely to be “senders” rather than “receivers” of attitudes within the family. Another possibility, which we cannot exclude, is that the sample of survivors who answered this question is too small ($N = 77$) to uncover anything but the largest effect sizes.

Not all families are equally likely to have these conversations. For example, descendants of Holocaust survivors from Eastern Europe were significantly less likely to report speaking about these issues with their parents and grandparents (Appendix D). This pattern is notable, since Jews from Poland, the USSR, Hungary and other Eastern European countries accounted for the overwhelming majority of Holocaust deaths. Other predictors of family socialization include prewar economic background (families involved in the agricultural and extractive sector were more likely to talk) and the survivor’s sex (men were less likely, though not significantly, to have these conversations than women). Our results hold when we take these family and personal characteristics into account.

Family socialization may help explain the convergence of attitudes between descendants and survivors, but not why Jewish respondents without family exposure were nonetheless more empathetic than non-Jewish Americans. This difference, as we have shown, is consistent across most specifications, and cannot be attributed to partisanship or education. To explore the matter more directly, we asked respondents how active
they were in their local Jewish community, and regressed support for refugees on this community activism variable.\textsuperscript{32}

Without the possibility of regularly engaging with survivors from one’s family, individuals may find opportunities for social learning by participating in local Jewish education, religious services and other community events. Our analysis suggests that this community pathway may help explain the group exposure effect (Table 2). Jewish respondents with no personal or family exposure to the Holocaust were slightly more likely – by half a point on the scale – to hold empathetic out-group attitudes if they reported being more active in their Jewish community. Community activism, however, had no discernible impact on survivors or descendants, for whom within-family transmission channels appear to have been more influential.

Table 2: Community activism and support for Syrian refugees. Sequential g estimates, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for pre- and post-treatment control variables not shown. P: personal exposure, F: family exposure, G: group exposure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active in Jewish community</th>
<th>Model 1 Seq.g</th>
<th>Model 2 Seq.g</th>
<th>Model 3 Seq.g</th>
<th>Model 4 Seq.g</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII covariates</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-WWII covariates</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure</td>
<td>P, F, G</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3305.3</td>
<td>339.3</td>
<td>707.7</td>
<td>2301.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>851</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{32} The question wording was “In the years since the war, how active have you been in your local Jewish community?” Responses are on a five-point scale, from “Not active at all” to “Extremely active.”
6 Discussion

Understanding the long-term political effects of repression and other forms of mass political violence is a crucial task for conflict research. Traditionally, studies of repression have focused on the immediate consequences of this violence for political activities (e.g. protest, revolution, insurgency, human rights). Yet there is little doubt that state political violence – particularly indiscriminate, collective repression and violence – can cast a longer political shadow. Experiences of political violence become embedded in the historical memory of oppressed populations and can profoundly impact their future political preferences. Investigating the pathways through which these experiences translate into political attitudes thus has important implications for our understanding of political behavior in general, and predispositions to group conflict or cooperation in particular. As we have shown here, one of the long-term effects of exposure to mass political violence may be increased empathy toward oppressed out-groups.

Out-group attitudes have important practical implications for current political issues. In the United States, President Trump’s temporary ban on immigration from seven Muslim-majority nations sparked outrage among a substantial segment of Americans. However, nearly 48% of the American public supported the ban. The ongoing debate over a wall on the US-Mexico border is another example of the continuing relevance of empathy versus threat in shaping outgroup political attitudes. This is not limited to the United States. Similar concerns about refugee flows and open borders have sparked fervent debates over the role of immigration in the European Union. Some countries, citing a moral imperative to help those in need, have welcomed a large share of immigrants...
and refugees, while others, citing security concerns, have closed their borders. The debate over “never again” and how it applies to refugees has also become prominent in contemporary Israeli discourse. In early 2017, the Israeli government moved forward with a plan to expel thousands of Sudanese and Eritrean refugees back to Africa. While supporters of the move emphasized the threat these refugees posed to Israel economically, symbolically, and security-wise, opponents decried the move as negating the very essence of “never again.”

