Author: Kumool Abbi ([email protected])
Professor at Punjab University, Chandigarh
As the major factors that dominate the Punjab election this time emerge, the core arenas of concern for Punjab perennially deal with “panthic issues” as well as “the ever present issue of regional autonomy and identity” (Jodhka 2022, 20). Thus the triumvirate of “caste, religion and region” are significant “indicators” to grapple the “political realities and trends in Punjab” (Judge 2022, 62). Both caste and class “tend to also intersect and interact with Panthic and Regional politics in locally specific ways” (Jodhka 2022, 20). There are several major caste clusters demographically represented in the Punjab profile. The Jat Sikhs, the dominant agrarian caste “who constitute approximately 19% of the population and may have an influence in 55–60 seats” (The Hindu Jan. 13, 2020). The Urban Hindu upper castes Khatris and Aroras who have traditionally dominated the trade commerce and industry of the region. Out of a Hindu population of 35.8% of the state, the Hindu SCs and OBCs comprise 11% and 8.3% of the population (Hindustan Times Feb. 18, 2021). The third major cluster relates to the scheduled castes of Punjab who are approximately 32.8% accounting for about 3% of the state’s population. They are divided in terms of their “religious and cultural identity” (Jodhka 2022, 20). The Mazhabis have a significant presence in Bhatinda, Mansa as well as Amritsar and Taran Taran. The Ramdasias are preponderant in Ropar, Moga and Faridkot districts, while the Raisikhs are a important fixture of Ferozepur, the Doaba region comprising Kapurthala, Jalandhar, Hoshiarpur, SBS Nagar is numerically dominated by the Ravidassias, Ramdasias Rehgars, Raigars (Hindustan Times April 17, 2018) to illustrate a few examples. Traditionally, the Mazhabis and the Ramdasiasa have voted for the Shiromani Akali Dal and the Balmikis and Chamars for the Congress. The fourth cluster is composed of the “Other Backward Castes” who constitute almost 31% of the state’s population but are “almost invisible in Punjab politics” (Judge 2022, 64; Jodhka 2022, 20). The factors leading to the Punjab elections “reflect a clear decline of the earlier hegemonies, particularly of the landed aristocracy of the region, which have controlled the state politics over the past five decades or so” (Jodhka 2022, 20). This churning leads to sociologically two very diverse trajectories. The resurgence and revival of the Jat Sikh spirit after the farmers agitation to be reconciled with the assertion of Dalit identity. The religious and caste arithmetic in the voting patterns of the previous elections, shows interesting trends in Punjab and would be crucial in understanding the voting pattern of significant caste groups. In terms of the CSDS data, at the time of the 2002 Punjab election the Akalis got 55% of the Jat Sikh vote, followed by Congress with 23%.
During 2007, the Akalis once again got 61% of the Jat Sikh vote and Congress received only 30%. The 2012 election saw the Akalis garnering 52% of the Jat Sikh vote while Congress followed with 31%. The 2017 election result showed a very interesting trend where the Akalis got 37% of Jat Sikh vote, followed by Congress with 28% of the vote and a new entrant, the Aam Aadmi Party, with 30% of the vote share.
The OBC Sikh data too reflects a similar trend with Congress getting 39%, 43%, 44% in the 2002, 2007, 2012 assembly elections. The Akali Dal managed to garner 32%, 43%, 46% of the OBC Sikh votes in the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections. Subsequently, the 2017 elections showed a new trend: while Congress got 37% of the vote and the SAD-BJP received 32% votes, it was the AAP which was able to garner 26% of the votes.
In terms of Hindu Dalit votes, Congress took 47%, 56% and 37% of the votes in 2002, 2007 and 2012 respectively. While the SAD-BJP took 11%, 25% and 33% of the Dalit Hindu votes in 2002, 2007 and 2012. The election of 2017 saw Congress garnering 43%, The SAD-BJP 26% and the AAP clinching 21% of the votes. In terms of Dalit Sikhs Congress got 33%, 49%, 51% of the votes during the 2002, 2007 and 2017 elections. The Akalis got 26%, 32% and 34% of the votes during the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections. The 2017 elections showed Congress lowering its share to 41%, the Akalis to 24% and The AAP with 19% of the share. This data shows the Congress Party’s endeavor to win back its Dalit Sikh votes and to reach out to the Dalit Community in general and stir up their sense of achievement.
