Written by: Elizabeth Dedyo
In recent decades, global fertility rates have dropped significantly, with many nations, including the United States, hitting record lows. Currently, the fertility rate most nations aim to maintain is 2.1. This means that on average every woman would bear 2.1 children—enough to replace both her and her partner—in order to keep the population stable (neither growing nor shrinking). The additional 0.1 accounts for mortality (Lewis-Kraus, 2025). When fertility rates drop below this “replacement-level”, global population growth risks entering negative territory, meaning that the number of deaths exceeds the number of births. The world’s fertility rate is projected to fall below 2.1 by 2050 (Bloom et al., 2025). It is clear that even the richest and most developed countries are currently experiencing fertility rates consistent with negative long-run population growth. Currently, the U.N.’s World Population Prospects states that the total fertility rate in the United States is 1.62, 1.03 in China, 1.46 in Germany, and 1.23 in Japan (United Nations, 2024).
When population growth declines, it can result in what economists call an “Empty Planet”. When the population gradually decreases, our planet is slowly “emptied” of people (Jones, 2020). At the same time, economic growth stalls or even turns negative as the stock of new knowledge and living standards stagnate. This can happen when low fertility rates lead to fewer workers, consumers, and savers available to help fuel the economy. When fewer young workers enter the workforce, total productivity and production decrease. Even if each worker is productive, there are simply fewer of them producing output. Innovation may also slow if the decline in fertility rates leads to fewer researchers, scientists, and entrepreneurs, resulting in fewer new ideas and knowledge to advance our planet. Additionally, low birth rates lead to rapidly aging populations, creating additional challenges surrounding social security and healthcare (Walsh, 2026).
The difficult question at hand is: How do we incentivize women to have more children? As fertility rates continue to decline in the United States specifically, the Trump administration has proposed a series of policies aimed at increasing birth rates that draw upon pronatalist ideals. Yet, I argue that these proposals fundamentally miss the point because they ignore the structural impediments in our labor markets for why people are choosing to have fewer children. Rather than relying on pronatalist incentives, policymakers should focus instead on reducing the opportunity costs associated with childbearing through policies such as affordable childcare, paid parental leave, and universal access to reproductive healthcare.
The causes often cited for people having fewer children are affordability and career interruptions—particularly for women. A 2013 poll done by Gallup found that, on average, American adults wanted 2 to 4 children; however, they feel they can barely afford to have even one (Newport and Wilke, 2013). In our current economy, rising job insecurity and the cost of housing and childcare put pressure on adults to have fewer children than they desire. Interestingly, however, wealthier and better-educated adults are also choosing not to have children, suggesting that financial costs are not the only factor. Instead, rising opportunity costs appear to be a driver in decreasing fertility rates. We currently exist in a modern economy where it is much easier to access higher education, and, as a result, young adults, particularly young women, are increasingly oriented toward long-term career goals rather than childbearing (Minkin et al., 2024). For individuals on competitive career paths, having children can be viewed as a burden on their professional advancement, as parenthood often interrupts work participation and can even reduce opportunities for promotion. Additionally, higher levels of education are associated with greater knowledge of contraception and reproductive health, as well as increased agency in family planning decisions (Pazol et al., 2015). In this sense, declining fertility rates reflect a shift in individual preferences rather than a market or government dysfunction. What can be viewed as a market dysfunction in the labor market, however, is that many career-oriented women are penalized if they do decide to have children. Women often face economic punishment for having children, such as being offered lower salaries or reduced chances of being hired at all compared to equally qualified non-mothers (Correl et al., 2007). Additionally, U.S. federal law does not require workplaces to provide paid parental leave, further exacerbating the risks of childbearing in a career-focused setting.
The Trump administration has been proposing policy ideas such as menstrual cycle-tracking classes to monitor fertility, medals of honor for those who have multiple children, and baby bonuses (Crays, 2025). These proposals, alongside the existing restrictions on contraception and abortion, are an attempt to directly increase birth rates. However, it is clear that these policy proposals do not necessarily take into account the mother’s health, socioeconomic factors, or the significant opportunity costs of raising children. Instead, these policies attempt to increase fertility by framing it as a problem of individual choice, rather than by addressing the economic and institutional structures that discourage childbearing. As I discussed above, for many women, having children requires sacrificing time, income, and career advancement because our labor market rewards devoted, uninterrupted commitment. Without reducing these opportunity costs, such pronatalist policies are unlikely to have any meaningful impact on fertility rates. Beyond this, pronatalist policies tend to favor nuclear families over nontraditional families and place pressures on the reproductive autonomy of women, reinforcing gendered expectations that frame women’s reproductive capacities as tools for achieving national goals (Delanerolle et al., 2025). Rather than addressing the structural conditions that make childbearing costly, pronatalist policies shift the responsibility onto women themselves, framing declining fertility as a failure of individual choices rather than a consequence of labor market incentives and inadequate social support.