As we have shown here, American Jews with a direct personal or family connection to the Holocaust are significantly more welcoming of Syrian refugees. However, exposure to repression also makes survivors and descendants less likely to change these views. While individuals without family ties to the Holocaust become more supportive of refugees after being primed to view the out-groups from an empathetic perspective, this manipulation has less of an effect on survivors and descendants.

However, it is also important to think about the scope conditions for our analyses and how the post-war context of American society may have interacted with exposure to the Holocaust to impact political attitudes. First, Holocaust survivors in the United States live in relative safety and security, as compared to survivors in other parts of the world, such as Israel. Second, Holocaust survivors in the United States are a religious minority in a majority Christian country. Both of these factors may mean that Holocaust survivors in the United States are likely to be less threatened by refugee populations than survivors in Israel, where Jews are both the majority and engaged in an active conflict with Arab adversaries. Thus, an important future direction for this work is to explore the relative pull of empathy- versus threat- considerations in other political contexts.
In the context of the current immigration debate in America, however, the implication of this result is straightforward: those with a direct personal or family experience of state political violence will be most empathetic towards those fleeing similar contexts, but least responsive to messaging to change their views. Thus, efforts to reduce hostile out-group attitudes or increase support for accepting immigrants and refugees will most effective among those who have never experienced repression themselves. Those who have experienced it, or are related to someone who has, do not need additional convincing. Their empathy toward other victims has much deeper roots.
REFERENCES


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Appendix

A  Power Analysis

TBD

B  Measurement

Our experimental treatment was designed to prime either empathetic or threatening considerations. A control condition primed neither. The exact treatment wording is as follows:

1. **Empathy:**
   In 1939, the St. Louis ocean-liner carried German Jewish refugees fleeing the worsening situation in Germany to the United States. However, due to strict immigration quotas at the time – and despite knowledge about the danger Jews faced in Nazi Germany – the refugees were sent back to Germany where many died in the Holocaust. Today, advocates of admitting more Syrian refugees to the United States frequently cite the Jewish imperative to ‘never again’ turn a blind eye to such slaughter, warning that many Syrians may die if they are not admitted to the US, while those opposed warn that extremists and terrorists may hide among the refugees. What do you think...

2. **Threat:**
   In 1933, Hitler rose to power by stoking anti-Semitic views in Germany, arguing that Jews were an inferior, corrupt race bent on world domination. The spread of these attitudes among the German population was the precursor of the violence to come – leading to anti-Jewish pogroms and, eventually, the Holocaust and near destruction of European Jewry. Today, advocates of restricting the entrance of Syrian refugees to the United States frequently cite the Jewish imperative to ‘never again’ go like lambs to slaughter, warning that extremists and terrorists may hide among the refugees, while those opposed warn that many Syrians may die if they are not admitted to the US.
What do you think...

3. Control:

Advocates of admitting more Syrian refugees to the United States frequently warn that many Syrians may die if they are not admitted to the US. On the other hand, those opposed warn that extremists and terrorists may hide among the refugees. What do you think...33

Control or Moderating Variables

We also measure several covariates that could potentially confound our analysis or otherwise moderate the relationship between exposure and attitudes towards refugees.

For those with ties to the Holocaust:

1. Residence: Pre-war residence of the survivor’s family
2. Profession: Pre-war profession of the survivor’s family
3. Religiosity: Pre-war religiosity of the survivor’s family
4. Socio-economic status: Pre-war socio-economic status of the survivor’s family34
5. Specific Experiences of Repression: Whether they (or their parent/grandparent) was forced to move to a ghetto, sent to a concentration camp, served in an underground movement, or was under captivity at war’s end
6. Aided by Others: Whether they (or their parent/grandparent) received aid from non-Jews that helped them survive the Holocaust
7. Salience of Experience: How often they (or their parent or grandparent) spoke about the Holocaust when they (or their children) were growing up

For all Jews:

1. Current Religious Affiliation: Reform, Conservative, Orthodox, Other, or Non-Jewish
2. Involvement in Jewish Community: How active an individual is in their local Jewish community

