Published Articles

How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba.” Forthcoming in Homo Oeconomicus. 2018

“Back to the Pinochet Constitution.” Forthcoming in Política y Gobierno. 2018.

“Jugadores de veto y cambio constitucional¿ Se puede desbloquear la Constitución de Pinochet?/Veto Players and Constitutional Change: Can Pinochet’s Constitution Be Unlocked?”. 2017.  Política y gobierno25(1).

The Time Inconsistency of Long Constitutions.” 2017. Summer Bulletin of American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The Time Inconsistency of Long Constitutions: Evidence from the World.” 2017. European Journal of Political Research. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12206.

“Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform.” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica:1–18

“Lessons from the Greek crisis” Journal of European Public Policy 2015, 1-17. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1087215

“A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries” (with Dominic J. Nardi, Jr.) 2014. British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123414000441

“The Greek Constitution From a Political Science Point of View”. Greek Political Science Review 2014 (July; 42): 145-72.

“Suspending Vetoes: How the Euro Countries Achieved Unanimity in the Fiscal Compact” (June 2014 with Hyeonho Hahm) Journal of European Public Policy. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.929167.

“Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach” (with EunYoung Ha) European Political Science Review, available on CJO2013. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773913000106.

“Bridging Qualified Majority and Unanimity Decisionmaking in The EU” (long version of article published in JEPP 2013 (8):1083-1103)

“Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas” (with E. Aleman) Journal of Politics in Latin America 3 (1): 3-28 May 2011

“Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the EU” JCMS lecture. Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (2): 265-292

“Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics.” In Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler, 2009.  (pp. 13-24).

“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries” (with T. Rizova) Comparative Political Studies 40 (10): 1155-82

“The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention” (with S.O. Proksch) Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (1): 157-86

“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America” (with E. Aleman) World Politics 57 (3): 396-420

“The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Proposal, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A Veto Players Analysis” (December 2005 with X. Yataganas) European Constitutional Law Review 1 (3): 429-51

“Assessing the Contributions of the DOSEI Project” European Union Politics 6(3): 377-90 (October 2005)

“The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America” (June 2005 with E. Aleman) Latin American Research Review Vol. 40 (2 ): 3-26

“Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries” (May 2004 with Eric Chang) European Journal of Political Research 43 (3): 449-76

“Veto Players and Referendums around the World” (Oct. 2002, with S. Hug) Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (4): 465-516

“Veto Players and Decisionmaking in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Judicial/Bureaucratic Discretion” (June 2002 with X. Yataganas) Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 283-308

“Understanding Better the EU Legislative Process” (Oct. 2001 with G. Garrett) European Union Politics 2(3): 353-61

“Legislative Procedures in the EU: An Empirical Analysis” (Sep. 2001 with C. Jensen, A. Kalandrakis, and A. Kreppel) British Journal of Political Science 31: 573-99

“Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (Jan 2001 with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(1): 99-105

“The Institutional Determinants of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU” (Spring 2001 with G. Garrett) International Organization 55(2): 357-90

“Veto Players and Institutional Analysis ” (Oct. 2000) Governance 13: 441-74

“Legislative Procedures in the European Union” (Feb. 2000, with G. Garrett) European Union Politics 1: 9-36

“More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (1999, with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (3): 331-38

“Why Resist the Temptation of Applying Power Indices in the EU” (1999, with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (3): 291-308

“Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis” American Political Science Review 93 (Sept. 1999): 591-608

“European Parliament and Environmental Legislation: The Case of Chemicals” (1999, with A. Kalandrakis) European Journal of Political Research 36 (1): 119-154

“Coalition Formation in the European Parliament” (1999, with A. Kreppel) Comparative Political Studies 32(8): 933-66

“The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in European Institutions” (1998, with A. Kreppel) European Journal of Political Research 33: 41-71

“More on Codecision” (1997, with G. Garrett) Journal of Legislative Studies 3: 139-43

“Rational Choice and Culture” (1997) Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics

“Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit” (1997) Aussenvirtschaft 52: 29-56

“Agenda Setting, Vetoes, and the EU’s Codecision Procedure” (1997, with G. Garrett) Journal of Legislative Studies 3: 74-92

“An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism” (Spring 1996, with G. Garrett) International Organization 50: 269-99

“Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices and Decision Making in the European Union” (1996, with G. Garrett) International Review of Law and Economics 16: 345-61

“More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter” (Dec. 1996) American Political Science Review 90: 839-44

“The Political Power of the French Senate: Micromechanisms of Bicameral Negotiations” (Sum. 1995, with J. Money) Journ. of Leg. Studies 1:192-217

“Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament” (Spring 1995) Journ. of Leg. Studies 1: 65-93

“Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France” (Jan. 1995, with J. Money) British Journal of Political Science 25: 101-29

“Another Response to Gordon Tullock” (Jan. 1995) Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 97-99

“Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism” (July 1995) British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-326

“Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective” (Dec. 1994, with R. Stephen) Political Research Quarterly 46: 793-820.

“The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter” (March 1994) American Political Science Review 88:128-42

“Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence” (June 1993) Journal of Theoretical Politics 5: 349-74

“Response to Thomas Mayer” (Apr. 1991) Rationality and Society 3: 269-71

“Cicero’s Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective” (Feb. 1992 with J. Money) International Political Science Review 13: 25-43

“The Effects of Fines on Regulated Industries: Game Theory vs. Decision Theory” (Jan. 1991) Journal of Theoretical Politics 3: 81-101

“Response to Gordon Tullock” (Jan. 1991) Rationality and Society 3: 144-47

“Response to Anatol Rapoport” (Oct. 1990) Rationality and Society 2: 512-6

“Penalty Has No Impact on Crime: A Game Theoretic Analysis” (July 1990) Rationality and Society 2: 255-86

“Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?” (Controversy with W. Bianco and P. Ordeshook June 1990) American Political Science Review 84: 569-86

“Are Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis” (March 1990) Journal of Conflict Resolution 34: 3-28

“Elite Interaction and Institution-Building in Consociational Democracies” (Jan. 1990) Journal of Theoretical Politics 2: 5-29

“Coercion and Revolution: Variations on a Predator-Prey Model” (May 1989, with J. Sprague) Mathematical and Computer Modelling 12:547-60

“The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy” (March 1989) American Political Science Review 83: 77–91

“When Do Allies Become Rivals?” (Jan. 1988) Comp. Politics 20: 233-40

“Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions” (April 1988) British Journal of Political Science 18: 145-70

“Book Review: Making Sense of Marx, by Jon Elster” (December 1986) American Political Science Review: 1320-1322.

“A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting” (July 1986) British Journal of Political Science 16: 395-404

“Note on Przeworski and Wallerstein” (Sept. 1984) American Political Science Review 78: 785-87