Written by Michael McKenna
There is a common perception of France, the European country, and French culture, equality – fraternity- liberty. Yet, this portrayal, largely propagated by pop culture, ignores a legacy of economic exploitation and a parallel citizenry existing in the South Pacific. The last vestiges of France’s colonial empire are still undergoing the decolonization process and New Caledonia, in particular, is a unique tale of two distinct Frances. Mired by economic inequality and historical grievances, New Caledonia grapples with its complex identity, caught between its colonial past and aspirations for autonomy. The enduring challenges of decolonization underscore the ongoing struggle for both economic prosperity and reconciliation in a post-colonial era.
The first successful French colony began in 1605 with the permanent settlement of Port Royal in present day Nova Scotia (Riendeau, 2007, p36). At its inception, the French perspective on colonial activity was a purely extractive endeavor. Colonists were primarily young men who lived among the native Huron and Algonquin tribes to learn their language and trade furs. This theme of emeshing French influence in local cultures and exploiting natural resources is a trend found across the history of French colonialism. When New Caledonia was claimed as part of the Second French Empire in 1853, an influx of European settlers arrived to stake claims over native land and establish independent cattle ranches. This low value agrarian economy was eventually supplemented by colonial ambitions to turn New Caledonia into a sugar island similar to plantations of the Caribbean and Mauritius. Wealthy planters relocated from Reunion Island due to crop failures and invested heavily into sugar cane plantations south of Noumea, the capital of New Caledonia. These planters brought with them thousands of indentured laborers originating from India, Vietnam, and China (Speedy, 2009, p123-140). These immigrants in conjunction with Kanaks, the native Pacific Islanders, formed the lowest class in New Caledonian colonial society. They would work to enrich the wealthy French planters, who existed nominally in society as absentee landlords and bureaucrats operating in France proper. This occurred while the white settler-ranchers would send their profits to the settler colony of Australia in hopes of economic mobility in “western” society. As a colonial possession, New Caledonia was a resource extraction scheme.
The discovery of rich nickel deposits on the island gave way to a new economy and social dynamic. New Caledonia possesses about 25% of global nickel deposits on its main island. This immediately led to an influx of global capital dedicated to extracting nickel ore and processing it as efficiently as possible. Open cut mining, the cheapest and most invasive extraction method was favored by mining companies for its simplicity with willing ignorance to the immediate harm it caused the environment (Dupon, 1986).The externalities of nickel mining (pollution, etc.) have become a generational curse on New Caledonia. 330 mines have opened on an island 30 times smaller than France, which at its peak during the coal boom had only 256 mines open (Porter, 1844). The mountains that represented an invaluable landscape had been decimated by mining. The resource extraction of New Caledonia is in essence an amortization of the island’s organic wealth. By the 1930s native Kanaks were moved to reservations occupying only 10% of their ancestral land in order to increase the availability of mineral rights without harming the ranching industry. Currently the mining industry on the island is controlled by three major corporations (Bahers et all, 2020). The largest is SLN, a subsidiary of French industrial conglomerate Eramet. The Koniambo nickel plant is operated by Glencore with a majority stake (51%) being held by the North Province where it is located. Vale, the Brazilian mining consortium, operates a large hydrometallurgical plant in the South Province. The Koniambo plant was conceptualized as a tool for economic development to share profits of mining with the native people, however it falls short of this goal. The mining rents are used as supplements to the budget of the provinces, however due to administrative bloat and French style public use of funds the true benefits of mining rents are miniscule compared to the quantifiable drawbacks of widespread mining (Lagadec & Sudrie, 2013).
In the decolonization period after world war 2 the question of New Caledonia’s role in the revived French Republic was lingering heavily in Noumea. The Kanaks wanted full independence and the return of their native land. The Caldoches, descendants of white settlers, had developed an independent political identity and wanted the same treatment as a French citizen. Despite the global trend favoring independence, France couldn’t simply let go of such vast mineral reserves and a strategic military position in the south Pacific. The French government believed that providing political incentive for the people of New Caledonia, regardless of race, in the form of citizenship would quell separatist sentiment. The reservation system had ended and New Caledonia would have a representative in Paris. What the French government fundamentally misunderstood was the racial economic gap between the Kanaks, colonial immigrants, and ethnic French settlers. The bureaucracy of the island was operated by French immigrants and the private sector was filled with successful descendants of white settlers. To the Kanak population, this was unacceptable in an era of global anti-colonial sentiment. For decades there was active mobilization of Kanak political movements that demanded more autonomy and economic equality. These challenges were elevated by the murder of numerous French soldiers and Kanak activists throughout the 70s and 80s. At the peak of political tensions, violent kidnappings were orchestrated against French military police in a majority Kanak area, which ended in an ambush and the execution of 19 Kanak political activists (Guiart, 1997).
