Sripada, C. (manuscript). “Human Agent Architecture Has a Valuationist Structure.” PDF

Sripada, C. (2022). “Whether Implicit Attitudes Exist is One Question, and Whether We Can Measure Individual Differences Effectively is Another.” WIREs Cognitive Science. PDF

Sripada, C. (2021). “Impaired Control in Addiction Involves Cognitive Distortions and Unreliable Self-Control, Not Compulsive Desires and Overwhelmed Self-Control.” Behavioral and Brain Research. PDF

Sripada, C & Taxali A, (2021). “Structure in the Stream of Consciousness: Evidence from a Verbalized Thought Protocol and Automated Text Analytic Methods.” Consciousness and CognitionPDF

Sripada, C (2021). The Atoms of Self-Control. NoûsPDF

Sripada, C (forthcoming). Loss of Control In Addiction: The Search For An Adequate Theory And The Case For Intellectual Humility. PDF

Sripada, C. (2020). The Fallibility Paradox. Special Issue of Social Philosophy & Policy. PDF

Sripada, C (2019). Addiction and Fallibility. Journal of Philosophy .PDF

Sripada, C An Exploration/Exploitation Tradeoff Between Mind Wandering and Goal-Directed Thinking. To appear in Oxford Handbook on Spontaneous Thought (edited by Kalina Christoff and Keiran Fox). PDF

Sripada, C Deliberative Guidance: Intuitive Guidance in the Counterfactual Mode. To appear in Homo Prospectus PDF

Sripada, C Mind Wandering as Deep Learning. To appear in Homo Prospectus PDF

Sripada, C At the Center of Agency, the Deep Self. PDF

Sripada, C (2017). Frankfurt’s Unwilling and Willing Addicts. Mind .PDF

Sripada, C (2016). Free Will and the Construction of Options. Philosophical Studies. PDF

Sripada, C (2015). Self-Expression: A Deep Self Theory of Moral Responsibility. Philosophical Studies. PDF

Sripada, C (2015). Acting from the Gut: Responsibility Without Awareness. Journal of Consciousness StudiesPDF

Sripada, C (2015). Moral responsibility, Reasons, and the Self in David Shoemaker, Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. PDF

Sripada, C. (2015). Mental Illness, Moral Responsibility, and Expression of the Self. In D. Moseley and G. Gala, Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New Perspectives. PDF

Sripada, C (2014). The Second Hit in Addiction in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Moral Psychology: Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. PDF

Sripada, CS (2014). How is Willpower Possible? The Puzzle of Synchronic Self-Control and the Divided Mind. Noûs. 48(1). 41–74. PDF

Sripada, CS (2012). Mental state attributions and the side-effect effect. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 48(1). 232–238.  PDF

Sripada, CS (2012). What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 85(3). 563–593. PDF

Sripada, CS, Konrath, S (2011). Telling more than we can know about intentional action. Mind & Language. 26(3). 353–380. PDF

Sripada, C (2010). Philosophical Questions about the Nature of Willpower. Philosophy Compass. 5(9). 793–805. PDF

Sripada, CS (2010). The Deep Self Model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action. Philosophical Studies. 151(2). 159–176. PDF

Sripada, CS (2008). Nativism and moral psychology: Three models of the innate structure that shapes the contents of moral norms. Moral Psychology. 1. 319–343. PDF

Sripada, CS, Stephen, S (2007). A framework for the psychology of norms in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, S. Stitch, Innateness and the Structure of the Mind, vol II. London: Oxford University Press. 280-302. PDF

Sripada, CS (2005). Punishment and the Strategic Structure of Moral Systems. Biology & Philosophy. 20(4). 767–789. PDF

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