Published Articles

“Can the Dutch Electoral System be Improved Upon?” (With Jesse Crosson) 2020. Munich Social Sciences Review, 3.

“How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba.” 2018. Homo Oeconomicus35(1-2), 81-90.

“Back to the Pinochet Constitution.” 2018. “Back to the Pinochet Constitution: A Response”. Política y gobierno25(2).

“Jugadores de veto y cambio constitucional¿ Se puede desbloquear la Constitución de Pinochet?/Veto Players and Constitutional Change: Can Pinochet’s Constitution Be Unlocked?”. 2017.  Política y gobierno25(1).

The Time Inconsistency of Long Constitutions.” 2017. Summer Bulletin of American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The Time Inconsistency of Long Constitutions: Evidence from the World.” 2017. European Journal of Political Research. DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.12206.

“Compromesso astorico: the role of the Senate after the Italian constitutional reform.” Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica:1–18

“Lessons from the Greek crisis” Journal of European Public Policy 2015, 1-17. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1087215

“A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries” (with Dominic J. Nardi, Jr.) 2014. British Journal of Political Science. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123414000441

“The Greek Constitution From a Political Science Point of View”. Greek Political Science Review 2014 (July; 42): 145-72.

“Suspending Vetoes: How the Euro Countries Achieved Unanimity in the Fiscal Compact” (June 2014 with Hyeonho Hahm) Journal of European Public Policy. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2014.929167.

“Coalition Theory: A Veto Players Approach” (with EunYoung Ha) European Political Science Review, available on CJO2013. DOI: 10.1017/S1755773913000106.

“Bridging Qualified Majority and Unanimity Decisionmaking in The EU” (long version of article published in JEPP 2013 (8):1083-1103)

“Political Parties and Government Coalitions in the Americas” (with E. Aleman) Journal of Politics in Latin America 3 (1): 3-28 May 2011

“Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the EU” JCMS lecture. Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (2): 265-292

“Agenda Setting and Executive Dominance in Politics.” In Parlamente, Agendasetzung und Vetospieler, 2009.  (pp. 13-24).

“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries” (with T. Rizova) Comparative Political Studies 40 (10): 1155-82

“The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention” (with S.O. Proksch) Journal of Common Market Studies 45 (1): 157-86

“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America” (with E. Aleman) World Politics 57 (3): 396-420

“The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Proposal, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A Veto Players Analysis” (December 2005 with X. Yataganas) European Constitutional Law Review 1 (3): 429-51

“Assessing the Contributions of the DOSEI Project” European Union Politics 6(3): 377-90 (October 2005)

“The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America” (June 2005 with E. Aleman) Latin American Research Review Vol. 40 (2 ): 3-26

“Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries” (May 2004 with Eric Chang) European Journal of Political Research 43 (3): 449-76

“Veto Players and Referendums around the World” (Oct. 2002, with S. Hug) Journal of Theoretical Politics 14 (4): 465-516

“Veto Players and Decisionmaking in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Judicial/Bureaucratic Discretion” (June 2002 with X. Yataganas) Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 283-308

“Understanding Better the EU Legislative Process” (Oct. 2001 with G. Garrett) European Union Politics 2(3): 353-61

“Legislative Procedures in the EU: An Empirical Analysis” (Sep. 2001 with C. Jensen, A. Kalandrakis, and A. Kreppel) British Journal of Political Science 31: 573-99

“Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (Jan 2001 with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(1): 99-105

“The Institutional Determinants of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU” (Spring 2001 with G. Garrett) International Organization 55(2): 357-90

“Veto Players and Institutional Analysis ” (Oct. 2000) Governance 13: 441-74

“Legislative Procedures in the European Union” (Feb. 2000, with G. Garrett) European Union Politics 1: 9-36

“More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (1999, with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (3): 331-38

“Why Resist the Temptation of Applying Power Indices in the EU” (1999, with G. Garrett) Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (3): 291-308

“Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis” American Political Science Review 93 (Sept. 1999): 591-608

“European Parliament and Environmental Legislation: The Case of Chemicals” (1999, with A. Kalandrakis) European Journal of Political Research 36 (1): 119-154

“Coalition Formation in the European Parliament” (1999, with A. Kreppel) Comparative Political Studies 32(8): 933-66

“The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in European Institutions” (1998, with A. Kreppel) European Journal of Political Research 33: 41-71

“More on Codecision” (1997, with G. Garrett) Journal of Legislative Studies 3: 139-43

“Rational Choice and Culture” (1997) Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics

“Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit” (1997) Aussenvirtschaft 52: 29-56

“Agenda Setting, Vetoes, and the EU’s Codecision Procedure” (1997, with G. Garrett) Journal of Legislative Studies 3: 74-92

“An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism” (Spring 1996, with G. Garrett) International Organization 50: 269-99

“Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices and Decision Making in the European Union” (1996, with G. Garrett) International Review of Law and Economics 16: 345-61

“More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter” (Dec. 1996) American Political Science Review 90: 839-44

“The Political Power of the French Senate: Micromechanisms of Bicameral Negotiations” (Sum. 1995, with J. Money) Journ. of Leg. Studies 1:192-217

“Conditional Agenda-Setting and Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament” (Spring 1995) Journ. of Leg. Studies 1: 65-93

“Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France” (Jan. 1995, with J. Money) British Journal of Political Science 25: 101-29

“Another Response to Gordon Tullock” (Jan. 1995) Journal of Theoretical Politics 7: 97-99

“Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism” (July 1995) British Journal of Political Science 25: 289-326

“Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective” (Dec. 1994, with R. Stephen) Political Research Quarterly 46: 793-820.

“The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter” (March 1994) American Political Science Review 88:128-42

“Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence” (June 1993) Journal of Theoretical Politics 5: 349-74

“Response to Thomas Mayer” (Apr. 1991) Rationality and Society 3: 269-71

“Cicero’s Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective” (Feb. 1992 with J. Money) International Political Science Review 13: 25-43

“The Effects of Fines on Regulated Industries: Game Theory vs. Decision Theory” (Jan. 1991) Journal of Theoretical Politics 3: 81-101

“Response to Gordon Tullock” (Jan. 1991) Rationality and Society 3: 144-47

“Response to Anatol Rapoport” (Oct. 1990) Rationality and Society 2: 512-6

“Penalty Has No Impact on Crime: A Game Theoretic Analysis” (July 1990) Rationality and Society 2: 255-86

“Crime and Punishment: Are One-Shot, Two-Person Games Enough?” (Controversy with W. Bianco and P. Ordeshook June 1990) American Political Science Review 84: 569-86

“Are Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis” (March 1990) Journal of Conflict Resolution 34: 3-28

“Elite Interaction and Institution-Building in Consociational Democracies” (Jan. 1990) Journal of Theoretical Politics 2: 5-29

“Coercion and Revolution: Variations on a Predator-Prey Model” (May 1989, with J. Sprague) Mathematical and Computer Modelling 12:547-60

“The Abuse of Probability in Political Analysis: The Robinson Crusoe Fallacy” (March 1989) American Political Science Review 83: 77–91

“When Do Allies Become Rivals?” (Jan. 1988) Comp. Politics 20: 233-40

“Nested Games: The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions” (April 1988) British Journal of Political Science 18: 145-70

“Book Review: Making Sense of Marx, by Jon Elster” (December 1986) American Political Science Review: 1320-1322.

“A General Model of Tactical and Inverse Tactical Voting” (July 1986) British Journal of Political Science 16: 395-404

“Note on Przeworski and Wallerstein” (Sept. 1984) American Political Science Review 78: 785-87