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“Suspending Vetoes: How the Euro Countries Achieved Unanimity in the Fiscal Compact.” (with Hyeonho Hahm) 2014. Journal of European Public Policy 21(10), 1388-1411. DOI:10.1080/13501763.2014.929167.
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“Introduction”, “Conclusions” (with Bjørn Erik Rasch) 2010. In B.E. Rasch & G. Tsebelis (Eds.), The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting (pp. 1-20, 270-273). Routledge. DOI:10.4324/9780203837429.
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“Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the EU” 2008. JCMS lecture. Journal of Common Market Studies 46(2), 265-292. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00788.x.
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“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in the Former Communist Countries”(with T. Rizova) 2007. Comparative Political Studies 40(10), 1155-82. DOI:10.1177/0010414006288979.
“The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention”(with S.O. Proksch) 2007. Journal of Common Market Studies 45(1), 157-86. DOI:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00707.x.
“The European Convention and the Rome and Brussels IGCs: A Veto Players Analysis” 2005. In T. König & S. Hug (Eds.), Policy-Making Processes and the European Constitution. A Comparative Study of Member States and Accession Countries (pp. 9-22). ECPR/Routledge. DOI:10.4324/9780203965801.
“Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin America” (with E. Aleman) 2005. World Politics 57(3), 396-420. DOI:10.1353/wp.2006.0005.
“The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Proposal, and the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: A Veto Players Analysis”(with X. Yataganas) 2005. European Constitutional Law Review 1(3), 429-51. DOI:10.1017/S1574019605004293.
“Assessing the Contributions of the DOSEI Project” 2005. European Union Politics 6(3), 377-90. DOI:10.1177/1465116505054838.
“The Origins of Presidential Conditional Agenda-Setting Power in Latin America” (with E. Aleman) 2005. Latin American Research Review 40(2), 3-26. DOI:10.1353/lar.2005.0017.
“Institutional Analyses of the EU” 2004. In C. Lequesne & Yves Surel (Eds.), European integration between institutionalization and reconversion of the State (pp. 117-41). Presses des Sciences Politiques. DOI:10.3917/scpo.leques.2004.01.0117.
“Veto Players and the Structure of Budgets in Advanced Industrialized Countries” (with Eric Chang) 2004. European Journal of Political Research 43(3), 449-76. DOI:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00161.x.
“Federalism and Veto Players” 2002. In U. Wagschal & H. Rentsch (Eds.), Der Preis des Föderalismus (pp. 295-318). Orell Füssli.
“Veto Players and Referendums around the World” (with S. Hug) 2002. Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4), 465-516. DOI:10.1177/095169280201400404.
“Veto Players and Decisionmaking in the EU after Nice: Policy Stability and Judicial/Bureaucratic Discretion” (with X. Yataganas) 2002. Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2): 283-308. DOI:10.1111/1468-5965.00355.
“Understanding Better the EU Legislative Process” (with G. Garrett) 2001. European Union Politics 2(3), 353-61. DOI:10.1177/1465116501002003005.
“Legislative Procedures in the EU: An Empirical Analysis” (with C. Jensen, A. Kalandrakis, & A. Kreppel) 2001. British Journal of Political Science 31(4), 573-99. DOI:10.1017/S0007123401000229.
“Even More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (with G. Garrett) 2001. Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(1), 99-105. DOI:10.1177/0951692801013001005.
“The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the EU” (with G. Garrett) 2001. International Organization 55(2), 357-90. DOI:10.1162/00208180151140603.
“Veto Players and Institutional Analysis ” 2000. Governance 13(4), 441-74. DOI:10.1111/0952-1895.00141.
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“Maastricht and the Democratic Deficit” 2000. In P. Moser, G. Schneider, & G. Kirchgässner (Eds.), Decision Rules in the European Union (pp. 16-47). DOI:10.1007/978-1-349-62792-9_2.
“More Reasons to Resist the Temptation of Power Indices in the EU” (with G. Garrett) 1999. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 331-38. DOI:10.1177/0951692899011003004.
