“Marriage market and labor market sorting” (with Paula Calvo and Ilse Lindenlaub). Coming soon.
We build a novel equilibrium model in which households’ labor supply choices form the link between sorting on the marriage and sorting on the labor markets. We first show that the nature of home production – whether partners’ hours are complements or substitutes – shape marriage market sorting, labor market sorting, and labor supply choices in equilibrium. We then explore how sorting patterns in each market and their interaction contribute to the gender gap in wages, as well as income inequality between and within households. To this end, we estimate our model and find that spouses’ home hours are strategic complements. We investigate the key drivers behind sorting and inequality based on primitives, where we assess the role of spousal complementarities in home production, women’s relative productivity in home production, and women’s relative productivity in the labor market. We find that the gender wage gap and within household income inequality would decrease if either gender productivity differences at home or in the labor market were reduced, but also if home production hours were even more complementary among partners. Finally, sorting on both markets has a significant quantitative effect on wage inequality: Labor market sorting cements the advantage of men in a world where women work less in the labor market and more at home. In
turn, marriage market sorting generates more balanced labor market outcomes – in hours, sorting, and pay – across gender.
“The impact of divorce laws on the equilibrium in the marriage market.” Revise and resubmit, Journal of Political Economy.
This paper investigates how the adoption of unilateral divorce affects the gains from marriage and who marries whom. Exploiting variation in the timing of adoption across the US states, I first show that unilateral divorce increases assortative matching among newlyweds. To explain the link between divorce laws and matching patterns, I specify an equilibrium model of household formation, labor supply, private and public consumption, and divorce over the lifecycle. Matching decisions depend on the anticipated welfare from marriage and divorce. The model has two key features (consistent with the data). First, working spouses whose partners do not work accumulate relatively more human capital during their lifetime, a fact that improves their outside value of divorce. Second, divorcees cannot sustain cooperation in public goods expenditures (interpreted as kids’ welfare), leading to inefficiencies that are mostly harmful to the top educated. Under unilateral divorce, the value of divorce becomes a credible threat that shifts the bargaining power in marriage, making both household production and marriage less attractive. This pushes the marriage market equilibrium towards more positive sorting in education and lower welfare, particularly for the most educated. I estimate the model using data from households that form and live under the pre-reform mutual consent divorce regime. Using the estimates, I then simulate the introduction of unilateral divorce and solve for the new equilibrium. I find sizable equilibrium effects. First, the correlation in spousal education increases and people, particularly educated females, become more likely to remain single. Second, the gains from marriage decrease for the most and the least educated with the largest impact seen for college educated females. Lastly, the marital welfare gains from acquiring a college or higher degree decreases for both males and females. These results reflect previously overlooked consequences of reducing barriers to divorce.
In the traditional marriage market literature, policies affecting partners’ property rights do not affect who marries whom. In this paper I build a theory that shows that this neutrality result breaks down if we consider marital investments which returns are unverifiable to courts and accumulate in the private account of one of the spouses. I develop an equilibrium model of marriage, household specialization, and divorce in which working spouses with stay-at-home partners accumulate relatively more human capital (a feature verified in the data). In this environment, I consider a policy change that decreases the commitment of ex-spouses to share the returns from the human capital accumulated during the marriage. I show that such a policy gives rise to an equilibrium with higher incidence of two earner households (even when specialization is efficient) and higher spousal assortative matching in human capital, relative to the pre-reform equilibrium. This prediction is supported by empirical evidence showing that the introduction of unilateral divorce in the US (a regime that reduced the enforcement of transfers among ex-spouses) is associated with higher sorting in education, parental education, and pre-marital labor earnings among newlyweds.
“Polygamy, co-wives’ complementarities, and intra-household inequality.” Under revision.
Regulating polygamy to induce more productive investments and improve women’s rights requires anticipating changes in marital choices and welfare. I develop and estimate a novel theory of polygamy that incorporates an empirical feature previously overlooked: co-wives interact in a senior-junior hierarchy. In equilibrium, single, monogamous, and polygamous households emerge. Optimal female sorting generates co-wives inequality: high skilled women become senior wives in polygamous households with wealthy males and low skilled juniors. The estimated model reproduces the observed equilibrium. A novel policy implication is that in the absence of better outside options from marriage, banning polygamy harms all women.
Improving school quality with limited resources is a key issue of policy. It has been suggested that instructing teachers to follow specific practices together with tight monitoring of their activities may help improve outcomes in underperforming schools that usually serve poor populations. This paper uses a RCT to estimate the effectiveness of guided instruction methods as implemented in under-performing schools in Chile. The intervention improved performance substantially for some students. However, the effect is mainly accounted for by children from relatively higher income backgrounds and not for the most deprived. Based on the CLASS instrument we document that quality of teacher-student interactions is positively correlated with the performance of low income students; however, the intervention did not affect these interactions. Guided instruction can improve outcomes, but it is a challenge to sustain the impacts and to reach the most deprived children.
“Teenage risky behavior and parental supervision: the unintended consequences of multiple shifts school systems” (with Martín Rossi).
Economic Inquiry, January 2019.
We study the relationship between attending high school at night and the probability of engaging in risky behavior, such as having unsafe sex or consuming substances. To address potential endogeneity concerns we take advantage of a random assignment of high school students to daytime and night shifts in the city of Buenos Aires. Using an original survey on students attending their last year of high school, we find that girls attending high school in the evening start having sex at an earlier age and present a higher probability of getting an abortion. We find no significant differences for substance use. Our experimental approach suggests that the link between high school shift and risky behavior is causal. Results hold when we use an alternative sample of alumni. Finally, we report evidence that the lack of parental supervision is the mechanism underlying our results.
“Failing to notice? Uneven teachers’ attention to boys and girls in the classroom” (with Marina Bassi, Mercedes Mateo Diaz, & Rae Blumberg).
IZA Journal of Labor Economics, November 2018.
This paper analyzes whether teachers’ attention to boys and girls differs in low-performing schools in Chile, where large gender gaps in test scores are also observed. We coded 237 videotaped classes of fourth graders, identifying specific behaviors of teachers toward boys and girls. The results show a general imbalance in teachers’ attention and interactions favoring boys. Gender attention gap is correlated with lower scores in math for girls on Chile’s national standardized test (SIMCE). The gender attention gap was also greater in general in classrooms in which teachers had overall worse interactions with students, as measured by the Classroom Assessment Scoring System (CLASS). The evidence in this paper contributes to the discussion about whether traditional measures of teacher-student interactions really capture all that matters for learning.