As political violence increased, France created job training programs and infrastructure schemes in the majority native northern part of New Caledonia. These were intended as peace gestures to the half of New caledonia’s population they had rejected for centuries prior. However by the 1980s only 10% of senior management positions in public administration were held by native Kanaks (Cornell, 2003, p125-143). The private sector was even less diverse in its hiring practices. This glass ceiling only served to further enrage the native population because there was a clear divide between the economic success of European French and the Kanaks. The half-hearted job training programs and infrastructure improvements were simply too little too late. French officials met with local leaders and political activists to negotiate a solution that would resolve secessionist sentiments as well as end the two tiered society dominated by wealthy french immigrants and disadvantaged Kanaks.
Under the Noumea Accord of 1998 New Caledonia was given a unique status within France (Noumea Accord, 1998). There would be an outlined 20 year plan to achieve Kanak autonomy in a parallel system to the state. Three independence referendums were planned at the end of the 20 years to determine whether the quality of life and economic reforms enacted were sufficient to the people of New Caledonia. The land held by the French state in New Caledonia would be devolved to the provincial governments and further land reform to private Kanak hands could be carried out at the local level. Economic powers were also devolved to the new local congress of New Caledonia. Trade, foreign investment, and resource exploitation were all under the purview of the local government. Development funds from the central government would also be rebalanced to encompass the development of all New Caledonian provinces. Majority Kanak provinces had been disregarded by both the public and private sector in favor of Noumea in the past. The accord calls for a negotiated redistribution of national tax revenue every 5 years to directly support development initiatives in rural majority Kanak provinces (Senate, 2011).
In the modern era, New Caledonia is no longer a French colony, however the limits to its autonomy and the distinction between the powers of the island and a mainland department of France are stark. As an overseas collectivity of France with special privileges, New Caledonia is a unique territory among the numerous islands administered by France. They are afforded a degree of political autonomy to acknowledge the distinct multicultural identity of the island. However, financially they exist in a precarious position dependent on multinational corporations and the will of the central French state. Widespread wealth inequality and resource exploitation still remains, not just as a holdover from before local autonomy, but as a continuous force that has co-opted the new political system. European French citizens relocate to New Caledonia for its tropical weather and perpetuate the same colonial process the French state began sanctioning in the 1800s. The prices of real estate and basic commodities are too expensive for most indigenous people, however those earning or living off savings made in metropolitan France are able to maintain a high standard of living. The economy of New Caledonia represents the state of the Kanak people. The primary industry, extractive mining controlled by foreign corporations, doesn’t trickle down wealth to the average citizen. The agrarian sector is dominated by descendants of the settlers who claimed indigenous lands. A quality of living rivaling the poorest French department is an unattainable lifestyle for the majority who have lived their whole lives on the island.
If the future of New Caledonia is being part of a greater French nation, then what will France do to remedy the economic inequality faced by its citizens and how will it change the relationship between territories and the mainland?
References
Bahers, Jean-Baptiste, Paula Higuera, Anne Ventura, and Nicolas Antheaume. (2020). The “Metal-Energy-Construction Mineral” Nexus in the Island Metabolism: The Case of the Extractive Economy of New Caledonia. Sustainability, 12(6).
Connell, J. (2003). New Caledonia: An infinite pause in decolonization? The Round Table, 92(368), 125-143.
Dupon, J.-F. (1986). The effects of mining on the environment of high islands: A case study of nickel mining in New Caledonia. South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), South Pacific Commission (SPC).
Guiart, Jean (1997). “A drama of ambiguity: Ouvea 1988–89”. Journal of Pacific History, 32(1), 85–102.
Lagadec, G., & Sudrie, O. (2013). Du court au long terme : un scénario “norvégien” pour pérenniser la rente nickel en Nouvelle-Calédonie ?. Développement Durable et Territoires, Vol. 4, n°3.
“Noumea Accord – Digest” [2002] 17; (2002) 7(1) Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 88
Porter, G. R. (1844). A Statistical View of the Recent Progress and Present Amount of Mining Industry in France; Drawn from the Official Reports of the “Direction Generale des Ponts et Chaussees et des Mines,” in Continuation of a Paper Read Before the Statistical Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, at its Meeting in Newcastle in 1838. Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 7(4), 281–291. https://doi.org/10.2307/2337970
Riendeau, Roger E. (2007). A Brief History of Canada. Infobase Publishing. p. 36
Speedy, K. (2009). Who Were the Reunion “Coolies” of 19th-Century New Caledonia? The Journal of Pacific History, 44(2), 123–140.
Information provided to the Special Rapporteur by the Customary Senate, 8 February 2011