Policies that reduce the opportunity costs of childbearing—such as affordable childcare, paid parental leave, and access to reproductive healthcare—are far more likely to influence fertility decisions than pronatalist incentives. One of the largest barriers to having children in the United States is the high cost of childcare. Because childcare is a labor-intensive industry that requires strict staff-to-child ratios, providers face high operating costs that are often passed directly onto families (Elkeurti & Miller, 2026). As a result, many parents (particularly mothers) must choose between remaining in the workforce or caring for young children. In addition, restricted access to reproductive healthcare is another barrier that disincentivizes women from childbearing. I argue that universal access to reproductive healthcare would support higher long-term fertility rates in a safer and more sustainable way, because it would give women the agency to plan the timing and spacing of pregnancies, and to have children when they are financially, physically, and professionally prepared to do so.
Other countries provide useful examples of how policy can reduce the opportunity costs of raising children. Nordic countries such as Sweden and Finland provide extensive family support, including free childcare and lengthy paid parental leave. For example, in Sweden, parents can receive 16 months of parental leave, with the first year paid at 80% of their salary. In Finland, children can attend universal daycare from around eight months of age through early childhood (Broom, 2019). Similarly, in Norway, women have universal access to reproductive healthcare, including maternal care (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Policies like these support childbearing and allow parents to temporarily step away from work without permanently sacrificing income or career advancement. By reducing the career and financial penalties associated with childbearing, these policies help individuals pursue both professional ambitions and family life, which in turn would likely have a positive impact on fertility rates. While programs such as these are expensive, on a cost-benefit basis, the long-term gains associated with higher fertility rates—sustained economic growth, innovation, and a stable future workforce—may ultimately dwarf the shorter-term financial costs.
If policymakers genuinely want to address declining fertility rates, then they must focus on reducing the actual structural barriers that discourage women from having children. Policies that make having children affordable, provide paid parental leave and access to childcare, and support reproductive autonomy do far more to influence family decisions than policies based on pronatalist incentives.
References
Asmaa Elkeurti and Claire Cain Miller. “Why Does Child Care Seem Less Affordable than Ever?” The New York Times, 5 Mar. 2026, www.nytimes.com/2026/03/05/upshot/child-care-expensive-prices.html?smid=url-share.
Broom, D. (2019, March 15). Why Nordic nations are the best places to have children. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2019/03/nordic-nations-best-places-for-parents-children/
Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a job: Is there a motherhood penalty? American Journal of Sociology, 112(5), 1297–1339. https://doi.org/10.1086/511799
Crays, A. (2025, August 26). The rise of pronatalism in the U.S.: The risks to reproductive and sexual health outcomes. O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law. https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/the-rise-of-pronatalism-in-the-u-s-the-risks-to-reproductive-and-sexual-health-outcomes/
Delanerolle, G., et al. (2025). Reproductive politics and women’s empowerment: How does geopolitics control women? Frontiers in Global Women’s Health, 6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fgwh.2025.1666773
Jones, C. I. (2020). The end of economic growth? Unintended consequences of a declining population (Working Paper No. 20-060). Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
Gideon Lewis-Kraus. “The End of Children.” The New Yorker, 24 Feb. 2025, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2025/03/03/the-population-implosion.
Minkin, R., et al. (2024, July 25). Reasons adults give for not having children. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2024/07/25/reasons-adults-give-for-not-having-children/
Newport, F. (2013, September 25). Desire for children still norm in U.S. Gallup. https://news.gallup.com/poll/164618/desire-children-norm.aspx
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Guideline Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norwegian Guidelines for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.
Pazol, K., et al. (2015, August). Impact of contraceptive education on contraceptive knowledge and decision making. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 49(2), S46–S56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amepre.2015.03.031
United Nations. (2024). Total fertility rate. Population Division Data Portal. https://population.un.org/dataportal/data/indicators/19/locations/156Walsh, R. (2026, January 6). Is the U.S. birth rate declining? Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. https://publichealth.jhu.edu/2026/is-the-us-birth-rate-declining