“Why Resist the Temptation of Applying Power Indices in the EU” (with G. Garrett) 1999. Journal of Theoretical Politics 11(3), 291-308. DOI:10.1177/0951692899011003001.
“Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Analysis” 1999. American Political Science Review 93(3), 591-608. DOI:10.2307/2585576.
“European Parliament and Environmental Legislation: The Case of Chemicals” (with A. Kalandrakis) 1999. European Journal of Political Research 36(1), 119-154. DOI:10.1111/1475-6765.00465.
“Coalition Formation in the European Parliament” (with A. Kreppel) 1999. Comparative Political Studies 32(8), 933-66. DOI:10.1177/0010414099032008002.
“The History of Conditional Agenda Setting in European Institutions” (with A. Kreppel) 1998. European Journal of Political Research 33(1), 41-71. DOI:10.1023/A:1006830805044.
“More on the Co-Decision Endgame” (with G. Garrett) 1997. Journal of Legislative Studies 3(4), 139-43. DOI:10.1080/13572339708420533.
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“Agenda Setting, Vetoes, and the EU’s Codecision Procedure” (with G. Garrett) 1997. Journal of Legislative Studies 3(3), 74-92. DOI:10.1080/13572339708420519.
“An Institutional Critique of Intergovernmentalism” (with G. Garrett) 1996. International Organization 50(2), 269-99. DOI:10.1017/S0020818300028563.
“Agenda Setting Power, Power Indices and Decision Making in the European Union” (with G. Garrett) 1996. International Review of Law and Economics 16(3), 345-61. DOI:10.1016/0144-8188(96)00021-X.
“More on the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda Setter” 1996. American Political Science Review 90(4), 839-44. DOI:10.2307/2945847.
“Decisionmaking Inside the European Parliament” 1995. In B. Eichengreen, J. Frieden, & J. von Hagen (Eds.), Politics and Institutions in an Integrated Europe (pp. 42-64). Springer. DOI:10.1007/978-3-642-57811-3_3.
“Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies” 1995. In H. Doering (Ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe: Majority Rule and Minority Rights (pp. 83-111). St. Martin’s Press.
“Patterns of Bicameralism” (with B.E. Rasch) 1995. In H. Doering (Ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe: Majority Rule and Minority Rights (pp. 365-90). St. Martin’s Press.
“Strikes Around the World: A Game Theoretic Approach” (with P. Lange). 1995. In S. Jacoby (Ed.), The Workers of Nations: Industrial Relations in a Global Economy (pp. 101-26). Oxford UP.
“The Political Power of the French Senate: Micromechanisms of Bicameral Negotiations” (with J. Money) 1995. Journal of Legislative Studies 1(2), 192-217. DOI:10.1080/13572339508420425.
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“Bicameral Negotiations: The Navette System in France” (with J. Money) 1995. British Journal of Political Science 25(1), 101-29. DOI:10.1017/S0007123400007080.
“Another Response to Gordon Tullock” 1995. Journal of Theoretical Politics 7(1), 97-99. DOI:10.1177/0951692895007001006.
“Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism” 1995. British Journal of Political Science 25(3), 289-326. DOI:10.1017/S0007123400007225.
“Wages, Strikes, and Power: An Equilibrium Analysis” (with P. Lange) 1994. In J. Booth, P. James, & H. Meadwell (Eds.), Politics and Rationality (pp. 132-64). Cambridge UP.
“Monitoring Unemployment Benefits in Comparative Perspective” (with R. Stephen) 1994. Political Research Quarterly 46(4), 793-820. DOI:10.1177/106591299404700401.
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“Penalty and Crime: Further Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence” 1993. Journal of Theoretical Politics 5(3), 349-74. DOI:10.1177/0951692893005003003.
“Cicero’s Puzzle: Upper House Power in Comparative Perspective” (with J. Money) 1992. International Political Science Review 13(1), 25-43. DOI:10.1177/019251219201300103.
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“Are Sanctions Effective? A Game Theoretic Analysis” 1990. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34(1), 3-28. DOI:10.1177/0022002790034001001.
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