In all these close clefts the non-Dalit Hindus too represent interesting voting patterns dependent on political exigencies. Congress won 52%, 49%and 46%of non-Dalit Hindu votes in the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections. While the SAD -BJP gathered 26%, 38%, and 36% during the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections.
The 2017 election showed the non-Dalit Hindus voting 48% for Congress, 23% for SAD-BJP and 23% for the AAP. This return to Congress fold has been seen by many analysts as a reaction and anxiety to AAPs dalliance with the radical Sikhs and a fear of revival of militancy in Punjab. This vote particularly in the urban areas would prove crucial and be of interest as it would also show the extent of non-Dalits Hindus participation and identification with the farmers movement as Aartiyas and workers have been important instruments in the struggle. Their voting pattern would reflect on the electoral fall out of the farmers’ protest. The controversy generated about the denial of the post of chief minister to Hindu Congressman Sunil Jakhar on the grounds of the party policy to give this position to a Sikh, exit of veteran leader Ashwini Kumar and the absence of Capt. Amarinder Singh are factors which could leave an impact. It is expected that the urban vote share of the BJP which had increased from 19% to 27% during the 2019 Lok Sabha election, may improve further and Congress may see a dip in its share of 45% from 2019 (based on CSDS-LOKNITI data, Indian Express, August 1, 2021; the federal.com, Sept. 21, 2021).
Congress’ plan “of coming to power only based on Dalits is difficult in Punjab as it is a State where society is multi-religious, multi-caste, and multi-cultural. Winning an election by focusing on ‘exclusivity’ is difficult in Punjab, and this is what precisely Congress is attempting here. From its traditional ‘inclusive’ oriented approach, the party has started a process to move towards adopting an ‘exclusivity’ approach, which is not very rewarding in the electoral politics of Punjab,” said analyst Pramod Kumar (The Hindu Jan. 13, 2022). Thus, whether Channi’s choice would really lead to a consolidation of the Dalit cluster “into an effective political formation and an identity” (Jodhka 2022, 21) is a matter to ponder over.
The farmers’ agitation has given a new dimension to Jat identity, pride and imagination. Seeing this zestful resurgence in the community power structure “political observers feel that a sense of uneasiness among the Jat Sikhs is bound to happen across party lines” because they see their dominance being diminished in days to come. The additional possibility of a declining agrarian dominance in politics, which “could be an unusual scenario for the single largest caste (Jat Sikh) in the state” (The Hindu Jan. 13, 2022) is also unsettling Jat Sikhs. Since Giani Zail Singh is the only Jat Sikh have become the chief Ministers in Punjab and “the community is miffed with Congress” (firstpost.com Jan. 19, 2022). It would indeed be a matter of interest how the Jat Sikhs handle their traditional system of Dhaddas (factions) in villages.
Will the “the dhaddas give way to a broader caste coalition spread over a geographical spread or would a caste and class coalescence take place.” Certainly, “countermobilization by the Jats” could be detrimental to different caste players emerging on the scene. The AAP, which has been quick to declare Bhagwant Mann a Jat Sikh as its chief ministerial candidate, is hoping to wrest “Jat Sikh vote from Congress which secured 30% of Jat Sikh votes in 2017 as compared to 28% of the AAP” (www.firstpost.com Jan. 19, 2022). Similarly, there are approximately 45 seats in urban areas where upper caste Hindus may have a decisive role (The Hindu Jan. 13, 2022). The way they would vote becomes significant in the light of the Congress Party’s tilt towards “asserting the party’s Sikh identity” (The Hindustan Times Feb. 18, 2022).
It is felt that the more parties in the poll fray they may affect vote share of all and the results may almost be a cliffhanger in different constituencies (Times of India Jan. 9, 2021). While the “SSM is poised to garner enough votes to disrupt the status quo and out of the 117 assembly seats, they are bound to impact the electoral fortunes of traditional Parties in almost 77 seats” (Bazz.com) a similar situation of “spoilers” applies to the PLC combine.
Though the SSM may not taste electoral success, the farmers protest movement has left a deep impact on political parties, their agenda and voters’ preferences as well as it has changed the political consciousness of the voters. What impact this broadening of vision and diluting of traditional boundaries of caste, region and religion will have on voting preferences is the million-dollar question and will determine the ultimate outcome of the elections.