33 There are two versions of the control to ensure there are no order effects. The second version of the control reverses the order of these two statements so that the anti-immigrant statement comes first.
34 For descendants of survivors, they could potentially have multiple pre-war residences, professions, religiosity or socio-economic status if, say, both their mother and father were survivors.
3. **Remembrance Activities**: How active an individual is in Holocaust education

For all:

1. **Political Interest**
2. **Political Ideology**
3. **Party ID**
4. **Age**
5. **Gender**
6. **Income**
7. **Education**

8. **Parents** - Basic information about parents’ families: age, religiosity, socio-economic status, country of origin, profession, immigration to America

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[35] If a parent was a Holocaust survivor, these questions were asked at the outset. If not, questions about the parents who were not Holocaust survivors were asked at the end.
C Alternative Measures of Out-Group Attitudes

Figures C.1 and C.2 replicate the analyses in Figure 3, with alternative measures of out-group attitudes. These include (a) building a U.S.-Mexican border wall, (b) imposing a ban on Muslim migration to the U.S., (c) establishing a “safe zone” for civilians in Syria, and (d) intervening in armed conflicts to protect civilians, as a general policy.

If the empathy hypothesis is correct, we would expect genocide exposure to have a negative relationship with support for the border wall and travel ban, and a positive relationship with support for “safe zones” and responsibility to protect. This is, indeed, what we find. Survivors are less supportive of the travel ban than non-exposed Jews and non-Jewish Americans. They are also less supportive of the border wall, but these differences are slightly more uncertain. Survivors are also more supportive than non-exposed Jews of military measures to protect civilians in Syria and elsewhere. Non-exposed Jews, in turn, are less supportive of the border wall and travel ban than non-Jewish Americans, and more supportive a U.S. responsibility to protect civilians. The only deviant result here is for respondents with family exposure: descendants are more supportive of the border wall than non-exposed Jews, and do not hold significantly different attitudes on the Muslim ban. Further study is needed to establish why attitudes on this particular issue differ across groups. All other results, however, are in the same general direction as those for refugees: individuals more directly exposed to the Holocaust are more empathetic toward out-groups.

36 Question wording: “How strongly would you support or oppose building a wall along the US-Mexican border in an attempt to stop illegal immigration?”
37 Wording: “How strongly would you support or oppose a temporary ban on Muslim immigrants to the United States in order to reduce the chance of a terrorist attack?”
38 Wording: “How strongly would you support or oppose the United States establishing a safe zone in Syria for civilians fleeing ISIS and the Assad regime?”
39 Wording: “Do you think the United States has or does not have a responsibility to intervene in armed conflicts to stop the killing of civilians?”

A3
Figure C.1: Exposure to genocide and out-group attitudes, alternative measures. Values represent average differences in support for each policy measure, between groups in the rows and columns ($\theta$ OLS coefficients in equation 1). Darker shades indicate larger differences. Diagonal lines indicate that differences are insignificant at the 90% (single line) or 95% confidence level (double line).
Figure C.2: Exposure to genocide and out-group attitudes, alternative measures. Values represent average differences in support for each policy measure, between groups in the rows and columns (φ ACDE coefficients for sequential g in equation 2). Darker shades indicate larger differences. Diagonal lines indicate that differences are insignificant at the 90% (single line) or 95% confidence level (double line).
## Determinants of Family Socialization

Table D.1 reports the results of additional sequential g models discussed in Section 5, with family socialization (survivors talking to friends and family about their experiences in the Holocaust) as the dependent variable.

Table D.1: Determinants of family socialization. OLS and sequential g estimates, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for post-treatment control variables not shown. P: personal exposure, F: family exposure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model type</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
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<td>Seq.g</td>
<td>Seq.g</td>
<td>Seq.g</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.58 (0.47)</td>
<td>0.54 (0.09)**</td>
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<td>0 (0)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
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<td>-0.11 (0.07)'</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.09 (0.03)**</td>
<td>0.06 (0.06)</td>
<td>-0.11 (0.04)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII: Primary</td>
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<td>0.25 (0.1)*</td>
<td>0.15 (0.09)'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII: Manufacturing</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.19 (0.07)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-WWII: Services</td>
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<td>0.12 (0.08)'</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>F</td>
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</table>

*p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001