Presidential Candidate Yoon Suk-Yeol campaigning in March, 2022. (Yonhap News)
Written by Austin Moon
Just this March, millions of TV screens across Korea flickered late into the night as news networks powered on with their ten-hour long broadcasts of the 20th Presidential Election of South Korea. The election was marred by especially heavy controversies surrounding possible unethical election practices of the Democratic Party of Korea, the current ruling party, and questionable conduct from the opposing People’s Power Party. Though Korean democracy would have benefited greatly from fair and civil elections, the extent of these controversies from the past few months highlighted the immense amount of public interest involved.
It would not be an overstatement to say that in the eyes of the Korean public, the 20th Presidential Election would decide the fate of the nation for decades to come. Indeed, the incredibly small voter percentage of 0.73% that allowed the People’s Power Party candidate, Yoon Seok Yul, to defeat the Democratic Party’s candidate, Lee Jae Myeong, testifies to the highly politicized and partisan nature of this particular election (N. Kim).
One particular reason behind the heated interest surrounding this election is the catastrophic state of the current housing market that formed during the term of the current President, Moon Jae In (more specific information on this can be found in the following article). In short, the Moon administration’s efforts such as strengthening loan requirements, creating regulation zones in which real estate trade is minimal, and other attempts at fine-tuning their shaky policy through more than 25 policy revisions were in vain. Rather, the 86.5% increase in housing prices during just four years of his term inevitably made the issue of stabilizing the real estate market a focal point of the election (Cho).
Interestingly, though the numbers behind their promises differed, both popular candidates Lee and Yoon seemed to agree on certain key actions that seemed to be necessary to tame the housing market. For instance, the candidates promised to lower the Comprehensive Real Estate Holdings Tax, which is the tax levied on those whose total real estate exceeds a certain amount of money in value (“Comprehensive Real Estate Holding Tax”). Though they disagreed on the method of implementation, Yoon and Lee both promised to lower other tax rates. More specifically, candidate Lee promised to legally consider even recent inheritors of properties as single-property owners under the condition that they owned one property prior to the inheritance, which comes as a relief to potential inheritors who would have faced heavy taxation (Y. Kim). On the other hand, candidate Yoon, much in line with his conservative party ideals, promised to revert certain property tax rates to match the previous administration’s. Finally, Yoon and Lee also agreed that a healthy supply of reliable housing needed to be introduced to the market, as both candidates promised large-scale housing construction projects.
The extremely close election showed that such policies which almost agreed with each other in philosophy resonated with large swathes of voters. However, as candidate Yoon has claimed victory in the election, the subtle aspects of their policies and implementation methods now carry much more significance to the Korean economy in relation to the current state of the housing market. As such, a close investigation of his specific promises are necessary.
First, Yoon promised to introduce up to 2.5 million units of housing, 1.3 million of which would be built in the “metropolitan areas” which include Seoul and the surrounding Gyeonggi province. Unlike Lee, Yoon sought to facilitate this by incentivizing the private sector through tax cuts, loosening building material-related regulations, and lubricating the bureaucratic process involved in the construction process (People’s Power Party 115).
In theory, his promise indeed has its economic strengths such as boosting the profits of construction companies. However, it is questionable whether this policy can be implemented in an area that will bring about substantial effects on the economy. More specifically, though it is very likely that 2.5 million housing units can be built, some experts deem the amount of occupied land in key metropolitan areas to be far too small to fully facilitate the amount of construction that Yoon promised (People’s Power Party 113). As such, even if President Yoon were to fulfill these promises by providing housing outside of the key metropolitan areas, it is not guaranteed that the sky-high demand for houses concentrated in the capital area will be diverted to such relatively unpopular areas of the country. After all, a key part of the housing problem was that the popular areas were saturated with already-expensive housing.
Conversely, Yoon’s other policies, such as lifting restrictions on the real estate remodeling and reconstruction industry, seem to show more promise for the Korean housing market. In his candidacy portfolio, Yoon pointed out that the Moon administration’s heightening restrictions on the remodeling industry was partially to blame for the housing prices, arguing that renewed units contribute to a significant portion of the housing supply (People’s Power Party 114). Indeed, experts quoted the lack of safe, desirable housing units in densely populated areas as one of the key reasons behind the drastic increase in prices; though the demand for housing in key metropolitan areas stayed mostly the same, the proportion of unsafe housing in the market continued to increase as the majority of units were built in the previous century. As such, provided that Yoon’s promises are not met with too much resistance, Koreans may expect to see a gradual increase of housing supply and subsequent dips in the market.
Candidate Yoon has achieved a hard-fought victory that would place him in an extraordinarily difficult position from the very beginning of his presidency. As if the state of the economy did not pose enough of a challenge for Yoon, 180 of the 300 available seats in the Korean National Assembly, the Korean equivalent of the United States Congress that abides by majority rule, are taken by the hostile People’s Power Party (Han). Given the highly contested election, it is reasonable to expect much political opposition from said party and its supporters, which could undermine the feasibility of Yoon’s policies.
But as Yoon and Lee’s similar measures to tame the housing market show, perhaps the time for the Korean populace to cast aside their political lines to show support for the necessary measures to take place has come. The “answer” is more or less clear: increase the supply of housing, lubricate the housing market by lifting restrictions and taxes on participants, and subsidize housing for those who are in immediate need of it. It is wholly understandable that people may feel dismay at the loss of their preferred political candidate. From a purely economic perspective, however, adamantly standing by highly polarized party-line politics would only make certain that there will be no reins placed on the wild housing market; the past five years should make it abundantly clear that now is the time for the government, whether it be Yoon or Lee, to intervene properly.
Cho, Tae Hyun. “[와이파일] 한국 집값이 안정적이라고요?…부동산 통계의 함정.” YTN, YTN, 3 July 2021, https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0134_202106260700020150.
“Comprehensive Real Estate Holding Tax.” Tax Dictionary, National Tax Service, 2022, https://txsi.hometax.go.kr/docs_new/customer/dictionary/wordList.jsp.
Han, Geum Bi. “민주당 180석, 무슨 일 할 수 있나.” Hankyeorae, HanKyeoRae News, 16 Apr. 2020, https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/assembly/937435.html.
Kim, Nari. “윤석열 당선의 의미와 선거 결과로 본 극복 과제들.” BBC News Korea, BBC, 10 Mar. 2022, https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-60686424.
Kim, Yeong Eun. “[그래픽] 이재명-윤석열 대선후보 부동산 공약 비교.” YNA, Yonhap News, 1 Jan. 2022, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/GYH20220102000100044.
People’s Power Party. 20th Presidential Election Promises , People’s Power Party, Seoul, Korea, 2021.